Air Algérie Flight 702P

Air Algérie (Phoenix Aviation) Flight 702P, named Oasis and registered 7T-VEE, was a Boeing 737 owned by Air Algérie and leased by Phoenix Aviation. On 21 December 1994, in low visibility conditions, it collided with power transmission cables and a pylon during its final approach to Coventry Airport in the United Kingdom. The aircraft subsequently overturned and damaged several houses before crashing inverted into a wooded area beyond. All five people on board were killed.

Accident
The occupants consisted of 3 Algerian crew members and 2 English stock handlers.

The captain of flight 702P was 44-year-old Ahmed Nemdil, he had accumulated 10,686 flight hours with 2,187 on the Boeing 737-200. The first officer, 35-year-old Nasreddine Hantour, had 2,858 hours of flying time with most of them on the B737-200. They were accompanied by an Air Algérie maintenance engineer, 38-year-old El-Hachemi Abdellaoui; and the two stock handlers were 31-year-old Adrian Sharp and 22-year-old Andrew Yates. Both were employed by Phoenix Aviation.

On the day of the accident, the aircraft and crew departed Amsterdam for their second flight to Coventry that morning (their first having arrived at 0340 hrs), where live animals were to be loaded on board for export to the Netherlands and France. Visibility at Coventry was poor due to fog and a low cloud layer, and it deteriorated steadily during the early morning hours; by the time the aircraft reached the Coventry area, the runway visual range (RVR) for the main runway at Coventry Airport was 700 m, which was below their regulatory minimum of 1200 m for conducting the approach at that time. The aircraft was not equipped to receive the newer Instrument landing system signal for the runway in use, so the pilots used a surveillance radar approach (SRA) procedure, which depended on guidance from an air traffic control radar operator. The aircrew was experienced with SRA approach procedures at Coventry, having conducted an SRA approach earlier that day to the same runway, "showing close adherence to the ideal approach path." Visibility was too poor to make a safe landing on this second approach, so the captain performed a missed approach procedure and diverted to the East Midlands Airport.

Approximately 90 minutes after landing at East Midlands, visibility at Coventry improved significantly, though with an RVR of 1100 m, it still was not adequate to meet their required minimum, which had increased to 1500 m due to the controllers at Coventry not having adequate notice to set up their specialized SRA radar in time for 7T-VEE's arrival. The flight departed East Midlands at 9:38 local time in order to make another attempt to land at the scheduled destination. At this point the pilots had been on duty for ten hours total (two hours more than their company's normal maximum for overnight operations), including five flight segments since 2345 hrs the previous night, two of which had included SRA approaches to runway 23 at Coventry (one concluding with a successful landing at 0340 hrs and the second concluding with a missed approach and diversion to East Midlands at 0740 hrs, and both being described as accurate and correctly stabilised by AAIB investigators). The accident flight lasted fourteen minutes, which left the crew with insufficient time to perform all normal flight deck procedures. During their third and final SRA approach to runway 23 at Coventry, their approach was never stabilised, and they developed an excess of airspeed. The landing checklist was not completed, and there was minimal communication between the captain and the first officer. The latter did not call out the minimum descent altitude (MDA), which is normal company procedure. The aircraft descended well below the MDA and collided with an 86 ft electricity transmission tower situated on the extended centreline of the runway approximately 1.1 mi from the runway threshold. The collision severed the upper portion of the tower and caused severe damage to the left engine and to the structure of the left wing; the aircraft rolled to the left and dropped, damaging several houses in Sunbury before crashing into Willenhall, Coventry woodland and catching fire.

Aftermath
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) determined that the accident was caused by the flight crew allowing the aircraft to descend significantly below the minimum descent height for the approach without gaining sight of the approach lighting or runway threshold. The AAIB also found that the crew had failed to cross-check altimeter height indications during the approach, that the non-handling pilot failed to call out the minimum descent height as the aircraft reached that altitude, and that the flight crew's performance had been impaired by the effects of fatigue.

A brass plaque remembering the event is now located in Middle Ride, close to the crash scene, which was erected on the 10th anniversary of the accident by the Willenhall Wood Residents Association.