Battle of Jalalabad (1989)

The Battle of Jalalabad, also known as Operation Jalalabad or the Jalalabad War, occurred in the spring of 1989, marking the beginning of the Afghan Civil War (1989-1992). The Peshawar-based Seven-Party Union (an alliance of seven Afghan mujahideen groups also known as the Afghan Interim Government or "Government in exile"), supported by the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI, attacked Jalalabad, which was then under the administration of the Soviet Union-backed Republic of Afghanistan. Though the mujahideen quickly captured the Jalalabad Airport, after a four-month battle the Afghan Armed Forces claimed victory.

Background
The Soviet Union officially withdrew from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, marking the end of the Soviet-Afghan War. The war was fought between mujahideen guerilla groups (supported by Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia, China, Iran, and other nations) and the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. However, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which the mujahideen perceived as a "puppet government" remained in power after the withdrawal.

The Mujahideen were supported by Pakistani intelligence. ISI Director Hamid Gul's stated goal was to establish a mujahideen government in Afghanistan, led by Hezb-e Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Analysts disagree as to whether Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was kept in the dark about the ISI's plan to overturn Afghanistan or was aware of the attack. One analyst stated that United States Ambassador to Pakistan Robert B. Oakley was exhortating this mujahideen attack.

The Americans reportedly were motivated by their wish to humiliate the Marxists and send them out of Afghanistan "clinging to their helicopters" to avenge the fall of South Vietnam. Pakistan wished to establish a friendly government in Kabul that would not support Baloch and Pashtun separatists in western Pakistan. The plan was for Jamiat-e Islami to close the Salang Pass, paralyzing the Afghan Government's supply lines. The plan was to establish an interim government in Jalalabad that would be recognized by western nations as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

Battle
Involved in the operation were forces of Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's Ittehad-e Islami and Arab fighters totaling 14,000 men. The attack began on March 5, 1989, and went well at first for the mujahideen, who captured the Jalalabad airfield before facing a counterattack. When government troops began to surrender, the attacking forces were soon blocked by the main Afghan army positions held by the 11th Division, which were protected by bunkers, barbed wire and minefields. The government troops received on intensive air support, as the Afghan conducting force flew 20 sorties a day over the battlefield. An-12 transport aircraft, modified to carry bombs, flew at high altitude out of range of the Stinger missiles used by the mujahideen; cluster bombs were used intensively. Three Scud firing batteries deployed around Kabul, specifically the 99th Missile Brigade, fired more than 400 missiles in support of the Jalalabad garrison.

Despite their lack of precision, these weapons had a significant effect on the morale of the mujahideen, who were unable to defend against them. The Battle of Jalalabad is considered to be the most concentrated ballistic missile campaign since the V2 Attacks on London during the Second World War.

By the middle of May, the mujahideen had made little progress against the defences of Jalalabad, and were running low on ammunition. In July, they failed to prevent the Afghan Army from retaking the army base in Samarkhel. Jalalabad remained under Najibullah’s government control. The mujahideen suffered an estimated 3,000 casualties during this battle. Arab foreign fighters sustained over 300 casualties. Approximately 12,000–15,000 civilians were killed, and 10,000 fled the conflict. The Afghan Army reported around 1,500 casualties during the battle. towards the end of the battle, the ISI-backedHezb-i-Islami (led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) launched an attack Jamiat-e Islami forces in Takhar Province, resulting in the deaths of 36 of Ahmad Shah Massoud’s commanders. Massoud In retaliation, Massoud pursued and executed the perpetrators of the ambush after a trial.

Aftermath
Contrary to American and Pakistani expectations, this battle proved that the Afghan Army could fight without Soviet help, and greatly increased the confidence of government supporters. Conversely, the morale of the mujahideen involved in the attack slumped and many local commanders of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf concluded truces with the government.

The failure of the Battle can be attributed to the failure of Ahmad Shah Masoud's forces to close the Salang Pass allowing Kabul to supply their forces. In the words of Brigadier-General Mohammed Yousaf, an officer of the ISI, "the jihad never recovered from Jalalabad". In particular, Pakistan's plans to promote Hekmatyar were also harmed.

Both the Pakistani and the American governments were frustrated with the outcome. As a result of this failure, General Hamid Gul was immediately sacked by Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and replaced with General Shamsur Rahman Kallu as the Director-General of the ISI. Kallu pursued a more classical policy of support to the Afghan guerillas. In this respect he cut off the barrier that his predecessors, Akhtar Abdur Rahman and Gul had placed between the mujahideen and the American secret service, which for the first time had direct access to the mujahideen.

The former Pakistani spies, such as Gul, had argued that this gave the United States an opportunity to both undercut Pakistan's interests as well as to weave discord among the mujahideen (something which Pakistan's promotion of Hekmatyar had of course done as well).

With direct American access to the mujahideen – in particular that of the envoy Peter Tomsen, whose attitude towards independent Afghans was arrogant and arguably hostile in that he deemed them dangerous extremists without direct US supervision – any segment of mujahideen unity crumbled. Traditionally independent mujahideen leaders, such as Yunus Khalis and Jalaluddin Haqqani, who had tried to unite the mujahideen rivals Massoud and Hekmatyar, now moved closer towards Pakistan because of their suspicion of the United States' intentions. (See also Haqqani network).

Others, like Abdul Haq and Massoud, instead favoured the United States because of their tense relations with Pakistan. While Abdul Haq remained hostile towards the communist government and its militias, Massoud would go on to make controversial alliances with former communist figures. Massoud claimed that this was an attempt to unite Afghanistan, but his enemies such as Hekmatyar attacked him for this.

Hekmatyar's push was also supported by Pakistan, so that by 1990 there was a definite (if loose) pair of competing axes. One was promoted by Pakistan and included Hekmatyar, Khalis, Jalaluddin Haqqani and other mujahideen leaders who were unsympathetic to Hekmatyar. The competing axis was promoted by the United States and led by Massoud, but also including other leaders such as Abdul Haq who were unsympathetic to Massoud.

The government forces further proved their worth in April 1990, during an offensive against a fortified complex at Paghman. After a heavy bombardment and assault that lasted until the end of June, the Afghan Army spearheaded by Dostum's militia, was able to clear the mujahideen entrenchments.

Criticism
Afghanistan

The Jalalabad operation was seen as a grave mistake by some mujahideen leaders such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Haq, who did not believe the mujahideen had the capacity to capture a major city in conventional warfare.

Neither Massoud nor Haq claimed to have participated in the attack on Jalalabad. Massoud even said it was by BBC radio that he learned about the operation. This is contradictory however as Masoud's party, Jamiat-e Islami, committed 500 men to the battle. Furthermore, it has been stated that Massoud was tasked with closing the Salang Pass, which he failed to do, disabling him from taking Jalalabad. Haq advocated the pursuit of coordinated guerilla warfare that would gradually weaken the communist regime and cause its collapse through internal divisions.

Abdul Haq was also quoted as asking: "How is that we Afghans, who never lost a war, must take military instructions from the Pakistanis, who never won one?" Ahmad Shah Massoud criticized the go-it-alone attitude of Pakistan and their Afghan followers stating: "The damage caused by our (Mujahideen forces) lack of a unified command is obvious. There is a total lack of coordination, which means we are not launching simultaneous offensives on different fronts. As a result, the government can concentrate its resources and pick us off one by one. And that is what has happened at Jalalabad."

Pakistan

Former Pakistani Minister of Interior Aitzaz Ahsan claimed that the civilian government knew about the "Jalalabad Operation" beforehand and opposed Hamid Gul's proposal but let the operation happen anyway.

Foreign Fighters

Jihad magazine, an Arabic propaganda magazine known for glorifying the achievements of the Arab foreign fighters in Afghanistan, could not downplay the disastrous defeat at Jalalabad. In its report of the battle, the magazine reported the Afghan communist forces had rained down Scud missiles with two thousand-pound warheads on the Arab fighters resulting in the slaughter of more than a hundred Arab fighters, and that each fallen warrior was soon followed by another rocket taking down another jihadist.

In the account of the battle by Osama bin Laden, the founder of Al-Qaeda, bin Laden claimed that the defeat at Jalalabad had inflicted greater casualties on the Arab fighters than they had sustained in the entire war against the Soviets.

The defeat in Jalalabad led to internal squabbles between Al-Qaeda and Maktab al-Khidamat. Ayman al-Zawahiri turned Osama bin Laden against Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, accusing him of mishandling the MAK. Zawahiri accused Azzam of being a puppet of the United States and the Saudi Arabian monarchy. He distributed leaflets in Peshawar, depicting Azzam as a questionable Muslim and advising Arabs not to pray with him.

Azzam was later killed by a bomb in November of the same year. While the identity of Azzam's killer remains uncertain, it is possible that it was the work of Al-Qaeda or al-Jihad affiliated jihadists operating in Pakistan, although bin Laden himself is unlikely to have been involved, as he was in Saudi Arabia at the time of the murder and still on (relatively) good terms with Azzam. The assassination of Azzam has also been attributed to KhAD.