Draft:Recruitment policy of the Federal Republic of Germany

From the mid-1950s, the Recruitment policy of the Federal Republic of Gemany recruited and placed workers from abroad. The Federal Government pursued this policy until a few years after the first oil crisis of 1973. The basic recruitment agreements for this were concluded between 1955 and 1968 with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. On the basis of these agreements, Germany granted foreign workers a temporary Residence in the country for the purpose of earning an income. Recruitment agreements were concluded with other countries in order to expand professional knowledge. The recruited workers were called guest workers, although this term also became popular as a general term for labor migrants from the 1960s onwards after the de facto abolition of the time limit. In total, around 14 million guest workers came to Germany between 1955 and 1973, while 11 to 12 million returned to their countries of origin. On November 23, 1973, a recruitment freeze imposed by the Social Liberal Coalition came into force.

First recruitment agreement with Italy
The impetus for an agreement to start recruiting Italians for gainful employment in the Federal Republic came from Italy. Bernhard Ehmke, the ministerial councillor responsible at the Federal Ministry of Labor, outlined the situation in a meeting on November 9, 1954: "Intensive... pressure from abroad to place workers in the German economy. [Not a ministerial visit goes by where this issue is not item 1." He mentioned Italy and Spain in particular. In Italy in particular, high unemployment and concerns about Communist unrest had increasingly become a domestic political problem. After a year of Italian insistence, an alliance of the Federal Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard, Foreign Office and Franz Josef Strauß as Federal Minister for Special Tasks persuaded Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to respond to the Italian requests. The allies each pursued their own interests. The Federal Minister of Economics was concerned about Italy's foreign trade deficit Italy, which threatened further sales of German goods in Italy. The Federal Foreign Office pursued the improvement of relations after the war period, which had recently been full of conflict between the two sides. By responding to the Italian requests, Strauß wanted to counter the demands for wage increases from German trade unions. Federal Minister of Labor Anton Storch, on the other hand, initially had a negative attitude and "initially had public opinion, including the employers' associations and the trade unions, behind him in view of persistent unemployment, but soon succumbed to the primacy of foreign policy already generated by the Foreign Office during the negotiations with Italy." One of the reasons given for Storch's relenting is that Ehrhard presented the agreement with Italy as "prophylactic": it was primarily intended to enable the rapid recruitment of workers in the event of a labor shortage. The decisive factor for the agreement was that an unexpected need for workers in agriculture had actually emerged in the fall of 1955; Storch himself had then pushed for an early conclusion. [[File:Bundesarchiv_B_145_Bild-F013093-0001,_Köln,_Schokoladenfabrik_Stollwerck,_Gastarbeiterinnen.jpg|link=https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Bundesarchiv_B_145_Bild-F013093-0001,_K%C3%B6ln,_Schokoladenfabrik_Stollwerck,_Gastarbeiterinnen.jpg|thumb|Female guest workers at the Stollwerck chocolate factory, Cologne (1962)]] The first recruitment agreement was concluded in Rome on December 20, 1955. At this time, Italy already had bilateral agreements with Belgium, France, Switzerland, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Czechoslovakia. bilateral recruitment agreements were concluded. According to historian Roberto Sala, the Italian authorities based the conclusion of these agreements on the historical example of the recruitment of Italians to Nazi Germany, in which all the modalities of recruitment were negotiated and laid down at diplomatic level.

The German-Italian agreement stipulated that the Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung (predecessor of the Bundesagentur für Arbeit) was to select and recruit workers in Italy together with the Italian employment service.

A survey conducted by the Allensbacher Institut in March 1956 revealed that 55% of German citizens surveyed were "against" "bringing Italian workers to Germany". 20% were "in favor" and 6% were "possibly in favor". "Not yet heard of it" was 18%. Of the 55% who were against, the vast majority (41%) gave as their reason that there were enough German workers.

The ökonomische Aufschwung der Nachkriegszeit was a key factor in recruitment. At the beginning of the 1950s, industrial production rose sharply, and not least due to the establishment of the Bundeswehr in 1955 and the reintroduction of compulsory military service (1956-57), the unemployment figures fell noticeably. The demand for labor grew, particularly in agriculture and mining. However, the number of new recruits remained low in the first few years. Only after unemployment had fallen below one percent in 1960 and there were more vacancies than unemployed people, full employment]] and the industries could no longer cover their needs with immigrants from Eastern Europe and the GDR, the number of recruits increased significantly for the first time.

Subsequent recruitment agreements
In the following years, after the Agreement with Italy of December 20, 1955, further recruitment agreements were concluded between the Federal Republic and the sending countries to reduce their current account deficit with the Federal Republic of Germany: in March 1960 with Spain and with Greece, on October 30, 1961 with Turkey, then with Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia]. October 1961 with Turkey, then with Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.

Recruitment was based on the following principles: In addition to economic reasons on the German side, foreign policy motives also played a role in the recruitment process. The initiative came from the sending countries. In contrast, the fact that a large number of migrant workers were placed in practice is largely attributed to pressure from employers and implementation by the authorities.
 * state mediation (although other channels existed in parallel),
 * the national primacy (workers could only be recruited in areas where there was a shortage of domestic workers),
 * equal pay (the recruited workers were to be paid according to the same rates as nationals with comparable jobs),
 * the rotation principle (initially, work and residence permits were only valid for one year),
 * permanent control (expulsion of contract violators, prevention of "communist infiltration").

The agreement with Spain was initiated by Spanish diplomacy, with the German government expecting several things from it. On the one hand, there was the expectation of being able to recruit workers there who would become unemployed as a result of the economic restructuring process, after the Stability Plan of 1959 - the Plan de Estabilización - had replaced the Francoist economic policy with economic liberalism. On the other hand, the aim of foreign policy was to support Spain's rapprochement with Western Europe.

This was followed by an agreement with Greece, which had been trying to do so since 1955. The initiative for the recruitment agreement with Turkey also came from the sending country. [Anton Sabel]], President of the Federal Office for Employment Services and Unemployment Insurance, told the Ministry of Labor on September 26, 1960, that an agreement with Turkey was in no way necessary in terms of labor market policy. However, he could not judge "to what extent the Federal Republic can close its mind to any such proposal by the Turkish government, since Turkey has applied for admission to the European Economic Community (EEC) and, as a NATO partner, occupies a not insignificant political position." The economic historian Heike Knortz points out that Turkey used its NATO membership as well as its economic exchange with Germany as arguments for a recruitment agreement. Historian Johannes-Dieter Steinert attributes the success of Turkey's application to its role as a NATO member.

The journalist Heribert Prantl describes the agreement with Turkey and the subsequent recruitment agreements as an indirect consequence of the wall construction, as the halt to the influx of people from the East from August 1961 meant that no new workers came from there who could have been employed in industry. The economic historian Werner Abelshauser disagrees with this assessment; there is no connection between the building of the Wall and recruitment of Turkish workers because completely different sectors of the labor market were affected, particularly in terms of the level of qualifications.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the German government rejected numerous requests for recruitment agreements from non-European countries. The agreements with Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963) and Tunisia (1965) provided for stricter conditions: Recruitment was limited to two years; the health examination for people from Turkey and Tunisia was not only to check their ability to work, but also for disease protection. For Turkish Turkish]] migrant workers, the time limit that had previously been introduced at the request of the Federal Republic and Turkey was lifted with effect from September 30, 1964. The number of labor migrants from Morocco and Tunisia remained low compared to Turkey: Moroccans and Tunisians often preferred to emigrate to France. In Germany, most Moroccan workers worked in coal mining, others in the metal processing industry, the building industry and agriculture. The recruitment agreement with Morocco was primarily based on the interest of German mining employers in Moroccan miners from the Rif region; on a diplomatic level, it was also about closer ties with the West.

In addition, the Federal Republic concluded Agreement with South Korea for the Recruitment of Miners (1963) and Nurses (1971), with both economic and foreign policy motives playing a role.

On September 10, 1964, the Portuguese Armando Rodrigues de Sá was ceremoniously welcomed as the millionth guest worker in Germany. At that time, a total of 78% of foreign employees in the Federal Republic of Germany were male and 22% female. The proportion of women there rose from 15% to around 30% in the period from 1960 to 1973. The proportion of women in employment in 1970 was significantly higher among foreign women (55%) than among West German women (29%).

In the 1960s, guest workers were mostly employed in industry as unskilled or semi-skilled workers. They mainly worked in areas where heavy and dirty work had to be done and where shift system, serial forms of production with low qualification requirements (assembly line work) and piecework wages determined everyday working life. In the beginning, mainly unskilled workers were recruited, later also skilled workers. There is also talk of an under-stratification of the world of work, as migrants mainly took on unpopular and poorly paid jobs and native workers were able to reach higher-paid positions in a kind of elevator effect. According to general opinion, the workers recruited from abroad contributed significantly to the German "economic miracle". The recruitment of guest workers had financial advantages for the companies as consumers of labor because, from their perspective, German workers would only have accepted the same jobs with considerable wage concessions. The additional workers acted as a mobile labor reserve, also referred to as the "industrial reserve army". Conversely, the recruitment of foreign labor thus had an impact on the wage levels of German labor suppliers, especially in the low-wage sector. Women were mostly recruited for the low-wage sector or for the low-wage groups of the time.

In order to overcome resistance in the countries of origin to the recruitment of women abroad, women were only recruited in groups if possible, jobs and accommodation were checked in advance by the employment office for moral compatibility and intensive support was sought, preferably through Caritas or the Catholic Girls' Protection Association. Many moved to where relatives or spouses were already living. Mothers were not a priority target group for recruitment, and mothers with many children were not accepted on a discretionary basis. Although pregnant women were in principle entitled to maternity protection and protection against dismissal, the Federal Employment Agency did not openly address employers about their entitlement to equal participation in the welfare state. From 1969/1970, the recruitment commissions used pregnancy tests in the selection process. Overall, labor migration was and remained closely linked to family migration, despite efforts to the contrary.

The agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal each contained a clause on family reunification, which held out the prospect of a benevolent examination of an application for family reunification by the German authorities. The agreements with Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia and Yugoslavia, on the other hand, did not contain such a clause. In the agreement with Portugal (1964), the Ministry of the Interior also initially pushed for the exclusion of family reunification, did not enforce this, however.

The possibility of family reunification was further regulated in 1965/1966 by resolutions of the Conference of Interior Ministers. This existed for spouses and underage children up to the age of 21, but was initially only used to a limited extent. Instead, many foreign workers "commuted" by returning to their country of origin after their stay in the Federal Republic in order to take up employment in Germany again. The federal and state interior ministries took a more restrictive stance compared to other ministries. They developed plans to limit residence in the country by forcing people to return and by imposing obstacles to family reunification - similar to the regulations in the German Empire and in the Weimar Republic. In view of the economic interest in labor migration, however, they did not push through these plans in the 1960s vis-à-vis other departments involved.

In the course of the recession in 1966/1967, many guest workers returned home as their contracts were not renewed. Around 100,000 Yugoslav workers came to Germany between 1961 and 1968 on the basis of private contracts with employers. After the Federal Republic of Germany resumed diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in January 1968 - relations had been broken off in 1957 due to the Hallstein Doctrine - a recruitment agreement was concluded with this country in the same year. This was done for foreign policy reasons and despite the express reservations of the Federal Ministry of Labor. From 1970 onwards, Turks formed the largest group of foreigners in the Federal Republic.

In November 1972, a circular from the Federal Foreign Office to German consulates ended the possibility of entering the country with a work visa without involving the recruitment commission ("second route"). In 1973, at the time of the Oil crisis and the associated economic downturn, a ban on the recruitment of guest workers was imposed.

Recruitment stop 1973
On 23 November 1973, the Brandt II government decreed a recruitment freeze by decree of the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS) in response to the current energy and economic crisis, signed by Federal Minister of Labor Walter Arendt. The decree ended the placement of foreign workers from all recruitment states with the exception of Italy and at the same time ordered a restrictive practice in the granting of new work permits. According to Abelshauser, not only the economic crisis, i.e. the oil crisis of 1973 and its consequences, was relevant for the stop, but also an emerging structural crisis - the first signs of a "crisis of standardized mass production", which "permanently removed the basis for the demand for unskilled industrial workers". Others see a major reason for the recruitment freeze in the fact that the government has become more aware of the social and political costs of the recruitment programs. At the time of the recruitment freeze, around 2.6 million foreign workers were employed in Germany. Immigration then continued at a low level. It was now largely a case of spouses and children joining their parents.

With a directive on the employment of foreign workers dated November 13, 1974, the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit excluded certain industries from the recruitment ban. These were the mining, fish and canning industry, peat industry and hotel and restaurant industry sectors. Since Article 1 of the agreement with South Korea provided for "expanding and perfecting the professional skills of Korean miners" in connection with the recruitment, the recruitment of Korean miners was classified as "technical development aid" and therefore did not have to be interrupted. Miners, nurses and nursing assistants continued to be recruited from South Korea beyond the official recruitment ban until 1977.

From December 1, 1974, there was a ban on access to the labor market: from then on, foreigners already living in the Federal Republic could no longer obtain a work permit to take up employment for the first time. Exceptions were only made for certain young family members of foreign workers and in areas with a high demand for labor.

The "recruitment stop" (1973) meant that migrant workers employed in Germany were now barred from returning to their home country, terminating their employment contract, and later taking up work in Germany again. This circumstance was reinforced by a reduction in child benefit for children not living in Germany (1975), led to an increased influx of family members in the 1970s, although politicians initially continued to adhere to the idea underlying the "rotation model" that guest workers should only stay for a limited period of time. As this meant that the issue of integration policy was largely ignored by politicians, the public debate was primarily limited to labor market and distribution policy aspects. Regardless of this situation, the officially organized labour migration of the 1950s developed into an "immigration situation" towards the end of the 1970s. On October 1, 1978, a new regulation of the right of residence ("consolidation regulation") enabled foreign workers and their family members to obtain a permanent residence permit after five years of uninterrupted legal residence and a residence permit after eight years, subject to certain conditions. The rotation model, which had never been practiced "officially and openly" anyway, no longer played a role towards the end of the 1970s; instead, a controversial discussion began about the final return of those originally recruited to their home countries.

1980s: Return promotion, beginning integration, fall of the Berlin Wall
In 1980, the asylum seeker numbers reached a first Höchststand with 92,918 applications for 107,818 persons. There was growing unemployment and an increasing influx of foreigners; in debates in politics and the media, labour migration and asylum were conflated and ideologized as a "foreigner issue". The federal government introduced a visa requirement for Turks in 1980. At the same time, the Supplementary Protocols and Decisions|Decisions 2/76 and 1/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council meant greater freedom of movement for the provision of economic services and for the residence of family members. In Germany, the immigration of workers from Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal was seen as a necessary consequence of European integration, but not immigration from Turkey. Helmut Kohl, who became Federal Chancellor in 1982, focused foreigner policy on three main areas: maintaining the recruitment ban, restricting family reunification and promoting the willingness to return. According to British government protocols, Kohl considered it necessary to "reduce the number of Turks by 50 percent" over the following four years. With the controversial Return Assistance Act (RückHG) to financially promote the willingness of foreign workers to return home, the Federal Government attempted in 1983/84 to relieve the labor market, which was characterized by increasing unemployment.

A survey conducted in 1984 among 2,000 people who applied for return assistance, in which multiple answers were possible, showed that for all but the Turkish returnees, job problems were the main reason for return. Around half of the Turkish workers surveyed mentioned homesickness and job problems and one in three of them mentioned health problems. [Xenophobia|xenophobia]] was cited by around 10 percent of Spaniards and Greeks and one in four Yugoslavs and Turks as a reason for returning. In 1984, Turkish nationals accounted for around 40% of foreigners leaving Germany, mainly as a result of the Return Assistance Act; previously, they had accounted for a quarter of all foreigners leaving Germany in both 1976 and 1977.

In the 1980s, the federal government took measures to better integrate foreigners - especially those with long-term residence permits - into the labor market by promoting language skills and providing information about the labor market. However, this was not a comprehensive integration policy. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, first-generation immigrants increasingly experienced social rejection and economic and social insecurity. Events such as the riots in Hoyerswerda, in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, in Mölln and in Solingen as well as the beginning asylum debate promoted the fear of being ostracized as foreigners.

Outlook
Today, the period of recruitment policy is regarded as one of several Phasen in der Geschichte der bundesdeutschen Zuwanderungspolitik, also known as the "recruitment phase". For non-EU citizens, the recruitment ban still applies de facto in accordance with the relevant ausländerrecht provisions, although it has been partially relativized by other possibilities such as family reunification, the granting of residence for the purpose of studying and the opening of legal immigration channels for skilled workers. In the 1980s, Greece (1981), Portugal (1986) and Spain (1986) joined the European Economic Community, resulting in the free movement of workers for their citizens.

The Recruitment Ban Exemption Ordinance (ASAV) of September 17, 1998 and § 9 of the Work Permit Ordinance (ArGV) on employment without a work permit dated September 17, 1998, The Green Card offensive (2000), the Residence Act (2005) with the associated ordinances and the Employment Ordinance (2013) The Recruitment Stop Exemption Ordinance was fundamentally amended in 2008 by the Act on the Reorientation of Labor Market Policy Instruments (ArbMINAG). In the final report of the High-Level Consensus Group on Skilled Labour Requirements and Immigration from 2011, it was emphasized that the regulations that allowed skilled workers to immigrate were formally exceptions to the generally applicable recruitment ban. The consensus group called for this system to be reversed by amending the Residence Act to make it clear that immigration to Germany was explicitly desired and encouraged. This "paradigm shift" is "indispensable in order to develop a invitation and welcome culture in our country". The recruitment ban exemption regulation was repealed at the end of 2011. The Skilled Immigration Act, which came into force on March 1, 2020, created further opportunities for the immigration of skilled workers from non-EU countries.

To this day, the social and residence benefits for employees from the recruitment states and their family members regulated in the recruitment agreements continue to apply, including a regulation according to which children under the age of 16 from the (former) recruitment states were exempt from the visa and residence permit requirement, was revoked in January 1997 by an emergency decree of the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

On labor migration in general, see the chapters: "Development in the Federal Republic of Germany up to reunification" and "Developments after reunification and political debate" of the article "Labor migration"]]

Recruitment agreements of the Federal Republic of Germany: Southern Europe and countries bordering the Mediterranean
Anwerbeabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1955 bis 1968), orange eingefärbt die Vertragspartner

The following agreements were concluded with states belonging to Southern Europe or Mediterranean countries bordering the Mediterranean. The first agreement with Italy served as a model:


 * 1955: Recruitment agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy (Cabinet Adenauer II / Antonio Segni)
 * 1960: Recruitment agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain (Cabinet Adenauer III / Francisco Franco)
 * 1960: Recruitment agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Greece (Cabinet Adenauer III / Konstantinos Karamanlis)
 * 1961: Recruitment agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey (Adenauer III cabinet / Cemal Gürsel)
 * 1963: Recruitment agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Morocco (Cabinet Adenauer V / Hassan II)
 * 1964: Recruitment agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal (Cabinet Erhard I / Américo Tomás)
 * 1965: Recruitment agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Tunisia (Cabinet Erhard I / Habib Bourguiba)
 * 1968: Recruitment agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Yugoslavia (Kiesinger Cabinet / Mika Špiljak)

The agreements often came about on the initiative of the countries of origin, which wanted to relieve their labor market and benefit from foreign exchange earnings; for the Federal Republic, they meant an economically desired influx of workers, especially because hardly any migrants came from the GDR after the Wall was built in 1961. The agreements should ensure state regulation of labor migration in terms of the volume and qualifications of migrant workers.

In addition to the first route, recruitment (entry and examination by the recruitment commission), there were also other ways for foreigners to enter the Federal Republic for gainful employment. The second route was entry with a consular visa on the basis of an existing job offer, whereby the granting of the visa required approval by the German police and the German employment offices, which checked, among other things, whether a suitable German worker was available for the vacant position (principle of national primacy). This path was underpinned by a Council Decision of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OEEC) of 1953, according to which no employee was to be prevented from concluding an employment contract directly in the Federal Republic. The third way was to enter the country with a tourist visa and then apply for a residence and work permit.

Three Verordnungen of August 1961, March 1964 and October 1968 introduced the free movement of labor in the EEC. As a result, from January 1, 1962, EEC workers no longer needed a visa to enter the country; an identity card was sufficient. From then on, the recruitment agreement was less important for Italian workers.

Further recruitment agreements of the Federal Republic of Germany
In addition to the recruitment agreements already mentioned, there were recruitment agreements with other countries. At the beginning of the 1950s, the Federal Government concluded bilateral agreements with Austria (1951), Belgium (1952), Spain (1952) and Sweden (1953), which were intended to improve professional and language skills and were limited to a few hundred guest workers per year (Austria 500, Belgium 150, Spain 150 and Sweden 250 per year). It also agreed temporary employment programs with South Korea, Japan and Chile for the recruitment of miners,   which - like the agreements with Morocco and Tunisia - were essentially aimed at temporary employment programs. Recruitment from Japan and Chile as well as the recruitment of male workers from Korea served the mining industry. The background to the recruitment from Japan was the labour shortage on the one hand and the rationalization measures in the Japanese mining industry in the 1950s on the other. In 1957, an exchange of notes was agreed with Japan to employ 500 Japanese miners in the Federal Republic for a limited period of three years; For this purpose, employees were granted leave of absence from their home companies in Japan. Recruitment from Japan came to a standstill in the 1960s in the wake of the recruitment of other guest workers. In 1963 and 1971, recruitment agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Korea were concluded: The 1963 agreement regulated the recruitment of miners and the 1971 agreement regulated the recruitment of nurses and nursing assistants. The legal basis for the recruitment of South Korean miners were three announcements issued by the German government in 1964, 1970 and 1971. In the recruitment of Korean nurses and nursing assistants, unlike the other recruitment agreements, the responsibility for selecting the workers did not lie with a German authority, but with a local organization, the Korean Overseas Development Corporation (KODCO).

Comparable recruitment agreements of other countries
Other European countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, also implemented similar recruitment programs. Bilateral agreements on recruitment provided a certain degree of protection for emigrants. They also gave the sending countries the opportunity to control emigration through the involvement of their employment offices - for example, by first offering skilled workers needed at home a job in their own country.

Intra-European labor migration began as early as 1945/46, shortly after the end of the World War II, mainly from Italy. Several countries concluded bilateral agreements with Italy under which workers could be recruited from there. Workers were recruited from the Federal Republic of Germany to non-European countries: Australia concluded a migration agreement with the Federal Republic in 1952, which permitted the recruitment of German workers via the German employment offices as well as via direct applications to the Australian representatives in the Federal Republic.

An OEEC study published in 1953 compared the recruitment practices of the various countries. They were similar in that bilateral agreements were used for the mass recruitment of a large number of comparably qualified skilled workers, whereas individual recruitment was primarily used to recruit more highly qualified workers.

For contract workers in the GDR and guest workers in other countries (Austria, Switzerland), see: Article "Guest workers", section "Situation in the GDR" and subsequent sections

European social security agreements
At the European level, four interim agreements were concluded on December 11, 1953, which Germany signed: These interim agreements still had some gaps, especially for people who had worked in more than two countries. At the same time as the Interim Agreements, the European Welfare Agreement (ETS No. 014) was concluded, which provides for equal treatment of citizens of the signatory states with nationals and a broad prohibition of deportation solely because they are in need. This ban on deportation applies if the person in need of assistance has already resided in Germany for five years - or ten years if they are older than 55&nbsp. This does not include periods during which he or she has claimed welfare benefits. A corresponding additional protocol (SEV no. 014A) was also concluded for this purpose.
 * an agreement on old-age pension, survivors' pension and disability pension (SEC-No. 012),
 * an agreement on social insurance benefits in the event of sickness, maternity, accidents at work, occupational diseases and unemployment as well as family benefits (ETS No. 013),
 * two additional protocols (ETS No. 012A and 013A), which extend the personal scope of the two agreements to refugees.

Legal basis in the Federal Republic of Germany
The legal basis for the admission of migrant workers was formed by two ordinances from the National Socialist era and the Great Depression, which allowed for increased state intervention in the labor market:


 * the Foreigners' Police Ordinance (APVO) of August 22, 1938, which regulated the granting of residence permits and the issuing of residence bans: The Federal Ministry of the Interior The APVO was reinstated in 1951, primarily due to the interests of the state interior ministries in controlling and monitoring border traffic - with the change that an incorrect statement about "racial affiliation" was no longer a reason for a residence ban. It was implemented without the involvement of Parliament, as was later the case with the recruitment ban.
 * dhe Ordinance on Foreign Employees (VOüAA) of January 23, 1933, which, as a further development of two previous ordinances from the 1920s, served to centralize the state's power to control the employment of foreigners: The VOüAA was reinstated in 1952 after discussions in the relevant labor administration authorities and largely without a review of its content. Since the VOüAA had been issued before the National Socialists came to power, the fact that the decree came from the President of the Reich Labor Administration Friedrich Syrup was not taken into account, who had subsequently held a responsible position in the organization of Nazi forced labor.

Later, the Ausländergesetz (AuslG) of April 28, 1965 formed the basis. This was passed largely without controversial debate and came into force in large parts on October 1, 1965.

The recruitment ban enacted in 1973 is also of particular importance. Ten years later, the Return Assistance Act of November 28, 1983 was intended to promote the departure of unemployed migrant workers from Germany.

Parties
The recruitment programs were adopted from 1955 to 1969 under governments led by the Union parties. In order to avoid religious and cultural heterogeneity, the agreements were to be limited to European countries in accordance with the ideas of Federal Minister of Labor Theodor Blank (CDU), the agreements were to be limited to European states. This was later deviated from and made a condition that the stay of non-Europeans would be limited to two years. This restriction was lifted a few years later. The recruitment ban of 1973, on the other hand, was adopted by the SPD and FDP after some politicians of the social-liberal coalition - including Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt, Minister of Labor Walter Arendt, Minister of the Interior Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Minister of Economics Helmut Schmidt - had begun to publicly consider how labor migration to the Federal Republic could be limited from around 1972. The CDU/CSU, meanwhile, spoke out against the stop: It was in favor of stronger regulation, but continuation of the recruitment policy.

In its Grundsatzprogramm von 1978, the CDU declared itself to be "committed to the social integration of foreign workers and their families into our society, as well as to maintaining their cultural independence and promoting their contacts with their home country". Families should be able to keep the option of returning open and measures should be taken to prevent the social isolation of children.

In September 1979, Heinz Kühn (SPD), as head of the Office of the Federal Government Commissioner for Foreigners, which had been founded the previous year, published a Kühn Memorandum on the situation of foreign workers and their families, in which he described the Federal Republic as a de facto immigration country, recognized the political responsibility of the receiving country towards migrant workers and outlined and called for a consistent policy of integration. However, the so-called foreigner policy of the SPD/FDP federal government continued to focus on concepts for temporary social integration.

As a result of their coalition talks, the CDU/CSU and FDP declared on October 1, 1982: "Germany is not an immigration country. All justifiable humanitarian measures must therefore be taken to prevent the influx of foreigners." They expressly adhered to the recruitment ban. From 1982, Federal Minister of the Interior Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU) campaigned to lower the immigration age for children from non-EU countries - by which he explicitly referred to immigration from Turkey - from 16 to six years. He met with resistance within the CDU/CSU, particularly from the Minister of Labor Norbert Blüm, and was ultimately unsuccessful. In terms of foreign policy, Turkey also exerted pressure to prevent this age limit from being lowered. In its 1986 election manifesto, the CDU/CSU demanded that "the number of foreigners should not continue to increase" and, for the first time, explicitly called for the integration of foreigners living in Germany. Dn the 1980s, the FDP largely supported the restrictive policies of the CDU/CSU as a coalition partner. The Commissioner for Foreigners Liselotte Funcke (FDP) resigned in July 1991, citing the lack of resources in her office to initiate a fundamental discussion; Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen (FDP) was appointed as her successor in November. At the end of 1991, the CDU removed the statement "Germany is not a country of immigration" from its Dresden Manifesto.

Founded in 1980, the The Greens party advocated a liberal policy on foreigners and migration. In view of the fact that many foreigners had no legal certainty about their long-term prospects in Germany after years of legal residence, "The Greens" were of the opinion that "immigrants should be given the same rights and obligations as German citizens as far as possible" in order to comply with the constitutional principle of equality of all citizens - in particular equal treatment in the labor market, free political activity, comprehensive social security and equal opportunities in education. In 1984, they introduced a draft bill for a right of settlement to the Bundestag, which was drawn up jointly with the foreigners concerned.

Employer
At the beginning of the 1950s, there was a labor shortage in the Federal Republic, especially in agriculture and mining. Some business associations were skeptical about hiring foreigners. After the Federal Agency for Job Placement and Unemployment Insurance had estimated an additional labor requirement of 800,000 people for the following year in 1955, business-related media reported on the concrete advantages of recruitment measures for employers. Although recruitment agreements obliged them to provide their workers with accommodation, the standards were low and accommodation in barrackss was sufficient. Later, entrepreneurs were more in favor of recruitment than any other social group. From the outset, miners were taught the language skills they needed to work underground.

The rotation principle, according to which guest workers were to come to Germany on a temporary basis and then return with savings and newly acquired technical skills, was implemented at the beginning of recruitment, but was dropped over time, as the economy did not want to do without the workers who had already been trained and many migrant workers were willing to stay.

Recruitment was handled very differently in the various large companies. For example, the Volkswagen plant in Wolfsburg recruited exclusively male workers from Italy for a long time and made a clear distinction between a core workforce on the one hand and a peripheral workforce on the other, which consisted largely of migrant workers and German women. The plant compensated for an increasing fluctuation of Italians, which in the mid-1970s was 60% per year, by constantly recruiting new workers, with the help of the Vatican. Other companies, however - such as the Ford plant in Cologne - switched to permanent employment contracts over time.

Migrant workers
In total, around 14 million guest workers came to the Federal Republic of Germany between 1955 and 1973. After the recruitment stop, family reunification from Turkey also increased because the migrant workers feared that stricter regulations on family reunification could be issued in the future. On the one hand, the attitude of guest worker families towards the host country generally remained ambivalent; On the other hand, the perceived change in the former home countries led to the experience of alienation in these families.

Turkish migrant workers mostly came from structurally weak regions, often from village backgrounds, and arrived in an urban environment. Conflicts could arise between the freedom of movement and consumer orientation in Germany and the traditional educational ideas of the immigrant families.

From the 1950s to the 1970s, 11,000 nurses came to Germany from South Korea. As the category of auxiliary nurse did not exist in their home country, some of the Korean women had a qualification advantage over their German colleagues. In the long term, around 30% of Korean migrant workers remained in Germany, while 70% moved on or returned to South Korea. After their return, South Korean nurses who had completed their training in Germany were denied recognition of their qualifications by South Korea's US-influenced training system. In Germany, nurses in 1978 and miners in 1979/1980 fought politically for the right to stay and also campaigned transnationally for the democratization of South Korea.

According to a representative survey, the majority of foreign workers employed in Germany in the fall of 1968 were married&#160;(71% of men and 64% of women; from recruitment states: 72% of men and 74% of women). The majority of married men and the vast majority of married women lived with their spouses in the federal territory (54% of married men and 90% of married women; from recruitment states: 58% and 92%). While German married women and mothers, if they were gainfully employed, often worked part-time according to the additional earner model, female guest workers were assumed to work full-time even if they had children.

The proportion of those living in shared accommodation fell over time from around two thirds (1962) to 23 % (1972), 10 % (1980) and 6.6 % (1985).

In the decades following the recruitment ban, the number of foreign self-employed (professional)/self-employed rose from around 40,000 (early 1970s) to around 220,000 (1993); Many of them worked in the hospitality industry. It was mainly Italians, Greeks and Turks who became self-employed. In the craft sector, foreigners were increasingly working in craft-like professions for which, in contrast to the craft trades, no master craftsman's examination or exemption permit was required. In 1993, there were a total of 16,100 foreign business owners in this sector nationwide, including mainly mend cutters (9,300 foreign business owners) and ice cream manufacturers (2,100 foreign business owners).

Trade unions
There were different attitudes to recruitment in the trade unions. On the one hand, they often held restrictive positions on migration. On the other hand, some trade unions considered regulated recruitment by means of agreements to be preferable to less controlled access for migrant workers. At the beginning of the 1970s, in the face of rising unemployment, the trade unions, together with employers' associations and the state employment service, exerted increasing pressure on the federal government to end recruitment, and after the recruitment ban of 1973 they prevented it from being relaxed.

From the very beginning of the recruitment agreements, trade unions recruited migrant workers as members, and the DGB and IG Metall introduced their own departments for "foreigner work". However, the interests of the trade unions remained largely focused on domestic employees, especially in times of crisis, when fears of competition for jobs came to the fore. After the reform of the Works Constitution Act in 1972, foreigners from non-EEC countries could also be elected to works councils for the first time. In the 1970s, foreign workers were organized in trade unions to a similar extent as their German colleagues, but they remained underrepresented in decision-making structures. Among other things, migrant workers were often assumed by the trade unions to have short-term interests and a lack of language and professional skills.

In 1973, 300,000 workers took part in around 400 unauthorized strikes, often concerning the working conditions of migrant workers. The wild strike of 1973 at the Ford plants in Cologne, in which mainly Turkish migrant workers went on strike, is considered the most important labor dispute on the part of migrant workers. Also in 1973, female workers, predominantly migrants, successfully took action against low-wage groups at the Pierburg carburetor company in Neuss through strikes, supported by IG Metall, which declared its solidarity with the strikers.

The role of trade unions at home and abroad in the recruitment of guest workers, as well as their organization in companies and trade unions, has been little studied to date.

Welfare organizations
From the 1950s and 1960s, the Wohlfahrtsverbände offered Ausländersozialberatung (social counseling for foreigners), which included advice on practical everyday issues such as legal matters and finding accommodation, as well as translation services and return counseling. In accordance with the rotation principle, there was little or no focus on social, professional and linguistic integration. Advice was provided by different associations depending on nationality: For Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese and Catholic Yugoslavs (mainly Croats) by Caritas, for Greeks by Diakonie, for others (mainly Turks and Yugoslavs) by Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO).

From 1984, the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMA), which regulated social counseling for foreigners and the professional qualifications of counselors. Those services "which are the responsibility of existing general public or independent care bodies or which are to be set up on the basis of legal requirements" were no longer to be carried out by social counselors. From then on, counseling was aimed at "enabling foreigners to shape their lives independently" and "mediating between foreigners and the general services and measures available in public and private sponsorship". Translation activities, consulting services for other institutions as well as tax and legal advice were excluded from then on. In 1998/1999, social counseling for foreigners was transformed into Migration counseling (MBE) and geared towards integration.

Statistics
Foreign workers lived and worked in the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of the freedom of movement regulations of the European Economic Community founded in 1957 or without a special treaty basis (Austria, Switzerland, Great Britain, USA). In terms of numbers, these workers played only a minor role compared to those who entered the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of recruitment agreements.At the beginning of the 1970s, the number of foreign employees was well over two million.

In total, around 14 million guest workers came to the Federal Republic between 1955 and 1973; around 11 up to 12 Millions returned to their home countries. Many stayed contrary to their original intention.

Southern Europe and countries bordering the Mediterranean
 Foreign employees 1954-1990,

June/July, by gender Data according to: "Annual figures 1980" and "Annual figures 1990" of the Federal Employment Agency (BA). Figures before and after 1974 are only comparable to a limited extent. (1954-1972: according to possession or need of a work permit. No data available for 1973. 1975-1980: foreign employees subject to social insurance contributions according to BA employment statistics. In 1984, employees in a prolonged labor dispute are not counted.) 1954-1960: July; 1961-1972 and from 1974: June.

 Foreign employees 1954-1990,

June/July, selected nationalities Data according to: "Jahreszahlen 1980" of the Federal Labor Office. Figures before and after 1974 are only comparable to a limited extent. (1954-1972: according to possession or need of a work permit; 1975-1980: foreign employees subject to social security contributions according to BA employment statistics. In 1984, employees in a prolonged labor dispute are not counted.) 1954-1960: July; 1961-1972 and from 1974: June.

A total of 2.39 million workers were placed in the Federal Republic of Germany by the foreign offices of the Federal Employment Agency. This represents only a part of the new influx of foreign workers, especially as the total figure also includes influxes from non-recruiting countries. Workers from the recruitment states were also able to immigrate legally by other means (second route: with a corresponding visa; third route: with a tourist visa and the hope of taking up employment and subsequent legitimization of their stay).

 '''1966-1973 Foreign employees placed by foreign offices of the Federal Agency''', Data according to: BAVAV (1969), BA (1972 and 1974).

 Foreign workers placed in the country concerned since the establishment of a permanently staffed office, Data according to: Federal Labor Office, 1974.

Weitere Staaten
Thanks to the bilateral program between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Korea, a total of almost 8,000 Korean miners and over 11,000 nurses came to Germany.

Between 1957 and 1965, a total of 436 Japanese miners worked as guest workers in the Ruhr area.

Old-age provision
A study published in 2013 found that Old-age poverty among foreigners aged 65 and over was 41.5% in 2011. This is partly attributed to the fact that many former guest workers received low incomes.

Statistically speaking, financial support from sons and informal care from daughters are more pronounced among Turkish migrants than in the general population.

In August 2023, the Federal Cabinet passed a draft law that provides for easier acquisition of German citizenship for former guest workers and GDR contract workers - with easier language certification and without a naturalization test.

Descendants
Schools were little prepared for dealing with migrant children. In the 1950s and 1960s, their numbers were still small, so that no educational policy and pedagogical efforts were made to cater for them. At the beginning of the recruitment programs, children of guest workers were typically taught in separate classes - so-called foreigner classes - and were excluded from regular classes. The federal states developed different approaches to educating the children. These ranged from Berlin's model of teaching all children together, possibly supplemented by mother-tongue instruction, to Bavarian Bavarian]] model of separate teaching, in which a transfer from a mother-tongue class to a mainstream class was only possible with sufficient knowledge of German and upon application.

The descendants of migrant workers in Germany are under increased pressure to adapt, which is reflected, among other things, in the demand that children should have a good knowledge of German before they start school. In the first decades, there was a lack of early language support; only in the context of model projects - for example in the "Denkendorfer Modell" initiated in 1972 by the training center of the Baden-Württemberg Protestant state church Kloster Denkendorf - these children received targeted support. Pupils of foreign nationality attend Hauptschule and Förderschule disproportionately often. Language deficits and a lack of support from parents were often interpreted as learning deficits and used as a reason to refer children of immigrants to special schools (see also: Article "Child poverty in industrialized countries", section "Escape from the poverty trap"). In some cases, school systems granted migrant children exemptions from foreign language lessons, but without their home language being counted as a foreign language, so that they were denied the opportunity to acquire a higher education entrance qualification. Some migrant organizations founded private schools to meet the needs of the children. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Greek state financed Greek schools in Germany on the basis of bilateral agreements, although their degrees were not recognized as equivalent in most German states and were instead intended to prepare students for studies at Greek universities.

Difficulties associated with the following generations first became the focus of attention in education policy when the number of children moving to Germany increased after the recruitment stop. A number of these perceived problems are analyzed and discussed in more detail to the present day - for example from the perspective of educational disadvantage. For North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, considerable regional differences were found in the proportion of foreign pupils referred to special schools and in the focus of special educational support, which pointed to regional disadvantages for non-German pupils that were interpreted as institutional discrimination.

Approaches to finding a solution include, in particular, support in school education. From the 1980s onwards, "education for foreigners" developed into intercultural education, which provides for a distanced reflection of cultural influences to be practiced by everyone imprints.

A Neuregelung des Ausländerrechts von 1991 and a reform of the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz of 1993 made it easier for first and second generation foreigners to acquire German citizenship. From 2000 onwards, the newly introduced "Option Model" in the Citizenship Act enabled numerous descendants of guest workers born in Germany from 1990 onwards to acquire German citizenship by birth. From the 2005 microcensus onwards, people with a migration background were recorded as a separate category.

At the turn of the 21st century, the group of former guest workers and their descendants formed the largest proportion of citizens with a migration background in Germany. Because this group is such a large and culturally visible immigrant group, research has spoken of the "myth of return" or even the "illusion of return". This does not take into account the fact that a large majority of migrants actually returned.

Children of Turkish guest workers educated in Germany have a permanent legal entitlement to reside and work in Germany on the basis of Decision ARB 1/80. Studies conducted in Germany using Turkish-sounding names in the 2010s showed discrimination based on name when looking for work and on the housing market. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the German-Turkish recruitment agreement, the Turkish community in Germany emphasized that "the achievements of the first generation" of people of Turkish origin in Germany were still not appreciated and that deficits in the integration were still having an effect today.

The Korean community in Germany is highly networked. Their networks, which focus on socializing and everyday assistance, among other things, have also facilitated the establishment of Korean companies in Germany and provided Korean students abroad with help in everyday life. In the second generation of German-Koreans, 70% have a high school diploma or a university degree.

Situation in the countries of origin
In the countries of origin, the question arose as to how to deal with the situation if many guest workers were to return at the same time. The economy was not prepared for their arrival and the countries of origin showed little interest in their reintegration. Yugoslavia courted returning skilled workers, but not the numerous unskilled workers; on the contrary, it was feared that, having experienced prosperity and luxury in the host country despite often undignified living conditions, they would increase the army of unemployed and stir up social unrest. In Spain, under Franco, the free formation of interest groups and associations was prohibited by law, so that returnees could hardly support each other. Although Greece's economy was considered strong enough to absorb 30,000 to 35,000 returnees in the event of a sudden recession in the Federal Republic, there was little interest in them. Conversely, employers in the host country also had no reason to feel responsible for preparing their workers for possible future self-employment in their home country, and there was a lack of targeted technical assistance. In many cases, guest workers remained abroad because they had not been able to save enough money.

In exceptional cases, companies were founded with saved start-up capital or through cooperation in the form of a cooperative. One example is the Turkish workers' company Türksan, through which the capital earned in the host country was to be invested in the home country to create jobs and which - with the support of the German and Turkish governments - ultimately led to the establishment of a carpet factory. Other Turkish employee companies (Türkyap, Türksal, Birsan) were less successful.

From November 28, 1983 to June 30, 1984, the Return Assistance Act temporarily granted the possibility of financial assistance upon return. Anyone who was not a citizen of an EC country and with whose country of origin no bilateral social security agreement existed, which was the case for people from Korea, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Turkey, had to give up their pension entitlements: The employee's share was paid out without interest, while the employer's share remained with the German pension fund. In addition, he was excluded by law from permanent residence in Germany. The Reintegration Assistance Act of February 1986 permitted the use of a German Bauspardarlehen in the country of origin.

Reception and criticism
The term guest worker for migrant workers was already considered euphemistic by some sociologists in the early 1970s.

In the retrospective evaluation of recruitment policy in the still young Federal Republic of Germany, various factors were taken into the focus of scientific consideration. The sociologist Friedrich Heckmann, for example, focused on shifts in social status and the improvement of qualification among German workers. According to him, the jobs filled by guest workers, for which no special qualification requirements were necessary, made it possible for German workers to advance to more qualified and popular positions. Hedwig Richter and Ralf Richter criticized that the uncritical collaboration of social scientists with political institutions had led to a "victim plot" in the history of labour migration, whereby migrants were stylized as passive victims without taking their motives into account. This prevents an objective and scientific discussion of the topic. Measures for the integration have often remained ineffective because a lack of initiative on the part of migrants and their "stubbornness" have stood in their way. However, a distinction must be made between groups and phases of residence. Especially in the case of first-generation Italian guest workers, a "transfer of southern Italian political and cultural structures into the German company and the German community" took place.

According to Reinhold Weber and Karl-Heinz Meier-Braun, the employment of foreign workers has enabled many Germans to reach better professional positions: 2.3 million Germans have risen from blue-collar to white-collar positions mainly due to the employment of foreign workers. Foreigners reacted more strongly than Germans to poor employment situations with self-employment. In addition, according to Weber and Meier-Braun, pension insurance was virtually "subsidized" by foreign workers for a long time: The amounts paid into the pension insurance scheme by foreign workers were offset by only around a tenth of the benefits.

On August 31, 2021, Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, Minister of State for Integration Annette Widmann-Mauz and former Federal President Christian Wulff presented four people with the Deutschlandstiftung Integration talisman. [Christian Wulff]] as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Deutschlandstiftung Integration presented four people with the talisman of the Deutschlandstiftung Integration: Anka Ljubek, Hoai Nam Duong, Yang-Hee Kim and Zeynep Gürsoy received the award on behalf of the people of the first generation of immigrants from the various recruitment countries. The award winners had come to Germany as part of the recruitment agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR, had worked there for many years and had children and grandchildren who were active in Germany in the fields of science, business, social services or culture.

Criticism of the political approach
The economic historian Heike Knortz spoke of a lack of discussion and transparency during the political initiation of the recruitment of guest workers. At that time, foreign policy was only counterbalanced by an internal government counterweight, and there was no critical counterweight from civil society. Only the Swiss press, but not the domestic press, reported on the underlying foreign policy motives. When it became clear that the assumption of a temporary stay did not correspond to reality, the Federal Foreign Office shirked its responsibility. At the same time, it did not want to refrain from concluding further recruitment agreements.

Lack of public information about the political background
Historian Johannes-Dieter Steinert reports that attempts were initially made to keep the recruitment agreement with Turkey, which was confirmed by an exchange of notes, secret in order to avoid creating a precedent that could have led to further requests for recruitment agreements. In this context, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria and Egypt were frequently mentioned, as well as Thailand, Somalia, Singapore and the Philippines. According to Steinert, society was "not or only insufficiently informed about the background and objectives of German migration policy". The recruitment policy remained a secret, and this "contributed significantly to the problems that persist to this day". Steinert speaks of an "abstruse fear of discussing questions of migration and integration policy openly and publicly" at the time. The lack of political will was concealed in the 1950s by the "occupationally and socially declassifying" term "guest worker". Foreign workers also remained in a state of permanent uncertainty as to how long their stay could be extended.

Criticism of the economic justification for recruitment
While the economic justification for recruitment developed in the 1960s and 1970s based on the labor shortage in German industry dominated public discourse for a long time, more recent research has shown that the main beneficiaries were companies in certain sectors of the economy. An essay by the WSI from 2014 states: "From their point of view, guest workers expanded the labor supply, curbed wage increases and, with their low hourly wages, ensured that economic growth could be maintained with high profits. However, this also allowed unprofitable companies to continue operating. Investments in labor-saving machinery were neglected. The Structural Change was postponed, and when it did set in, the jobs of foreigners were disproportionately affected." Knortz emphasizes that the government did not succeed in stimulating rationalization as an alternative to recruiting foreign workers. Abelshauser emphasizes that recruitment was primarily geared towards mass production, but that the strength of the German economy still lay in the "post-industrial tailoring of machines and systems", which meant above all a need for highly qualified skilled workers.

Criticism of the social consequences
The guest workers who remained in Germany formed a permanent underclass in the labor and housing market. They are also overrepresented at the lower end of society in old age and "receive significantly lower pensions than Germans, have an extremely high risk of poverty and live modestly."

The culture and language of guest workers were marginalized in Germany from the very beginning, also with academic support such as from the authors of the Heidelberg Manifesto of 1981, who warned of an alleged "overforeignization" of the German language and the "Volkstum". The multilingualism of the descendants of guest workers is also hardly valued to this day: "Migration languages are not perceived as cultural or economic capital, they rarely have a positive connotation, and the majority population only knows them, if at all, as an "obstacle to integration"."

Quote
In connection with labor migration, the Swiss writer Max Frisch is often quoted - also when applied to Germany - who wrote a foreword to dialogues in the documentary film "Siamo Italiani" by Alexander J. Seiler in 1965 under the title "Überfremdung" ("Immigration").

Ernst Schnydrig]], the chairman of German Caritas, had already made similar comments in 1961: "We wanted to import workers - and people came." Frisch is also quoted in Germany in connection with labour migration, for example to emphasize that its human aspects were ignored for a long time.

Literature

 * Marcel Berlinghoff: Das Ende der „Gastarbeit“. Europäische Anwerbestopps 1970–1974. Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2012, ISBN 978-3-506-77668-6.
 * Aytaç Eryılmaz, Cordula Lissner (Hrsg.): Geteilte Heimat. 50 Jahre Migration aus der Türkei. Klartext Verlag, Essen 2011, ISBN 978-3-8375-0640-2.
 * Aytaç Eryılmaz, Mathilde Jamin (Hrsg.): Fremde Heimat – eine Geschichte der Einwanderung aus der Türkei. Klartext, Essen 1998, ISBN 3-88474-653-7 (deutsch und türkisch).
 * Ulrich Herbert: Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge. Beck, München 2001, ISBN 3-406-47477-2.
 * Hedwig Richter, Ralf Richter: Der Opfer-Plot. Probleme und neue Felder der deutschen Arbeitsmigrationsforschung. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. Nr. 1, Oldenbourg, München 2009, p. 61–97 (PDF; 485 kB).
 * Roberto Sala: „Gastarbeitersendungen“ und „Gastarbeiterzeitschriften“ in der Bundesrepublik (1960–1975) – ein Spiegel internationaler Spannungen. In: Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies in Contemporary History 2 (2005), p. 366–387.
 * Hedwig Richter, Ralf Richter: Der Opfer-Plot. Probleme und neue Felder der deutschen Arbeitsmigrationsforschung. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. Nr. 1, Oldenbourg, München 2009, p. 61–97 (PDF; 485 kB).
 * Roberto Sala: „Gastarbeitersendungen“ und „Gastarbeiterzeitschriften“ in der Bundesrepublik (1960–1975) – ein Spiegel internationaler Spannungen. In: Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies in Contemporary History 2 (2005), p. 366–387.