Genocidal intent

Genocidal intent is the mens rea (mental element) for the crime of genocide. Intent to destroy is one of the elements of the crime of genocide according to the 1948 Genocide Convention. There is an unresolved "intend debate" over whether dolus directus (direct intent, meaning that the perpetrator committed the act with both the knowledge of its harmful consequences and the desire to cause that harm) needs to be proven to convict for genocide, or whether a knowledge-based standard should be enough to convict for genocide.

Definition and legal standards
For an act to be classified as genocide (under the Genocide Convention), it is essential to demonstrate that the perpetrators had a deliberate and specific aim (dolus specialis) to physically destroy the group based on its real or perceived nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion. Intention to destroy the group's culture or intending to scatter the group does not suffice.

In 2019, Canada's National Inquiry’s into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women argued that when it comes to state responsibility for genocide, "a state's specific intent to destroy a protected group can only be proved by the existence of a genocidal policy or manifest pattern of conduct."

International Criminal Tribunals
The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and International Court of Justice have ruled that, in the absence of a confession, genocidal intent can be proven with circumstantial evidence, especially "the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups."

Standards of intent
It is non-controversial that proving dolus directus would meet the Genocide Convention's intent requirement; the weaker standard of dolus indirectus (indirect intent, meaning that the perpetrator did not desire the harm but foresaw it as a certain result of their actions and committed the act with this knowledge) is less clear.

Some scholars argue that a knowledge standard would make it easier to obtain convictions. Some of the existing international tribunal cases like Akayesu and Jelisić have rejected the knowledge standard.

The acquittal of Jelisić under the more onerous standard was controversial, and one scholar opined that Nazis would have been allowed to go free under the ICTY's ruling. When Radislav Krstić became the first Serb convicted by the ICTY under the purpose standard, the Krstić court explained that its decision did not rule out a knowledge standard under customary international law.

Recent developments
In 2010, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal referred to the precedent of the ICTR in discussing the role of genocidal intent.

Debate
In the 2004 United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the War in Darfur, Claus Kress argued that the ICTY and ICTR were incorrect in their view of the genocidal intent of individuals. Hans Vest argued for the interlinked roles of an individual's intent and the individual's expectation of contributing to a collective action. Kjell Anderson discussed ways of separating out the roles of collective policies and their interaction with individual intent. Olaf Jenssen disagreed with the lack of sentencing Goran Jelisić for genocidal intent, arguing that legal consistency would imply that some of the perpetrators of the Holocaust would not have been convicted for genocide.

Cases

 * Akayesu: The court rejected the knowledge standard.
 * Jelisić: Acquittal under the more onerous standard, controversial for its implications.
 * Krstić: First Serb convicted by the ICTY under the purpose standard; did not rule out a knowledge standard under customary international law.