Talk:1948 Palestine war

RfC: Should we mention the exodus of Jews from Arab countries in the lede?
Should we mention the exodus of Jews from Arab countries during and immediately after the war in the lede of this article? Alaexis¿question? 23:05, 7 March 2024 (UTC)

Discussion (RfC: Should we mention the exodus of Jews from Arab countries in the lede?)

 * No, as discussed above in "Recent changes". The beginning of the exodus is only indirectly a consequence of the war and we should be striving for brevity in the lead of this article as there is much information to cover. Note also that though the lead is a summary of the body, the aftermath section of this article currently gives disproportionate attention to this aspect of the war's consequences and results. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 23:16, 7 March 2024 (UTC)


 * Yes. This was a massive event, with hundreds of thousands people fleeing or emigrating. Multiple reliable sources (see the list here) agree that this was one of the major consequences of the war. Therefore a brief mention is warranted. Alaexis¿question? 23:22, 7 March 2024 (UTC)
 * No certainly it was an important event, but it was not an event that is a subtopic of this war. At most a small portion of the emigration was even indirectly related to this war, and the argument that we should include decades of immigration from a large number of countries not even involved in this war makes no sense. And the claim that reliable sources agree that it was a major consequence of the war is just not true. Morris says "The war indirectly created a second, major refugee problem", Schindler says In Arab countries, the defeat of the Arab armies and the exodus of the Palestinian Arabs exacerbated an already difficult situation. In December 1947, a pogrom and the destruction of synagogues in Aleppo persuaded half the city’s Jewish population to leave. In Egypt, arrests, killings and confiscations catalyzed the flight of nearly 40 per cent of the Jewis hcommunity by 1950. In Kuwait, the minuscule number of Jews were expelled. In Iraq, the Criminal Code was amended in July 1948 such that Zionists were lumped together with Anarchists and Communists. The death penalty could be meted out to adherents or they could be sentenced to many years’ imprisonment. Enforced emigration to Israel became the officially permitted route out of Iraq for an increasingly oppressed Jewish community. Israel ironically became the unlikely destination for many Jewish Communists despite their opposition to Zionism. In Libya, Algeria and Morocco, there were periodic outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence. Over 37 per cent of Jews in Islamic countries – the Arab world, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan – left for Israel between May 1948 and the beginning of 1952. This amounted to 56 per cent of the total immigration. And he says that in a chapter on Jewish emigration, not in coverage of this war. It is an attempt at trying to balance what actually was a direct major consequence of this war, the expulsion and flight of 80-90% of the Palestinians from the territory Israel would come to control in this war, with an entirely different topic that was not a part of this war. And a ton of it was from countries not involved in this war at all. There are no sources that treat this as a major consequence of this war, and the claim that there is rests on the assumption that nobody will actually check, as it is so plainly not true, and been shown untrue on this talk page previously. Beyond that, there is no definition of immediately after that includes years and years later.  nableezy  - 00:09, 8 March 2024 (UTC)


 * No, it's a part of the IP conflict but not a significant-enough part of the 1948 war to merit being mentioned in the lead. While Morris says this is an "indirect" result of the war, I think the balance of sources do not treat this as a significant effect of the war, even indirectly. Further, in the RM for the article about the exodus, I quoted Tessler's book explaining the complicated factors he said was behind the exodus, and the war was only a small part of it; I won't reproduce the whole quote here but it applies to this RfC as well. It's something that happened over years during and after the war (1948-52), which is further evidence that while it's a part of the conflict, it's not a huge part of the (47-) '48 war. Levivich (talk) 01:25, 8 March 2024 (UTC)


 * No, it wasn't a part of the 1948 war. Lots of things happened as a result of the foundation of Israel, but that's not the topic of this article. Zerotalk 02:48, 8 March 2024 (UTC)
 * Elaborating, the exodus of Jews was a result of the foundation of Israel and the consequent implementation of Israeli policy. It would have happened without the war that accompanied Israel's foundation, so it is factually incorrect to call it a consequence of that war. Zerotalk 11:09, 25 March 2024 (UTC)
 * 'It would have happened without the (1948) war. That is as hypothetical at least as the argument that the exodus was consequential on that war. For one thing, in an alternative history, one could imagine that the old Zionist priority to privilege Ashkenazi immigration over aliyah from 'Arabized' Jews (i.e. deemed slack, uneducated etc.,) probably would have prevailed, esp. given that they were the victims of a Holocaust whose mass immigration to the US and Great Britain was systematically blocked by those powers, for the usual electoral-antisemitic motives. 'Consequence' does not mean strictly an assertion of some mechanical 'post hoc ergo propter hoc' reasoning.  Nishidani (talk) 13:25, 25 March 2024 (UTC)


 * Ummmm. There is way to much in the lede already. It should be cut significantly down with superfluous language removed. It DOES NOT read as neutral. Most of the factual information should be in the body of the article. With that said, if the lede stays "as-is" then, yes, information about an exodus should be added if nothing more than to provide a more balanced perspective and neutrality. Slacker13 (talk) 05:49, 8 March 2024 (UTC)
 * No: It wasn't a direct effect of the war; just an indirect side-effect in the aftermath of the conflict. Iskandar323 (talk) 06:18, 8 March 2024 (UTC)
 * agreed Slacker13 (talk) 21:57, 9 March 2024 (UTC)
 * You might want to amend your vote and clarify your position on this, @Slacker13. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 22:04, 9 March 2024 (UTC)


 * No I do not see evidence that this event was sufficiently closely related to be DUE in the lead of the article. (t &#183; c)  buidhe  04:44, 21 March 2024 (UTC)
 * Yes The Jewish exodus from Arab countries was one of the most important consequences of the war, along with the Palestinian refugee problem. I agree with Alaexis. Marokwitz (talk) 07:27, 25 March 2024 (UTC)
 * The ethnic cleansing of Palestinians wasn't a consequence of the war: it began before the war, was partially a trigger for the war, and intensified during the war by design. It was a direct impact on the civilian population in the warzone. The subsequent exodus of Jews from other countries due to a range of push and pull factors, one of which was negative sentiment arising from the war (and the ethnic cleansing it entailed), was a consequence, but not a direct impact of the conflict. The two phenomena are in entirely different categories of immediacy to the conflict. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:26, 25 March 2024 (UTC)
 * The expulsion of Palestinians started only in April 1948 – six months into the civil war – and was a direct consequence of the conflict. According to Morris, the majority of the Palestinians fled out of fear of being caught up in hostilities, rather than being directly expelled. Therefore, the circumstances precipitating the flight of both the Arabs and the Jews were not dissimilar. Amayorov (talk) 20:59, 6 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Untrue. It began in 1947. Iskandar323 (talk) 21:04, 6 July 2024 (UTC)
 * The expulsions began only in April 1948. The only village vacated before April 1948 was the Qisariya village in mid-February – with a total population of 1'114. Amayorov (talk) 19:39, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * That's completely false. Selfstudier (talk) 21:28, 6 July 2024 (UTC)
 * The expulsions began only in April 1948. The only village vacated before April 1948 was the Qisariya village in mid-February – with a total population of 1'114.
 * From from Morris's 2008 book:
 * During this period [by the end of March 1948] Jewish troops expelled the inhabitants of only one village-Qisariya, in the Coastal Plain, in mid-February.''
 * Though the Arabs had initiated the violence, they were quickly evincing signs of demoralization. ... Flight was the earliest and most concrete expression of Palestinian demoralization. Within twenty-four hours of the start of the (still low-key) hostilities [on 30 Nov 1947], Arab families began to abandon their homes in mixed or border neighborhoods in the big towns. Already on 30 November 1947 the HIS reported "the evacuation of Arab inhabitants from border neighborhoods" in Jerusalem and Jaffa. Arabs were also reported leaving the area around the Jewish Quarter of Safad (the town was predominantly Arab) and fleeing the villages of Jammasin and Sheikh Muwannis, bordering Tel Aviv. By 9 December, the HIS was reporting that "Arab refugees were sleeping in the streets [of Jaffa]" and "wealthy families were leaving the [coastal] citiesheading inland. [Many initially fled to the family's village of origin.] Rich people are emigrating to Syria, Lebanon, and even Cyprus." In one or two sites, there was deliberate Jewish intimidation of Arab neighbors to leave.
 * Despite the haphazard efforts of some Arab local authorities, the following months were marked by increasing flight from the main towns and certain rural areas. By the end of March 1948 most of the wealthy and middleclass families had fled Jaffa, Haifa, and Jerusalem, and most Arab rural communities had evacuated the heavily Jewish Coastal Plain; a few had also left the Upper Jordan Valley. Most were propelled by fear of being caught up, and harmed, in the fighting; some may have feared life under Jewish rule. It is probable that most thought of a short, temporary displacement with a return within weeks or months, on the coattails of victorious Arab armies or international diktats.'' Amayorov (talk) 19:41, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * The Nakba did not start or end in 1948
 * "When did the process of displacement actually begin? Though displacement of Palestinians from their lands by the Zionist project was already taking place during the British Mandate, mass displacement started when the UN partition plan was passed. In less than six months, from December 1947 to mid-May 1948, Zionist armed groups expelled about 440,000 Palestinians from 220 villages." Selfstudier (talk) 20:14, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Almost a half million Palestinians were displaced between December 1947 and May 1948. The greatest outflow of refugees took place in April and early May 1948 coinciding with the start of operations by Zionist paramilitary organizations. Trying to downplay what occurred pre Israel is not a good look. Selfstudier (talk) 20:28, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "from December 1947 to mid-May 1948" – that is technically correct. Plan Dalet was only drawn up towards the end of March 1948, and practically all these expulsions happened between April 1 and May 15, 1948. Before then, it was the upper and middle class families that had evacuated, rather than expelled. Amayorov (talk) 20:21, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Says Morris Iskandar323 (talk) 20:25, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * According to Pappé, by the end of March 1948 thirty villages were depopulated of their Palestinian Arab population. So unless they were villages entirely populated by the upper and middle classes, something is rotten in the state of Morris' storytelling. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:28, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Pappé's "Ethnic Cleansing" does, indeed, refer to 30 villages, but doesn't provide their names or a reference. The nearest reference is in the next paragraph – which is to Morris. This again illustrates Pappé's general sloppiness with historical fact.
 * Morris' book "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem revisited" (2004) provides an exhaustive list of each Palestinian settlement, the date of its depopulation, and the causes. He does care to distinguish direct expulsion from flight due to fear. This painstaking work again confirms his assertion (see p.1-13 and 130). Amayorov (talk) 20:53, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Does Morris contradict Pappé? Iskandar323 (talk) 21:04, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I hadn't realised quite how bad Morris' warped and selective narratives were. Now I realise it's very spun. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:24, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * No per Nableezy, Levivich and Buidhe, The 'exodus' narrative emerged later to draw a false equivalence between the radical programmatic ethnic cleansing which Yishuv and then Israeli forces imposed on Palestinians during the war, and what occurred to Jews in Arab countries after the cessation of hostilities, often at the open invitation of the new state of Israel, which adopted a policy of encouraging Jews in those countries to make aliyah, not always successively, as their conditions deteriorated very much as a consequence of the impact of the image of mass expulsions on the 'Arab street'.Nishidani (talk) 09:04, 25 March 2024 (UTC)
 * Yes The Jewish exodus from Arab countries was one of the most important consequences of the war. Vegan416 (talk) 23:29, 1 April 2024 (UTC)
 * Can you give any sources that say that a. it was a consequence of the war, and b. it was one of the most important of those consequences?  nableezy  - 23:33, 1 April 2024 (UTC)
 * No, it's not of great enough significance in regards to the war and it occurred after the cessation of hostilities. TarnishedPathtalk 10:31, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Circumstances of the native Ottoman Jews
I believe that discussion the attitudes towards native Ottoman Jews in the Ottoman Palestine is important, as it directly affected the relationship between the Zionist and Arab communities.

Here is the relevant paragraph. All information is sourced from Morris' "1948: A History of the First Arab–Israeli War":

"The condition of the native Ottoman Jews was complex. Following centuries of discrimination and occasional violence by Muslims, the Jewish dhimmi status was formally repealed in the mid-19th century. In practice, however, Ottoman Jews continued to be treated as second-class citizens until the Empire's collapse in World War I. These Muslim attitudes to also influences the Zionist migrants to Palestine and their relationship with the Palestinian Arabs."

@Iskandar323 – why did you revert the edit? Amayorov (talk) 21:06, 6 July 2024 (UTC)


 * Because the background section needs trimming down if anything, not plumping up. Details about mid-19th century developments would be more relevant, if anything, to the background section of Intercommunal conflict in Mandatory Palestine, which is already linked in the background section here. Iskandar323 (talk) 21:10, 6 July 2024 (UTC)
 * There's evidence (which I linked) that the native Ottoman Jews were treated as second-class citizens until at least 1919. Morris in his book devotes several sections to discussing how the relationships between the Ottoman Jews and Palestinian Arabs affected the perceptions towards Zionist immigrants.
 * Besides, I've only added a single paragraph (a couple of sentences), so it doesn't take much space. Compared to other articles, such as on the Civil War and the Arab-Israel 1948 war, the Background section is tiny. Amayorov (talk) 19:43, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Find a second source that witters on about this as background and I'll concede defeat. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:18, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * There is plenty of evidence that the Arabs treated the native Ottoman Jews with contempt, and that the first anti-Zionist publications (e.g. Falastin) used those attitudes to stir up anti-Semitic sentiment. However, I actually can't so far another author that has made the connection between former dhimmitude and the intercommunnal conflict as explicitly as Morris has. I have removed the edit pending further research. Perhaps this should indeed go to Intercommunal conflict in Mandatory Palestine. Amayorov (talk) 23:44, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Better phrasing referring to Plan Dalet
Regarding the latest edit, I suggested to change this phrasing

"Towards the end of the civil war phase, Zionist forces executed Plan Dalet, an offensive operation conquering territory for the planned establishment of a Jewish state."

to this

"Beginning in April 1948, in anticipation of an invasion by Arab armies, Zionist forces implemented Plan Dalet, an operation aimed at securing territory for the establishment of a Jewish state."

I believe that it's better because (1) removes the controversial assertion that Plan Dalet was offensive (see the discussion on the dedicated Wiki article) (1) it add the context that the action took place a month before the anticipated Arab invasion.

@Iskandar323 why did revert this edit? In order to avoid an edit war and in line with the reverting guidelines, I suggest that we discuss it on the Talk page. Amayorov (talk) 21:18, 6 July 2024 (UTC)


 * It's described as an offensive operation on the plan's page, and no discussion has progressed on the talk determining otherwise. It's cited in the lead and throughout the page to both Morris and Khalidi. Iskandar323 (talk) 21:42, 6 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Quoting from the dedicated page: This strategy is subject to controversy, with some historians characterizing it as defensive, while others assert that it was an integral part of a planned strategy for the expulsion, sometimes called an ethnic cleansing, of the area's native inhabitants.
 * Quoting from Plan Dalet: Generally, the aim of this plan is not an operation of occupation outside the borders of the Hebrew state. However, concerning enemy bases lying directly close to the borders which may be used as springboards for infiltration into the territory of the state, these must be temporarily occupied and searched for hostiles according to the above guidelines, and they must then be incorporated into our defensive system until operations cease.
 * Morris (2008) amply describes the catastrophe facing the Yishuv in March 1948, following the blockage of Jerusalem, as well as in the Negev and Northern Galilee. Amayorov (talk) 10:42, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Wikipedia is not a reliable source, but even so, if you had read the entire page then you would have also seen: "Plan Dalet was implemented from the start of April onward. This marked the beginning of the second stage of the war in which, according to Benny Morris, the Haganah passed from the defensive to the offensive." Iskandar323 (talk) 16:45, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I've only referred to Wikipedia, because you said yourself that it's described as an offensive operation on the plan's page. The Haganah passed to the offensive, but Dalet Plan itself was arguably not. The dedicated page includes many references to historians regarding Plan Dalet as defensive. It is best to remove controversial statements from the lead section. Amayorov (talk) 19:45, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I plan on looking into this when I have the time, but @Amayorov, why did you restore your changes after they were reverted by @Iskandar323? Such changes should be discussed, see WP:BRD.
 * Additionally, @Amayorov I would caution you against continuing to make large changes without discussion, better to propose and discuss large changes on the talk page first. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 05:22, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I felt that the reasons for the revert given by @Iskandar323 were very non-specific: "RV gf edits - unfortunately, adding random titbits of background information from Morris, removing dates and badly rephrasing other parts is not an improvement"
 * Quoting from BRD: Revert an edit if you disagree with it and cannot immediately refine it. If you revert, be specific about your reasons in the edit summary or on the talk page. BRD does not encourage reverting, but recognizes that reversions happen. Revert only when necessary.
 * I then immediately initiated discussion on the Talk page in order to discuss if the revert was actually necessary. Amayorov (talk) 10:46, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I did not think that the changes I made were large, but, of course, I will henceforth discuss them on the talk page first. Amayorov (talk) 10:47, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Changes to lead
I reverted drastic changes to the lead with which I disagree and which need to be discussed. @Amayorov

The lead was changed from:

During the war, massacres and acts of terror were conducted by and against both sides. A campaign of massacres and violence against the Arab population, such as occurred at Lydda and Ramle and the Battle of Haifa, led to the expulsion and flight of over 700,000 Palestinians, with most of their urban areas being depopulated and destroyed. This violence and dispossession of the Palestinians is known today as the Nakba (Arabic for "the disaster")
 * and resulted in the beginning of the Palestinian refugee problem.
 * and resulted in the beginning of the Palestinian refugee problem.
 * and resulted in the beginning of the Palestinian refugee problem.

to:

During the war, massacres and acts of terror were conducted by and against both sides, such as at Lydda and Ramle, Haifa and Kfar Etzion. Despite this, the war has been described as noteworthy for the relatively small number of civilian casualties and atrocities committed by both sides. The war led to the expulsion and flight of over 700,000 Palestinians, with most of their urban areas being depopulated and destroyed. This violence and dispossession of the Palestinians is known today as the Nakba (Arabic for "the disaster") * IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 05:16, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * and marked the beginning of the Palestinian refugee problem.


 * Most changes were stylistic, pertaining to Manual of Style/Linking: linking events instead of whole phrases. For example, "massacres and acts of terror were conducted by and against both sides" to "massacres and acts of terror were conducted by and against both sides." – If you disagree, I will revert this.
 * Another change relates to the addition of the sentence "Despite this, the war has been described as noteworthy for the relatively small number of civilian casualties and atrocities committed by both sides.". This comes from Morris (2008), and could help contextualise the scale of the massacres that Morris himself did much to bring to light. Amayorov (talk) 10:57, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Morris is a deeply partisan source. You shouldn't be introducing any content into the lead solely on the basis that "Benny Morris says so". If you care about establishing NPOV statements, you need to check what historians with very different perspectives, such as Ilan Pappé or Rashid Khalidi, also say about the same thing. Moreover, the lead should summarize the page. You shouldn't really be importing novel content from sources directly into the lead at all, especially for a contentious topic like this. Iskandar323 (talk) 16:36, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * That's why I added a qualification: "the war has been described."
 * Besides, neither Pappé, nor Khalidi dispute Morris' estimates of the 1948 civilian casualties. In fact, Khalidi often sources Morris' work himself.
 * All-in-all, I don't insist on this particular sentence being included. Amayorov (talk) 19:48, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I think "small number of atrocities" is a very disputable statement. And if Morris is your only source for that, it's not "has been described", it's "has been described by Morris". Per WP:ECREE. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:04, 7 July 2024 (UTC)

Religious character of the war
Should we add a section to discuss whether the Palestine war was, at its core, a religious or a nationalistic one? This could also include religious motivations that animated the Palestinian Arab and foreign volunteer fighters, as well as the religious significance of the region.

Benny Morris asserts in his book that "The 1948 War was a war of religion as much as, if not more, a nationalist war over territory." On the other hand, other scholars have stated that religion was merely a tactical tool by the Arab leaders.

Morris provides various quotes to back his point. A couple excerpts: The Jewish rejection of the Prophet Muhammad is embedded in the Qur'an and is etched in the psyche of those brought up on its suras. As the Muslim Brotherhood put it in 1948: "Jews are the historic enemies of Muslims and carry the greatest hatred for the nation of Muhammad." Such thinking characterized the Arab world, where the overwhelming majority of the population were, and remain, believers.

In 1943, when President Franklin Roosevelt sent out feelers about a negotiated settlement of the Palestine problem, King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia responded that he was "prepared to receive anyone of any religion except (repeat except) a Jew." A few weeks earlier, Ibn Saud had explained, in a letter to Roosevelt: "Palestine ... has been an Arab country since the dawn of history and ... was never inhabited by the Jews for more than a period of time, during which their history in the land was full of murder and cruelty.... [There is] religious hostility ... between the Moslems and the Jews from the beginning of Islam ... which arose from the treacherous conduct of the Jews towards Islam and the Moslems and their prophet."

Historians have tended to ignore or dismiss, as so much hot air, the jihadi rhetoric and flourishes that accompanied the two-stage assault on the Yishuv and the constant references in the prevailing Arab discourse to that earlier bout of Islamic battle for the Holy Land, against the Crusaders. This is a mistake. '''The 1948 War, from the Arabs' perspective, was a war of religion as much as, if not more than, a nationalist war over territory. Put another way, the territory was sacred: its violation by infidels was sufficient grounds for launching a holy war and its conquest or reconquest, a divinely ordained necessity.'''

In the months before the invasion of 15 May 1948, King Abdullah, the most moderate of the coalition leaders, repeatedly spoke of "saving" the holy places. As the day of invasion approached, his focus on Jerusalem, according to Alec Kirkbride, grew increasingly obsessive. "In our souls," wrote the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, "Palestine occupies a spiritual holy place which is above abstract nationalist feelings. In it we have the blessed breeze of Jerusalem and the blessings of the Prophets and their disciples."

The jihadi impulse underscored both popular and governmental responses in the Arab world to the UN partition resolution and was central to the mobilization of the "street" and the governments for the successive onslaughts of November-December 1947 and May-June 1948. The mosques, mullahs, and gulema all played a pivotal role in the process. Even Christian Arabs appear to have adopted the jihadi discourse. Matiel Mughannam, the Lebanese-born Christian who headed the AHC-affiliated Arab Women's Organization in Palestine, told an interviewer early in the civil war: "The UN decision has united all Arabs, as they have never been united before, not even against the Crusaders.... [A Jewish state] has no chance to survive now that the `holy war' has been declared. All the Jews will eventually be massacred. " The Islamic fervor stoked by the hostilities seems to have encompassed all or almost all Arabs: "No Moslem can contemplate the holy places falling into Jewish hands," reported Kirkbride from Amman. "Even the Prime Minister [Tawfiq Abul Huda] ... who is by far the steadiest and most sensible Arab here, gets excited on the subject."

On 2 December [1947] the gulema, or council of doctors of theology and sacred law, of Al-Azhar University in Cairo – one of Islam's supreme authorities – proclaimed a "worldwide jihad in defense of Arab Palestine." Amayorov (talk) 14:22, 7 July 2024 (UTC)


 * Please read something other than just Benny Morris. Just clutching at snippets of POV-infused statements from Benny Morris is no way to go about understanding the topic, let alone establishing anything in a neutral, encyclopedic voice. Please gain an appreciation of some other sources. Iskandar323 (talk) 16:41, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * It's not just Morris – the religious character of the war has been discussed at length in much of Israeli historiography.
 * If you disagree, we could include reference to other historians that consider that religion was only a minor factor. That is, in fact, exactly what I proposed. Amayorov (talk) 19:49, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * "Israeli historiography" – if it's an Israeli narrative then it needs to be delineated as such, but yes, more voices than Morris would be needed to support this, otherwise it's a Morris narrative, and we already have too much Morris. Though frankly, the sad clutch of quotes above hardly makes the point that Morris seems to think it does. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:00, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Just as "pro-Palestinian" or "Arab" historiography must be disclaimed.
 * I agree that references to other historians would be useful. I will work on that. Amayorov (talk) 20:06, 7 July 2024 (UTC)


 * Morris (who recently wrote in Haaretz that Israel should nuke Iran without delay) took up the "jihad" idea after his "conversion" and it's sort of embarrassing. The transparent purpose is to deny the Palestinians any genuine reason for complaint. There were plenty of people on both sides who spouted religious nonsense; let's not play that game here. Zerotalk 12:55, 8 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Sorry, but what you wrote doesn't constitute a historical argument.
 * The idea that the 1948 War was viewed through a religious lens was first advocated by Morris in his 2008 book, which was widely praised, even by non-Zionists like Avi Shlaim. This book has become a key reference for many scholars.
 * Sure, some scholars (Shlomo Ben-Ami, Yoav Gelber, etc) have said that Morris exaggerated the role of a "religious war," and that it wasn't as important as he suggested. However, a discussion of this could still be useful to add to the article. Amayorov (talk) 23:09, 8 July 2024 (UTC)
 * So you want to over-emphasize the main thing that reviewers of the book criticize as being over-emphasized in the work as one of its key drawbacks? It's the opposite. You should listen to the feedback from academic reviewers, and since they commonly chime in that Morris over-emphasizes religious background and motivations, that makes it more undue and fringe. Iskandar323 (talk) 02:51, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Morris overload
It's come to my attention that Benny Morris is quite gratuitously over-represented on this page relative to other historians, with 50+ citations and mentions. I'm not sure if any other historian crests half a dozen citations and mentions. On a page with just over 100 citations, the sea of Morris references is quite overbearing. This is a pretty clear balance issue. Iskandar323 (talk) 19:51, 7 July 2024 (UTC)


 * I think that would be good! However, one must distinguish between backing up objective facts using a historian's research, and representing the conclusions that that historian draws from them as fact.
 * I don't have a problem with the former. Morris has done a massive amount of primary research, which he quotes in his books and which was later quoted by other authors, such as Shlaim, Flapan, Pappé and others. Amayorov (talk) 20:04, 7 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Iskandar323 is right. إيان (talk) 05:26, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * This is a problem across many Wikipedia articles regarding this history. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 17:07, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Seems like this would be a situation to -add- further scholars, not just remove information. Arkon (talk) 17:57, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * There are different Morris "eras", seems to me, and I agree with Arkon, we should add sources, and if that results in Morris being drowned out on any point, so be it. I am not knocking Morris, one of the first sensible scholars from that side of the line but no need to overdo it, is there? Selfstudier (talk) 18:04, 9 July 2024 (UTC)

Recent changes
I revered multiple recent chanhes by @Amayorov. I didn't provide much reason in the edit sunmaries, any objections to my reversions can be discussed here. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 17:06, 9 July 2024 (UTC)


 * Why did you revert the estimate of the number of people killed in massacres? According to Benny Morris, "About 800 civilians and prisoners of war killed in massacres." That is important because no other statement in the article gives a possible breakdown of the Arab casualties between civilians and soldiers.


 * Amayorov (talk) 17:39, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * @IOHANNVSVERVS A gentle reminder Amayorov (talk) 13:25, 13 July 2024 (UTC)
 * If it is to be included it would have to be atteibuted to Morris or else corroborated by other sources. Also the number of civilians killed in massacres specifically is probably not due for inclusion, especially since many civilians were killed in acts of terrorism etc which are not massacres. Furthermore Morris' "about 800" is not very sensible, there is a wide range of estimates for many of the massacres. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 05:24, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Do all estimates have to be corroborates by more than one reference? For example, 20,000 casualties is sourced from Esber (2009), and isn't quoted anywhere else. That is the only citation from Esber on this page, and yet it's included, whereas Morris, who is the most referenced author anyway, is quoted selectively.
 * Morris estimates that 800 civilians were killed "all told – most of them in several clusters of massacres." He clearly includes acts of terrorism here.
 * You say that there is a wide range of estimates, and yet I can't find any other estimate of civilians killed anywhere. Amayorov (talk) 08:13, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * @IOHANNVSVERVS Why did you remove this estimate? Morris' estimate is for the entire 1947-9 war, including the civil war phase. In fact, many of those "eight hundred civilians and prisoners of war all told" were murdered before the Arab armies invasion in May – "in several clusters of massacres in captured villages in April-May". Amayorov (talk) 06:52, 17 July 2024 (UTC)


 * Why did you revert the description of Plan Dalet? This has been discussed on the Talk page here. The description of Plan Dalet as an offensive operation is controversial, as is described on the dedicated page. Amayorov (talk) 17:40, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I don't want to engage in WP:STATUSQUOSTONEWALLING, but in this case I would say uou should try to get consensus for such a significant change. It was obviously an offensive operation, did you read the page about Plan Dalet? IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 05:26, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Yes, and that's what it says on Plan Dalet:
 * "This strategy is subject to controversy, with some historians characterizing it as defensive, while others assert that it was an integral part of a planned strategy for the expulsion, sometimes called an ethnic cleansing, of the area's native inhabitants."
 * Given that there are still significant disputes as to the plan's purpose, I suggest we leave controversial assessments out of the lead. Amayorov (talk) 08:16, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * It says "Historians describe Plan Dalet, in which Zionist forces shifted to an offensive strategy, as the beginning of a new phase in the 1948 Palestine war." IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 15:35, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * I don't really mind this phrasing. But the original sentence goes beyond that: "Towards the end of the civil war phase, Zionist forces executed Plan Dalet, an offensive operation conquering territory for the planned establishment of a Jewish state." A strategy can be offensive for defensive purposes too, such as when the side defending itself goes on the offence. But calling it an offensive operation aimed at conquering is subject to discussion. Amayorov (talk) 16:03, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Why did you remove the quote by Jamal al-Husseini? I think it's important to highlight that a ceasefire in mid-April 1948 was impossible and was rejected by both sides. The quote itself is corroborated by UNSC archives.


 * On April 16, the Palestinian Representative, Jamal al-Husayni, made a statement to the United Nations Security Council, rejecting any ceasefire that does not undo the Partition Plan:


 * The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not attackers, not aggressors; that the Arabs had begun the fight and that once the Arabs stopped shooting, they would stop shooting also. As a matter of fact, we do not deny this fact. We told the world, during the last session of the General Assembly, that we could not accept our country being torn to pieces. [...] Our fighting is in compliance with a God-given right, that of self-defence. We are no invaders, and we are no aggressors, but we have to use the right that God has given us, as to anyone who is unprovokedly attacked.


 * Amayorov (talk) 17:42, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
 * The quote is simply not WP:DUE for inclusion. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 05:20, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * But that is not a "minority view," it's an official statement by the Palestinian representative to the UN SC, taken from the UN archives. A similar quote is already included in the article, such as the United Nations Conciliation Commission from 23 October 1950 stating that "The Arabs rejected the United Nations Partition Plan so that any comment of theirs did not specifically concern the status of the Arab section of Palestine under partition but rather rejected the scheme in its entirety." This quote is a manifestation of the same view, but from a much earlier date.
 * A better argument against its inclusion would be WP:PRIMARY, which however allows for use of primary sources to be used "with care" and "to make straightforward, descriptive statements of facts." Amayorov (talk) 08:43, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * Also, it's been mentioned and discussed in secondary sources. I've added one such source to the article. Alaexis¿question? 08:59, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * We can't include every quote from the war though that's the point. IOHANNVSVERVS (talk) 15:36, 14 July 2024 (UTC)
 * But it's an important quote: a Palestinian representative admitting to the UNSC that they would not accept any ceasefire that doesn't undo the Partition. The date is also important – April 16, 1948, is approaching the zenith of the "second wave" in Morris' analysis. Amayorov (talk) 15:54, 14 July 2024 (UTC)