Operation Vukovar '95

The Operation Vukovar '95, more known as the Vukovar dove (in Croatian: Vukovarska golubica) was a planned military-police operation of the Croatian National Guard in early November 1995 and in mid 1996. The operation was intended to militarily liberate the last remaining occupied part of Croatia after Operation Storm, including the region of Eastern Slavonia. The operation was abandoned due to intervention of UN peacekeepers and the signing of the Erdut Agreement.

Background
After the end of the major military operations of the Croatian National Guard in the summer of 1995, there was a turning point in the balance of forces. The Croatian side, that kept achievung many great victories, was determined to militarily re-capture the symbols of the Croatian war of Independence, including Vukovar. Based on some reports, it is stated that after Operation Storm, units of the Yugoslav Army, including the Novi Sad corps, entered the area of Eastern Slavonia and Baranja in order to provide support to the 11th Slavonia-Baranja Corps of the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK) for an eventual Croatian operation. The representatives of Vukovar Serbs told the ambassador of the European Union that it was impossible for them to accept the Croatian government, and that they will persist in even at the cost of a new conflict. In the beginning of October, a series of meetings between the representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the Serbs were held in order to find a solution until the beginning of the Dayton Accords on November 1. At the same time, as an option in case the negotiations fail, the Croatian state and army leadership began preparations for a new major military operation to re-capture the remaining occupied part of Eastern Slavonia. Crostian president Franjo Tuđman gave the operation the code-name of Vukovarska golubica.

Opposing forces
Immediately after Operation Storm, the Operation Manjinjorgo was carried out as a preparation for the Vukovar military operation, with the goal to mobitalize around 30,000 croatian soldiers from five guard brigades in Eastern Slavonia. About 100,000 more soldiers were deployed in reserve, in case the Yugoslav Army was involved in the conflict. The Serb forces, however, were well entrenched, protected by minefields. In the occupied territory, the Serbs had about 25,000 soldiers and civilian volunteers at their disposal.

The Croatian National Guard headquarters was preparing a tactical surprise. This new strategy was called "fire channels", and then renamed to "fire chariots" in honor of the Slavonians. The name symbolizes the image that would be created by the mass use of artillery and rocket units that would gradually burn carefully the enemy's defenses into which armored units and guardsmen from five brigades would then arrive. The operation was supposed to result in a penetration through the enemy's defenses using three "fire channels" would be broken through Baranja, and four through the Vukovar area. With these tactics, the Serb forces would be split, with the simultaneous destruction of command centers and strongholds by Mi-24 attack helicopters. The goal was to burst onto the Danube in and occupy the entire area using the fire channels. The operation was supposed to last a maximum of three days, and methods of fighting in a populated place were specially trained. The operation was conceived as a quick one in order to preserve at least what remained of Vukovar.

Croatian withdrawal
By putting the signatures of representatives of the Croatian government and Serbs on the Erdut Agreement on 12 November 1995 and the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1037 on 15 January 1996, which established the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), the process of returning the region of Eastern Slavonia to Croatian rule began. Even after the adoption of the Erdut Agreement, Yugoslavia and the Serbs believed that there was a real, although relatively small, possibility that Croatia would launch a military operation. Although the operation was abandoned, according to the memories of Mate Granić, parts of the Croatian leadership influenced President Tuđman to launch tge military operation. Granić does not specify the exact period when this proposal was made, but it can be assumed that it was the second half of 1996. According to Granić, he then stated in an interview for the Croatian press that a military takeover of Eastern Slavonia for Croatia would had severe international consequences, and that after that the mentioned operation was aborted Tuđman was allegedly welcomed by Granić's statement to get rid of the pressure from the Ministry of Defense to carry out the mentioned operation.

Foreign policy reasons
The international community was worried knowing that the Croats intended to launch a military liberation operation, which would result in a new refugee crisis and shake the regime of Slobodan Milošević. In that case, it was feared that the Yugoslav Army would be directly involved in the conflict, which would inflame the war even more, and there would be a frontal collision between Croatia and Serbia in the area. A possible Croatian military action would mean the disruption of the American peace initiative, the Dayton Accords, which would also continue the Bosnian War. In that case, Croatia would be branded in front of the whole world as the culprit for the failure of the negotiations.

Number of potential victims
Since a large part of the terrain and the bridges towards Baranja were mined, it was estimated that the Croatian army would not be able to advance quickly and could not put their tactics in place. Also, bearing in mind the immediate proximity to the border with Serbia, an artillery strike from Serbia against the Croatian forces was not ruled out. When President Tuđman heard that the number of potential victims was estimated at 1,500, he decided to avoid military action at all costs and stop the offensive. He explained his decision with the words: "Every life is important to me, both Croatian and Serbian." On 8 June 1997, at the departure of the first train to Vukovar, he publicly explained why Croatia opted for a peaceful solution: "Not because of the recommendation of European and world powers, but also because of Croatian national interests, to have no more victims and destruction, to prove to the world... that we don't want all Serbs to leave Croatia, but for those who want to recognize it to remain in Croatia like your homeland..."