Talk:1999 Russian apartment bombings/Archive 9

Removal of Izmailov's claims
Speaking of this edit, please, explain, how does the text in the article distort the source?

The article is concluded with the following passage:

"А то, что говорит Березовский об участии ФСБ во взрывах в Москве и Волгодонске, - это ложь. У меня нет доказательств по всем взрывам, но по некоторым есть. Я знаю, что эти взрывы устроили бандиты", - отметил Измайлов.

Translated into English:

"But that which Berezovsky sais about FSB participation in Moscow and Volgodonsk explosions is a lie. I don't have the proof for all explosions, but I have for some. I know that the explosions were perpetrated by bandits." -- Ismailov noted.

Removing this source looks like WP:Vandalism.

Document hippo (talk) 15:48, 10 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Do you read Russian? Here is quoted source. The title: "Измайлов: ФСБ лукавит. Деньги Березовского пошли на выкуп солдат из плена". As follows from translation, the essence/summary of the publication is that FSB lied about Berezovsky, not that Berezovsky lied. As about last phrase from the link, its meaning is not clear at all. Author (not Izamilov) tells something about "bandits" (one could tell "terrorist"). Yes, sure, but the controversy is who exactly these terrorists were. That was a cherry picked quotation out of context if not outright distortion. My very best wishes (talk) 16:10, 10 September 2017 (UTC)

Йес, ай ду. I am not picky about whether it's "terrorists" or "bandits" (although the latter feels more natural for me), and of course if there's any controversy it's not up to WP editors to weigh in and offer their own expert opinions which would constitute OR. The reader can handle that on his own.

So, you believe the problem is in selective reading of the source. Until your recent edit we used to discuss Berezovsky and FSB counter-claims regarding each other in detail. Perhaps, we could discuss Izmailov's claims in more detail, more in the spirit of the article, and may be provide the very minimal context? Document hippo (talk) 16:25, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * If you want to use publications by Izmailov for sourcing, that's fine. But you need to use something that he actually had written (something like that), not a vague phrase someone else said about him. My very best wishes (talk) 16:32, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Thanks, I've read that article and I think it speaks about a different terrorist act, which took place in a different city.
 * What's wrong about a journalist speaking in an interview? A lot of WP sources are interviews. Also, we could make it clear it's not something he has personally written, but his words quoted in an interview. Document hippo (talk) 16:39, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Because the meaning of quotation is not clear, at best. What "bandits" he is talking about? What claims by Berezovsky he is talking about? This is not in the quoted source, because the source was about something different. My very best wishes (talk) 16:46, 10 September 2017 (UTC)

Izmailov's main argument was made in September 1999. Paul Murphy, "Wolves of Islam", p. 105:

Khattab told Al-Watan Al-Arabi that the war "had shifted to all Russian cities and would be directed against all Russians." When specifically asked, he refused to condemn the Moscow bombings. Vyacheslav Izmailov, a respected news commentator on Chechnya, thought that he knew why Khattab reacted this way.

Going on Russian NTV television, Izmailov said that very reliable sources in Chechnya had told him that Khattab, just after his initial defeat in Dagestan, recruited former Russian military personnel for a terror campaign across the Russian Federation. The men were divided into four teams to carry out bombings in Dagestan, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Rostov-on-Don. Each team was given money to buy what it needed and to rent premises to hide explosives intended for the bombings.

Document hippo (talk) 23:32, 11 September 2017 (UTC)
 * The question under discussion (and removed text) was not about Khattab. I removed it because the meaning of text was not clear, as explained above. Now, speaking about views by Izmailov in general, I quoted this his article for a reason. He tells here that certain terrorist acts were either organized by the FSB or at least they have been involved. My very best wishes (talk) 12:04, 13 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Alright. Is the meaning of what Izmailov reportedly said on the NTV in 1999 clear?
 * Second, the article you cited speaks of a different, unrelated event. It's perfectly normal for a person to have different views of different subjects. But hey -- note that in my entire history as a Wikipedia editor I have not removed a single source from this page. That's my principal policy. So, if you believe that it's essential to mention that Izmailov was critical of the FSB case against Astrakhan bombers (that's what I understood from the article) -- I do have zero objections, quite frankly. Just follow the WP:Verifiability, and we will be friends, as I told to other editor at this page. Document hippo (talk) 12:28, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
 * "I have not removed a single source from this page. That's my principal policy." That would be against WP policies, including WP:RS and WP:NPOV. A lot of content and sourcing in WP in general (and on this page) is junk, opinion pieces by non-experts, or irrelevant to the subject. This can and must be improved. My very best wishes (talk) 13:32, 13 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I rely on your judgement regarding whether Izmailov's position regarding Astrakhan bombings is relevant or not. Document hippo (talk) 14:59, 13 September 2017 (UTC)

Redirect
I made a redirect here because we have a lot of clearly duplicated materials on these two page. Another possible solution would be to move such materials from this main page to "explanation attempts" page instead of making the redirect (I do not mind), however keeping exactly same content on two pages is not a good idea. My very best wishes (talk) 20:19, 13 September 2017 (UTC)

Dagestan war
A lot of materials on this page (included mostly by a red-linked account) are not about these bombings, but about War in Dagestan, which is an entirely different subject. The only actual connection is that both the bombings and the War in Dagestan were used as a casus belli to start Second Chech War. These materials should be either removed or moved to proper page. My very best wishes (talk) 13:56, 15 September 2017 (UTC)

Removal of Kovalev's claim
I wonder, what was the reason for this edit?

In that interview, Kovalev said:

S. Kovalev. Yes, of course. I think it would be natural to check that. Moreover, I don't want to speak about likelihood, truthworthy or even serious doubts of that material without a most thorough and very tedious analysis. FSB will check that, and we will check, to the extent of what's accessible for us. Now, about the belief in this or that version. Yes, Felshtinsky and Litvinenko claim: "FSB explodes Russia". I won't like to believe in that, but I try to be impartial, and I don't rule out that version. I don't rule out any of them, including the Chechen connection, the FSB connection, or any hybrid versions which are possible too. Experience shows it's a frequent situation. Generally, I'm not a big proponent of conspiracy theories. But Litvinenko's and Felshtinsky's theory is a pure conspiracy. But regardless of what one feels is the preferred option, I believe that an investigator should follow the golden rule of a researcher, there's a similarity. There shouldn't be a more sharp and more demanding criticist of a hypothesis, than its author. Because it's he who knows all of the details. And he should strive to kill his own hypothesis, to destroy it. But if he doesn't succeed, then he exhales with a relief and says: "Well, now it's not a hypothesis, it's a proven thing, now it's a theory at least." One simply cannot see such desire on the side of the authors of the book. I won't even mention that the very book itself, the episodes which are known very well to me as a participant, there's incredible amount of fiction. For example, Budennovsk. It's pure fiction, and not even a single link. That's not how serious books are written, which pretend to be truthworthy.

T. Pelipeyko. Thanks, Sergey Adamovich. To sum it up, the very fact of errors in something else causes you to doubt that which was claimed by Litvinenko and Felshtinsky today?

S. Kovalev. I don't think such doubts should offend them. I think they have given the material to the commission so that it would be subject to impartial and fair minded analysis.

How would you summarize it?

Document hippo (talk) 20:57, 14 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Kovalev is one of key participants of these events and his opinion must be prominently included on this page - I strongly agree. However, the summary I removed was an outright distortion of his views on the subject. According to quotation above, he had no very clear opinion on the subject in 2002 ("I don't rule out any of them, including the Chechen connection, the FSB connection, or any hybrid versions which are possible too"). But he made his opinion later. Here is what he thinks in 20017. "Я думаю, что "чеченский след" был достаточно умело спровоцирован.", and so on. In other words, he thinks that FSB version of the events was fabricated. Let's use this most recent source here. My very best wishes (talk) 13:42, 15 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Essentially he said the following:

Сергей Ковалев: Я не могу с полной уверенностью утверждать, что эти взрывы были организованы властью. Хотя понятно, что они были ей на руку, на руку будущему президенту Владимиру Владимировичу Путину, потому что он только что обещал "мочить в сортире", как он выразился, каждого, кто имеет какое-то отношение к терроризму. И напугать людей терроризмом было для него политически целесообразно. Это не доказано.

Но что можно с полной уверенностью утверждать: расследование взрывов и московских, и так называемых "учений" в Рязани – все это шито белыми нитками. Могут быть разные варианты. Мне кажется, что Рязань должна была стать очередным взрывом, но я не могу этого доказать.
 * That's consistent with his 2007 claims and some of his 2002 claims that we cite. Alright, perhaps the 2002 claim I cited could be removed -- although it's not inconsistent with his 2017 claims, either. There's always a degree of ambiguity. --Document hippo (talk) 17:29, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * What would be a proper summary of his opinion? He makes several points/conclusions:


 * 1) The events in Ryazan were not a training exercise (he tells this with full certainty, especially if you read whole discussion);
 * 2) The entire version of events by Russian government (not only the events in Ryzan, but whole thing, including people who allegedly committed the bombings) were fabricated - he tells this with full certainty;
 * 3) Who committed the bombings? He tells he does not know, but the only side who really had a motive was Putin.
 * 4) He tells there is no direct/solid proof the bombings are committed by the FSB. OK, indeed there are version it was committed by GRU or some other people.
 * So, including a summary along these lines I think would be OK. My very best wishes (talk) 17:44, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I suggest translating the entire passage. There's no need to summarize something which is already brief.
 * Sergey Kovalev: I cannot state with full confidence that the explosions were organized by the authorities. Although it's clear that the explosions were useful for them, useful for future President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, because he had just promised to "waste in the outhouse" (as he said) everyone who had any relation to terrorism. It was politically benefitial for him to scare people with terrorism. That is not proven.

But what can be stated with full confidence: the investigation of both the Moscow explosions and the so-called "exercises" in Ryazan is trumped up. There can be various possibilities. It seems to me, that Ryazan should have been the next explosion, but I cannot prove that.
 * --Document hippo (talk) 18:09, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * We can't translate and include everything he said during the interview (a couple of pages). This is an OK quotation, but I do not think it fairly summarizes everything he said during the interview. We should make a summary, possibly with very short quotations (much shorter than that one). My very best wishes (talk) 18:30, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * He discussed a lot of stuff, much of which is a rehash of the material already reviewed in this article. Anything unique -- reflecting his personal take -- would be indeed short and could be translated as a direct speech (perhaps in addition to that text). --Document hippo (talk) 18:46, 15 September 2017 (UTC)

"Theory of Ibn Al Khattab's involvement"
This whole section looks to me as highly problematic. Why do we have this described as a separate "theory"? Was not he involved according to the official version? Yes, he was. As about the terrorist attacks being carried out not by Chechens but by other nationalities, this is simply a matter of fact (as noted by Latynina and others), and not a theory. This should be mentioned somewhere, but not as a "theory". My very best wishes (talk) 15:44, 16 September 2017 (UTC)


 * It's removal of lots of relevant, reliably sourced notable content in direct relation to the events discussed at the page, which qualifies as WP:Vandalism. If you dislike the caption, suggest a better one. Yes, Khattab was involved according to the official theory. However, lots of authors who argued in favor of this theory are not officials, and have no relation to the Russian Government. It's unclear why their viewpoints should be removed. --Document hippo (talk) 16:05, 16 September 2017 (UTC)
 * According to official version (see court ruling, "The official investigation was concluded in 2002. According to the Russian State Prosecutor office,[91][117] all apartment bombings were executed under command of ethnic Karachay Achemez Gochiyayev. The operations were planned by Ibn al-Khattab and Abu Omar al-Saif, Arab militants fighting in Chechnya on the side of Chechen insurgents.. So, this is an official conclusion by Russian government investigation. Why this should be repeated second time as a conspiracy theory? If anything from quotation farm and illogical discussion I removed deserves re-inclusion, this should be placed somewhere to a different section if you insist. I found only one meaningful paragraph that deserves inclusion and moved it to a different section where it belongs. My very best wishes (talk) 00:34, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

The lead

 * This edit. Yes, the claims are sourced. If you wish, you can place them in the body of the page. I made the edit because: (a) the intro did not summarize the content of the page, but instead included a discussion of different positions on the subject, (b) the intro was too long, poorly written and not logical. If you can improve my last version by making it even shorter and more clearly written, please do. If you think some important info was missing, please tell what was missing, let's discuss it and possibly include. But simply reverting everything is hardly the way to achieve consensus here. My very best wishes (talk) 03:55, 10 September 2017 (UTC)

The problem is, the alternative version gives undue weight to the conspiracy theory, which many of the editors who wrote at this talk page did oppose. People like Strobe Talbott, Ariel Cohen and Thomas de Waal are not less notable than Felshtinsky, Litvinenko or Berezovsky. There's no attempt to discuss, but rather than that, the lead provides indication of various attitutes towards the conspiracy theory. Document hippo (talk) 04:24, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Where does it tell that "false flag attack" theory was "the truth"? This version of intro only gives some factual information and tells that the "false flag attack" explanation exist/was suggested by such and such researchers. Well, if you think we should add that some other authors who believed that such explanation was wrong, I do not really mind. I would only suggest to include only such authors who wrote a book or at least a chapter of a book on the subject of this page. There are many people who did not study this subject, but only have a opinion (piece). They do not belong to the intro, and possibly even do not belong to the page. Would that be OK? My very best wishes (talk) 04:44, 10 September 2017 (UTC)

Like I've previously explained at this talk page, conspiracy theories are not falsifiable. Therefore, no one could ever say that this particular explanation is wrong. No kind of an argument exists which would prove it wrong.

The only thing which can be said is that there's no evidence for it. Even David Satter wrote that there's no direct evidence of the theory of FSB involvement:

The circumstantial evidence that the bombings were carried out by the FSB is overwhelming. The only reason there is no direct evidence is that the Putin regime has concealed it.

And that's pretty much it. You don't need a chapter to say there's no evidence. Document hippo (talk) 04:58, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Yes, sure. That's why my version does not tell there is a direct evidence of anything. Yes, sure, let's cite Satter exactly as you did. I do not mind. I am only telling that the lead must summarize content of the page. If we have something about about the research by Strobe Talbott or Ariel Cohen on this subject in the body of the page, then let's reflect this in the lead. But if we do not, this should not appear in the lead. My very best wishes (talk) 04:44, 10 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Why, the lead does summarize the content of the article. The article does indeed review facts pertaining to the bombings, it does indeed provide some context, it does review the theory of FSB involvement, and it does provide a further discussion. Document hippo (talk) 05:13, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * How come? Where the body of the page tells about the research on the subject by Arien Cohen? I do not see it. What we are going to summarize? Where the body of the page tells about research by Thomas de Waal? I can see only one his quotation, and it is not consistent with summary about his opinion in the lead. Where it tells about "His [Putin] popularity, combined with Boris Berezovsky’s money, allowed the pro-Putin Unity Party to win the second place in the elections to the State Duma" and why this is relevant at all to this page and must be included in the lead? And so on. My very best wishes (talk) 05:20, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Frankly, I was puzzled why there was the statement that "The war in Chechnya boosted the popularity of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who was previously the director of the FSB, and helped the pro-war Unity Party succeed in the elections to the State Duma and helped Putin attain the presidency within a few months." But what puzzled me more is that it was not historically correct, that's why I replaced it with a more accurate version. I don't think it really changed anything.
 * Talbott, Cohen and de Waal are notable because of their work in or around Russia, and because of their standing in the society. It's perfectly OK to briefly link to them in the lead. If you wish, I could further expand their views in the body of the article. Document hippo (talk) 05:35, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Once again, I am only telling that the lead should summarize content of the page, and it does not. Bringing random opinions (that are not explained and discussed in the body) to the lead is WP:SYN in the lead. I also do not think that a lot of personal opinions belongs to the body of the page. If someone did research on the subject and published a book or a chapter of a book about it (like Satter, Felshinsky, Litvinenko and some others), then yes, this should be described in the body and briefly mentioned in the lead. But if someone wrote an opinion piece (no matter "pro" or "contra" something), that does not belong to the page. My very best wishes (talk) 14:24, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
 * In addition, claims in intro are not consistent with sources. Here is publication by Thomas de Waal. OK, it can be used as source here, but it tells "Former Kremlin insider accuses President Putin of collusion in the 1999 bomb blasts that triggered the second Chechen war" . This is not what the lead of this page tells about Thomas de Waal. My very best wishes (talk) 14:44, 10 September 2017 (UTC)

The title refects the fact that de Waal wrote a commentary on a Berezovsky-sponsored movie, rather than endorses or rejects the claims made in the film. In that publication, Thomas de Waal wrote: There was very little in the allegations made by Berezovsky, which had not been reported in small-circulation Russian newspapers and a book written by an ex-KGB officer over the last two years. <...> Chekulin's testimony was the nearest thing to a "smoking gun" but even he admitted that he had no direct documentary evidence directly related to the three apartment block bombings.

That's consistent with the claim made in the lead.

You might argue that he said "no direct documentary evidence", and that's not the same thing as just "evidence". Fine. If you insist, I don't mind if this particular citation is removed. The first link is his September 30, 1999 BBC article which almost word-by-word coincides with Talbott's claim. I have specifically sought de Waal's later writing to double-check his opinion didn't make an U-turn in the years since the 1999, like it happened to a certain hero of this article. You can consider it more of an internal consistency check.

Regarding your other claims, please, note that SYNTH is not summary.

Document hippo (talk) 23:58, 11 September 2017 (UTC)


 * All right, I made another, shorter version of the lead noting that the matter is highly controversial and there are different opinions on the subject. My very best wishes (talk) 19:06, 14 September 2017 (UTC)


 * It's mostly alright. However:
 * (1) There are some issues with the concluding passage.
 * (1a) The effect of the bombings on Putin's popularity is not a theory. Indeed, his handling of the crisis boosted his popularity. Not so easy with the Unity party. According to David Hoffman, it was masterminded by Boris Berezovsky and funded by him. Hoffman writes, that Berezovsky is the single man who did the most to bring Putin to power.
 * (1b) As I have written before, some of the links do not support the theory of FSB complicity, so their use in that context is strange.
 * (2) As we mention there's a controversy, for the sake of completeness we should mention some other opinions. Most notably, Strobe Talbott who was a senior U.S. diplomat and is among the few world's top politicians to make a statement on the bombings. --Document hippo (talk) 20:29, 14 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I do not mind if you fix the last version of lede. More specifically: (a) I agree with removal Unity Party, (b) adding some names of people who hold another opinion is fine, but I do not think that any officials from US or Russian government would be a good source given this for example, (c) yes, sure, Berezovsky did a lot to bring Putin to power and he admitted this himself, but I do not think this should be included in the lead. My very best wishes (talk) 20:55, 14 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I do not mind if you include Satter's claims that the U.S. Government helped cover the conspiracy -- if I got it correctly -- into the appropriate section. But now, essentially, we have Satter's word vs. the U.S. Government's position. So we shouldn't exclude Talbott's claims on the basis of Satter's viewpoint. Document hippo (talk) 21:51, 14 September 2017 (UTC)

Forgot to talk about a brief mention of Khattab's invasion and threats in the lead. I have previously written about it. Now that I've changed the text to Khattab having had "links to Osama bin Laden", I could name several more sources supporting that claim -- for example, Klebnikov, Talbott, Clarke, Gerges... It's not an attempt to denigrate Khattab. It's pretty much factual description, with very strong support in the literature. --Document hippo (talk) 01:21, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I am not sure how much do you know about the sources you are trying to use on this page. Some of them are questionable at best, at least on this subject. For example, according to Sergei Tretyakov (intelligence officer), Strobe Talbott was "an extremely valuable intelligence source" manipulated by SVR agents (see book "Comrade J"). Klebnikov was an honest journalist, but he was fed disinformation by his FSB "sources" according to books by others, and so on. This is an additional reason why one should not include merely statements of opinion on this page. If someone (like Talbott) explained why he thinks so (and this is something that would add value to the page), his explanation should be included. However, if he simply tells "I think so", this is a pure opinion piece, uninformative and does not belong to the page. My very best wishes (talk) 18:21, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * If you believe that any of those persons collaborated with the FSB or something, and you can prove it, why won't you edit the respective pages for those people? (Minding the BLP, of course.)
 * I do not see how it is relevant to this page -- the reason why I included them is precisely that the conventional view of them is alright.
 * Lastly, I cannot help but wonder, have you read the book by Paul Klebnikov, or only other people's commentaries on it?
 * I am currently reading it and enjoying it enormously. (I have looked up relevant parts of it before, but only now I can attest that Klebnikov was indeed a great journalist.) --Document hippo (talk) 18:35, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Talbott's view is particularly interesting because as a former senior U.S. diplomat he had access to classified information, and as he curated the U.S. policy vis-a-vis Russia, his words that "there was no evidence" actually mean a lot. Document hippo (talk) 18:41, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Yes, I saw their books and used them to find something, although I did not read them completely. It's great that you are reading the book by Talbott. Can you please include here what of substance did he wrote on the subject of these bombings, rather than simply telling "there is no evidence"? My very best wishes (talk) 18:49, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I have typed the most relevant part of his book here. While it's a big picture, he seems to have been aware of the details of the conspiracy theory and likely haven't found them significant -- which is a valid perspective of an ex-senior official. --Document hippo (talk) 18:55, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Regarding the rest of his book -- it's fairly interesting, and what's important in relation to this page, Talbott certainly is not a Russia sympathizer. After all, his work was to promote U.S. interests and he had done a good job.
 * [Full disclaimer -- I do not want to lie here -- I haven't read Talbott's book in full, but I have been aware of it well before my recent edits. I was looking up information about the 1993 Constitutional crisis for my blog post, and Talbott's book proved to be a good source. -- Document hippo (talk) 19:13, 15 September 2017 (UTC) ]
 * Thank you! That helps. He is telling only most general info on the subject that was published everywhere. According to this fragment, Talbott did not study this subject (like Felshtinsky and some others), he did not have any special knowledge as "insider" of the FSB (like Litvinenko) or at least he does not tell anything about his special knowledge, he was not involved in investigations (like Trepashkin and Kovalev), and so on. Why on the Earth we should cite his hearsay opinion as something important on this page which is already too big? My very best wishes (talk) 19:17, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * he did not have any special knowledge as "insider" of the FSB -- true, but he did have special knowledge as an insider of U.S. State Dept (what Litvinenko, on the other hand, definitely lacked).
 * "Why on the Earth we should cite his hearsay opinion" because he was deeply involved into the Russian politics -- arguably, more than any other American at that time. --Document hippo (talk) 19:20, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * No, in this text he tell nothing special he would know as an insider of U.S. State Department. He tells only most common facts published everywhere. Why is that? To answer this question, one should use other secondary RS on the subject. For example, this source The State Department provided six documents but nothing about an assessment. I made a renewed request, and March 22, the State Department responded that documents concerning the U.S. assessment of the bombings would remain secret. So, US State Department had all info, but it made it state secret. That's why the ambassador tells nothing about it in his memoirs. Why should we quote his cover up "opinion" as something important? This is misleading for readers. My very best wishes (talk) 19:36, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Like I have suggested before, if you believe it's necessary, you can update the FSB involvement theory section to indicate that the U.S. Government has helped to cover it up (according to David Satter). --Document hippo (talk) 19:40, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * That would be a long shot. I am only telling that we should not include uninformative and baseless opinions (such as "there is no evidence", without any supporting explanations), especially by people who are not a reliable source on the subject. My very best wishes (talk) 19:48, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I am not aware of an opinion -- not even Satter's opinion -- to specifically single out Strobe Talbott as an unreliable source on Russia -- the matter and subject of his job in the interests of the U.S. Government during two U.S. presidential terms. --Document hippo (talk) 19:54, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Two points here. (1) We should not include uniformative personal opinions by people who are not experts on the subject (and were not directly involved in the subject) anywhere in WP because that does not improve pages. If he was telling something interesting and substantial on the subject, we could include it. But he does not. (2) We do not make any WP:OR, but it is our responsibility to evaluate sources. Obviously, the Comrade J book and the info being treated as a classified information by State Department totally disqualify Talbott as a authority on this specific subject (although he is probably an excellent authority on something else about Russia!). My very best wishes (talk) 20:26, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Strobe Talbott is definitely an expert on the Russia-related topics in general, and the inside workings of the top echelons of Russia's politics in particular.
 * Second, if you believe you have anything novel to say about Strobe Talbott, please consider contributing that info to his Wikipedia page. Judging from what I could read there, there are no indications that his opinion might be untrustworthy.
 * Third, if you believe there are indications that a particular U.S. agency might cover up Russia Government's crimes, please consider contributing that info to the Wikipedia page about that U.S. agency.
 * -- Document hippo (talk) 20:44, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Yes, sure, one can use his writings for sourcing something on the Russia-related topics in general, but only under two conditions: (a) he is telling something interesting and important which would be worthy inclusion on a page; and (b) that something would not be a classified information while he was an Ambassador (and this is still a classified information according to the official response from State Department). He has an obligation not to tell the truth on the classified subject, however excellent expert he might be. My very best wishes (talk) 21:21, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * No kind of a security clearance would force a person to lie. If Talbott had any information he would rather not share, he would remain silent about it. However, the particular statement made by Talbott is very unambiguous -- indeed, he wrote that "there was no evidence to support this conspiracy theory", which excludes any ways to read it differently. And as there's nothing in the man's past to indicate he is untrustworthy, it is a reliable source. --Document hippo (talk) 21:34, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * I would never speculate what another person can do to keep state secrets safe. Did you read the book "Comrade J" by Pete Earley? Highly recommended. It tells something that is not consistent with your opinion. My very best wishes (talk) 21:55, 15 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Thanks, I will add it to my reading list.
 * I have studied that source regarding Talbott's reliability as a source about Russian apartment bombings, and I stand for what I said before. I have placed my findings at the respective talk page. Document hippo (talk) 12:52, 16 September 2017 (UTC)
 * You are trying to disprove something that I never said. Once again, I am not telling his book is not a reliable source on Russia in general. I am only telling he provided no substantial information about the subject of these bombings in his book. I am also telling that he was under obligation do not disclose information on the subject of the bombings because such information was classified by State Department, and it is still classified. That's why he did not provide any substantial information. This is fine. Who cares? This is just not a good source on the subject, nothing special. That happens all the time. Now, speaking about the book, "Comrade J", see pages 179-184. According to the book, T. was an US patriot listed as "unofficial trusted contact" by the SVR. According to the book, he influenced the entire foreign policy by Clinton's administration with regard to Russia in favor of Yeltsin administration. It describes an SVR person who had frequent meetings with T. who said he had these meetings, but the SVR person did not influence his decisions. However, according to a US House report (mentioned in the book) "a small group of of administration officials, including Talbott, consistently ignored and downplayed U.S. analytical information ..." and so on. But once again, I am just a reader of the book. My very best wishes (talk) 13:18, 16 September 2017 (UTC)
 * The same book cites Tretyakov's claims that in his view Talbott was not a Russian spy, but an American patriot. Also the book cites Talbott on that he considered the Cox report to be politically biased (it was written predominantly by Republicans and published during the election season).
 * Indeed, Talbott did not provide extensive details about the bombings, but his relevance comes from the fact that he's -- to my knowledge -- the top world's official to make a statement on the bombings (P.S. -- speficically as regards to the theory of FSB involvement) who is not a Russian official.
 * Also, he was very particular in his statement that "there was no evidence to support this conspiracy theory". If there was some evidence he was aware of but did not cite -- for whatever reasons -- would mean he deliberately lied. And it's a very serious accusation -- I'm not aware anyone claimed that. --Document hippo (talk) 13:47, 16 September 2017 (UTC)
 * He did not provide any specific details about it. Of course he lied by not disclosing classified information he knew. That kind of lie is classic that appears in stories that where written for kids, specifically to explain what the lie is - see ru:Чук_и_Гек. My very best wishes (talk) 14:07, 16 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Actually the Soviet and American cultures are strongly different. While that tale might be important to define the typical Soviet mindset -- which I am not sure of, just suggesting -- I doubt that Strobe Talbott has read it as a kid (or anytime in his life, to be honest). I am not aware of a similar American book for kids, a TV cartoon or something which would justify lying. In the American culture lying is strongly discouraged. --Document hippo (talk) 14:14, 16 September 2017 (UTC)
 * ??? Lie is not specific to any culture. This is known as Lie. For example, not including an important relevant information to a scientific report would be considered a scientific misconduct in any country. A company which does not include some important results of a drug trial to their reports is another example, and so on. I am really surprised by your responses here. My very best wishes (talk) 14:33, 16 September 2017 (UTC)
 * A recent example of a cultural difference I mentioned. When Russian President Putin has first denied the presence of Russian troops in Crimea and then confirmed that fact -- he might have thought it's no big deal. But the fact that he has lied and admitted that on public caused a sharply negative reaction in the West.
 * If Talbott used a different wording -- like, for example, "there was no evidence published in the press to prove the conspiracy theory", then assuming he was aware of the evidence of FSB's complicity, he would be guilty of a lie by omission. However, he made a very strong statement -- "no evidence" -- which would mean he directly lied if it's proven to be incorrect. --Document hippo (talk) 14:44, 16 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Even if you want to include it, T. does not explain why he thinks whatever he thinks. Best we can do is to tell: "T. believes that ....". Yes, people do have personal believes, but I do not see why they should be included here. My very best wishes (talk) 01:59, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

Klebnikov
I checked the book by Klebnikov (published in 2000 and written soon after the events), pages 303-305. He tells about various speculations on the subject (including bombings being conducted by "mavericks of Putin's camp" as something he does not exclude!), and adds "but all of this is speculation". Basically, he has no opinion on the subject. Therefore, I do not think his opinion should be included on this page. My very best wishes (talk) 03:33, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

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Slight oversight in one section
Real simple, in the section title "Claims, denials and confessions of responsibility for the blasts" there is mention of a Dekkushev who I believe is meant to be Adam Dekkushev. It's the first time Dekkushev is mentioned in the article and a first name should probably be included.

My first wiki-post, sorry for any breach of wiki-etiquette or protocol! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.203.249.119 (talk) 08:02, 19 June 2018 (UTC)

"Theory of warlords involvement"
There are several problems with this recent inclusion. (1) This is not really a "theory", but the official version of Russian government. (2) It is already described in other sections of the page. This is duplicate content. If you think something was missing. please include it in appropriate section. (3) It creates incorrect structure of the page: the books and films were NOT about this specific "theory", but about whole event. My very best wishes (talk) 19:45, 10 October 2018 (UTC)


 * Yeh, a publication by Scott Anderson (novelist). My very best wishes (talk) 02:23, 18 January 2019 (UTC)

Confused information about total number of casualties
On English Wikipedia, we currently have 293 as the total number of deaths and 1000+ as the number injured. Russian Wikipedia has 307 and 1700 respectively. Despite this fact, the English Wikipedia actually has both sets of casualty numbers if you read the article. The casualty numbers without citation are actually the lower figures and not the higher figures. Here's a summary:

Date - Deaths - Injuries

31 August 1999 -     1   -   40  can be sourced to book "New Cold War" by Edward Lucas (journalist), pages 22-23.

4 September 1999 -  64  -   133;   68 - 150 ; Lucas: 64 killed

9 September 1999 - 106/94 - 249;   100 - 690 ; Lucas: 94 - 150

13 September 1999 - 119/118 - 200;  124 - 7  Lucas: 118 -200

16 September 1999 - 17   -   69;   19   - 1045  Lucas: 17 killed

Mathematical totals:

with higher numbers and including 31 Aug:  307   -  691

excluding 31 Aug & with lower numbers:     293  -   651

English Wiki total:                         293  -  1000+

Russian Wiki total:                         307 -   1700

Other sources:                              367 killed

Geographyinitiative (talk) 18:38, 14 April 2019 (UTC) (modified)
 * This contradictory numbers problem is a glaring issue that doesn't exist for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 or September 11 attacks and the alternate language versions of those pages. More people were killed in the Russian apartment bombings than in Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, so the topic is on a similar level of importance. I know very little about Russia or these bombings, but my best guess is that the 293 killed and 1000+ injured figures represent some kind of initial estimate that was later revised up. The 293 and 1000 figures can also be seen on the Chinese Baidu Baike: https://baike.baidu.com/item/莫斯科公寓楼爆炸案 死亡人数 293 受伤人数 1000. I can't read Russian, but unless they have different numbers on the injuries at the different attacks, then there's an overestimate of more than thousand people being injured (1700 minus 691). I don't know. If anyone looks into this, I would also be interested in understanding if the people killed and injured were 100% Russian citizens, or if there were people of other nationalities, etc. It should be done something like or.
 * I would make a guess that the updated/finalized casualty figures would probably be reiterated at the annual or decadal memorials for those who died. The twenty year mark will be coming up in September, so hopefully we will figure this stuff out by then. Geographyinitiative (talk) 22:59, 14 April 2019 (UTC) (modified)
 * Sorry to ping you on a sensitive topic, but who else is interested in this article that might be able to clarify the numbers? Geographyinitiative (talk) 01:37, 15 April 2019 (UTC)
 * I just placed the numbers above from the official statement by court, and they are very different... Here is the problem: no one knows the precise numbers, just as with Beslan school siege and especially Moscow theater hostage crisis (where many people died later). Yes, of course, this is different from Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 or September 11 attacks! Here is the difference. There was no independent or reliable official investigations. There was only a cover-up for various reasons. Many people who tried to do independent investigations in these three cases were killed by Russian government agents, even in London, prosecuted by the government (like "Mothers of Beslan"), etc. Perhaps one needs a range of numbers as follows from multiple sources. My very best wishes (talk) 16:27, 15 April 2019 (UTC)
 * This is probably too complicated and political for me to really be able to contribute in a useful manner. But it's very sad that there's not a known number of deaths (or at least a known range) that appears on all language versions of Wikipedia. 367 deaths is still different from the 307 deaths that currently appears on the Russian version of Wikipedia. Geographyinitiative (talk) 22:04, 15 April 2019 (UTC)
 * We can't use WP for sourcing. According to official numbers (see links above) that would be 312 (1+68+100+124+19) killed, which gives range of 312 to 367 (article in NYT). Can anyone trust these numbers? No, of course not, knowing other details of the case. The number of injured in Volgodonsk alone was more than a thousand because the blast was enormously powerful, so a lot of people were hit by the blast wave and had injured their hearing. My very best wishes (talk) 22:39, 15 April 2019 (UTC)

Sourcing for false flag claims
Pinging User:Geographyinitiative and User:The Four Deuces. This is in reference to this diff which rejected text from this article at Vladimir Putin on the grounds that the source was unreliable, and which brought about this diff. (This could equally well be discussed at Talk:Vladimir Putin but this is closer to the source.) This is a clear application of WP:INTEXT and WP:NEWSORG: an op-ed by David Satter is evidence that David Satter believes that the bombings were a false flag attempt. Whether National Review is good enough is not the issue (for the record, it's a well-established source for commentary, analysis, and opinion pieces). Is the op-ed is a reliable source for what David Satter believes? (I would think yes.) Beyond that, I think we ought to discuss the best way to phrase the claim. Wikiacc (¶) 02:51, 29 April 2019 (UTC) (minor edits 02:55, 29 April 2019 (UTC))
 * Obviously this is a sensitive topic to be discussing. I don't know anything about the issue really, but there are some glaring problems with this article like the fact that the number killed in the English version of the Wikipedia article is STILL different from the number killed given in the Russian version of the Wikipedia article, and I think that such a number should be pretty precise (or at least narrowed to precise parameters) twenty years on from the events. To me, it just means that the English-speaking world doesn't really care, and I find that very disheartening and sad. We should know this stuff by now. Also, I don't claim to know "who dun it", but I thought that, given what kind of conspiracy theory allegations are on this page, it might be appropriate to add some kind of one-sentence summary or one-phrase summary to Putin's page about the allegations and speculation that there was some kind of government involvement that intended to help him be elected President. I'm not saying it's true. I know nothing of Russian politics and intrigue. I'm just saying that the fact that there are these kinds of theories circulating is something relevant about Putin, even if the conspiracy is 100% wrong. Let's say it's a totally nonsense conspiracy theory: it still seems relevant to Putin in some way, worthy of a passing mention on his page (or on a subpage about conspiracy theories concerning him, if there is such a page). You have written a really good comment, but I won't be able to help you any further than this, because it's out of my area of expertise. Good luck.  My condolences to families of the victims of the tragedy. Geographyinitiative (talk) 03:43, 29 April 2019 (UTC)


 * The disputed text is, "A number of historians and observers have stated that the bombings were a false flag attempt, coordinated by Russian state security services to bring Putin into the presidency." Per "weasel-wording you would need at the least to say who these historians and observers are. One could say the same thing about any alternative history, for example the Kennedy assassination or the 9/11 attacks. It would be technically true but misleading. You need a secondary source, preferably an academic one that explains the degree of acceptance of this theory. Furthermore, one could expect to know why they state this. I do not know much about this theory but based on your sources it appears to be limited to the "right-wing echo chamber." It's sort of like a wire service. Once a theory is posted in one publication, it gets repeated in all the others. But it lacks weight unless it makes it into mainstream media and academic writing. TFD (talk) 04:08, 29 April 2019 (UTC)


 * I did not write the sentence. The poor condition of this sentence may speak to the poor quality of this article generally. Maybe it is only right-wing echo chamber. If it is, then this article needs to be changed. If it is not, then the Putin article needs to add one short, well-cited mention of the historians' theories. (IMO) Geographyinitiative (talk) 04:50, 29 April 2019 (UTC)Geographyinitiative (talk) 04:26, 29 April 2019 (UTC)


 * I have added a NPOV label to this article and the Vladimir Putin page on the basis that the sentence, "According to historians, the bombings were coordinated by the Russian state security services to bring Putin into the presidency." may (may) be the result of 'right wing echo chamber' nonsense. If support is found in multiple reliable scholarly and journalistic sources for this sentence, then that sentence is extremely relevant to the Vladimir Putin page, and should be included on that page in some form, with the relevant sources. BUT if that sentence is not really supported by the sources and is merely 'right-wing echo chamber' nonsense, then it should either 1) not be included here (meaning that the current version of the page includes 'right wing echo chamber' or some other nonsense), 2) be included in a revised form (meaning that the current form of the page has a bias or spin in wording), or 3) have a 'better source needed' label after it (meaning we basically don't know what to think of the claim). Geographyinitiative (talk) 08:44, 29 April 2019 (UTC)


 * I'm currently leaning toward the 'better source needed' idea. But if no 'better source' is needed to prove the claim that "According to historians, the bombings were coordinated by the Russian state security services to bring Putin into the presidency.", then that sentence or some version of it would unquestionably need to be added to the Vladimir Putin page in my view. Geographyinitiative (talk) 08:54, 29 April 2019 (UTC)


 * @Geographyinitiative. The exact wording "false flag attack" may indeed be disputed, because some good sources do not use that exact wording. That why I have removed this wording before you started this thread. What's the problem? Do you suggest to place this wording back? Do you want more sources to support the essence of the claim, rather than the exact wording? Speaking of recent academic sources/books, those are books or other publications by Karen Dawisha, Amy Knight, Yuri Felshtinski, David Satter, etc. They are cited on the page. Do you need more? Now, if you have content disagreements about other pages, they should be resolved on other talk pages. My very best wishes (talk) 19:41, 29 April 2019 (UTC)


 * If the statement ""According to historians, the bombings were coordinated by the Russian state security services to bring Putin into the presidency."" is a cited fact, then it is obviously relevant to the Putin page. My contention: it cannot be a cited fact on this page and at the same time not be relevant on the Putin page. Last time I tried to add a similar sentence to the Putin page, it was rejected- maybe because of the false flag wording. I am going to try to add the current version of this sentence to the Putin page again and see what happens. If it is again rejected or reverted on the basis of a lack of evidence or citation, then (my contention is) either that page is not neutral or this page is not neutral. Geographyinitiative (talk) 20:17, 29 April 2019 (UTC)
 * I added that sentence, with the relevant citations (which I have not fully checked- I didn't check the books) Geographyinitiative (talk) 20:33, 29 April 2019 (UTC)
 * Again, I know nothing about the bombings. It's a sensitive topic of course, so I'm trying to be as even-handed as I can be. I just think that if the above statement can be cited as a Wikipedia-level cited statement on this page, then it is incredibly relevant to the Putin page. So either the sources are messed up, the wording of the sentence is messed up, or it just hadn't yet been added to the Putin page. It's a sensitive topic and borders on 'conspiracy theory', so I obviously understand if other editors revert it or get angry. I don't want to play games- I'm just saying that if the above statement is a cited statement on this page and not just biased garbage propaganda, then it definitely needs to be added on that page too. Again, my deepest condolences to the families of the victims. Geographyinitiative (talk) 20:54, 29 April 2019 (UTC)
 * If both pages remain basically as they are (with respect to this sentence) after my new edit to the Putin page, then I think the npov problem is resolved. However, last time I added a similar sentence, it was reverted. We'll see what happens. If there's no more discussion here or on that page, and if that sentence(or some version of it) can be found on both pages, then I would be satisfied with that result. Geographyinitiative (talk) 22:27, 29 April 2019 (UTC)

as expected my edit was reverted  so i re added the better source needed marker Geographyinitiative (talk) 23:46, 29 April 2019 (UTC)
 * I already responded on your talk page, but can repeat it here.


 * 1) When we tell "according to ..." - this is an attribution, not a statement of fact. This claim does need to be attributed.
 * 2) This is not a question of WP:RS. The books and other publications by Karen Dawisha, Amy Knight, Yuri Felshtinski, David Satter and others are obviously RS. Your question is probably different: how exactly these sources need to be summarized? Speaking about this, I would strongly recommend you (or anyone else) to actually read these books, where the entire chapters are dedicated to the subject.
 * 3) Speaking on the essence of the claim, yes, the historians mentioned above (and many others, like Alexander Litvinenko, Vladimir Pribylovsky or Scott Anderson) tell that the bombings have been arranged by FSB and GRU people. There is no any doubts about it based on indirect evidence, although there is not much direct material evidence either, which is not surprising given that very same organizations who committed the terrorism acts did the "investigations" and eliminated all witnesses including even their own people, such as General Ugryumov. What was exactly the role of Mr. P. (that is where you want to place it) - this can be only a matter of reliable guessing, but no one familiar with the subject has doubts. A "fiction" book "Lesser Evil" by Yuli Dubov hints that the actual mastermind behind the plot was Philipp Bobkov, but there is no evidence of that to my knowledge. My very best wishes (talk) 03:41, 1 May 2019 (UTC)
 * @Geographyinitiative


 * 1) I agree with comments above about poorly written text and therefore restored a slightly older version and removed disputed "false flag" wording. If you want to fix it further, please do.
 * 2) "either that page is not neutral or this page is not neutral". No. Those are different pages, and the text for inclusion should be different. You can't just copy-paste text from one page to another and do not expect objections. Also, if you want to include something, but your edit was challenged, this is your responsibility to check the sources, use additional sources and appropriately rephrase the summary for inclusion. You did not do it. My very best wishes (talk) 19:49, 1 May 2019 (UTC)

Seleznyov "slip of the tongue"
This detail (parliament's speaker announcing a bombing three days in advance by mistake) struck me as bizzare. I searched around and it seems that there was an explosion in Volgodonsk the day prior. Here is a small news item describing it. For context, it was published on the day of the second apartment bombing, among the flurry of contradictory and panicked news and reports about the bombings appearing almost every minute (here's a compilation of news flashes about the bombings, it shows that the same website published several dozen the same day, and it doesn't even include this fluff piece).

The Monday 9/13 news item itself is a sort of a digest; it says that during the preceding weekend, one unindentified bomb exploded in Volgodonsk, injuring two (according to RIA Novosti IA); one homemade bomb blew up in a country house in a town named Artyom, and one grenade in a town named Miass. Three more cities reported mock bombs found in apartment block hallways. An archived excerpt from a daily newspaper (also published before the Volgodonsk apartment bombing, on 9/15) claims that the explosion on 9/12 was a (fourth) assassination attempt on some kind of criminal boss nicknamed Admiral; initially thought as a terrorist attack.

(There are two more minor reasons the claim seemed strange. One is that the speaker's words were not broadcast anywhere and were uttered during the session of the parliament, in passing, using one sentence (judging by the way it's cited by a fellow MP whistleblower years later). The only reason these words had surfaced was because Zhirinovsky "called out" Seleznyov on them on Thursday 9/16. There seems to be no reason for Seleznyov to have broken the news of the bombing for some kind of theatrical effect, since only the MPs were going to hear it (and also fail to mention it anymore, like it's some minor occurence). If it was indeed an FSB blunder, the man would have said something else about such a major event that he believed had happened. Another reason is the source of the controversy, namely Zhirinovsky. Since the early 90s and to this day he is invariably known in Russia as a politician who relies solely on his eccentricity, showmanship, and wild, outrageous claims. This trait was especially prevalent at the time, and he enjoyed great popularity because of it, coining multiple "memes" of the time.)

Overall, as I understand, the article is mainly sourced from the exposé sources, which debunk the official Russian version. This gives the article a rather non-encyclopedic tone: the text seems to steadfastly debunk the official version, 'without' actually spelling out the official version (of the investigation, alleged timeline, etc.). Also, the personalities (e. g. Kovalyov) are only quoted as fully supporting the false flag theory, and there are no counterclaims or critique even from the liberal/opposition side (there were, inc. from Novaya Gazeta; Kovalyov himself, talking to an opposition radio station Echo of Moscow, stressed that Blowing Up Russia is a classic conspiracy theory and lacks rigor).

I don't have a definite opinion on this matter, and it is truly a murky, controversial stuff. So this comment is only about encyclopedic rigor and article quality. Seleznyov slip of the tongue is both fully described in the abstract and has its own section in the article, and is treated like a very important detail on the topic. I believe that, even if true, it doesn't merit this — and if it is, it'd be more of a bizzare trivia. AyeBraine (talk) 02:12, 24 May 2019 (UTC)

PS: Russian wiki seems to have an extensive page specifically on the controversy about government involvement, with a sourced section dedicated to the stuff above. Reading through it, it seems rather neutrally edited, including claims and counterclaims by many different sides. AyeBraine (talk) 02:29, 24 May 2019 (UTC)
 * If you want to add more sourced info about the "official version", you are welcome. Just remember, no "original research" by yourself, you need a good secondary RS telling something about the Selezneyov statement, for example (your first link above does not tell anything about Seleznyov). As about Kovalyov, you can use this. Here is what they said about the incident with Seleznyov:

Владимир Кара-Мурза-старший: Сергей Адамович, в Думе был такой эпизод, когда спикер Селезнев объявил "минуту молчания" в память о жертвах взрыва в Волгодонске, а взорвался дом на Каширском шоссе.

Сергей Ковалев: Еще взрыва не было, официально не было объявлено о взрыве.

Владимир Кара-Мурза-старший: Он только через три дня произошел, а в этот день был взрыв на Каширском шоссе.

Сергей Ковалев: Надо сказать, что на этом поймал его Жириновский. Ну, как-то это замяли.

Владимир Кара-Мурза-старший: Но это же очень серьезное обстоятельство.

Сергей Ковалев: Это был очень серьезный промах. Это значит, что Селезнев знал о том, что будет...

My very best wishes (talk) 23:08, 27 May 2019 (UTC)

Significance of the conflict in Dagestan for the bombings
Over the years, the article has grown less balanced. In its present form it glosses over the significance of the conflict in Dagestan, and overlooks substantial evidence that Dagestani Wahhabis (such as those convicted of the crime) were responsible for the bombing in Buinaksk and perhaps for one or more of those in Moscow and Volgadansk. This evidence is not contrary to evidence for the culpability of the Russian security services in Ryazan. The evidence suggests an arc of copy-cat culpability from Dagestani Wahhabis (associated with the enclave in the villages of Karamachi, Chabanmachi, and Kadar) to the federal security services.

Robert Ware

Sourcing summarized in Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance, M. E. Sharpe, 2010. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.211.153.190 (talk) 03:55, 18 August 2019 (UTC)


 * Please suggest the edits to the article that would fix the problem. Alex Bakharev (talk) 04:07, 18 August 2019 (UTC)


 * As I state at the head of this talk page, and as I also state on the talk page for War in Dagestan, you must, first, remove the uninformed personal attack against me that you display at the top of this talk page. Second, you must restore to this article (Russian Apartment Bombings) the several paragraphs of material that you evidently have removed as a consequence of the personal attack against me that is displayed at the head of this talk page.  Evidently, you have parked this material on a transient basis on the talk page for the article on the War in Dagestan. On that talk page, you ask readers whether the material that you removed from this page should be published on the War in Dagestan page-- since, at the moment, that material is published on no page at all.  The answer to your query is that you must restore those several paragraphs of material to this article on the Russian Apartment Bombings.

Prior to publishing any more personal attacks against me, I recommend that you acquaint yourself with the broad body of scholarly publications that followed from my field work in the North Caucasus and Russia during the years of the war in Dagestan and the Russian apartment bombings. The fact that I also teach philosophy has no bearing on this discussion and ad hominem attacks of the sort that you countenance above should be beneath the dignity of this publication.

As you have requested concrete suggestions for improvement of this page, I am copying below a segment from an upcoming chapter in a book on Post-Soviet Conflicts. This analysis closely follows the analysis presented in my book titled Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance (M. E. Sharpe, 2010); also published in my book titled The Fire Below: How the Caucasus Shaped Russia (Bloomsbury, 2013); also published in "Revisiting Russia's Apartment Block Blasts" (Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 5 January 2007); also published in Richard Sakwas edited volume, Chechnya: Past to Future  You are welcome to use any of this material that you wish:

Explosions: Deadly, Controversial, Crucial, and Influential

During the night of September 4 1999, as fighting raged in Karamakhi, a truck bomb ripped through an apartment block in the nearby town of Buynaksk, killing sixty-four people. Although the building was inhabited by civilians, it had previously housed military families. The next day, on September 5, Basaev and Khattab launched their second invasion of Dagestan in a month, this time further north, in Dagestan’s Novolaksky Rayon. There is reason to suppose that this second invasion was intended to relieve the residents of Karamakhi from Russian attack. Yet there is no reason to rule out other motives including 1) the recovery of historic Chechen territory in what had briefly been the Aukovsky district but which became primarily the Novolaksky Rayon of Dagestan following the deportation of the Chechens in 1944; 2) the conquest of a corridor to the Caspian Sea; 3) the subsequent strategic division of Dagestan into northern and southern portions. Because these four potential objectives represent a linear eastward progression (from Novolaksky, to Karamakhi, to the Caspian shore) it is possible that Basaev may have entertained all four motives and aspired to achieve as many of them as he could. Yet the only real consequence of the September 5 insurgency was the creation of a new theater of military action in Dagestan. 	On September 9, ninety-four people died in their sleep when an explosion leveled a nine-story Moscow apartment building. Four days later, 118 died in another Moscow apartment blast. Just three days after that, seventeen people died when a bomb exploded in a truck parked near an apartment building in the city of Volgodonsk. The newly installed Prime Minister Putin saw a Chechen connection in these explosions, though this was denied by Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. Further doubts were raised after September 22 when another suspected bomb, discovered in the basement of an apartment building in the Russian city of Ryazan, turned out to be part of a “training exercise” sponsored by federal security services. The next day Russian aircraft bombed the Grozny airport, and a week later Russian troops re-entered Chechnya. The newly appointed Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, saw his reputation soar on his hardline prosecution of the conflict in the Caucasus, but there were lingering suspicions that the blasts had been the work of government authorities seeking to generate public support for an invasion of Chechnya. The Ryazan incident led to speculation that federal security services had planned an explosion there, and perhaps had planted the bombs in Moscow and Volgodonsk. Earlier questions had been raised when the speedy removal of rubble seemed to preclude a full investigation of the Moscow blast sites. Some observers noted that Chechen leaders such as Shamil Basaev and Salman Raduev were usually quick to claim responsibility for their exploits. Would not Basaev have taken credit if the apartment blasts had been his work? Indeed, why would any Chechen wish to enrage Russians by attacking civilians in their beds? And why did the explosions stop when Russian troops reentered Chechnya? If Chechens were behind the blasts then would not the blasts have continued after warfare in Chechnya resumed? In later years, two Russian legislators who were investigating the blasts died in questionable circumstances. A Russian lawyer, and former security agent, was arrested on a dubious weapons charge after inquiring about the case. Finally, in 2003, two Karachai men were convicted in the cases of the apartment block blasts. However, their closed trial answered none of the questions about the explosions, while raising new questions about the need for secrecy in a trial of great public consequence. These and other troubling ambiguities have been explored in a series of publications suggesting that Russian security services planted the bombs with the intent of blaming Chechens for the explosions and thereby mobilizing Russian society for a second war in Chechnya.2 The simplest explanation for the apartment block blasts is that they were perpetrated by Islamist extremists from the North Caucasus who were seeking retribution for federal military attacks upon the Islamist enclave in the central Dagestani villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar. There is much evidence for this hypothesis. In an interview published in the Prague periodical Lidove Noviny 3 on September 9, 1999, Shamil Basaev said: “The latest blast in Moscow is not our work, but the work of the Dagestanis. Russia has been openly terrorizing Dagestan. . . For the whole week, united in a single fist, the army and the Interior Ministry units have been pounding three small villages. . . And blasts and bombs—all this will go on, of course, because those whose loved ones, whose women and children are being killed for nothing will also try to use force to eliminate their adversaries. This is a natural process and it is yet more evidence of Newton’s third law, that each action generates a reaction. . . What is the difference between someone letting a bomb go off in the center of Moscow and injuring 10–20 children and the Russians dropping bombs from their aircraft over Karamakhi and killing 10–20 children? Where is the difference?” Among those whose women and children were in Karamakhi during the Russian assault was Khattab, who was married to a Karamakhi woman. On September 15, 1999, Greg Myre, an Associated Press reporter quoted Khattab as saying: “From now on, we will not only fight against Russian fighter jets (and) tanks. From now on, they will get our bombs everywhere. Let Russia await our explosions blasting through their cities. I swear we will do it.” Yet in a subsequent interview with the Interfax news agency Khattab denied that he had anything to do with the Moscow attacks. “We would not like to be akin to those who kill sleeping civilians with bombs and shells,” Khattab was quoted as saying. Khattab and other Wahhabis affiliated with the Islamic Djamaat clearly had a motive for blowing up Russian apartment buildings. In September 1999, when the Islamic Djamaat was being bombarded their motive was somewhat more crystalline and immediate than were those of other suspects, such as the Russian military and political establishments. Indeed, the last of the blasts, in Volgodonsk, occurred on September 16, the same day that fighting stopped in Dagestan. If the blasts were connected to the conflict in Dagestan, then one might expect them to conclude at the same time that the fighting did. Moreover, the Wahhabis would have had as much to gain from war as Russia’s military and political leaders since warfare would also mobilize their own supporters and spur the international fund raising upon which they depended. There was also much evidence that Dagestani Wahhabis were responsible for a long series of subsequent terrorist explosions in Dagestan. The best-publicized of these occurred at a parade in the Dagestani town of Kaspiysk on May 9, 2002, but there were many other explosions. For many of these explosions, Dagestani officials blamed Wahhabi gangs led by Rappani Khalilov and Shamil Abidov. Proponents of the view that Russian security services were responsible for the apartment blasts, such as David Sattar and Rajan Menon, have noted that the apartment block explosions involved hexogen, and have argued that hexogen is a highly controlled substance in Russia with availability tightly restricted outside of government circles. According to Menon, “the bombs used in Moscow and Volgodonsk were made with tons of hexogen, which is manufactured under tight security in very few locations in Russia; it would have been extraordinarily difficult to obtain it and transport it in such massive quantities.” However, Dagestani law enforcement officials sponsored a program for the voluntary surrender of arms from October 1, 2003 to December 1, 2003. Among the weapons that were surrendered were nearly one ton, 878 kilogram of explosives, including large quantities of hexogen and ammonite. Also surrendered were fifty-seven artillery rounds and missiles, three guided anti-tank rockets, 6,807 grenades, 1,256 detonators, 1,151,033 bullets, 962 rifles and pistols, 291 grenade launchers, and three flame throwers.4 Sizeable amounts of hexogen and large quantities of weaponry, both familiar and exotic, were readily available in Dagestan. Dagestani officials estimate that the surrender program recovered only a small fraction of the weapons, ammunition, and explosives circulating in Dagestan, since most of those wishing to dispose of these items would be better compensated on the black market. Certainly, the defenders of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar, who were heavily armed and well-fortified, had access to the full range of this ordinance. In 2001, a Dagestani court convicted five local Islamists of the Buynaksk blast. One of them, who had previously worked as a cook in a terrorist training camp that Basaev and Khattab operated in Chechnya, described the transit of the explosives used in Buynaksk from Chechnya to Dagestan beneath a truckload of watermelons. In the autumn of 1997, the Karamakhi Islamists had signed a mutual protection pact with Chechen Islamist groups. Hence, the most credible explanation for the apartment block blasts is that they were perpetrated by Wahhabis from Dagestan, and perhaps elsewhere in the region, under the leadership of Khattab, as retribution for the federal attacks on Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar. If the blasts were organized by Khattab and other Wahhabis as retribution for the federal attack on Dagestan’s Islamic Djamaat, then this would explain the timing of the attacks, and it would explain why there were no attacks after the date on which the fighting in Dagestan was concluded. It would explain why no Chechen claimed responsibility. It would account for Basaev’s reference to Dagestani responsibility, and it would be consistent with Khattab’s initial vow to set off “bombs everywhere. . . blasting through their cities.” Yet if Khattab and other Wahhabis were responsible for the blasts then this would mean that the Chechens were blamed unfairly, and this injustice would have contributed to many injustices that followed. Vladimir Putin’s suggestion that Chechens bore primary (or sole) responsibility for the apartment block blasts appears to have been poorly grounded, and to have given rise to a dangerous and inequitable mythology of Chechen culpability. At the same time, assertions that Russian security services are responsible for Russia’s apartment block blasts appear to be at least partially incomplete in so far as they do not account for the preceding evidence. Conversely, the Ryazan incident is not addressed by the evidence above. Over the years, I have concluded that the first of the four apartment-block blasts, in Bynaksk, was the work of Dagestani Wahhabis, who were supplied from training camps in Chechnya, and who were inspired to plant their truck-bomb by the Federal attack on Karamakhi. It seems likely that one or more of the blasts in Buynaksk and Moscow were the work of the same people. The bomb in Ryazan was unquestionably the work of the Russian security service. Hence, it appears that culpability shifted in the month of September 1999. Khattab and his supporters (perhaps including Basaev) clearly were responsible for the first blast in Buynaksk, and Russian security forces, recognizing the utility of the blasts for purposes of social mobilization, were then preparing to follow Khattab’s lead with a blast of their own in Ryazan. The first blast, on the 5th of September was the work of the Dagestani Wahhabis who subsequently were either killed or convicted of responsibility for the blast. The bomb in Ryazan on the 22nd, was avowedly the work of the Russian government. What of the other three bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk? Because the rubble in Moscow was hastily removed (much as it was two years later in New York), a thorough examination was never conducted. In Moscow, there was never an open trial of the alleged perpetrators – much as Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaida leaders were never brought to trial after 9/11. Hence, there will always be uncertainty about events in Moscow, as in New York. American analysts, policy makers, and incoming leaders took great interest in the four Russian apartment block blasts. I have reached the conclusion that events in Russia in September 1999 were influential for events in New York in September 2001, and were the basis in both countries for the social mobilization that swiftly occurred in support of brutal wars against Muslim populations. In any case, resistance in the vicinity of the “Islamic Djamaat” was brought to an end on September 13 when the militants departed the ruined villages. Three days later, on September 16, the same date as the explosion in Volgodonsk, fighting ended in the Novolaksky rayon. The Dagestani government counted 45,000 “victims of the war,” including those who suffered property damage; 32,000 Dagestanis lost their homes or were otherwise displaced. As the dust settled, it gradually began to appear that the conflict was nearly as cathartic for Dagestan as it was catastrophic for Chechnya. While the war led to further devastation in Chechnya, it stimulated a dramatic improvement in relations between Makhachkala and Moscow. Indeed, the war resolved the otherwise intransigent problem of a well-armed, well-fortified, militant Wahhabi djamaat, located at the strategic center of Dagestan near the main federal military base in Buynaksk. At the same time, Wahhabite insurgence in Tsumadinsky and Botlikhsky rayons, resulted in their universal condemnation. Dagestani resistance was a genuine “people’s war” that surmounted internal Dagestani ethnic tensions, and fused the interests of Dagestan’s elite with those of the general population. In the months following the war, Wahhabis were treated as pariahs, their leaders arrested or driven underground. If only temporarily, Islamist radicalism was suppressed in a manner that not only avoided internal political and religious stress, but temporarily strengthened connections between rulers and ruled, and thereby, at least momentarily, addressed that political alienation that contributed to the appeal of the Islamists. In a similar way, many complex problems that had emerged in Dagestan during the 1990s, and that had seemed to be nearly insoluble prior to the conflict, were in its aftermath, at least temporarily improved. These included problems resulting from: economic collapse, cross-border political realignment in Chechnya and Dagestan, and claims of Dagestan’s Chechen-Akkin population who had suffered Soviet deportation from their homes in the Novolaksky rayon. At the same time, it would be difficult to overstate the surprise and relief among Russian officials as the breadth and durability of Dagestani loyalty became increasingly evident. In the countryside, federal troops were received as defenders and allies by people who historically had shown them little sympathy. Indeed, the eventful year of 1999 culminated all the more climactically in Dagestan. At the stroke of midnight on the New Year’s eve, Boris Yeltsin resigned his position as Russian president, and according to the constitutional provision handed power over to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, once-obscure security official, who had suddenly catapulted to popularity and fame on the strength of his steely and aggressive response to the invasion of Dagestan. In the days immediately following Vladimir Putin’s appointment as prime minister in August 1999, he was widely dismissed by the Russian media, by the Russian public, and by other Russian leaders. Hence, it was his unexpected good fortune in Dagestan that signaled the beginning of Putin’s stunning ascent. As a result, Putin felt a sense of personal gratitude and attachment to Dagestan that could not be separated from his private aspirations. As Yeltsin announced his resignation, Vladimir Putin was in Dagestan, where he was feted at the holiday celebration by the local political elite. Celebrating the New Year (let alone the New Millennium) in Dagestan would have been entirely unprecedented for a Russian Prime Minister even if it had not turned out to be the moment Boris Yeltsin’s emotional resignation, and Putin’s startling promotion to the Russian presidency. It was extraordinarily auspicious for Putin, perhaps intentionally so, that, in this moment of highest drama, he was seated, not at Boris Yeltsin’s feet, but at the table of a people previously perceived as potential antagonists. At the stroke of the New Millennium, Putin raised his glass to toast his new-found friends: “I love the Dagestanis,” Putin said.

Robert Bruce Ware — Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.211.153.190 (talk) 15:10, 18 August 2019 (UTC)


 * I agree: the section "War in Dagestan" should be re-expanded. However, the included text should be very brief, a couple of para at most. I can try fix it later.My very best wishes (talk) 17:47, 11 September 2019 (UTC)