Draft:Battle of Sochi (1918)

The Battle of Sochi (1918) was fought between the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the Russian Soviet Republic over Sochinsky okrug. It ended with a Georgian victory.

Background
In June 1918, several Bolshevik uprisings took place in Georgia's Abkhazia region. After Georgian General Giorgi Mazniashvili defeated the rebels, the government of Georgian Democratic Republic decided to launch offensive in Sochinsky and Tuapsinsky okrugs. The Georgian operation in Sochi was directly related to the Bolshevik rebellions in Abkhazia. On 24 June 1918, the Abkhaz People's Council issued a special resolution on "the necessity of taking Sochi and Tuapse okrugs", in which it argued that Bolshevik uprisings in Abkhazia were supported from Sochi and Tuapse, also these uprisings were largely caused by a food crisis stemming from Bolshevik control of Sochi and Tuapse, because Bolsheviks controlled ports there and also were not allowing cargo to reach Georgia from the Northern Caucasus. Thus, it recognized the expediency of taking control of Sochi and Tuapse by Georgia. General Giorgi Mazniashvili himself recalls in his memoirs: "Both from Tbilisi and from Abkhaz National Council I received orders: to move forward and capture Sochi. Reasons, as they were provided for me with a direct line by telegraph, were requests and calls from Georgian residents of Sochi, as well as some members of Abkhaz National Council, as they argued that Sochi belonged to Abkhazia, and that the old borders of Abkhazia even reached Anapa. After these orders, I was moving for one week, but was preparing for taking Sochi... We were told, that Georgians there [in Sochi] were awaiting arrival of Georgian army... Moreover, as long as Bolsheviks were in Sochi, there always would have been threats of invasions and provocations".

Battle
On 29 June, Georgian armed forces crossed the river of Mzymta and took over Adler. According to a commander of Tbilisi special battalion, poruchik Pirtskhalava, the Bolsheviks lost 200 men in the battle. 100 were taken captive, the large number of weapons and ammunitions was seized. The further offensive of the Georgian army was delayed by the unexpected landing of an Ottoman force in Abkhazia. After defeating this force, Georgian army continued its offensive. On 2 July, Georgian army fought the vanguard of Russian army on the outskirts of Sochi. Russians retreated to the city. Georgians camped 10 versts away from Sochi. On 5 July, Georgian army took over Khosta. They captured 6 cannons, 8 machine guns and 200 hostages. They lost 9 men, among them the porutchik Pirtskhalava and two officers of the 3rd Georgian regiment. Russians regrouped and mobilized, but Mazniashvili decided to attack with 6,000 troops. In the first phase of operation, the naval forces were utilized, which launched an offensive from the sea. The Georgian cutter "Saint Mikheil" opened fire on artillery battery of the Bolsheviks, destroying their 5 long range cannons. After this, the offensive was launched by the armoured train battalion of Vladimer Goguadze and armored vehicles. Russian army was retreating from one location to another, disorganized. After a brief clash near Khosta, Georgian troops took over Sochi. Mazniashvili stationed there a small garrison, which was granted police functions. The main forces camped outside the city.

Results
It remains unclear whether the capture of Sochi was a spontaneous action undertaken by the government of Georgian Democratic Republic, necessitated by the offensive against Bolsheviks, or a purposeful and consistent strategy of restoring control over historical Georgian lands. General Mazniashvili seemed to be initially unaware of the planned offensive in Sochi, as he considered his mission to be over after retaking Abkhazia from rebels. Various opinions existed among the members of the government of Georgia about taking Sochi. On 27 July 1918, a special envoy of the Georgian government in Sochi, Gizo Anjaparidze, organized a rally and told it that the Georgian army took Sochi and Tuapse to "cleanse the area from Bolsheviks" and allow it to prepare itself for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. He told the demonstrators that if they could give a guarantee to Georgia that the Bolsheviks "would no longer violate our [Georgia's] borders", the Georgian army would withdraw from the area. But if they requested help, it would stay and provide aid to Sochi and Tuapse. Georgian Foreign Minister Evgeni Gegechkori told the Sukhumi mayor Niko Tavdgridize: "Why are we intervening in Tuapse and Sochi, when we can not even calm down [a Bolshevik rebellion in] Mingrelia?". Therefore, there was no consistent approach about the Sochi operation among the government officials.

In August 1918, the White army concluded its successful offensive in Kuban by capturing Yekaterinodar (Krasnodar). On 3 September 1918, Anjaparidze sent a letter to the Georgian government: "As we are notified by the [White] General Alekseev and along with him by the Kuban government, the entire Black Sea Governorate, as well as Sochi, is viewed by them as belonging to Kuban. What should be done next? Do we consider to retain Sochinsky okrug no matter what?". On 15 September 1918, Evgeni Gegechkori sent a letter to the government, saying that it was a "mistake" that Georgia did not announce annexing Sochi while taking control of the city. He relied in his letter on the fact that local Social Democrats and Social-Revolutionaries were positively predisposed towards the Georgian Democratic Republic. On 18 September, the Council of Sochi, largely made up of local Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, announced joining the Georgian Democratic Republic on a temporary basis against the threats from both Reds and Whites. It concluded that the "democratic development, land reforms and self-governance" would be impossible in case of joining the Kuban.

On a conference between Georgian delegation and White Russians in Yekaterinodar on 25 September 1918, Evgeni Gegechkori appealed to the common fight against Bolshevism to justify annexing Sochi in his conversation with White generals and also said that the annexation was temporary, as long as there were threats coming from Bolsheviks. He said that White army should have concentrated its efforts on capturing Moscow from Bolsheviks, while Georgia would have protected the southern territories. He also said that since Volunteer Army was "a private organization", it had no competence to settle such matters as the issue of Sochi, which should have been fully resolved only after the restoration of all-Russian government and convocation of Constituent Assembly. He said that Sochi was annexed to Georgia to protect its Georgian population, and that Georgians would not have withdrawn from it until the White army could have guaranteed a protection for peaceful civilians. According to professor Vakhtang Chania, these were diplomatic tricks used by Gegechkori to retain control over Sochi. Since the civil war was raging in Russia, White movement was in no position to guarantee a protection for civilians. Also, no one really knew when, if ever, would it have been possible for the Constituent Assembly to reconvene, thus Sochi would have remained part of Georgia for uncertain time. Also, Gegechkori relied on a fact that while the Great Britain supported the White movement as the principal anti-Bolshevik force, after the White defeat it would have switched to supporting the peripheral republics, thus retaining Sochi as a buffer zone for Georgia against Soviet Russia could have been supported by the Britain in the future.