Japanese occupation of West Sumatra

The Japanese occupation of West Sumatra, officially known as Sumatora Nishi Kaigan Shū (スマトラ西海岸州), started from 1942 until 1945 when the region was controlled by the Empire of Japan. The occupation was notable and recognized as one of the rare instances where a civilian government was established, rather than being governed by someone associated with the Japanese Imperial Army. The Japanese entered Padang on 17 March 1942 and within ten days all important cities in the West Sumatra region were occupied without resistance from the Dutch. The Japanese occupation of the region ended on 17 August 1945 with the proclamation of Indonesian independence by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta.

In the early days of the Japanese occupation, events in Padang were heavily influenced by Sukarno. In October 1943, Japan ordered the establishment of the Giyūgun to help with defence. Led by Chatib Sulaiman, the Giyūgun was the only army unit formed by the Japanese in West Sumatra. This voluntary army would later become the backbone of Indonesia's armed forces after independence.

Japanese arrival
In February 1942, the Japanese began its invasion of Sumatra by deploying paratroop units in Palembang. According to Audrey Kahin, the Japanese intended to preempt Dutch plans to damage oil installations near Palembang. From Palembang, the Japanese army soon spread across southern and northern Sumatra swiftly. By mid-March, larger numbers of troops landed on the northern and eastern coasts of Sumatra, and moved rapidly southwards.

Through the Agreement of Kalijati on 8 March 1942, the Dutch ceded the Indonesian colonies to Japan. After the occupation began, the Japanese divided Indonesia into three military administration areas. The Sumatra region was under the 25th Army Military Government Department (Rikugun) in Singapore led by General Tomoyuki Yamashita. However, for nine days after receiving the Dutch surrender, Japan had not yet reached West Sumatra, leaving a power vacuum in the region and what remained of Dutch authority in complete disarray. However even after the official capitulation of the Dutch East Indies, rogue elements of the KNIL army of Sumatra disavowed this order. Led by then Governor of Sumatra and former resident of Sumatra's West Coast, Adriaan Isaac Spits, he declared the Dutch army in Sumatra would continue to fight "to the last drop of blood." He enacted a scorched earth policy across West Sumatra to slow down the Japanese advance, much to the suffering of the locals. Demonstrations were planned to happen on 12 March on Padang Panjang against A. I. Spits' scorched policy. Led by Chatib Suleiman, Leon Salim, and several supporters, they intend to demand the Dutch to hand over power to the Indonesians before the Japanese army enters West Sumatra, so they will be the ones to negotiate with the Japanese occupation army. They were later arrested after word spread about the planned protests and were subsequently taken by the Dutch to the mountains of West Sumatra, where the Dutch intended to make a final stand against the Japanese. Pressure and bombing from the Japanese led the Dutch to instead change locations to Setan Mountain in Atceh. Originally sentenced to death, they were all freed once the Japanese occupied the town of Kutacane without resistance. They all went back to West Sumatra once they got permission from the occupying Japanese.

The Japanese entry into West Sumatra almost coincided with their movements in other parts of Sumatra. Japanese army soldiers entered Padang City on 17 March 1942. Within days, all of West Sumatra was under their control and the Dutch military commander in Sumatra surrendered unconditionally to the Japanese.

Administration
To academic Audrey Kahin, one of the focuses of the Japanese occupation army during the first year of occupation was to get the government apparatus in Sumatra functioning so that they could make efficient use of its vital resources, particularly the oil fields near Palembang and the rubber plantations in East Sumatra. To this end, the Japanese occupation army revived the Dutch system of government and reappointed most of the former Indonesian officials who had served in the Dutch colonial government. It wasn't long before Within the broader Japanese framework, West Sumatra was not initially a priority in terms of economic interests, but it held significant strategic importance. Initially, it was a major route through which the Japanese expected to infiltrate their agents into Sumatra. However, since mid-1943, Sumatra's strategic importance increased as the Japanese predicted that Allied counterattacks against the west coast of Sumatra and surrounding islands would be launched via the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Japanese revived the Dutch system of government and reappointed most of the former Indonesian officials who had been in the previous bureaucracy. The Japanese divided Sumatra into 10 shū (identical to the administrative regions of the Dutch residencies and the former province system of Japan), each headed by a shūchōkan.

Sumatra in the occupation government structure was initially under the control of the Singapore-based 25th Army. However, the 25th Army Command concluded that it was not possible to govern Sumatra from its headquarters in Singapore, especially in terms of protecting the area around vital installations. In subsequent developments, the direction of the war since the beginning of 1943 was unfavorable for the Japanese. On various Pacific fronts, the Japanese army began to be pushed back and the initiative for the attack lay with the Allies. This circumstance had forced the Japanese Army Command for the “Southern Area” to shift its main focus of policy from consolidating power in the newly occupied areas to a defensive strategy against possible Allied counterattacks. After a feud between Yaheita Saito and Shigenori Kuroda, Chief of Staff of the Southern Army, over the issue of relocating the 25th Army to Sumatra, the headquarters of the 25th Army was moved from Singapore to Bukittinggi in Sumatra in May 1943. Consequently, Sumatra, which had previously been attached to Malaya, was made a self-governing unit. Recognizing Sumatra's potential to support the Japanese economy and military in the face of Allied forces, the Japanese separated Sumatra from Malaya on 1 May 1943. The 25th army took direct control of the city, later renaming it from Stadsgemeente Fort de Kock to Bukittinggi-Si Yaku Sho (or simply Shiyakusho, lit. 'Municipal office; council; city hall') and expanded the city limits for their needs.

The West Coast Sumatra Province was formed in August 1942 under the name Sumatora Nishi Kaigan Shū to replace the residency system to the Shū (州) system. The province has its capital in Padang. Former Toyama Prefecture Governor Yano Kenzo served as the first shūchōkan. As tasked for being the civilian leader for the West Coast Sumatra Province, Yano Kenzo arrived in Padang on 9 August 1942 along with 68 civil servants. The division of West Coast Sumatra's administrative units was almost entirely based on the division made by the Dutch in 1935, consisting of 5 afdeelingen, 19 onderafdeelingen, 20 districts, and 49 onderdistricts and at least 430 nagari. Historian Gusti Asnan noted that a slight difference from the division of administrative units by the Japanese was the exclusion of Fuku Bun Bangkinang and the inclusion of the Kampar Regency in Rio Shū (Riau Province). In running the wheels of government in West Coast Sumatra, the Japanese did not make many changes to the government structure, except for changes in nomenclature into Japanese. The Afdeeling, headed by an assistant resident, was changed into a bunshū (分周), headed by a bunshūchō (分周長). The onderafdeeling headed by a controller was changed to a fuku bunshū headed by a fuku bunshūchō. The district headed by a demang was changed to a gun (郡) headed by a gunchō. Onderdistricts headed by assistant demangs were transformed into fukugun headed by a fuku gunchō. Except for important positions in the administration, the Japanese still used native officials who had previously been in the Dutch East Indies administration on condition that they did not infringe on Japanese authority. The highest native official headed the gun and its subordinate structure, the fukugun (副郡). The smallest government unit, the nagari, was termed son and the head of the nagari was called sonchō or son (村).

Initial landing
Led by Colonel Fujiyama, the first Japanese soldiers entered the city of Padang on 17 March 1942, and ten days later the Dutch military commander in Sumatra surrendered unconditionally. Historian Gusti Asnan notes that Japanese spies had previously exercised influence over the Minangkabau people. Some of the Japanese who had settled in West Sumatra since the 1920s acted as Japanese intelligence "sent to pave the way for their occupation." When the locals of Padang ventured out early morning, well-armed Japanese troops were seen on the streets of Padang, occupying strategic locations. Some were on foot, while others were on bicycles. Initially, there was no display of fear; many even greeted the soldiers with gratitude. Shortly thereafter, the city saw an influx of people from neighboring areas who wanted to observe the newly arrived Japanese troops. The arrival of the Japanese army in Padang was initially hailed by the people, who chanted "Merdeka! Banzai! Long live Japan!" The people had been convinced that the Japanese were coming to liberate the nation from the rule of Western Imperialism. The Japanese invoked the slogan of Asia for Asians as a liberator of Asia from imperialism. However, the situation soon changed, and tensions increased as the soldiers began to arrest people and confiscate bicycles. Anyone who attempted to resist was met with physical force. Consequently, people started hiding possessions that might attract a soldiers' attention.

Initially exiled to Bengkulu for his disruptive political activities, Sukarno was marched, bussed, and trucked to Padang with the intention of transporting him to Australia to be kept as a prisoner. When word spread about the impending Japanese landings in Padang, the Dutch abandoned Sukarno to save themselves. Dutch resistance eventually collapsed across West Sumatra as reports of Japanese landings arrived not only in Padang, West Sumatra, but also across the East Indies archipelago. After the Dutch failed to take Sukarno to Australia, he was stuck in West Sumatra for a period of three to five months, from February 1942 to July 1942, being held under the protection of the Japanese stationed in Sumatra. Initially, the Japanese had files on Sukarno and decided that his return to Java was necessary to stabilize Indonesia. This decision was explicitly made and arranged by the Japanese 16th Army Headquarters after receiving numerous letters from Indonesian youths and student groups requesting the Army to find Sukarno and allow him to return to Java. However, during the first months of occupation, the Military Administration had no clue about his whereabouts, prolonging his stay in West Sumatra.

When the Japanese first arrived to meet Sukarno, represented by Colonel Fujiyama of the Imperial Army for Sumatra, Sukarno showed a cooperative attitude towards the Japanese. However, the leaders and figureheads of the National Party of Indonesia (PNI) were divided during a meeting at the Bumiputra office in Bukittinggi. Some supported cooperation with the Japanese, while others refused to do so. Anwar Sutan Saidi, the head of the pro-independence bank, Bank National, and various trade organizations, chose to avoid the political track that were of the result of Japanese collaboration and instead focus on the economic track. His aim was to raise funds and procure weapons to support the struggle for independence. Tamimi Usman led a group of people who followed Sutan Syahrir's non-cooperative way and mobilised underground activities. The group led by Chatib Sulaiman followed the path of struggle for independence of Indonesia rather than collaborating with the Japanese to gain it.

In West Sumatra, Sukarno managed to persuade most independence movement leaders to cooperate with Japan. Intending to create an independence committee, Sukarno decided to stay in Padang in February 1942 for 15 days. In his speech in Padang, Sukarno urged the people not to resist the Japanese army because the forces were not equal. According to Sukarno, the Indonesian people must use Japan to achieve their goal of realising Indonesian independence. Through his cooperative attitude, Sukarno managed to prevent the Japanese army's harsh actions against the people of West Sumatra. Sukarno persuaded most of the national figures in West Sumatra to cooperate with Japan. When the Japanese army prohibited the raising of flags other than the Japanese flag, Sukarno ordered the people to lower the flag "until the time comes when we can fly Sang Dwi-warna freely from all forms of foreign domination". Sukarno and Hatta saw co-operation with Japan as the best way to achieve the goal of Indonesian independence, "sailing in one ship with the Japanese while carrying our own merchandise." Sukarno and West Sumatran leaders formed the People's Committee, as a temporary government to maintain calm in the region as Japanese troops consolidated their power. Meanwhile, Leon Salim, Chatib Suleiman and Mohammad Nasroen united all existing youth organisations into the Pemuda Nippon Raya organization. However, this organisation did not last long as the Japanese peeked the idea behind its establishment. Leon Salim was arrested by the Japanese on 14 November 1942 on suspicion of pretending to help them, but was released after a week.

Under Yano Kenzo's governorship
The civil administration of West Sumatra only became effective after the arrival of Yano Kenzo to West Sumatra on 9 August 1942 as 'Governor of West Coast Sumatra'. Before serving in West Sumatra, Yano had served as Governor of Toyama Prefecture. Gusti Asnan noted that Yano played a major role in realising good cooperation between the people of West Sumatra and the Japanese. Yano opposed many policies of the 25th Army Command, but maintained friendly relations with 25th Army Commander Moritake Tanabe in Bukittinggi. Tanabe had reservations about the increasing role of the Indonesian nationalist movement on Java, but responding to the "Koiso Promise" granting increased autonomy and eventual independence to Indonesia he established the Sumatra Central Advisory Council and trained locals for administrative leadership roles. However, he attempted to distance himself from local politics by as much as possible, leaving much leniency to the administration of West Coast Sumatra outside of Bukittinggi to the civilian government headed by Yano Kenzo in Padang. The Japanese made sure that cooperation with the natives in Sumatra was vital for the war effort, given the resources Sumatra holds. And so, Japanese sought co-operation among the native elite, both from civil servants (known as the pamong praja) and prominent leaders in the guise of independence, rousing support from the locals. The Pamong praja were useful for keeping the administrative system running, which basically followed the pattern from the Dutch colonial period. In reality, however, the policies of the military leaders in Sumatra were largely constrained by the principles governing the administration of the occupied "southern territories", which dictated that the native pribumi population should be "guided in such a way as to engender confidence in imperial power, and premature encouragement of native independence movements should be prevented".

Even so, Yano Kenzo's sympathy for the local people's aspirations for independence, and his disappointment with government policies that did not match his views, were expressed in an article he wrote later in 1967. As a civilian leader, Yano Kenzo instead approached the Minangkabau people through culture and multiculturalism, rather than through force or authority much like his equivalent peers. He had an interest in nature, society, and the customs of Minangkabau, which adhered to the matrilineal tradition. According to Gusti Asnan, his political views, which were influenced by his keen interest in Minangkabau, became the basis for his idea to initiate the establishment of several civic, social and cultural organisations in West Sumatra. For persisting in his stance against the exploitative nature of the economic policies pursued by the Japanese authorities, Yano Kenzo resigned as governor in March 1944. Officially leaving on April 1944, he was then replaced by Hattori Naoaki. The new governor, described as a "careful and cautious person," had previously served as the head of education in Sumatra. Yano argued that the Japanese occupying forces were well aware of Indonesia's abundant resources and were determined to maintain their hold on the country, even if it meant giving up the Philippines and Burma.

""...The Minangkabau of Sumatra, under my jurisdiction..., seem to be the most intelligent and economically advanced of all the tribes; and their political awareness is admirable. So, it is not surprising that they have a strong desire to end 350 years of Dutch oppression, and achieve full independence. Convinced that the Japanese occupation army would help them achieve their long-term dream, they co-operated. However, after two years of occupation, nothing changed.""

- Yano Kenzo

During his tenure as Governor of West Coast Sumatra, Yano established the Kerukunan Minangkabau (Gui Gan) as a consultation body between himself and Minangkabau leaders. The Kerukunan Minangkabau was established by Yano on 1 October 1942. Kerukunan Minangkabau met regularly at the governor's residence. Represented from each district, subdistrict, head of nagari, head of adat, scholars, youth, and the intelligentsia, Its members consisted of 10 to 20 people. Its members were representatives of ulama, politicians, traditional leaders (including datuks), and academics who acted as an informal advisory board to the shūchōkan. Gusti Asnan referred to Kerukunan Minangkabau as the early House of Representatives (DPR). When the 25th Army Command issued an order for the establishment of a regional representative councils (州参議会) in each shū on 8 November 1943 for the Central Advisory Council, the civilian government of West Sumatra continued the existing Kerukunan Minangkabau as a Shū Sangi-kai and Muhammad Sjafei was appointed chairman, supported by the 25th Army.

Support from Minangkabau ulamas
In response to the transfer of power to the Japanese army, the Minangkabau ulama group initiated the establishment of the Minangkabau Higher Islamic Council (MIT). Ahmad Husein noted that this assembly was established as a forum where the scholars deliberated on the politics of the Japanese government. Meanwhile, according to Datuk Palimo Kayo, the MIT was born thanks to the awareness of reformist ulama figures about how dangerous Japanese rule was. Established in 1942, the organisation elected Sulaiman Ar-Rasuli as chairman. With the aim of gathering all the forces of struggle of the Minangkabau Muslims, the MIT Minangkabau received the support of the entire Minangkabau people. Leaders of Islamic organisations at the time such as Perti and Muhammadiyah were united in resisting Japanese politics.

To gain acceptance from the people, the Japanese tried to approach the ulama group and give them a place in policy-making. The Japanese designed the formation of the Masyumi organisation at the centre. Religious Affairs Offices were established in each prefecture called Shu Muka. The clerics were given a special training programme called Kiyai Koshokai to prepare them to become Japanese propaganda tools. The "Principles Concerning Military Government in the Occupied Territories" (Senryochi Gunsei Jisshi Yoko) issued by the Japanese authorities on 14 March 1942 stated, "that religions should be respected as far as possible in order to keep the minds of the people stable... Muslims, should be given special attention in order to make use of them in order to grip the minds of the people". Minangkabau clerics took advantage of the offer of cooperation with Japan to gather the strength of the Minangkabau Muslim struggle against the colonisers. The Japanese gave the Minangkabau MIT a place in policy-making, including appointing Mahmud Yunus to represent the Minangkabau MIT as a resident advisor. In addition, several members of the assembly were invited to attend the Greater East Asia Islamic Congress in Singapore.

""...The Dutch do not allow us to be soldiers for them, but the Japanese do. Entering the Giyu Gun will be useful for us to fight them.""

- Syekh Abbas Abdullah

Despite encouraging the people to help the Japanese, the Minangkabau ulama at the same time fostered the growth of Indonesian nationalism. They encouraged young men to attend military training organised by the Japanese. Together with traditional leaders, they were involved in the recruitment process of prospective Giyūgun officers to minimise the influence of Japanese propaganda and replace it with the spirit of nationalism. Historian Gusti Asnan noted that their involvement in the selection of officers was to select candidates who were over 25 years old to 30 years old and insert the spirit of love for the country in the Giyūgun march. "They wanted the candidates to be mature enough to avoid the negative influence of the Japanese military upbringing." UIN Imam Bonjol academic, Irhash A. Shamad, stated that the pseudo-support given by Minangkabau scholars during Japanese rule had blinded the Japanese in seeing what was behind the support. Community leaders together endeavoured to achieve Indonesian independence. According to Irhash, fighting openly against the Japanese at that time was a wrong calculation, so the scholars motivated the people to fight quietly "while taking refuge behind the support for the Greater East Asia War echoed by Japan."

Mobilization of the population
Within a year of the occupation, the Japanese shifted the focus of their policy from consolidating power and controlling the occupied areas in Southeast Asia to preparing to defend the region from Allied attack. Sumatra with its rich oil fields in Palembang and North Sumatra was particularly important in this regard. Strategically, Sumatra was also considered important due to its geographical position facing the Indian Ocean, especially the northern part of Sumatra's West Coast being the most vulnerable area from the two allied attacks of India and Ceylon To implement these objectives, it was necessary to guarantee security and order from physical force, violence, and political conciliation. From mid-1943, the Japanese strategic plan anticipated an Allied counter-attack from Ceylon through the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Consequently, the defense of Sumatra centered around the west coast, particularly the northwest coast, and on the islands of Nias and Sabang. The 4th Division was stationed in Padang to counter potential attacks from the west and to serve as a reserve force for northern Sumatra. Additionally, the 25th Brigade in Tapanuli stationed a third of its troops on Nias Island and deployed a sizeable force to the Mentawai Islands. The Japanese sought to mobilise the population's power for the Japanese cause. Previously, the occupation army had failed to supplement the strength of the armed forces by using the mercenary system. Chatib Sulaiman proposed to West Sumatran Governor Yano Kenzo the formation of a volunteer army in West Sumatra that could be used to supplement the strength of the Japanese army. After the Army Command based in Saigon, Vietnam issued an order to form a Kyōdo Bōei Giyūgun on 8 September 1943, the 25th Army Commander Tanabe gave full authority to the Governor of West Sumatra to implement the formation of a volunteer army. On 14 October 1943, Chatib Sulaiman led and pioneered the formation of a committee for the formation of the Giyūgun called Giyūgun Koenkai. To support this effort, Chatib Sulaiman traveled extensively around West Sumatra, recruiting prospective Giyūgun officers and frequently shuttling between Padang and Bukittinggi. This committee under Japanese supervision screened prospective volunteer officers to be formed. The responsibility of recruiting prospective Giyūgun officers was handed over to Chatib Sulaiman together with Mahmud Yunus, and Ahmad Datuk Simaradjo. They convinced the officers that the military training provided by the Japanese was aimed at achieving the ideals of Indonesian independence. Young men in Minangkabau were encouraged to become Giyūgun troops to receive military training from the Japanese. With the encouragement of traditional and religious leaders, many young men registered to become Giyūgun. Among those listed were Dahlan Djambek, Ismail Lengah, Syarif Usman, Dahlan Ibrahim, Syofyan Nur, Syofyan Ibrahim. A. Talib, Nurmatias, Sayuti Amin, Alwi St. Marajo, Syefei Ali, Mahyuddin Tonek, Burhanuddin, Munir Latief, and many others. From here there were around 20,000 who applied for the Giyūgun, but only 1,000 rations were available. Great encouragement for the development of the Giyūgun was given by Yano at a large meeting on 20 November 1943 in Bukittinggi. Finally he was able to influence the penghulu, who had been able to recruit at least another 20,000 soldiers from each member of his descendants. The call of the penghulu was well received by his people group.

The Giyūgun Koenkai became the only military force established by the Japanese in West Sumatra. The Giyūgun force was initially formed in Padang and the coastal areas, trained by the 37th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Osaka Division. In the highlands, the Giyūgun was only formed at the end of 1944. Japanese propaganda intensified in 1944. The various groups were united in the Hōkōkai, led by Muhammad Syafii and Khatib Sulaiman from the nationalist or educated movement; Datuk Parpatih Baringek and Datu Majo Uang from the tradition group; and Djamil Djambek and Sutan Mansur from the religious group. The Giyūgun Koenkai (later Giyūgun Koenbu), an association of Giyūgun supporters, was formed as a liaison between civilian and military leaders. Haha No Kai, the women's wing of the Giyūgun, was established to prepare supplies for fellow officers. By the time of the proclamation of independence, the Giyūgun had organised two drills for its officers.

On 24 August 1944, Japanese planners did correctly assessed an Allied attack originating from Ceylon under the initiation of Operation Banquet. However, the attack took the form of a minor bombing raid rather than an impending amphibious landing. Commanded by Rear Admiral Clement Moody, the operation included bombing raids over Japanese positions in and around Padang, targeting the Padang airfield, the Indaroeng cement works, and the harbor facilities and shipping at Emmahaven. This operation was the closest and only attempt at an Allied attack on West Sumatra during World War II. In reality, the Allies had largely avoided the Dutch East Indies and opted to focus on the Central Pacific and the South-West Pacific, as previously agreed from the Casablanca Conference.

As tensions in the Pacific War escalated, Japan increased its control over the population. In Bukittinggi, the Japanese constructed the largest radio transmitter on the island of Sumatra, intending to use it as a way to serve as a propaganda tool to raise the spirits of the people and garner support for the Japanese war effort. In an effort to meet the need for labour, the Japanese authorities imposed compulsory rōmusha labour on the population for various Japanese purposes, such as building roads, railways, bridges, fortifications, and protection tunnels. In addition, civil servants, merchants, school children and residents who did not participate in forced labour were subjected to Kinrohoshi, voluntary work to collect river stones, sand and gravel and transport them to the necessary places. Japanese bunkers and protection tunnels were found in Padang and Bukittinggi. The Muaro-Pekanbaru railway line was the result of forced labour involving approximately 6,600 prisoners of war and 30,000 rōmusha workers. Through education, the Japanese made fundamental changes in West Sumatra. Schools were mobilised for Japanese interests. Indonesian was made the language of instruction in schools to introduce Japanese culture and at the same time, students at various levels were taught Japanese. Meanwhile, the educated classes, especially teachers, civil servants and students were made into "new Japanese." Seikeirei (bowing to the emperor's palace in Tokyo) and Mukto (commemorating the spirits of Japanese heroes) are performed at certain times. These activities are usually done after hearing the speeches of the shūchōkan or Japanese officials. Keirei (standing salute) is mandatory whenever passing Japanese dignitaries, even in cars. The Gregorian calendar is replaced by the Japanese imperial year, which is 660 years apart, while the time signature is adjusted to Japanese standard time, which is about 2.5 hours apart from Tokyo time. It is through these harsh acts done by the Japanese occupation government that made then civilian governor, Yano Kenzo, reign in protest.

Women under the occupation
During the Japanese occupation, many West Sumatran women were victims of Japanese army violence, especially sexual exploitation. Acts of violence against women have occurred since the first days of the Japanese army's arrival. The rules of values that respect women were violated by acts such as coercion, kidnapping, and rape, to forcibly making comfort women or Jugun ianfu. Japan could no longer bring in comfort women from their own country so instead, Japan made a policy to force women to serve as comforters for the needs of its soldiers in the brothels they set up. A government policy issued in 1938 said that every battalion needed to have a brothel, so that Japanese soldiers could concentrate on the war.

Overcoming this form of coercion was attempted by local leaders. In 1942, while in Padang, Sukarno discussed with several ulama and gave permission to practice prostitution for Japanese soldiers. "Solely as an emergency measure, in order to protect our girls, I intend to make use of the prostitutes in this area. In this way, foreigners can satisfy their desires and the girls should not be disturbed, "explained Sukarno. The granting of this permit is marked by the existence of brothels in several places in West Sumatra such as Padang, Bukittinggi, and Payakumbuh. Generally, sex workers come from non-West Sumatran women, most of them come from women who were brought by the Dutch to work and their lives were neglected. Sukarno acknowledged that it was his administrative act as the de-jure leader of the Indonesian people. He congratulated himself on "simultaneously enhancing the women's income, sating the lust of the invaders, and thereby protecting virtuous Minangkabau maidens."

Sukarno's granting of licenses to brothels was originally intended to stop the Japanese army from harassing West Sumatran women. The beginning of this program was to gather 120 prostitutes as "volunteers" to be penned in a special camp for service to Japanese soldiers. However, the number of women permitted to operate in Japanese camps was insufficient to serve the thousands of soldiers. "To get the comfort women provided, Japanese soldiers had to buy queue tickets. Even for one woman, there were up to four or six people queuing in one night," testified one Kaigun Heiho with the rank of corporal. With these tickets, Japanese soldiers were organized while waiting their turn to be with the women they desired. The stark inequality in the number of women available caused dissatisfaction among many Japanese soldiers, prompting them to coerce many West Sumatran women. To obtain women, the Japanese resorted to coercion, abduction, rape, and persuasion. They did not hesitate to take women even if they were married, regardless of whether they were sitting with their husbands at the time.

Japanese influence
According to Akira Oki, the legalisation of Indonesian as the language of instruction in schools affected the development of the Indonesian language and led to a sense of unity among the people. The education provided by the Japanese accelerated the maturation of Indonesia's independence efforts, something that the Japanese authorities in West Sumatra did not realise. In the political field, the Japanese had bequeathed the form of the representative institution Kerukunan Minangkabau, which brought together traditional and religious leaders as advisors to the resident. Although they had no official authority in the government, they could colour the policies of the Japanese rulers in West Sumatra, and secretly instil national ideals in the people. In the military field, the Japanese provided military training through the Giyūgun volunteer army. The first batch of Giyūgun officers would later play a role in the establishment of the Indonesian armed forces after independence and most of them gained strategic places in the military hierarchy during the revolutionary period.

Audrey Kahin notes that co-operation between adat and religious leaders during the Japanese occupation of West Sumatra formed a link in the chain of territorial relations and a foundation for mutual understanding, something that was particularly valuable in the years after independence.