Quintus Sertorius

Quintus Sertorius (c. 126 – 73 BC) was a Roman general and statesman who led a large-scale rebellion against the Roman Senate on the Iberian peninsula. He had been a prominent member of the populist faction of Cinna and Marius, fighting under Marius during the Cimbric Wars and aligning himself with Cinna during the Roman civil wars started by Sulla's first march on Rome. During the later years of the civil war of 83–81 BC, he was sent to recover the Iberian Peninsula. Sertorius made Hispania the last outpost of the defeated Marian regime, defying the Sullan government in Rome for most of a decade. He was never decisively beaten on the battlefield and remained a thorn in the Senate's side until his murder in 73 BC.

When his faction lost the war, Sertorius was proscribed (outlawed) by the dictator Sulla. Supported by a majority of the native Iberian tribes, Sertorius skillfully used irregular warfare to repeatedly defeat various commanders sent by Rome to subdue him. The Sullan Senate devoted significant resources to defeating him; later in his war, he contended with Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey).

In his Parallel Lives, the Greek biographer Plutarch paired Sertorius with Eumenes. Like Eumenes, Sertorius was betrayed by his own men. Both generals also fought for a defeated cause, much weakened in power.

Early life and career
Sertorius was born in Nursia (a town whose people had received Roman citizenship in 268 BC) in Sabine territory around 126 BC. The Sertorius family were minor aristocrats, almost certainly Equites Romani (usually called "knights" in English), the class directly below the senatorial class. His father died before he came of age and his mother, Rhae, focused all her energies on raising her only son. She made sure he received the best education possible for a young man of his status. In return, according to Plutarch, he became excessively fond of his mother. Like many other young domi nobiles Sertorius moved to Rome in his mid-to-late teens trying to make it big as an orator and jurist.

His speaking style made a sufficiently negative impression on the young Cicero to merit a special mention in a later treatise on oratory:


 * Of all the totally illiterate and crude orators, well, actually ranters, I ever knew – and I might as well add 'completely coarse and rustic' – the roughest and readiest were Q. Sertorius ...

After his undistinguished career in Rome as a jurist and an orator, he entered the military. His first recorded campaign was under Quintus Servilius Caepio and ended at the Battle of Arausio in 105 BC, where he showed unusual courage; when the battle was lost, Sertorius escaped while wounded by swimming across the Rhone with his armaments after losing his horse. This became a minor legend in antiquity. Serving under Gaius Marius, Sertorius succeeded in spying on the wandering Germanic tribes that had defeated Caepio. Marius likely wanted information regarding enemy dispositions, movements, and intentions. Sertorius "after seeing or hearing what was of importance," returned to Marius. After this success, he almost certainly fought at the great Battle of Aquae Sextiae (now Aix-en-Provence, France) in 102 BC in which the Teutones and the Ambrones were decisively defeated.

He probably also fought at the Battle of Vercellae in 101 BC, where the Cimbri were decisively defeated, ending the German invasion. A few years after the Cimbric wars, Sertorius's patron Gaius Marius fell out of grace for his support of the demagogue Lucius Appuleius Saturninus and he and Sertorius had to leave Rome and stay away for a while. Sertorius travelled to Hispania Ulterior and served its governor, Titus Didius, as a military tribune, in 97 BC.

During his service, he was posted to the Roman-controlled Iberian town of Castulo. The local garrison had become hated by the native Celtiberians for their lack of discipline and constant drinking, and Sertorius either arrived too late to stop their impropriety or was unable to. The natives invited a neighbouring people (Oretani) to free the town of the garrison, and they were successful in slaughtering many of the Roman soldiers. Sertorius escaped and gathered the other survivors. He secured the unguarded exits of the town, and then led his men inside, killing all barbarian men of military age irrespective of participation in the revolt. Once he learned some attackers had come from a neighbouring town, he had his men clothe themselves in the armour of the slain natives and led them there. The town opened the gates for Sertorius and his men, convinced they were their warriors returning with loot from the slain Roman garrison. Sertorius then killed many of the towns' inhabitants and sold the rest into slavery. This incident won Sertorius a Grass Crown and some fame in Hispania and abroad, aiding his future political career.

Social War and Civil War
In 91 BC, he was elected quaestor and served in Cisalpine Gaul. His quaestorship was unusual in that he largely governed the province while the actual governor, perhaps Gaius Coelius Caldus, spent time across the Alps subduing remnants of the German invasion. During his quaestorship the Social War broke out, and Sertorius contributed by recruiting and training legionaries, along with obtaining weapons. He may have done more, though the existing sources do not record it. According to the historian Sallust:
 * "Many successes were achieved under his [Sertorius] leadership, but these have not been recorded in history, firstly because of his humble birth and secondly because the historians were ill-disposed towards him."

It is probable that Sertorius also led as a commander and fought along with providing men and materiel to the southern theatres of the war, as a wound sustained during the conflict cost him the use of one of his eyes.
 * Sertorius used his wounds as personal propaganda. Being scarred in the face had its advantages. 'Other men, he used to say, could not always carry about them the evidence of their heroic achievements. Their tokens, wreaths and spears of honour must at some times be set aside. His proof of valour remained with him at all times.'

Upon his return to Rome he apparently enjoyed the reputation of a war hero. Sertorius then ran for tribune of the Plebs, but Lucius Cornelius Sulla thwarted his efforts (for reasons unknown, but probably because he was in Marius's clientele, and Sulla and Marius were at odds), causing Sertorius to oppose Sulla. Sulla's reasons for doing so may originate in a personal quarrel since both men served under Marius earlier in their careers. It is also equally possible Sulla (and by extension the optimates, who he was closely tied to through marriage with Caecilia Metella and opposition to Marius) were uncertain about what manner of tribune Sertorius would be, fearing the emergence of a demagogue like Saturninus but with the added reputation of an excellent soldier. Knowing Sertorius was popular with the common people and associated with Marius may have been enough to thwart his ambitions. In any case, Sertorius did manage to become a senator on the strength of his earlier quaestorship.

In 88 BC, after being sidelined by his political opponents, Sulla marched his legions on Rome and took the capital. He took revenge on his enemies and forced Marius into exile, then left Italy to fight the First Mithridatic War against Mithridates VI of Pontus. After Sulla left, violence erupted between the optimates, led by the consul Gnaeus Octavius, and the populares, led by the consul Lucius Cornelius Cinna. Remembering Sulla's opposition when he ran for tribune, and being a former subordinate of Marius, Sertorius declared for Cinna and the populares.

When Cinna was driven from Rome in 87 BC during the Bellum Octavianum, Sertorius being one of his allies, aided him in recruiting ex-legionaries and drumming up enough support to enable them, in their turn, to march on Rome. When Marius returned from exile in Africa to aid the Cinna-Marian cause, Sertorius opposed granting him any command either out of fear his position would be diminished, or because he feared Marius' vindictiveness and what he would do when Rome was retaken. Sertorius advised not to trust Marius, and though he had a very bad opinion of Marius by then, he consented to Marius's return upon understanding that Marius came at Cinna's request and not of his own accord.


 * Oh, really? Here I was thinking that Marius had decided for himself to come to Italy, and so I was trying to decide what good it would do. But it turns out there's nothing to discuss. Since after all, you invited him, then you have to receive and employ him. There's no question about it.

In October of 87 BC, Cinna marched on Rome. Sertorius commanded one of Cinna's divisions and fought a battle with troops commanded by Pompeius Strabo. After Octavius surrendered Rome to the forces of Marius, Cinna, and Sertorius, Sertorius abstained from the proscriptions his fellow commanders engaged in. Sertorius went so far as to rebuke Marius and move Cinna to moderation. After Marius's death he, possibly with Cinna's approval, annihilated Marius's slave army which was still terrorizing Rome.

The years 87–84 BC are often described as spent 'waiting for Sulla' and what exactly Sertorius did while Cinna controlled Rome is unclear. He was not sent with Gaius Flavius Fimbria and Lucius Valerius Flaccus east for the First Mithridatic War. Sertorius certainly served in the government during this time; Cinna may have utilized his skill as a soldier and popularity with the common people to quell any remnants of revolt and stabilize Italy, thereby consolidating his power and that of the Marian government. He probably also helped train and levy soldiers for Sulla's inevitable return. Marius died in January 86 BC; eventually, Cinna himself was murdered in 84 BC, lynched by his own troops. It is probable that Sertorius became praetor in 85 or 84 BC. On Sulla's return from the East in 83 BC a civil war broke out. Sertorius, a praetor now, was called upon to serve in the government's armies. When the consul Scipio Asiaticus marched against Sulla, Sertorius was part of his staff. Sulla arrived in Campania and found the other consul, Gaius Norbanus, blocking the road to Capua. At the Battle of Mount Tifata Sulla inflicted a crushing defeat on Norbanus, with Norbanus losing six thousand of his men to Sulla's seventy. The beaten Norbanus withdrew with the remnants of his army to Capua. Sulla was stopped in his pursuit by Scipio's advance. However, Scipio was unwilling to risk a battle and started negotiations. Sertorius did not trust Sulla and advised Scipio to force a decisive action. Instead, he was sent to Norbanus to explain that an armistice was in force and negotiations were underway.

Sertorius made a detour along his way and captured the town of Suessa which had gone over to Sulla. When Sulla complained to Scipio about this breach of trust he was given back his hostages as a sign of good faith. Disappointed by the behavior of their commander and unwilling to fight Sulla's battle-hardened veterans, Scipio's troops defected. Scipio and his son were captured by Sulla, who released them after extracting a promise that they would never again fight against him or rejoin Cinna's successor Carbo.

Sertorius departed to Etruria where he raised yet another army, some 40 cohorts, as the Etruscans, having gained their Roman citizenship through the Cinna-Marian regime, were fearful of a Sullan victory. In 82 BC, Marius' son, Gaius Marius the Younger, became consul without having held the offices that a candidate for the consulship should have held, and at the unconstitutional age of 27. Sertorius, who probably qualified for the office, objected but his opinion was ignored. Following this appointment, Sertorius returned to Rome and castigated the Marian leadership for their lack of action in combatting Sulla, pointed out Sulla's bravery, and stated his belief that unless met directly soon Sulla would inevitably destroy them. Plutarch sums up the events:


 * Cinna was murdered and against the wishes of Sertorius, and against the law, the younger Marius took the consulship while [ineffectual] men as Carbo, Norbanus and Scipio had no success in stopping Sulla's advance on Rome, so the Marian cause was being ruined and lost; cowardice and weakness by the generals played its part, and treachery did the rest, and there was no reason why Sertorius should stay to watch things going from bad to worse through the inferior judgement of men with superior power.

Propraetor of Hispania and Fugitive
After having fallen out with the new populares leadership Sertorius was sent to Hispania as propraetor, representing the Cinna-Marian faction and their cause in Hispania. This was either done because of Sertorius' insubordination and criticism of their inaction or to put an able commander in charge of an unruly province.

When Sertorius marched through the Pyrenees mountain range he ran into severe weather and a mountain tribe that demanded a tribute for allowing his passage. His companions indignantly claimed it was an outrage; but while they considered it disgraceful to give in to extortion, Sertorius simply paid the tribe and commented that he was buying himself time, and that if a man had a lot to do, nothing is more precious than time. The governor of the two Spanish provinces, Hispania Ulterior and Hispania Citerior, Gaius Valerius Flaccus did not recognize his authority, but Sertorius had an army at his back and used it to assume control. Then he persuaded the local chieftains to accept him as the new governor and endeared himself to the general population by cutting taxes. After gaining control of both provinces Sertorius sought to hold them by sending an army, under Julius Salinator, to fortify the pass through the Pyrenees. Sulla's forces, under the command of Gaius Annius Luscus, were unable to break through until Salinator was assassinated by Calpurnius Lanarius, one of his subordinates, who defected to the Sullans. Annius then marched into Hispania.

Unable to convince the Spanish tribes to fight for him, Sertorius was seriously outnumbered and he decided to abandon his provinces. With 3,000 of his most loyal followers he fled to Mauritania, but was driven off by the locals who wanted no part of his rebellion. He then fell in with a band of Cilician pirates who were pillaging the Spanish coast. Together they attacked and took Pityussa, the most southerly of the Balearic Islands, which they started using as a base. When this was reported to Annius, he sent a fleet of warships and almost a full legion which drove Sertorius and his pirate allies from the Balearics. The pirates defected and went to Africa to help install the tyrant Ascalis on the throne of Tingis. Sertorius followed them to Africa, rallied the locals in the vicinity of Tingis, who were unhappy with Ascalis for they saw him as a puppet of Sulla, and defeated Ascalis's men and the pirates in battle.

After gaining control over Tingis, Sertorius defeated Paccianus, one of Sulla's generals, who had been sent to put Ascalis on the throne.

Local legend had it that Antaeus, the son of Poseidon and Gaia, and the husband of Tinge who gave name to Tingis, was buried in Mauritania. Sertorius had the tomb excavated for he wanted to see the body of Antaeus which was reported to be sixty cubits in size. According to Plutarch, Sertorius was dumbfounded by what he saw and after performing a sacrifice, he filled the tomb up again, and thereafter was among those promoting its traditions and honours.

During his forays in Hispania and Africa Sertorius continued to collect news of the war in Italy. Likely from refugees and Marian exiles fleeing Sulla's veteran legions, he heard of Sulla's victory over the Marians in various battles, his second capture of Rome, and the Sullan proscriptions. Sertorius learned, unsurprisingly, that he was one of the foremost among the proscribed, listed with the first eighty names.

The North African success won Sertorius the fame and admiration of the people of Hispania, particularly that of the warlike Lusitanians in the west, whom Roman generals and proconsuls of Sulla's party had plundered and oppressed. The Lusitanians, being threatened by a Sullan governor again, asked Sertorius to be their war leader. It is likely they were influenced by Sertorius' tenure as governor being far gentler than his predecessors, who often extracted very high taxes and warred against tribes arbitrarily for glory and plunder, neither of which Sertorius did. While considering the offer, Sertorius learned of his mother's death and "almost died of grief," lying in his tent, unable to speak for a week. With the aid of his friends and fellow exiles, Sertorius was eventually able to leave his tent. He decided to accept the Lusitanian offer, and prepared his army and fleet to return to Hispania.

Sertorian War
On a moonless night in the year 80 BC, Sertorius sailed his forces from Tingis across the Gibraltar strait back to Hispania. A small fleet under Aurelius Cotta from the coastal town of Mellaria tried to stop him, but he pushed them aside and landed his army at the small fishing town of Baelo near the Pillars of Hercules. Rumours of his army spread far and wide in Hispania. At this point, it was composed of 2,600 Roman legionaries and 700 Libyans.

After being reinforced by 4,700 Lusitanians he marched on Lucius Fufidius, the local Roman governor, intent on defeating him to strengthen his support and prestige. At the Battle of the Baetis River, fought at the Baetis estuary, Sertorius took advantage of his native soldiers and their knowledge of land to defeat Fufidius and soon started to consolidate his power in Hispania. Archaeological evidence suggests Sertorius saw himself acting with proconsular authority.

Brave, noble, and gifted with eloquence, Sertorius was just the man to impress the native warriors, whom he organized into an army and adjoined to his core Roman forces. They spoke of him as the "new Hannibal" whom he resembled physically (having one eye) and in military skill; he was an extraordinary general who repeatedly defeated forces many times his own force's size. Many Roman populare (Marian) exiles and Italian refugees joined him, and with these and his Spanish and African volunteers and mercenaries he completely defeated several of Sulla's generals (Fufidius, Thorius, and to some less-direct extent Domitius Calvinus and Manlius). Sertorius' power grew exponentially following these victories. Plutarch reports that the Sullan generals in Hispania altogether had 120,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 2,000 skirmishers.

Gaius Annius Luscus' command in Hispania was not renewed the following year despite his prior successes against Sertorius, for unclear reasons. Thus, between 79–77 BC, Sertorius' main enemy was Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, an experienced Sullan general who had been given a proconsular command by the Senate specifically to defeat and drive him from Hispania Ulterior. Prior to Metellus' arrival, Domitius, propraetor of Hispania Citerior, marched to Hispania Ulterior to put down Sertorius after hearing of the defeat of Fufidius. Sertorius sent his legate, Lucius Hirtuleius, to confront him while he prepared for the campaign against Metellus. Hirtuleius met and defeated Domitius at the Battle of the Anas River.

Despite Metellus' substantially greater military resources and able generalship, he was unable to make progress against Sertorius, who outclassed him tactically and inflicted many defeats upon him. Sertorius, who referred to Metellus as 'the old woman', repeatedly outmaneuvered him, ambushing his immobile troops and supplies, employing guerrilla warfare extremely effectively. In a little-known battle early in 79 BC, Sertorius defeated and killed Lucius Thorius Balbus, legate to Metellus. Plutarch describes the unequal campaign between the two generals:
 * He [Metellus] was accustomed to regular warfare with heavy infantry. He liked to command a solid, ponderous bloc of infantry. This formation was superbly trained to push back and vanquish the enemy in close quarter combat. For constantly chasing men who floated like the wind over the mountains he had to climb for enduring – as their enemy did – constant hunger without either tent or campfire, his army was useless. The light armour and consequent agility of his Iberian warriors meant Sertorius was constantly shifting his focus and changing the situation, until Metellus was at his wits' end. Metellus was no longer young, and after the many heroic contests of his youth he was now somewhat inclined to ease and luxury, while Sertorius was full of mature vigour. ... When Sertorius challenged Metellus to single combat, Metellus' men cheered and urged him to fight it out, general to general, and they mocked him when he declined.

What grand strategy Metellus employed in Lusitania against Sertorius between 79-77 BC is not known, besides the fact that it was not successful. Sertorius' repeated victories against him led Metellus to ask for help from Lucius Manlius, governor of Transalpine Gaul, only for Manlius to be defeated and dispersed by Hirtuleius. Following these successes, Sertorius drove Metellus from Hispania Ulterior for the remainder of the year. Hirtuleius' victories allowed Sertorius to consolidate control over Hispania Citerior as well. Part of Sertorius' victories were due to his efforts in making the Iberians an organized army through Roman formations and signals. He encouraged them to decorate their armaments with gold and silver, and thus made them more likely to retain their equipment between engagements. Many native Iberians pledged themselves to him, serving as bodyguards who would take their own lives if he perished.

Famously, while organizing his armies, Sertorius decided to give them a visual lesson in tactics. The Lusitanians, along with other natives under his command, wanted to take on the Roman legions head-on, something Sertorius knew would end disastrously. Unable to convince them, he allowed the natives to do so in a minor engagement, presumably against Metellus, and rode to their rescue. Afterward, he had two horses brought in front of them, one strong, the other weak. He then ordered an old man to pull hairs from the strong horses' tail one by one, and a strong youth to pull on the weak horses' tail all at once; the old man completed his task, while the youth failed. Sertorius then explained that the Roman army was akin to the horse tail, in that it could be defeated if attacked piece by piece, but if taken all at once victory was impossible.

Although he was strict and severe with his soldiers, Sertorius was particularly considerate to the people in general, and made their burdens as light as possible, despite considerable financial strain in his war effort. This was likely partially pragmatic, as Sertorius had to retain the goodwill of the native Iberians if he had any chance of winning the war. It seems clear that he had a peculiar gift for evoking their enthusiasm, and we can understand how he was able to use his famous white fawn, a present from one of the natives that was supposed to communicate to him the advice of the goddess Diana, to his advantage.
 * Spanus, one of the commoners who lived in the country came across a doe trying to escape from hunters. The doe fled faster than he could pursue, but the animal had newly given birth. He [Spanus] was struck by the unusual colour of the fawn, for it was pure white. He pursued and caught it.

As it happened, Sertorius was in the area, and it was known that he amply rewarded those who brought him game and produce. Sertorius acquired the fawn, and after a while the animal became so tame and well-trained that it came when he called it, and followed him on his walks without minding the crowds and bustle of life in camp. Eventually it occurred to him that the barbarians easily fall into superstition, so he started to give the fawn religious significance.

Sertorius announced that the doe had been sent by Diana, and claimed that through the doe she revealed hidden information to him. He helped the idea along by various tricks. If he heard of an enemy raid into his territory, or an attempt to subvert a city from its allegiance to him, he would claim that the fawn had told him of this in a dream, and tell his men to prepare. Or when his commanders sent him messages of victory, he would hide the messenger and bring out the white fawn wearing celebratory garlands. He would sacrifice to the gods, and tell his men to celebrate because they would soon hear something good had happened. By such stratagems he persuaded his people they were not by the fallible wisdom of some foreigner, but by divine power. So the people were made tractable and all the more ready to help him with his plans, and consequently the extraordinary growth of Sertorius' power led to reinforcing this belief.

By 78 BC, Metellus, exasperated by Sertorius' tactics, having failed to cross the Tagus and rapidly losing the initiative, chose to campaign against Sertorius-aligned cities instead of attempting to make open battle with him. He targeted Lacobriga due to its lack of access to water if besieged. Intending to take the city in two days, Metellus provisioned his men with five days worth of supply and prepared to march. Sertorius learned of his intentions and selected fit volunteers, sending them with two thousand wineskins of water to Lacobriga. The volunteers delivered the water and extracted all non-essential defenders from the town, also stripping the nearby surroundings of anything useful.

When Metellus arrived, still harried by Sertorian guerrillas, he found the city unexpectedly very well-provisioned and defended. He quickly ran out of provisions and was forced to send out foragers under a general named Aquinus. Aquinus collected resources and soon reformed his foragers to lead them back to Metellus. As they passed through a ravine, Sertorius ambushed them, sending two thousand Iberian warriors to attack the column from behind. When the column reorganized to face this threat, Sertorius himself sallied forth, attacking the legion from their newly formed rear. The foragers were routed, with many killed and captured; Aquinus and those that escaped with him abandoned their collected resources, and armaments, and fled to Metellus. Metellus had no choice but to decamp and leave Lacobriga.

In 77 BC, Sertorius focused his attention on subduing Iberian tribes who had not yet accepted his authority in the interior. Possibly during this year, one tribe, the Characitani, who dwelled in an impregnable hill with caves in it, were conquered by Sertorius. He did so by piling mounds of dirt and letting the wind carry the dust in, then ordered his cavalry to kick up dust by riding back and forth, and in so doing made the natives choke in their caves and offer surrender. Metellus did not extensively campaign against Sertorius in the year due to the revolt in Rome of the consul Marcus Aemilius Lepidus (father of the triumvir).

Contrebia and Lauron
In the summer of that year, with Lepidus' revolt having ended, the Roman Senate eventually recognized a greater force was needed to defeat Sertorius, as to this point all Sullan generals had failed and Metellus was doing miserably against him. Plutarch describes the mood in Rome regarding Sertorius' ongoing revolt: "'... Sertorius, was in possession of Spain, and was threatening the Romans like a formidable cloud. As if for the final disease of the state, the civil wars had poured all their venom into this man. He had slain many of the inferior commanders, and was now engaged with Metellus Pius, an illustrious man and a good soldier, but, as men thought, too slow by reason of his years in following up the opportunities of war, and outdistanced when events swept along at high speed. For Sertorius attacked him recklessly and in robber fashion, and by his ambuscades and flanking movements confounded a man who was practised in regular contests only...'"Both sitting consuls refused to command the war against Sertorius. Thus, the Senate resorted to giving an extraordinary command (not as proconsul, but as Lucius Marcius Philippus quipped, 'pro consulibus,' i.e. in place of the apprehensive consuls) to Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (now better known as Pompey) to help out Metellus, take back Hispania, and crush Sertorius' rebellion. Soon after, in either late 77 or early 76 BC, Sertorius was joined — at the insistence of the forces he brought with him, who feared Pompey — by Marcus Perperna Vento, with a following of Roman and Italian aristocrats and a sizeable Roman-style army of fifty-three cohorts, largely made up of remnants of Lepidus' revolt and Marian exiles. With this army Sertorius was able to meet the Roman commanders in open field engagements instead of only guerrilla warfare.

Sertorius besieged the natives of Contrebia in that year, who had also refused his authority. The natives destroyed a siege tower taller than their city walls during the siege, but Sertorius, staying awake through the night, rebuilt it in the same spot and later laid fire to the city's primary defensive tower, forcing a surrender. He left Lucius Insteius in command of the city and marched to the Ebro River. Sertorius encamped during the winter in the town of Castra Aelia along the river, where he set up factories and then distributed arms, armour, payment, and clothing to his forces. He called together representatives of all the Iberian tribes, thanked them for their aid in providing arms for his troops, discussed the progress of the war, and dismissed them after encouraging them. By the 76 BC campaigning season, Pompey had recruited a large army, some 30,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry from his father and Sulla's veterans, its size being evidence of the threat posed by Sertorius to the Sullan Senate. His arrival in Hispania stirred up rebellious sentiments against Sertorius in the peninsula, due to Pompey's reputation as a skilled general. Sertorius, contemptuously calling Pompey 'Sulla's pupil', made many speeches against him, deriding the general as a boy in need of "a cane and whip" but nonetheless paid close attention to Pompey's movements. Sertorius was at this point at the height of his power, as near all of Iberia was under his control and he had several large armies throughout the peninsula with which to combat the Roman generals.

Early in the spring, Sertorius sent Perperna with 20,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry to his allies, the Ilercavones, to prevent Pompey from securing the coast in Citerior, which he was besieging; he also gave instructions to Perperna regarding the lay of land and to lure Pompey into ambushes. Sertorius then sent instructions to Gaius Herennius (another of his legates, who was in Citerior), and Hirtuleius, informing Hirtuleius in particular not to enter pitched battle with Metellus in Lusitania, whom Sertorius believed Hirtuleius could not match. Sertorius, apparently, did not intend to march on Pompey or expect him to offer battle, since he believed the Roman Senate knew they could defeat him in a war of attrition.

Sertorius then committed himself to subduing two more rebellious Iberian peoples, the Berones and Autricones, as they had repeatedly asked for help from Pompey during the winter of 77 BC and harried his soldiers during the Siege of Contrebia. Sertorius wanted to show them "the severity of war" and, after marching through allied territory peacefully, laid waste to hostile tribe land and camped with an allied city. He sent out his quaestor Marcus Marius to collect soldiers from the native Arevaci and Cerindonians, and Gaius Insteius to collect cavalry and stand by in Contrebia. He then attacked the Vaccaei after conducting reconnaissance, who called the Autricones to their aid, with unknown success. Sertorius presumably wished to set a reliable headquarters in northern Hispania to be able to aid his legates if the need arose.

Sertorius also sent another army to slow Pompey's march and succeeded in ravaging one of his legions sent out to forage. Undaunted, Pompey apparently outmaneuvered Herennius and Perperna, marching past them toward Valentia, which he intended to take. Sertorius, hearing of Pompey's movements, rapidly moved south and blockaded the strategic city of Lauron in Citerior, which had recently allied itself to Pompey. Sertorius besieged the city, knowing it could serve as a junction by which Pompey and Metellus could join their armies, and likely hoped to pull Pompey from Valentia by attacking a new ally of his. In response, Pompey made for Lauron, "drawn by Sertorius into a deadly trap."

Pompey reached Lauron and saw Sertorius encamped there already, beginning the Battle of Lauron. Sertorius, on hearing of Pompey's eagerness to besiege, remarked that he himself would give a lesson to Pompey: that a general must look behind him rather than in front of him. Pompey began attempting to drive Sertorius from the city when he saw Sertorian forces at his rear and was forced to stay put. He then sent out foragers, who Sertorius forced to forage far by repeatedly attacking those who foraged close. Sertorius then sent ten infantry cohorts and light-armed Iberian units along with cavalry, led by his officers Gaius Octavius Graecinus and Gaius Tarquitius Priscus, who ambushed and slaughtered these far-reaching foragers.

Pompey sent out a legion to save his foragers, for they were a large portion of his army, but this legion was also slaughtered when the Sertorian cavalry hit them in the rear. Finally, Pompey led out the rest of his army to salvage the fiasco, but Sertorius checked him by leading out his army and offering battle. This forced a stalemate as Pompey could not march out with Sertorius behind him, nor battle him and risk the Sertorians who had killed the foragers attacking his rear or flank. Pompey could do nothing but watch his army be slaughtered. He lost 10,000 men while inflicting next to no losses on Sertorius' forces. Sertorius let the natives go and burned down the city before Pompey's watching army. He then executed an entire Roman cohort due to their attempts to plunder and ravage the natives of Lauron after he gave orders that they were to be unharmed. As Pompey retreated, Sertorius left him to his legates Perperna and Herennius while he returned to Lusitania to match Metellus.

Sertorius owed some of his success to his prodigious ability as a statesman. His goal was to build a stable government in Hispania with the consent and cooperation of the people, whom he wished to civilize along the lines of the Roman model. He established a senate of 300 members, drawn from Roman emigrants (probably also including some from the highest aristocrats of Hispania) and kept an Iberian bodyguard. For the children of the chief native families he provided a school at Osca (Huesca), his capital city, where they received a Roman education and even adopted the dress and education of Roman youths. Sertorius held exams for the children, distributed prizes, and assured them and their fathers they would eventually hold some positions of power. This followed the Roman practice of taking hostages. Late in his campaigns, a revolt of the native people arose and Sertorius killed several of the children that he had sent to school at Osca, selling many others into slavery.

Sucro and Saguntum
In 75 BC, Perperna and Herennius were defeated at the Battle of Valentia by Pompey. Hearing this, Sertorius left the command against Metellus with Hirtuleius and marched his army to meet Pompey. Metellus defeated Hirtuleius at the Battle of Italica, so Sertorius sent Perperna at the head of a large army to block Metellus from coming to Pompey's aid and engaged Pompey, who, for whatever reason, chose to accept the offer of battle rather than wait for his ally, beginning the Battle of Sucro.

The two armies drew up their lines late in the day and each general took the right flank; Pompey faced a subordinate of Sertorius, while Sertorius faced Lucius Afranius, Pompey's lieutenant. When the battle began and Sertorius saw his left wing falling to Pompey's advance, he rode over, rallying and inspiring them. Sertorius led the reinvigorated flank into a fierce counterattack which shattered the Pompeian right, nearly capturing Pompey himself. Afranius, however, had broken the Sertorian right and was plundering their camp; Sertorius left the promising situation on his left and rode over to save his camp, killing many of Afranius' men and forcing the latter to depart back to Pompey. The following day, both armies drew up to conclude the issue, but Sertorius then heard Metellus had defeated Perperna, plundered his camp, and was now marching to aid Pompey. Unwilling to fight two armies who would outnumber him if joined, Sertorius decamped, bitterly commenting:"Now if the old woman had not made an appearance, I'd have thrashed the boy and packed him off to Rome." After the Battle of Sucro Sertorius' white doe went missing for a time. When it was caught again by men who were passing by, Sertorius gave the men a large sum of money and retrieved the animal. After several days, he concealed the doe nearby and went about a tribunal proceeding, smiling and informing the native leaders that Diana had told him in his dreams good fortune was forthcoming. The doe was then released and bound to Sertorius joyfully, laying her head in his lap and licking his hand, and Sertorius shed tears. The natives, struck with amazement, had their confidence restored by this event, and their faith in Sertorius was reinforced once more.

Sertorius negotiated with the formidable King Mithridates VI of Pontus during his war, likely in the winter of 75 BC. Mithridates wanted Roman confirmation of his occupation of the Roman Province of Asia, after relinquishing control of it to Sulla in the First Mithridatic War, along with the Kingdoms of Bithynia and Cappadocia, and saw Sertorius' Senate as a venue for this. Mithridates, convinced by Lucius Magius and Lucius Fannius (two Marian exiles, members of Fimbria's army), sent envoys to Iberia asking for this, while offering ships, gold, and recognition of Sertorius' government as the 'true' Roman state in return.

Sertorius assembled his Senate to discuss the issue, which agreed, noting it would only benefit them since they lacked any direct control over Roman Asia as of now. Sertorius decided that Mithridates could get Bithynia and Cappadocia (and possibly Paphlaglonia and Galatia as well) as they were kingdoms that "had nothing to do with the Romans." But Asia, being a Roman province, would not be allowed to be his again. As part of the treaty, Sertorius sent Mithridates an army under the command of his quaestor, Marcus Marius. Though Mithridates accepted these terms and sent 3,000 talents of gold and forty ships to Sertorius, he is said to have remarked: "What terms, pray, will Sertorius impose when he is seated on the Palatine, if now, after he has been driven forth to the Atlantic sea, he sets bounds to our kingdom and threatens war if we try to get Asia?"

Later on in the year, Sertorius moved into Celtiberian lands and Metellus followed him. Sertorius employed guerrilla warfare once again, ambushing Metellus' supply trains. However, he was eventually forced by his native troops to give battle against Metellus and Pompey, likely when Metellus marched on the Celtiberian town of Segontia. The coming Battle of Saguntum was the last pitched battle Sertorius fought, the largest battle of the war, and probably one he had not wanted in the first place. The fierce battle lasted from noon until night-time and resulted in the deaths of Gaius Memmius and Hirtuleius. When a native brought Sertorius news of Hirtuleius' death during the engagement, Sertorius stabbed him with a dagger to keep the news from breaking the spirit of his men. Though Sertorius defeated Pompey on the wing, slaying some 6,000 men, Metellus had again defeated Perperna, killing 5,000 men. Sertorius went against Metellus next, but Metellus "stood his ground with a vigour unexpected in a man of his age," and when wounded by a spear, his men, ashamed, fought fiercely enough to turn the tide. The battle ultimately ended in a draw, with heavy losses for both sides.

Following the battle, Metellus had positioned his camp in a vulnerable position, considering himself secure in his victory; Sertorius, seeing this, led his men to ambush the camp and surround it in a trench. However, Pompey formed up his army and hastened to his ally's support, and Sertorius desisted. Sertorius finally disbanded his army, telling them to break up and reassemble at a later location rather than organizing a concerted retreat, for fear of Metellus' pursuit. This was common for Sertorius, who "wandered about alone, and often took field again with an army... like a winter torrent, suddenly swollen."

Clunia and the Final Years
After the battle Sertorius reverted to guerrilla warfare again, having lost the vast majority of the heavy infantry Perperna had lent to his cause which enabled him to match the Sullan legions in the field. He retired to a strong fortress town in the mountains called Clunia. Pompey and Metellus rushed to invest him, and during the siege, Sertorius made many sallies against them, inflicting heavy casualties. Pompey and Metellus allowed many of Sertorius' native warriors to escape under the assumption they would capture him soon from the city, and indeed, Sertorius spent time repairing the walls and gates of the city as if he intended to stay for a protracted siege, but did not plan to. It is probable that during the siege, Sertorius set up trenches around the city at night and formed up his army the following morning, attempting to lure the enemy cavalry inward. When the cavalry approached, they fell into the trenches and were slain. Sertorius also sent messages to his native allies to inform him when his army was reformed outside of Clunia. When he received the confirmation, he sallied from Clunia, slew the besiegers in his path and rejoined with his army, continuing the war.

As the two Roman generals had pursued Sertorius into the Celtiberia in order to capture him in Clunia, they were now in unfriendly lands and Sertorius regained the initiative. For the rest of the year he resumed a guerrilla campaign against them, cutting off supply lines, raiding their converted territories and camps, and eventually forcing Metellus and Pompey to winter out of Sertorian-aligned land due to lack of resources. Sertorius himself wintered in Lusitania, likely to rebuild the armies lost by his legates in the year. During that winter, Pompey wrote to the Senate for reinforcements and funds, without which, he said, he and Metellus would be driven from Hispania. Despite being weakened, Sertorius was still evidently a threat, so much so that in Rome it was said that he would return to Italy before Pompey did. The Senate capitulated, and funds and men (two legions) were found with great effort and sent to the Roman generals.

With the men and materiel reinforcements from Pompey's letter, in 74–73 BC, Pompey and Metellus gained the upper hand. The two Roman generals began slowly grinding down Sertorius' rebellion; unable to defeat him in battle they now opted for attritional warfare, and what had worked against Hannibal a century and a half before would now be brought to bear on Sertorius. By now the Roman legions were largely able to march where they pleased, as Sertorius lacked the men to meet them in open combat, though he continued to relentlessly harry them with guerrilla warfare. Mass defections to the Roman generals began, and Sertorius responded to this with harshness and punishments.

Sertorius continued to win some victories in these years, such as when he prevented Pompey's siege of Palantia by appearing nearby, then slaying 3,000 men who were besieging the town of Calagurris. Despite this, he was losing the war, and the Roman generals continued to occupy strongholds and cities in Celtiberia that were once under his control. Goldsworthy writes that "if Sertorius was not losing the war, it was by now clear that he could not win it." Sertorius' authority over his men declined, and he lost much of his acumen and authority, descending into alcoholism and debauchery. In these later years, the once mild and just Sertorius became paranoid, irritable, and exceedingly cruel to his subordinates. Plutarch writes that "as his cause grew hopeless, he became harsh toward those who did him wrong."

Sertorius was in league with the Cilician Pirates, who had bases and fleets all around the Mediterranean, and near the end of his war he was also in communication with the insurgent slaves of Spartacus in Italy, who was openly in revolt against Rome. But due to jealousies and fears among his high-ranking Roman officers and some Iberian chieftains as well a conspiracy was beginning to take form.

Conspiracy and death
Metellus, seeing that the key to victory was removing Sertorius, had made his pitch toward the Romans still with Sertorius sometime during the war: "Should any Roman kill Sertorius he would be given a hundred talents of silver and twenty-thousand acres of land. If he was an exile he would be free to return to Rome". This turned Sertorius paranoid, he started distrusting his Roman retinue. He also no longer trusted his Roman bodyguard, exchanging it for a Spanish one. This was deeply unpopular among his Roman followers. By the autumn of 73 BC, the Roman aristocrats and senators who made up the higher classes of his domain were discontented with Sertorius. They had grown jealous of Sertorius's power, resentful from his paranoia and cruelty, and could now see that victory was growing impossible. Perperna, aspiring to take Sertorius's place, encouraged the jealousy of Sertorius' top Roman staff for his own ends, and led the conspiracy against him. The conspirators took to damaging Sertorius by oppressing the local Iberian tribes in his name. This stirred discontent and revolt in the tribes, which resulted in a cycle of oppression and revolt, with Sertorius none the wiser as to who was creating such mischief. One of the conspirators, Manlius, told one of his lovers about the plot against Sertorius' life. This man then told another conspirator, Aufidius, who told Perperna. Perperna, accordingly, urged on by the "sharpness of their crisis and of their peril" took action. He told Sertorius of a supposed victory over the Roman generals. Sertorius was elated by this news, while Perperna suggested a banquet and with effort persuaded Sertorius to attend in order to separate him from his bodyguards. The banquet took place at Osca, Sertorius' capital. The conspirators included many of Sertorius' top staff, such as Marcus Antonius, Lucius Fabius Hispaniensis, Gaius Octavius Graecinus, Gaius Tarquitius Priscus (all proscribed senators), Aufidius, Manlius, and Perperna himself. Sertorius' scribes, Versius and Maecenas, may have been involved since they were in perfect positions to forge evidence of Perperna's supposed victory. Sertorius' loyal Spanish bodyguards were made drunk and kept outside of the banquet hall.

While under most circumstances, any festivities to which Sertorius was invited were conducted with great propriety, this particular feast was vulgar, designed to offend the skillful general and get him off his couch and among the crowd where a knife could be shoved through his ribs without difficulty. Disgusted, Sertorius changed his posture on the couch, intent on ignoring them all. This position presented something of a problem as Sertorius, although in late middle age, had a well-deserved reputation as a skilled fighter. They changed their tactic; Perperna gave the signal to his fellow conspirators by dropping his goblet on the floor, and they attacked. Antonius slashed at Sertorius, but he turned the blow and would have risen if Antonius did not hold him down. The others rushed in and stabbed him until he was dead.

Aftermath
Upon learning of the death of Sertorius, some of his Iberian allies sent ambassadors to Pompey or Metellus and made peace. Most simply went home. The Lusitanians (who were among Sertorius' greatest partisans) were infuriated by his assassination. What happened to Sertorius' white doe and his body is not known.

Perperna assumed control of the rapidly deteriorating rebel army after Sertorius' assassination. He resorted to harsh measures to retain power, executing several leading Sertorians. To make matters worse, Sertorius' will named Perperna his chief beneficiary. Already disgraced as the man who had slain his commander, the man who had given him sanctuary, Perperna was now also revealed to have killed his main benefactor and friend. And now that Sertorius was dead, his virtues were remembered, and his recent atrocities forgotten.


 * People are generally less angry with those who have died, and when they no longer see him alive before them they tend to dwell tenderly on his virtues. So it was with Sertorius. Anger against him suddenly turned to affection and the soldiers clamorously rose up in protest against Perperna.

After Sertorius' death his independent "Roman" Republic crumbled with the renewed onslaught of Pompey and Metellus. Metellus, who "considered it no longer a difficult task for Pompey alone to vanquish Perpenna" left for other parts of Hispania. Pompey subsequently crushed Perperna's army and killed the rest of Sertorius' assassins (some fled to Africa and died there). The only survivor, Aufidius, "came to old age in a barbarian village, a poor and hated man." Other Sertorian officers and soldiers who surrendered were well treated by Pompey.

Several Sertorian cities refused to surrender after the assassination of Sertorius, and Pompey remained in Hispania for some years pacifying these remaining holdouts. Most famously, the city of Calagurris resorted to cannibalism rather than submitting to the Roman siege, but was eventually conquered by the Senatorial army. The two victorious generals, each desiring a triumph, wanted the war to be considered foreign rather than civil. When Pompey crossed the Pyrenees to return to Rome in 71 BC, he erected a monument to his victory speaking of the more than eight hundred towns he subjugated. The monument lacked any mention of Sertorius.

During Gaius Julius Caesar's Gallic Wars, when his lieutenant Publius Licinius Crassus was conquering Aquitania in 56 BC, the alarmed Gauls sent ambassadors to many surrounding tribes for help, including Iberians from Hispania Citerior. These Iberians were led by veterans who had fought with Sertorius during his war and had learned Roman military tactics from him; they showed "disconcerting proficiency in fighting Romans." They confidently picked prime positions for camps, conducted raids on supply lines, and did not overextend themselves. Crassus eventually defeated these Sertorian veterans.

Legacy
Even sources hostile to Sertorius concede he was a great military leader (Magnus Dux), and noted his proficiency in warfare. Accordingly, during the Sullan Proscriptions, Sertorius was "especially feared" and his war was not seen as a foregone conclusion while it was occurring. Appian states his belief that, despite his descent into debauchery and paranoia, if Sertorius had lived longer "the war would not have ended so soon or so easily." Some modern sources believe Sertorius was a traitor to Rome for his war against the Sullan Senate, cooperation with native Iberians against Roman armies, and alliance with Mithridates; others believe he was a true patriot of a defeated regime. Ancient sources scorn Sertorius' cruelty and the "savage and prodigal" man he became late in his war, yet others admire his "great, but ill-starred, valour."

No busts or coinage of Sertorius has survived. Despite Valerius Maximus reporting the presence of a wife in Italy, there is no evidence of Sertorius having had any children.

Sertorius' motives cannot really be known, though evidence suggests he saw himself fighting for the survival and reenfranchisement of those disinherited and proscribed after Sulla's victory in 82 BC (including himself, who, like the rest, had no prospects in Rome). Plutarch reports that Sertorius himself repeatedly sought terms with Metellus and Pompey to return to Rome (after a victory in the field), telling them he would rather "live in Rome as her meanest citizen rather than to live in exile from his country and be called supreme ruler of all the rest of the world together." If Sertorius had successfully severed Hispania from Senatorial control, he may have intended to march on Rome in order to reestablish the Marians as rulers of the Republic.

Modern accounts that do not directly deal with Sertorius largely describe him and his war in terms of its impact on the Roman state, and his influence on the career of Pompey the Great. Leach calls Sertorius one of Pompey's "most brilliant adversaries," and Collins refers to him as an "eccentric genius of guerrilla warfare." Pompey's highly irregular career was initiated by the aftermath of the civil wars of Sulla and Marius, but it was the strong military threat Sertorius posed which necessitated his extraordinary, effectively proconsular, command and thereby deteriorated Senatorial control over the Roman legions. To the proscribed, Sertorius represented a chance for reemergence in Roman politics, and a return to their properties and lives in Rome. Sertorius' war is, resultantly, seen as "an inheritance from the Sullan proscription," and its end, along with his death, signalled the close of the civil wars started by Sulla's First March on Rome. Ironically, the defeat of Sertorius (and thus the last Marian resistance) may have been what precipitated the repealing of several optimate laws, as there was no longer "fear that the [Sullan] structure itself might crumble."

Many commentators described Sertorius's life as a tragedy. Plutarch wrote that "He [Sertorius] was more continent than Philip, more faithful to his friends than Antigonus, and more merciful to his enemies than Hannibal; and that for prudence and judgment he gave place to none of them, but in fortune was inferior to them all." Gruen writes that "only the divisive contests of civil war forced him to end his life as a declared outlaw rather than an esteemed senator." Spann concluded, "Sertorius' talents were wasted, his life lost, in an inglorious struggle he did not want, could not win, and could not escape".

In fiction

 * The 1662 French play Sertorius by Pierre Corneille and the 1679 English play Sertorius by John Bancroft both portray the events of the rebellion
 * In Colleen McCullough's novels The First Man in Rome and Fortune's Favourites, Quintus Sertorius features as one of the secondary characters.
 * In Steven Saylor's short story "The White Fawn", Sertorius features as one of the secondary characters.
 * Sertorius is the main character in Vincent Davis II's historical fiction series The Sertorius Scrolls.

Ancient sources

 * Plutarch, Parallel Lives, Life of Sertorius (in his Parallel Lives Plutarch pairs Sertorius with Eumenes − Plutarch saw many parallels between the lives of these two men)
 * Plutarch, Parallel Lives, Life of Pompey.
 * Appian, Bell. civ. (Civil Wars).
 * Appian, Hispanica.
 * the fragments of Sallust.
 * Livy, Epitome and Fragment of Book 91
 * Dio Cassius xxxvi.
 * Frontinus, Stratagems
 * Orosius, History Against the Pagans Book 5
 * Florus, Epitome of Roman History, Book 2, 10
 * Julius Exsuperantius, De Marii Lepidii
 * Diodorus Siculus, Books 38 & 39

Modern sources

 * Gruen, Erich S. (1974). The last generation of the Roman Republic. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-02238-6.
 * Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith (2016). In the name of Rome: the men who won the Roman Empire (First Yale University Press edition ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-21852-7.
 * John Leach, Pompey the Great, chapter 2. (1978)
 * John Leach, Pompey the Great, chapter 2. (1978)
 * John Leach, Pompey the Great, chapter 2. (1978)