Talk:1953 Iranian coup d'état/Archive 9

Aftermath section should be expanded
The section needs to be expanded to include more details about Nixson's visit as a VP right after the coup, the execution/murder of Dr Fatemi, execution of other political figures in the aftermath, the shooting of civilians who were protesting Nixon's visit, the training and establishment of Savak by CIA, and their killing and torture methods. --Wayiran (talk) 22:36, 10 February 2010 (UTC)


 * These are constructive suggestions that would move this article along. Feel free to make these additions.Skywriter (talk) 21:17, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

Disputes over sources
I came to this article looking for information, so I don't claim any expertise on the topic, but have a suggestion for how to resolve the disputes over sources.

When something isn't mathematically provable, standard academic procedure is to rely on consensus in quality peer-reviewed journals, not the popular press (newspapers/books/TV/radio/interviews). Popular works may be used when they represent unique primary sources (eg interviews with witnesses to an event), and can also provide context, but relying, for example, on popular press interviews of secondary sources (no matter how distinguished the parties) to refute articles published in specialised, peer-reviewed journals (even by so-called 'minnows') simply isn't valid academic procedure.

Anything published in quality peer-reviewed journals has been systematically scrutinised by scholars with recognised expertise in the subject matter. In general, when the subject matter is at all controversial, this will include those who disagree with the point of view expressed in the article. In the popular press, there are no such guarantees -- anyone can write anything they like, including respected scholars whose personal opinions are nevertheless outside the mainstream of what they can publish in peer-reviewed journals.

The weighting of different points of view should similarly be based on the quantity of journal articles published in journals of similar stature (ideally top-tier journals), especially from different authors (although if one author is very widely published, this is an important factor in the weighting). If an overwhelming majority of articles support a particular view, then it is by definition the mainstream consensus. If the views are relatively evenly split, then there is no consensus. Subjective views of what is 'mainstream' or 'extreme', and who is a 'giant' or a 'minnow', have no place in academic research.Faagel (talk) 15:36, 14 February 2010 (UTC)


 * These are constructive suggestions. This article has been bogged down in disputes over sources for more than a year, especially obscure sources. Skywriter (talk) 21:19, 15 February 2010 (UTC)


 * The title-post is very constructive indeed, but only potentially positive if the purported consensus follows the tenor of its contents. It notes the general academic methods that Wikipedians, through various rules, guidelines, and essays are supposed to follow, and all without one blue WP:link.  One very impressive theoretical first-post, Faagel, thanks, and please increase your edit-count for the project’s sake.  If you decide to hover and see where this goes, I have an immediate question, since I am without any ‘quality peer-reviewed journals’ that you note, since I believe most others are similarly wanting.   The book I do have, self-described by  Lenczowski, says in the Intro it “is addressed primarily to university students concentrating on the Middle East, to foreign service officers and government officials dealing with the area, and, more broadly to educated laymen interested in U.S. foreign policy.”  Could you comment about where this purported academic-type text might fall, within the range of quality and appropriateness between “peer-reviewed journals” and “the popular press (newspapers/books/TV/radio/interviews)”?


 * Concerning Sky’s comment, while outwardly positive and certainly hitting the bogged-down nail on the head, seems only to perpetuate the “[s]ubjective views of what is 'mainstream' or 'extreme', and who is a 'giant' or a 'minnow', [and which] have no place in academic research.” Such views apparently seem quite important to his definition of consensus, however; but that personal judgment of mine is based only on the minnow-like ‘obscure sources’ characterization that was used.  Sky, please read Faagel again, open your perspective to a valid uninvolved editor’s comment, and consider that your views might have contributed more to the problem than its solution.  Regards, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 02:43, 18 February 2010 (UTC)
 * On the first point, I'm new to Wikipedia, so I know very little about its policies (hence the lack of WP links). I'm referring to standard academic research procedure (eg the procedure used for researcg in my field), not Wikipedia policies, and apologise if I was unclear about that.


 * On the second issue, a starting point to find peer-reviewed journals is the PAIS International Peer Reviewed Journals List: http://www.csa.com/factsheets/supplements/paispeer.php . A few peer-reviwed journals in the list (some with websites) that are probably relevant are:


 * Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. (1089-201X) http://dukeupress.edu/journals/index.shtml
 * International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). (0020-7438)
 * Middle East Journal. (0026-3141) http://www.mideasti.org
 * Middle East Policy (MEP). (1061-1924) http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/journal/journal.asp
 * Middle East Quarterly. (1073-9467) http://www.meforum.org
 * Middle East Report. (0899-2851) http://www.merip.org


 * If you have any academic connections (eg student or faculty), librarians in specalist libraries can often help point researchers to widely-read peer-reviewed journals in a particular area.


 * I was probably unclear on the distinction between academic books and popular books. Peer-reviewed academic journals are the best source, because of the discipline imposed by the peer review process, but academic texts are also good sources, especially in conjunction with journal articles discussing them. Popular books targeted at general audiences are the ones you have to be careful with.


 * For popular media generally, I'm referring to sources like 'Democracy Now!', which is apparently a TV news programme, or 'All the Shah's men' by Kinzer (a journalist). I know very little about the former, but TV news programmes are generally well below the academic standard.


 * Kinzer's book is reviewed in MEP ( http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118799757/abstract ), which is one of the peer-reviewed journals listed above. The review is highly favourable, and implies that many of the points in the book should be taken seriously in academic research, but it must ultimately be kept in mind that the book is a popular work, not an academic one. The review also points to some authors who are critical of Kinzer (eg Abdollah Shahbazi, who calls Kinzer's book 'a fairy tale for Americans'), as well as to some other sources generally.


 * Friendly regards,Faagel (talk) 10:48, 18 February 2010 (UTC)
 * Hmmmm, I hope we don't throw out the baby with the bath water here.
 * 1) You can get good information from reputable journalists unavailable from academic sources. Interviews with important people, etc. And Kinzer is now an academic himself (Northwestern University) which certainly suggests his book was well recieved by his peers in the peer-review world.
 * 2) "The review also points to some authors who are critical of Kinzer (eg Abdollah Shahbazi, who calls Kinzer's book 'a fairy tale for Americans')."  Let's have a look at what Abdollah Shahbazi has to say: "In Kinzer's book, one sees veins of Zionist attachments or influences. For example, when he mentions the suspicious bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires (1994) and other such bombings, where footprints of Mossad and other mysterious Western conspirators are evident, Kinzer blames the Islamic Republic of Iran." Would that pass a peer review!!!!?
 * 3) "Kinzer's book is reviewed in MEP ( http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118799757/abstract ), which is one of the peer-reviewed journals listed above." When you go to the MEP link you get an abstract which says that Kinzer's book is reviewed in the article. That's all. If you want to read the review you have to pay, which is the problem with these journals. They aren't very accessable. --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:40, 18 February 2010 (UTC)


 * 1) There should be no throwing out of babies with bath water. The point is to follow a systematic process in the face of disagreements, and not rely on subjective views or personalities. The Wikipedia:Verifiability guidelines are actually similar to academic guidelines here:
 * 'Academic and peer-reviewed publications are highly valued and usually the most reliable sources in areas where they are available, such as history, medicine, and science. Material from reliable non-academic sources may also be used in these areas, particularly if it appears in respected mainstream publications.'
 * The academic or Wikipedia process does not imply that any non-academic sources (eg popular media) must be thrown away, only that in disputes, more reliable sources win. If the academic literature says X, and a popular book/periodical says Y, then X wins. If a reliable, mainstream popular book/periodical says Z and it is not discussed in the academic literature at all, then of course the popular book/periodical can be cited.
 * 2) The link you posted is the same review from MEP by Masoud Kazemzadeh, so yes, it did indirectly pass peer review. Without knowing anything about Abdollah Shahbazi, I know that a book review quoting him as a source was published in a peer-reviewed journal.
 * Shabazi's primary criticism seems to be the portrayal of Truman as 'good' and Eisenhower as 'bad'. A brief look at some journal articles suggests to me that the consensus view is that the change in government from Truman to Eisenhower was instrumental in leading to the coup, but not in as black-and-white a way as Kinzer suggests (it is more exciting in a popular book to frame things as black-and-white, to create heroes and villains). There is no need to cite Kinzer in this example, since there are peer-reviewed articles such as:
 * Gasiorowski, Mark J. (1987). The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), pp. 261-286
 * This is a peer-reviewed article. In a review of the book by Gasiorowski and Byrne, published in IJMES, which is also peer-reviewed, G. Hossein Razi refers to Gasiorowski as 'the world’s foremost living authority on the conduct of the [1953] coup [in Iran]':
 * G. Hossein Razi (2009). Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2004). Pp. 408. $49.95 cloth.. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 41, pp 176-178
 * doi:10.1017/S0020743808090442
 * This adds some weight to Gasiorowski's article (since both are in peer-reviewed journals), but some more recent scholars have suggested greater continuity between Truman and Eisenhower, rather than a major shift. They note, however, that they are challenging the consensus view (as put forward in Gasiorowski (1987)):
 * Gavin, F. (1999). Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950–1953. Journal of Cold War Studies, 1(1), 56-89. doi:10.1162/15203970152521890.
 * Marsh, S. (2005). Continuity and Change: Reinterpreting the Policies of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations toward Iran, 1950–1954. Journal of Cold War Studies, 7(3), 79-123. doi:10.1162/1520397054377205.
 * 3) If you're on a university network (probably any major university), the link I gave has access to the PDF, either directly or with a login. If you haven't access to academic journals, I can only say it will be difficult to do research, but I wish you luck! Faagel (talk) 10:38, 19 February 2010 (UTC)
 * 1) Shabazi's primary criticism may be of the portrayal of Truman as 'good' and Eisenhower as 'bad', (if I remember correctly Gasiorowski's book also seems to think there was a big difference in Truman's and Eisenhower's attitude towards the advisability of staging a coup), but if Abdollah Shahbazi's peers approved a personal attack such as "In Kinzer's book, one sees veins of Zionist attachments or influences. ... where footprints of Mossad and other mysterious Western conspirators are evident [i.e. blowing up the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina building, killing of 85 mostly Jewish people], Kinzer blames the Islamic Republic of Iran," I have to question the reliability of those peers!
 * 2) You're right, the link you gave has access to the PDF. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:40, 19 February 2010 (UTC)
 * doi:10.1017/S0020743808090442
 * This adds some weight to Gasiorowski's article (since both are in peer-reviewed journals), but some more recent scholars have suggested greater continuity between Truman and Eisenhower, rather than a major shift. They note, however, that they are challenging the consensus view (as put forward in Gasiorowski (1987)):
 * Gavin, F. (1999). Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950–1953. Journal of Cold War Studies, 1(1), 56-89. doi:10.1162/15203970152521890.
 * Marsh, S. (2005). Continuity and Change: Reinterpreting the Policies of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations toward Iran, 1950–1954. Journal of Cold War Studies, 7(3), 79-123. doi:10.1162/1520397054377205.
 * 3) If you're on a university network (probably any major university), the link I gave has access to the PDF, either directly or with a login. If you haven't access to academic journals, I can only say it will be difficult to do research, but I wish you luck! Faagel (talk) 10:38, 19 February 2010 (UTC)
 * 1) Shabazi's primary criticism may be of the portrayal of Truman as 'good' and Eisenhower as 'bad', (if I remember correctly Gasiorowski's book also seems to think there was a big difference in Truman's and Eisenhower's attitude towards the advisability of staging a coup), but if Abdollah Shahbazi's peers approved a personal attack such as "In Kinzer's book, one sees veins of Zionist attachments or influences. ... where footprints of Mossad and other mysterious Western conspirators are evident [i.e. blowing up the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina building, killing of 85 mostly Jewish people], Kinzer blames the Islamic Republic of Iran," I have to question the reliability of those peers!
 * 2) You're right, the link you gave has access to the PDF. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:40, 19 February 2010 (UTC)
 * 3) If you're on a university network (probably any major university), the link I gave has access to the PDF, either directly or with a login. If you haven't access to academic journals, I can only say it will be difficult to do research, but I wish you luck! Faagel (talk) 10:38, 19 February 2010 (UTC)
 * 1) Shabazi's primary criticism may be of the portrayal of Truman as 'good' and Eisenhower as 'bad', (if I remember correctly Gasiorowski's book also seems to think there was a big difference in Truman's and Eisenhower's attitude towards the advisability of staging a coup), but if Abdollah Shahbazi's peers approved a personal attack such as "In Kinzer's book, one sees veins of Zionist attachments or influences. ... where footprints of Mossad and other mysterious Western conspirators are evident [i.e. blowing up the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina building, killing of 85 mostly Jewish people], Kinzer blames the Islamic Republic of Iran," I have to question the reliability of those peers!
 * 2) You're right, the link you gave has access to the PDF. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:40, 19 February 2010 (UTC)
 * 2) You're right, the link you gave has access to the PDF. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:40, 19 February 2010 (UTC)


 * I think you may have got the wrong end of the stick. Publishing in peer-reviewed journals usually requires some acknowledgement of credible views that differ from the ones presented by the author. Authors who don't do this tend to have difficulty getting published. Kazemzadeh obviously thinks very highly of Kinzer's book, but essentially had to also present opposing views.


 * On the point of continuity between Truman and Eisenhower (which is just a point I selected at random), Kazemzadeh could have referred to Gavin's (1999) peer-reviewed article, but instead chose Abdollah Shahbazi. He then included otherwise irrelevant comments from Shahbazi that tend to reduce his credibility (well, maybe not in the Middle East, but certainly in the West). If the view of continuity were entirely a fringe view, there would have been no need to address it at all. The fact that Kazemzadeh did address it suggests it is not. The fact of and manner in which he cited Shahbazi to represent it suggest it's a view he doesn't agree with.


 * According to Gavin (1999), Eisenhower's policy in Iran was essentially a continuation of the policy shift that started under Truman in 1952. On p 87 he writes:


 * 'On balance, one is struck by the large degree of continuity between the two administrations in their policies toward Iran. The policies of both administrations were driven almost entirely by Cold War concerns. Both wanted to achieve a negotiated settlement if possible. The difference came during the last months of the Truman administration, when a more assertive and unilateral policy was adopted. This new policy had little, if anything, to do with presidential personality or party differences. Given the dynamic of the dispute and the global and regional weakness of the United States, it is hard to imagine that Eisenhower would have risked the use of force in Iran in 1951. By the same token, Truman in August 1953 may have taken actions similar to the ones Eisenhower took; all the groundwork for the events of 1953 had been laid during the last months of the Truman administration.'


 * This is a minor point in the overall scope of the article. However, it does show the difference between the balanced, measured approach required in peer-reviewed journals and the more sensationalistic style of popular works, even highly-regarded ones, which often focus on heroes, villains and telling exciting stories.Faagel (talk) 20:52, 21 February 2010 (UTC)
 * You are correct again Faagel and quite helpful. I agree we should keep the baby as well as the bath water. Everybody knows where the Iran-baby bounced, but it seems the only bath water worth consensus mention is the residual CIA slime that was left on top of it. That said, there must have been some H2O-like medium to support it; certainly sounds like US concern about the era’s ‘red menace’ was part.


 * You keep noting ‘academic procedure’, and since you have looked at some blue-links, I think we can both agree that Wiki-procedure is rightfully similar. The main difference seems to be that our editors tend not to recognize others so much as peers as just an opposition to their POV, perspective, side-of-the-story, etc.  The peer-ness is developed by collaboration and consensus, which is also Wiki-procedure, but as well documented on this page, it has been sorely lacking, and now quite loud by its absence.  Regards, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 10:45, 22 February 2010 (UTC)

Back to the proposed new lead
The new lead has been on the table since Feb 9 (two weeks) so I'm proposing this be the last week waiting for replies before we move on to Requests for comment. I believe Skywriter was going to have time this week to reply. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:34, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
 * Kurdo has sent me this message
 * The kind of detailed response/counter-proposal I have in mind, will take hours to write. But due to some real life issues, I only have like 20 minutes for Wikipedia every other day, which I spend doing some minor edits. So be patient, and I'll make my response soon. There is no need to rush anyways, the article is already tagged, and in the meanwhile you can actually go ahead and implement the non-controversial changes from your proposed lead. --Kurdo777 (talk)
 * So I propose implementing those non-controversial changes from the proposed lead, i.e. everything but the sentence:
 * While the American Truman administration had opposed a coup, the new Eisenhower administration feared that Iran was in danger of falling under the influence of the expansionist Soviet Communist "empire".[12]
 * ... which I will replace with:
 * While the American Truman administration had opposed a coup, the new Eisenhower administration supported it.[12]
 * ... until we have resolved the dispute with RfC and so on.
 * Any objections? --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:36, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
 * No objections. I'll put in proposed lead. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:43, 28 February 2010 (UTC)
 * I said "non-controversial changes", which you interpreted as meaning "everything but the sentence" about communism. That's not what I said. "Non-controversial changes" does not mean deleting relevant sourced material from the previous lead. I'll be making some changes to it, in the coming days. --Kurdo777 (talk) 21:26, 28 February 2010 (UTC)
 * If you didn't like what I proposed you had plenty of time to reply. --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:50, 28 February 2010 (UTC)

While we are waiting, let's work on the "Giant quote from Ervand Abrahamian"
While we are waiting for the "detailed response/counter-proposal" of Kurdo, Binsternet suggested we work on the giant quote earlier here ''Why do we have a lengthy quote from Ervand Abrahamian in the first section? This is an encyclopedia article summarizing an event in history, not a podcast. We should summarize the event, using experts as sources. We should not let a source like this take over the body of the article—it will cause readers to skip ahead past the long quoted section. Binksternet (talk) 19:01, 22 January 2010 (UTC)''

Here is proposed rewriting of the Background section which starts out with a few short paragraphs on the motivation for the coup, summarizing Abrahamian's, Mark Gasiorowski's and Kinzer's views (a shortened version of Abrahamian's quote appears later in the rewriten article), before going on to some history of oil in Iran. (I think the rewritten background section is still too long. Others might have ideas on trimming it.) --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:21, 28 February 2010 (UTC)

New first para lede
Not to be disruptive with a bold 3-edit flurry, but please give it a chance. Look at the diffs; I made it as easy as possible to illustrate their overall minimal changes. I used existing words largely and shortened. Nonetheless, I can see two immediate questions and will state my reasons. The first and last paras had ended with the same relevant content, so I concatenated them. From a general view, this fits proper ‘pedia writing organization with a flowing style. It wraps the related notable aspects in a neutral manner, and rightly ends in a self-admission. I’ll summarize its contents on a ribald and hopefully humorous note: They did it, they stepped in that swamp for the first time; they thought it a short-cut at that chilly time, but realized later that crap leaves a trail and really stinks. With greatest regard to content, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 04:26, 4 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks for that, I think the changes are constructive. Albeit, it could be argued that it is WP:UNDUE to put Madam Albright and President Obama's comments in the very first paragraph, but I have no objections to it. --Kurdo777 (talk) 05:12, 4 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks for seeing it that way. It might be argued with that, but unlikely, since it so notably establishes its notability, with the SecState and Prez. More to the point are all the refs in the lede, albeit this is likely not the best time. Regards, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 06:39, 4 March 2010 (UTC)

and now part of the 2nd para
Please give this a chance, also; I'll go in increments while under construction. Few edits should create problems, but some might and can be discussed individually when the package is complete. Regards, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 07:14, 5 March 2010 (UTC)
 * There are some writing problems I'm sure you'll fix but the my main impression is that the lead is really long. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:30, 5 March 2010 (UTC)


 * The changes are fine, expect for the part citing Lenczowski. There is no WP:consensus to use Mr. Lenczowski, as a source on this article, we have gone through this discussion before, a number of points have arisen about his validity as a source on this particular topic, given his personal relationship with the Shah, and his fringe views on the topic, that attempt to legitimize the coup by going as far as implying that it was Mossadegh who was staging a coup, and this was just a "counter-coup". --Kurdo777 (talk) 20:28, 5 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Your continued attempts to marginalize Lenczowski are consistent, I will say that for you. However, nothing in our WP:V and WP:RS guidelines takes Lenczowski out of consideration. His familiarity with the subjects he was writing about is not an argument against him. Binksternet (talk) 21:07, 5 March 2010 (UTC)

That seemed to go reasonably well; it certainly defined where our areas of difference exist. Overall, it was a positive move toward improving content readability and context. Can we all agree that what remains is more-or-less stable? I agree that it is long, but that seems of minor importance, in the light of its less-than complete content. I doubt much can be removed without missing context, relevance or stepping on some point-of-view toes. Context and relevance are prime among those in developing lede content; the devil is in working out the details of those pov’d toes. It might be best if we discuss context and relevance and avoid the other for now. The last revert seems being down to just chronology and pov, so I will delay that one for now.

Stripping the only added (and reverted) sentence of any pov wording, leaves the following very relevant contextual content: The remaining words consist of: The, |protracted crisis]], led to decreased, attempts by the, to, increasing, hardship and, friction in, and some loss of, support for. We should leave those out of the discussion to follow, for now, since the bulleted items are the important ones to discuss first. This seems to isolate these two types of content succinctly enough.
 * [[Abadan Crisis
 * world oil supplies
 * United States
 * negotiate
 * economic
 * domestic
 * Iran
 * Mosaddeq’s tactics.

I contend that the first two are context and relevance no-brainers, since Abadan was the largest refinery, but that mattered more for Europe than the US. Nonetheless for its part, the US was financing the reconstruction of Europe, and they wanted to buy nearer oil for that purpose. So, they arbitrated the negotiations between UK and Iran, with a well-established policy, being overall anti-colonial, pro- self-determination, and generally supporting Iran’s view. This is noted in part in the article; but what is not included are the failed Ike-admin negotiations, which caused US actions to change and support the coup to get oil flowing; these should be included in # U.S. motives. The other bullets are Iran-related, including changing economic and domestic political dynamics and Mosaddeq’s tactics. These very much influenced US actions; UK and US tactics are overly included, as are the Shah’s, who is presented too much as a sycophant. Where are Mosaddeq’s tactics discussed? They are included in the timeline, and its higher section. This seems not a neutral presentation of the various RS’d povs, and the revert outright excludes expert views of the era, which tend to be less revisionist, than current experts. This is within the overall debate, two different views, right. So what do we do?

Eliciting comments on the relevance and appropriateness of including the bulleted items above, appears to be the way to go. Keeping discussion on that topic would speed things along. I’d appreciate any on-topic comments here, and make my others separately. Regards, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 03:14, 6 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I'll state the obvious. It would be advantageous, for example, if the missing content so indicated was included in the article.  CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 06:43, 6 March 2010 (UTC)

WP:3O requested
A third opinion has been requested here. The requesting editor considers that 3O applies to himself and a certain other editor, specifically about “whether Lenczowski is an RS for this article.”  The former introduced the author’s reference to the page, and the latter has been most consistent in keeping it off the page; admittedly, other editors have fallen on both sides and in the middle. The basic question remains unresolved between these two editors.

The editorial dispute starts at the top of the page, but is best described here, here, a serendipitous 3O-type discussion here, as well as the sub-section above, linked to the request. I hope a 3O will be accepted, and request the other editor to comment, should he consider this presentation non-neutral. Respectful of the process, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 07:46, 6 March 2010 (UTC)

The narrow question is “whether Lenczowski is an RS for this article.”  The simple answer is yes. His analysis should not be considered wp:fringe, his friendship with the royal family does not raise serious wp:coi issues. However, they can't be used in isolation to state as "fact" a statement that is disagreement with mainstream academia. Either citing him directly or qualifying statements may be the right approach. For me to to be more helpful, it would be useful to discuss specific edits and how they should be phrased.

On a slightly broader topic, the current lede is tendentious, and rightfully deserves the NPOV tag. Clearly all the editors must agree, The   proposed new lede reads much better, and should be used as a base for tweaking the final lede. It is, however, in need of serious editing. In the details, I would think it should use terms like the Eisenhower administration (....) and possibly feared a communist takeover rather then Eisenhower administration feared that Iran was in danger of falling under the influence of the expansionist Soviet Communist "empire". Add another reason from academics on any other reason (if there is a mainstream view). Needless to say, drop terms like "the expansionist Soviet Communist "empire""  Lets work together, I think we can make this a really good article.--Work permit (talk) 10:08, 6 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I assume the link you mean, which "reads much better, and should be used as a base for tweaking the final lede' is this proposed new lede. Is that correct? CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 10:53, 6 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Yes I do, I corrected it now in this edit. I should add, as a way to build consensus, we can differentiate Eisenhower's (possible) fear, and whether that fear was based on reality (in hindsight).  Looking through the sources, the existence of the fear is on much more solid ground then the grounding in reality.--Work permit (talk) 11:02, 6 March 2010 (UTC)

Hmmm, I at least appreciate your opinion. Some say silence is golden; I'd say this silence is quite deafening. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 15:34, 8 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm not an expert, but I'm willing to work with all interested editors on the lede.--Work permit (talk) 17:27, 8 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Thank you for your taking time over this Work permit. If I remember correctly I used "empire" (in quotes) because I had linked it to the article Soviet Empire which seemed the best wikipedia link for the cold war beliefs of Eisenhower et.al.
 * Work permit, CasualObserv, or anyone else, would you object to using the phrase
 * Eisenhower administration feared that Iran was in danger of falling under the influence of the expansionist Soviet Communist state, rather than a simple communist takeover. The distinction between the two is that the Soviet Union had been expanding since WWII and before, Iran was its much smaller neighbor, and geopolitically Iran was in the midst of the Persian Gulf oil fields. So Soviet influence was a much bigger deal than if some unaffiliated, anti-imperialist, anti-US,  lefty regime took over in Iran. See some of these quotes ("US Scenario of commie takeover", "How the Soviet reluctance to withdraw from occupying Iranian Azerbaijan after World War II, spooked the US", "Pres. Truman's opinion of the geopolitcal importance of Iran in the Cold War", etc.) from the book on the coup Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:25, 8 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I think we want to say Eisenhower administration feared that Iran was in danger of a commie takeover but in a more encyclopedic fashion. Eisenhower administration feared that Iran was in danger of falling under an expanding Soviet influence"? or  Eisenhower administration feared that Iran was in danger of falling into the Soviet Union's sphere of influence--Work permit (talk) 20:25, 8 March 2010 (UTC)
 * But what did a commie takeover or Soviet influence mean?? The important factor was that the power and influence of the Soviet state was expanding and had been expanding steadily since the Bolshevik revolution. "' .... the 1945-46 Azerbaijan crisis, the consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, the communist triumph in China, and the Korean War ....'"


 * While I'm at it how about a little more encyclopedic subtlety in the sentence
 * The 1953 Iranian coup d’état (termed the 28 Mordad coup d'état in Iran), was the overthrow of the democratically-elected Iranian government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh by the Central Intelligence Agency
 * It sound like a bunch of Americans charged into the presidential palace and arrested Mosaddeq. Kinzer says the CIA "staged the coup" (All the Shah's ..., p.ix). Obama says the CIA "played a part" in the coup.  http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j8-a9Bpq471PDjYA2z6WazPmIZqw
 * The citations at the end of the sentence do not support "overthrown by the CIA". They were there before Kurdo changed the sentence, when it used to simply say:
 * The 1953 Iranian coup d’état (referred to as 28 Mordad 1332 in Iran, and as Operation Ajax or TPAJAX by the CIA) deposed the democratically-elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq. Later in the lead what the CIA did is described. --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:29, 8 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I agree that the first sentance needs changing. I sort of liked the proposed lede The 1953 Iranian coup d’état (referred to as 28 Mordad 1332 in Iran, and as Operation Ajax or TPAJAX by the CIA) deposed the democratically-elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq.[2][3][4].  I probably would say a little more: The 1953 Iranian coup d’état (referred to as 28 Mordad 1332 in Iran, and as Operation Ajax or TPAJAX by the CIA) deposed the democratically-elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq.[2][3][4] and reinstalled Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi to power..or some such wording.  Regarding the CIA's role, I think neutral terms include "orchestrate", "staged", "organized", "sponsored" etc and belong in the next sentance.  I agree "overthrow..by the CIA" is misleading.--Work permit (talk) 23:20, 8 March 2010 (UTC)
 * (Sorry, comment composed prior to more recent two edits) The Soviet wording seems easy to work out, and I would use that specific word; I commented before about dislike for the use of ‘fear’, and ‘empire’.  Suggest; The Eisenhower administration worried that the worsening conditions in Iran created another opportunity for Soviet expansion. (another opportunity might provide helpful context).
 * Concerning the CIA’s previously over-stated role, this was one of my first edits; it seemed quite minimal at the time, since the Brits were the ones hot to trot to the coup. After that was reverted, this was tried, and it included ref’d words to support it.  I do not believe there are any real differences between people currently on the page.  I’d proffer that consensus is set in stone only until another interested editorial passer-by trips over it; the previous lede caused me to stumble, but initially, only to the extent indicated by those edits.  CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 02:30, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

First, you guys need to establish that "fear of Soviet" sensational nonsense is the prevalent mainstream scholarly view on the motives behind the coup, which is not the case, and for which there is no consensus, before arguing semantics, about using "Soviet empire" or "Soviet union". As for Lenczowski, the subject of his book is not even about this topic, he mentions this topic in passing, in a book he has written about American presidents. Even if we overlook the WP:RS and WP:COI red flags, there is just no way that WP:UNDUE will allow Lenczowski and his fringe theories from a random book whose focus is not this subject, to be used in this article in any form or shape, when there are hundreds of books, journals, and other published sources about this topics, by qualified academics and historians who have written extensively on this topic. We don't have to use Lenczowski, and there is simply no justification for giving any weight to his book, before hundreds of other books that are actually about this topic. --Kurdo777 (talk) 01:40, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * No, the "fear of Soviet" bit is present in much mainstream work—what we do here is present it along with the sources that say it was not a factor. About Lenczowski, we have been over this (!), and his mention of the coup is not casual or tangential, it is of critical importance in his discussion of the president he is writing about. Furthermore, as a writer, he is very familiar with the coup, and is not simply regurgitating other sources in that section of his book. He is a reliable source well worth using. Binksternet (talk) 02:12, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * On the other hand, the basic 3O question certainly remains, please proceed. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 02:32, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * We'd all agree with that. What is the prevailing consensus amongst academics?  Is fear of soviet a significant minority?  If so,  the Eisenhower administration (....) and possibly feared a communist takeover  where (...) is the prevailing view.  Or if there is no consensus, list the two or three major theories in the lede?  Needless to say, we're not discussing if the fear were justified or rational, just if it existed and if it did whether that fear played a role the the events that followed. --Work permit (talk) 02:18, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

No, there is nothing about Lenczowski or his book, which is of "critical importance". His book is not about this topic, he is neither a historian, nor an academic. There is absolutely nothing about him or his book, that would make him or his book stand out, or be more worthy of inclusion in this article, than works of hundreds, if not thousands of, qualified academics who have written on this subject. This is an encyclopedia, we need to be exclusive, and stick to independent, neutral, scholarly works written by academics and historians. --Kurdo777 (talk) 04:05, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Lenczowski is not an academic?? He is Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, at the University of California, Berkeley. What could you possibly mean by "nor an academic"? Binksternet (talk) 04:40, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

Is it fair to say there are two questions going on here?: If so, can we seperate these two threads?--Work permit (talk) 04:20, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Is it appropriate to say Eisenhower admin was motivated by fear of communism (no matter how justified that fear was)
 * Is it appropriate to cite Lenczowski as a source to say the threat of communism was real"--Work permit (talk) 04:19, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Yes, though not exactly, it is appropriate; I agree. Per the process, Work is here in response to the 2-editor, WP:3O  request noted above; the other-editor party has responded, concerning both the narrow 3O question, “whether Lenczowski is an RS for this article,” as well as other questions, which can be separated easily.  These other questions are separate from that 3O for now, and have been on-going, yet they continue being discussed in the ‘3O-section’.  I feel it should be discussed separately, per policy, from other ‘lede questions’, and I will note,  ‘content’ questions posed above, and still sitting lonely with a lack of response.  Regards, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 05:21, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks. I think it may be best to first tackle the broader question smoke vs fear.  I hope we can reach consensus on that topic.  At least create a framework from which consensus can be derived.  The framework may make it easier to then tackle the narrower issue.  It seems if we tackle the narrower issue first, it explodes into the broder one.--Work permit (talk) 05:36, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * ...and I have noted other basic considerations, similarly noted in the previous serendipitous discussion. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 05:56, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

=Fear vs Smoke=
 * In light of the detailed nature of the information already declassified about the coup in the last decade or so, like the false flag operations involving fake "communists", or memos on how Mossadegh was a nationalist who was deeply against any communist and Soviet influence in Iran, the current academic consensus is that the "fear of communism" taking hold in Iran, did not exist at all. It was just a smokescreen to deflect from the real motives behind the coup, which were the control of Iranian oil, and making Iran a client state serving US interests in the region and acting as a formidable force separating the Soviets and the Persian Gulf. As a matter of fact, the top American officials from the era, Eisenhower's own advisers, the perpetrators of the coup themselves, have by now admitted on record that "fear of communism" was a just a smokescreen. --Kurdo777 (talk) 04:53, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * "In fact"? There are other reliable opinions, modern ones, that you refuse to acknowledge. The "smokescreen" group and the "fear of communism" group should both be represented in the article. Binksternet (talk) 04:58, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Please read WP:UNDUE and WP:LEAD. The vast majority of academic works on the topic, written after the declassification of the secret documents about the coup, dismiss the "communist fear" theory. Either way, the lead is no place for "opinions". So "motives" and other subjective issues do not belong in a lead anyways. The lead is suppose to be a summary of undisputed facts, not disputed controversial theories that are not supported by most scholars in the field. --Kurdo777 (talk) 05:17, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * WP:UNDUE and WP:LEAD say nothing about how "the vast majority of academic works on the topic, ... dismiss the "communist fear" theory." Only you do. --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:03, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

Can each editor cite examples from modern journals and texts that support either of the two theories: At issue is not just direct communist influence in Iran (ie tudeh party). The issue is fear of Soviet influence.--Work permit (talk) 05:09, 9 March 2010 (UTC) Lets not debate the valididty of each source. Just list the academic author, the source, and the relevant passage below.--Work permit (talk) 05:19, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Smokescreen :the Eisenhower admistration was not motivated by fear of soviet influence in Iran
 * Fear : The Eisenhower admistration was motivated by fear of soviet influence in Iran
 * What do you mean "Lets not debate the validity of each source"? This is a controversial topic, a source has to be recent, reliable, neutral and written by an academic or a historian. --Kurdo777 (talk) 05:25, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I should have said lets not debate them for now. The goal right now is just a list under each heading.  Debating each source comes after listing them out.  I think it's a useful way to structure the debate.  jstor id's would be ideal, but just the title and author is fine.  And the relevant passage if you like.--Work permit (talk) 05:30, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I agree that those two present valid reductionist choices, while missing some simple, over-riding, and neutral others: those of various facts and chronology. What are the publication dates of the sources? Are these sources during, or after the Cold War?    Virtually all sources are acceptable, but those written during the Cold War saw it as very real, certainly Lenczowski., while those written afterward, enjoy the opportunity to Monday-morning-quarterback historical relative importance.  You should also add a ‘Both’ choice, since Abrahamian notes such in his large quote.CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 05:51, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Understood. I added "Both".  Needless to say, the issue to be resolved is what did the Eisenhower administration think then.  Not what should they have thought, with hindsight.--Work permit (talk) 06:44, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * … and after looking at that giant quote, and its discussion, twice, the two choices alternately might be re-phrased better in the present view as the Soviet threat and as Oil, since no sources dispute the Cold War had influence at the time. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 06:32, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * The giant quote is from an interview. That's not the best of sources. I think we would do best in this smoke vs fear section by citing peer reviewed journal articles. Books (that have citations/footnotes) are not quite as good, since they don't go through peer review (though they do go through editorial review). Books without citations are not as good as books with citations. Interviews even less valuable.  Of course, the reputablity of the author is also to be taken into account.--Work permit (talk) 06:53, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

No, not all sources are acceptable. The cold-war era publications are unacceptable and inadmissible, since the the declassified documents have since raveled that mass media, even the BBC, were complicit in the coup, and numerous authors and journalists were ordered or bribed to portray Mossadegh as a stooge of the Soviets, in order to justify the coup for the public opinion in the West. We are not going to recycle propaganda from Cold-war era, please stick to modern, reliable, neutral, scholarly works. --Kurdo777 (talk) 07:09, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * You're currently debating an empty list. The debate can come next, once we actually have all the sources. You mention the recently declassified materials. Please add referred journal articles that discuss and cite them.  Needless to say, you're free not to particpate, or in fact ignore everything I have to say or ask.  I'm only here to help.  --Work permit (talk) 07:16, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I do agree that news articles from the time are not very valuable. I did ask above each editor cite examples from modern journals and texts that support either of the two theories--Work permit (talk) 07:24, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * What I am debating is what type of a source we can or cannot use, given the complexity of this topic. Here is a list of some of the declassified documents about the coup. --Kurdo777 (talk) 07:32, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Ok, that's a start. Do you have the full set of documents? That would be helpful.  Unfortunately, these are wp:primary sources.  Please read our policy on primary sources.  Much better would be wp:secondary sources that discuss the documents. Do you have a reference for an article from an academic journal that discusses these documents?--Work permit (talk) 07:47, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

I've added a couple of sources to show a useful format. I've used the citation template, don't feel you have to be that precise. Lets keep discussions out of the next two sections. Keep discussions in this section.--Work permit (talk) 08:29, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

Changes by CasualObserver'48
In this edit :, in the lead section , a new sentence that changes the whole meaning is added ."increasing communist involvement" is an addition that legitimizes the involvement of the anti-communist powers and is a violation of fringe theory (WP:FRINGE) and undue weight (WP:UNDUE), and not the mainstream scholarly view on the subject. More than that, if we are going to change a sourced material from a book , we may first discuss it in talk page to know if the previous understanding of the sentence was wrong , then inserting a new sentence. About the section (George Lenczowski source), that view is one view among many, and if we are going to use this source , we may first mention that this is the Lenczowski's point of view and not all the scholar's view. --Alborz Fallah (talk) 07:22, 16 January 2010 (UTC)


 * I restored that section, as your deletion of it introduced problems with reading flow and spelling. As well, the quote was attributed directly to George Lenczowski, not hidden from context, so the reader who believes Lenczowski to be a fringe observer will be able to judge for himself. Binksternet (talk) 15:22, 16 January 2010 (UTC)


 * I think the last version covers the problems . What do you think ?--Alborz Fallah (talk) 16:52, 16 January 2010 (UTC)
 * I fixed the problems you introduced with spacing around Lenczowski, but the wording is okay. I also restored your deletion of the bit about communism—it is prominent in the reference source. I named the reference and used it to support the communism bit more directly. Binksternet (talk) 17:27, 16 January 2010 (UTC)


 * The new wording is OK with NPOV and I like it, but the comment about communism is not a direct sentence from "LaTulippe" . If we are referencing it to that source , shouldn't it be mentioned in the book ? --Alborz Fallah (talk) 18:13, 16 January 2010 (UTC)


 * The lead can not be changed with a WP:CONS. As per George Lenczowsk, he is not a historian, the book cited is not expert book about the coup, and his calling of the coup an "anti-coup", makes him a fringe theorist who should not be used in the article at all per WP:undue. --Wayiran (talk) 19:47, 16 January 2010 (UTC)
 * Yes the wording is fine. Guys I enjoyed reading this article (took me long time). I have also a bit problem with those about communism which is not a direct use of source. I think, Communism in this event was the smoke-screen, not any unveisrally held opinion. Also, Lenczowsk is basically stating that Mossadegh was staged a coup, and this was an anti-coup. This is really a minority view, and the wiki policy is clear that "If a viewpoint is held by an extremely small (or vastly limited) minority, it does not belong in Wikipedia " (wp:undue as others are saying too). Xashaiar (talk) 20:02, 16 January 2010 (UTC)

CasualObserver'48 replaced the lead with the bolded section-- now the subject of controversy. In a plan called Operation Ajax, the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped organize and execute the overthrow of the nationalist government of Prime Minister Mosaddeq. This came about in part from America's fear of increasingly aggressive Soviet-backed communism in Iran,

CasualObserver'48, you must work toward establishing {{WP:consensus]] and you have not done this. Please try to persuade those of us reading this talk page (and who have a long history writing and editing this article) that what you have repeatedly added to the lead of this article is the unchallenged mainstream view by historians of this coup. Using mainstream sources AND PAGE NUMBERS from recognized historians, journalists or academics who are expert in this subject, please show that this was THE single primary motivation of the US government. If you believe this strongly, you ought to be able to prove it. We will listen. In the absence of proof, you are acting as the catalyst for an unnecessary edit war. Skywriter (talk) 19:02, 17 January 2010 (UTC)


 * The reversions against CasualObserver'48 are wholly unsatisfactory. George Lenczowski is no wild-eyed fringe character. His observations are valid, and they are even credited to him, which means that readers can gauge their worth according to the source. Regarding LaTulippe, the fact that mainstream U.S. historical works about the coup consistently include some form of "American fears of increased Soviet communism in Iran" should rouse some sort of mirroring response here at this article, but patriotic Iranian editors repeatedly refuse this bit. The situation is ridiculous. Binksternet (talk) 20:33, 17 January 2010 (UTC)

We had an agreement to propose and discuss all major edits, and obtain a WP:CONS before implementing them. George Lenczowski is neither a historian nor an expert on 1953 coup, and the simple fact that he calls the 1953 coup, an "anti-coup" disqualifies him as mainstream source. --Kurdo777 (talk) 22:12, 17 January 2010 (UTC)


 * Uh, no. Whatever George Lenczowski says is said with the authority of years of research. If he says "anti-coup", then so be it. Let's pull off the blinders and take a fresh look at the man's work. Binksternet (talk) 22:23, 17 January 2010 (UTC)
 * That's not how Wikipedia works sir. This was a coup d'état, that's an undisputed fact supported by all mainstream scholarly sources, and the reason why the page is titled 1953 Iranian coup d'état. When some politically-motivated commentator makes a revisionist claim that it was a "anti-coup", then in accordance with WP:Undue, such extreme minority view should not be given any weight or quoted in the page. And that's besides the fact that George Lenczowski is no authority on this subject anyways. --Kurdo777 (talk) 22:32, 17 January 2010 (UTC)


 * This is not about Lenczowski, Bink. It is about this article. One scholar's view can be an outlier. That does not mean it is the view accepted by experts in the field. The attempt here is to make this the dominant viewpoint: the lead that is supposed to fairly summarize the historical viewpoints. To restate: Using mainstream sources AND PAGE NUMBERS from recognized historians, journalists or academics who are expert in this subject, please show that this was THE single primary motivation of the US government. Skywriter (talk) 00:39, 18 January 2010 (UTC)

Outdent:First, let me apologize for seeming disruptive; other than watching history, I never looked at the talk page until informed, thanks Sky. Second, I note we all are seasoned editors, and I will engage toward the consensus, of which I am now part, and which apparently, caused some imbalance. Third, although personally familiar with Iran, I tend to edit farther to the west, so I am unfamiliar with other editors here, and how best to include RS’d edits efficiently. Fourth, I saw reasoned support for my edits, as well as some proper re-wordings of them, by those generally opposed. Fifth, I note unhappily that none of my lede edits remain, but happily that zurkhaneh is blue. And sixth, I see the page is locked, sorry for that, sysop; but for my part, it is no longer needed.

My editorial and RS objection to the previous version, was that while Ajax was the CIA’s baby, the whole success of that coup is blamed solely on the CIA; that is SYNTH and just not possible, mumkin neest. It is no more possible than saying everybody involved all went one way; that didn’t happen, Iranian society is too open, though governments differ considerably. Quite frankly, my refs do not include too many details on this subject; they tend to cover the forest rather than individual trees. Lenczowski is an RS’d source; the coup/counter-coup wording seems only point of view, as noted below and certainly not fringe. My relevant edit included two parts: ones in the lede, and the Lenczowski cite farther down. I added ‘helped organize…’; that is backed up quite fully by Lencz. I also added ‘communism’, which Bink improved to RS. What is wrong with a linked Cold War?

I will close with part of the first para (p.32) from Lencz’s 8-page discussion of The Mossadegh Oil Crisis in Iran. It says: “The two administrations gave a different emphasis to the crisis. Whereas Truman’s concern centered primarily on the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, Eisenhower had to face a constitutional crisis in Iran that originated in the oil issue but evolved into a struggle for political control of the country. It was in this second phase that the climax to the entire crisis occurred.” [Additionally late reply, due to real life and internet connection problems]  Regards, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 06:19, 18 January 2010 (UTC)


 * CasualObserver wrote--"Lencz’s 8-page discussion of The Mossadegh Oil Crisis in Iran. It says: “The two administrations gave a different emphasis to the crisis. Whereas Truman’s concern centered primarily on the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, Eisenhower had to face a constitutional crisis in Iran that originated in the oil issue but evolved into a struggle for political control of the country. It was in this second phase that the climax to the entire crisis occurred.”


 * This is both a tight and useful summary that can be added to the article (with page number for that exact quote) as it does fairly reflect what mainstream historians and journalists have written. Anyone disagree? Skywriter (talk) 20:28, 18 January 2010 (UTC)


 * Pardon, but I think what I said remained unnoticed in debate . I said : "The comment about communism is not a direct sentence from "LaTulippe" . If we are referencing it to that source , shouldn't it be mentioned in the book ?" Thank you again .--Alborz Fallah (talk) 13:32, 19 January 2010 (UTC)
 * Others may comment also, but for myself, my first question is: Do you mean a direct quote? If that is what you are asking, it is my understanding of the wiki-rules that it does not, necessarily.  The specific words used need to neutrally reflect those of the reference, be verifiable, and come from consensus.  While looking into your question, the most helpful section I found was WP:LEADCITE, with further information at WP:V and Citing sources.  I hope that helps. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 02:07, 20 January 2010 (UTC)


 * reply to Alborz Fallah-- The reference to LaTulippe is not to a book. It is to an opinion article posted on a blog. The author is someone in Ohio with an opinion but no recognized subject matter expertise in the topic of this article. As I have consistently argued, that reference ddoes not belong in this article. Skywriter (talk) 21:43, 12 March 2010 (UTC)

No Progress toward a new consensus. None.
I do not get the feeling that some editors are negotiating in good faith. Evident, instead, is flagrant point-of-view WP:POV pushing. Same words, different source doesn't cut it.

Is it too much to ask that editors begin with the WP:RS reliable secondary source and faithfully register what each author has written, instead of selecting a POV with specific wording and try to shove that square peg into a round hole. One size, indeed, does not fit all.

As to the content, Boogalouie, for a year or more, you have been pressing to make United States fear of the former Soviet Union the guiding motivation, the justification, the apologia behind this coup. Each time other editors come along to point out that secondary sources point to other motivations, you stubbornly return to this. While we are impressed with your stamina, we are not impressed with POV-pushing. I ask that you stop. Stick to the facts. What goes into each article is not about what we think, it is what the consensus is among intellectuals who have studied the topic and taken the time to write histories of it. Skywriter (talk) 23:52, 30 January 2010 (UTC)


 * This is pretty outrageous! There are all manner of books and scholars supporting the motivation of fear of communism for the coup. Where is your evidence? Who's "we"? --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:23, 2 February 2010 (UTC)
 * PS, How can you pontificate as a defender of RS when after months of editting and months after I noted it the citation from an unsigned essay "BUZZFLASH READER REVIEW" http://www.buzzflash.com/contributors/03/08/25_shah.html is still in the article???? --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:34, 2 February 2010 (UTC)


 * What's stopping you from taking it out, booga? Skywriter (talk) 03:27, 3 February 2010 (UTC)
 * What do you think? rvts by your people. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:35, 3 February 2010 (UTC)

(unindent)Your people???? The portrayal of yourself as long-suffering is ripe. Get a grip, booga. Skywriter (talk) 21:58, 12 March 2010 (UTC)


 * ...And that's where your stance fails. The intellectuals are divided on the issue—there is no consensus among them. What we do is report what they have said, and how they differ. Binksternet (talk) 23:58, 30 January 2010 (UTC)
 * I can agree with that sentiment, though less intellectual. What we do is report what RSs say; not only what they say now, but also what they have said in the past.  With those balanced properly, we may arrive at something closer to NPOV, rather than the current filtered and selective RSs, which synthesizes a particular position favoring blow-back, as the lead now implies.  CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 04:25, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

What to do
Since we seem to have hit a dead end in reaching consensus, I propose we seek mediation or arbitration of the article. (I've suggested this before and found little interest, I know.) What would the editors who are not satisfied with the lack of any mention of coldwar motivation of the coup in the lead and undue WP:weight given to alleged covetting of Iran's oil by coup-makers, (and the lack of any mention of anything that might be considered a criticism of Mosaddegh) in the article think of rewriting the article to our satisfaction on a separate page in preparation for mediation or arbitration of the article? I'm thinking of CasualObserver and Binksternet and maybe some editors who dropped out of the editing recently.

I've started such a rewrite on my talk page but it can be moved to another location if desired. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:50, 3 February 2010 (UTC)


 * Booga, please do not invite people who agree with you to edit this article on your talk page. This is the talk page for this article; discussion should appear here and edits in the article itself. If you do not agree, that issue can certainly be mediated or arbitrated in any way you like.
 * OK, and the rewriting of the article (a proposed rewriting that is) on some talk page on wikipedia is part of that mediation or arbitration. --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:56, 4 February 2010 (UTC)
 * Please do not misconstrue the positions of your fellow editors. The following, for example, misrepresents detailed presentations of your fellow editors. What would the editors who are not satisfied with the lack of any mention of coldwar motivation of the coup (and the lack of any mention of anything that might be considered a criticism of Mosaddegh)...


 * The discussion has always focused on WP:weight. The disagreement focuses on whether western interest in Iranian oil was a prominent motivation for the coup, as the WP:RS have long said it was, adding that the Cold War played a part. Blaming the Soviet Union for the coup is, as you know, akin to the US claiming The devil made me do it.


 * No WP:RS have not long said it, but I have corrected my initial statement with new words in italics to address your complaint. --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:56, 4 February 2010 (UTC)


 * What exactly your "criticisms" of Mossadegh are, you have not made clear. What do you want to say? And what are your sources for saying it? This is all about facts and presenting them faithfully as related by secondary sources, I am sure you would agree. The goal is to keep our personal opinions out of it and not engage in or add original research. Skywriter (talk) 02:28, 4 February 2010 (UTC)


 * One of the complaints against Mosaddegh by the US coup supporters (and especially the UK ones) was that Mosaddeq didn't think or behave rationally, but you may be right that my attempts to add that information are all on the related mosaddeq article, not on this article. I will work on a paragraph or to about the issue of criticism of Mosaddeq. --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:56, 4 February 2010 (UTC)


 * Historians describe him as a colorful character, flamboyant, dramatic, and a master politician. Who among "US coup supporters (and especially the UK ones)" claimed he was irrational? Skywriter (talk) 20:09, 4 February 2010 (UTC)

Should we have a WP:RfC or wait?
The request being for comments by other wikipedia editors on whether the current lead edited by Skywriter and Kurdo is preferable to lead written by myself, CasualObserver and Binksternet? The alternative being to wait until we have an agreed on alternative to the first section after the lead. --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:18, 2 March 2010 (UTC)
 * The current lead is your lead, with a some minor modifications mostly dealing with grammar and spelling. Wikipedia is a collaborative project, you can't possibly expect other editors to endorse every little detail of your proposed lead. --Kurdo777 (talk) 22:37, 2 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I think I can be the judge of what is my lead and the current lead is not mine. It has been edited by you and sky to your satisfaction and I consider it crude and crappily written. --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:41, 3 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Boogalouie, your ad hominem attacks are tiresome. Your criticism is vague. Crude and crappily written? Please state the specifics of your disagreement-- the exact wording with which you disagree and what you think makes more sense. Don't send us somewhere else to look for your suggested changes. Say what you mean within the thread. And please stop attacking fellow editors. Thank you.Skywriter (talk) 21:49, 12 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Here is the difference between my change in the lead and the changes you and Kurdo made.
 * Crude is here: The 1953 Iranian coup d’état (referred to as 28 Mordad coup d'état in Iran), was the overthrow by the CIA of the democratically-elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. The CIA overthrew? They charged into Mosaddeq's house and arrested him.
 * Mossadegh’s supporters were rounded up, imprisoned, tortured or executed. The minister of Foreign Affairs and the closest associate of Mossadegh, Hossein Fatemi, was repeatedly stabbed by a mob, and later executed by a firing squad. [16] Fatemi was the only supporter executed. --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:08, 13 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Booga, your contention is unnecessarily belligerent and lacking in collegiality. Characterizing one version as "crude" and your own as an improvement, without citing any particular factual or grammatical errors heightens the negative tension to flatter your own ego. When you study the history, you will find this is a factually correct statement widely accepted by historians and throughout the world: The 1953 Iranian coup d’état (referred to as 28 Mordad coup d'état in Iran), was the overthrow by the CIA of the democratically-elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. Skywriter (talk) 18:39, 11 April 2010 (UTC)


 * Booga--please STOP CONFLATING my edits with anyone else's. I removed the bolding from the lead sentence and I removed the clumsy wording of what various parties called the coup. And, today, I removed bogus references, which I had mentioned previously are bogus but you saw fit to include in your version. Further, it is factually incorrect to say "Fatemi was the only supporter executed." What is your source for that statement? Skywriter (talk) 00:27, 13 March 2010 (UTC)

Smokescreen

 * Here is a list of some of the declassified documents about the coup.--Work permit (talk) 07:47, 9 March 2010 (UTC) And here are all the documents--Work permit (talk) 00:46, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * "The New York Times recently leaked a CIA report on the 1953 American-British overthrow of Mossadeq, Iran's Prime Minister. It billed the report as a secret history of the secret coup, and treated it as an invaluable substitute for the U. S. files that remain inaccessible. But a reconstruction of the coup from other sources, especially from the archives of the British Foreign Office, indicates that this report is highly sanitized. It glosses over such sensitive issues as the crucial participation of the U. S. ambassador in the actual overthrow; the role of U. S. military advisers; the harnessing of local Nazis and Muslim terrorists; and the use of assassinations to destabilize the government. What is more, it places the coup in the context the Cold War rather than that of the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis — a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World.”--Work permit (talk) 00:23, 10 March 2010 (UTC)


 * In a daily TV/radio news program hosted by Amy Goodman, historian Ervand Abrahamian says "Yes, I think oil is the central issue. But of course this was done at the height of the Cold War, so much of the discourse at the time linked it to the Cold War. I think many liberal historians, including of course Stephen Kinzer’s wonderful book here, even though it’s very good in dealing with the tragedy of the ‘53 coup, still puts it in this liberal framework that the tragedy, the original intentions, were benign.—that the U.S. really got into it because of the Cold War and it was hoodwinked into it by the nasty British who of course had oil interests, but the U.S. somehow was different. U.S. Eisenhower’s interest, were really anti-communism. I sort of doubt that interpretation. For me, the oil was important both for the United States and for Britain. It’s not just the question of oil in Iran. It was a question of control over oil internationally"--Work permit (talk) 00:23, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * In a daily TV/radio news program hosted by Amy Goodman, historian Ervand Abrahamian says "Yes, I think oil is the central issue. But of course this was done at the height of the Cold War, so much of the discourse at the time linked it to the Cold War. I think many liberal historians, including of course Stephen Kinzer’s wonderful book here, even though it’s very good in dealing with the tragedy of the ‘53 coup, still puts it in this liberal framework that the tragedy, the original intentions, were benign.—that the U.S. really got into it because of the Cold War and it was hoodwinked into it by the nasty British who of course had oil interests, but the U.S. somehow was different. U.S. Eisenhower’s interest, were really anti-communism. I sort of doubt that interpretation. For me, the oil was important both for the United States and for Britain. It’s not just the question of oil in Iran. It was a question of control over oil internationally"--Work permit (talk) 00:23, 10 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Alan Greenspan: The Age of Turbulence (2007): "What do governments whose economics and citizens have become heavily dependent on imports of oil do when the flow becomes unreliable? The intense attention of the developed world to Middle Eastern political affairs has always been critically tied to oil security. The reaction to, and reversal of, Mossadeq's nationalization of Anglo-Iranian Oil in 1951 and the aborted effort of Britain and France to reverse Nasser's takeover of the key Suez Canal link for oil flows to Europe in 1956 are but two prominent historical examples."--Wayiran (talk) 20:39, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * David S. Robarge: "The target was not an oppressive Soviet puppet but a democratically elected government whose populist ideology and nationalist fervor threatened Western economic and geopolitical interests. The CIA's covert intervention—codenamed TPAJAX—preserved the Shah's power and protected Western control of a hugely lucrative oil infrastructure. It also transformed a turbulent constitutional monarchy into an absolutist kingship and induced a succession of unintended consequences at least as far ahead as the Islamic revolution of 1979."--Wayiran (talk) 20:39, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Comment. This quote is Robarge bringing his reader up to speed on Kinzer, in his review of Kinzer's book. The quoted section is in no way a representation of Robarge's personal opinion; it is merely Robarge's brief summary of Kinzer's position. You can see Robarge's own opinion listed in the "Fear" section. Binksternet (talk) 22:48, 10 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Retired Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson testified January 2008 in front of the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, and gave a prepared speech entitled Iraq: Alternative Strategies in a Post-Surge Environment: "Iran is the hegemon of the Persian Gulf. We recognized this when we helped orchestrate the overthrow of the first democratically-elected government in the history of Persia, led by Mohammad Mossadegh, in 1953. We installed the Shah and he was in power for 26 years and was, so to speak, our hegemon."--Wayiran (talk) 20:39, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * US Senator Robert Byrd's 2004 book, Losing America: Confronting a Reckless and Arrogant Presidency, page 132: "The thirty-six-year-old shah had been installed in his marble palace in 1953 by a CIA-backed coup against Iran's nationalist leader Mohammad Mossadegh, who planned to nationalize Iran's oil resources. That could have meant prosperity for the Iranian people. But in 1955, U.S. companies were pumping over 50 percent of the oil from the Mideast and providing Europe with over 90 percent of its oil imports. One could well see why Mossadegh was not in US plans for the region."--Wayiran (talk) 20:39, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Will Fight For Oil, by Ted Koppel: "Because Mossadegh was such a fervent nationalist—utterly devoted to Iran's independence and repelled by the very idea of foreign interference—his government was no more prone to falling under Russian influence than British or American. In fact, if Iran were to come under the wing of anyone, it would have been the United States itself. Dr. Mossadegh, who once posed with President Truman on the steps of DC's Blair House, admired and trusted America, which he visited on several occasions. On the other hand, Mossadegh never once appealed to the Soviets for help, and even refused to grant them oil concessions. Yet Mossadegh's repeated pleas for U.S. aid via cable correspondence were rejected by Eisenhower; a missed opportunity of epic proportions."--Wayiran (talk) 20:39, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Comment Wayiran, could you please add appropriate external links or cites where these originate, as well as their dates, so others may veify the context and content. Thanks, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 03:00, 11 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Question Is the Ted Ted Koppel reference a personal observation by Koppel, or is he reporting on an experts statement?--Work permit (talk) 05:54, 11 March 2010 (UTC)
 * here's the piece. its an op-ed column.  --Work permit (talk) 22:37, 27 March 2010 (UTC)

Fear

 * p xix "A central question he (Byrne) addresses is how to explain the evolution from Truman's relatively even-handed approach to Eisenhowers advocacy of direct, covert involvement. A variety of factors came into play, but the fundamental explanation lies in the unfolding cold war rivalary between the United States and the Soviet Union.   A string of events, primarily in the region, helped to convince the White House that the Kremlin posed a fundamental threat to expanded post-war U.S. interests"--Work permit (talk) 08:32, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * p xix "A central question he (Byrne) addresses is how to explain the evolution from Truman's relatively even-handed approach to Eisenhowers advocacy of direct, covert involvement. A variety of factors came into play, but the fundamental explanation lies in the unfolding cold war rivalary between the United States and the Soviet Union.   A string of events, primarily in the region, helped to convince the White House that the Kremlin posed a fundamental threat to expanded post-war U.S. interests"--Work permit (talk) 08:32, 9 March 2010 (UTC)


 * p 275 "What motives led U.S. policymakers to overthrow Mosaddeq? It is often argued68 that the main motive behind the coup was the desire of U.S. policymakers to help U.S. oil companies gain a share in Iranian oil production.68 On the face of it, this argument has considerable merit. The Eisenhower administration was certainly favorable to U.S. business interests, and the Dulles brothers' law firm had often represented U.S. oil companies in legal matters. Moreover, the final agreement worked out in 1954 with the Zahedi government gave U.S. companies a 40% share in Iranian oil production, which had previously been controlled by the British. While this view cannot entirely be refuted, it seems more plausible to argue that U.S. policymakers were motivated mainly by fears of a communist takeover in Iran, and that the involvement of U.S. companies was sought mainly to prevent this from occurring.  The Cold War was at its height in the early 1950s, and the Soviet Union was viewed as an expansionist power seeking world domination. Eisenhower had made the Soviet threat a key issue in the 1952 elections, accusing the Democrats of being soft on communism and of having "lost China." Once in power, the new administration quickly sought to put its views into practice..."
 * 68See, e.g., Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 412-20; and Bahman Nirumand, Iran: The New Imperialism in Action (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 5.--Work permit (talk) 08:45, 9 March 2010 (UTC)--Work permit (talk) 08:47, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Close, but other terms more appropriate. George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, (1990), (p.36): CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 10:43, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Upon his assumption of the presidency, Eisenhower found the situation in Iran vastly changed. The initial focus on the dispute over oil was becoming quickly overshadowed by the struggle between Mossadegh and the shah.  … Mossadegh took a succession of steps to ensure his control of the country: (a) he wrested command of the military from the shah by arranging that his own supporter, General Taghi Raihi, become chief of staff; (b) he secured from the Majlis approval of his rule by decree for six months with an extension for another six months; (c) he induced the Majlis to vote the dissolution of the Senate; (d) in July 1953 he called, in turn, for the dissolution of the Majlis and by August 12, through a referendum marked by intimidation, he obtained popular approval of this measure. While thus consolidating his power and reducing the shah to the position of a figurehead, Mossadegh tried to secure from the newly elected President Eisenhower financial aid to rescue Iran from the economic crisis which his intransigent oil policy had brought about.  His strategy revolved around two major points: (1) prevent and/or destroy American-British cooperation on the Iranian problem and (2) gain American support by threatening that in its absence Iran would fall victim to a communist takeover.  The latter was a specious argument because it was precisely Mossadegh’s reckless policy on oil, his challenging of the shah’s power, and the ensuing chaos that were the main reasons for the Communist upsurge in Iran.
 * Upon his assumption of the presidency, Eisenhower found the situation in Iran vastly changed. The initial focus on the dispute over oil was becoming quickly overshadowed by the struggle between Mossadegh and the shah.  … Mossadegh took a succession of steps to ensure his control of the country: (a) he wrested command of the military from the shah by arranging that his own supporter, General Taghi Raihi, become chief of staff; (b) he secured from the Majlis approval of his rule by decree for six months with an extension for another six months; (c) he induced the Majlis to vote the dissolution of the Senate; (d) in July 1953 he called, in turn, for the dissolution of the Majlis and by August 12, through a referendum marked by intimidation, he obtained popular approval of this measure. While thus consolidating his power and reducing the shah to the position of a figurehead, Mossadegh tried to secure from the newly elected President Eisenhower financial aid to rescue Iran from the economic crisis which his intransigent oil policy had brought about.  His strategy revolved around two major points: (1) prevent and/or destroy American-British cooperation on the Iranian problem and (2) gain American support by threatening that in its absence Iran would fall victim to a communist takeover.  The latter was a specious argument because it was precisely Mossadegh’s reckless policy on oil, his challenging of the shah’s power, and the ensuing chaos that were the main reasons for the Communist upsurge in Iran.


 * Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran Author = Behrooz, Editted by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.102,  This reference was similarly rejected previously.  CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 11:10, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * "Newly available CIA documentation on the role of the United States and Great Britain in toppling the nationalist government of Mohammad Mosaddeq presents a single, all-embracing motive for the coup. CIA analyst Donald N. Wilbert's Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran: November 1952 – August 1953 suggests that fear that the Tudeh Party might push Iran into the Soviet camp—geopolitical anxieties conditioned by the cold war—were of prime concern to the perpetrators of the plot and the main justification for Operation TPAJAX. The new CIA documents argue that with the deterioration of Iran's economy under the nationalists, chaos and collapse were probable and would ultimately lead to the loss of Iran to the West. The oil issue is deemed to be of secondary importance in the new documents and is explained away by pointing to an oversupply of petroleum on the international market."


 * April 2007 review by Dr. David S. Robarge of Kinzer's book. Robarge is the chief historian of the Central Intelligence Agency. The review is hosted on www.cia.gov. Robarge writes, "Mossadeq failed at a basic test of statecraft—trying to understand other leaders' perspectives on the world. By ignoring the anticommunist basis of US policy, he wrenched the dispute with the AIOC out of its Cold War context and saw it only from his parochial nationalist viewpoint." Robarge notes that Kinzer depicts Eisenhower as being the dupe of the Dulles brothers, but Robarge contrasts that image as running against recent scholarship of Ike's presidency showing him in "masterful control of his administration". Binksternet (talk) 04:49, 10 March 2010 (UTC)


 * SnowFire's compilation. In June 2009, User:SnowFire started a list of sources for the 'fear' side of the argument. BoogaLouie has been adding to it since then. Binksternet (talk) 04:52, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * and BoogaLouie has added new excerpts from this talk page to the Talk:1953_Iranian_coup_d'état/Communism_sources page as well to make it as complete as possible. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:40, 10 March 2010 (UTC)


 * 2003 book by Douglas Little, page 216 of American orientalism: the United States and the Middle East since 1945. Douglas Little, Ph.D. Professor, Department of History at Clark University, a specialist in the history of American diplomacy, writes that in March 1951, Americans in the White House who were watching Iran worried that "the Pahlavi regime might be swept away by revolutionaries with ties to Moscow." Little quotes an American official at the end of 1951 who wrote "Iran could be effectively lost to the free world."


 * 2008 book entitled Eminent Persians: the men and women who made modern Iran, 1941–1979: in two volumes, Volume 1, page 244. Author Abbas Milani, historian and Iranologist, describes a warning given to Mossadeq a few days before the coup, given by Alahyar Saleh, Iran's US ambassador. Saleh's analysis concluded that the US was worried about Mossadeq's relations with the communists, and that the US was worried Mossadeq could not stand up to them.

"By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the Mossadeq government in Iran was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western countries; was reaching a dangerous and advanced stage of illegal deficit financing; was disregarding the Iranian constitution in prolonging Premier Mohammed Mossadeq's tenure of office; was motivated mainly by Mossadeq's desire for personal power;  was governed by irresponsible policies based on emotion; had weakened the Shah and the Iranian Army to a dangerous degree; and had cooperated closely with the Tudeh (Commmunist) Party of Iran. In view of these factors, its was estimated that Iran was in real danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain;  if that happened it would mean a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a major setback for the West in the Middle East.  No remedial action other then the covert action plan set forth below could be found to improve the existing state of affairs"
 * . An internal CIA document, written in March 1954 by Donald Wilber, one of the operation’s chief planners. Leaked to the NY times and published on June 18, 2000.  wp:primary source.--Work permit (talk) 03:48, 11 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Francis J. Gavin, Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950-1953, Journal of Cold War Studies, 1.1 (1999) p.56-89


 * Steve Marsh, Continuity and Change: Reinterpreting the Policies of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations toward Iran, 1950-1954], Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 7, Number 3, Summer 2005, pp. 79-123 (summary/abstract)
 * "It has long been argued that the Eisenhower administration pursued a more assertive policy toward Iran than the Truman administration did. This interpretative consensus, though, has recently come under challenge. In the Journal of Cold War Studies in 1999, Francis Gavin argued that U.S. policy toward Iran in 1950-1953 became progressively more assertive in response to a gradual shift in the global U.S.-USSR balance of power. This article shares, and develops further, Gavin's revisionist theme of policy continuity, but it explains the continuity by showing that Truman and Eisenhower had the same principal objectives and made the same basic assumptions when devising policy. The more assertive policy was primarily the result of the failure of U.S. policy by early 1952. The Truman administration subsequently adopted a more forceful policy, which Eisenhower simply continued until all perceived options for saving Iran from Communism were foreclosed other than that of instigating a coup to bring about a more pliable government."


 * So far, these are largely courtesy of serendipitous Faagel. I chased two of those he m:entions, and for those with connections that can access the articles, he provided more. Since I am learning as I go, I’ll quickly summarize.  These two papers are all fear, but they debate the povs behind the correct lede phrasing in the British and Harry-to-Ike transition edits/reversions. They mainly debate whether the Harry-Ike-change in policy (to a coup) was a white/black, Dem/Rep, liberal/conservative change in presidential policy, or whether it was a continuation of policy already set by Truman.  Lencz side-steps that, noting Harry was about solving oil dispute, and Ike more about saving the shah against Mossy’s moves, deterioration of situation and fear, approximately.  Oil was there in a can’t-loose-it-to-the-Soviets way, but no discussion about a changing consideration of oil, and certainly not the currently debated importance of oil by some; that seems new.  I just copied and saved these for ref. and will fill them in a bit, after I read them more fully. Appropriate formatting, helps establish WP:N Regards, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 10:43, 11 March 2010 (UTC)

"The palpable fear of a communist takeover changed the political alignment that dominated Iranian politics. The religious establishment, worried about communism, switched sides, as did key segments of the middle classes and commercial interests, and some nationalist leaders. The political realignment promoted concerted action by the alliance between the monarchy and the Iranian military in close cooperation with the United States and Britain. The result was a military coup that toppled Mosaddeq's government, ended the democratic interregnum, and restored power to the monarchy." "The opposition to Mosaddeq, led by the Shah, conservative politicians such as prime ministers Ahmad Qavam and General Ali Razamara .... and commanders of the military, most notably General Fazlollah Zahedi (d.1963), also believed that the British position was unjust and illegal. However, they thought that Mosaddeq's idealism had led to a Don Quixote foreign policy. ..."  "Regardless of the merits of Iran's position, it was unrealistic that the country would be able to win its case; in `charging the windmill,` Iran was more likely to jeopardize its national interests. Only five years after the Soviet attempt to separate Azerbaijan and Kurdistan from Iran, the monarchy and its allies believed that Iran's interests lay in close ties with the West to ward off the Soviet threat. Where as Mosaddeq saw Britain as the foreign devil, they saw Britain and its imperialism as the lesser evil. ..." (p.53) --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:42, 15 April 2010 (UTC)
 * 2006 book entitled Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty, By Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.53 [This book talks not about US or UK fear of Soviet expansion, but the fear of Mosaddeq's Iranian opponents.]

Both

 * George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, (1990) Duke University Press, ISBN=0-8223-0972-6, p. 6 General statement of post-WWII policy considerations: the “new postwar era witnessed an intensive involvement of the United States in the political and economic affairs of the Middle East, in contrast to the hands-off attitude characteristic of the prewar period. Under Truman the United States had to face and define its policy in all three sectors that provided the root causes of American interests in the region: the Soviet threat, the birth of Israel, and petroleum.”

Discussion of references
I've added an additional section called "Survey articles". As the name implies, it is meant to be a list of survey articles. If you are not familiar with the concept, please read the linked wikipedia article on it. The intention of this section is NOT to defend a particular position. The intention is to give rapid access to material scattered over many papers, so that editors can scan for potentially valuable references to use in the other three sections. Ideally the survey article would be published in reputable journal. The example I provided is from World politics, published by Cambridge University Press. I haven't personally scoured the article to see if there is anything useful. I only added it to show an example of an entry.--Work permit (talk) 05:45, 11 March 2010 (UTC)

It seems that specific (short) comments or questions would now be useful in above section. I suggest we keep out "rebuttals" for now. Only comments, questions, and answers directed to questions for now (ie no "follow-up" questions, or "follow up" comments). It should be short, one or two lines. It should be limited to simple clarifications or questions. There is a section below for more lengthy discussion. Our goal continues to be the creation of a list of wp:rs, to the extent we can find them.--Work permit (talk) 06:00, 11 March 2010 (UTC)

The comments should be limited to clarifications, for example, "that's not what the source said", or, "the source is quoting another article". Questions should be geared towards receiving clarification. PLEASE, no "rebuttals". That's what the section below is for.--Work permit (talk) 02:17, 12 March 2010 (UTC)

Regarding fear
regarding Gasiorowski (2004) & Gasiorowski (1987)
 * These last two are outdated, cold-war era sources. They are exactly the type of source we should not be using on this article. Also, Gasiorowski's take on the issues, greatly differs now from the one presented in 1987, we should stick to his latest works. Although, what you quoted from his 2004 work is about general US approach at the time, and irrelevant to this particular incident. --Kurdo777 (talk) 09:59, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * the 2004 chapter is by Byrne. Please check the source.  The 1987 work is in a peer reviewed journal, so the language would be expected to be more balanced then a book.--Work permit (talk) 11:16, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * While I understand this to be the previous editor's overall personal view concerning which references may be included in the article, I have yet to find a WP:bluelink policy or guideline that supports such an exclusion on those grounds. That excludes a vast body of work and points of view for a 40-year period, and appears to suffer excessively from recentism, which based on the dearth of references noted, appears to be a minority opinion. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 02:33, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Gasiorowski's take on the issues, greatly differs now from the one presented in 1987. How does it differ from his 2004 writing? It seems pretty similar to me. --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:42, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

regarding the cia documents:
Bear in mind that while these declassified CIA documents described in the New York Times help demonstrate the CIA lied and cheated and false-flagged during the coup, they do not demonstrate the US administration was not really worried about communism and communism in Iran.

Concerning the question of whether to join the UK in a plot to overthrow Mossy: "'The Americans, who `had not intended to discuss this question at all,` agreed to study it, the secret history says. It had attractions. Anti-Communism had risen to a fever pitch in Washington, and officials were worried that Iran might fall under the sway of the Soviet Union, a historical presence there. ...''The aim was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party.' [from here] |undefined"

Or that the CIA controlled the coup and the Iranians who actually did the work were nonentities and puppets. "The history says agency officers orchestrating the Iran coup worked directly with royalist Iranian military officers, handpicked the prime minister's replacement .... But on the night set for Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh's overthrow, almost nothing went according to the meticulously drawn plans, the secret history says. In fact, C.I.A. officials were poised to flee the country when several Iranian officers recruited by the agency, acting on their own, took command of a pro-shah demonstration in Tehran and seized the government. [from here]|undefined" BoogaLouie (talk) 20:15, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I agree, I don't see how these documents address the question of the administrations motives. I assume there are better sources that discuss oil as a motivating factor, but I don't see it--Work permit (talk) 21:31, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * There must be ... because Kurdo and Skywriter keep saying there are ... they just never provide them. --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:35, 9 March 2010 (UTC)


 * BoogaLouie, I remind you that I have contributed and written in most of the resources in the book section and today added nine more. Can you focus on the article and not other editors? Can you comment without attacking me? I find your comments to be uncivil. They have the effect of driving editors away from these pages. May I remind you also that I am not your personal researcher. Skywriter (talk) 23:02, 12 March 2010 (UTC)


 * You have made many edits to the article, many comments on the talk page, and I'm sure you have added bibliographic information too. What you haven't done is provide any evidence that the motivation for the coup did not involve fear of comunist expansion. .... There are Abrahamanian's assertions in the interview, but as these guys say, they aren't peer reviewed. --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:17, 13 March 2010 (UTC)--BoogaLouie (talk) 00:17, 13 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I'll do my own search on JSTOR. I assume there must be something. Interestingly, so far, the only reputable source provided here that supports the "oil" theory is the one I provided on the "fear" section..It is often argued that the main motive behind the coup was the desire of U.S. policymakers to help U.S. oil companies gain a share in Iranian oil production However, the sources used to support this staement date back to 1969 and 1972, well before the publication of the CIA documents in 1980.  As I said, I'll try looking myself--Work permit (talk) 00:11, 10 March 2010 (UTC)

Following is the First chapter, summary, of the declassified CIA documents. From my read, we may want to reclassify these documents as in favor of fear. Am I missing something? Following is the first paragraph. I bolded the statement which seems, at least to me, to support the fear theory: "By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the Mossadeq government in Iran was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western countries; was reaching a dangerous and advanced stage of illegal deficit financing; was disregarding the Iranian constitution in prolonging Premier Mohammed Mossadeq's tenure of office; was motivated mainly by Mossadeq's desire for personal power;  was governed by irresponsible policies based on emotion; had weakened the Shah and the Iranian Army to a dangerous degree; and had cooperated closely with the Tudeh (Commmunist) Party of Iran.  In view of these factors, its was estimated that Iran was in real danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain;  if that happened it would mean a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a major setback for the West in the Middle East.  No remedial action other then the covert action plan set forth below could be found to improve the existing state of affairs" --Work permit (talk) 01:05, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Well, that certainly sounds like Lenczowski, but in all good faith, Lencz does make a cryptic reference to ‘American oil companies’, as commented on this page before; this is re-formatted and corrected from that, but the link provided no way to delve into it more. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 02:07, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Well, yes. I was surprised that the "declassified CIA documents" was SO supportive of the FEAR doctrine. Lenczowski is now tame in comparison. I'm left with saying that the CIA sources are wp:primary and should not be taken so seriously as Lenczowski. But that was not my initial goal. I am, remember, trying to be neutral here.  The declassified CIA documents support the FEAR theory much more strongly then any other academic source--Work permit (talk) 03:00, 10 March 2010 (UTC)


 * After noting Truman cut off military aid to Iran in Jan’52 (p34), Lenczowski notes Truman was growing so exasperated with the British “rule or ruin’ policy in Iran that they were ready to cast aside cooperation and develop “an independent policy or run the gravest risk of having Iran disappear behind the Iron curtain and the whole military and political situation in the Middle East change adversely” (quote ref’d to Acheson’s Present at the Creation, p.682 (1969) Ed.1(?)). But it was precisely this risk of Soviet absorption of Iran that prompted Acheson, despite his own criticism of Eden’s foot-dragging, to insist on synchronization of American and British policy. Any break with London could weaken NATO ‘and require joint action by major American oil companies—an alternative Acheson dreaded to envision because of known opposition of “police dogs” in the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice. Of course, failure to make any headway in the solution of the dispute could not be blamed only on the British.’ [next para about Mossy’s side of blame](LenczAmPres. p35)
 * I am going to find wp:rs to refute you here. At least, I promise to do my best.  I presume other editors can do better--Work permit (talk) 03:00, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * As well you should; you volunteered to do so, and thanks. But, I am ambivalent about the result of your labors, since my question wasn’t on oil; I just repeated it from this page in a bend-over-backwards, AGF response to your question concerning “better sources that discuss oil as a motivating factor”. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 05:02, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Abrahamian seems to think the "secret cia leaked documents" was sanitized. The 1953 Coup in Iran. I think the right way to refute you is by refuting this sanitized version of events leaked by the CIA, and keep searching for Abrahamian.  I'll look for Noam Chomsky as well, I bet he has something to say about this.--Work permit (talk) 05:56, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I thought I hit pay dirt..a book by Abrahmamian AND Chomsky titled Targeting Iran. No way is is academic in any sort of way.  Unfortunately, just passing references to the coup as fulfilling US "geopolitical objectives"..  I'm not giving up.--Work permit (talk) 06:11, 10 March 2010 (UTC)

The declassified CIA documents appear to support the fear theory described above. Unless any editor objects, in a day, I will move it to the fear column.--Work permit (talk) 03:34, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * That is certainly my thought. Are these declassified docs the same ones noted by Behrooz? When were they declassified?  The parallel thoughts, and in-fact, similar wording with Lencz appears quite revealing. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 05:02, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * From the docs posted above I gather the full documents were released on June 18, 2000. Any academic author would have access to this information after that date. These are the only "secret CIA documents" that I have found.  They seem to be the ones that -Kurdo777 references.  Regarding "Behrooz", the answer is yes, assuming you mean the chapter in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 coup in Iran By Mark J. Gasiorowski, Malcolm Byrne.--Work permit (talk) 06:14, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Hmmm. What might one think of a source who reports this type of historical background and thinking a full decade before similar mentions are revealed publicly with the release of previously secret CIA docs?  I can think of several possibilities with direct impact on the present discussion, including that he had already read it, but will suggest the term ‘reliable’ as seeming quite important. When was the released report originally written?  Others may think differently and wish to comment.  CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 06:39, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * The initial report is dated Nov 1952-Aug 1953. It is the "famous" report written in March 1954 by Dr. Donald N. Wilber, who played an active role in the operation.  As stated above, all academics had this source by June, 2000.--Work permit (talk) 06:51, 10 March 2010 (UTC)

regarding the cia dcuments First of all, all those documents constitute a WP:Primary source, I never listed them under any column here, someone else must have put them there. I simply cited them as proof that Cold-War era sources should not be used, since these released documents clearly show that the mass media at that time, were instructed or bribed to portray Mossadegh in a bad light. Some of the books referenced/quoted on this web-page, may also help shed some light on the issue. Secondly, many editors with diffrening views, have been absent in this discussion, and there seems to be a monologue of like-minded users developing here. You need to take into consideration, that not everyone on Wikipedia is as active as some of the resident editors here, and slow down the pace a bit. --Kurdo777 (talk) 08:09, 10 March 2010 (UTC)


 * By "monologue" I guess you mean consensus. I oppose any proposal to slow this mediation down. If editors who have contributed to this page in the past wish to jump in, they can, but if they do not we cannot cease working on a solution out of deference to them. Binksternet (talk) 13:57, 10 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Clearly I listed the documents as you can see by my signature. The documents seem to come up from time to time in these talk pages, so I've included them as a reference, so that editors can clearly see what they are.  As I indicated previously, they are wp:primary.  I've left a message last night on Kurdo777  and Skywriter‎'s talk page.  Are there additional editors that should be contacted?--Work permit (talk) 14:23, 10 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Work permit, thank you for visiting my talk page. I did not receive your message because a longtime editor of this article erased your name and part of your message. Skywriter (talk) 21:53, 12 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Intended for Kurdo: Well… an uncommon, yet much anticipated response; but, where are Sky and Way, et.al.?; they have indicated a stake in this discussion, but currently seem to be missing. Please feel free to sound your alarm to them.  Yes, the CIA documents (to which I assume you have referred), were in fact placed temporarily in the ‘Pro-smokescreen’ column, by others; this is because you had indicated this is where you thought they should go; that is AGF.  And yes, the other editors currently here, do recognize those sources as ‘primary’, and we do appreciate your concurrence with that assessment, since all of us also have actual, other, real-life lives, which you now only seem to recognize as an imposition on your own real-life. We also, per policy, better-like secondary sources, which mention them; your stated and quite owning vision of consensus has seemed to have complicated that process.   In fact, your lack of consensual agreement, and your employed methods, have continued to be a non-AGF imposition upon us all.


 * To use your own words for parallel construction, ‘first of all’, tonight is Wed night for me in Asia, but likely just Wednesday for most of the others. Given that, it is my weeknight out with friends and therefore, I am less inhibited by sobriety and politically correct Wiki-isms.  Who do you think you are?  I recognize you as an editor with the same restrictions as I, or others.  Why should we all just wait for you to get your ducks in a row; we all have our own ducks to arrange.  If you are presuming that your ducks are more important or relevant than those of others, then, you have another think coming.  Your methods, pre-disposed point-of-view, and actions have disrupted me for two months now, and others for much longer.  I will give you some time, per AGF and the voluntary nature of our project work here, but do not expect me to bend over backwards to accept your stated temporal excuses at this point.  I and others are only here this way because you have provided little alternative to advance the project and article content quietly and more collaboratively.  At this point, your point of view remains poorly documented with RSs; I believe this is the time to improve your position by documentation, rapidly. Respectively, CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 14:44, 10 March 2010 (UTC)


 * If past experience is a guide, sooner or later the "many editors with diffrening views, [who] have been absent in this discussion" will show up to express their outrage, alleging "cherry picking" and "fringe sources" and so on. In the mean time IMHO we would do well to build a consensus version (if possible), to prepare for arbitration. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:12, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * PS I've added new excerpts from "the fear side" (George Lenczowski, the declassifed docs) to the old Snowfire Talk:1953 Iranian coup d'état/Communism sources page. Hope I haven't missed anything.
 * PPS, regarding the contention that the released CIA documents "clearly show that the mass media at that time, were instructed or bribed to portray Mossadegh in a bad light". The NYT did a article on that for their Secrets of History series, called C.I.A. Tried, With Little Success, to Use U.S. Press in Coup. It seems the US press did not know of or at least did not report that the CIA was organizing the coup and that "some of the unrest had been stage-managed by C.I.A. agents posing as Communists." Nothing about libelous attacks on Mosaddeq. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:52, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * To Binksternet: what consensus are you talking about? I am just going to WP:spade, and say that it's no secret that you, BoogaLouie, and a couple of other conservative/right-wing ideologues have a history of tag-teaming on this page, trying to white-wash the coup, making it look the best thing since sliced bread. A monologue among a group of like-minded editors does not constitute a consensus on anything. This is not a mediation either, nobody has requested mediation, Work permit is not a mediator. Oh and, you or CasualObserver are in no position to issue ultimatums or set deadlines for other editors. --Kurdo777 (talk) 18:48, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Please assume good faith WP:AGF and please do not accuse others of things that are not true. No one here is praising the coup, and speaking for myself, I am certainly not a right wing ideologue --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:35, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Kurdo, you would laugh if you knew my voting record, how it belies your supposition that I am right wing. I live in one of the most left-wing liberal parts of California, Oakland, and I have determined that, in general, I do not have to leave my house and vote in elections. The majority of my neighbors vote for me. ;^) Binksternet (talk) 22:48, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Mr. BoogaLouie. I am afraid Kurdo is right. A strong biased POV is observed repeatedly in your edits on Iran pages, this pattern has been a concern of mine too. The discussion here is too long for me to read entirely, but I will add some quotes about the motives of the coup plotters. --Wayiran (talk) 20:36, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I may or may not have made POV edits, but the issue at hand is a couple of other conservative/right-wing ideologues have a history of tag-teaming on this page, trying to white-wash the coup, making it look the best thing since sliced bread --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:13, 13 March 2010 (UTC

regarding Abrahmian interview by GOODMAN
How can any one speak for the thoughts of someone else? This seems to be drifting away from content, so I will attempt to bring it back. While the generally opposite characterization was used above, I will point out that the proper RS’d content term we should be talking about  is the usage by Ervand Abrahamian, from the giant quote: “Yes, I think  oil is the central issue. But of course this was done at the height of the Cold War, so much of the discourse at the time linked it to the Cold  War. I think many liberal historians, including of  course Stephen Kinzer’s wonderful book here, even though it’s very good  in dealing with the tragedy of the ‘53 coup, still puts it in this liberal framework that the tragedy, the original  intentions, were benign—that  the U.S. really got into it because of the Cold War and was hoodwinked  into it by the nasty British who of course had oil interests, but the  U.S. somehow was different, that the U.S. Eisenhower’s interests were  really anti-communism. I sort of doubt that interpretation.”

Does anybody have an inkling of what he is talking about? I am unfamiliar with what a “liberal historian” might be, but it seems to encompass some aspects of historiography and the like. This might allow some discussion how differing views might be presented in the article. I can accept most sources, it is just a matter of how they are included; what I can not easily accept is a consensus that is not based on the relative weight of RSs provided on the page. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 01:25, 11 March 2010 (UTC) P.S. I have just learned that the process appears to have moved on.
 * Perhaps he means a Liberal versus a Marxist framework?  See below comment Regarding Abrahamian (2001).  Abrahmian published a rebuttal to the fear theory in a peer reviewed marxist journal, Science & Society.--Work permit (talk) 02:50, 12 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I agree. Abrahamian may or may not be Marxist but his writing often gives class analysis and a lot fo attention to the Iranian left. --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:30, 13 March 2010 (UTC)

Regarding Wilkerson
Note that Wilkerson says that he has been "watching Iraq closely since 1990" when he was Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. He does not say he is an expert in Iran or in pre-1990 events. Binksternet (talk) 03:36, 11 March 2010 (UTC)

Note also that Wilkerson does not does not include something dismissing the idea of fear of communist expansion, [an example would be: "we were not worried about the Soviets, we wanted a hegemon under our control"]. I'm not sure any statement can qualifies as evidence of "smokescreen" in motivation of the coup without such a dismissal. Wanting a "hegemon under our control", wanting control of oil, are not at all mutually exclusive with fear of Soviet exansion (Soviets being, after all, Iran's northern neighbor, the world's second most powerful power and famous for adding Central Asian lands as Soviet Republics.)--BoogaLouie (talk) 19:21, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

Regarding Abrahamian (2001)
I've added a peer reviewed article by Abrahmian supporting "smokescreen". In it, he argues the 1953 CIA document was a whitewash. It's published in Science & Society, which "is the longest continuously published journal of Marxist scholarship, in any language, in the world. Science & Society is a peer-reviewed interdisciplinary journal of Marxist scholarship."--Work permit (talk) 01:52, 12 March 2010 (UTC). As a caveat, I'm not familiar with the journal, and couldn't find it on PAIS. It's not available (at least for me) on Proquest or Jstor. I only have the web reference, which only contains the abstract from which I provided the quote--Work permit (talk) 02:02, 12 March 2010 (UTC)

Correction: Science & Society is listed as a peer-reviewed journal at the PAIS link provided above by Work; my question remains. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 01:18, 13 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Question: (Actually, it had piqued my interest; thanks for the backgrounder on the peer-reviewed journal. It helped a lot.) With that background, may one NPOV’ly consider that their reviewing peers could be more similar/less diverse than, say, other larger/different/less ideological/less defined peer groups?  Put another way, is that peer group moored to a quite different pier, far from the normal peer-reviewed journal-port of most others?  And Comment:  While personally seeing it as excessively frilly at the edges, I do see material or a quote in it, which seems to well describe a different point of view by that RS in a peer-reviewed journal. That seems very much like something along Wiki-policy lines, including of course, other RSs in peer-reviewed journals that differ. CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 05:34, 12 March 2010 (UTC)
 * You agree that Science and Society can be used as a wp:rs in some manner within the context of this article. I think you're asking whether it can it be used as a source to establish views of mainstream academia.  You're also asking if the views need to be attributed.  You can post such questions on Reliable_sources/Noticeboard.--Work permit (talk) 01:36, 14 March 2010 (UTC)

Regarding Greenspan (2007)
A question of proper placement and relevance concerning the coup. Putting his mentions on-topic and in chronological order, he states: “The reaction to, and reversal of, Mossadeq's nationalization of Anglo-Iranian Oil in 1951 and the aborted effort of Britain and France to reverse Nasser's takeover of the key Suez Canal link for oil flows to Europe in 1956 are but two prominent historical examples." …of …“The intense attention of the developed world to Middle Eastern political affairs has always been critically tied to oil security.”…”What do governments whose economics and citizens have become heavily dependent on imports of oil do when the flow becomes unreliable?” Isn’t that last bit rhetorical, and valid only for Europe, but not the case in the US at the time. Where does it mention the coup?  It does note the “reaction to, and reversal of, Mossadeq's nationalization”, but he clearly puts that to “has always been critically tied to oil security.”  I do not know about others, but that sounds like a non-commie fear to me; and one noted generally by Lencz, called oil. Also, where is the smoke fogging up the screen? Frankly, I’d see him as more neutral if he had similarly noted Nasser’s ‘nationalization’ of the canal, rather than terming it a ‘takeover’ (and much other off-topic stuff on that page). Didn’t the US stop that ‘coup’? CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 07:13, 12 March 2010 (UTC)

Regarding Robarge in smokescreen ‘column’.
Questioning proper 'column', actual relevance and notability within this particular smokescreen/fear debate. I believe this might be a good ref for the 1st lede paragraph, but it is just a reiteration of history. I am assuming that ‘unintended consequences’ equates to more recent high-level US gov’t statements included there. But where is the smokescreen? He notes “a democratically elected government whose populist ideology and nationalist fervor threatened Western economic and geopolitical interests.” Taking just the latter of “threatened Western economic and geopolitical interests”, seems much like fear to me; I believe Lenczowski would call them petroleum and the Soviet threat. Do you see smoke anywhere? He adds that the coup however, “preserved the Shah's power and protected Western control of a hugely lucrative oil infrastructure.” This might seem smokey, but he has mixed original intent to save the shah, with later results; is that one of the unintended consequences. Aren’t we talking original motives here, rather than after-the-fact results? CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 08:35, 12 March 2010 (UTC)

Regarding Robert Byrd
A book with no footnotes, no citations. In academic circles, this would be considered a popular book. The author clearly had a wp:pov. Nothing academic here, its worthy of mention just because of the author.--Work permit (talk) 01:47, 28 March 2010 (UTC)

Regarding Ted Koppel
An Op-Ed piece in the New York Times. As with any Op-Ed piece, notable only for the fact the author stated it.--Work permit (talk) 01:47, 28 March 2010 (UTC)

BoogaLouie's whitewash
BoogaLouie says, and I quote, "Fatemi was the only supporter executed". Here is a video showing the portraits and gravestones of some of the thousands of dissidents who were rounded up and executed by the coup government. When statements like this are made, it becomes very difficult to continue to assume good faith with certain editors here, when the evidence points to historical revisionism and deliberate attempts to whitewash the coup and the atrocities associated with it, at any cost. --Kurdo777 (talk) 15:35, 13 March 2010 (UTC)
 * The right response is "What is your source for that statement?". I've found the most productive way to move disputes along is to require WP:RS for any statement. Then, rather then debating the editor, debate the sources.  "Trust, but verify", I always say :) For example, here's the first source I found to refute the statement: Zahedi, who  had been hiding just outside Tehran, was brought into the  city to assume  leadership, while Mossadegh and the rest of his  supporters were rounded up; 22  were later executed, including the  foreign minister.Newsweek magazine.  I won't bother to format the source, I'm sure there are plenty of sources, and wouldn't want to assume the total number was just 22--Work permit (talk) 20:38, 13 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Here is the source of my information on the aftermath of the coup: "As the shah returned home, the armed forces proceeded to dismantle the National Front as well as the Tudeh. They arested Mossadeq, Razavi, Shayegan, and after a three-month search, Fatemi, who had taken shelter in the Tudeh underground. They also arrested eight high-ranking officers who had supported Mossadeq; the main cabinet ministers, including Abul Qassem Amini; and the leaders of the Iran party, the National Party, and the Third Force. With the exceptions of Fatemi, who was executed, and Lufti, the justice minister, who was murdered, the other National Front leaders recieved lenient treatment - often prison terms no longer than five years. The treatment meted out to the Tudeh, however, was much harsher. As the Tudeh undergound was gradually unearthed in the next four years, the security forces executed forty party officials, tortured to death another fourteen, sentenced some two hundred to life imprisonment, and arrested over 3000 rank-and-file members." (Iran Between Two Revolutions, by Abrahamian, 1982, p.280, -BoogaLouie (talk) 17:58, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
 * P.S. So Fatemi was not the only one killed, Lufti was also. Tudeh may be called victims of the coup, but whether its militants were supporters of Mosaddeq is another question. They supported him late in his administration and at the time of the coup (ineffectvely) but earlier were very anti-Mosaddeq: "The Tudeh press constantly portrayed Mossadeq as a feudal landlord, a devious old-time politician, and a stooge of the United States..... In 1951-2 the Tudeh supported the National Front only during the July uprising, when the danger from the shah appeared imminent." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.323)
 * .... but it doesn't look like thousands of them were killed.
 * P.P.S. Aside from whether Kurdo's a video is WP:RS, has anyone been able to open it? --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:35, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I did. It's basically a slideshow of photos and graves of people, with music in the background.--Work permit (talk) 23:22, 27 March 2010 (UTC)

Discussion refactoring
I've re-factored the talk page Talk:1953_Iranian_coup_d'état. I believe I've kept most everything in order and attributed comments where they are due and attributed references to the appropriate contributor. Please review them and tell me if I've missed anything major. I think the conversation flows pretty clearly. I understand I've created more "structure" to the talk pages then originally was there. All in all, I think that's a good thing. It allows us or an outside editor to read through the issues, references, discussions and quickly understand the issues discussed. If editors would like, I'll structure the references in a consistent manner and check them for validity, but I don't want to do that unless there is wp:consensus. --Work permit (talk) 07:55, 14 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Looks good; thank you. Binksternet (talk) 13:22, 14 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Ditto that, and so much easier to place a comment.CasualObserver&#39;48 (talk) 00:50, 15 March 2010 (UTC)

Current lead
Recent edits have added a big blockquote and made the lead extemely long. The sentence - Not everyone concurs with Heiss's assessment of the effects of Britain's boycott - is confusing to readers as there is no prior mention of Heiss. Hense, I have added a quote farm tag. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:56, 16 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Oh, no, this is terrible article layout. The lead is already quite large—it cannot bear expansion with material best placed elsewhere. I am removing the giant quote and restoring the lead section to a version prior to those changes, and I am removing your quotefarm tag. Binksternet (talk) 19:47, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Binksternet, watch what you do when you're editing the article. You didn't just remove the giant quote and the tag, you provided a misleading edit summery and made a sweeping revert of all of Skywirter's constructive edits to the lead (ie removing a non-RS Tourism book), for every single one of which he had provided a rational in the edit summery. --Kurdo777 (talk) 05:35, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
 * The edit summary was not so much misleading as incomplete. I will fix the indicated problems. Binksternet (talk) 13:28, 17 March 2010 (UTC)

Good faith/bad faith edits
This was the activity in the last week.

Binksternet and BoogaLouie finally agree that the tourism book and the junior high school U.S. social studies books can finally be removed from the lead paragraphs. This is a long time in coming but we have now reached agreement. These are, finally, good edits. Also a good edit is BoogaLouie asking a question and adding a tag to the long quote I added last weekend. Booga asks what is "Heiss's assessment"? Heiss is the supporting documentation that exists in this article to support three different sections. Please look at the references. While I concur that Heiss should now be referred to in the text for the sake of clarity, I do not see it as a useful edit for Binksternet to have eviscerated the entire section from the POV of the former Iranian oil minister who was present during the coup and in the aftermath. This occurred less than an hour and a half after Bogga's good edit. I would have welcomed Binksternet contacting me to ask me to modify the length of the quote or to provide a summary. Aggressive editing to the extent of disappearing points of view is a bad edit, a destructive edit, an aggressive edit that is lacking in collegiality. It is the sort of editing that chases people away. Binksternet, do you think you could remember to contact me or other editors when, in your considered opinion, you believe it useful and prudent to remove entire viewpoints? Now, in the experience and history of this talk page, Boogalouie answers questions that are asked of Binksternet. I do not conflate these two editors and hope Boogalouie stops also. It would be better if Binksternet answered this question directly. Following my sigline is the history of the most recent week. Skywriter (talk) 22:52, 18 March 2010 (UTC)


 * 1) (cur) (prev)  13:28, March 17, 2010 Binksternet (talk | contribs) (68,152 bytes) (trimming away two unneeded books) (undo)
 * 2) (cur) (prev) 19:47, March 16, 2010 Binksternet (talk | contribs) (68,408 bytes) (Getting rid of giant quote and quotefarm tag) (undo)
 * 3) (cur) (prev) 18:40, March 16, 2010 BoogaLouie (talk | contribs) (70,017 bytes) (why is there a great big block quote in the lead, talking about "Heiss's assessment" when there is no other mention of him???) (undo)
 * 4) (cur) (prev) 23:03, March 14, 2010 Skywriter (talk | contribs) (69,987 bytes) (adds effect of boycott on Tehran through eyes of Shah's oil adviser) (undo)
 * 5) (cur) (prev) 22:39, March 14, 2010 Skywriter (talk | contribs) m (68,152 bytes) (→Books) (undo)
 * 6) (cur) (prev) 21:44, March 14, 2010 Skywriter (talk | contribs) (68,153 bytes) (→Books: Summary of Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq) (undo)
 * 7) (cur) (prev) 21:37, March 14, 2010 Skywriter (talk | contribs) (67,809 bytes) (→Books: Summary of Mostafa Elm's Oil, Power and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath) (undo)
 * 8) (cur) (prev) 21:31, March 14, 2010 Skywriter (talk | contribs) (67,393 bytes) (Gasiorowski U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah-- content summary.) (undo)
 * 9) (cur) (prev) 21:18, March 14, 2010 Skywriter (talk | contribs) (66,891 bytes) (→Books: adding summaries to what each book offers, beginning with Blood & Oil.) (undo)
 * 10) (cur) (prev) 00:13, March 14, 2010 24.186.162.80 (talk) (66,530 bytes) (The word "publicly" was spelled incorrectly.) (undo)
 * 11) (cur) (prev) 00:00, March 13, 2010 Skywriter (talk | contribs) (66,531 bytes) (→Books: adds another on-point reference from POV of British intelligence) (undo)
 * 12) (cur) (prev) 23:09, March 12, 2010 Skywriter (talk | contribs) (66,269 bytes) (Removed the tourism book Iran which does not even mention the coup. Example 2 of bad sourcing. Don't believe it? Look it up.) (undo)
 * 13) (cur) (prev) 23:05, March 12, 2010 Skywriter (talk | contribs) (66,330 bytes) (Removed unnecessary first reference that has been topic of repeated discussion on talk page. It adds nothing to support the lead.) (undo)
 * 14) (cur) (prev) 22:49, March 12, 2010 Skywriter (talk | contribs) (66,525 bytes) (→References: per popular request, I have added 9 (nine) books to references, all reliable sources.) (undo)

Skywriter (talk) 22:52, 18 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Some replies:
 * As I believe I've said before on this page, I'm not defending the preservation in the article of using books you call a "tourism book" and a "junior high school U.S. social studies book" for citations. What I have asked about is why you raised so much sound and fury over cites to a point everyone agrees with?  (i.e that the CIA was involved in the coup.) Why didn't you just replace it with a better cite and explain why, instead of making a big deal out of it?
 * Booga asks what is "Heiss's assessment"? Heiss is the supporting documentation that exists in this article to support three different sections. Please look at the references. I read the references. I know who Heiss is.  But I'm working on editing the article.  We're writing the article for the public, for casual readers of the article. Do we expect them to not be confused by stuff like - Not everyone concurs with Heiss's assessment of the effects of Britain's boycott - when there is no prior mention of Heiss in the article text, only in the footnotes?
 * Criticism of Binksternet. The lead WP:lead is supposed to "define the topic, establish context, explain why the subject is interesting or notable, and summarize the most important points." A long quote block on some tangental point has no place in the lead. Binksternet's deletion of thequote was a good edit.
 *  lacking in collegiality. Collegiality has been scarce on your comments on this talk page and in your comments on other editors talk pages for some time! --BoogaLouie (talk) 23:57, 18 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Skywriter, you asked me to "remember to contact [Skywriter] or other editors when, in [Binksternet's] considered opinion, [Binksternet] believe[s] it useful and prudent to remove entire viewpoints". No, Skywriter, I will not contact anyone here if I see an immediate need to correct the format of an article, or the spelling of an article, or anything about an article that I feel expert enough to change. I do not follow article ownership directions such as your request.


 * Your huge quote was not something appropriate for the lead section, per WP:LEAD, where a maximum of four paragraphs is specified. I do not need to ask permission to take it down; to restore it to four from your six. In response, you do not need to complain that my edit "eviscerated" the article as if the text were completely gone, because it is not—it is archived. You can go back to that version and copy the text, to move it down into the body of the article if you think it might fit. I did not bother with this myself as I did not want to try and interpret where it should be repositioned—I just acted to save the lead section from becoming the article itself rather than the summary, to save the lead section from becoming tedious. Binksternet (talk) 00:57, 19 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Skywriter, one last point about talk page etiquette. You wrote: "Now, in the experience and history of this talk page, Boogalouie answers questions that are asked of Binksternet. [...] It would be better if Binksternet answered this question directly." I think this is a poisonous comment, a bad precedent for working together, and something that should never be put into place as talk page policy. First, we here on the talk page should be discussing ideas, not editors. We should be discussing how to improve the article, not how to place blame or answer guilt. Second, all editors should be able to discuss all questions that are raised here, with no limitations. If a question is directed at one editor, any other editor should be allowed a voice, and the discussion can thus be moved forward even if the targeted editor is offline or busy elsewhere. When the targeted editor returns to participate, I would expect him to supply his answer and any corrections to the ongoing discussion, if needed. But for the most part, we are here to discuss the article, not to ask each other pointed, targeted questions. Let's focus on collegiality, please. Binksternet (talk) 15:33, 19 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Skywriter did you contact any editors to see if they thought your long blockquote in the lead was "a useful edit"? Did you ask for consensus? or even explain its importance on the talk page? If not (all I see is an edit summary) why are you asking others to do it? --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:25, 19 March 2010 (UTC)

The current lead
The current lead refers to the current U.S. president and a recent Secretary of State. Both inclusions are inappropriate. This article is not about them. It is about an event that took place 60 years ago. Can we please stay on topic?

I have no problem with adding quotes from leading contemporary sources. I do not believe it belongs in the lead. do you? Skywriter (talk) 22:55, 18 March 2010 (UTC)


 * The lead section is supposed to establish notability and grab a reader's interest. The inclusions serve this purpose. The article is about an event, and it is about the consequences of that event. Modern interpretation belongs in the article, and if it is in the article, is should be in the lead section. Have a look at WP:LEAD to help in deciding what is and is not appropriate for the first three or four paragraphs. Binksternet (talk) 00:38, 19 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I agree with Binksternet about "establishing notability and grabing a reader's interest" and including "the consequences of [the] event," though I think the lead is too long and the mention could be shortened to something like this:
 *  In America, the coup was originally considered a triumph of covert action but now is considered by many to have left "a haunting and terrible legacy," not only in Iran, but worldwide. In recent years, speeches by both the American Secretary of State (2000), and President (2009), have acknowledged US involvment in the coup and the fact that a democratic government was overthrown. --BoogaLouie (talk) 14:51, 19 March 2010 (UTC)

A proposal
I was thinking about the main point of disagreement on this article, and I came up with a proposal that I think, may address everyone's concerns here to some degree. I propose that as a compromise, we all agree to add a line to the lead that says " the scholarly opinions on the motive behind the coup are varied" or something similar in wording, and then we hyperlink the word "varied" to a section exclusively dedicated to the various theories on the motive/motives behind the coup, that gives balanced due coverage to all the modern scholarly views on the motive/motives behind the coup, which are advocated by all parties here. For now, please just state briefly if you agree or disagree with the proposal in principle. Lets leave the details about the content of the section in question, to when we have an agreement in principle, on the proposed format. One step at a time. --Kurdo777 (talk) 07:09, 20 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Yes, and no. We say something similar to "the scholarly opinions on the motive behind the coup are varied" but no hyperlink. The various motives must be discussed at various appropriate points in the article, whenever the story comes to an intersection of contrasting opinions. Binksternet (talk) 13:56, 20 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I think you are on the right track. But I don't think it takes another article. I think "historians disagree" and we cite the wp:rs historians that do, and the popular press does as well, citing those wp:rs can be easily incorporated in the article itself. If it gets too complicated, then we split it off into another article.--Work permit (talk) 05:30, 27 March 2010 (UTC)