Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce

Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding campaign finance regulations. The majority opinion authored by Thurgood Marshall held that the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, which burdened political speech by prohibiting corporations from using treasury money to make independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections, was appropriately justified by a compelling state interest so as to overcome a First Amendment challenge. The court also found no Fourteenth Amendment violation, stating that Congress could treat press corporations and nonpress corporations differently without violating the Equal Protection Clause. Upholding the restriction on corporate political speech, The Court stated that "Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections"; however, the Michigan law still allowed the corporation to make such expenditures from a segregated fund.

Background
The Michigan Campaign Finance Act banned corporations from spending treasury money on "independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections for state offices." The Act had one loophole-if a corporation had an independent fund solely used for political purposes the law did not apply. The Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to use its general funds to publish an advertisement in a local newspaper to support a candidate for the Michigan House of Representatives,

Opinion of the Court
Louis J. Caruso, Lansing, Michigan, argued on the side of the appellants (Austin). Richard D. McLellan, Lansing, Michigan, argued for the respondent (Michigan Chamber of Commerce).

The majority opinion written by Thurgood Marshall held the Act did not violate the First or the Fourteenth Amendments. The Court recognized a state's compelling interest in combating a "different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."

Marshall concluded by noting the importance of the Act: "Michigan identified as a serious danger the significant possibility that corporate political expenditures will undermine the integrity of the political process, and it has implemented a narrowly tailored solution to that problem. By requiring corporations to make all independent political expenditures through a separate fund made up of money solicited expressly for political purposes, the Michigan Campaign Finance Act reduces the threat that huge corporate treasuries amassed with the aid of favorable state laws will be used to influence unfairly the outcome of elections."

Marshall was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices William Brennan, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens. Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and O'Connor.

Subsequent developments
The decision was overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010), ruling that the First Amendment right of free speech applied to corporations.