Draft:Capture of U-505

Editors: this draft is under heavy editing. I do not recommend any other edits until it is a proper article. Everything in bold are notes.

Background
Why each ship was there, duty, introd uction to U-505 EXPLAIN THE BATTERY CHARGE, WHY IMPORTANT

On 16 March 1944 German submarine (U-boat) U-505 left Brest, France for her 12th war patrol during World War II. Compared to most of the other U-boats, 505 lacked a schnorkel breathing device that allows the diesel engines to operate underwater. This meant that the submarine had to stay on the surface to recharge the batteries, exposing the vessel to enemy aircraft and detection. U-505 arrived at her patrol area of West Africa on 25 April, where over the next several weeks she encountered merchant ships, failing to engage any as they were either neutral or not worth the risk. After an unremarkable patrol, the boat under the command of Oberleutnant zur See Harald Lange left the area to return to Brest on 23 May. Notably, Lange was handpicked by Grand Admiral Karl Donitz to lead the 505, following the suicide of the former captain and a string of technical problems. By the 23rd, the vessel was low and fuel and battery charge. explain general German strategy, see Chicago

Across the Atlantic, American Task Group (TG) 22.3 built around the escort carrier USS Guadalcanal (CVE-60), and ships of Escort Destroyer Division 4 left Norfolk, Virginia for an anti-submarine patrol. Those ships were the USS Pillsbury (DE-133), the flagship, Pope (DE-134), Flaherty (DE-135), Chatelain (DE-149), and Jenks (DE-665). US Navy intelligence had intercepted U-boat radio transmissions in the area and dispatched the task group to find and sink the enemy boats. The so-called "hunter-killer" task group was designed to cover mid-ocean gaps in coastal allied air patrols, depriving U-boats areas of the Atlantic where they would be free from enemy aircraft. These forces became the bane of U-boat crews as their usual threats, such as convoy escorts, could never loiter around a U-boat for long as they leave to protect the convoy. Hunter-killer task groups on the other hand could shadow a submarine over several days with aircraft, waiting for the enemy to surface and make a kill. Submerged submarines did not have the speed to escape the range of aircraft, making the scenario of getting cornered by a force extremely dangerous. The nature of submarines of the era restricted the boats to only submerge when attacking or escaping, as the electrical engines used underwater required power from batteries that could only be charged when surfaced. If a submarine stays under for too long its batteries fully deplete, leaving no power for propulsion or surfacing.

Neither side was inexperienced. Guadalcanal and her escorts are credited with sinking U-515, U-554, and U-68 in the same operational area of the West African Coast. Several months earlier, the task group successfully forced the surfacing of U-515. After surfacing, the submarine was bombarded for four minutes by the escorts' entire arsenal of weapons before sinking bow up. Captain Gallery of the Guadancal began to consider if it was possible for his force to board and capture a U-boat, even though the skipper of U-515 intended to scuttle the submarine. When docked at Norfolk, he ordered each destroyer escort to form boarding parties and have a whaleboat ready at all times for launch. Each ship conducted daily drills where the volunteered members of the boarding groups practiced launching, rowing, and recovering their boats.

Explain how everyone thought it wont be used

According to Guadalcanal captain '''and task group commander Daniel Gallery, this was not the first time the forces met. two and a half months earlier, U-505 was able to slip through the task group's screen sailing from the Bay of Biscay to Freetown.'''

'''On 15 May 1944, Guadalcanal left Norfolk, Virginia for her 3rd war cruise apart of Task Group 22.3, compared to Task Group 21.12 that she had been operating under as flagship. '''

U-505 was in a similar situation without kills, patrolling off Western Africa. It was chased of by a British destroyer the only time when it was in contact with an enemy merchant ship after blue smoke started to radiate from the starboard engine. After arriving of the coast, it suffered breakdowns in the FuMo, Nacxos, periscope raising mechanism, and the outer hatch for torpedo tube 2. What was most troubling was the torpedo hatch which limited the submarine to operate at a maximum of 20 meters, within easy detection distance by aircraft and ships. Another effect of the breakdown was that a very delicate T-5 acoustic homing torpedo was stuck in the tube. The T-5 torpedo was highly sensitive to moisture, requiring daily drying and servicing. Becoming stuck in the torpedo tube became a major worry as a buildup in moisture could trigger the electrical fusing, detonating the warhead. The problem would eventually be solved after green phosphorous began emanating from the aft of the boat, requiring sailors to dive into the water and correct the issue after 20 hours of work.

Initial contacts
On 30 May 1944, the American force had been underway for three weeks with no success. The force was leaving the area of patrol to refuel in Casablanca when a message from US Navy Tenth Fleet’s U-boat tracking room instructed the group to find and engage an enemy submarine, who had been tracked through radio transmissions its entire patrol. That submarine would turn out to be U-505, returning from her patrol. Task Group 22.2 planned to intercept the submarine on 2 June, assuming the information was correct. This theory would come to be proven by various sonar, radio, and radar contacts. The low fuel became an overhead worry for the group, adding a sense of urgency.

The same day, U-505 detected constant enemy aircraft above with its radar. Coupled with the sounds of distant depth charges, this lead Lange to correctly believe that an enemy hunter-killer task group was nearby. The key indication of this was the constant enemy aircraft operating in an area with little land based facilities to maintain such activities. Over the next few days, the aircraft quickly became problematic as the submarine could not surface for more than a few minutes to recharge its batteries, having to dive down when an aerial contact was detected. Any time the submarine was surfaced, it was detected by radar which gave its location away to the Americans. He than maneuvered the boat closer to the shore, without luck. The submarine being submerged for long times caused the air to become stale, forcing the crew to use re-breathing devices to survive.

After several days of the constant diving, Lange decided to act. The Americans were used to the pattern of the submarine surfacing during the night, and the radar operators would usually be less vigilant during the day. He decided to take advantage of this, ordering the submarine to surface in the afternoon of 3 June. Allied aircraft failed to notice the submarine as it traveled a, "sufficient distance" before settling back into the old routine.

By the night of 2-3 June, it was clear that a submarine was nearby and in need to surface. However, the Guadalcanal was running low on fuel and made the decision to break of for port on the ___th night at 1100 of 4 June. Ten minutes after turning to port, the Chatelain announced a sonar contact 800 yards off its starboard bow at 11:09 AM. The Guadalcanal broke off to the west, before launching two Wildcat fighter planes. This was done to separate the ship from any possible action, as an escort carrier only has its aircraft and escorts to protect itself from submarines. The Pillsbury and Jenks quickly arrived to assist as Chatelain passed over the contact, confirming it to be a submarine. The U-boats crew manned their stations after assuming they have made contact with a convoy by chance. It was only at periscope level when visual was established when the captain realized what the enemy was, firing a single torpedo at Guadalcanal to distract the force while they dive to maximum depth. The U-boat was taken surprise as at some point, the listening gear became faulty and failed to pick up any contacts.

The Chatelain passed over the target before identifying it as a submarine. Following this, the destroyer escort formed a complete circle, straightened its path out and launched a total of 20 Hedgehog contact triggered anti-submarine rockets one hundred meters away. No hits were made. The contact was quickly reestablished as the ship prepared to attack with depth charges. The two other escorts searched for the submarine, preparing to make their own attacks. Meanwhile, the two Wildcats from the carrier dove down and staffed an area of ocean 100 yards from where Chatelain attacked announcing over the radio, "Sighted sub-destroyers head for spot where we are shooting!" The submarine was exposed by extremely clear water, giving the fighters a target, who's bullet splashes guided destroyers. At 1211 the Chatelain turned to attack the diving submarine, dropping 12 600 pound depth charges set to detonate at 60 feet. The depth charges detonated in pairs, each one closer to the submarine. The last two charges threw the crew of their feet and nearly keeled the boat. The lights went out, dive planes jammed, all electronic equipment failed to work, a non-critical leak sprung in the control room, and water began flooding the rear torpedo room. Langue ordered the rear torpedo room evacuated and closed off before more news came in. The rudder was jammed, forcing the submarine into a tight starboard turn. The emergency rudder controls were located in the isolated torpedo room, which was now abandoned. The submarine was in an uncontrolledly dive as the crew attempted to stabilize the boat. This task was made much more difficult by the jammed dive planes and unresponsive ballast controls. Eventually the crew regained control and and began surfacing their boat, after the order was given at around 1115.

On the surface, oil was spotted followed by a message from one overhead Wildcat announcing the submarine was surfacing.

Surrender and capture
[experience from U-515]

Six and a half minutes after Chatelain's attack, the submarine breached the surface 700 meters from the ship. The Chatelain, Pillsbury, Jenks, and two Wildcats opened fire with anti-personnel automated weapons, clearing the deck of escaping crew. Only 50 caliber, 20 millimeter, and 40 millimeter weapons scored hits as all other weapons missed. Lange lead the bridge watch crew and 1st watch officer to the deck, in an attempt to evaluate the situation. Lange was immediately hit by shrapnel in the leg as other attempt to man the antiaircraft guns underfire. The watch crew was strafed as another at the gun was injured. Lange made his way to the hatch, ordering to scuttle and abandon ship. This order was relayed by the engineering officer as most of the crew made their way on deck. A majority of the control room's crew stayed behind, planning to ready onboard scuttling charges under the leadership of the chief engineer. The chief engineer had already jumped ship, which became problematic as only the captain, executive officer, and chief engineer knew how to set the charges' timer. This also opened a chaotic power vacuum, as the boats line of command starts with the captain, than the 1st watch officer and than the 2nd watch officer. By now, Lange was unconscious and the 1st watch officer was wounded on deck. The 2nd watch officer does not appear as doing anything of note during the chaotic evacuation, leading to panic among the crew and the scuttling order not being carried out. An engineering petty officer assumed control of the situation, planning on opening all the diving tanks once most of the crew was evacuated. This plan went well before it was realized depth charge damage to the operating shafts of the largest diving tanks, 6 and 7, prevented their opening. The rest of the crew evacuated after several futile attempts to open the tanks. The plan to detonate scuttling charges - recognized as an effective way to sink the ship once detonated - was abandoned as all officers needed were unavaible, and the chief engineer who was assumed to be the most knowledgeable about the task, was gone. Immediately before parting, one of the control room crewmembers removed a steel cover from the water strainer apart of the main pump, which rushed in water. Critically, he threw it on the ground nearby.

The submarine's rudder was damaged, which caused it to drift out of control right. This was misinterpreted by the Chatelain as the submarine aiming torpedoes, who fired one of her own in response. The torpedo and 3 inch rounds from the main armament all missed. Captain Gallery announced the message, "I want to capture that bastard, if possible" followed by the escort commander ordered, "Cease firing" and "Away all boarding parties" at 1126 once most of U-505's crew was in the water. The motorboat from Pillsbury, under the command of Lieutenant Junior Grade Albert David, was already manned and quickly launched. What was problematic about the group was that they had no idea what kind of resistance they would find, how primed the scuttling charges were, and the fact that none of the men had ever been on a submarine before. The motorboat came along the rouge submarine before quickly securing the deck. The body of the only engagement's fatality was found on top of the conning tower hatch. Two men went down the ladder, finding no remaining Germans onboard. The codebooks were the first things seized, being transferred via human chain onto the deck. Uncontrolled flooding began setting the boat deeper, angling it 10 degrees bow up. A third man entered after the capture of codebooks, who identified the source of the water. The cover of a sea chest was removed, exposing a 6 inch hole which water fell though. The cover was found nearby on the floor, and was reinstalled. The eminent threat of sinking was fixed as it was the only source of flooding. The buoyancy issue reached the point where seawater began entering through the conning tower hatch, forcing the boarding party to close it. The boarding party than occupied itself with destroying the wiring of what they thought were scuttling charges.

Meanwhile, the Guadalcanal turned and launched its own motorboat which contained sailors who had more knowledge of submarines. This group was lead by the experienced engineer Commander Earl Trosino. On their arrival, a wave threw their boat on the submarine, breaking the boat and throwing its crew on the deck. After collecting themselves, the second party failed to open the main hatch, which was sealed shut by an imbalance of air pressure. A nearby German sailor in the water was brought aboard, asked how to open the hatch, and promptly thrown overboard once completing the request. Once onboard, Trosino would focus on understanding the ballast system and stabilizing the boat. This was achieved by him tracing out pipes below the main deck. At the same time, another man searched for scuttling explosives that were meant to purposely sink the boat in an attempt to avoid its capture. It was known to the Americans that 14 5 pound TNT charges were throughout the vessel, but not its design or precise location. Thirteen were found and disarmed within hours, leaving one unlocated.

Transport
After Trosino and his crew got aboard, the first attempt at securing the submarine was made. Pillsbury attempted to come along to send over water pumps and tow the ship, but the captain failed to account for the submarine's diving planes, who's port bow plane cut into the hull and flooded two compartments, including an engine room. The ship than backed off to focus on damage control. Pillsbury later reported that a destroyer escort would not be able to tow the U-505, so the job was passed to Guadalcanal. During this time, the U-505 was in a problematic state. When underway the submarine would only list about ten degrees stern. Yet when slowed down, the boat would settle enough that water submerged the conning tower hatch. Guadalcanal than approached U-505, sending over a heaving line and a messenger line with a one and a quarter inch towing line attached from the aft. The line was quickly secured as an American flag flying over a German flag was installed in one of the submarine's voice tubes. A message was sent to United States Navy Atlantic Command and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet requesting assistance in towing the captured vessel. The submarine still had a jammed rudder, list to starboard, and was sheering right which streched the towing lines. Guadacanal's speed was limited to 6 knots as it had to turn into the wind to recover four aircraft. She than launched several others as the extremely slow ship was a prime target in U-boat waters. The Pillsbury announced it hoped to sail again in a few hours though one screw, whereas Pope was detached to stay with the damaged escort. Realizing the Guadancal was unable to reach its destination of Casablanca, Captain Gallery made announced to Atlantic Command that he intended to head to nearby Dakar. As the sun set the boarding parties were recalled, explaining the situation on the boat. Trosino believed the submarine would stay afloat, he could repair the rudder by morning, and that there might be a booby trap.PG301

Shortly after the sun set, Flaherty reported spotty radar contacts, joined by the Chatelain announcing a possible sound contact. The Guadalcanal was too aggressive in its counter-maneuvering attempting to leave the area of a possible enemy, which caused the tow line to snap at midnight. The rest of the night was spent circling the submarine until a two and one quarter inch thick wire was secured between the two ships. Updated orders were sent from the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, requiring the force to dock in Bermuda with the submarine, as Dakar was known to contain spies. To facilitate this, fleet tug Abnaki and oiler Kennebeck were detached from an east bound convoy to take over the towing job and to refuel the fleet. Add 14th scttling charge, see Navy in WW2

Legacy
Awards given

'''Call it a U-cruiser? and explain why'''

Trosino recomened for navy cross, only got legion of merit, see 20 tons

NOTE1 - The tanks are described as "diving cells" in Hunt and Kill: U-505 and the U-Boat War in the Atlantic, yet are the same.

See hunt and kill for charge information

Commanders
Order U-505 for command

Commander F. S. Hall - Screen Commander

Commander Dudley Knox - Chatelian

294

Sunk U-515

U-554

U-68

Damaged U-129