Draft:'usual-possibility' and 'narrow-possibility'

Avicenna has presented a variety of innovations and initiatives in completing and developing modal logic. His explanations of modal concepts are more expansive and accurate than his predecessors. Possibility is one of these modal concepts. In some of his books, such as al-Ibārah or al-Shifā, he refers to three meanings of possibility (usual possibility, narrow-possibility, future possibility), but in some of his books, such as Mantiq Al-Mushriqiyyïn or Al-Isharat wa l–tanbihat, he refers to four meanings (usual possibility, narrow-possibility, future-possibility, and narrowest-possibility).

Usual possibility
'usual possibility' means 'not impossibility'. the relationship between possibility and necessity can be presented in Avicenna's analysis as follows:

" usual possibility = not necessary not = not impossibility."

Narrow possibility:
narrow-possibility means neither necessary nor impossible. [4] If proposition p is a narrow possibility, it means that p is neither necessary nor impossible. The narrow possibility of p means negating the existence and the non-existence of p.

Narrowest-possibility:
A narrower meaning of possibility that includes the negation of all necessities, namely, essential, descriptive, and temporal, is called "narrowest-possibility". "which is that the assertion is completely unnecessary, not at a time like an eclipse, not in the present as a change for what's moving, rather it's like writing for a man …"

The narrowest possibility in the last Arabic logician includes negation of all necessities, namely essential, descriptive, and temporal, and is considered except for the “necessity-conditioned by-predication”. “necessity-conditioned by-predication” is the necessity after the existence and realization of the predicate to subject. This characteristic of specific possibilities has promptedNasir al-Din al-Tusi (1201-1274) to consider this possibility more worthy of the title 'possibility,' as "narrow-possibility" and "usual possibility" may be descriptive or temporal necessities, and in this case, one of the two sides of negation and imposition is preferred for them.

Future possibility
Avicenna defines "future-possibility" as follows:

"It is possible and can be understood as another meaning, which is that considering is not based on what is described by the thing in a state of existence, whether positive or negative, but according to considering its condition in the future. Suppose that meaning is not necessary for existence or non-existence at any time in the future, then it is possible.""" The condition of the“necessity-conditioned by-predication” is initially raised in the definition of "future-possibility" by Qūtb al-Din al-RazI, and it became prevalent after him in the definition of receptive possibility.