Draft:Edit Request United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine

Edit Request: The Negev issue
This is a major Edit Request. I already made a comment about the Negev some 2 months ago. I have now researched this matter because the differing information in various sources about the land use and importance of the Negev has so confused me. Recently, some new research was published on this matter. I now know significantly more than before and am therefore making another, greatly expanded edit request. I am now also WP:XC, but I am proposing such an extensive change here that I prefer to put it up for discussion first. Mainly, I propose to restructure and expand the Ad hoc Committee section.

Why it should be changed: The inclusion of the Negev was the major innovation of the Partition Resolution; therefore, it should be explained. It was also obviously unfair, and very likely even more unfair than depicted in older literature. This should not be obscured. Additionally, the Negev issue was linked to at least one major irregularity in the drafting of the partition (the meeting between Truman and Weizmann), and probably even two (the inaccurate British data). Lastly, this simply reflects the most recent state of research: The extent of the Bedouins' cultivated land according to pre-1946 estimates was only brought to public attention again by Abu-Sitta in 2010 (p. 54) and by Kedar et al. in 2019 (pp. 130-132), following the earlier work of Hadawi. The agricultural history related to this was reconstructed by Halevy only in 2021. The crucial role of Lowdermilk and the UNSCOP visit to Revivim for the Negev decisions was, as far as I know, only highlighted in the four cited monographs from 2019 and 2023. All these pieces are essential to understand both the peculiar innovation of the UN and the outrage of the Arabs about it.

Preparatory Mini-Request

 * What I think should be changed and added (format using textdiff):


 * Why it should be changed: This would set the stage for the major edit request. I now also have realized that "which was mostly not suitable for agriculture, nor for urban development at that time" is probably not just slightly inaccurate. See below.

Major Edit Request
Draft:

== Ad hoc Committee and border adjustments ==

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On 23 September 1947 the General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question to consider the UNSCOP report. Representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and Jewish Agency were invited and attended.

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During the committee's deliberations, the British government endorsed the report's recommendations concerning the end of the mandate, independence, and Jewish immigration. However, the British did "not feel able to implement" any agreement unless it was acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, and asked that the General Assembly provide an alternative implementing authority if that proved to be the case.

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The chairman H. V. Evatt excluded the Arab states from Subcommittee One, which had been delegated the specific task of studying and, if thought necessary, modifying the boundaries of the proposed partition: Initially, only UNSCOP's majority proposal was to be drafted, but an unnamed US politician maneuvered to also draft the minority proposal, thereby excluding the Arab states from the majority proposal's drafting. Instead, all Arab states were placed in Subcommittee 2 to draft the minority recommendation. Evatt also rejected a motion from Subcommittee 2 to balance this subcommittees' composition. He was later criticized for thereby preventing a compromise and a fairer partition proposal by creating these "unbalanced" subcommittees.

=== Subcommittee 2 ===

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Despite being primarily set up to draft a detailed plan for a future unitary government of Palestine (Resolution No. III ), sub-committee 2's groundwork for this resolution only comprised sections 84-91 of their report. Additionally, they worked on two other draft resolutions: a recommendation to refer the Partition Plan to the International Court of Justice (Resolution No. I ), and concerning Jewish refugees from World War II, a recommendation for the countries from which the refugees originated to take them back as much as possible (Resolution No. II ), which was partly adopted by the Ad hoc Committee. Furthermore, they elaborated in sections 57-83 why UNSCOP's partition proposal was "legally objectionable, politically unjust, and economically disastrous." A key point of criticism was the Negev and the Bedouins.

=== UNSCOP's Negev proposal ===

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UNSCOP's inclusion of the Negev in the Jewish state had had mainly two reasons:

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(1) Some Palestinian researchers such as Sami Hadawi and Salman Abu Sitta have suggested that the British – who were determined not to cede the Negev to the Zionists, as they aimed to provide Jordan access to the Mediterranean and prevent Egypt, both of which were under British influence, from being isolated from other Arab states – may have provided inaccurate information about the land use of the Negev. Regarding the Jewish-owned area, this is certain. It is probably also true for the Bedouins: Most estimates assumed that during the British Mandate period, the Bedouin grain cultivation area in the Beersheba subdistrict had gradually expanded from 300,000 hectares to 400,000 hectares. If this is true, it would have constituted nearly 36% of the agricultural land in the region of Palestine and encompassed almost the entire northern half of the Negev. Indeed, during several years of the British Mandate period, barley produced by Bedouins in this area was Palestine's economically most important export. However, the British conveyed to both the 1946 Partition Commission and the Sub-committee 2 figures that were only half as large, and portrayed the Negev as largely barren with the exception of an area "in the extreme north-west of the sub-district" that was already firmly in the hands of the Bedouins, the barren remainder being suitable only for Bedouin livestock breeding. Finally, they emphasized the "land rights" of the "Beersheba Bedouin" and their "historic association" with the Negev.

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(2) If the British numbers were indeed inaccurate, they had just the opposite effect: Walter C. Lowdermilk, an American Christian Zionist, had written a renowned book that, among other topics, envisioned a water pipeline from the northern Jordan River to the Beersheba District to irrigate the Negev. During the UNSCOP's visit to Revivim in the Negev, the sight of a field of gladioli, freshly irrigated by water from the new Nir Am pipeline, convinced them of the feasibility of Lowdermilk's plans for agricultural development in the Negev. Believing that large areas of the Negev were still "capable of development", though only achievable with significant Zionist investment in irrigation, they recommended including the Negev in the Jewish state.

=== Sub-committee 2's criticism ===

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Subcommittee 2 initiated its criticism based on the economic importance of the Negev and the large number of Bedouins living there, for which it also received figures from the British: The number of Bedouins was revised upwards from the 90,000 reported in the UNSCOP report to 127,000. This figure was likely also incorrect. This figure would have meant that, from the beginning, the now 509,780 Arabs would constitute a majority over the 499,020 Jews in the Jewish state. Sub-committee 2 further declared: Since all other agriculturally and economically important areas of Palestine had already been allocated to the Jewish state and the Bedouin were "responsible for the cultivation of the greater part of the [200,000 hectares] of cereal land" of Beersheba (which still amounted to nearly 22% of the agricultural land in Palestine),

"[...] it is certain that the proposed Arab State cannot be viable. It would have no cultivable lands of any importance. Such cultivable lands as it would have would not supply a small fraction of the cereal requirements of its population. It would have no other economic resources, no raw materials, no industries, no trade, and would have to subsist on subsidies or loans."

=== Boundary changes ===

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The population argument was accepted by Subcommittee 1 during plenary sessions of the Ad hoc Committee. Therefore it was decided to exclude the urban area of Jaffa as an Arab enclave from the territory of the Jewish state, which reduced the number of Arabs in the Jewish state by several tens of thousands.

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Additionally, the dominant USA had already planned to reallocate the Negev to the Arab state to gain favor with Arab states and secure their support for the partition plan. However, when the Zionists learned of these plans, President Truman's advisor David Niles arranged a meeting with Chaim Weizmann, who persuaded the President with the vision of a canal running through Jewish territory from the Gulf of Aqaba to Tel Aviv. Following Truman’s direct orders, the Americans abandoned their earlier tactic     and only introduced a modification proposal (which was also accepted) to slightly enlarge the Palestinian area with the city of Beersheba and a section on the border with Egypt. This, however, did not change the issue of insufficient arable land, as this section primarily consisted of sand dunes.

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The proposed boundaries would also have placed 54 Arab villages on the opposite side of the border from their farm land. In response, the United Nations Palestine Commission established in 1948 was empowered to modify the boundaries "in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary". These modifications never occurred.

=== Reactions ===

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The Jewish Agency expressed support for most of the UNSCOP recommendations, but emphasized the "intense urge" of the overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons to proceed to Palestine. The Jewish Agency criticized the proposed boundaries, especially in the Western Galilee and Western Jerusalem (outside of the old city), arguing that these should be included in the Jewish state. However, they agreed to accept the plan if "it would make possible the immediate re-establishment of the Jewish State with sovereign control of its own immigration."

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Two further comments: (1) While Hadawi, Abu-Sitta, and Kedar's coauthor Oren Yiftachel may have perspectives influenced by their backgrounds, the data they reference aren't "Palestinian" data. The Abramson Report was a British-Zionist venture; Epstein was a Zionist. To ensure balance, I searched for even more Zionist figures, but found only two: In a book by Yosef Weitz, there is an estimate claiming that the Bedouins had cultivated only 6,000 hectares. But this is obviously unrealistic. Kedar et al. also cite a Zionist survey of 1920, but this is incomplete, ignores several Bedouin tribes and sections of land, and some data are incorrect (for example, the individual percentages for the Azazima do not add up to the stated total). Thus, I don't think that they are worthy of Wikipedia.

(2) I should add that I now also know more about the geography of the agricultural areas as well. In case anyone searches for this info: Comment: This is a misquotation. The source he cites, on the contrary, inferred from the analysis of ancient fruit trees that the Negev Highlands were continuously cultivated from over 1,000 years ago until 70 years ago. I assume Avni intentionally misquotes this because he is one of the main proponents who have proven that the Highlands were cultivated not only during the Byzantine but also during the early Islamic period. The end of Highland agriculture after the early Islamic period is thus one of his main theses. The cited source is Eli Ashkenazi et al.: The vitality of fruit trees in ancient Bedouin orchards in the Arid Negev Highlands (Israel): Implications of climatic change and environmental stability. Quaternary International 545, 2020. See also recently Yotam Tepper et al.: Relict olive trees at runoff agriculture remains in Wadi Zetan, Negev Desert, Israel. Journal of Archaeological Science: Reports 41, 2022. In any case, according to both positions, it was an area of 20,000-50,000 hectares – little in relation to the more northerly Beersheba agricultural area, but surprisingly much for the Highlands. This agrees with a survey by Jacob Verman and Daniel Zohary from 1941, who found that almost the entire wadi area in the highlands north of Makhtesh Ramon was used for barley cultivation, except for the too sandy Wadi Boker area and the Nahal Ramon area directly at Makhtesh Ramon.
 * There are two different positions on the Highlands: Developed agricultural land in the Highlands measured between 30,000 and 50,000 hectares. Researchers who have interviewed Bedouins believe that the Bedouins used the Highlands even more intensively than the Negevites did in Byzantine times and therefore built their own terraces in addition to the Byzantine ones.  According to this, all of these 30,000-50,000 hectares would have been cultivated by Bedouins. Archaeologists, on the other hand, often believe that Bedouins cultivated less land than the Byzantine Negevites and only reused the best-preserved terrace remnants, meaning: only parts of the 30,000-50,000 hectares. Avni, for example, assumes 8-10% of the Highlands (=17,000-20,000 hectares). Yoav Avni: The Emergence of Terrace Farming in the Arid Zone of the Levant - Past Perspectives and Future Implications. Land 11 (10), 2022. p. 18 of the PDF: "The seminomadic Bedouin population of the Negev Highlands utilized the best-preserved ancient plots for agricultural production during the last 250 years [...]. Most of these plots were used for cereal cultivation while, in small, designated plots with improved runoff irrigation, they cultivated small orchards (mainly olives and figs, but also carob, almonds, and dates). [This is incorrect. See the following comment] In the 1:100,000 scale British maps of the Negev south of Be´er Sheva that were published in 1942-1946, approximately 8-10% of the land was characterized as 'cultivation in patches' [this is also not true. It is not possible to determine from the maps how much of the area was actually cultivated, and Avni overlooks the 'cultivation' areas in addition to 'cultivation in patches']. Most of these plots were cultivated for the production of cereals by the local Bedouin population of the Negev Highlands, estimated at several thousand people."


 * In the region east and southeast of Beersheba that would later become the Siyag, only 40,000 out of 100,000 hectares were suitable for agriculture.  Most of this wasn't included in the Arab state. The area on the border to Egypt was mainly sand dunes (see above). So, the whole rest of the 200,000 / 400,000 ha minus the 20,000-50,000 ha of the highlands and the 40,000 ha east of Beersheba were west and northwest of Beersheba, and nearly everything of the 200,000 / 400,000 ha was to go to the Jewish state.

DaWalda (talk) 09:19, 9 June 2024 (UTC)

Some minor inaccuracies

 * What I think should be changed and added (format using textdiff):


 * Why it should be changed:
 * Changed "many specific cases" to "most cases" as the attached map corroborates this more general statement, allowing for the removal of the 'citation needed' tag.
 * Removed "Thus the Jewish State would have an overall large Arab minority." This is not accurate. As Sub-committee 2 commented, the Jewish State would have had from the start an Arab majority due to the updated figures for the Bedouins. This was the reason why Jaffa with its some tens of thousands Arabs was ultimately changed into an Arab enclave in the Jewish state (see above). Hence also the next change:
 * Added "[According to UNSCOP's calculations,] the Plan would have had the following demographics (data based on 1945)": See above.
 * Removed the assertion that the Negev was included for immigration purposes. This is a misreading of the UNSCOP report. The relevant passages have been analyzed by Yakobson and Rubinstein. There are two passages in the report, both somewhat unpleasant:

-- That's not a comment on the Negev but on the fact that a minority of 45% Arabs in the Jewish state was accepted in order to provide ample room for immigration. So it was precisely the populated regions that were handed over to the Jewish state for immigration. Immigration to the sparsely populated Negev was a more long-term and uncertain issue: -- This passage has a different prehistory. I'm currently drafting another edit request to make the decision on the Negev more understandable, but it's going to take some time. In the meantime: This refers to a visit by UNSCOP to Revivim, where they saw that plants grow better with Zionist water pipelines than with the Bedouins' farming methods on the surrounding fields, which did not use artificial irrigation. So this is not about immigration, but about technical development: The Negev was assigned to the Jewish state because it was assumed that they could cultivate it "better" than the Bedouins.
 * (1) "The proposed Jewish State leaves considerable room for further development and land settlement and, in meeting this need to the extent that it has been met in these proposals, a very substantial minority of Arabs is included in the Jewish state."
 * (2) "The inclusion of the whole Beersheba sub-district in the Jewish State gives to it a large area, parts of which are very sparsely populated and capable of development, if they can be provided with water for irrigation. The experiments already carried out in this area by the Jews suggest that further development in an appreciable degree should be possible by heavy investment of capital and labour and without impairing the future or prejudicing the rights of the existing Bedouin population. The Negev south of latitude 31, though included in the Jewish State, is desert land of little agricultural value, but is naturally linked with the northern part of the sub-district of Beersheba."

DaWalda (talk) 09:19, 9 June 2024 (UTC)