Strategic frivolity

Strategic frivolity in the foreign policy defines shortsighted political decisions that are not connected to the long-term interests of the country making these decisions. Henry Kissinger used the term in his book "World Order" (2014) while describing the policies that caused the First World War and remarked that "history punishes strategic frivolity sooner or later".

Examples
Kissinger had introduced the notion of frivolity in his book "Diplomacy" (1994) describing the actions of the statesmen in the second half of the 19th century that eventually led to the Great War. In particular, he singled out the actions of Napoleon III who considered the foreign policy of France, per the words of Baron Hübner, as "an instrument he uses to secure his rule in France". "Frivolity is a costly indulgence of a statesman", and Napoleon quickly got trapped in the crises he manufactured without thinking through the long-term consequences: after antagonizing Russia by joining the Crimean war in 1853 and supporting the Polish revolt (1863), he found no support against the German assertiveness already in 1864 during the Second Schleswig War. The control over the power arrangements in Germany, enjoyed by France for centuries (since Cardinal Richelieu), was lost in a flash.

In "World Order" Kissinger describes how diplomatic resolutions of the First Moroccan Crisis, Second Moroccan Crisis, and the Bosnian Crisis created an impression that risk-taking to appease the nationalistically-inclined journalists and agitated public is a normal way of conducting the foreign policy. The statesmen became accustomed to pushing other major powers over issues of secondary interest, counting on diplomats to find ways to avoid actual wars. The overall European status quo actually was acceptable to all major powers (there were no territorial disputes in Europe with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine), yet it took just two weeks from the 10-point ultimatum to a start of hostilities. Europe never recovered from this indulgence.

In Russian politics
The expression was introduced into Russia's political discourse (in the Kissinger's meaning) by Бордачев, Тимофей Вячеславович in 2010s. It is used to compare the situation in Europe in the beginning of the 21st century to the one before the "Second Thirty Years' War" (1914–1945) and describe the actions of the major powers that are based on assumptions that a global war is impossible. All participants, including Russia, appear to be ready to carry long-term risks of ever-escalating wars to achieve short-term tactical results, as these wars are "mistakenly perceived as unthinkable". In this worldview, Russia is playing the game since the requests to take her interests into account are ignored otherwise.

The experts and public in Russia are puzzled by seemingly random positions on foreign policy taken by the European Union and the United States. In their opinion, EU does not seem to accept a cause-and-effect link between the support for the Arab Spring and the European migrant crisis.

Bordachev guesses that this state of affairs will persist for a long time, as the United States appear to be uncapable to accept any change to the global order that does not look like an unquestionable victory. In the meantime the problem of frivolity can only get worse, and both China and Russia should prepare for the worst possible decisions of the other side.