Talk:1984 New Zealand constitutional crisis

A constitutional crisis?
I take issue with the description of the events of 1984 as a constitutional crisis. This implies far greater significance than it really had. It was at most a political crisis, though even that is, I believe, overstating it. Some political foes of Robert Muldoon have tried to give the events of that year much greater importance than they can sustain.124.197.15.138 (talk) 20:20, 19 May 2009 (UTC)


 * Almost all academics, documentary directors and journalists writing about the period describe the events on 1984 as a "constitutional crisis", which they were. The outgoing Prime Minister refused to accept the advice of the Prime Minister elect, breaking constitutional convention. Since a large part of our constitution rests on such basic unwritten ways of doing things I find it difficult to see how this could be construed as a political crisis - unless someone was trying to push their POV on Sir Robert Muldoon. --Lholden (talk) 20:27, 19 May 2009 (UTC)


 * It is true that the events are called a "constitutional crisis" by commentators. That does not make it so!  Constitutional convention did not require the outgoing government to accept instructions - orders - from the incoming.  That is simply incorrect. Convention requires that the outgoing government take no active initiatives, and simply keep the wheels of government moving.  There was no reason for a devaluation - until Lange's inflamatory pronouncements on TV of a "crisis" panicked the markets.124.197.15.138 (talk) 08:13, 23 September 2010 (UTC)


 * I'm no fan of Muldoon, but it seems that the crisis is not universally seen as a constitutional one. Gustafson (2000, p. 394) says "As one non-partisan expert observer commented retrospectively, there was never a constitutional crisis as some people feared because after an 'emotional hiccup' brought about by Muldoon's understandable frustration on the Monday, once Lange told him what to do Muldoon did it albeit reluctantly and gracelessly." An attached footnote refers to a 1990 interview with Patrick Millen, a senior civil servant, as well as a contemporary article by Oliver Riddell for The Press, 18 July 1984. So this article's title may not be appropriate. Gustafson refers to the situation as the "exchange rate crisis" or "post-election currency crisis". --Avenue (talk) 10:58, 23 September 2010 (UTC)


 * It seems the perspective on whether the events were or weren't a constitutional crisis depends on whether you're a Lange or Muldoon supporter. Nonetheless, it seems obvious to me that there was a constitutional convention that stated "The outgoing government undertook no new policy initiatives and acted on the advice of the incoming administration, governing under the second arm of the caretaker convention. (See paragraphs 6.24 - 6.25.)" It's also obvious that by refusing to implement Lange's advice, Muldoon broke this convention. Whether he was right to do so in the face of the currency crisis isn't the question here. --LJ Holden 21:42, 23 September 2010 (UTC)


 * It doesn't really matter for the article whether we think there was a constitutional crisis or not; what matters is what reliable sources say, and if they express differing views, we should give the different views due weight. Still, I think it's not quite as clear as you say. First, the link you give is to the current cabinet manual, which may well have been changed since 1984. Second, it is not clear that Muldoon exactly refused to implement Lange's directions, since he may not have received them by the time he gave that interview. He said he wouldn't devalue while he was Minister of Finance, and that he hoped Lange would agree with him. The second part of that statement makes me think he was not directly refusing Lange. --Avenue (talk) 02:13, 24 September 2010 (UTC)


 * No objection from me about adding Gustafson's view on the events, however, there's plenty of other references to back up the view that the events were indeed a constitutional crisis. On your first point - sure, the link I provided was from the current Cabinet Manual, but if you look at its context you'll see an explanation that the paragraphs primarily applied to the old system under FPP. This was one of the issues that the Officials Committee on Constitutional Reform (which from memory referred to the 1984 constitutional crisis) dealt with, although they eventually recommended against codifying convention. On your second point, I'm afraid it's pretty clear Muldoon had Lange's instructions before the interview with TVNZ (see Revolution, part 7, otherwise he couldn't have refused it. It seems bizarre to me that Muldoon would do an interview arguing for a joint statement if he didn't have Lange's advice to devalue. --LJ Holden 03:19, 24 September 2010 (UTC)


 * Okay, let's work Gustafson's view into the text, along with whatever other reliable sources are needed to give both views due weight. I think it would be productive to postpone any more discussion of whether the title is appropriate until we have a consensus here that the article's text is a balanced reflection of the various sources on this issue.
 * Thanks for the link to the Revolution documentary. It agrees in parts with Gustafson's account of what happened that Monday, but they disagree very substantially too. In particular, the narrator of Revolution says that Lange asked the officials he met at the airport to tell Muldoon to accept his instructions, and that Muldoon adamantly told them there would be no devaluation. In contrast, Gustafson says that the officials decided not to pass on Lange's request to Muldoon, and that Muldoon had heard nothing from Lange or the officials by 5 pm, when he went home. Gustafson goes into a lot of detail about how the officials managed to avoid confronting Muldoon (which I won't repeat here), making his account seem credible to me. Gustafson also says that Muldoon asked Lange to make a joint statement at 10:30 am Monday morning, before Lange's meeting with the officials, so I don't find it bizarre that he would argue for this in his TV interview.
 * You say it is clear that Muldoon had Lange's instructions before the interview. Reading Gustafson's account again, I see that Muldoon did receive a letter from Lange around 7:15 pm, before the interview (which finished about 8:30 pm). Gustafson says that in this letter Lange acknowledged Muldoon's views, summarised the advice Lange had received from the officials (without mentioning any specific devaluation percentage), and assured Muldoon that he (Lange) would take responsibility for any decision he asked Muldoon to implement. This seems to fall far short of providing a clear instruction to Muldoon. I can see why Muldoon's statement that as Minister of Finance he would not devalue was taken as a refusal, but I'm still not convinced it was meant that way. Gustafson says that Bill Birch believed that evening that in the interview Muldoon was simply expressing his opinion about what should be done, and that Muldoon told McLay the next morning that he had not said he would not implement a clear written instruction from Lange to devalue. --Avenue (talk) 14:10, 24 September 2010 (UTC)
 * I think there's obviously a difference of opinion as to whether the advice was refused or not. That's probably been lost in the midst of the currency crisis. I don't doubt that Gustafson's account is well researched and reliable, but I think there's a lingering question of credibility as he was (or is) a member of the National Party and known to be a Muldoonist. However I'm happy to leave it for now. --LJ Holden 21:53, 24 September 2010 (UTC)
 * The description of this event as a constitutional crisis is doubtful. Arguable it was, more probably it was not. But I strongly suggest that it was not an "important constitutional and political event in the history of New Zealand". That is clearly overtating the significance of the event. There was a breakdown of communication, followed by an inflamatory press statement by Lange that panicked the financial markets.  I find it hard to see that as a constitutional crisis.
 * Journalists and political commentators may call this a constitutional crisis - that doesn't make it so. They often also call the removal of a leader a "coup", though no one would mean that in a literal sense - I hope. However surely it cannot be called "an important constitutional and political event". The immediate and long terms effects were negligible.  I would question whether it even merits a Wikipedia article203.184.41.226 (talk) 01:45, 11 August 2012 (UTC)

Date errors
There are clearly some date errors in this story: dramatic (talk) 18:12, 26 August 2010 (UTC)
 * There is a PA story on the devaluation on Wednesday 18 July - e.g.(page 3)
 * 17 July was a Tuesday, not a Sunday. I'm not sure whether the day or date is wrong.
 * Yes the dates are all mixed up. Here's the chronology again:

I'll edit the dates to follow this and cite the PA article. --LJ Holden 22:52, 26 August 2010 (UTC)
 * 14 July (Saturday): election, National voted out;
 * 15 July (Sunday): Lange / Douglas informed of currency crisis, ask Muldoon to devalue, he refuses;
 * 16 July (Monday): Currency markets closed to prevent, massive sell-down of the $NZ; Muldoon gives an interview defying Lange, Lange responds;
 * 17 July (Tuesday): Market re-opened, National holds emergency caucus meeting, threat to roll Muldoon forces him to back down;
 * 18 July (Wednesday): Devaluation took place.