John Mearsheimer bibliography

This is a list of works by John Mearsheimer. In his later years, he focused increasingly on current events.

Journal articles
"The credibility of NATO’s defences was analysed and discussed ... Many of the contemporary analyses looked at strategy or numbers, taking a wholesale approach, but failed to address the overall capability based on existing force structures. An example is the analysis given by Dr J Mearsheimer, which provides an example contemporary to the period. It provides a useful perspective on the difficulties inherent in assessing the credibility of defence policy from a purely academic standpoint." "Mearsheimer’s article provides an excellent example of scenario analysis being used to extend an existing theory and develop testable hypotheses that were subsequently falsified. Various reasons may explain why his theory was incorrect—such as normative claims, continued reliance on US security guarantees, and so on—but it is at least clear that his scenario-based approach framed a debate in a rigorous and clearly articulated way and has led to new areas of exploration for the discipline."
 * Criticised by Dan Gouré and Gordon McCormick the following year, published with a rejoinder by Mearsheimer. Referenced in several later studies on the topic but without extensive discussion: by Robert Mandel, David Blagden, Lauren Kahn and Michael C. Horowitz.
 * Described by Barry Posen as "a critical discussion of the possible tactical implications of the military reformers' prescriptions for ground warfare" and regarded as important though not convincing by David P. Calleo, it was referenced in the first years after its publication, but its first detailed critique came from Joshua M. Epstein and several others in the context of the replacement of combined arms with maneuver doctrine in the United States Armed Forces around 1989 and in the context of NATO's tactical future after the First Cold War. It has seen occasional treatments in retrospective literature since that time.
 * Also published as a chapter of Conventional Deterrence in 1983. The context of the article was described in Matthews 1996, as standing in opposition US president Ronald Reagan's strengthening of NATO forces in Europe, supported by Samuel P. Huntington (who had initially reviewed Mearsheimer's article favourably) and others. Also relevant was the debate over whether or not the US nuclear weapons in West Germany were necessary. Positively received by Posen and Evera 1983,  Brauch and Unterseher 1984,  Lübkemeier 1985,  Dean 1986 and to some extent Weinstein 1983,  and Strachan 1985 and Simpson 1985.  Its conclusions were opposed on methodological grounds by Jack Snyder and with alternative models by William Kaufmann, William Mako and Andrew Hamilton.  With the exception of Corcoran 1983,  most concrete opposition did not come until three separate articles published in 1988 by Snyder, by Joshua Epstein and by Eliot A. Cohen, building on an earlier review by Aaron Friedberg. Although the reception that year was not entirely negative,    most papers published in the immediate aftermath of these were critical.  Employed favourably in some retrospective analyses.   That by Barry D. Watts, then director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, relayed Cohen's criticisms. The 2016 review by military Kenton White criticised it for not taking USSR and general WTO airborne capabilities or their OMG concept, while following Cohen in arguing for an alternative view that the WTO might have been able to prepare a "standing start" attack undetected enough for the resulting delay to allow for the WTO to potentially collapse part of the NATO front, which Mearsheimer had argued was not a danger. White followed this up in more detail in 2017. A less detailed critique was published by international relations professor Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou. The approach of Cohen and Kenton was in turn criticised in the overview of Tecott and Halterman, which defended Mearsheimer while warning about his "over-extrapolation" on the basis of a single scenario, echoing Richard Stoll's 1990 defense of Mearsheimer's article to justify further model-based approaches. But outside the context of the debate and with the passage of time, the article began to see uncritical use,  especially with the successful urban defences of the Russo-Ukrainian War.   More widely read than his previous studies, it is this study along with his 1983 book that propelled him onto the academic scene as an "Optimist" in their debate with the "Pessimists",  which has been termed the "Great Debate" in security circles,  in which moderate Pessimists held a majority.
 * Described by Barry Posen as "a critical discussion of the possible tactical implications of the military reformers' prescriptions for ground warfare" and regarded as important though not convincing by David P. Calleo, it was referenced in the first years after its publication, but its first detailed critique came from Joshua M. Epstein and several others in the context of the replacement of combined arms with maneuver doctrine in the United States Armed Forces around 1989 and in the context of NATO's tactical future after the First Cold War. It has seen occasional treatments in retrospective literature since that time.
 * Also published as a chapter of Conventional Deterrence in 1983. The context of the article was described in Matthews 1996, as standing in opposition US president Ronald Reagan's strengthening of NATO forces in Europe, supported by Samuel P. Huntington (who had initially reviewed Mearsheimer's article favourably) and others. Also relevant was the debate over whether or not the US nuclear weapons in West Germany were necessary. Positively received by Posen and Evera 1983,  Brauch and Unterseher 1984,  Lübkemeier 1985,  Dean 1986 and to some extent Weinstein 1983,  and Strachan 1985 and Simpson 1985.  Its conclusions were opposed on methodological grounds by Jack Snyder and with alternative models by William Kaufmann, William Mako and Andrew Hamilton.  With the exception of Corcoran 1983,  most concrete opposition did not come until three separate articles published in 1988 by Snyder, by Joshua Epstein and by Eliot A. Cohen, building on an earlier review by Aaron Friedberg. Although the reception that year was not entirely negative,    most papers published in the immediate aftermath of these were critical.  Employed favourably in some retrospective analyses.   That by Barry D. Watts, then director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, relayed Cohen's criticisms. The 2016 review by military Kenton White criticised it for not taking USSR and general WTO airborne capabilities or their OMG concept, while following Cohen in arguing for an alternative view that the WTO might have been able to prepare a "standing start" attack undetected enough for the resulting delay to allow for the WTO to potentially collapse part of the NATO front, which Mearsheimer had argued was not a danger. White followed this up in more detail in 2017. A less detailed critique was published by international relations professor Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou. The approach of Cohen and Kenton was in turn criticised in the overview of Tecott and Halterman, which defended Mearsheimer while warning about his "over-extrapolation" on the basis of a single scenario, echoing Richard Stoll's 1990 defense of Mearsheimer's article to justify further model-based approaches. But outside the context of the debate and with the passage of time, the article began to see uncritical use,  especially with the successful urban defences of the Russo-Ukrainian War.   More widely read than his previous studies, it is this study along with his 1983 book that propelled him onto the academic scene as an "Optimist" in their debate with the "Pessimists",  which has been termed the "Great Debate" in security circles,  in which moderate Pessimists held a majority.
 * Also published as a chapter of Conventional Deterrence in 1983. The context of the article was described in Matthews 1996, as standing in opposition US president Ronald Reagan's strengthening of NATO forces in Europe, supported by Samuel P. Huntington (who had initially reviewed Mearsheimer's article favourably) and others. Also relevant was the debate over whether or not the US nuclear weapons in West Germany were necessary. Positively received by Posen and Evera 1983,  Brauch and Unterseher 1984,  Lübkemeier 1985,  Dean 1986 and to some extent Weinstein 1983,  and Strachan 1985 and Simpson 1985.  Its conclusions were opposed on methodological grounds by Jack Snyder and with alternative models by William Kaufmann, William Mako and Andrew Hamilton.  With the exception of Corcoran 1983,  most concrete opposition did not come until three separate articles published in 1988 by Snyder, by Joshua Epstein and by Eliot A. Cohen, building on an earlier review by Aaron Friedberg. Although the reception that year was not entirely negative,    most papers published in the immediate aftermath of these were critical.  Employed favourably in some retrospective analyses.   That by Barry D. Watts, then director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, relayed Cohen's criticisms. The 2016 review by military Kenton White criticised it for not taking USSR and general WTO airborne capabilities or their OMG concept, while following Cohen in arguing for an alternative view that the WTO might have been able to prepare a "standing start" attack undetected enough for the resulting delay to allow for the WTO to potentially collapse part of the NATO front, which Mearsheimer had argued was not a danger. White followed this up in more detail in 2017. A less detailed critique was published by international relations professor Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou. The approach of Cohen and Kenton was in turn criticised in the overview of Tecott and Halterman, which defended Mearsheimer while warning about his "over-extrapolation" on the basis of a single scenario, echoing Richard Stoll's 1990 defense of Mearsheimer's article to justify further model-based approaches. But outside the context of the debate and with the passage of time, the article began to see uncritical use,  especially with the successful urban defences of the Russo-Ukrainian War.   More widely read than his previous studies, it is this study along with his 1983 book that propelled him onto the academic scene as an "Optimist" in their debate with the "Pessimists",  which has been termed the "Great Debate" in security circles,  in which moderate Pessimists held a majority.
 * Also published as a chapter of Conventional Deterrence in 1983. The context of the article was described in Matthews 1996, as standing in opposition US president Ronald Reagan's strengthening of NATO forces in Europe, supported by Samuel P. Huntington (who had initially reviewed Mearsheimer's article favourably) and others. Also relevant was the debate over whether or not the US nuclear weapons in West Germany were necessary. Positively received by Posen and Evera 1983,  Brauch and Unterseher 1984,  Lübkemeier 1985,  Dean 1986 and to some extent Weinstein 1983,  and Strachan 1985 and Simpson 1985.  Its conclusions were opposed on methodological grounds by Jack Snyder and with alternative models by William Kaufmann, William Mako and Andrew Hamilton.  With the exception of Corcoran 1983,  most concrete opposition did not come until three separate articles published in 1988 by Snyder, by Joshua Epstein and by Eliot A. Cohen, building on an earlier review by Aaron Friedberg. Although the reception that year was not entirely negative,    most papers published in the immediate aftermath of these were critical.  Employed favourably in some retrospective analyses.   That by Barry D. Watts, then director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, relayed Cohen's criticisms. The 2016 review by military Kenton White criticised it for not taking USSR and general WTO airborne capabilities or their OMG concept, while following Cohen in arguing for an alternative view that the WTO might have been able to prepare a "standing start" attack undetected enough for the resulting delay to allow for the WTO to potentially collapse part of the NATO front, which Mearsheimer had argued was not a danger. White followed this up in more detail in 2017. A less detailed critique was published by international relations professor Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou. The approach of Cohen and Kenton was in turn criticised in the overview of Tecott and Halterman, which defended Mearsheimer while warning about his "over-extrapolation" on the basis of a single scenario, echoing Richard Stoll's 1990 defense of Mearsheimer's article to justify further model-based approaches. But outside the context of the debate and with the passage of time, the article began to see uncritical use,  especially with the successful urban defences of the Russo-Ukrainian War.   More widely read than his previous studies, it is this study along with his 1983 book that propelled him onto the academic scene as an "Optimist" in their debate with the "Pessimists",  which has been termed the "Great Debate" in security circles,  in which moderate Pessimists held a majority.
 * Also published as a chapter of Conventional Deterrence in 1983. The context of the article was described in Matthews 1996, as standing in opposition US president Ronald Reagan's strengthening of NATO forces in Europe, supported by Samuel P. Huntington (who had initially reviewed Mearsheimer's article favourably) and others. Also relevant was the debate over whether or not the US nuclear weapons in West Germany were necessary. Positively received by Posen and Evera 1983,  Brauch and Unterseher 1984,  Lübkemeier 1985,  Dean 1986 and to some extent Weinstein 1983,  and Strachan 1985 and Simpson 1985.  Its conclusions were opposed on methodological grounds by Jack Snyder and with alternative models by William Kaufmann, William Mako and Andrew Hamilton.  With the exception of Corcoran 1983,  most concrete opposition did not come until three separate articles published in 1988 by Snyder, by Joshua Epstein and by Eliot A. Cohen, building on an earlier review by Aaron Friedberg. Although the reception that year was not entirely negative,    most papers published in the immediate aftermath of these were critical.  Employed favourably in some retrospective analyses.   That by Barry D. Watts, then director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, relayed Cohen's criticisms. The 2016 review by military Kenton White criticised it for not taking USSR and general WTO airborne capabilities or their OMG concept, while following Cohen in arguing for an alternative view that the WTO might have been able to prepare a "standing start" attack undetected enough for the resulting delay to allow for the WTO to potentially collapse part of the NATO front, which Mearsheimer had argued was not a danger. White followed this up in more detail in 2017. A less detailed critique was published by international relations professor Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou. The approach of Cohen and Kenton was in turn criticised in the overview of Tecott and Halterman, which defended Mearsheimer while warning about his "over-extrapolation" on the basis of a single scenario, echoing Richard Stoll's 1990 defense of Mearsheimer's article to justify further model-based approaches. But outside the context of the debate and with the passage of time, the article began to see uncritical use,  especially with the successful urban defences of the Russo-Ukrainian War.   More widely read than his previous studies, it is this study along with his 1983 book that propelled him onto the academic scene as an "Optimist" in their debate with the "Pessimists",  which has been termed the "Great Debate" in security circles,  in which moderate Pessimists held a majority.
 * This article was published in response to criticisms of Mearsheimer's application of the 3:1 rule as expressed and used in Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe. One of its chief critics, Jeffrey Epstein, published a rebuttal that year. A detailed mathematical evaluation of the 3:1 rule, which Mearsheimer first examined in 1982, would not come until Kress and Talmor 1999.
 * The article's thesis turned out to be incorrect, but the article itself was retrospectively praised for its testable framing by Junio and Mahnken 2013.
 * This article was published in response to criticisms of Mearsheimer's application of the 3:1 rule as expressed and used in Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe. One of its chief critics, Jeffrey Epstein, published a rebuttal that year. A detailed mathematical evaluation of the 3:1 rule, which Mearsheimer first examined in 1982, would not come until Kress and Talmor 1999.
 * The article's thesis turned out to be incorrect, but the article itself was retrospectively praised for its testable framing by Junio and Mahnken 2013.
 * This article was published in response to criticisms of Mearsheimer's application of the 3:1 rule as expressed and used in Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe. One of its chief critics, Jeffrey Epstein, published a rebuttal that year. A detailed mathematical evaluation of the 3:1 rule, which Mearsheimer first examined in 1982, would not come until Kress and Talmor 1999.
 * The article's thesis turned out to be incorrect, but the article itself was retrospectively praised for its testable framing by Junio and Mahnken 2013.
 * This article was published in response to criticisms of Mearsheimer's application of the 3:1 rule as expressed and used in Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe. One of its chief critics, Jeffrey Epstein, published a rebuttal that year. A detailed mathematical evaluation of the 3:1 rule, which Mearsheimer first examined in 1982, would not come until Kress and Talmor 1999.
 * The article's thesis turned out to be incorrect, but the article itself was retrospectively praised for its testable framing by Junio and Mahnken 2013.
 * The article's thesis turned out to be incorrect, but the article itself was retrospectively praised for its testable framing by Junio and Mahnken 2013.
 * The article's thesis turned out to be incorrect, but the article itself was retrospectively praised for its testable framing by Junio and Mahnken 2013.
 * This article was Mearsheimer's defense of his The False Promise of International Institutions.
 * cite-14
 * This article was Mearsheimer's defense of his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
 * Revised version published as Spanish translation published as  cite-400
 * The article was presented before the National Press Club the year of its publication. In response to widespread criticism, the authors published a response as
 * Also delivered in lecture form at the Centre for Independent Studies, which on account of being widely viewed is sometimes cited instead. John Ikenberry debated the article with Mearsheimer in 2021.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * cite-14
 * This article was Mearsheimer's defense of his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
 * Revised version published as Spanish translation published as  cite-400
 * The article was presented before the National Press Club the year of its publication. In response to widespread criticism, the authors published a response as
 * Also delivered in lecture form at the Centre for Independent Studies, which on account of being widely viewed is sometimes cited instead. John Ikenberry debated the article with Mearsheimer in 2021.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Revised version published as Spanish translation published as  cite-400
 * The article was presented before the National Press Club the year of its publication. In response to widespread criticism, the authors published a response as
 * Also delivered in lecture form at the Centre for Independent Studies, which on account of being widely viewed is sometimes cited instead. John Ikenberry debated the article with Mearsheimer in 2021.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at the Centre for Independent Studies, which on account of being widely viewed is sometimes cited instead. John Ikenberry debated the article with Mearsheimer in 2021.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at the Centre for Independent Studies, which on account of being widely viewed is sometimes cited instead. John Ikenberry debated the article with Mearsheimer in 2021.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at the Centre for Independent Studies, which on account of being widely viewed is sometimes cited instead. John Ikenberry debated the article with Mearsheimer in 2021.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at the Centre for Independent Studies, which on account of being widely viewed is sometimes cited instead. John Ikenberry debated the article with Mearsheimer in 2021.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at the Centre for Independent Studies, which on account of being widely viewed is sometimes cited instead. John Ikenberry debated the article with Mearsheimer in 2021.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at the Centre for Independent Studies, which on account of being widely viewed is sometimes cited instead. John Ikenberry debated the article with Mearsheimer in 2021.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at the Centre for Independent Studies, which on account of being widely viewed is sometimes cited instead. John Ikenberry debated the article with Mearsheimer in 2021.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.
 * Also delivered in lecture form at The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, sometimes cited instead on account of its over 4 million views. To that lecture, the director of the EUI, political scientist Alexander Stubb who was also the president of Finland at the time, published a critical response. Two political scientists from the same institute had already published a brief critique, mainly of his theories on the role of NATO. Another EUI political scientist followed up Stubb's video with his own critique.

Magazine and newspaper articles

 * Criticised by Vojtech Mastny in a letter to Foreign Affairs.
 * cite-57
 * Not to be confused with its dlivery in the form of a lecture at the University of Ottawa, widely viewed.
 * Delivered as a lecture at the The University of Chicago, sometimes cited instead. It was also delivered before Carleton University.
 * A lecture he delivered on this article was viewed over 29 million times on YouTube.
 * Criticised by Michael McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich in the same edition, including a response from Mearsheimer. Their criticism was in turn critiqued by Susan Eisenhower.
 * Delivered in lecture format before the Jefferson Literary and Debating Society, the University of Chicago and Reed College.
 * Originally published in The National Interest.
 * Criticised by John Ikenberry, Andrew J. Nathan, Susan Thornton and Sun Zhe, with a response by Mearsheimer.
 * Originally presented as
 * Criticised by Vojtech Mastny in a letter to Foreign Affairs.
 * cite-57
 * Not to be confused with its dlivery in the form of a lecture at the University of Ottawa, widely viewed.
 * Delivered as a lecture at the The University of Chicago, sometimes cited instead. It was also delivered before Carleton University.
 * A lecture he delivered on this article was viewed over 29 million times on YouTube.
 * Criticised by Michael McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich in the same edition, including a response from Mearsheimer. Their criticism was in turn critiqued by Susan Eisenhower.
 * Delivered in lecture format before the Jefferson Literary and Debating Society, the University of Chicago and Reed College.
 * Originally published in The National Interest.
 * Criticised by John Ikenberry, Andrew J. Nathan, Susan Thornton and Sun Zhe, with a response by Mearsheimer.
 * Originally presented as
 * cite-57
 * Not to be confused with its dlivery in the form of a lecture at the University of Ottawa, widely viewed.
 * Delivered as a lecture at the The University of Chicago, sometimes cited instead. It was also delivered before Carleton University.
 * A lecture he delivered on this article was viewed over 29 million times on YouTube.
 * Criticised by Michael McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich in the same edition, including a response from Mearsheimer. Their criticism was in turn critiqued by Susan Eisenhower.
 * Delivered in lecture format before the Jefferson Literary and Debating Society, the University of Chicago and Reed College.
 * Originally published in The National Interest.
 * Criticised by John Ikenberry, Andrew J. Nathan, Susan Thornton and Sun Zhe, with a response by Mearsheimer.
 * Originally presented as
 * Delivered as a lecture at the The University of Chicago, sometimes cited instead. It was also delivered before Carleton University.
 * A lecture he delivered on this article was viewed over 29 million times on YouTube.
 * Criticised by Michael McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich in the same edition, including a response from Mearsheimer. Their criticism was in turn critiqued by Susan Eisenhower.
 * Delivered in lecture format before the Jefferson Literary and Debating Society, the University of Chicago and Reed College.
 * Originally published in The National Interest.
 * Criticised by John Ikenberry, Andrew J. Nathan, Susan Thornton and Sun Zhe, with a response by Mearsheimer.
 * Originally presented as
 * Delivered as a lecture at the The University of Chicago, sometimes cited instead. It was also delivered before Carleton University.
 * A lecture he delivered on this article was viewed over 29 million times on YouTube.
 * Criticised by Michael McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich in the same edition, including a response from Mearsheimer. Their criticism was in turn critiqued by Susan Eisenhower.
 * Delivered in lecture format before the Jefferson Literary and Debating Society, the University of Chicago and Reed College.
 * Originally published in The National Interest.
 * Criticised by John Ikenberry, Andrew J. Nathan, Susan Thornton and Sun Zhe, with a response by Mearsheimer.
 * Originally presented as
 * Criticised by Michael McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich in the same edition, including a response from Mearsheimer. Their criticism was in turn critiqued by Susan Eisenhower.
 * Delivered in lecture format before the Jefferson Literary and Debating Society, the University of Chicago and Reed College.
 * Originally published in The National Interest.
 * Criticised by John Ikenberry, Andrew J. Nathan, Susan Thornton and Sun Zhe, with a response by Mearsheimer.
 * Originally presented as
 * Criticised by Michael McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich in the same edition, including a response from Mearsheimer. Their criticism was in turn critiqued by Susan Eisenhower.
 * Delivered in lecture format before the Jefferson Literary and Debating Society, the University of Chicago and Reed College.
 * Originally published in The National Interest.
 * Criticised by John Ikenberry, Andrew J. Nathan, Susan Thornton and Sun Zhe, with a response by Mearsheimer.
 * Originally presented as
 * Originally published in The National Interest.
 * Criticised by John Ikenberry, Andrew J. Nathan, Susan Thornton and Sun Zhe, with a response by Mearsheimer.
 * Originally presented as
 * Criticised by John Ikenberry, Andrew J. Nathan, Susan Thornton and Sun Zhe, with a response by Mearsheimer.
 * Originally presented as
 * Originally presented as
 * Originally presented as
 * Originally presented as

Books

 * cite-1393
 * An influential book within the United States Army. Positively reviewed by George E. Orr, but less positively by David Calleo. Reviewed by Jed Snyder in 1985. It became a combat textbook. As a standard reference, it has been extensively employed in works by Corbin Williamson, Philip J. Romero, and others.
 * The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company. 2001. ISBN 0393020258..
 * The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2007. ISBN 978-0374177720..
 * The book received mixed reviews, prompting the authors to respond with an article in Prospect. After its initial presentation, it was presented as a lecture before the Council for the National Interest, Code Pink, the GBH Forum Network, the Center for International and Regional Studies, and most prominently at the University of Chicago, sometimes cited instead of the book Bruce Feiler debated Mearsheimer on the book in 2018.
 * Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics. Oxford University Press. 2011. ISBN 9780199758739..
 * It grew out of the material from of a 2010 lecture at the Centre for International Governance Innovation. The book itself was presented as a lecture viewed over 6 million times on YouTube.
 * Reviewed by C. William Walldorf, to which Mearsheimer responded with an article in Perspectives on Politics. Also reviewed Reviewed by Glenn Diesen. Several lectures delivered on the subject of the book were widely viewed, including that before The Bush School of Government and Public Service and that before Carleton University. The book was also delivered i lecture form at the SOAS University of London and the University of Bonn, and presented and discussed at the SETA Foundation.
 * Ashley J. Tellis debated Mearsheimer on the book in 2023.
 * Reviewed by C. William Walldorf, to which Mearsheimer responded with an article in Perspectives on Politics. Also reviewed Reviewed by Glenn Diesen. Several lectures delivered on the subject of the book were widely viewed, including that before The Bush School of Government and Public Service and that before Carleton University. The book was also delivered i lecture form at the SOAS University of London and the University of Bonn, and presented and discussed at the SETA Foundation.
 * Ashley J. Tellis debated Mearsheimer on the book in 2023.
 * Ashley J. Tellis debated Mearsheimer on the book in 2023.

Contributions

 * Republished in
 * Because it was widely viewed, some sources cite the lecture instead: 9:21.
 * Because it was widely viewed, some sources cite the lecture instead: 9:21.
 * Because it was widely viewed, some sources cite the lecture instead: 9:21.
 * Because it was widely viewed, some sources cite the lecture instead: 9:21.
 * Because it was widely viewed, some sources cite the lecture instead: 9:21.
 * Because it was widely viewed, some sources cite the lecture instead: 9:21.
 * Because it was widely viewed, some sources cite the lecture instead: 9:21.
 * Because it was widely viewed, some sources cite the lecture instead: 9:21.
 * Because it was widely viewed, some sources cite the lecture instead: 9:21.
 * Because it was widely viewed, some sources cite the lecture instead: 9:21.
 * Because it was widely viewed, some sources cite the lecture instead: 9:21.

Book reviews

 * Review of
 * Review of
 * Review of
 * Review of
 * Review of
 * Review of
 * Review of
 * Review of

Lectures

 * Part 1 33:93. Part 2 32:43.
 * 1:03:04.
 * 49:11.
 * 1:20:38.
 * 1:57:10.
 * 1:11:29.
 * 1:50:19.
 * 42:54.
 * 53:33. 535K
 * 1:23:42.
 * 1:47:12.
 * 1:59:00.
 * 1:16:56.
 * 54:15.
 * 1:47:21.
 * 1:33:46.
 * Rereleased as 46:77.
 * 1:30:40.
 * 1:47:21.
 * 1:33:46.
 * Rereleased as 46:77.
 * 1:30:40.
 * 1:30:40.
 * 1:30:40.