Second Battle of Heligoland Bight

The Second Battle of Heligoland Bight, also the Action in the Helgoland Bight and the Zweite Seeschlacht bei Helgoland, was an inconclusive naval engagement fought between British and German squadrons on 17 November 1917 during the First World War.

British minelaying
The British used sea mining defensively to protect sea lanes and trade routes and offensively to impede the transit of German submarines and surface ships in the North Sea, the danger of which was illustrated on 17 October 1917 by the sortie of the German Brummer-class cruisers SMS Brummer and SMS Bremse (the action off Lerwick) against the Scandinavian Convoy. (During 1917, six U-boats were sunk by British mines and in two years, the German minesweeping counter-effort suffered the loss about 28 destroyers and 70 minesweepers and other ships.)

The Germans had been forced into minesweeping up to 150 nmi into the Heligoland Bight and in the southern Baltic Sea, covered by light cruisers and destroyers, with occasional distant support by battleships. After the action off Lerwick, several proposals for attacks on the German minesweepers and escorts were canvassed at the Admiralty. On 31 October, the British sent a large force of cruisers and destroyers into the Kattegat, which sank Kronprinz Wilhelm, an armed merchant ship and nine trawlers.

German test trips
The prolific British laying of mines and net barrages outside the main German mine belts between Horns Reef and Terschelling, close to the bases of the High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte) forced the Kaiserliche Marine into surveying the British minefields, to find routes through them for transit into and back from the North Sea. Test trips were carried out, being substantial operations with ships to find the mines, minesweepers, torpedo boats (usually a continental term for destroyers), U-boats, barrier breakers and light cruisers, with air reconnaissance by Zeppelins and seaplanes. The Test trips were also protected by battleships on routes known to be free of mines.

North Sea operations
On 20 October, the British code breakers of Room 40, part of the Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty, decrypted orders to the submarine UB-61 to scout to the north of Bergen to find the new route of the Scandinavian Convoy. Agent reports from Copenhagen disclosed an imminent German attack by seven light cruisers and 36 destroyers. During the week ending 11 November, British light cruisers, destroyers and a battlecruiser escort, conducted an abortive sweep along the fringe of the Heligoland Bight minefields. By mid-November the Admiralty had obtained enough intelligence to intercept one of the big German minesweeping operations, provided that the ships based at Rosyth, in Scotland, could sail in time. The Admiralty decided that an offensive operation should begin on 17 November.

Test trip, 17 November
The Germans planned a Test trip for 17 November 1917, comprising the 2nd and 6th Auxiliary Mine Sweeper Half-Flotillas, the 12th and 14th Torpedo Boat Half-Flotillas, Barrier Breaking Division IV and light cruisers of Scouting Group Division II, commanded by Rear-Admiral (Konteradmiral) Ludwig von Reuter from the 6th Mine Sweeper Half-Flotilla. The Kaiser-class battleships, SMS Kaiser (1911) and SMS Kaiserin from Squadron IV, each with ten 12 in guns, led by Captain (Kapitän zur See) Kurt Graßhoff in Kaiserin, were to act as covering force for the group. The battleships were to reach a point west of Heligoland by 7.00 a.m. while the Test trip group rendezvoused in the Heligoland Bight about half-way between Horns Reef and Terschelling. With poor weather grounding Zeppelins and making it impossible for light cruisers to embark seaplanes, after they had alighted on the sea, the Test trip relied on reconnaissance patrols by two land-based seaplanes from Borkum on the German coast, just east of the Netherlands, for reconnoitring ahead of the group.

British plan
The German Test trip had been revealed by the code breakers of Room 40, allowing the British to plan an ambush. On 16 November, orders for an attack on the Test trip were sent to Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander-in-Chief of the British Grand Fleet. On 17 November 1917 a force of cruisers under Vice Admiral Trevylyan Napier was sent to attack the German minesweepers as they were minesweeping.

Battle
The action began at 7:30 a.m., roughly 65 nmi west of Sylt, when HMS Courageous (50) sighted German ships. She opened fire at 7:37 a.m. Reuter advanced with four light cruisers and eight destroyers towards the British ship to cover the withdrawal of the minesweepers, with all but the trawler Kehdingen (1906), escaping the British detachment. A stern chase ensued as the German forces, making skillful use of smokescreens, withdrew south-east at their best speed, under fire from the 1st Cruiser Squadron, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and the 6th Light Cruiser Squadron. HMS Repulse (1916) was detached from the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and came up at high speed to join the battle. Both sides were hampered in their manoeuvres by the presence of naval minefields.

At about the same time, the light cruisers came under fire from Kaiser and Kaiserin, Kaiser-class battleships, which had come up in support of Reuter's ships; HMS Caledon (D53) was struck by a 30.5 cm shell, which damaged a gun turret; shortly afterwards, the British ships gave up the chase as they reached the edge of more minefields. A shell went through the upper conning tower of the light cruiser HMS Calypso (D61), killing the conning tower crew and mortally wounding the Captain, Herbert Edwards, on the bridge and knocking unconscious the navigator, Lieutenant-Commander M. F. F. Wilson. All personnel on the lower bridge were killed and the gunner officer, Lieutenant H. C. C. Clarke took command, which was made more difficult because the shell also cut all electrical communications and reduced the rate of fire. The battlecruiser Repulse briefly engaged the German ships at about 10:00 a.m., achieving a hit on the light cruiser SMS Königsberg (1915) that started a serious fire.

Analysis
In 1984, Patrick Beesly wrote that the British operation was daring but that Napier was unjustly blamed for its failure to pursue the German ships with sufficient vigour. Room 40 was well informed about the positions of German minefields and the British fields which the Germans were trying to clear. The information had been added to Room 40's naval charts but the information was denied to Napier, who made decisions based on the charts he did have. Admiralty reluctance to disclose that their information was derived from the decoding of wireless intercepts had led to the naval commander's being ill-informed. The Admiralty did at least supply operational intelligence to the Naval commanders, after Beatty had made an emergency request when he was at sea. Napier was informed in ninety minutes by the Admiralty that German capital ships had sailed at 8:30 a.m. and the location of German cruisers, leading to Königsberg's receiving severe damage. At the least, Room 40 had prevented the British operation degenerating from fiasco to disaster.

Casualties
In 1920, Admiral Reinhard Scheer wrote that the Germans suffered casualties of 21 men killed, ten seriously wounded and thirty men slightly wounded. An Admiralty communiqué listed British casualties as one officer and 21 men killed, four officers and 39 men wounded; 22 prisoners were taken.

Victoria Cross
Able Seaman John Carless of Walsall, aboard Commodore Cowan’s flagship Caledon, was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his bravery in continuing to load and fire his gun despite receiving mortal shrapnel wounds that opened his abdomen.

British forces


1st Cruiser Squadron Vice Admiral Trevylyan Napier CB, MVO
 * HMS Courageous (50) (flag; Capt Arthur Bromley)
 * HMS Glorious (Capt Charles B. Miller CB)
 * Attached destroyers (13th Destroyer Flotilla)
 * HMS Ursa (1917) (Cdr John Tovey)
 * HMS Nerissa (1916) (Lt. Cdr. Montague G. B. Legge DSO)
 * HMS Urchin (1917) (Lt Cdr Guy P. Bowles)
 * HMS Umpire (1917) (Lt Cdr Roger V. Alison DSO)

6th Light Cruiser Squadron Rear Admiral Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair CB MVO
 * HMS Cardiff (D58) (flag; Capt. Claud H. Sinclair)
 * HMS Ceres (D59) (Capt. the Hon. Herbert Meade DSO)
 * HMS Calypso (D61) (Capt. Herbert L. Edwards)
 * HMS Caradoc (D60) (Capt. William M. Kerr)
 * Attached destroyers (13th Destroyer Flotilla)
 * HMS Valentine (L69) (flotilla leader; Cdr. Charles A. Fremantle)
 * HMS Vimiera (1917) (Cdr. Dashwood F. Moir)
 * HMS Vanquisher (D54) (Lt Cdr. Kenneth A. Beattie)
 * HMS Vehement (1917) (Lt. Vernon Hammersley-Heenan)

1st Light Cruiser Squadron Commodore Walter Cowan CB, MVO, DSO
 * HMS Caledon (D53) (Cdre Cowan)
 * HMS Galatea (1914) (Capt. Charles Forbes DSO)
 * HMS Royalist (1915) (Capt. the Hon. Mathew R. Best MVO, DSO)
 * HMS Inconstant (1914) (Capt. Francis A. Marten)
 * Attached destroyers (13th Destroyer Flotilla)
 * HMAS Vendetta (D69) (Cdr. Charles Ramsey)
 * HMS Medway (1916) (Lt. Cdr. Charles H. Neill James)

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (detachment) Rear Admiral Richard Phillimore CB, MVO)
 * HMS Repulse (1916) (flag; Capt. William Boyle)

Other forces at sea in support (none of which engaged)
 * Battle Cruiser Force
 * Vice Admiral Sir William Pakenham KCB, KCVO)
 * HMS Lion (1910) (flag), HMS New Zealand (1911), HMS Princess Royal (1911), HMS Tiger (1913)
 * Attached light forces (13th Destroyer Flotilla)
 * HMS Champion (1915) (flotilla cruiser), HMS Nepean (1916), HMS Obdurate (1916), HMS Oriana (1916), HMS Petard (1916), HMS Telemachus (1917), HMS Tower (1917), HMS Tristram (1917), HMS Verdun (L93).
 * 1st Battle Squadron
 * Admiral Sir Charles Madden
 * HMS Revenge (06) (flag), HMS Royal Oak (08), HMS Resolution (09), HMS Emperor of India, HMS Benbow (1913), HMS Canada (1913)
 * Attached destroyers (12th Destroyer Flotilla)
 * HMS Saumarez (1916) (flotilla leader), HMS Valhalla (1917) (flotilla leader), HMS Noble (1915), HMS Nonsuch (1915), HMS Napier (1915), HMS Paladin (1916), HMS Penn (1916), HMS Prince (1916), HMS Mischief (1915), HMS Munster (1915), HMS Narborough (1916).

German forces


2nd Scouting Group Konteradmiral Ludwig von Reuter
 * SMS Königsberg (1915) (FKpt Karl Feldmann)
 * SMS Pillau (FKpt Gerhard von Gaudecker)
 * SMS Frankfurt (FKpt Otto Seidensticker)
 * SMS Nürnberg (1916) (KptzS Walther Hildebrand)

7th Torpedo-Boat Flotilla KKpt Hermann Cordes
 * S62 (KptLt Max Fink; flotilla leader)
 * G87 (OLtzS Wolfgang Komorowski)
 * 14th half-flotilla (KptLt Richard Beitzen)
 * G92 (KptLt Arthur von Killinger; half-flotilla leader)
 * G93 (KptLt Georg Reimer)
 * V83 (Kpt Lt Wedig von Keyserlingk)
 * 12th half-flotilla (KKpt Rudolf Lahs)
 * V43 (OLtzS Victor Narjes; half-flotilla leader)
 * V44 (OLtzS Eberhard Kautter)
 * V45 (KptLt Martin Laßmann)

Minesweepers
 * 6th Minesweeper Half-Flotilla [6. Minensuchhalbflottille] (KptLt d'Ottilié)
 * M66, M7, A36, T74, M53, M4, M3, M1
 * 4th Auxiliary Minesweeper Half-Flotilla [4. Hilfsminensuchhalbflottille] (KptLt d R Joachim Löwe)
 * A63 A68, A69, A74, A41, A52
 * 2nd Auxiliary Minesweeper Half-Flotilla (KptLt d R Klose)
 * fishing vessels
 * 6th Auxiliary Minesweeper Half-Flotilla (KptLt d R Wilke)
 * fishing vessels
 * 4th Barrier-Breaker Group [IV. Sperrbrechergruppe] (KptLt d R Hillebrand)
 * two vessels
 * Group S, North Sea Outpost Flotilla (LtzS Heinrich Woldag)NO
 * armed trawlers Fritz Reuter and KehdingenGE

4th Battle Squadron (detachment) KptzS Kurt Graßhoff
 * SMS Kaiserin (KptzS Kurt Graßhoff)
 * SMS Kaiser (1911) (KptzS Max Loesch)
 * Attached torpedo-boats (anti-submarine escort)
 * S18 (KptLt Wildemann)
 * SMS S24 (1913) (KptLt Paschen)

Other forces at sea in support (none of which were engaged)
 * Battleships: SMS Friedrich der Grosse (1911), SMS König Albert
 * Battlecruisers: SMS Hindenburg, SMS Moltke