Draft:Recapture of Fort Vaux

The recapture of Fort Vaux (Prise du Fort de Vaux) was a military engagement between 24 October and 3 November 1916, during the Battle of Verdun on the Western Front in France in World War I. French troops recaptured Fort Vaux.

Context
Following a series of German offensive victories, such as Fort Douaumont, Fort Vaux, Damloup battery, General Charles Mangin took command of French Groups D and E on 19 June 1916, also known as the Mangin Group.

During the summer, fighting in the area continued for metres of land, with no major breakthroughs: the village of Fleury-devant-Douaumont changed hands 16 times between June and August 1916, between French and Germans troops. On 1 July 1916, the German offensive towards Verdun was stopped at "La Poudrière", 2 km from the city's outskirts.

At the beginning of August, French troops brought the fight to the Fumin woods, 800 m from Fort Vaux.

Neither side manages to have superiority. The Germans dominated many strategic points, which blocked all attempts at French progress. Specially, Fort Douaumont, Fort Vaux, the battery of Damloup, the small “depot” (deposit base), the Post Thiaumont and large numbers of isolated batteries (batteries of the quarries, of the false coast, etc.) as well as many ridges, are in German hands. The French troops, who advance through ravines, gutters and exposed open spaces are systematically pushed back at the cost of many lives. The French troops managed to keep Fort Souville and Fort Tavannes, which stoppes the German forces progression toward Verdun.

- On September 7, Lieutenant-Colonel Viotte, commander of the 230eRI, says :"“The situation is less alarming than in the spring but not that good. Over thousands of hectares, the enemy has created a hell of carnage and fire; day and night, its artillery pours an avalanche of projectiles on our lines and the numbers (soldiers) continue to shrink rapidly; the wear and tear is extreme and we feel that an entire winter spent in these conditions would be terrible against an adversary who still holds key points of support on the battlefield.”"It is clear that there have been few convincing outcomes from isolated attacks carried out since June, and we know that the Germans have shifted a significant portion of their resources to the Somme front.

- On September 17, 1916, a real turning point occurs when General Mangin made the following proposal; a new strategy before winter and before a reinforcement of German troops from other battles. This change in strategy is backed by his superior, General Nivelle, who will encourage him to always surpass himself.

General Mangin’s proposal
Note n°2323/3 from General Mangin to General Nivelle commander of the French Second Army; here is an extract: “The operations carried out by the D.E. group now form an additional barrier, in front of Verdun, on the war front: rump 321, entrenchment Z... Vaux-Chapitre Woods. But we are not sure that this barrier will sustain a major attack; there is therefore a great interest in building an additional barrier ahead to create more distance between the Germans and Verdun on one hand, and at the same time to make it impossible for them to attack the barrier defined above.

1- The analysis of the terrain sets the objective of this frontline around Fort Vaux and Fort Douaumont. We would be uncomfortable with this new front because the Germans would see everything from Fort Douaumont and communications would be difficult. But tactical interest takes precedent over all other considerations.

2- We can wonder if the method of retail offensives which has given good results can continue to be used. It is not so. Indeed, if the successes obtained are largely due to the ascendancy that our troops have gained over the adversary, the terrain also has a certain influence. The German position formed a pocket in our lines, this pocket was located in a ravine of which we held a large part of the ridges. The enemy could therefore be very easily isolated from its rear by artillery fire, and in addition, local actions could support each other by providing very serious support. But to carry our current line forward, the same method is no longer possible, and it is through large-scale action that we must progreed.

Military tools needed:

- Infantry: war front to attack approximately 4000m, 1 battalion per 300m = 12 to 13 battalions.

- Enemy: 1st line 13 battalions, 2nd line 5.5 battalions, 3rd line 2.5 battalions and 37 battalions in reserve.

However, of the two sides, the one with most reserves will have control of the battlefield. A total of 48 battalions, or 4 Divisions, are therefore necessary to carry out the operation. Taking into account the reliefs, in reality only 2 additional DI are needed to support the two currently mobilized (Divisions 55th and 133rd).

- Additional field artillery to go with the increase of two more divisions.

- Short artillery needs are already satisfied; there would be serious advantages in increasing the number of rapid-fire weapons and a battery of 370mm guns supplied with 400 rounds would be required for destructive fire on the forts of Vaux and Douaumont. The 2 howitzers of 270mm and the 2 howitzers of 280mm are not enough.

- Long heavy artillery: 143 German batteries, we can counteract with 49 of our own, so we would need an additional 94. On September 21, 1916, General Nivelle approves of this offensive plan (and Annex No. 562 ).

Positions of the two Armies
The French Second Army, commanded by General Nivelle, occupied the war front from Chauvoncourt up to the border with the Marne Province at “Les Islettes”, bypassing Verdun (on the map of Oct 1st, 1916, Verdun is highlighted in violet, the Second Army is circled in green, and the war front around fort Douaumont and fort Vaux is in green dotted line).

The DE Group is positioned on the banks of the Meuse River at Bras-Vacherauville to the National Road No. 18 (from 1916 map, between Fort de Tavannes and Eix ≈D603 today), with the A.B.C. groups to the northwest and to the South-East group F.

This is approximately 10 km of Front.

These groups are made up of subgroups, themselves made up of several Infantry Divisions, themselves made up of various units (brigades, artillery, stretcher bearers, health services, engineers, hunters, Infantry Regiments, Military Police, communication, etc.).

For the attack on Fort Vaux, General Mangin will align the 74th DI on a front of approximately 2150m.

Plan of engagement
Extract from plan of September 24, 1916, French 2nd Army, Annex n°627.

The D.E. group will have four Division Infanteries in 1st line and three Divisions Infanteries in the second line.

• Objective 1: in a single assault take the Nawé, Chomel, Multrier, Fulda, Clausewitz trenches, Depot 2305, Small Depot, etc. and then continue to push until serious resistance is met from the enemy.

• Objective 2: Baleourier, Prussia trenches, hill 374 and 4589, western slopes Ravin Fumin woods, etc. and possibly to capture Fort Douaumont.

• Modifications: capture Baleourier trench and Lady ravine, reassignment of Infantry Regiments and artillery.


 * Annex n°657 of September 26,1916: the assignments of the reserve Infantry Divisions and extension of the attack to the Seydlitz trench.
 * Ammunition allocations.
 * Annex n°843 of October 4, 1916: a 3rd objective is added, Douaumont church, Damloup battery... and a garrison must be set up at Douaumont fort.
 * Annex n°848 of October 5th, 1916: addition of air reinforcement.
 * Annex n°853 of October 5th, 1916: order to begin the training of units and attack exercises.
 * Annex n°872 : organization of heavy artillery.
 * Annex n°883 of October 7, 1916: it is necessary to attack until contact with the enemy but objective n°1 mainly, occupy and consolidate the positions. Prohibited from going further if by observation the destruction by artillery is not controlled.
 * Annex n°897 of October 8, 1916: mission and date of the attack fixed around October 15, 1916.
 * Annex n°913 of October 9, 1916: General Pétain approves the attack project.
 * Annex n°928 : the fort of Vaux becomes an objective (if the opportunity is favorable).
 * Annex n° 945 and 946 of October 10, 1916: details of the execution of the attack and objective to push the enemy beyond Fort Douaumont.
 * Annex n°966 of October 11, 1916: transmission connections. (Note: P.V. = homing pigeon and optical = visual).
 * Annex n°1020 : organization of commands.
 * Annex n°1053 : General Pétain requests help from the Eastern armies for bombing reinforcements.
 * Annex n°1066 of October 16, 1916: as soon as the second front is reached, immediately carry out reconnaissance on Fort Vaux (50eBCP) and seize it if possible.
 * Annex n°1077 of the 17th, 1916: bad weather forced to postpone the attack to an indefinite date.
 * Annex n°1093 of October 17, 1916: special order for the BCP group and the Vaux fort.
 * Annex n°1098 of October 18, 1916: General Nivelle gives the order that the fort Vaux and Douaumont are clearly determined objectives and not at the discretion of the executioners.
 * Annex n°1115 and 1116 : we must achieve the objectives and keep the ground we have won, whatever happens. Difficulties in anticipating all the hypotheses. Free the entire 50th BCP for the attack on the fort, it must not be partly "eaten" before.
 * Annex n°1129 of October 19, 1916: reduction of artillery preparation time from 5 to 3 days.
 * Annex n°1154 : remarks by Colonel Barescut on objectives that are not clear enough and perhaps too high, command limits that are not optimized (duality of commands), and a lack of forecasting of supply depots.
 * Annex n°1172 of October 21, 1916: details of hypothesis A - easy attack with few losses.
 * Annex n°1217 to 1220 of the October 23, 1916: results of firing on the forts of Douaumont and Vaux.}}

Preparations
- On September 23, the 148th brigade (Colonel Challe) received the mission of establishing the bases and starting communications for the operation.

- October 3, Instructions French IInd Army, Annex n°828 : On D-6 we will methodically attack all the batteries which will be reported as blocking in the region of the operation until D-1.

Douaumont: D.1, the fort will be bombarded with large mortars in such a way as to disrupt the organizations.

D Day: bombardment with the most powerful projectiles.

Vaux: same shots but less heavy. - On October 6, the 74th DI prepared for the attack on Fort Vaux.

- On October 9, the 63rd Engineer section juxtaposed itself with the one of the 74th DI to prepare the land. And the 299th Infantry Regiment begins exercises in preparation for the big attack.

Harassment shootings are daily from both sides; with for example:

- As early as 12 October 1916, the French General Army Staff studied an offensive on Fort Vaux, with a report for the use of a 400mm howitzer on the proposal of Squadron Leader Martin, temporarily (p.i.) commander of the GAC's (GAC: Central Army Group) ALGP (ALGP: High powered heavy artillery) group. Objective: Fort Vaux at about 13800m distance.

Location: to be found west of the railway between Dugny and Ancemont, about 1500m SE of Dugny.

Equipment: 400 mm howitzer to be taken from the battery near Baleycourt. Allocate for 96 shots of 400. 10 days of work planned (railway construction, etc.). Proposal approved by General Franiatte on October 16, 1916.

From 16 October 1916, the various units were prepared.

- On 16 October, the 305th Infantry Regiment is mobilized in the sector.

- The original date of 17 October to launch the offensive was postponed because the bad weather of the preceding days did not allow the preparation of artillery. The 30th Infantry Regiment received General Operation Order No. 3 from the French Second Army on 1916/10/10. This plan of commitment to an overall offensive action assigned him the role of seizing the Heinmetz, Werder and Von Kluck trenches.

- On 20 October, the 118th Infantry Regiment began recognitions and training, in reserve, in preparation for the Verdun offensive.

- On 21 October, the preparation gradually intensified for the 74th Division (strong wind, 0°C). And the Artillery of the 63rd Division carried out its adjustments by aircraft on the remarkable points of the sector. General Mangin therefore lined up the following battalions to take this sector of the front.

For the attack, mainly the 74th Infantry Division, composed of the 147th Brigade (222nd Infantry Regiment; 299th Infantry Division; 50th BCP and 71st Infantry Division) of Colonel Giralt and the 148th Brigade (230th Infantry Regiment and 333rd Infantry Division) of Colonel Challe, 3 artillery groups and 2 engineer companies.

See Map (Forecast attack 18 Oct. 1916 Fort Vaux) and detail map of the 50th BCP.

These strengths are included with reserve battalions and rotations.

About 7000 soldiers will be engaged for the 2km front during the assault.

And the glorious task of attacking Fort Vaux will be for the 50th BCP.

Example of a soldier's equipment, the 401eRI :


 * 150 cartridges per man armed with the rifle


 * 2 grenades per man


 * 2 hearth bag per man


 * 4 days' supply food (in addition to the day's food)


 * 2 x 2 liters canisters (filled with water and wine)


 * 1 hand tool


 * 1 canvas panel

The fort attack mission plan
On 21 October, Major Imbert, commanding the 50th BCP, received the following mission plan from the 74th Infantry Division, French IInd Army. Mission: an overall operation whose aim is to push-back the enemy beyond the fort Douaumont.


 * 1) Front 1: 333rd Infantry Regiment reinforced by an engineer company captures the Fulda trench at H-hour.
 * 2) Front 2: point b included and battery 4591 excluded at H+3
 * 3) Front 3: attack on Fort Vaux at H+3

For the Fort Vaux

- 9th Company of the 50th BCP: between H and H+3 transport to Front n°1.

At H+3 removal of Front n°2. After H+3 resupply of fronts 2 and 3, clearing of the fort.

- 7th and 8th Company of 50th BCP: at H+3 attack on the fort, occupation, cleaning.

- Machine Gun Company H position in Bluzet.

- Platoon of pioneers and team of grenadiers (Lieutenant Blaise) with the 8th, special mission to attack Fort Vaux on Front 3.

- Engineering reinforcement of companies.

Direction of Attack / Axis of Motion


 * 1) Fronts 1 and 2 attacks, west horn of Fort Vaux from Molke Trench.
 * 2) Attack front 3, West Horn 7th Company, South Horn 8th Company, and Gorge of the 9th Company.

Progress by successive leaps at an average pace of 100m in 4 minutes. This pace is to allow the artillery to lengthen its fire to stay just in front of the French offensive line, the aim being to avoid bombing our soldiers. On a clear day, the shot is adapted by a report of planes, balloons or from observation points in almost "real" time. When observation from a "distance" is not possible, runners are sent to go and see the situation and come back to report (especially during attacks) or pigeons; most of the time many runners and pigeons had to be send because they sufferred heavy losses. The ALGP fired 48 shots of 400 howitzers and 70 shots of 370 on Fort Douaumont.

On 22 October, the artillery of the 63rd Infantry Division prepared the attack on the Douaumont-Vaux region. It made its adjustments, prepared the barrage-shots in front of the 1st objective and then the accompanying fire of the infantry from the 1st to the 2nd objective as well as the shelling fire.

On October 23, 1916, after the visit of General Pétain and General Nivelle to General Mangin, it was decided that the attack would take place the next day at 11:40 a.m.

Baleycourt's 400 howitzer fired 4 shots on Fort Douaumont and the 370 mm fired 70 shots ; around 2:45 p.m., several punctures were observed, there seemed to be a fire. The fire had set fire to a depot of benzine, rockets and grenades. The German garrison had to evacuate the fort where only men on guard remained in the north counterscarp chest and a few telephone machine gunners trapped by the landslides in the turret of 75.

40 shots of 370 were fired at the Fort Vaux, a violent explosion was noted and about twenty Germans escaped from the fort.

One 400 howitzer was withdrawn from Baleycourt and sent to Fleury-sur-Aire and then to Dugny (Meuse) to fire the next day on Fort Vaux. But this howitzer suffered several damages, empty air cylinders for brakes or with insufficient pressure, or cylinders with reverse pitches, therefore not compatible etc.

The companies are taking their positions. "The 1st line was so bombarded that it no longer existed, and it was necessary, at night and with the compass, to squeeze into shell holes. Men are blocks of mud; they repair weapons."Everything was in place by 2 a.m. (on 24 October), the Hohenlohe, Kurtenaz, and Suphate trenches were occupied, and the companies that could not find a place in these trenches remained in the Belmont trench.

German positions and order of battle on 24 October 1916 on this front.

General Mangin set up his headquarters in the “ouvrage round” (round structure) and the big chiefs observed from the fort Souville.

Tuesday, October 24, 1916
After a long night of rain and light bombardment, the day began in intense fog. The view is impossible at a distance of more than 3 to 4 meters. Despite the weather, the orders were maintained ."Despite this long and feverish wait, the men are eager to attack to get out of the sea of mud in which they are floundering and to approach the opponent. One wonders how one will get into this terrain, which is indicated by an official document as not very favorable to an attack, but which one will nevertheless cross."The terrain is muddy, very difficult, the shell holes are filled with water. There are still many lines of barbed wire intact.

7:30 a.m.: Artillery preparation begins.

10:00 a.m.: The bombardment intensifies.

11:40 a.m.: 1st wave of attacks, the German trenches Werder, Strinketz, Mudra, Seydlitz, Moltke and Brochemuch are cleared without stopping (in about 5 minutes), the thick fog favors the march and allows to surprise the enemy. The Sophie and Ilsa trenches were passed, in spite of the presence of quite a number of corpses, and from which many enemy groups advanced towards us with arms in the air, shouting "kamerades" and were taken prisoner.

11:53 a.m.: German retaliation, very heavy fire.

The advance was halted 40 m before Filda Trench (the limit of Objective No. 1) in front of a trench still in fairly good condition, garrisoned by resolute defenders, flanked by machine guns located at the small depot.

12:10 p.m.: The quarries are conquered; the surprised enemy flees before the momentum of our infantrymen.

12:35 p.m.: Order to mobilize the necessary means to take the small depot before 1:40 p.m., as it blocks the advance in the fort sector and delays the mission. But this goal did not succeed.

12:40 p.m.: The enemy unleashes an unbelievably violent barrage shooting on the sector.

One of the first French officers to fall was Captain Jolly (or Joly) of the 71st BCP. He was killed at the head of his company (the 7th); lowered by a hunter (this is the name of a soldier of the BCP) from his company at the bottom of a trench, before expiring, he was able to say: "'I die for France. Tell the Commander that my last thought is for France!'."He was decorated posthumously a few days later.

Many platoon leaders were put out of action or killed. This leads to a certain amount of disorganization.

Lieutenant-Colonel Vidal, commander of the 299th Infantry Regiment, gave the order not to advance beyond the front1 until he had been able to break the enemy resistance and take the small depot.

The enemy trenches have not been cut off, isolated and are receiving reinforcements for counterattacks.

On the French side, difficulties in refueling with grenades, after 3 attempts a chore finally passed at 5 pm. We saw that the soldiers left with 2 grenades, so it was often necessary to take the equipment of the dead comrades or those of the Germans, the soldiers had learned to use the German grenades.

Very difficult advances, heavy losses, especially of leaders (officers ) and very intense enemy resistance.

≈2:00 p.m.: after passing the Von Cluck trench, Second Lieutenant Martin of the 30th Infantry Regiment seizes the Damloup battery. For this fine action, beyond his objectives but knowing how to take advantage of the circumstances, Second Lieutenant Martin was proposed as a Knight of the French Legion of Honor.

Following a decent advance to Front 2, the battalion commander gave the order to start again the march and push on the fort Vaux.

2:15 p.m.: the fog having cleared; the General of DI asks for the assistance of the ALGP to crush the Fort Vaux on which machine guns are reported in action.

At 2:30 p.m.: the 50th BCP is at positions 4591 and 4690 on the plan of the 50th BCP (300-350m from the fort).

2:50 p.m.: Fort Douaumont falls.

3:45 pm: the battalion commander of the 50th BCP is injured, he hands over command to Captain Magner, the battalion is 300-350m from the Fort but is stopped mainly due to strong resistance from the small depot. The number of men was reduced to 60-70 men per company, and the groups were broken up. The 50th BCP was "eaten" before the moment of the attack when it should have attacked the fort with all its strength. 3 battalions were absorbed in the encirclement maneuver on the “Petit Dépôt” region.

4:40 p.m.: The assault is launched on the small depot, the enemy's center of resistance, under the command of the Battalion Commander, who leads his men in the lead and in the center, singing the Marseillaise. Many islands of enemy resistance surrendered.

8:45 p.m.: The small depot falls. Major Ricamdet (299th Infantry Regiment) occupied the premises. Mudra's island of resistance also falls.

In the evening: General Mangin gives the order of operation for the attack on the Fort Vaux for the next day and on the village. The men dug trenches and niches for the night, and nibbled away at some of the food saved from the mud.

All objectives were achieved, more than 4000 prisoners were counted, including more than 100 officers.

The artillery, 74th Division, fired 27937 shots of 75, 9410 shots of 155 and 1745 shots of 220, and the 63rd Division fired 24000 shots on the sector for this first day of the offensive.

Dugny's 400 howitzer was ready to fire on Fort Vaux and fired 10 shots and the 370 fired 23 shots.

The attack on Fort Vaux will start again tomorrow after a violent and meticulous artillery preparation, and the ALGP will complete with destructive fire as soon as visibility permits.

For trench and shelter, the soldier has only his shell-hole: it is there that he must live and fight.

Wednesday, October 25, 1916
Front No. 2 was completely hit.

There is no longer any question of an attack on the village of Vaux for the moment.

Added to the attack on Fort Vaux were 2 battalions of the 216th Infantry Regiment and 1 battalion of the 333rd Infantry Regiment (63rd Infantry Division) and placed under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Perchenet, commander of the 216th Infantry Division.

9:30 a.m.: A French plane flies over the Fontaine PC and sends out a weighted message containing the route of the occupied line.

10:00 a.m.: Launch of the attack on the fort (initially scheduled for 9:30 a.m., many orders and counter-orders). Despite artillery barrage and machine-gun fire from the Fort, the attack progressed to the outskirts of the structure (300m).

At 10:40 a.m.: The Fort is surrounded to the south and west, but machine-gun fire, placed at the SE horn on the superstructure and in the Iena trench, prevents a foothold in the fort where the destruction carried out by the artillery is insufficient. Our 1st line was halted on the outskirts of the Fort.

The 216th Infantry Regiment was stopped 300-400m (point 4889) from the fort by heavy fire from several machine guns, some men managed to reach the superstructure of the Fort, others tried to throw grenades into the machine gun crenellations.

At 11:00 a.m.: the right of the 23rd Company, (6th Battalion of the 333rd Infantry Regiment) under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Franchet, was at the height of the north horn of the fort but it was subjected to enemy machine gun fire, it was unable to advance and received the order to withdraw to the 2nd front.

The 230th Infantry Regiment failed to push its line beyond the 3696 quarries into the Fontaines ravine, the attack on the village of Vaux was cancelled.

The Altenkirchen and Gotha guts in particular were still well organized on the German side.

Two battalions were present in the vicinity of Fort Vaux; one south of the fort and the other in battery 5090 (less than 200m from the fort see map), despite the enemy's efforts, these positions were maintained at the end of the day.

A German counter-attack was repulsed on the Damloup battery; reorganization of the front against which the attempts made by the enemy (German) have all come to break.

At night, Special-Order No. 1, withdrawal to front 2, to allow a new artillery preparation. But orders sometimes take more than 2 hours to arrive (runners) and another 3 hours to be carried out (bombings and machine guns).

The attack on Fort Vaux will start again the next day, 26 October, with 3 battalions in line.

During the night, there was no reaction (infantry) from the enemy except a violent bombardment of the captured positions. For this day, the artillery of the 74th Division fired 61232 shots of 75mm, 8623 of 155 and 2100 of 220 on the Douaumont and Vaux sectors. And that of the 63rd Division, fired 16000 shots, mainly on the fort, to support the capture attempts. It was necessary to wait until night before the battalions could be moved; the machine guns of the fort and the one at the bottom of the Horgne (and others isolated) inflicted heavy losses on those who tried during the day.

Special Order No. 4215s/c from General Nivelle, Commander of the French Second Army, to the troops.

Relief is very difficult and so is the supply of food and ammunition.

Note: According to information from prisoners of the German 53rd Infantry Regiment, it was known that the garrison of the fort on 25 October was 280 to 300 men (2 companies). Seven pillboxes, each occupied by about forty men (53rd and 192nd Infantry Regiments). Supported by 6 battalions and 2 regiments in the vicinity, with an unlisted underground tunnel at the Iena trench.

On the morning of 25 October, the ALGP fired 14 shots of 400 from Dugny and 9 rounds of 370 at Fort Vaux.

Thursday, October 26, 1916
The French forces feared a strong German counterattack; The German bombing is violent.

It is in these terrible and extreme conditions, a chaotic terrain and almost impossible communications, on a floating and ill-defined line of defense; that the French soldiers, who could only rely on their weapons, isolated, to prepare for any eventuality, reorganized and reinforced the positions gained.

The artillery of the 74th Division fired 39230 shots of 75, 4834 of 155 and 332 of 220 shots on the fort and the Altenkirch trench.

The lack of leaders and manpower forced the companies to reorganize, 3 companies became 2; and rehabilitate the trenches.

The PC is installed at the small depot.

12:45 p.m., Battalion of the 305th Infantry Regiment will try to obtain the capture of the Altenkirchen and Gotha trench which could not be obtained by the exhausted 230th. The attack was set for 4:00 p.m. and finally executed around 5:00 p.m., delayed by a heavy enemy barrage bombing.

Points 4200 and 4298 were reached, but the Altenkirchen trench was heavily occupied by German forces.

The 216th Infantry Regiment relieved the 50th BCP, the 6th Battalion was to march directly on Fort Vaux and establish itself solidly on the superstructure, supported by the 333rd Infantry Regiment on the left and the 4th Battalion on the right.

After a good advance, the battalions came up against heavy enemy fire and the order was given to halt the advance. The order did not reach the 21st and 22nd companies, which made another leap and arrived in the immediate vicinity of Fort Vaux. A few men even managed to reach the superstructure of the Fort. But they were attacked by the enemy batteries of the Woëvre and suffered heavy losses.

Attempts to communicate remain unsuccessful throughout the day and night.

From 27 October to 3 November, 1916
The French battalions remained in the captured positions where they were subjected to the uninterrupted bombardment of the enemy's artillery. These troops reorganized, but above all kept the ground they had conquered, they did not give up!

The fight continued unabated, and every day a few elements of the enemy's trenches were in French hands, thus making it possible to improve and completely organize the conquered positions. Seydlitz Trench is seized...

The artillery fires about 10,000 shots a day. "'To continue the attack on Fort Vaux, it is necessary to call in fresh troops under a single command. It was the 63rd Division that was entrusted with this mission'."The 107th BCP will write for October 28, 1916 :"'Our hunters are mud men, at least in appearance. No longer a way to shelter them, the cold penetrates; beware of frostbite on the foot. Why don't we have last winter's anti-frost ointment in Alsace!!!'."On October 29 at 6 p.m., the first line was relieved of the 333rd Infantry Regiment, the 50th BCP and the 71st BCP. Preparation of the ground for the subsequent attack on Fort Vaux. The JMO of the 299th RI summed up these few days very well: "'From 27 to 2 November 1916, the only Regiment of the Division that was not relieved, the 299th was subjected to a severe test, in persistent bad weather, with supplies almost impossible, it occupied trenches which were continuously demolished by bombardments of unprecedented violence and which were subjected, at a distance of 400m, to the relentless fire of the machine guns of Fort Vaux. The task was made all the more difficult by the fact that the number of officers and non-commissioned officers was very small: 19 officers out of 31 mounted were killed, wounded or missing. But the Regiment forbade access to the Horgne ravine, it held the fort Vaux under fire and prevented the enemy from approaching it during the day to the south and east. That's his mission, that's his duty, and he's fulfilling it to the fullest.'"The Regiment has bought its glory expensively.

This phase of occupation was essential, as the fort was only supplied by a gut, that of Iena and the unlisted underground mentioned above. A fort like that of Vaux is practically impregnable in "direct" attack. The two sides knew that they had to either cut it off from its lines or crush it under heavy shells as at Douaumont. When, on 24 October, part of the Croll Battalion (38th Division) arrived at Fort Douaumont, it crossed the superstructure, which was nothing but a heap of ruins.

But, as retraced above, on the fort Vaux the heavy artillery could not completely prepare the ground (401 rounds of heavy free 270 to 400mm) for the 3 assaults that successively attacked it.

This is why we often see written: "seize the fort Vaux if possible". On the maps, this objective is dotted a bit like a "plus".

But it seems important to proceed with the 2 forts to be really in control of the surrounding terrain, tactically and symbolically.

The Germans know it well, in June Commander Raynal and his men resisted as much as possible to guard the French Fort Vaux during the German offensive, and now the situation is reversed. Isolated, the fort's troops had to capitulate, and these events were still fresh in the minds of both sides. If the Germans are isolated in the fort, they will have to surrender at some point.

The artillery continued firing in preparation for an attack.

On 2 November, the artillery of the 74th Infantry Division carried out demolition fire on the fort Vaux and "around 11 a.m., a strong explosion in the fort Vaux following a fire from our heavy artillery (220 mortar)".

At about 3 p.m., a radio communication, the Germans evacuated the fort.

At 11 p.m., a reconnaissance must go to check.

November 3rd: The order to attack is given for 1 a.m. to check. Captain Fouache and his men went through the superstructure, he fell from the top of the Fort and bruised badly. In the end, it was Lieutenant Mathelier (118th Infantry Regiment) who found a passage through a hole blocked with bags of earth near the gate to the gorge.

At 3 a.m., the Fort was occupied by French troops; the Germans having resigned themselves to their defeat after almost 10 days of fighting.

On 4 November, General Andlauer appointed Captain Peyron of the 298th Infantry Regiment as provisional commander of Fort Vaux.

In all, 5554 German prisoners, including 138 officers, were taken in this sector of the front, and according to one estimation the German losses amounted to about 20000 men.
 * The fort is once again French.

On November 6, 1916, a selection of soldiers from the sections involved in the capture of Fort Vaux paraded and were decorated by the French President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré, at Robert Espagne. He also decorated the flags of the awarded battalions, for example he hung the “Croix de Guerre” on the Flag of the 299th Infantry Regiment.

Among others, he made Captain Chevanney of the 333rd Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Lamy-Quique of the 230th Infantry Regiment and Major Charpy of the Artillery Staff of the 74th Infantry Division at the rank of Officer of the “Legion d’Honneur”.

Then at Brillon-en-Barrois, the President made Second Lieutenant Touer and Captain Du Luc of the 401st RI knights of the Legion of Honor, and attached the Croix de Guerre to the flag.

Many officers and soldiers will be decorated for this battle, it seems more reasonable to mention those decorated with the highest French distinction that is the Legion of Honor without depriving all combatants of merit and bravery.

- The following shall be appointed to the Order of the Legion of Honor in the rank of Officer:

Lieutenant-Colonel Viotte, commanding the 230th RI and Major Ballay of the 305th RI.

- The following shall be appointed to the Order of the Legion of Honor in the rank of Knight: Captain at TT (temporary title) Fonbonne of the 21st Company of the 230th Infantry Regiment; Lieutenant Fromaget, commanding the 19th Company of the 299th Infantry Regiment; Captain Toupet, commanding the 21st Company of the 299th Infantry Regiment; Captain Chevanney of the 333rd Infantry Regiment; Captain at TT Chadue in the 305th Infantry Regiment Knight; Captain at TT Porter in the 305th Infantry Regiment Knight.

And Soldier Ronechon of the 305th Infantry Regiment knight: "'A soldier of exceptional courage and energy. On October 26, 1916, discovered, by his fortunate initiative, the entrance to a concrete shelter where half a company of the enemy had taken refuge; attacked this entrance with grenades, rushed into the dugout and by his resolute attitude succeeded in getting about sixty Germans, including several officers, to lay down their arms'."

The battle continues
It can be observed that the capture of Fort Vaux (or Douaumont for that matter) did not mark the end of the fighting in the sector; but it will lead to, or contribute to, what will be called the Victory of the Battle of Verdun.

As early as 26 October, the commanding general of the French Second Army, General Nivelle, insisted on the need to continue the attack on Fort Vaux by combining it with an operation on the ouvrage of Lorient and Hardaumont.

The immediate exploitation of the success of 24 October had not been envisaged, the offensive was aimed at repelling the enemy from Verdun. But these successive events would guide to the victory of 15 December. On November 3rd, the front was just a few meters behind the fort, image aside.

And on December 3, 1916, the front was still about 700m north of Fort Douaumont and less than 1.5km north of Fort de Vaux (see image below).

Summary of the days following the capture of Fort Vaux: November 4, 1916: no more attempts on detailed actions that yield only mediocre and too costly results. Planning for the Nov. 13 Attack. The 82nd Infantry Regiment (9th Infantry Division) pushed on in contact with the enemy.

5 November: slight increase in the Belrupt sector.

6,7,8 November: Bombing.

On 7 November 1916, the front was about 1km behind Fort de Vaux and less than 200m from Fort Douaumont.

9 November: German attack on Deleau Trench repulsed. Violent bombardment of the forts Vaux and Douaumont.

10 and 11 November: nothing to report, particularly active German artillery, 105, 150 and 210 shells on the Bazil ravine, Fumin woods... and particularly on the Fort Vaux and its surroundings.

12 November: German artillery activity (Fort Douaumont and Bazil ravine).

13 November: French attack on the Halle Trench.

14 to 18 November: bombardment of the forts Vaux and Douaumont.

19 November: Arrival of the 21st Infantry Division.

20 November: Arrival of the 123rd Infantry Division.

21 and 22 November: bombardment of the front lines of the Douaumont sector.

23 November: General Dauvin (21st Division) takes command of the Douaumont sector.

24 and 25 November: nothing to report.

26-29 November: Heavy bombing.

30 November: attack on the post at the station of Vaux.

1 to 13 December 1916: bombardment and preparation for the attack, starting on 10 December.

14 December: simulation of French attack to reveal the positions of the German batteries. General Nivelle, appointed by Presidential Decree of 12 December 1916, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and North-East, left the Second Army on the evening of the 15th. He was replaced by General Guillaumat. He had just enough time to thank the Second Army for this victory.

December 15, 1916: the attack begins at 10 a.m. Goal: push-back the enemy. That will lead to the "end" of the Battle of Verdun.

December 17th: all objectives are achieved and marks the end of the Mangin group.

In fact, as we can see, during the 1st World War the fighting never really stopped; even after the capture of the 2 forts, the fighting continued. Even after the "symbolic end" of the Battle of Verdun on 18 December 1916, the city of Verdun was bombed and fighting continued daily on the front just behind the forts of Douaumont and Vaux (less than 3 km to the "north").

19 December: attack on the small rooms.

20-21 December: bombardments of Thiaumont, Fleury, Fort Vaux....

On 22 December 1916 at 8:00 a.m., General Mangin left the Second

Army and took command of the Sixth Army.

The entire sector suffers a lasting trauma and still today is classified as a "red zone".

Additions / comments
The notoriety of the Battle of Verdun lies mainly in the fact that almost all the French regiments and battalions came to fight on this front during these 10 months, which is what makes Verdun not a battle like any other and that in almost all French families, a soldier of 14-18 "did Verdun".

The great offensive of 24 October with the capture of the forts Douaumont and Vaux, completed by the victory of 15 December 1916 were what would be called "the end of the Battle of Verdun" or more clearly victorious end of the first offensive in front of Verdun.