Draft:Chester Braddock deGavre

Chester ("Chet") Braddock deGavre (August 17, 1907 - May 16,1993 ) tested and evaluated most of the equipment used by the U.S. Army's airborne forces in World War Two, pioneered free fall parachuting in the military, served as a controversial commander of the 65th Infantry Regiment in Korea, and was a noted waterfowl artist.

Early life
deGavre grew up in Red Bank New Jersey. His father, Charles J. deGavre of Newark New Jersey, was a parttime limousine driver who served as the organist for the Red Bank Lodge of the BPO Elks and played the piano for the Guardians of the Old Guard of Red Bank. His mother, S. Louise Braddock deGavre of Seville Florida, was the cornerstone of the family, commuting daily to New York City to her job as a seamstress. She was part American Indian, most probably Cherokee.

Military Career
In April 1926 deGavre enlisted as a Private in Troop E of the 102nd (horse) Cavalry, New Jersey National Guard (Essex Troop). In July 1929 Corporal deGavre was accepted by the United States Military Academy through a National Guard appointment in a nationwide competition. He entered West Point at age 22 as one of the oldest members of the Class of 1933. Athletically inclined, he lettered in lacrosse and wrestling and played football. He graduated in the lower 89th percentile of his class.

Upon graduation, he was detailed to the Army Air Corps flight school at Randolph Field and in his own words "washed out". He requested the Cavalry branch but was assigned to the Infantry.

Airborne

Following several routine infantry assignments, in September 1942 Major deGavre completed parachute training at Fort Benning, one of the first officers to do so and at age 35 one of the oldest trainees. Immediately upon completing parachute training, deGavre joined the staff of the newly formed Airborne Command at Fort Bragg and later at Camp Mackall under the command of Colonel William H. Lee, "The Father of the U.S. Airborne". In the same month Colonel Lee directed that all testing and development of equipment be consolidated under Major deGavre.

deGavre joined the airborne community at a pivotal moment in its history. In May 1940 a small German glider contingent, followed by parachutists, had audaciously captured Fort Eban Emael, the supposedly invincible northern anchor of the Belgian fortifications facing Germany. More important to the evolution of U.S. military thinking was the successful airborne assault by a large force of German parachutists, or Fallschirmjägers, in May 1941 on the island of Crete which was defended by a numerically superior British and allied force. The Crete operation gave both credibility to the early advocates of airborne operations within the U.S. Army and impetus and urgency to developing airborne equipment and doctrine. For the Germans, the high casualties experienced by their Fallschirmjägers and the large losses of transport aircraft foreclosed any future large-scale airborne operations. In Hitler's words, "the days of parachute troops are over".

In March 1942 following Pearl Harbor and the sweeping reorganization of the War Department, the Army accelerated and greatly expanded its plans for Airborne forces. The Provisional Parachute Group at Fort Benning was redesignated the Airborne Command with expanded responsibilities (later re-designated the Airborne Center in February 1944 with reduced responsibilities) and moved to Fort Bragg. The Airborne Command was tasked with activating, training, and preparing for combat all airborne units and with a myriad of other activities relating to airborne forces, including doctrine, organization and equipment. In only three years, by the end of World War II, American airborne units had evolved from specialized light infantry units into formations more resembling a standard army division.

deGavre's responsibilities for all testing and development of airborne equipment was challenging. James Gavin, who had joined the predecessor to the Airborne Command in August 1941 and later served as the CO 82nd Airborne Division, wrote: "[T]he problems were without precedent. Individuals had to be capable of fighting at once against any opposition they met upon landing. ...Equipment had to be lightweight and readily transportable. Weapons had to be hand-carried. This meant larger weapons had to be broken down into individual loads, such as mortars and parachute-dropped artillery." German parachute equipment fell far short of these criteria. Parachutes were attached to the soldiers' waists suspending them facing downwards and thus Fallschirmjägers could not reach their parachute risers to maneuver their parachutes. Their harnesses were tight and early versions did not have quick-release buckles. Aircraft exit procedures required the Fallschirmjäger to have free hands, and these procedures plus the restrictive harnesses prevented the German soldier from carrying rifles or machine guns on their person during descent. Weapons, other than pistols and knives, had to be parachuted separately in containers that upon landing the soldier had to locate and open on the battlefield often under fire.

For the next two years, deGavre served as Chief of the Test and Development Section of the Airborne Command (September 1942-July 1943) and then as Parachute Officer (July 1943-July 1944). In these capacities, Major and then Lieutenant Colonel deGavre, without the aid of any established precedent and at great physical risk, personally evaluated, tested, developed, adapted or standardized most of the equipment used by the rapidly growing airborne forces. He parachuted from dozens of different types of aircraft - transports, bombers, gliders - with experimental parachutes, harnesses and equipment from low altitudes with static lines and free-falling from high altitudes. He personally conducted these jumps as "first tries", thereby inspiring the soldiers in his Section.

In August 1944, deGavre received the Legion of Merit, then a relatively new military medal first awarded in October 1942. The award's citation reads in part: "In the early period of the airborne organization Lieutenant Colonel Degavre directed the expansion of the Test and Development Section [of the Airborne Command] ... He displayed exceptional talent for inventiveness and exercised great mechanical ingenuity in conducting test and development of airborne equipment. He pioneered a majority of the projects pertaining to weapons and equipment proposed for airborne units both parachute and glider."

The sateen jump suit deGavre used while assigned to the Airborne Command - a circa 1941 one-piece balloon cotton jump suit with numerous zippered and other pockets - was in the collection of the 82nd War Memorial Muesum. It is now held by the U.S. Airborne and Special Operations Museum at Fort Liberty (Fort Bragg) in North Carolina. When on display, the jump suit is on a mannequin stenciled with the name "C.B. DE GAVRE"

In July 1944 Lieutenant Colonel deGavre together with 35 other officers and men were sent by the War Department from the United States to assist in planning and executing the airborne spearhead of Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of Southern France. Apocryphally the invasion was re-named Operation Dragoon (previously Operation Anvil) to reflect Prime Minister Churchill's persistent reluctance to the invasion of Southern France.

deGavre was appointed Chief of Staff of The First Airborne Task Force, an ad hoc division-size unit. He and his officers were given only a few weeks to plan a complex operation. The Task Force was a hastily assembled amalgam of 19 mostly American parachute and glider units, including a Japanese American antitank company and a British independent parachute brigade, none of whom had previously worked together. On August 15,1944, 396 troop-transport aircraft carried the parachutists in a pre-dawn assault, followed later in the day by another parachute drop. Two waves of 407 gliders carrying troops and heavy equipment landed in the early morning and early evening.

deGavre parachuted on August 15 in the pre-dawn dark and mist into the Argonne Valley near Le Muis. As was common with many paratroop operations, deGavre landed dispersed from his comrades and was soon besieged with two other soldiers in a stone farmhouse under fire from German soldiers who had dismounted from a truck convoy. A column of soldiers from the 542nd Parachute Infantry Combat Team, together with some British paratroopers, relieved the three Americans, the 542nd soldiers' "burdens eased somewhat by three captured [German] trucks". Many years later in 1984 deGavre was "adopted" by the 542nd Parachute Infantry Association.

The airborne component of Operation Dragoon is considered by some to have been one of the more successful airborne operations of World War Two and the most accurate night combat drop of the War. Although greatly overshadowed by the success of the Normandy invasion, the historian Anthony Beevor has written that the invasion of Southern France, "... accelerated the German retreat and saved the rest of France from the destruction which occurred during the battle of attrition in Normandy." In addition, the captured ports of Toulon and Marseille provided over 1/3 of the Allied logistical needs in Northern France until Antwerp was opened in December 1944.

Its mission accomplished, The First Airborne Task Force was disbanded in late November 1944. deGavre then very briefly commanded the 5th Airborne Training Center near Rome which provided parachute training for replacements for airborne units and was modelled on the parachute school at Fort Benning. It had also served as a training area to bring unit cohesion to the disparate units that composed the First Airborne Task Force. The Center was closed shortly after the invasion of Southern France.

In December 1944 the Army established an Airborne Board to centralize the testing, evaluation and development of airborne equipment. deGavre, soon to be a colonel, returned to Camp Mackall to be its first President. One veteran, writing almost fifty years later, recalled the entrepreneurial and experimental spirit deGavre inculcated among his men. "We never knew from day-to-day whether we'd be drop testing a Cushman Scooter or motorcycle; marching in the field with experimental gas masks; jumping the Hart, Derry, Baseball or Elastic-Line chute; or (horrors) being considered as a subject to descend in the Higgins Parabag. Yep ... them were the days!" The Board, composed of many veterans from the 542nd Parachute Infantry, continued the work of its predecessors - testing and developing containers, parachute packs for crew-served weapons, radios, demolition kits, ammunition, rations and other supplies. New types of parachutes were tested to improve control in the air and to reduce oscillation. A daisy chain was developed for field artillery to hold packs together. Heavier artillery was tested and flown in planes and gliders.

In July 1946, the officers and men who served from March 1942 to June 1946 in this unit and its predecessor, The Airborne Command's Service Test Section, were awarded The Meritorious Service Unit Plaque (now The Meritorious Unit Commendation) for "...exercising extreme ingenuity and initiative with complete disregard for personal safety in evaluating, testing and developing material for airborne operations..."

In 1946-1947 deGavre was assigned as the American liaison to the British airborne at Brize Norton where he took further parachute training to compare Amercian and British parachute techniques, parachuting from ballon cars and Dakota transport aircraft. Partly as a result of his reports, American equipment and techniques underwent further changes. After attending the Army Staff College in Norfolk, he was assigned to the Pentagon as Chief of the Airborne Section in Army R&D from 1948-1952.

Korea: the 65th Infantry Regiment - Pusan through Outpost Kelly

On October 11, 1952, deGavre, now in Korea, was appointed Commanding Officer of the 65th Puerto Rican Infantry Regiment, a National Guard regiment. While serving as Commanding Officer of the 65th, he was decorated with the Silver Star and his second Legion of Merit. Nevertheless, his tour with the 65th is controversial among many of its Puerto Rican veterans,

deGavre lobbied for the position upon being told it was becoming available. He had served with the unit in Puerto Rico as a Captain from 1939 to 1941 as the commander of the 65th's Headquarters company. During his two years in Puerto Rico, he had gained fluency with Spanish. He left with a very good impression of the 65th Infantry. In an interview later with military historian Clay Blair, deGavre recalled that the regiment "...was highly respected and fathers and sons and grandfathers had been in the regiment. ... The old non-coms were terrific people. They were professional all the way and their hearts were in the right place. ... They were eager to have their children and their grandchildren become good soldiers." Some of the soldiers serving with the regiment in Korea in 1952 had served previously with deGavre in the headquarters company in Puerto Rico, including his soon-to-be adjutant who was a "very good friend of mine" and the sergeant major of the 3rd battalion.

deGavre's assessment was not unique among the "continentals " who had served with the 65th. Colonel William W. Harris, who very ably served as its CO from July 1949 to April 1951, as told by the military historian Clay Blair, "came to admire the people and the spirit he found in this offbeat outfit, and he was soon its most ardent booster ... [In Korea, he was] a dedicated advocate (and publicist) for his Puerto Ricans".

Immediately prior to deploying to Korea the regiment enlisted 2,000 recruits to fill its ranks, out of tens of thousands that applied for duty. The large majority of the recruits were World War Two veterans and spoke both Spanish and English. After disembarking in Pusan in September 1950 and soon to be part of the 3d Infantry Division, the 65th Regiment fought from the Pusan perimeter north towards the Chosin Reservoir. In the northward advance towards the Yalu River, "... the Puerto Ricans, experiencing subzero temperatures for the first time in their lives and still dressed in summer clothing, performed with astonishing valor and élan." There they "... faced hordes of Chinese, eyeball to eyeball, and did not flinch. ... [the Puerto Ricans] ... demonstrated even to the most skeptical of their critics that they were a force to be reckoned with." The 65th together with other units as part of Task Force Dog helped open up the evacuation route for the First Marine Division to the port of Hungnam. Fighting a rear-guard action, it was among the last combat units defending the Hungnam perimeter before embarking on U.S. Navy ships. Later back on the offensive, the 65th was the first unit to cross the Han River below Seoul and one of the first to re-enter Seoul in 1951. It was instrumental in breaking the "Iron Triangle" in the summer of 1951. Colonel Harris records innumerable instances of bravery by individual privates, corporals and sergeants that saved outposts from being overrun or that broke the back of an enemy assault. "The men of the 65th were cool, determined, self-reliant, and effective combat soldiers. They were fearless." "It was well led, well trained, and highly motivated." It had earned an "enviable" record.

The 65th Infantry Regiment - referred to as a Regimental Combat Team when augmented with embedded artillery and tank battalions - did have its detractors. It was an idiosyncratic unit, composed of three Puerto Rican battalions, for a time one Philipine battalion, and in the north a black tank unit and a black artillery battalion. As a geographically based unit, it was institutionally unique within the U.S. Army. As an ethnic and colored unit, it attracted prevailing biases and doubts from some senior commanders. Yet the 65th's unimpeachable combat record through 1951 spoke for itself.

By the end of 1951 and accelerating into 1952 the combat effectiveness of the regiment began to deteriorate significantly. Signs of erosion reached as far back as the Spring of 1951 when there was a rash of fingers and toes being shot off by "inductees" - service fillers or replacements for casualties - who had not absorbed the traditions of the proud 65th. Later in September the regiment experienced its first major tactical setback failing to seize hills in the Chowon Valley despite substantial support from all elements of its parent unit, the 3d Division.

In mid-1951 Colonel Harris was replaced as CO, ultimately with a Puerto Rican political appointee. His two highly regarded veteran battalion commanders - St. Clair and Dammer - were also replaced. Most destructive was the army's rotation policy introduced in September 1951 which led to a massive exodus of combat-experienced soldiers, NCO's and officers. "Inductees", typically without high school degrees and with little or no fluency in English, replaced proud bi-lingual and veteran volunteers. Although all U.S. Army units suffered from this policy, the 65th was uniquely impacted by the loss of its bilingual NCO cadres who provided essential communication on the battlefield. Following the huge turnover in personnel in the first six months of 1952, the 65th's NCO deficit reached "crisis proportions".

The Korean War itself had also changed. For twelve months it had been a war of movement. Now following the peace negotiations which had commenced in July 1951, it had become a static war characterized by bloody battles for contested hills lying between each side's main line of defense. The hills themselves were typically barren and rocky offering little natural protection to soldiers. Both sides placed reliance upon heavy artillery - and Chinese artillery competency, artillery shell supply and tactical acumen had markedly improved. The result was battles which produced prodigious casualties. Though the battles for the hills were intense and costly in terms of human life, the hills were in the words of the historian Clay Blair "inconsequential". Others saw them as having more political rationale than military - as negotiating leverage at the sometimes-stalled truce negotiations at Panmunjom. .The last two months of the war - which ended on 27 July 1953 - were among the most horrific of the war in terms of casualties. Well before then most troop commanders had concluded that the War as it was being fought was "verging on the criminal".

Troop morale within all U.S. Eighth Army units - including the 65th Regiment - was significantly impacted by the high casualties incurred in fighting a stalemated, no-win war. Time magazine wrote "soldiers see no purpose and no good in the kind of war they are fighting. Many months later in July 1953 General Maxwell Taylor decided he could no longer justify risking more lives for hills that were of minimal strategic importance. Chinese commanders continued to operate on a different calculus and assaulted United Nation positions.

In September 1952 the Chinese launched an offensive against several of these contested hills, one being Outpost Kelly then occupied by units of the 65th. The regiment fought for the hill for eight days in late September 1952 and was ultimately pushed off of Outpost Kelly. Soldiers of the 65th were caught literally in their sleeping bags by the attacking Chinese and numerous soldiers were killed and captured. The regiment then failed in a counterattack to re-occupy the Outpost. The disintegration was not gradual or orderly - "men [were] in full flight .... without helmets, weapons or even shirts". Five other outpost hills held by other Eight Army units had been overrun by Chinese forces as part of their larger offensive, but Outpost Kelly was the only one not recaptured. The eight-day battle for Outpost Kelly produced numerous casualties. During the month of September, the regiment suffered 413 battle casualties, the bulk at Outpost Kelly, the unit's highest monthly casualty rate since the 65th arrived in Korea.

The 1st Corps Commander Lieutenant General Paul Kendall, who had personally witnessed the 65th's failure at Outpost Kelly, relieved the commanders of both the 3d Division and the 65th Regiment. General Kendall wrote that the commander of the 65th Infantry, Colonel Juan Cesar Cordero-Davila, was "... incapable of properly commanding a regiment of infantry in combat". Colonel Cordero, the only National Guard officer to command a regiment in Korea, was a popular figure in Puerto Rican politics with little battlefield experience or formal military education. According to the historian Villahermosa, Colonel Cordero "... owed his assignment to his close ties with Puerto Rico's political elite." Only his able subordinates held the unit together. Compounding leadership weaknesses at the regimental level, the 3d Division commander failed to address the regiment's NCO crisis, exercising hands-off leadership of the 65th, possibly intimidated by Cordero's strong political associations. Cordero returned to Puerto Rico a national hero and was later promoted to Brigadier General.

The debacle on Outpost Kelly resulted in two senior officers bring relieved and no soldiers being court-martialed.

Korea: the 65th Infantry - Jackson Heights and Court-Martials

Upon assuming command of the regiment on October 11, deGavre immediately understood that the 65th was not the unit he remembered. The regiment that he had served with a decade previously - a regiment of proud career bilingual officers, NCO's and soldiers - was now manned largely by draftees, NCO's who were not bilingual and "continental" officers who could not speak Spanish. The unit had lost its tight-knit cohesion and its proud sense of family.

deGavre immediately addressed widely recognized deficiencies in both training and discipline which had suffered under Colonel Codero. As recorded by the historian Gilberto Villahermosa who has written extensively on the 65th Infantry, Colonel Codero pandered to his men rather than emphasizing discipline and combat training. He established a Privates' Council which met once a month, undercutting the military chain of command. In the words of the CO of the 3d Division, "there was much to indicate that Colonel Codero was not a disciplinarian."

deGavre embarked upon an intensive three-week training cycle which was hobbled by lack of ammunition, restrictions on live-fire exercises, and division inspections. He also issued an order for all soldiers to improve their appearance and the condition of their equipment. The order encompassed haircuts, shaving beards and mustaches, wearing helmets, proper treatment of firearms and proper clothing. deGavre told the interviewer Clay Blair "The first thing I decided to do was to shape this outfit up and bring it back to Jesus, so to speak. This regiment is going to shave clean by Monday morning."

The order to shave mustaches in particular provoked a strong response including from Colonel Betances-Ramirez, the 2nd Battalion CO and the only Puerto Rican to command a battalion in the 65th during the Korean War. Mustaches were integral to a Puerto Rican's sense of manhood. Major Silvestre E. Ortiz, the regimental adjutant and a friend of deGavre's from his time in Puerto Rico (1939-1941), wrote: "Mine had to go also after 22 years with me. All that the mustache means to a Puerto Rican, it is part of his personality, in many cases the product of a religious vow, so much so that the three chaplains went to visit this gentleman and apprised him of its importance..." The regiment's chaplains personally warned deGavre that he was going to be murdered in 24 hours.

Gilberto Villahermosa concluded that "... De Gavre hoped to persuade Smythe [CO 3d Division] that the 65th was capable of adhering to the same standards of military courtesy and discipline exhibited by the 7th and 15th Infantries [the other two regiments in the 3d Division]. He also realized that the chain of command would not tolerate the 65th maintaining a separate identity as long as the regiment continued to perform badly in combat."

Fourteen days after deGavre assumed command, on October 25, 1952, the Chinese launched another series of attacks including an assault on Jackson Heights held by a unit of the 65th. Jackson Heights was a barren, steep, solid rock hill two thousand yards distant from the main United Nations' line of defense. Following prodigious Chinese artillery fire over three days, the American soldiers withdrew after suffering numerous battle casualties. On October 28 a unit of the 65th recaptured the hill. Following heavy loses, soldiers began deserting the hill and the next day refused to return, forcing the remaining soldiers to withdraw. On October 29 a unit of the 65th again secured the hill, but shortly thereafter its men began abandoning the hill "without an enemy round being fired or a live enemy being sighted". Five days later, a patrol from the regiment into no man's land was aborted when several deserted to the rear and others refused a direct order issued through an interpreter. The 3d Division withdrew the 65th Regiment from the front lines.

Almost immediately after the battle for Jackson Heights, the 3d Division staff judge advocate reviewed statements from everyone at Jackson Heights, interviewed some soldiers, and brought charges. The Army's theatre commanders approved harsh measures including mass court-martials and severe sentences. In total, one officer and 90 enlisted personnel received stiff sentences for desertion, misbehavior before the enemy, and willfully disobeying a lawful order from a superior officer. It was not the first time soldiers had panicked under fire in Korea, including soldiers from a patrol from the 3d Division's 15th Infantry one month later. But it was the first time soldiers had been court-martialed for such action. And it was in "a unit that which had won international recognition for bravery."

Months later when the court-martials became public, a political storm erupted in Washington. deGavre's wife, who was working at the time in the Pentagon as a stenographer in the army's Office of Congressional Relations and who was not aware of the court-martials, recalled the Office receiving numerous letters from Capitol Hill. In January The New York Times did an in-depth report. It concluded: "Of the 519 men in the three companies and patrols involved, most held their ground and did not flee. The Army had sufficient evidence to bring charges against ninety-seven ...The sentences given range from six months to ten years at hard labor. The severity of the sentence was governed by the circumstances and previous records." Within two years, the Secretary of Army Robert Stevens had given clemency or pardons to all those sentenced. No exonerations were offered.

The debates over the cause of the regiment's disgrace on Jackson Heights and the ensuing court-martials remain bitter and emotional today.

The historian Clay Blair, a great admirer of the 65th in the early War years, points to the Army's rotation policy: "Stripped of its experienced and spirited volunteers, the 65th sank into a gradual decline that was to result, finally, in a scandalous bugout."

Villahermosa has written extensively on the 65th. In an article published in Army Magazine in 2001 Villahermosa explored collapse of the 65th, focusing on the lack of bi-lingual NCO's and specifically the practice of assigning English-speaking Puerto Rican NCOs to Eighth Army units other than the 65th. He has offered more inclusive interpretations both in his 2000 report Honor and Fidelity and in his longer 2009 book The 65th Infantry in Korea. At the end of his 2009 book, he summarizes in over six pages his conclusions. He points to numerous issues, most importantly - as judged by the space devoted to the subject - the rotation out of experienced soldiers and officers and the lack of bi-lingual NCO's, the politically motivated appointment of Col. Cordero as regimental commander, and the inattentive leadership at the division level. At the end of this summary, he briefly questions some of deGavre's decisions, specifically the potential impact on morale of his order to shave all facial hair. Villahermosa also writes deGavre lacked time to accomplish much before being ordered to defend Jackson Heights. Two weeks of intensive training could not remedy the basic weakness of the regiment.

More recent magazine articles focus blame upon deGavre, attributing to him personally - a white continental - the failure at Jackson Heights. The oft cited criticism is deGavre's order, as quoted by Villahermosa, to shave mustaches "until such time as they gave proof of their manhood" and its damaging effect on morale which then caused or contributed to the Jackson Heights failures. As inferred from Villahermosa's The 65th Infantry in Korea, these words come from a memo written by Col. Betances-Ramierz twenty-five years later in 1988, a memo which is in the personal files of Villahermosa. Col. Betances-Ramirez was - questionably - relieved of his battalion command by General Smythe of the 3d Division following the route at Jackson Heights and thus arguably may not be an unbiased observer. No historian has cited a written order with these words and thus they may have arisen during a bitter argument between deGavre and Betances-Ramirz who vigorously opposed the order to shave mustaches.

The ten incendiary words - "until such time as they gave proof of the manhood" - are central to the critique of deGavre and his responsibility for the debacle at Jacson Heights. For example, an article in the Military Officer, the magazine for the Military Officers Association of America, cites these words which, when combined with the language barrier, resulted in insubordination in two of the three battalions. This narrative prevails in other current writings.

The ad hominem critique of deGavre does not explain the 65th's failure on outpost Kelly. The ten words are also at sharp variance with deGavre's persona as assessed by his commanding officers over his years of military service. For example, as cited in a Bronze Medal (Meritorious) awarded only a few months later, deGavre (then serving as an advisor to a Korean (ROK) division) is seen as possessing tact, persistence and quiet aggressiveness while at the same time promoting mutual respect (see below).

Another book - a 2020 novel - based upon interviews with thirteen Puerto Rican veterans - all Silver Star or Bronze Star veterans - digs deeper into the psychology of the 65th soldiers after Outpost Kelly. The veterans recall the miserable failure of Col. Cordero in his mission, the loss of the old veterans, the suicidal assaults on Outpost Kelly and later Jackson Heights where there was no cover and no place to dig a foxhole both of which were in the end meaningless objectives, the illiterate draftees who could not converse with their continental officers through the language barrier, the order to shave mustaches even though Army regs permitted them, a widespread prejudice against Puerto Ricans, the paucity of Silver Stars awarded to Puerto Rican soldiers. In the end, author concluded that the veterans felt the Army had deserted them, that "the whole organization of the war effort was culpable", that "the refusal to fight ... was more a criticism of the system rather than a reflection on their valor".

Korea: Redemption - 1953

Immediately following the debacle at Jackson Heights, the 65th Infantry was withdrawn from the front line. deGavre launched an intensive program of training that emphasized small unit capabilities and confidence in organic weapons. The regiment, still an ethnic Puerto Rican formation, was re-committed to combat in December 1952 and January 1953. Although unit cohesion continued to be bedeviled by the lack of bilingual NCO's, deGavre reported " ... signs of better spirit and improved efficiency", unit morale excellent, and a dramatic drop in disciplinary problems. Notwithstanding deGavre's positive comments, the Army command had already lost faith in the 65th, seeing the lack of bilingual NCO's and officers as insuperable challenges.

In early November 1952, General James Van Fleet, Commander of the Eighth Army, had recommended the Department of Army de-activate the 65th Infantry Regiment. However, unlike other regiments perceived to be unreliable in combat in Korea, the regiment was retained. At the end of February 1953, the Army ordered the regiment be reconfigured into an integrated formation with soldiers from across the Nation. Levies were placed on other units in Korea to supply soldiers and NCO's to the 65th. Over 2,000 Puerto Rican soldiers were transferred to other units in Korea. All Puerto Rican officers in the 65th were retained. General Maxwell Taylor, now the hands-on Commander of Eighth Army, visited deGavre at the 65th on March 28 for a personal update on the quality of the personnel being transferred into the 65th. One month later, the newly integrated regiment began a six-week period of intensive training. The accelerated course included training in individual weapons, crew-served weapons and squad tactics, squad, platoon and battalion exercises with infiltration courses, model defensive positions, bunkers, minefields, and bayonets. In mid-May the regiment was recommitted to the frontline at Outpost Harry. It was almost immediately tested by a Chinese mid-night assault on May 16 which was repulsed with large enemy casualties. The fighting then and later at Outpost Harry was as intense as at Outpost Kelly and Jackson Heights. The regiment did not hesitate on the offensive and stubbornly held its ground on the defensive and then counterattacked. The 65th's performance attracted praise from its senior commanders. In early June 1953, General Maxwell Taylor returned to the regiment to observe personally its combat operations and in a telegram addressed to the CO 3d Division "have noted with pride the staunch defensive and offensive opns [operations] conducted by the three inf div during the period nine dash one June [June 1-9]. The successful raid by the six five inf reg and defense of Outpost Harry by the one five inf reg are outstanding. I extend most sincere congratulations to you and your troops." In the following month, the CO 3d Division congratulated the regiment for a raid and reconnaissance patrol, writing: "The elan and professional skill demonstrated throughout these operations [night of 5-6 July 1953] are indicative of outstanding leadership and dogged devotion to duty."

The unit's combat performance vindicated the Army's decision to retain the 65th. It was also a testament to deGavre's "unusual ability" that in eight intensive weeks he integrated and trained thousands of new personnel into a cohesive and effective fighting force.

Shortly before the July 27,1953 Armistice in Korea, deGavre was replaced as CO of the 65th. He had served as the 65th's CO for nine months, the average tenure for regimental commanders in the 3d Division in Korea being less than 4 months.

deGavre was awarded several citations during his command. In March 1953 he received the Silver Star Medal citing "his calm and fearless manner" while under intense artillery fire. In July 1953 the 3d Division awarded him a Bronze Star (Meritorious) for his leadership in reorganizing the regiment into a national unit, his intensive training program, outstanding professional skill, the success of the regiment's "bold and punishing daylight attacks". deGavre "... performed his duties in an exceptionally superior manner. His reassuring presence with the most forward elements of his command and his resourceful stability in times of stress were all inspiring and vital factors in the success of the 65th Infantry Regiment."

The Bronze Star was almost immediately supplanted by deGavre's second Legion of Merit awarded by Gen. Maxwell Taylor's Eighth Army citing "outstanding service ... displaying astute judgement and professional competence ... reflected in the combat effectiveness and high morale of officers and men." In August 1953 Gen. Maxwell Taylor personally wrote to the Adjutant General, Department of the Army, recommending deGavre's promotion to Brigadier General citing "his outstanding record while under my command."

These medals and awards are not mentioned in Villahermosa's seminal history of the 65th Regiment in Korea.

Many years later, upon deGavre's retirement from the Army, the Army Chief of Staff wrote in a letter to deGavre: "As commander of the 65th Infantry Regiment, you were responsible in large measure for organizing and training this organization and leading it in combat with exceptional results."

Remaining in Korea, deGavre served for two months from July 12,1953 to September 24,1953 as senior advisor to the 12th ROK Division. In a citation for a Bronze Star (Meritorious), his superiors wrote: "He personally inspected frontline positions under enemy observation and fire. ...The effectiveness of his interest and professional advice was reflected in a remarkable improvement in health standards, morale and fighting spirit of the individual soldier. ... Demonstrating a tact, persistence and quiet aggressiveness, he promoted an atmosphere of complete cordiality and mutual respect."

Korea to Retirement: 1953-1963

Colonel deGavre served as Chief of Staff for the 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg. Upon graduation from the Army War College in Jume 1953, he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, and returned to the Pentagon in Army R&D under the airborne icon, General M. James Gavin. In his own words, the "finest assignment I have ever had" was serving as the Assistant Division Commander for Combat Arms of the 82nd Airborne Division from 1957-1959. In 1942-44 while at Camp Mackall he had pioneered free falling with heavy radio equipment, falling from altitudes of 5,000 to 6,000 feet with delayed openings of up to 17 seconds. Now serving with the 82nd Division, he became the first general officer to become a free fall parachutist, completing 10 such jumps. He encouraged the development of the 82nd Division's Sky-Dive unit and the famous Army parachute team. Prior to leaving the 82d, he completed his 135th parachute jump. Following assignments in Ethiopia as head of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and at Fort Monroe, he retired from the Army in 1963. Immediately prior to retirement, he was awarded his third Legion of Merit.

Waterfowl Artist and Carver
As a young boy aged 12, Chet deGavre began to spend the winter months hunting waterfowl on the banks of the Shrewsbury River in Rumson, New Jersey. He carved his own full-size decoys both as a necessity and as an expression of his enduring love of waterfowl. None of these decoys remain extant. Later in the Army he shifted to carving full size decorative birds, for example, as lamp-bases. Then in 1935 recognizing the practicality of military life, he turned to carving miniatures on a one-to-six scale, often carrying four or five "blanks" in his pockets while on long flights or while idle on field maneuvers or even in the cold winters in Korea. Carving was a thorough joy for him, a form of metal relaxation offering in his words "therapeutic value". His deep love of waterfowl guided his large hands to create out of a block of wood ducks and geese that were alive.

Each pair of miniatures took five hours to carve using a penknife and sandpaper, plus another twenty-five hours to apply meticulously oil paint under a magnifying glass and then to mount them. He used bass wood for bodies - a straight-grained wood - and mahogany for the heads and later the wings. The birds were typically mounted in pairs on driftwood of red cedar. The noted carver A.J. King (1881-1963) - the preeminent carver of decorative miniature game birds of that era - greatly influenced Chet's work as he developed his own style.

While in the military, carving was a hobby and a form of relaxation. Before retiring, he had completed very roughly 500 pairs of waterfowl. Thereafter the numbers of his miniatures increased substantially which he sold at exhibits and to a client list that grew steadily by word of mouth. Though it became a business with such an impossibly long backlog that he stopped taking orders, carving and painting remained for him a pleasure and again in his words was "never tedious".

Chet's work achieved national recognition. As one of thirty artists, he was invited to exhibit his work at the National Audubon Society's 1978 show of contemporary bird carvings and decoys in New York City. He also exhibited his work at many other shows including the annual Atlantic Flyway Waterfowl and Bird Carving Show in Salisbury Maryland sponsored by the Ward Foundation; the well-attended annual Waterfowl Festival in Easton Maryland; the biennial American Bird Carving Exhibit at Washington College in Chesterton Maryland; and the Wetlands Institute in Stone Harbor New Jersey. The Eastern Shore Chapter of Ducks Unlimited recognized him as the Artist of the Year in 1982.

Persona
Upon graduation from West Point in 1933, his classmates wrote in the Howitzer (the class yearbook) their description of Chet. "His nickname [Chet], like his character embodies the sterling characteristics of young America. If ever there was a man with the manliness of a man yet the kindness of a heart of a woman, you see him here. His is a mixed temperament, alternately high spirited and low-spirited ... Athletically inclined, he has no use for the red-comforter man and often denounces vehemently the 'Do-Nothings'."

He was not an intellectual or an academic, as evidenced by his low academic standing at West Point and his distaste for Pentagon assignments. Energy, initiative, ingenuity, courage, common sense, inspiration, were the words commonly used by his superiors to describe Chet. His leadership abilities were widely recognized by his superiors as cited in his decorations referred to above, but also by "grunts" and junior officers. On Chet's first parachute jump in a plane laden with nervous soldiers, one trainee later wrote that his "leadership became contagious". .

As he matured, he became known within the military and the artist waterfowl community for his outsized persona - his abundant sense of humor, his strong moral character, his exuberant enthusiasm. "His striking personality was always foremost."

He had come to the Army through the enlisted ranks. He never forgot that. He was "an Enlisted Man's General", the "Airborne 'Soldiers General' " Sergeants were the core of the Army. One enlisted veteran wrote to him almost 50 years later: "I am sure you are aware of your popularity with noncoms and grunts".

On the Eastern Shore of Virginia where he lived in retirement, they still tell stories of the "General". A former chair of the local Ducks Unlimited chapter recalled Chet ten years after his death: "What a memory. What a man."

deGavre's last years were difficult fior him. He lost his physical prowess, prior cobalt treatment for prostate cancer brought its consequences, his hands shook depriving him of the relaxation he gained from carving and painting his waterfowl miniatures.

Personal Life
In Chet's own words, "I shall start my story in 1949 because that is when my life really began - with my marriage to a lovely and wonderful English [war] widow whose two sons have been a constant joy to me." This was his second marriage, the first having ended in divorce. For the next forty-three years Chet and Teresa ("Tita") enjoyed an enviable companionship. Tita was a "supportive" Army wife. In Ethiopia they explored, camped, hunted and fished together. Later in retirement she complemented Chet's artistic skills in restoring their recently purchased eighteenth-century home at Deep Creek on the Eastern Shore of Virigina. Chet crafted antique furniture made from the wood of walnut trees on the property, personally disassembled or jacked-up dilapidated old barns or small buildings and moved them to their property, resting only to fish in the Bay or to carve his miniatures. After several years, their home attracted much celebration in the annual Historic Garden Tours and in print. The book Chesapeake: The Eastern Shore Gardens and Houses is a beautiful pictorial tour of their home - photographs of Chet's furniture and raised-panel cabinets, a collection of his miniature waterfowl carvings, buildings he moved to the property, Tita's crewel work and gardens, and their menagerie of animals and birds.

Chet died in 1993. He had no children and raised his two stepsons as his own. He is buried alongside Tita at their home. On his tombstone are engraved the words: AIRBORNE PIONEER - WOOD CARVER - LOVING HUSBAND.