Talk:1999 Russian apartment bombings/Archive 8

Wrongly attributed claim about Yushenkov and Schekochikhin
In the current revision, section Analysts:

Sergey Yushenkov, the head of the unofficial inquiry into the bombings, was assassinated 13 days before the announcement of the completion of the official investigation of the bombings and Yury Schekochikhin's medical records are still classified. Yushenkov had occasionally suggested to reporters off the record his personal belief that the security services were behind the murder of his colleague Vladimir Golovlyov, as well as the Moscow bombings.

This statement is followed by the reference "Foiled Attack or Failed Exercise? A Look at Ryazan 1999". That reference says lots of things. For example,

Commenting on the film, Russian Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov decried the lack of civilian control over the armed forces and especially over the secret services in Russia. Following the events of September 11, Yushenkov stated, many Russians waited with concern to see how the United States would react whether or not the Americans would forget Benjamin Franklin'sadmonition that those would sacrifice freedom for security would gain neither. Those fears were not borne out; even after the terrorist attack, democratic institutions functioned normally, including civilian control over the military and secret services. Russia's experience was different, and the movie showed three things clearly, according to Yushenkov. First, there is no civilian control over the secret services in Russia, which is clear from the refusal of the Russian Duma and government to investigate the suspicious events in Ryazan. Second, the Russian authorities, especially the FSB, are prone to lying. And third, even if FSB claims that the Ryazan incident was a civilian defense exercise were true, such an exercise involving unsuspecting civilians would be a gross violation of Russian law. Without civilian control, Yushenkov concluded, the FSB will continue to get away with violations of law and telling lies to society.

The only thing it doesn't say is anything to support the claims made in the current revision of the article.

The first author of the cited fragment has inserted an unreferenced statement, and the second author might have inadvertently used the wrong link as the reference. It's actually no big deal at all. But until the correct link is found (which does prove the statement, so that we can correctly attribute it) I suggest that the cited fragment should be removed from the article.

Document hippo (talk) 17:53, 21 August 2017 (UTC)

Death of a Dissident by Goldfarb for the first sentence and https://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol8/ed0810.html for the second sentence. Please restore.

RAB3L (talk) 19:38, 24 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Thanks, but I'll have to find the page number of the book before I could proceed. Meanwhile, I perceive it as a sign of disrespect when I see a reference to the entire book, rather than the specific page number (or a small range of page numbers). Looking up the page numbers is the part of the job of the person providing the reference. Document hippo (talk) 19:55, 24 August 2017 (UTC)


 * I admit you have the source for the second sentence. (UPDATE: made a self-revert on that sentence. Document hippo (talk) 20:24, 24 August 2017 (UTC))
 * But here's what Death of a Dissident says, pp. 277-279:
 * But here's what Death of a Dissident says, pp. 277-279:

For a long time I was of two minds as to who killed Yushenkov, and why. His murder fit the mounting pattern of conspiracy theories, from the apartment bombings to the Terkibayev revelations. But then again, none of them had been proven, and, as a scientist, I had to consider that they could have been coincidences, however improbable. Intuitively it was logical that the FSB killed Yushenkov, who was the most vocal promoter of anti-FSB allegations. Then, a competing theory about Yushenkov emerged. Two months after the murder, the police caught his assassins. The two perpetrators turned out to be career criminals and drug addicts, who were paid for the hit by a certain Alexander Vinnik, a Liberal Russia functionary from the provincial center of Syktyvkar. Vinnik confessed and said that he had acted on behalf of Mikhail Kodanev, Yushenkov’s rival in the Liberal Russia leadership. When the four of them went on trial, Kodanev was the only one who pleaded not guilty. Vinnik was lying, he said.

Yet Kodanev had a motive. In july 2002, a couple of months after Liberal Russia had been formed, Yushenkov had a conversation with a highly placed official at the justice Ministry. He told him in no uncertain terms that the party would never be registered for the 2003 elections if Berezovsky remained on its candidate list. That was the president’s explicit order. Yushenkov had no choice; he agreed to dump Boris. The party split in half, with a Yushenkov wing and a Berezovsky wing. But then Yushenkov came to London, sat down with Boris, and they reconciled: after the party was registered, Boris’s wing would return to Yushenkov’s fold. Kodanev had been Number Two in Boris’s wing, but would have faced a much lesser standing in the reunited party. According to the prosecution, he put out the contract on Yushenkov when he learned about his reconciliation with Boris.

On the testimony of Vinnik, Kodanev was convicted and given a sentence of twenty years. I had met Kodanev a couple of times in London, and I did not like him. But Sasha was adamant that it was all a setup. The two killers were probably recruited by the FSB while in jail, he said. They were promised a few months of freedom and a reduction in their remaining sentences in exchange for the hit and for naming Vinnik as their patron. Vinnik, in turn, was told to name Kodanev or face a life sentence. Sasha had no doubt; he had seen dozens of such cases. With his pledge to make the bombings an election issue Yushenkov was a threat; Kontora would stop at nothing to get rid of him. How could I not see it? Yushenkov was not the first and would not be the last, he predicted. "And there will always be a plausible ‘legend.’ That’s part of the tradecraft."

Indeed, seven months before Yushenkov was killed, his associate, Vladimir Golovlyov, a Duma member who was in charge of Liberal Russia finances, was shot while walking his dog. His killers were never found. The predominant theory was that it was a business dispute; Golovlyov had been involved in many privatization deals.

Three months after Yushenkov, Yuri Schekochihin, the crusading journalist from Novaya Gazeta and a member of the Public Commission, died suddenly from an unexplained "allergic reaction." His medical chart ended up "classified." His colleagues and his family suspected poisoning related to his numerous investigations of the FSB.

‘See," said Sasha when we learned of Schekochihin’s mysterious death, "I told you, didn’t I?”

Sasha was an oper, not a scientist. He did not believe in coincidences. In retrospect, he had a point.
 * I don't see it as a clear-cut issue. Document hippo (talk) 20:11, 24 August 2017 (UTC)
 * I don't see it as a clear-cut issue. Document hippo (talk) 20:11, 24 August 2017 (UTC)

If you refer back to the opening sentence of this section, all I said was that Yushenkov was assassinated, he was shot, but I didn't say who by. You are being way too defensive. Also why would you classify someone's medical records unless the cause of death was suspicious and the government was involved in his death? Pages 278-9. RAB3L (talk) 12:22, 28 August 2017 (UTC)


 * In those pages I can see that Yushenkov was killed, and Schekochihin's medical chart ended up "classified".
 * Alright. Made another self-revert / partial rewrite — that much I can say based on the provided source, and some other source I have looked up for Yushenkov's date of death. Document hippo (talk) 13:23, 28 August 2017 (UTC)
 * If you look at my edits (like I suggested), you could see that I spend a part of my time hunting for citations. I believe it's an essential point that the information in the Wikipedia articles should be WP:Verifiable. If you follow WP:Verifiability, we will be friends.
 * Document hippo (talk) 23:08, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

Removing OR
While all good-faith contributions to Wikipedia are appreciated, this edit has added some WP:OR.

With due respect to its author, the OR contents should be moved to the talk page (here), until it can be adequately sourced. Here's the removed content:

However, the invasion of Dagestan began on 4th August and the first bombing in Moscow was on the 4th September; according to the official Russian investigation of the bombings, as mentioned above, the explosives used were stored for 2 months in a wharehouse in Kislovodsk. How can preparations for a retributive act commence long before the act for which the retribution is intended even started?

Meanwhile, perhaps we could have a little bit of a discussion here in the talk?

It seems to me, that a trivial explanation would be that the explosives were prepared by Wahhabis beforehand, in the anticipation that they might become useful as the leverage against the Russian authorities (similar to Basayev's Budyonnovsk moment).

So, Wahhabis invested in the capability which might or might not have been used. And once the Russian army started to deal with their invasion into Dagestan, they blew up the buildings as an act of revenge.

Perhaps I used too many words, but hopefully made it clear that IMHO there's no necessary contradiction contained in Ware's statement. Stated like that, it's OR of course, but it's only the talk page so it should be excusable. ;-)

Document hippo (talk) 00:04, 16 August 2017 (UTC)

Even with explosives to hand, four weeks or less is wholly insufficient time for preparation of an apartment bombing. From this article: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Whos-Blowing-Up-Russia.pdf

"This story, which openly contradicted official statements (that the terrorist acts in Moscow were committed by Chechen terrorists as revenge for their defeat in Dagestan), was first aired on the morning of  16th September,  a  few  hours  before  the  explosion  in  Volgodonsk. Moskovskiy Komsomolets published  an  article  with  a  sensational  headline:  “Was  the  Kremlin  making bombs?”. With reference to an anonymous intelligence analyst, the article claimed that “together with the commonly accepted story [that Chechens wanting to avenge state operations in Dagestan were  behind  the  Moscow  bombings],  a  series  of  bizarre  scenarios  have  been  considered”. Specifically, “just three hours after the first bombing on Kashirskoye Highway, it was suggested that Chechen mujahidin had nothing to do with the terrorist acts in the capital. Over time, there is more and more evidence to support this”.

According to  the  anonymous  analyst,  “simulating  an  attack  similar  to  the  two  explosions  in Moscow proves that terrorists would have needed between four and four and a half months to plan  them”. But “during  that  time,  even  if  the  Chechens  were  indeed  planning  to  invade Dagestan, they would have only been in the very early stages”. This leads to the conclusion that the terrorist  acts  in  the  capital  could  not  have  resulted  from  the  situation  in  Dagestan  or  in Chechnya,  meaning the  Moscow  explosions  could  have  been  the  work  of  the  FSB. The Main Directorate for Special Programs of the President of the Russian Federation (GUSP), which the article mentions, could have played a role. A part of the GUSP is “the former 15th division of the KGB which operates the underground bunkers for top public officials in case of war. The experts from this  division...  know  how  to  work  with  explosives. Furthermore, the  administration  is  a “pocket” presidential intelligence agency subordinate only to the head of state”.

The material  unambiguously  claimed  that  “the  terrorist  acts  in  Moscow  were  almost  certainly carried out by professionals”. In addition, the anonymous analysts put forward the idea that “it could have been done by men hired by the Russian security services”. Naturally, the President’s spokesman Dmitry  Yakushkin  was  quick  to  announce  that  “any  suggestion  of  the  Kremlin’s involvement in the explosion is absolutely monstrous”. "

RAB3L (talk) 17:18, 16 August 2017 (UTC)


 * "Even with explosives to hand, four weeks or less is wholly insufficient time for preparation of an apartment bombing. "
 * Yep, that's why I suggested that Wahhabis had more time to prepare. Satter somehow implies that the entire narrative of the invasion started in August 1999.
 * While the unrest in Dagestan has been brewing for quite a long time -- well over a year -- which provided a plenty of time to prepare the invasion and the accompanying terrorist attacks.
 * Multiple sources say that involvement of Wahhabis in the Dagestani business continued for quite a while.
 * Actually even the invasion itself was preceded by a stage of infiltration which began in June, but didn't draw much attention of the federal authorities because it was, eh, slow. We don't accurately consider that point, but we might.
 * Document hippo (talk) 19:11, 16 August 2017 (UTC)

Once, when I was at Shamil’s home and we were sitting in the living room, he asked me, “Tell me, Ilyas, do you have a dream, a vision of our future?”
 * As an example that preparations did indeed start well before the events, consider this insightful excerpt from the Akhmadov book (p. 138-139). The exact date is not specified, but judging from the context it was around or before July 1998 (the time when Basayev moved to Serzhen Yurt). Emphasis mine:

I answered, “Yes, I do have a dream. I don’t have to be part of it, but I would like to look through a key hole and see on the other side that Chechnya resembles a state with normal political processes.”

“You are an idealist, as are many among us,” Shamil countered. “I used to believe this too, but now I can see, based on everything that I’ve experienced, we’ll never be able to build a state.”

“What do you mean? What have we been trying to accomplish all these years? And why have we made all the sacrifices if not for a Chechen state?”

“The Russians will never permit us to establish a normal state,” he insisted. “We need to create a caliphate. The Russians will never let us be.”

“Shamil, do you understand that a caliphate is an empire, a religious empire, but still an empire? Historically empires arise in one of two ways: if a state is so well run, prosperous, and beneficial to its citizens that its neighbors rush to unite with it, or if it is so strong militarily that it can conquer its neighbors. Right now we resemble a gang, and you cannot build a caliphate around a gang. Chechnya is a piece of land divided by rival gangs. We don’t control our territory, we don’t control our borders, there’s chaos all around, and based on this you’re going to build a caliphate?

“Your problem is that you are a hostage of your Soviet education,” Shamil shot back.

“Okay. Let that be my problem, but I don’t want my problem to become anyone else’s problem. I don’t pretend to understand these congresses and caliphates, and I don’t think that they offer a way out, and I have no desire to participate in them. In any case, Shamil, in any endeavor that you undertake, if what you are doing is just and right in my understanding, I will always be your loyal companion and I will stand next to you, but I have to believe that you are on the right path.”

He responded, “Each is free to make his own decisions and each will answer to the Almighty for his decisions and his actions.” This was probably the last time that I casually dropped by Shamil’s house. After this we had very few meetings, partly because he moved to Serzhen Yurt and partly because our relationship changed. I think Udugov and Shamil were already hatching plans for Dagestan, and this is why they would quieten down when I entered the room, or isolate themselves from me.


 * Document hippo (talk) 19:23, 16 August 2017 (UTC)

--

But that's my opinion, of course. The point you tried to insert as OR is currently reviewed in the article in the section Theory of ibn-Khattab involvement/Criticism: The culprits would also have needed to organise nine explosions (the four that occurred and the five attempted bombings reported by the authorities) in different cities in a two-week period. Satter’s estimate for the time required for target plan development, site visits, explosives preparation, renting space at the sites and transporting explosives to the sites was four to four and a half months. If Satter is correct, the preparations for these acts of revenge would have needed to be initiated long before the act for which they were revenge for, had occurred! I don't see how it would help if it's repeated twice. Document hippo (talk) 20:28, 16 August 2017 (UTC)

OK, so you are suggesting that the Wahhabis went ahead and manufactured and/or acquired explosives for future use. That's a very reasonable suggestion. But then, before the invasion of Dagestan, they somehow transfer some of those explosives to Moscow "just in case" they are required for future use. Questionable I'd say, given the risk of being found out. Even more questionable, to say the least, when the storage used, as fairly conclusively proved by Trepashkin, was rented by Romanovich, an FSB agent - unless of course the Wahhabis were collaborating with the FSB! It was easy to frame Gochiyaev; he had known Wahhabi sympathies. Fortunately the swapping of the identifit of Romanovich for that of Gochiyaev was found by Trepashkin. So no, as far as Moscow is concerned, this theory is a non-starter.

You should also be sceptical about the Wahhabis. Zakayev, as pointed out in the article, was under the impression that the Wahhabis were sponsored by the Russians. During a crackdown in 1998, the Maskhadov government rounded up some Wahhabis and expelled them to Jordan. They were all Arabs who spoke Russian and were in the pay of the Russians. They couldn't enter Chechnya directly because the borders were tightly sealed to outsiders. They all had Jordanian passports with Russian visas and had entered Chechnya by flying first to Moscow. They could not have done so without the FSB knowing.

It would also seem that the invasion of Dagestan was facilitated by the Russians. This is covered in Dunlop's book pages 71-73:

"That the rebels would be coming into Dagestan," the deputy minister of internal affairs of Dagestan, Major General Magomed Omarov, recalled in mid-2003, "was known to everyone several months before the events. That there would be a war in August was spokenof as early as the spring (of 1999) beginning with the operational workers from the power structures and ending with the women of the bazaars.""The information, naturally was passed on to the centre," he remembered, " but why the necessary reaction did not take place is a question not to be addressed by me."

Omarov also noticed that "three mnths [before the incursions] the troops were withdrawn from the Dagestan-Chechen border, troops which had stood there for a long time.""There are many more other questions," Omarov added, "the main one of which is: why were the rebels let in without hindrance and why were they allowed to leave freely."

Retired army colonel Viktor Baranets reported in September 1999 that, "The administration of the FSB of Dagestan had over the course of the last three years mre than 2,000 times informed Moscow about the growing activity of Chechen emissaries in the republic." Baranets, citing the text of a "confidential document", reports that on 5-6 June 1999, control over a section of the border 14 kilometers long in Tsumadinskii District was transferred from the Russian Border Guards, an elite unit, to the Tsumadinskii branch of the MVD of Dagestan. "And to the excursion there remianed precisely sixty days".

Florian Hassel, Moscow correspndent of the Frankfurter Rundschau, has reported meeting, in October 1999, five Dagestani policemen who had briefly fought Basayev's troops in the Mountains:

"Basayev's attack on Dagestan was apparently organised in Moscow," said one policeman, Elgar, who watched the Chechens retreatfrom the village of Botlikh on September 11. "Basayev and his people went back comfortably in broad daylight with about 100 cars and trucks and many on foot. They used the main road to Chechnya and were not fired at by our combat helicopters. We received express orders not to attack."

The commander of a Russian special operations team in Dagestan told a correspondent for Time magazine that one one scorching August day in 1999, "he had Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev in his sights....With a simple squeeze of a finger [he] could take out Basayev.... But [he] says that he received the following order over his walki-talkie: "Hold your fire". We just watched Basyev's long column of trucks and jeeps withdraw from Dagestan back to Chechnya under cover provided by our own helicopters."

Some invasion!

RAB3L (talk) 19:51, 17 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Well, sure thing, preparing for too much time would be dangerous, too! So there was some sort of a sweet spot, the optimal time, not too short and not too long: enough to prepare the bombs, but not long enough to get busted. But a certain degree of risk was unavoidable for terrorists. And indeed, the authorities prevented some explosions by locating and defusing the bombs.


 * There's definitely a fair amount of "he said, she said" thing. I'm not even sure how to comment on Zakayev's claim, of course. Wahhabism was alright until there was a serious terrorist threat by Wahhabist jihadi. Zakayev assumes that the FSB had to take action against Wahhabis in mid-1990s — but there hardly was a reason to do so. It's also definitely possible that the authorities in Chechnya and Dagestan had better insight into the dangers associated with that religion than the Kremlin. Document hippo (talk) 21:14, 17 August 2017 (UTC)

So, in other words you agree that at least one act of revenge was initiated before the act for which the revenge was intended had even started? Of course, the longer the explosives were stored in the final position of use, the more the suspicion should be that the FSB were responsible. If the FSB explosives were found (as in Ryazan) there would be no consequences! Explosions were prevented because Gochiyaev warned the authorities! The culprits could have been caught (by setting a trap) but the FSB decided to make their "find" public, possibly to avoid the embarressment of catching their own people! Trepashkin tried to investigate Gochiyaev's phone records but the FSB were uncooperative. According to Trepashkin they have no interest in finding him!

RAB3L (talk) 19:31, 22 August 2017 (UTC)


 * "So, in other words you agree that at least one act of revenge was initiated before the act?" -- I don't see an issue, actually. Preparations might be made well before the bombings, but the final decision could be made in a few days or hours before the bombings. Document hippo (talk) 20:16, 22 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Thanks for sharing Dunlop's viewpoint.


 * You might find it interesting to compare it against the explanations suggested by Robert Bruce Ware:


 * While there is not yet sufficient information for the conclusive evaluation of such claims, the following considerations may prove useful:

1. Russian troops inexplicably were withdrawn from the Dagestani border in the area of the insurgency just prior to the onset of the conflict.

2. Basayev exited the republic with an ease reminiscent of Raduyev's departure from Pervomaiskoye. The Dagestani Avar leader, Gadji Mahachev, claims that his requests that Russian troops should mine Basayev's exit routes were unheeded. Of course it is easier to request mines than it is to plant them in rugged western Dagestan, and it is far from certain that mines would have proven effective, but it seems that Basayev got into, and out of, Dagestan far too easily.

<...>

Without sacrificing simplicity, it is possible to account for the first two points by postulating low-level, as opposed to high level, conspiracies:

Scenario 1: Basayev bribes Russian officers near the Dagestani border to permit him access by retracting their troops just prior to his advance and later permitting his escape.

Scenario 2: Russian officers on the ground in Dagestan, who are familiar with the Dagestani people and realize that most of them will resist Basayev, pull back to allow him to enter Dagestan, because they anticipate that the trap will weaken or destroy Basayev. Basayev's escape is due to his well-known skills combined with well-documented Russian incompetence.


 * Document hippo (talk) 20:23, 17 August 2017 (UTC)

So in effect, Ware is supporting the conspiracy theory, at least as far as Dagestan is concerned. Your scenarios are meaningless conjecture. This was not a local arrangement. It was negotiated in Beaulieu with Voloshin. Dunlop: "It is necessary for me to report here that a representative of one of the French intelligence organisations, whose identity is known to me, subsequently confirmed to an experienced Western academic, that French intelligence does indeed possess evidence that coincides roughly with what Boris Kagarlitsky wrote." RAB3L (talk) 19:42, 22 August 2017 (UTC)


 * No, Ware is suggesting counter-arguments to the conspiracy theory, as far as Dagestan is concerned. Those scenarios are not mine, but Ware's. A point to note: I'm not Robert Bruce Ware and have no connections whatsoever to that person, other than that I've bought his book at Amazon. Document hippo (talk) 20:06, 22 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Lastly, blaming the Russian authorities for not taking an action doesn't prove anything at all. Numerous analysts claim that the mood in Russia was consistently anti-war, as evidenced by opinion polls. It's also clear that politicians in charge of the situation were reluctant to act, until well, the situation demanded the direct military response. And meanwhile, it required changing the prime minister to put the war machine into action. In retrospect, yes, we might call the Russian authorities at the moment less than competent. Incompetence is not a crime, though. Document hippo (talk) 20:36, 17 August 2017 (UTC)

Have you ever made an edit in this article that was anti Russian government? Some time ago there was someone who we worked out was a Dutch nationalist. Most likely a member of Geert Wilders party, which is sponsored by Russia. So I asked him if he was working quid pro quo for the chekists. He never replied and seems to have disappeared from Wikipedia.

RAB3L (talk) 19:50, 22 August 2017 (UTC)


 * I follow the sources. All my edits are proved by the sources, unlike at least some of yours. Moreover, I encourage you not to trust me on my word but actually read the sources I cite. I don't see an issue with making anti-Russian government edits.
 * Lastly, I am not sure who are you talking about ("Dutch nationalist"). Document hippo (talk) 20:06, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

"I don't see an issue with making anti-Russian government edits." You are avoiding the question. RAB3L (talk) 21:52, 23 August 2017 (UTC)


 * The question I don't have to answer, honestly. However, I've introduced some token criticism of the Russian Government to this article. Will I be awarded a medal now or something? Document hippo (talk) 21:55, 23 August 2017 (UTC)

That's criticism? More like the exception that proves the rule! Why did they need a war instead of using television? Because Yeltsin's popularity was in single figures!

RAB3L (talk) 12:00, 28 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Yes, it's criticism of the way the Russian authorities handled the elections since mid-1990s. Yulia Latynina has a consistent record as an opposition journalist. In 2008, she received the Freedom Defenders Award from the United States Department of State!
 * You've asked for one example, I've provided it. You didn't like it, fine, you can browse my edit history and study my edits in detail. I don't see how I could help you with that.
 * Lastly, Yelstin's popularity was in single figures in 1996, too. So... at the very least Latynina made a good point which deserves to be heard. Document hippo (talk) 22:44, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

"Lastly, Yelstin's popularity was in single figures in 1996, too. So..." - good point, or maybe not: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2107565,00.html. It worked once but perhaps not a second time. So something else was required, perhaps postponement or cancellation of the 2000 presidential elections? RAB3L (talk) 19:13, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
 * RAB3L, how does the article you've linked to support your argument?
 * Document hippo (talk) 19:22, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

Merger of Romanovich discussion
In the article the discussion of Trepashkin's claims about Romanovich appears twice, with a significant overlap (current revision).

First, in the section Related events -> Arrest of independent investigator Trepashkin:

The commission of Sergei Kovalyov asked lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin to investigate the case. Trepashkin found that the basement of one of the bombed buildings was rented by FSB officer Vladimir Romanovich and that the latter was witnessed by several people. Trepashkin was unable to bring the evidence to court because he was arrested by FSB in October 2003 and imprisoned in Nizhny Tagil, allegedly for "disclosing state secrets", just a few days before he was to make his findings public.[106] He was sentenced by a military closed court to a four-year imprisonment.[107] Amnesty International issued a statement that, "[T]here are serious grounds to believe that Mikhail Trepashkin was arrested and convicted under falsified criminal charges".[108] Romanovich subsequently died in a hit and run accident in Cyprus. According to Trepashkin, his supervisors and FSB members promised not to arrest him if he left the Kovalyov commission and started working with the FSB "against Alexander Litvinenko".[109]

Second, in the section Investigations and theories -> Attempts at independent investigation:

Trepashkin claimed to have found that the basement of one of the bombed buildings was rented by FSB officer Vladimir Romanovich and that the latter was witnessed by several people. Trepashkin was unable to bring the alleged evidence to the court because he was arrested in October 2003 for illegal arms possession, just a few days shortly before he was to make his findings public.[106] He was sentenced by a Moscow military court to four years imprisonment for disclosing state secrets.[107] Amnesty International issued a statement that "there are serious grounds to believe that Mikhail Trepashkin was arrested and convicted under falsified criminal charges which may be politically motivated, in order to prevent him continuing his investigative and legal work related to the 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow and other cities".[108]

However, in 2009, Russian Novaya Gazeta newspaper published a note which stated that Romanovich died more than a year before the apartment bombings took place:[166] "According to legally reliable texts of certificates of his [Romanovich's] death (the source is the bodies of power of the Republic of Cyprus), that we obtained after publishing that article, death of Romanovich occurred in April 1998."

I propose the merger of these sections. Trepashkin's claims are viewed more extensively in the second place, so I suggest the related material should be moved there. Document hippo (talk) 22:19, 17 August 2017 (UTC)

Especially since it was later revealed that Romanovich died a year before the bombings, I don't think it's an overly important point, and not the one that deserves multiple discussions. Document hippo (talk) 22:56, 17 August 2017 (UTC)

How do you know that the so-called death certificate was genuine? Why did it take 10 years to "discover" it? Suspicious or what? RAB3L (talk) 21:50, 23 August 2017 (UTC)


 * In my view, they could contact the authorities of Cyprus to obtain the relevant information, or perhaps even the certificates themselves.
 * I don't claim to know the backstory, but I think the two articles in September 2009 are related. Perhaps they did the research for the first one but couldn't complete it in time and had to publish the second article. There are other possibilities, too. I don't see much utility in playing the guessing game, though. Document hippo (talk) 22:01, 23 August 2017 (UTC)

Worst of all, the material has been presented like that for years. Apparently it's not obvious to notice, no wonder it evaded everyone's attention. Document hippo (talk) 23:09, 17 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Done the merger:.
 * Document hippo (talk) 00:34, 18 August 2017 (UTC)

Meanwhile, I wondered, how did Dunlop address the report in Novaya Gazeta that Romanovich died in 1998? Well, he found it "rather strange" (p. 155) and asked a bunch of questions (p. 156) which he apparently didn't attempt to answer: Is, one is prompted to ask, the information contained in this "Refutation" accurate? If so, why did Romanovich's widow, or "widow," and her well-wishers wait nearly six years to refute what Mikhail Trepashkin had first publicly asserted in November of 2003 and had then repeated in public many times subsequently? Were the documents from the Republic of Cyprus that were allegedly produced authentic or could they have been forged? And how did a death certificate from Cyprus prove that Romanovich had had no connections to the FSB? Could immense pressure have been put on Gefter and the editorial board of the newspaper to issue this refutation? These are questions that need to be addressed. We can't even say he doubted that article because there are just questions that are left hanging in the air. Why didn't Dunlop ask Romanovich's wife? Why didn't he address Gefter or the editorial board of Novaya Gazeta? Etc, etc.

The problem is, you cannot arbitrarily trust and distrust the same newspaper depending on whether you like or dislike what you read — and Novaya Gazeta has been the major venue researching the conspiracy.

What's ever strange in that journalists of Novaya Gazeta just honestly did their job, reporting the evidence they have got? Document hippo (talk) 12:01, 18 August 2017 (UTC)

"you cannot arbitrarily trust and distrust the same newspaper depending on whether you like or dislike what you read" - is that not exactly what you are doing? RAB3L (talk) 21:47, 23 August 2017 (UTC)


 * I'm glad to see you, RAB3L. However, I'm not sure what do you mean. Could you be more specific, please? Document hippo (talk) 21:52, 23 August 2017 (UTC)

It's apparently not too difficult to acquire false death certificates in Cyprus:

http://northcyprusfreepress.com/entertainment/art-music/north-cyprus-property-muhtars-issuing-false-death-certificates/

http://news.pseka.net/index.php?module=article&id=3609

Would Trepashkin not have been aware of when Romanovich died?

RAB3L (talk) 21:06, 22 August 2017 (UTC)


 * It's standard journalist business. If Novaya Gazeta adheres to high standards, they would have made all the necessary checks. While if they do not, nothing of what they report can be reliable. Which pretty much nails it, because they have been one of the major sources in this article. Hope this helps. Document hippo (talk) 21:18, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
 * "Would Trepashkin not have been aware of when Romanovich died?" He seems to have relied on the word of mouth, which could be misleading sometimes. Document hippo (talk) 21:18, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
 * "Would Trepashkin not have been aware of when Romanovich died?" He seems to have relied on the word of mouth, which could be misleading sometimes. Document hippo (talk) 21:18, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

"He seems to have relied on the word of mouth" - How on earth can you claim that? How do you know how he obtained the information? Complete B/S!

RAB3L (talk) 21:47, 23 August 2017 (UTC)


 * It's a bit tricky part. In his articles and the book Dunlop refers to Korolkov's article "Фоторобот не первой свежести". Here's Dunlop's translation of the relevant part (I'm citing Dunlop's article, but the relevant part of the translation looks the same in the book, at p. 139):

Once he had had a chance to see, in the direct wake of the Moscow bombings, the composite photo of the Moscow bomber which had been compiled from Blumenfeld’s words, Trepashkin informed his former leaders in the FSB that the composite photo was very similar to Romanovich. “Soon,” he has recalled, “I paid attention to the fact that the composite photo had been transformed: the face had become more elongated. And later I learned that Romanovich, who had left for Cyprus, had been struck and killed by a car.”
 * Here's how the original text from Korolkov's article looks:
 * Сделав неожиданное открытие, я сообщил об этом своим бывшим руководителям из ФСБ, передав им и фотографию Романовича, которая у меня была. Вскоре я обратил внимание на то, что фоторобот, очень похожий на Романовича, трансформировался: лицо становилось все более вытянутым. А спустя полгода узнал, что Романовича, который к тому времени выехал на Кипр, будто бы задавила машина.
 * What's lost in Dunlop's translation is some uncertainty in Trepashkin's direct speect, like he has heard that from someone else and is not entirely sure if the information in correct. A more accurate translation would be: "And after half a year I have learned that Romanovich, who had left for Cyprus by that time, was allegedly run over by a car."
 * You don't use the word "allegedly" if you have hard evidence, like documents.
 * (BTW, here's the English translation of the Russian words "будто бы".)
 * Hopefully, I have addressed your concerns. Document hippo (talk) 11:31, 24 August 2017 (UTC)
 * P.S. Another wonderful aspect is, that assuming that Romanovich died in 1998, Trepashkin is still technically correct, because he hasn't specified (and might have been unaware of) the date of Romanovich's death! Document hippo (talk) 14:12, 24 August 2017 (UTC)
 * P.S. Another wonderful aspect is, that assuming that Romanovich died in 1998, Trepashkin is still technically correct, because he hasn't specified (and might have been unaware of) the date of Romanovich's death! Document hippo (talk) 14:12, 24 August 2017 (UTC)
 * P.S. Another wonderful aspect is, that assuming that Romanovich died in 1998, Trepashkin is still technically correct, because he hasn't specified (and might have been unaware of) the date of Romanovich's death! Document hippo (talk) 14:12, 24 August 2017 (UTC)

The Russian word for "allegedly" is "предполагаемо"; strangely it's absent from your quotation! Romanovich or not, it doesn't alter the fact that the FSB attempted to fit up Gochiyaev, as Trepashkin conclusively proved. RAB3L (talk) 21:18, 24 August 2017 (UTC)


 * RAB3L, I've given you a link to the dictionary. But there's an easier way. Put the Russian sentence into Google Translate, and you'll read: "And six months later I learned that Romanovich, who by that time had left for Cyprus, had allegedly been crushed by a car."
 * "Предполагаемо" is an uncommon Russian word, it would be strange if Trepashkin used it in an interview.
 * The problem with the "Romanovich or not" approach is that the proponents of the conspiracy theory, like David Satter, are still talking about Romanovich! That's from his 2016 article:
 * Acting on a hunch, Trepashkin began going through old newspaper archives in the hope that the original sketch had been published somewhere before the FSB had pulled it from circulation. After an exhaustive search, he finally found it. To his surprise, it was a sketch of someone he knew: Vladimir Romanovich, an FSB agent who in the mid 1990s had been responsible for investigating Chechen criminal organizations.
 * That's why we cannot just drop claims about Romanovich from the description of the conspiracy theory.
 * Here's a better fact: Trepashkin thought he had a clue, but he'd got it wrong. Document hippo (talk) 22:07, 24 August 2017 (UTC)

If you use Systranet (http://www.systranet.com/translate/?session=ba187eb98110d60b--5d50190f-12e3a08ec4f--2290) you get a different answer. Supposedly might be a better term than allegedly, but as used it (or allegedly) only refers to the means of death rather than the death itself. Presumably Trepashkin was not present when Romanovich died! The other "surprising" aspect is that it took ten years for the death certificate to be "discovered".

You haven't got your "facts" right about Romanovich either: "The sting resulted in a raid on a Bank Soldi branch in Moscow in Dec 1995. Trepashkin claims that the raid uncovered bugging devices used by the extortionists, whose serial numbers linked their origin to the FSB or Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, a van outside the bank was monitoring the bugging devices. In the van was Vladimir Romanovich, an FSB agent who Trepashkin claims was working for the criminals. However, most of those arrested in the sting were released. Nikolai Patrushev took Trepashkin off the case, and began an investigation of Trepashkin instead.[2]" Of course if it was the normal practice of the FSB investigating itself, you would be correct! RAB3L (talk) 11:37, 28 August 2017 (UTC)


 * "as if machine[car] would crush [Romanovich]" still implies uncertainty about circumstances of his death. What I suggest is that Trepashkin didn't have evidence. If he did have any evidence which would expose the 2009 Novaya Gazeta article as a fake, why didn't he reveal it?
 * Meanwhile, do you know how did Trepashkin's story change after 2009? I have read a more recent (2014) interview with Trepashkin at "Radio Freedom": . He says that he saw a facial composite of fake-Laipanov, which he recognized as his ex-colleague Romanovich... After that, full stop. No discussion of the controversial accounts of Romanovich's death (his pre-2009, and Novaya Gazeta's in 2009), and no claims whatsoever regarding Romanovich's death. Looks like he doesn't have reasons to doubt Novaya Gazeta — other than he might find discussing that story embarrassing for himself.
 * The simplest theory would be that certificates were first obtained in 2009, because it's the first time anyone started looking for them.
 * I don't think it's a tremendous effort to contact the authorities in Cyprus and ask them to provide details about Romanovich's death. It could still be done now — if either Dunlop, Satter or Trepashkin wanted to do that, they had a plenty of time to obtain that information.
 * I haven't said Romanovich wasn't FSB agent. Novaya Gazeta hasn't said that either. What they said is "We consider it necessary to apologize to the family of the deceased for that ... we mentioned his name in the context of ... possible connections of that person with Russia's FSB."
 * Dunlop thinks it means Romanovich wasn't FSB agent. No, it doesn't, if you read it literally.
 * Why did Novaya make that point?
 * I think, after they learnt of Romanovich's death in 1998, they lost any interest whatsoever to other circumstances of his life. Instead of finding proof he was an FSB agent, they thought it's easier to apologize and forget about that.
 * Document hippo (talk) 22:58, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

"as if machine[car] would crush [Romanovich]" - is a comment on the means of death, not when the death occurred. Clear? "He says that he saw a facial composite of fake-Laipanov, which he recognized as his ex-colleague Romanovich... After that, full stop." - What Trepashkin doesn't say is no evidence of anything. What is more important to the case is that an attempt was made to switch the identity of the person responsible for renting the basements. Trepashkin thought it might be Romanovich but his only evidence was a photofit, so he could have been wrong. In the same article, Trepashkin describes Romanovich as an FSB informer. "Dunlop thinks it means Romanovich wasn't FSB agent." - where does that come? Not from me! It's interesting perhaps that Trepashkin considers that it would have been impossible to transfer explosives by road into Moscow, either before or during September. 89.241.95.151 (talk) 18:54, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
 * "Dunlop thinks it means Romanovich wasn't FSB agent." - where does that come? Not from me! -- Alright. Dunlop doesn't think what I thought he thought.
 * I hope you are alright.
 * Document hippo (talk) 13:15, 1 September 2017 (UTC)

Found another place with duplicate information, which I removed. The same info can be found in the section "Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war". I point out that no information is removed from the article. But there's no reason to repeat the same info twice. If the discussion about Yeltsin and Putin's role in the Second Chechen war seems to be more appropriate in any other place than the section "Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war", it could be moved there. But I repeat it, there's no reason to repeat the same info twice. It doesn't serve any end but irritates the reader. Document hippo (talk) 14:09, 18 August 2017 (UTC)

Another strange bit in the current revision (section "Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Scholars"):

According to Henry E. Hale of Harvard University, one thing that remains unclear about the "FSB did it" theory: If the motive was to get an FSB-friendly man installed as president, why would the FSB have preferred Putin, a little-known "upstart" who had leapt to the post of FSB director through outside political channels, to Primakov, who was certainly senior in stature and pedigree and who was also widely reputed to have a KGB past?[191] Why? Because Putin was supported by the "Family" whereas Primakov most certainly wasn't. According to Felshtinsky, Berezovsky was unaware of the FSB's support for Putin until about a year after the apartment bombings.[186]

Regarding the bold part of the text, Felshtinsky only claims that FSB supported Putin. He doesn't say that the FSB supported Putin because the Family supported Putin. I can see some issues with that. That would imply the FSB was somehow dependent on the Family, which makes the Family the entity which ruled the FSB. Anyway, stated like that it's OR, because the claim is not supported by the reference.

Please think of how it could be fixed to reintegrate that or a similar thought into the article. Document hippo (talk) 00:00, 19 August 2017 (UTC)

Where does it say "that the FSB supported Putin because the family supported Putin"? That's just wilful mis-interpretation! Nothing more. Perhaps you have problems understanding English?

RAB3L (talk) 17:47, 22 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Thanks for your reply, RAB3L. Indeed, the basic grammar structure of that passage is:
 * " why would the FSB have preferred Putin ...? ... Why? Because Putin was supported by the "Family" "
 * It means, that the FSB would have preferred Putin because Putin was supported by the "Family".
 * I don't think it requires extraordinary English skills to make that conclusion.
 * Document hippo (talk) 18:08, 22 August 2017 (UTC)
 * I don't think it requires extraordinary English skills to make that conclusion.
 * Document hippo (talk) 18:08, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

OK, both Putin and Primakov were FSB but Primakov was a lot older and not a long-term prospect perhaps. If Putin was backed by the "Family" and FSB and Primakov was only backed by the FSB, which of the two was the likely winner? Simple really!

RAB3L (talk) 19:20, 22 August 2017 (UTC)


 * It's still not a proof of the argument that Putin was favoured by the FSB because the Family preferred him. Even so, we have to rely on sources. Document hippo (talk) 20:47, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

Further bit. Section "Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Analysts".

Berezovsky wasn’t actually the originator of the theory of the FSB's responsibility for the bombings. According to Yury Felshtinsky, Berezovsky wasn’t even aware of the FSB’s support for Putin as presidential candidate until a conversation with the former about a year after the apartment bombings. With this knowledge, he then realised who was most likely responsible for the bombings.

Very well. Here's what we are being told in the preceding section "Section Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Scholars":

According to Felshtinsky, Berezovsky didn’t come to the conclusion that Putin and the FSB were responsible for the bombings until about a year after they had occurred, at about the same time that he also realised that Putin had had the support of the FSB as presidential candidate. Until then Berezovsky had believed that only the “Family” had backed Putin. Berezovsky even offered to show Felshtinsky’s manuscript of Blowing Up Russia to Putin on what was possibly the former’s last visit to Moscow.

There's a significant overlap. I propose a merger of these two fragments. Document hippo (talk) 00:16, 19 August 2017 (UTC)
 * Merged the two fragments into one. Document hippo (talk) 00:38, 19 August 2017 (UTC)

Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war
Under the above title:

Andrew Jack, former Moscow bureau chief for the Financial Times, quoted a "very senior official from the period" who dismissed as bravado Stepashin's claims that the military operations were long planned:

Two weeks before the invasion, Stepashin went to Dagestan and said everything was calm. He was ineffective. Nothing was prepared for the attack. We were not ready. Putin could lose, people didn't want to fight, and the polls were against war.

Stepahin's statements were made in early 2000 and were solely about Chechnya. There was, as far as I have found, no mention of any invasion of Dagestan. How could there be? It would have been secret but it appears that he was aware of it at the time. So how could statements made in early 2000 about Chechnya (only), have any effect on Dagestan in 1999? It's just a stupid statement and should be removed!


 * I have hopefully addressed your concerns below. Let's keep any further discussion there. Thanks, Document hippo (talk) 18:39, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

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Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war
Under the above title:

Andrew Jack, former Moscow bureau chief for the Financial Times, quoted a "very senior official from the period" who dismissed as bravado Stepashin's claims that the military operations were long planned:

Two weeks before the invasion, Stepashin went to Dagestan and said everything was calm. He was ineffective. Nothing was prepared for the attack. We were not ready. Putin could lose, people didn't want to fight, and the polls were against war.

Stepahin's statements were made in early 2000 and were solely about Chechnya. There was, as far as I have found, no mention of any invasion of Dagestan. How could there be? It would have been secret but it appears that he was aware of it at the time. So how could statements made in early 2000 about Chechnya (only), have any effect on Dagestan in 1999? What it does suggest though is that there was a conspiracy!

RAB3L (talk) 18:16, 22 August 2017 (UTC)


 * The core statement is "dismissed as bravado Stepashin's claims that the military operations were long planned" -- that's 100% relevant, and actually a direct quote from Jack's book. The further quotation merely serves to illustrate Stepashin's lack of grip on the reality. Document hippo (talk) 18:22, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

Yes, that applies to Chechnya and Chechnya only, not Dagestan. Stephashin knew what would happen in Dagestan at the time but the military could not be forewarned! How could they when they had seemingly made every attempt to hollow out the defences?? How could he have made it known that the Russians knew what was going to happen but did nothing? Jack's statement does in fact reinforce the suspicion that it was a conspiracy.

RAB3L (talk) 19:09, 22 August 2017 (UTC)


 * You suggest that Stepashin was actually a part of the conspiracy. It's an interesting theory. But, wouldn't it make the circle of conspirators dangerously wide? But that's only my thoughts. Such possibility cannot be ruled out. However, due to the Biographies of living persons policy we would need a good source to claim that Sergei Stepashin was involved in the conspiracy. If you find one, feel free to contribute. Document hippo (talk) 19:41, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

No, I didn't suggest that Stephasin was part of the conspiracy, only that he knew about it: https://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n20/jonathan-steele/doing-well-out-of-war It seems he didn't have the stomach for war and was trying to avoid it; that's maybe why he was replaced as prime minister. RAB3L (talk) 17:52, 24 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Please, could you cite the relevant fragment of the article which makes you think Stepashin knew about the conspiracy? Thanks, Document hippo (talk) 18:55, 24 August 2017 (UTC)

"In the summer of 1999, Berezovsky, by then no longer a member of the government, says he was visited by a Chechen ally of Basaev, who asked him how Russia would react to a Chechen incursion into Dagestan. Berezovsky says he told his visitor it would be a crazy thing to do and would lose Chechens their international support. But when Berezovsky contacted Sergei Stepashin, Putin’s predecessor as prime minister, Stepashin is supposed to have told him to keep quiet because everything was under control. Berezovsky may be biased, but after he lost his job Stepashin himself told a Russian newspaper that the Kremlin had started planning a second invasion of Chechnya in March 1999, long before the Basaev offensive in Dagestan." RAB3L (talk) 12:25, 28 August 2017 (UTC)


 * What can I say? Steele has not said that Stepashin was a part of the conspiracy. What he has indeed said is that Stepashin got the information from Berezovsky. And then told him to get quiet. Doesn't that prove that Stepashin was ineffective in his job, like Jack's interlocutor claimed? Document hippo (talk) 12:42, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

"But when Berezovsky contacted Sergei Stepashin, Putin’s predecessor as prime minister, Stepashin is supposed to have told him to keep quiet because everything was under control." Doesn't that imply that Stepashin already knew? Either your understanding of English is limited or you are guilty of willful mis-interpretation (again). 89.241.95.151 (talk) 17:25, 31 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Glad to see you!
 * I've understood your point perfectly well, but I disagree with it.
 * You claim that Stepashin knew about a Chechen incursion into Dagestan before it happened. Which supposedly means that he knew about the "conspiracy".
 * In reality, Stepashin knew about a Chechen incursion, but it had no relation to any sort of a conspiracy.
 * That point is clearly stated in a book by David E. Hoffman, an American journalist who served as the Moscow bureau chief for the Washington Post.
 * Here's is an excerpt from pp.548-549 of his famous book, "The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia":
 * (Footnote 39)


 * 39

Berezovsky’s role in the onset of the Chechen hostilities has been the subject of much speculation. Berezovsky had good connections among some Chechen groups, but I think he was more of an intermediary than an instigator. The origins of the second war lie primarily in disorder inside Chechnya and weariness with the conflict in Moscow. The first factor, internal disorder, was caused by a split between Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen president, and Basayev. Maskhadov, who had been Moscow’s interlocutor, lost control of the disparate Chechen fighting groups. The second factor was Kremlin indecision. Anton Surikov, a former Russian military intelligence officer who later became a staff director of a Russian parliamentary committee, told me Russian officials had indications that Basayev was planning something on the Dagestani border that summer. “It was not being hidden,” he said. “There was a certain panic here. There was a feeling of complete helplessness.” Likewise, Voloshin said in August, “The dates [of the Basayev assault] were definitely known several days before.” But, he added, the “area is hilly and difficult to guard. There are hundreds of different paths, plenty of canyons, mountain paths. There is no border, actually.... That is why it is not possible just to line up soldiers to guard the border.” Berezovsky told me that he began warning the Kremlin in May and June 1999 that Chechen commanders were telling him that things were getting out of control and “there may be trouble in Dagestan.” Berezovsky added, “I passed it all on to Stepashin, who was the prime minister then. I had a meeting with him and told him. He said, ‘Boris, don’t worry. We know everything, all is under control.’” Separately, Stepashin told me the planning for a crackdown on Chechnya was under way earlier in the year after a Russian Interior Ministry general was kidnapped. He said the Russian authorities had intelligence in June of a possible attack, and “we were planning to implement” a cordon around Chechnya “irrespective of Basayev’s assault.” Stepashin said he chaired a meeting of the Kremlin Security Council in July, and “we all came to the conclusion that there was a huge hole on our border that won’t be closed if we don’t [advance] to the Terek [River inside Chechnya]. It was a purely military decision.” Stepashin said that after his dismissal, Putin picked up the plans he had put in place and continued with them. Basayev’s reasons for staging the dramatic cross-border incursion, and his reading of how Russia would respond, are not clear. He declared at the time that he hoped to trigger an uprising in Dagestan, rallying support for the creation of an Islamic state. But it was a futile effort. The raid triggered alarms in Dagestan, which is a mosaic of ethnic groups, and many villages began arming themselves to fight the Chechens. Eventually Russian troops beat them back to the border, and Putin launched the larger offensive. Another unanswered question is who was responsible for the apartment house bombings that triggered the war. Putin and his government blamed Chechens. Inside Russia, some have speculated that the blasts were carried out by shadowy groups possibly linked to security services as a way to propel Putin to power. When Berezovsky was asked about this on September 19, 2000, during a meeting with Washington Post editors and reporters, he said that at first he could not believe the security services would have done it; he was sure it was the Chechens. But, he added, “I have more and more doubts that it was done by Chechens.”
 * Hope this helps!
 * Document hippo (talk) 19:00, 31 August 2017 (UTC)

"In reality, Stepashin knew about a Chechen incursion, but it had no relation to any sort of a conspiracy." - How is the above proof of this statement? In any case, whether Stepahin was part of any conspiracy or not, doesn't prove either way whether there was a conspiracy. RAB3L (talk) 19:24, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
 * That's a point about conspiracies: they are not falsifiable, so no kind of an argument can convincingly disprove a conspiracy.
 * However, the above citation does prove that there were reasons for Stepashin's claims other than indications of a potential conspiracy.
 * Such as, Russia had intelligence, but taking a defensive action was complicated for purely military reasons.
 * Document hippo (talk) 19:35, 31 August 2017 (UTC)
 * Yes, there were negotiations with Basyev about starting the War of Dagestan, but this should be only briefly mentioned on this page because the subject of this page is different. My very best wishes (talk) 03:34, 10 September 2017 (UTC)

Irrelevant content
I removed this section because it was about connections between Berezovsky and Chechens, but not about subject of this page. Yes, it is widely known that he paid Chechens ransoms for hostages, but this is an entirely different story. My very best wishes (talk) 14:30, 10 September 2017 (UTC)


 * My very best wishes, as a contributor to that section, I'm conflicted about it. I'm concerned that Berezovsky's involvement is discussed in numerous texts. Whether it is better to just drop the entire story, or to provide a detailed discussion, is a tough question. I'm concerned that someone will bring it up in future. Document hippo (talk) 14:59, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Also, if this question ever arises again, a note to future contributors. Kulikov's statement that Berezovsky paid $10M to Chechen warlords is contested. Paul Klebnikov (2000 book, p. 301) wrote that "Berezovsky had donated $1 million in cash, possibly more, to Shamil Basayev". Akhmadov claimed that the only money Basayev received from Berezovsky was $1M -- and that he personally seen bags of money in Basayev's house. Document hippo (talk) 15:18, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Does this section includes any well sourced allegations that Berezovsky funded terrorists to arrange these bombings? No, it does not, if I understand correctly. But then how it is relevant to the subject of the bombings (this page)? Yes, there were allegations about Berezovsky being engaged in talks with Basayev about starting the Dagestan war. But that's another page. My very best wishes (talk) 15:16, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * You changed your comments . Yes, this is exactly what I am talking about. He allegedly paid money to Basayev (to release the Russian hostages according to many sources), but how it is related to these bombings? My very best wishes (talk) 15:30, 10 September 2017 (UTC)

My very best wishes, as an editor I don't have a strong opinion on this issue. I feel conflicted. I would rather abstain from a discussion. Thanks, Document hippo (talk) 16:01, 10 September 2017 (UTC)

Yury Dud's interview with Zhirinovsky.
Recently the theory of FSB complicity in apartment bombings resurfaced in the Russian media, in an August 2017 interview of sports journalist and video blogger Yury Dud (ru:Юрий Дудь) with Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

Here's the video (~ 4 million views by now). I have written down the relevant part of the interview.

From 33:52 to 37:50. For convenience, Dud's speech is marked as bold text, and Zhirinovsky's as plain text.

-Боитесь ли Вы Путина?

-Я никого не боялся. Ни Горбачева, ни Ельцина, ни Путина, ни Медведева.

-Если Вы никого не боитесь, Владимир Вольфович, расскажите нам, пожалуйста. 1999 год. Ваше выступление в Думе. Вы говорите, ловите Селезнева на дикой, чудовищной оговорке. Селезнев за три дня до взрыва в Волгодонске произнес об этом -на совете Думы.



-Как это понимать?

-Видимо ему позвонили кто-то и сказал, что совершен теракт. И назвали Волгодонск. Ну здесь, планировались, видимо, теракты. Обстановка была ненормальная. Теракты, естественно, могли быть ближе к Кавказу. Ростовская область. Волгодонск, потому, что там, по-моему, атомная станция или завод по производству. Это вот, конечно, вызвало подозрения, что значит, ему сообщили, что теракт уже произошел. Он не произошел еще. В этом плане, он же четвертый человек в стране. Он член Совета Безопасности. Его обязаны информировать. И он _нам_ сообщил это. А это была ошибка, никакого теракта не было.

-Но Вы понимаете, что это выглядит очень просто? Все... Есть версия, она очень популярная, что дома взрывало ФСБ.

-Нет.

-Рязанский сахарок.

-Да, да.

-Тот самый.

-Ну.

-И эта оговорка, о чем она может говорить? О том, что он знал, что взрыв будет там. И Вы, единственный, его на этом подловили. Как мне, гражданину России, вашему потенциальному избирателю,

-Да.

-после этого верить в то, что в Кремле, о будущем взрыве не знали?

-Объясняю.

-И не они это сделали. Как?

-Объясняю. Еще раз оценить мое мужество и смелость, ибо все молчали, и никто ничего не говорил, и никто якобы ничего не заметил.

-Окей.

-Второе. Обстановка была самая напряженная. И теракты могли произойти в любой момент, в любых точках. И ФСБ отслеживало. Слушайте внимательно. ФСБ отслеживало, где может произойти. И они уже знали, что определенная группа пришла в Волгодонск. Или там в Рязань. Или еще где-то. Но. Возможно, технически сработало так, что информация была что _готовится_ теракт в Волгодонске. А по инерции кто-то мог передающий написал, что произошел теракт. Это же был сбой технический. Ибо по всей стране, обстановка была сверх-напряженная, с августа по, там, сентябрь 1999 года.

-Вы допускаете, что ФСБ это сделало, и что спецслужбы это сделали, и этим была оговорка допущена?

-Нет. Я просто, вот, смотрите.

-Почему "нет"? Какой аргумент "нет" кроме того, что человек из спецслужб теперь Президент России, в том числе, Ваш начальник. Глобально.

-Потому, что и так обстановка была напряженная. Зачем же что-то еще делать? Тогда можно сказать, что мы войну устроили там? Войну, на Кавказе. Две войны, устроили. Знать они могли. Вот в этом плане оговорка была. Они знали, где возможны теракты. Как сейчас. Они ведут жесткую борьбу с будущими террористами. Москва, Петербург, Новосибирск, Ростов. Крупные города. Там, где выгодно совершить теракт. Никто не поедет в Урюпинск делать теракт. Это впечатления не произведет. Поэтому они знают и сегодня, ФСБ. И они ведут работу. Они в Петербурге почему прохлопали? Они хотели еще узнать связи этой группы. Может быть, еще будут связи, и накрыть всех вместе. И опоздали, они взяли, рванули метро раньше срока. Ну, это ошибка их, просчет.

Document hippo (talk) 18:35, 10 September 2017 (UTC)


 * What's the point? Yes, sure, exactly as you included here, FSB knew in advance about the terrorist act in Volgodonsk, and they informed Seleznev about it in advance. That is exactly what was published many years ago. The real question is this: why did FSB knew about this terrorist act in advance and did not do anything to prevent it? But we know the answer. The FSB people were caught red-handed while planting another similar bomb in Ryazan. My very best wishes (talk) 03:20, 11 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Zhirinovsky did indeed say that there was high risk of terrorist acts near Caucasus and in big cities. In addition, Volgodonsk has a nuclear power plant in it, so it's an easy guess. In addition, he implied that the FSB failed to act on whatever the information they have got.
 * Why the FSB failed to prevent the terrorist act if they had some intelligence is a good question. I don't know. Sometimes terrorist acts happen, might be the best answer based on the information we have so far. :( Document hippo (talk) 11:20, 11 September 2017 (UTC)
 * According to all these sources, it's not that FSB suspected something. It knew in advance exactly when and where that was suppose to happen and reported about it in advance to an appropriate person in Russian Duma (Seleznev). Seleznev did not talk about "risk". He talked about the actual event. That's the point. My very best wishes (talk) 14:38, 11 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Zhirinovsky makes a point there was no actual event by that time, and that it was a mistake of some person responsible for communications -- which he attributes to a "tense atmosphere in the country". The FSB failed to report the accurate information to Seleznyov. One could speculate that that contributed to its failure to prevent the act. Document hippo (talk) 14:58, 11 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Let's keep it factual. Seleznev said what he said, and Zhirinovsky demanded an explanation at the time of the events. Other than that, Zhirinovsky knew nothing and was not involved in these events (as also follows from the interview above). Why should he be cited prominently on this page based on the poor sourcing (the YouTube record)? Because his "liberal" party is a front organization (according to Alexander Yakovlev (Russian politician)) and he is therefore very knowledgeable in FSB affairs? We already have a quotation farm on this page and a lot of personal opinions by people who did not do research on this subject. Such things should be removed, not added. My very best wishes (talk) 18:00, 11 September 2017 (UTC)
 * But it's pretty much factual. We have an incident involving Seleznyov and Zhirinovsky. We cite Seleznyov's explanation of the incident, and now we have Zhirinovsky's account of the incident. I tried to keep it as concise as possible without sacrificing the essense of Zhirinovsky's statement.
 * Yes, it's not a written account, but I would say the quality of this source is about the average.
 * 4 million views of the video is much more (by a wide margin) than circulation of many newspapers cited in this article.
 * As a member of the Russian parliament and a leader of a major party, Zhirinovsky has access to some non-public information, so at the very least, it's an important data point, if you care about quality of the research.
 * Lastly, we totally could insert criticism of Zhirinovsky. However, he frequently responds to criticism (even in the above video, if you watch it beyond the cited fragment). Do we need to go in criticism-counter criticism circles?
 * Document hippo (talk) 18:34, 11 September 2017 (UTC)


 * @Document hippo. This page is mess. One should fix it using books by scholars written on this subject. But instead you are bringing YouTube records, make long translations from Russian about something that is not really relevant, and revert my edits in a matter of minutes . Can I please try to fix this page without you reverting my edits? Thank you. My very best wishes (talk) 19:12, 11 September 2017 (UTC)


 * I suggest to keep the discussion about Wikipedia policies regarding sources at my talk page, because it's not really relevant to the topic of this article.
 * I do hope that my contributions helped to make this article less of a mess. I do my very best to keep calm and stay civil. I feel insulted to hear your criticism of my effort, which I believe is not justified.
 * Lastly, you've removed the POV tag, and asked why is it there. It was put there by other user who, unfortunately, did not provide an explanation; so I think it could be safely removed. Document hippo (talk) 20:02, 11 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Not going to wade into the depths of this debate, but while I appreciate Document hippo's civility and some sense of trying to stick to sources, Vladimir Zhirinovsky is a fascinating but not exactly mainstream personality (indeed he and his party are called fascists ), whose notable moments include fantasizing about deporting Jews (his dad was Jewish, ironically) and East Asians, fantasizing disturbingly graphically about violently raping Condaleezza Rice using racist and sexist slurs , saying Ukrainian women were "nymphomaniacs" and urging the rape of Stella Dubovitskaya , threatening to bomb Poland and the Baltics back to the Stone Age , and more gemstones like these. Surely there are many people who have their own interesting views on what happened in these bombings. Why should Zhirinovsky get special mention? Indeed, I'm shocked that Russian editors even want him mentioned on pages that aren't about him, lest the Western readership have their curiosity piqued and learn more about such an (erm) interesting man. If I was Russian, I'd be mortified. Unless this is a different man with the same name, I really don't see why we should be giving his views any weight over the many others that aren't mentioned.--Yalens (talk) 04:18, 12 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Yalens, I don't like Zhirinovsky, too. And I am not trying to defend his many controversial remarks. If you watch the entire video, you would see the interviewer was pretty harsh on some of Zhirinovsky's more notable remarks, including his allegedly fascist sympathies, remarks on the Ukraine and his handling of women. Or his famous jab at Yeltsin in which he claimed that only dumb people live near the Ural Mountains -- offending vast swaths of Russia's population. (Frankly, I'm surprised why Zhirinovsky's famous 2002 drunken rant -- where he made his offensive remarks against certain American politicians -- was not mentioned.) The problem is, Zhirinovsky is not a marginal figure. He leads a major party. Unfortunately, he is pretty much mainstream! At the last Parliamentary election, his party got 6,917,063 votes (13.14% of the total votes). In a way, he resembles Trump — like Trump, Zhirinovsky made a number of shocking comments, but is fairly popular.
 * Before my edits, Zhirinovsky's direct speech was already cited profusely in the section "Incident in Russian Parliament". If there was a concern about his notability, that question should have been asked years ago.
 * Zhirinovsky's interview is notable because he was specifically asked to shed light on the Incident in Russian Parliament in the context of the theory that FSB perpetrated the bombings. By the way, do you think I have dug through the troves of Zhirinovsky's speeches including racial slurs and whatnot, to discover this particular interview? Of course not! I have learned about it from a major Australian newspaper, The Sydney Morning Herald: The future of Russia's media is in the hands of young and tech-savvy vloggers by Helen Womack.
 * So, Zhirinovsky is a notable figure, both in Russia's politics, and as a major protagonist of the Incident in a textbook description of it. His interview is notable, because he was particularly asked about the incident.
 * Lastly, like you, I don't like much of what's going on in either Russian or American politics. Yet, this edit is about a person's interpretation of a particular event. If you are aware of Zhirinovsky's other comments on the incident (I am not aware of such claims, though), where e.g. he claimed the blasts were perpetrated by the FSB, let's include them, too.
 * "Surely there are many people who have their own interesting views on what happened in these bombings." In my view, not really so. I mean, not "their own". Sometimes, a person who could write an original account, would just link to Satter, Dunlop or Litvinenko instead. Yes, it saves time, you don't have to do meticulous research, but could just cite someone else's book. However, I see that as a problem, because sometimes a vast body of research is essentially uncritically reused. But it's not always the case. Whenever researchers are not just following Litvinenko's book but do a study of their own, they often reach different conclusions, too. Like, for example, the duo of Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov, the world's best experts on the FSB, in their book The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB. Another frequent case is when the authors would (sometimes in great detail) list the various arguments but abstain from making any definitive conclusions -- like, for example, Ilyas Akhmadov, who wrote he "did not know" who perpetrated the bombings. -- Document hippo (talk) 12:29, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * P.s. Sorry for the rant, but I have actually studied a plenty of sources -- another typical take on the apartment bombings is to say "The bombings were blamed on the Islamists by the Russian authorities" (or other variants of that phrase). And no further discussion after that. That's another nice way to avoid making a decision, which is fairly common. I would say that a lot of authors have mastered the art to avoid any controversy in their works, which is commendable on one side, but hardly can be considered useful for the purposes of editing this article. -- Document hippo (talk) 15:56, 12 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Yes, I agree Zhirinovsky is a lot like Trump. In my opinion, Ilyas Akhmadov (who worked in foreign relations) is an example of something that isn't useful as a source for extensive usage here. It's quite likely that on a personal level, like most Chechens who support independence, Akhmadov believes that the bombings were not orchestrated by Chechens but would he publish himself saying that? No, he wants to appear moderate (he needs to, because of his past ties to Shamil Basayev, the child-killer), and he can leave the accusations against the FSB to people who present themselves as experts on that (not himself).
 * There are indeed many other theories Akhmadov certainly doesn't believe -- like the ones linking Basayev to the Russians -- although there is an interesting interplay here with the fact that Akhmadov was formerly on "Basayev's side" (albeit a moderate inside Basayev's camp) against Maskhadov. One interesting thing to see is if Akhmadov's comments are ever (or ever have been) rebuked by Basayev's former Chechen opponents, but that's far out of the scope of this page (and the mainspace as a whole). How you come across your sources isn't a thing I spend time thinking about-- I don't mean any offense by that, but I want you to know that I don't have any assumptions there. As you alluded to yourself, there are certain sources that are indeed much more relevant -- Litivinenko, and also Borogan, and et cetera. Zhirinovsky shouldn't get more than a couple sentences at most, outside of the reporting of his incident in parliament. To be fair, looking at the article as it stands, it doesn't seem that he has much more than that.--Yalens (talk) 16:24, 12 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Additionally, the stuff about the hostage trade in Chechnya, and the war in Dagestan, is really tangential to the point of off-topicness to the page. In particular, I can't see how the blockquote that Akhmadov has about dispelling myths that their were "four" major hostage taking bosses is relevant to this page at all. --Yalens (talk) 16:24, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Yalens, I agree mostly with your comments, however, according to many sources Basayev did work for the Russian GRU for a period of time (some even named his official "curator"), meaning at least that Basayev had connections with their people until they decided to get rid of him and directed him to the mine field where he lost his leg amputated by Khassan Baiev. But this is mostly relevant to the War of Dagestan he started. My very best wishes (talk) 16:55, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Yalens, it's perfectly alright to shorten the blockquote like you did.
 * Also, I believe the distinction should be made between the Chechens who fought for independence, and those who fought to spread jihad. Do you remember Akhmadov's account of how he entered Khattab's training camp to meet Basayev? There's clearly the sense of cultural shock. Like, Akhmadov reports seeing the Central Asian guards, who "wouldn't be even allowed to marry in a respectable Chechen family" (approx. quotation). There were clearly two opposing camps. One endorsed a separatist, and not-so-much religious, hopefully secular ideology, with an admixture of Chechen nationalism (like Maskhadov). While the other (Khattab and his Chechen allies) was in favor of Wahhabi brand of Islam, which was a pretty much international ideology, where self-identification was largely based on one's religion, rather than nationality.
 * Akhmadov is an interesting person, because while he initially worked more closely with Basayev, he ended up in a different camp than the latter. In the end, Akhmadov stayed in Maskhadov's Government, and as he reported the feeling of being isolated from Basayev, he couldn't have known anything about Khattab's plans. Document hippo (talk) 17:12, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * In the end, Akhmadov wrote a book that many people would consider to have been very soft on Basayev, portraying him in a relatively very sympathetic light. Maybe this isn't apparent, but if one looks at the book from a more "Chechen" perspective it rapidly becomes clear. Akhmadov falls far short of the total condemnation and disowning of Basayev that many people, especially Chechens, were hoping for. Although he actually is mostly fair to Maskhadov, he does at times portray Maskhadov as somewhat paranoid. Of course Basayev is a polarizing figure for Chechens, as on the one hand there are many who hate the fact that he was ever born and consider him an ignominy for the entire Chechen nation, there are others who have written new folk songs about Shamil Basayev, as a sort of tragic hero. (My very best wishes-- no I never said Basayev didn't work with the Russians-- I only said that Akhmadov said that he didn't think Basayev did.) I agree that it's useful to divide out the Islamists from the secularists. But it can also be a simplification if used excessively. Udugov was a committed Islamist, and Zakayev was a committed secularist (though also a practicing Muslim) but there was a lot of pragmatism in between (there's a wider range of ideologues too, ranging from "there is no Chechen nation, only Muslim North Caucasians" to "Islam is foreign and has eroded true Chechen culture" as the two crazy extremes; this entire debate tends to pretend Chechen atheists don't exist, but they do) . Although Basayev is typically considered by many Western narratives as a longtime member of the "Islamist" camp, he originally disdained the actual committed Islamists (Udugov, who ran "an Islamic orgy", Basayev's quote words in Akhmadov's book); he was an Islamist later when it was convenient for him. Most conflicts between the major Chechen warlords that seized power in the post 1997 era boiled down to personal relationships, resource squabbling and even taip rivalries, not religion; all the major players except Maskhadov were mostly interested in expanding their fiefs and would take whatever help was available, which often ended up being Islamist. In the case of Kadyrov, his sponsor turned out to be Russia itself, who ultimately helped him win out at the expense of everyone else. --Yalens (talk) 00:20, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Thanks, Yalens; that's a great deal of context. Document hippo (talk) 00:36, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Yeah, sorry, I believe I may have gone way off-topic.--Yalens (talk) 00:45, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Actually, a point that crossed my mind is that this article is mostly written from a Russia-centric perspective. It might be interesting to write a section on how these events were viewed from Chechnya, perhaps discussing some relevant background. --Document hippo (talk) 01:19, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
 * As for Chechen opinions there's Zakayev of course, Maskhadov, Basayev had interviews; I'm sure Udugov or Yandarbiev might have said something if you want to get all the POVs represented. A lot of Chechens consider the bombings as having been at the very least exploited to justify the second war; the Maskhadovists often blame this sort of Russian-Arab-Islamist-warlords destabilization axis for many things including Beslan as well. No surprise the Islamists hate them saying this; they instead view Maskhadov as having been a Russian stooge for trying to maintain peace (and Zakayev as an irrelevant sissy actor boy hiding away in England, welcome to the macho land of Chechnya :) ). I'm busy now but perhaps I'll see what I can dig up sometime.  --Yalens (talk) 01:47, 13 September 2017 (UTC)

Removal of Kirill Pankratov's take
I wonder why this edit had to be made.

Johnson's Russia List is a valid information source, which is cited in books on the topic.

Besides, Kirill Pankratov is an established journalist, having published 38 articles for The eXile magazine.

I would be glad to receive more comprehensive explanations. -- Document hippo (talk) 17:22, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Here is link provided on the page. This looks like a personal email sent from hotmal. Why it should be included? It fails WP:RS. My very best wishes (talk) 17:55, 12 September 2017 (UTC)


 * It looks like a personal email, because JRL is an email newsletter. Here you can see the list of contributors which, besides Kirill Pankratov, includes a lot of much more notable persons. Document hippo (talk) 21:51, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * At the very best, this is an "opinion piece" by a person that do not even have a WP page about. My very best wishes (talk) 12:11, 13 September 2017 (UTC)

Removal of Latynina's claim
In that edit, Latynina's claim was removed, with the cited reason being "Irrelevan here/citation out of context. Author actually tells that "terrorists attacks were not carried out by Chechens but by other nationalities"". Yes, she indeed says that. But the section is called Theory of Ibn Al Khattab's involvement. Ibn Al-Khattab wasn't a Chechen, he was a Saudi citizen. So I do not see any contradiction. Please, show me where I'm wrong.

However, actually I believe the quotation is wrongly placed and could be better used as the statement of that theory, rather than an argument to prove it. Document hippo (talk) 17:28, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Here is the source. Main idea by author is that "Most of these terrorists attacks were not carried out by Chechens but by other nationalities". OK, if you want to source that point somewhere, you are welcome. BTW, there are numerous other quotations on the page that distort views by authors by using quotations out of context. They all must be fixed.My very best wishes (talk) 18:00, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * That "Most of these terrorists attacks were not carried out by Chechens but by other nationalities" is the essential point in the theory of Ibn al-Khattab's involvement. If we don't currently say that, it's a shame, because we totally should. This source looks fine. Document hippo (talk) 18:09, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Of course Chechens were not directly responsible for the bombings, and we should avoid saying that. It was the ploy used by the Russian authorities to provide additional support for the Second Chechen war. The Chechen's might be indirectly responsible -- by hosting Khattab's training camps and providing safe haven for Basayev -- but (1) the Chechen Government was weak and didn't have resources to expel Khattab even if they wished to do that, (2) such detailed explanations might be beyond the scope of this article. Document hippo (talk) 18:12, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Here is her opinion piece. Where does it mentioned Khattab? What you are telling is WP:OR. My very best wishes (talk) 18:41, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * She talks extensively about Khattab in other sources. It's not OR. Just other sources should be cited, too. Document hippo (talk) 18:46, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Once again, what you are doing is WP:OR. Who said she is a "major proponent"? You? My very best wishes (talk) 18:47, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I've meant to say she has written extensively on the subject. But, fine, I do not insist she's a "major" proponent. Will remove that word. Document hippo (talk) 18:54, 12 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Please show me a couple of secondary sources telling there is such thing as "Ibn Al-Khattab theory" with such and such "proponents" and "opponents". Unless you can do that, this whole section qualify as WP:OR. Same with other "theories" on this page. You can simply describe an opinion of an author (if this is "due" on the page), but you need sources about this author to call him "proponent" or call his views a "theory" or whatever. To my knowledge, the involvement of Ibn Al-Khattab is not a theory. My very best wishes (talk) 11:52, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
 * There are multiple opinions about who was responsible for the bombings. And there are two ways to organize this page.
 * (1) We cease any attempt to classify authors as the proponents of this or that theory, and just try to explain each author's view on the topic.
 * (2) We broadly classify authors' view in two categories -- either supporting the conspiracy theory or the official version.
 * There's no OR here. Note, that if we remove the section about "Ibn Al-Khattab theory", we need to do the same with the "Theory of FSB complicity".
 * Also, note that there's the third class of theories -- those implying Berezovsky's complicity -- which do not currently fit into either of the two major theories we review. But we totally should mention them if we cease any attempt of classification. Document hippo (talk) 12:19, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Lastly, I agree with your criticism that indeed it would be hard to find a reliable secondary source claiming Latynina is a proponent of that particular theory. Let me implement a quick fix. Document hippo (talk) 12:40, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I asked you to provide supporting sources, but you could not. No, we can not use "POV qualifiers", such as "a conspiracy theory" (e.g. about Khattab) unless this is done in majority of sources. Also, we should not classify authors (as we wish) because their views were not simply "pro" or "contra" something, but a lot more complex. That's why their views must be explained, rather than simply declared. Simple declarations are usually distortions. Moreover, the simple declarations (such as "yes, I think he did it") do not add any meaningful content to the page and therefore should be usually removed, just as very long uninformative quotations (short and clear quotations are fine). My very best wishes (talk) 12:43, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
 * My very best wishes, note that I agreed with your criticism and removed the words which I could not provide a reliable source for. Document hippo (talk) 12:46, 13 September 2017 (UTC)