Talk:1948 Arab–Israeli War/Archive 10

Good source
http://www.motl.org/resource/curriculum/curriculum_15.htm Zeq 16:52, 28 March 2006 (UTC)

War of Standing Straight
This is purly wrong translation (and does not make any sense) Komemeiut is "rebuilding, resconstruction, restoration" and also "to become independent " etc...Zeq 03:41, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

POV flag
The neutrality of this article has been disputed for many months. The background is not neutral because it emphasizes events far less relevant than many others for a background. Typically, the following paragraphs : great uprising, yishouv/British intelligence and Haj Amin al husseini should not be developed that much. I suggest they are deleted and the background is changed. Alithien 18:19, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
 * In my view it emphasises those issues usually highlighted by historians, including Gelber and Ben-Ami in the books recently discussed elsewhere. --Ian Pitchford 18:33, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Hello Ian. Hope you are fine. I can say that this doesn't fit at all Gelber's background. I would be ready to claim there is not a single word about "british/yishouv" intelligence (<> from collaboration). He talks few about Husseini, more about the HAC. He refers to some aspects of 1936-39 uprising. On the other hand, there are several pages about the military situaiton of both communities. Which I would say is quite normal for a war. Whatever, it is a pity that so many people that know so much about the topic do not succeed in collaboratin on this. I keep my position. This article is POV (and even very POV, and poor too). If you speak French, I would highly appreciate your mind about what was written here (NB:Haj Amin quotes about his ... will disappear from French wikipedia very soon but there were not on the 1948 article). Christophe Greffe 18:47, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
 * It's true that nobody emphasises the role of the mufti, but Gelber certainly covers the importance of British actions in 1936-1939 and in the Second World War in the introduction and in Chapter 6. In any case the sections you refer to are unusually well sourced for a Wikipedia article. The article is certainly POV mainly because of the original research that has been added and because the intentions and plans of the Arab states are not covered at all. --Ian Pitchford 19:39, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

No. He doesn't "cover" this in the introduction. In the introduction he covers the armement and politicial status of first yishouv and palestinian society in 1947 but doesn't consider important to explain in details why the 1936-39 revolt was that much critical for the palestinian. He gives some words about that later but don't forget his book is not about the war but about the "war, the escape and the refugee problem". I will summarize exactly what he says in chapter 6 but if this is in chapter 6, that also means that it is not in the introduction or background.

Much historians I read (eg Gelber, Pappé, Laurens, Morris, Karsh) or commentators (Lapierre et Collins) emphasizes on the "goals" (if any) of the protagonists during the war (ie Yishouv - HAC - Abdallah - Arab League - British - US - (Soviets). All (same + Vidal) emphasizes of their real military situation. All this is important. I would add that commentators such as Lapierre et Collins have the same approach.

This is quite normal for a war to emphasizes on that. This is indeed more interesting, to fit to propaganda, to emphasize on "Mufti's antisemitism and collaboration with Nazis" or the "Zionist and Jewish (underground) intelligence with British" or to try to make believe there was a "overtrained" army in Palestine in 1947.

Do we delete all this stuff ?

Best Regards, Alithien 08:19, 5 April 2006 (UTC)


 * The priorities for deletion should be original research, material from self-published sources and sections written in sub-standard English.
 * You are right. A priority for NPOV is that everything is handled at its right weight. As a consequence, the article will remain POV until all as relevant elements as the one currently in the article are treated. Do you agree ?
 * Events cited by historians as contributory factors to the outcome of the war, including British actions during the 1936-39 revolt and access to military training should remain in the article.
 * And should be added the description of the political goals of each side, the real armement situation and the real number of soldiers in 1947. In the core of the article should be added the description of the evolution of this. I agree
 * They are relevant and properly sourced.
 * Yes. Now we just need to add the numerous more relevant aspects, in details as precise as these ones.
 * I have checked again to be certain that Gelber does cover this material. If anything he emphasises the British role more strongly than most historians, making it clear that they could have prevented the Yishuv's military achievements before May 1948 and could have failed to restrain Arab forces. --Ian Pitchford 10:04, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
 * I am not sure to say the contrary. But in the article, it is the British role during 1936-39 which is emphasized. What you are talking about is not exactly what we are discussing. Now, on this now point, could you please precise to me to what page of Palestine 1948 you refer to avoid any misunderstanding of what you mean ? Alithien 15:17, 5 April 2006 (UTC)

deletion's rule
Ian, you agree to delete Haj Amin. It is rather well-sourced (here). There are more reference in Gelber (and I think in all history books on the topic) about Haj Amin than about the 1936-39 Great uprising consequences on 1948's war. I don't understand how you are convinced that it is justified to delete one and not the other. Could you explain your point ? Alithien 15:17, 5 April 2006 (UTC)


 * I don't agree. Husseini is rarely described as having an important role in the war. Even Karsh has little to say about him. On the other hand historians often claim that the Palestinians lost the 1948 war in 1936-39. --Ian Pitchford 22:09, 5 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Husseini is more an example of the wider issues of why the Arabs fell to pieces, as such. As far as I can ascertain, he is not particularly significant in the wider scheme of how the specific 1948 war went. - Cyril Washbrook 09:12, 8 April 2006 (UTC)


 * I agree that he didn't have a real impact on the military part of the conflict, but he was politically very influential among the palestinians.- Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg | Talk 11:45, 8 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Yes, I don't think any serious source would disagree with Moshe's assessment, though of course he was also opposed by segments of Palestinian society and political groups, some of which were successful in thwarting his ambitions. --Ian Pitchford 11:48, 8 April 2006 (UTC)

Hello. I don't say he was not relevant. I say many people were far more. I think historians emphasize first on the role of other politicians and on some fighters or soldiers. Politicians : Ben Gourion, Abdallah, The "British" (Bevin, Cunningham, Kirkbride) were far more relevant than him. It is therefore POV to talk about al-Husseini withtout talking about them (Let's not forget Truman and Farouk who could have changed the issue of that war). Haj Amin al-Husseini was a "spectator". On the military point of view, there are many "personnalites" to introduce : Yadin, as real chief of staff on Yishuv side, Glubb, Qawuqji, Abd-al Kader and Salame... Above all, a description of their intents before the war and during this is exteremly important to have a fair image of what happened. Alithien 08:57, 10 April 2006 (UTC)

"conflict"
I've been asked to look at a conflict here, but I'm not sure what it is. Could someone explain it? Jayjg (talk) 22:36, 5 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Rather than a conflict this is a potential future one. I think it is wise to have a third party in the "discussion" as soon as it starts. That is the reason of my intervention on your talk's page. I would like an external mind on the following topic : Ian removed 2 pov's flags. I put it back. May we keep this or not ?
 * In parallel, I am a little bit disappointed by the lack of collaboration. I have the feeling there is no "constructive" discussion (again) and rather a shock of ideas which is tiring. Christophe Greffe 06:29, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Do you have specific objections to the sections in question? If you do, they can stay, if you don't, they should go. Jayjg (talk) 17:54, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Hello. Here are my objections concerning the current background section. The neutrality of point of view is not respected because even if true, these information only covers (and with far too much emphasizes) *some* (and few) aspects of the relevant elements of that war. Therefore all this should be merged in the "main" articles where they could be developed. Christophe Greffe 06:42, 7 April 2006 (UTC)
 * I still don't understand your point. How would you explain how a settler population came to be the chief military power in the country with sufficient strength to seize control of territory and then defeat Arab expeditionary forces? --Ian Pitchford 11:57, 8 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Hello Ian. Do you consider that it is due to the 1936-39 revolt that yishuv had the military power it had ? I don't remember reading this anywhere. I already read that 1936-39 uprising had consequences on Arab Palestinians but not on the Yishuv's ability to win the war. More this uprising took place more than 10 years before the events. And in between, there is World War II.
 * What I understand from what I read, is that in 1947, there was a very little army without enough light weapons, without heavy weapons but with a very high potential due to a reserve of very experienced people (mainly veterans from WWII).Historians and commentators agree that Arab Palestinians had no chance against Yishuv. But most commentators also agree that in Dec1947, Yishouv had no chance against Arab armies. Historians (and some protagonists at the time) underlined that Arab armies were not ready for a campaign.
 * Ben Gourion had always expected to have several years to organise Haganah. In Nov47, he accelerated the process :
 * He sent "emissaries" to buy weapons in Europe and in the USA, he sent Meir gathering funds (25,000,000 $) in the USA to pay them. He made organise their shipment to Palestine.
 * Yishuv was already a very well organised (democratic) society. He (as politician) gathered all the decisional power of Yishuv in 2 comitees, one for the military aspects. He (as "future" Defense Minister) organised conscription (with 1 male in age of fighting out of 2-3 under the arms), he organised training (with different training centre in the country). He reorganised Haganah (from 1 brigade in july 1947 to 9 in april 1948), all assigned "operation theater", commanders, arab advisers, ... He gave precise orders stating that "not a single settlement" should be abandon.
 * I read several times in Morris (Birth revisited), but also have in mind Gelber, Laurens, that the fact that Jewish were (or thought they were) facing "an extermination war" fi they would lose.
 * If in the article, there are 30 lines about "particular units" of "pecial jewish forces" during the 1936-39 uprising and after, there should be 1000 (?) about these facts. The same way, if there are 10 lines about al-Husseini, there should be 500 lines about all other more relevant protagonists. So today -with these paragraphs and without the others-, the article is not neutral. Christophe Greffe 10:05, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
 * We've been over all this before Alithien - see above . You're descibing Yishuv forces at a very early stage in the war, when equipment levels were low. Within a short time Jewish forces outnumbered the combined Arab forces and were better equipped, and of course Israel did have heavy weapons including tanks, field guns and armoured cars. The Yishuv didn't face "Arab armies", it faced Arab expeditionary forces, These forces had very limited objectives and were restrained in their military options by Transjordan and the UK and also by Israeli military action against their supply lines. --Ian Pitchford 13:05, 10 April 2006 (UTC)

Ian. I agree but there are many things to comment... As a consequence, it is extremely relevant to explain why a paramilitary underground organisation became an army and why several armies only sent expeditionary forces with restrained military options. And we must explain (with quotes) how real these restrictions were. And just after, we must explain how far the other side was aware of these restrictions... That is a very difficult exercise to explain everything fairly. 81.246.202.230 14:17, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
 * I agree we discussed this before but Brian Heptor, Moshe and I agreed to shorten the background. You didn't
 * Yes these forces had limited objectives and Arab League didn't send armies but expeditionary force but they had armies and they sent what they decided to send. This must be said. This is propaganda to read "5 Arab armies invaded Israel the day after its creation". All thise must be explained in details but chronologically. In Nov1947, Yishuv didn't know how many soldiers would (or would not) attack him.
 * Yes the Yishuv finaly had a very strong army in July 48 but in Nov 1947, he had not and what happened in 1936-39 is not that much revelant on the reasons why this army existed in July.


 * Simply not true. Israel's first "armed brigade" was established during the war. Initially it did not had any tanks and only had cars that were reinforced with welded sheets of metal to make it bullet proofs. Zeq 13:48, 10 April 2006 (UTC)

Naj(j)ada and Futawa
Were really these youth organisation ? Nor Gelber (p.5) or Karsh (p.26) precises this. For the spelling they both write this with one "j". And so does Morris (I have just checked) =correction, he uses 2 jj p.36= with one j he refers to something else. What means "youth" here ? Christophe Greffe 20:45, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
 * p.404, Gelber again doesn't precise "youth". p.397. He precises Futawa was loyal toward Husseini but again doesn't precise the "youth". p28 he talks about the Negev local Najada. So I deduce they were not "only" located at Jaffa. p31 he precises they were still in their infancy but that doens't mean these were "youth" organisation. p40 he talks about "Najada members in the town-s-. p41, he talks about Najada members in Jerusalem. (I didn't check more but would deduce that numbers of Morris only concerns Jaffa ? What do you think ? Christophe Greffe 21:09, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Is this a valuable enough source for en wikipedia ? They talk about a 10,000-members "youth" organisation and also talks about a new one I didn't know : Alithien  21:18, 5 April 2006 (UTC)


 * There is a rather good source already cited for this claim. To say something was based at one place doesn't mean it only existed there. BTW Christophe it doesn't mean anything in English to say that someone "precises" something. --Ian Pitchford 22:11, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Thanks. The English word would be "underline" then. What means BTW ? Alithien 06:19, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
 * That would be appropriate and your meaning is clear most of the time. --Ian Pitchford 11:50, 8 April 2006 (UTC)

Christophe, I think the verb you're looking for is either "define" or "specify" (instead of "precise"). Joffan 21:42, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

Lapierre and Collins
Can "O Jerusalem" be considered as a valuable source because they give much information about the acquisition of weapons by Haganah and Arabs that I personally didn't find with so much details in the other references books ? Alithien 20:45, 5 April 2006 (UTC)
 * I don't see why you couldn't use "O Jerusalem". Jayjg (talk) 17:55, 6 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Hello Jayjg. Because this is a self published book and they are not scholars (etc)... Given the reknown of this book (even referred by historians, such as Karsh) do editors agree we write "factual information" (not analysis) from L&C. We would keep them unless better sources confirm or deny the information. Do you feel this is reasonnable or acceptable ? Christophe Greffe 06:26, 7 April 2006 (UTC)
 * I would say that books by journalists are perfectly acceptable. As a publication of Simon & Schuster it isn't self-published. --Ian Pitchford 11:53, 8 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Ok. Perfect. I agree with you. But I don't understand how can be interpretated english wikipedia policy about sources because by paying you can see your book published by such private publishers. That is why I hesitated. As far as I understand, if these people just asked a friend to publish their book they would become relevant for wikipedia. This doesn't matter. Alithien 10:20, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
 * The main point is that publishers (who have reputations to maintain and potential legal penalties to avoid) have various forms of quality control, and academic publishers use peer review, which means that their scholarly volumes have been vetted by subject experts prior to publication. The other organizations we've discussed elsewhere are not publishers in this sense as they will just publish anything at all for a fee. --Ian Pitchford 12:11, 10 April 2006 (UTC)
 * I understand and agree. Alithien 12:18, 10 April 2006 (UTC)

Balance of forces
Not to give the feeling that the "universe" was against the Yishuv, wouldn't it be important to gather the arab coalised forces as far as reasonnable ? I introduce this but feel free to revert. Alithien 08:42, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

To give a fair and understandable vision of the situation, background should only introduce the real military power in 1947 and the article should explain how each side prepared itself and why. The last subsection of phase 2 should show what the Israeli army had become and what were Arab forces ready for combat. Alithien 08:42, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Ian suggested to wait for some time before to proceed to see if this is needed (see our talk's page). I agree. Wait and see, so. 08:53, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

Arab air forces
Somebody deleted this : Of the Arab aircraft, only less than a dozen fighters and three to four bombers saw action, the rest were unserviceable..

Personnally I only heard about Egyptian bombing of Tel Aviv and don't know for the remaining. Karsh underlines that Iraqi air forces had only half of their planes operationnel (Karsh, p.27). I don't know their range of action. I read on the "apparently neutral" website that it was roughly the same for the Egyptian air forces. They talk also about 5 squadrons like Karsh. Are there reliable scholar sources about this (I write reliable because sometimes historians, even or maybe particularly academicians, do not know a lot about military matters) ? Alithien 08:53, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

some thoughts about this article
"Finkelstein and [another writer] share a method: they selectively quote from [my books] what suits their purposes while ignoring, and in Finkelstein's case, ridiculing what doesn't. Neither seems to know anything about 1948 beyond what is to be found in my books and neither marshals sources or material from elsewhere that could serve to contradict my findings." Benny Morris. (see Finkelstein)Alithien 10:33, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

I would bet money that the person above isn't Benny Morris, although I do still agree with what he said.- Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg | Talk 10:37, 21 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Finkelstein isn't quoted or cited in this article at all. To be eligible he would have to make up his quotations and source everything to Jewish Virtual Library. --Ian Pitchford 10:43, 21 April 2006 (UTC)


 * I don't understand, Finklestein wouldn't be elgible unless he sourced it to the Jewish Virtual Library? Can you explain that I'm kinda confused.- Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg | Talk 11:05, 21 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Ian is ironical. He feels targeted by the remark and therefore answers -ironically- in stating that only JewishVirtualLibrarty would be a good source for this article. Moshe, I don't know if the "quote" if from Morris but if you feel it is not, it should be removed from Finkelstein'article where it comes from... Kind Regards Alithien 17:50, 22 April 2006 (UTC) (I have just changed my username for personnal reasons).


 * Honestly when I first wrote the that it wasn't benny Morris I did it out of misunderstanding, I didn't see the quotattion marks and actually thought the editor was claiming to be Benny Morris (Someone had just done a similar thing on another article talk page when I wrote it).- Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg | Talk 17:57, 22 April 2006 (UTC)
 * lol lol lol. I already wrote to Benny Morris. He is not very cooperative (which is I think quite normal, I don't blame him for that) but I am not him ;-) Alithien 21:24, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

recent modifications of the article by Humus and Moshe
Hello. I thank you for your attempt to "neutralize" the article. Let's see what can be done that way. Alithien 12:08, 28 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Yes, it's high time strict standards of relevance and good sourcing were enforced in this article. --Ian Pitchford 13:33, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

British study revels nazi connections to palestinians
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3248081,00.html

and German study:

http://www.ejpress.org/article/7448

and a jewish study:

http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-kuntzel-s05.htm

Zeq 06:06, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

Haganah Superiority
Ian, this last addition may be misleading. Haganah was of course superior to the Arab population in Palestine. Everybody knew about it, and it is not possible to doubt it after reading the article. But the article is about the war which was mainly fought between IDF and the Arab armies. Haganah was then generally considered to be inferior to those armies. If memory serves it deemed its own chances as only about equal. Writing that it considered itself superior to the Arab polulation have a great chance to be misinterpreted, without adding anyting to the article that wasn't already there. -- H eptor  talk 16:28, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
 * It's not a new addition Heptor - I just reverted the deletion of something that has been there for many months. This Times article is actually quite important to this section because it's about the collaboration between the Yishuv and the British during 1936-9 and World War II, although I admit that I probably haven't made this clear because to do so I would have to add a lengthy quotation to a section that probably shouldn't be much longer. It estimates Haganah strength in 1945 at 50-75,000 men "with first-rate equipment including automatics and mortars supplied by its own secret factories... the Haganah knows that its military strength easily surpasses that of the local Arabs." This part is not about a comparison with the forces of Arab states at the time, though if it were the Haganah would be the largest military force in the area. I'd be glad to email a copy to anyone interested. --Ian Pitchford 17:37, 8 May 2006 (UTC)
 * I would say that it is much better to risk having written a bit too much than writing something misleading. Moshe misunderstood it, and I understood that it had to be just local Arabs only because I already knew that opposite could not be true. Try to distance yourself from the text a bit, maybe you'll see it. Things like that happen to me sometimes too, that I write something obviously very difficult to understand, without being able to see the problem myself.


 * The complete text is fully relevant, of course.


 * wbr, H eptor   talk 20:42, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

Arab and Jewish point of view on 15 Mai 1948
In the conclusion of chapter 8 - the Arab Regular Armies'Invasion of Palestine of Palestine 1948, Y. Gelber writes this :


 * Despite the wild rhetoric that had preceded and accompanied the invasion, the invaders's goal was not and could not be "pushing the Jews to the Mediterranean". (...) Arab governements' primary goal was preventing the Palestinians'total ruin and the flooding of their own countries by more refugees. According to their perception, had the invasion not taken place, there was no Arab force in Palestine capable of checking the Haganah's offensive. (...) The Yishuv's comprehension fo the Arab onslaught was totally different. (...) The Yishuv perceived the peril of an Arab invasion as threatening its very existence. Having no real knowledge of the Arabs' true military capabilities, the Jews took Arab propaganda literally, preparing for the worst and reacting accordingly.

Alithien 12:00, 20 May 2006 (UTC)
 * There is material in the article that contradicts this conclusion, including Morris on military assessments and excerpts from Ben-Gurion's diary. --Ian Pitchford 16:04, 20 May 2006 (UTC)


 * Sorry ? Very precisely, and in citing quotes ONLY without analysis : which one ? Alithien 11:22, 21 May 2006 (UTC)
 * But there's no evidence in Gelber's quotation, whereas Morris does cite his sources and Ben-Gurion's diary speaks for itself. --Ian Pitchford 11:26, 21 May 2006 (UTC)
 * Very precisely and in quoting article's sentences you refer to, what material in this article contradicts Gelber's conclusion ? Alithien 20:34, 21 May 2006 (UTC).
 * When you write taht "there's no evidence in Gelber's quotation, whereas Morris does cite his source", do you mean Gelber doesn't conclude properly his chapter 8 or he would do not provide his sources ? Alithien 22:56, 21 May 2006 (UTC)
 * Gelber writes "The Yishuv perceived the peril of an Arab invasion as threatening its very existence. Having no real knowledge of the Arabs' true military capabilities, the Jews took Arab propaganda literally, preparing for the worst and reacting accordingly", but the Yishuv's military leaders rated their chances against the Arab forces at the beginning of the war at 50:50 in the assessment given to Ben-Gurion. As you know contemporary newspaper accounts suggest that the Yishuv was actually quite optimistic and that optimism is reflected in in Ben-Gurion's diary. After the difficult first few weeks, when strategic failures or failure to obtain equipment could have had a dramatic effect it, became clear that the Yishuv's optimism was well-founded. --Ian Pitchford 18:34, 23 May 2006 (UTC)

Pappé writes in "La guerre de 1948 en Palestine" that (free translation) in february the Jewish Agency meeting was very pessimistic due to the situation of Jerusalem and the recent victories of Palestinians and the entry of ALA troops. I would add that they had not received weapons from Czecoslovaquia and that they planned the D-Day of the attacks of ALA for April (the Arab League meeting). Without weapons, they also knew they could not fight versus the potential intervention of Arab armies. And they didn't know that Bevin had forbidden Abdallah to attack them in Tel Aviv or that Arab armies didn't plan to interact. What you do is personnal research. Gelber and others historians have a wider vision as we have. If you want we analyse all together the reality of what historians claim, I am intersted to debate this with you but not here. I suggest we subscribe on a forum where we can discuss freely and emit personnal opinions and make hypothesis. Here on WK, we just report facts and professional analysis. Alithien 10:31, 24 May 2006 (UTC)
 * Citing Morris on the military's direct advice to Ben-Gurion and quoting his diary is hardly personal research; nor is this: "at each stage of the war, the IDF outnumbered all the Arab forces arrayed against it, and, after the first round of fighting it outgunned them too. The final outcome of the war was therefore not a miracle but a faithful reflection of the underlying military balance in the Palestine theater. In this war, as in most wars, the stronger side prevailed" (Shlaim, 2001, p. 81). As for the ALA the Yishuv opened negotiations with them on 1 April through Yehoshua Palmon: "Palmon then suggested that the Haganah and the ALA should refrain from attacking each other and plan instead to negotiate following the departure of the British. Qawuqji agreed but explained frankly that he needed to score one military victory in order to establish his credentials" (Shlaim, 2001, p. 86). Golda Meir left the meeting with King Abdullah on 10 May and recorded in her own contemporary report that "Abdullah needed to send his army across the River Jordan in order to gain control over the Arab part of Palestine contiguous with his kingdom. He did not say anything about attacking the Jewish forces in their own territory" (Shlaim, 2001, p. 88). --Ian Pitchford 18:28, 24 May 2006 (UTC)
 * I find some comments of Shlaïm interesting. You can find here the excerpt of Ben-Gourion diary about the meeting of 10 may (it is in English). That event is a very interesting for WK. As you can see, treating this a npov way means giving *all* interpretation given by historians and not only shlaim's point of view. Alithien 20:51, 24 May 2006 (UTC)
 * Remind me. The massacre of Kfar Etzion, it was indeed done by Arab Legion and 3 days after that meeting, wasn't it ? I am not sure if Jewish citizens were aware they were unfortunately on the bad side of the border. Alithien 20:59, 24 May 2006 (UTC)
 * So you agree now that it's not personal research, but different interpretations by historians and those directly involved? --Ian Pitchford 12:17, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

No Ian. Unfortunately, I still think that what you present is the gathering of facts from different sources to argue for one point of view, which I think is different from giving all points of views of different historians. In the current case, I still say that both Gelber and Morris unambiguously claim that yishouv "feared the face a genocide's threat" and that they both consider this is revelant for the war. My personnal understanding of the conflict is that they don't lie nor exagerate when they give these analysis. Schlaim's analysis is interesting but I never read his book. I choose Pappé to have a pro-palestinian pov. If your point is that in practice they never faced such a threath, that is also true and to know if they would have been genocided if Arabs had won the war is part of what Pappé calls "alternative History". Alithien 18:03, 26 May 2006 (UTC)