Bombardment of Arras

The Bombardment of Arras took place during the War of the Spanish Succession on 2 and 3 March 1712. An Allied army under Arnold van Keppel, Earl of Albemarle closed in on Arras with the aim of destroying the supplies held there. In this way, they hoped that the French would not be able to prevent the sieges of Arras and Cambrai. Although the action succeeded, the advantage had to go entirely unused because the Emperor's troops arrived too late to the Allied army.

Prelude
The beginning of the year of 1712 during the War of the Spanish Succession was marked by disunity in the Allied camp. In Britain the Tories had taken over power from the Whigs. They accused the Duke of Marlborough and the Whigs of enriching themselves with war. Marlborough, the general who had led the Allies in the Low Countries from 1702, was thus removed from office by Queen Anne under the influence of the Tories.

The Tories also had a bone to pick with their Dutch allies. In The Conduct of the Allies Jonathan Swift argued that the Dutch were ungrateful allies and a threat to England. The Dutch were, according to Swift, in 'a condition to strike terror into us, with 50,000 veterans ready to invade us from the country which we have conquered for them'. However, when the British House of Commons passed a resolution stating that the Dutch Republic had not fulfilled the agreements made, regarding mutual military contributions, Anthonie Heinsius and his fellow regenten decided they could not let this go unchallenged. The thorough reply in which they refuted every accusation by the Tories point for point, greatly embarrassed the British government under the Earl of Oxford.

This did not stop the Tories from continuing their secret peace's negotiations with France. To keep their allies in the dark and to maintain a stronger negotiating position with France, the English government nevertheless decided to participate in a new campaign in 1712 in appearance. The Duke of Ormonde was chosen to lead British troops in this campaign. Although Ormonde had gained experience under William III in the Nine Years' War, he was relatively inexperienced. Oxford saw this as an advantage, as he could therefore control him more easily. Ormonde had been given secret instructions to thwart the Allied war effort as much as possible, which would make the Dutch and the Holy Roman Emperor more inclined towards peace. However, the Dutch States General had no intention of allowing Ormonde to lead their soldiers. They asked the Emperor to send Eugene of Savoy back to the Netherlands instead. The Emperor agreed to this and also sent an additional 20,000 men.

The Duke of Marlborough, having conquered Bouchain in the previous year, had left most of his troops to occupy the outermost border towns, so that the French would be prevented from building up lines to cover their remaining lands during the winter. In January, this prompted a plan in The Hague to burn down a large hay storehouse, set up by the French within Arras, which would prevent them from getting their armies into the field early in the year. This would then allow Eugene to lay siege to Arras or Cambrai without the threat of a French army under the Duke of Villars. The Earl of Albemarle, Dutch general and governor of Tournai, was appointed to lead the mission to Arras.

The bombardment
In Februari, Albemarle, with 36 battalions and 44 squadrons, supported by the generals Hompesch, Grovestins and Cadogan, launched a series of diversions that led the French to believe he wanted to undertake some along the river Sambre. Instead, he ordered the garrisons of Oudenaarde, Courtrai, Menen, Ath, Aire, Lille, Bethune, and Tournai to move towards Douai, where they would cross the Scarpe towards Arras. 2,000 labourers were added to this force. With this army, he left 4 o'clock in the afternoon on 1 March towards Arras. In the evening they crossed the Scarpe at Fampoux. After marching all night, Albemarle's army arrived at the plain before Arras 4 a.m. on 2 March.

There he ordered the workers to dig trenches and erect two artillery batteries. This went so smoothly that the garrison of Atrecht under Pierre de Montesquiou d'Artagnan did not realise the encirclement of the city until the Anglo-Dutch army was fully covered and peasants brought the news to the city. D'Artagnan immediately decided to launch an attack then on Bapaume, a suburb of Arras taken by the Allies, but this attack was unsuccessful. Albemarle, on the contrary, had to wait for the heavy artillery to arrive. This arrived at 11 a.m., but it would take until 5 p.m. until the artillery barrage started. Bombs and glowing cannonballs were shot into the city.



These had the effect that the hay, straw and other supplies, which lay in thirty-six large piles on a plain between the city and the citadel, caught fire about 11 o'clock in the evening. The fire additionally consumed a large wood storehouse. Such a fire as this, which produced light burning dust, instilled fear in both the governor and the citizens that it might spread to the citadel's arsenal, and by igniting the gunpowder could destroy the whole city. D'Artagnan did herefore distribute the gunpowder in several other and safer places in all haste.

Albemarle kept the firing going until three o'clock the next morning. Having fully achieved his objective, he then, 1 hour before dawn, gave the order to withdraw the artillery. The rest of the army departed in the morning at 8 o'clock with flying banners and blowing trumpets, after which he sent them all back to the towns they had previously occupied.

Aftermath
The mission had been an undisputed success. 1 to 1.2 million rations, among other things, had gone up in flames. Albemarle wrote to the States General: "'The consternation which this expedition has caused among the enemies is incredible, and prevents her from gathering her army before the troops will be able to subsist from the land crops, and by which [they] consequently ... will not be able to prevent ... us from opening an early and advantageous campaign.'" However, to Albemarle's disappointment, this advantage was to remain entirely unexploited, as the 20,000 promised troops the Emperor would send did not arrive in the Low Countries until mid-May. Villars had by then already assembled his army in the plain between Cambrai and Arras. So instead, the Allies' campaign in 1712 would prove troublesome.

First of all, Ormonde began to sabotage the campaign. He refused to agree to any venture Eugene and the Dutch proposed. Something the French had been made aware of by the British government. Although Ormonde kept this secret, he admitted that he had had 'restraining orders' from the British government. Ormonde, thus put strong pressure on Oxford's government. Oxford informed his allies that Ormonde had misinterpreted the orders and authorised Ormonde to take part in the siege of Le Quesnoy.



Not long after the situation changed again. Ormonde was ordered in June to return with his troops to Flanders. However, the 25,000-30,000 German and Danish troops in British service refused to leave and declared to the Dutch field deputies that they would not leave the Allied army until they had received further orders from their sovereigns. The field deputies promised them that the Dutch Republic would provide for their maintenance. Despite the absence of British troops, this meant that the Allies could still continue their offensive and the siege of Le Quesnoy went well for them.

At the Battle of Denain, however, the Allies were defeated. This enabled Villars to recapture Le Quesnoy and other French fortresses before the armies went to winter quarters. The road to Paris thus became out of sight for the Allies and the Dutch decided it was now time to accept the Franco-British proposals for peace. On 11 April of 1713, the Peace of Utrecht was signed. The Emperor fought on until 1714 and made peace in the Peace of Rastatt.