1928 Polish parliamentary election

Parliamentary elections were held in Poland on 4 March 1928, with Senate elections held a week later on 11 March. The Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government, a coalition of the Sanation faction - won the highest number of seats in the Sejm (125 out of 444) and 48 out of 111 in the Senate–in both cases, short of a majority. Unlike latter elections during the Sanation era, opposition parties were allowed to campaign with only a few hindrances, and also gained a significant number of seats. The 1928 election is often considered the last fully free election in the Second Polish Republic.

Background
The 1928 elections were the first elections after Józef Piłsudski's May Coup in 1926. Thirty-four parties took part in the 1928 elections. Piłsudski was supported by the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (BBWR) led by Walery Sławek, which campaigned for a more authoritative government, declaring its total support for Piłsudski and proclaiming itself to be a patriotic, non-partisan and pro-government formation. Other factions in contemporary Polish politics and their primary parties included: the Left, consisting of the Polish Socialist Party of Ignacy Daszyński; the Communist Party, two Polish People's Party factions (the Polish People's Party "Wyzwolenie" of Jan Woźnicki and Stronnictwo Chłopskie of Jan Dąbski); the Right (endecja, represented by the Popular National Union of Stanisław Głąbiński); the Center, composed of the PSL faction, Christian Democracy of Wojciech Korfanty and the National Workers' Party of Adam Chadzyński; and finally, the Minorities, represented by the Bloc of National Minorities.

The government applied much pressure to ensure victory for its candidates. Propaganda media were distributed, Sanation supporters tried to break up opposition rallies and some opposition lists and candidates were declared invalid by ostensibly neutral government institutions. Pressure was put on state employees to vote for the BBWR and to participate in its electoral campaign. Public funds were diverted to the BBWR, which had ready use of government facilities.

Despite these irregularities, opposition parties were still able to campaign and put forward candidates, and the results were not falsified. For these reasons, the 1928 election is reckoned as the last even partially free election held during the Second Polish Republic, and the last free elections of any sort held in Poland until 1989 (or 1991). The last three elections held before World War II were all rigged in favour of the Sanation forces (the BBWR in 1930 and 1935, the Camp of National Unity in 1938). By the time of the first elections after the return of peace, in 1947, a Communist regime was rapidly consolidating.

Ethnoreligious voting analysis
According to Kopstein and Wittenberg, 45% of the majority Catholic population voted for non-revolutionary left-wing parties, 16% for the Pro-Pilsudski bloc and 15% for right-wing parties.

The 1928 vote has been studied in relation to the Zydokomuna narrative which portrays the major ethnic minority blocs of Jews as well as Ukrainians and Belarusians as fifth columns and reservoirs of communist support. After the 1921 these minorities were totally excluded from cabinet positions and parties self-identifying as "Polish" refused to form governments with minority interest parties although they had captured 24% of the vote together in 1922, which among other factors led to ethnic polarization. Elements of Poland's pre-1918 political elite had discussed the creation of a federal arrangement with regional autonomy for minorities, but after 1922 these plans were scrapped in favor of a unitary state with "less than adequate protection of cultural and education rights for the countries Germans, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Jews". Soviet propaganda tried to convince Belarusians, Ukrainians and Jews that their cultures and national aspirations could be better protected within the Soviet state.

However, the response to this Soviet overture varied between Ukrainian Uniates, Ukrainian Orthodox, Belarusian Orthodox, and Jews. All four groups, according to analysis by Kopstein and Wittenberg, faced the problem of how best to react to a centralizing and nationalizing state which at various points pursued policies of either accommodation, assimilation or discrimination, with the response of the minorities varying between attempts at "exiting" the state, trying to persuade the state to change its behavior, or by asserting loyalty to the state.Kopstein, Jeffrey S., and Jason Wittenberg. "Who voted communist? Reconsidering the social bases of radicalism in interwar Poland." Slavic Review 62.1 (2003): 87-109. Quote is commented. <!--Page 93:"Who Voted Communist? 93 In fact, however, all three policies?accommodation, assimilation, and discrimination?were pursued at different times and with different inten- sity.20 The nationalities problem was not easy in Poland. Germans found it distasteful to be ruled by a group they considered their cultural inferiors. From the outset, many Ukrainians, having been denied their own state by the Versailles powers and offered only a simulacrum of autonomy in the Soviet Union, rejected the Polish state altogether. A fanatical fraction turned to terrorism and sabotage, provoking a repressive response from Warsaw. Belarusans, by contrast, did not have as well developed a sense of national identity as either Ukrainians or Germans, but they too began to consolidate a group consciousness under the pressure ofthe Polonization emanating from Warsaw and the allure of potential autonomy offered by their co-nationals across the new border with the Soviet Union... ification. Asking someone if he or she were a member of the Polish nation, as in 1921, or if his or her mother tongue were Polish, as in 1931, was not necessarily the best way to get at group identification. Many Jews, as demonstrated by the differences in the totals for "Jewish nationality" and 'Jewish religion" in 1921, must have given their nationality as Polish. The same applies to the different totals for mother tongue and religion.... According to Horak's account, which is sympathetic to the Ukrainian national cause, by spring 1923 "the majority of [the] Galician-Ukrainian population [had] resigned themselves to Polish supremacy. The Ukrainian political parties decided to continue the struggle for national rights on the floor the Sejm and to stress the desire for independence."... 101: "Indeed, the fact that virtually every district is beneath the line indicates that even if the communist parties drew their entire vote From Ukrainians, the vast majority of Ukrainians were supporting other parties" 102: "The predominance of eastern districts among the largest communist supporters points to the Belarusans as the other reservoir of communist votes. Significantly, three of the most Jewish municipalities in Poland, Lwow (4 percent communist support, 35 percent Jewish), Warsaw (14 percent communist support, 33 percent Jewish), and Wilno (5 percent com? munist support, 36 percent Jewish), fall below the diagonal. For compar? ison with the minorities, the pattern of communist support in Catholic areas for all of Poland is displayed in the bottom left panel. There is little correlation between the presence of Catholics and the communist vote, with anticommunism particularly strong in the homogeneous Catholic districts at the lower right part of the panel. The one obvious exception, B^dzin (41 percent communist support, 86 percent Catholic), is an over- whelmingly working-class district.... upport for minority parties varies much more widely across ethnic groups than it did in 1922. These parties claimed only about one-fifth of Orthodox support but received nearly three-quarters ofthe (Galician) Ukrainian vote. Support for the pro-government bloc is almost as disparate, with somewhat fewer than a third of the Ukrainians and nearly half ofthe Jews casting their vote for Pilsudski." 103: "Support For the nonrevolutionary leFt among Orthodox voters dropped From 37 percent in 1922 to only 4 percent in 1928. x voters. This high level oF communist support among the Orthodox is particularly striking in view oFthe 8 percent support they gave in 1922. A number oF reasons may explain why a large proportion oF Orthodox Belarusans supported the communists by 1928. First, there was systematic discrimination in the eastern parts oF Poland. Since the eastern territories were densely populated with minorities, the Polish state attempted to exclude these areas From Full political participation, fearing they would capture power proportionate to their population. Second, by 1928, the Soviet Union was actively backing separatism among the Orthodox Belarusans in eastern Poland and the Polish communists at the time were largely pro-Soviet. The Belarusans did not have a well-developed national movement at the tiem and thus could have reasonably preferred the pro-Soviet communist party, with its promise of autonomy within the Soviet Union... a population comprisedprimarily of [sic] Orthodox peasants, egven if still prenational in orientation, ultimately felt some affinity for their east Slavic co-religionists in the Soviet Union. How much oF the Orthodox communist vote in 1928 was Belarusan? In a number oF areas oF Polesia and Volhynia that were overwhelmingly inhabited by Orthodox Ukrainians, communist parties, especially the Ukrainian Sel-Rob LeFt, received strong electoral support in 1928. On average, these parties received 25 percent oF the vote in the six predominantly Orthodox Ukrainian districts in eastern Poland where they ran in 1928, below what we have estimated the Orthodox vote For the communists as a whole to be, but far above the estimated communist vote among Uniate Ukrainians... the vote for the communists among Belarusans was probably higher than our estimated 44 percent for Orthodox voters as a whole (because the communist vote among Orthodox Ukrainians was certainly a good deal less than this number)... we can saFely say that the dramatic shiFt over time in Orthodox support From minority parties to the communists is evidence that the combination of Polish discrimination and Soviet interference... succeeded in radicalizing Belarusan politics." 104: "Whereas Belarusans had lived in the socially and politically backward Russian empire, the Uniate Ukrainians were from the considerably more developed Austro-Hungarian empire and had a far more developed national movement than the Belarusans or even their Orthodox co-nationals.44 Whereas Orthodox Belarusans or Ukrainians could view Russians as their cultural and political equals, by 1928 Uniate Ukrainians probably looked upon a potential unification with the Soviet Union with more distaste than they viewed remaining within a discrimi- natory Poland. The Ukrainians were, to be sure, unhappy with their treatment by the Polish state... But whereas the Belarusans chose to regis- ter their dissatisfaction by voting communist, the more nationally self- conscious Ukrainians became strong supporters of their national parties in the minorities' bloc." 104-105: "The biggest surprise is the political behavior of the Jews. As we men- tioned in the introduction, there is a myth in Poland that, more than any other minority, the Jews were (and are) the bulwarks of communism at the mass level, and that even if not all Jews were communists, at least all com? munists were probably Jews... Only 7 percent of Jewish voters supported the communists in 1928. Thus, even at the height of the communist appeal?before Iosif Stalin estab? lished absolute power and Marxism became equated in the popular mind with terror?fewer than 10 percent ofthe Jews voted communist. This es? timate remains fairly uniform across regions and represents less than one- fifth the level of support the Orthodox gave the communists. Along with the nonrevolutionary left and the nationalist right, the communist bloc was the Jews' least favorite politial grouping.... For Poland as a whole roughly 14 percent of the communist vote came from Jews. By contrast, again for Poland as a whole, 18 percent of the communist vote came from Catholics... Related to the myth of the "Jewish communist" is the perception that the Jews of Poland resisted integrating themselves into Polish political life, that they lived in the Polish state but were not ofit. Our data tell a differ? ent story. The proportion of Jewish voters supporting minority parties fell from roughly two-thirds in 1922 to one-third in 1928. Moreover, 49 per? cent of Jews voted for Pilsudski's pro-government bloc in 1928. Even in the face of both public and private prejudice, the Jews were showing their willingness to integrate themselves politically into Polish society. Indeed, as the vote for the pro-government bloc in table 3 illustrates, in propor- tional terms the Jews provided greater support than any other ethnic group for "the establishment... es! A conventional interpretation of these numbers would emphasize that so many Jews voted for Pilsudski because they viewed him as a protector in an atmosphere of increasing na? tional tensions. This may be true. An alternative interpretation, however, is that a good number of Pilsudski's Jewish supporters wanted to integrate themselves into Polish polities, if they were not excluded by definition" 105-106: "As cultural minorities within a unitary Poland, Belarusans, Ukraini? ans, and Jews were confronted with a dilemma about their future. How gbest to react to a "nationalizing" state? ... well-known triad of "exit, voice and loyalty"... with poorly perForming "firms" and "states." First, dissatisfied consumers or citizens may abandon the firm or state in Favor oF another? the "exit" strategy. Second, they may ofFer their opinion and try to get the firm or state to change its behavior without abandoning it altogether, which Hirschman summarizes under the rubric oF "voice." Third, under certain circumstances, dissatisfied consumers or citizens will continue to support a firm or state, especially iF either has some intrinsic value, a strat? egy that Hirschman labeled "loyalty". lthough the Belarusans, Ukrainians, and Jews cannot be said to have pursued any oF these strategies exclusively, the evidence presented here shows that between 1922 and 1928 one strategy increasingly dominated each group's political behavior. In the six years between the two elections, Poland's Belarusans opted largely For revolutionary communism, the ulti? mate "exit" strategy in that it ofFered both an exit From Poland and From international capitalism ... within the Polish state. Ukrainians, by contrast, had Few compelling options. Unwilling to choose the revolutionary international- ism oF the Soviet Union or the assimilating nationalism oF Poland, the Ukrainians turned increasingly to the "voice" oFethno-nationalist politics. Finally, the Jews, when ofFered a modicum oF acceptance, were ready to show their loyalty to the Polish state in increasing numbers... Our research has shown that the idea oF the "Jewish communist" is a myth at the mass level. Roughly 93 percent oF Jewish voters supported noncommunist parties in 1928, and only around 14 percent oFthe com? munists' electoral support came From Jews... Most Jews were thus politically neither "internationalist" nor ethnically ex- clusionary, as a large vote For the minority parties in 1928 would have in- dicated. Rather they were casting their lot with the Polish state."-->



The combination of discrimination, Soviet interference, and the lack of a prior national movement radicalized Belarusian politics such that support for centre-left and minority interest parties gave way to the heaviest support for communists. Overall the 44% of the Orthodox vote that went to communists is estimated to also have included the Ukrainian Orthodox, who based on data from Volhynia and Polesia are estimated to have yielded 25% of their vote to communist parties, meaning the Belarusian level of support must have been higher than 44%. On the other hand, Uniate Ukrainians and Jews were mostly unconvinced by Soviet overtures. The Uniates instead held to minority interest parties. Among the Jewish population, support for minority parties fell from 65% in 1922 to 33%, while a plurality of Jews voted for Pilsudski's bloc. Despite the prevalent "Judeo-communist" myth, and although Jews were prominent in the leadership of communist institutions, 93% of Jews did not support communists at "the height of communist appeal" before Stalin consolidated absolute power, and furthermore only 14% of the communist vote came from Jews, less than the 16% which was from Catholics.

Instead, Jews were the strongest ethnic bastion of support for the Pilsudski government, moreso than both other minorities and the Polish majority, with no significant regional differences in the political behavior. Kopstein and Wittenberg argue their data show that "Even in the face of both public and private prejudice... Most Jews were thus politically neither "internationalist" nor ethnically exclusionary, as a large vote For the minority parties in 1928 would have in- dicated. Rather they were casting their lot with the Polish state." An alternative explanation holds instead that Jews turned to Pilsudski as a protector in an increasingly volatile political scene.

Aftermath
The BBWR government bloc won the highest number of seats (125 out of 444 in Sejm (Polish parliament) - 28.12% of the total, and 48 out of 111 in the Senate of Poland - 43.24% of the total); the opposition parties, however, gained a majority of the remaining seats, with the left - including Polish Communists - doing much better than the traditional Polish Right. Groth notes that the elections showed a progressively increasing fragmentation of the Polish electorate; a steady and significant increase in the proportion of ethnic minority voting; the rapid rise of the Polish Socialist Party as a major force within the less stable and cohesive Polish Left; and the substantial weakening of the Right by Piłsudski's supporters, as the BBWR, which despite its claims of being above traditional party divisions, attracted its support mostly from the right.

Although the opposition to Sanation failed to gain control of the Sejm, it was able to show its strength and prevent Sanation from taking control of the Sejm. This convinced Piłsudski and his supporters that more drastic measures had to be taken in dealing with the opposition. Opposition politicians became increasingly persecuted and threatened.

Opposition parties formed the Centrolew coalition to oppose the government of Sanation. Their actions led to a vote of no confidence for the Sanation government and dissolution of the parliament. New elections were held in 1930; however, Sanation succeeded in having many Centrolew politicians arrested; and the 1930 elections are not considered free.