Talk:2015 Philadelphia train derailment/Archive 3

No ATC on entry to northbound Frankford Curve
I have previously shown that this article has an unbalanced POV because while it mentions Amtrak's statement that the PTC system could have prevented the incident but hadn't been installed due to "regulatory requirements" (lack of radio frequency allocation), nevertheless it doesn't disclose to the reader that a different and simpler system (ATC; Automatic Train Control) was not yet installed on the northbound track, though it had been present and active for years on the southbound track at that curve. Here is the relevant reference establishing this: http://mobile.philly.com/news/?wss=/philly/news&id=305749951. The relevant section states: "The older, less sophisticated safety system - Automatic Train Control - was installed on dangerous curves after a 1990 crash in Boston. But Amtrak officials have said it was only used in areas where the approaching speed limit exceeds the speed that would cause a derailment.  That planning did not appear to account for the possibility that a train might be pushed far past the speed limit. Train 188 was traveling over 100 m.ph., past the 80 m.p.h. speed limit approaching the Frankford Junction curve and the 50 m.ph. limit in the curve.  Under orders from the Federal Rail Administration, Amtrak installed Automatic Train Control on the northbound side of the tracks shortly after the wreck and was examining other potentially dangerous curves where it could be used along the Northeast Corridor.  Read more at http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20150602_Lawmakers_to_grill_Amtrak_for_first_time_since_derailment.html#Eby1UkdosjPIV10P.99  " I invite anyone to insert this reference; being a newbie, it'll take me awhile to figure out how do so otherwise. Sluefoot (talk) 21:46, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
 * This, your original edit, isn't acceptable because it contains a non sequitur. PTC does have regulatory delays; right now Congress is considering extending the mandate's effective date because numerous companies, public and private, won't meet it and the FCC's delay in releasing spectrum is a major part of that. ATC is a different technology and isn't subject to that constraint but it isn't installed everywhere, and of course Amtrak wouldn't roll out ATC when it was in the process of rolling out PTC, a far superior system. The missing piece here is whether Amtrak was negligent in not including this curve in the ATC rollout which followed the Back Bay crash (and note that ATC was already active on the Northeast Corridor well before). We'll need a reliable source on that, though the lack of a crash since 1943 on a dense railroad line suggests that the risk was reasonable. That the FRA ordered it installed afterwards doesn't affect that one way or the other. I would expect the final NTSB report to address this in detail. Mackensen (talk) 00:16, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
 * I don't see a contradiction here, or perhaps I don't understand your comment. I KNOW PTC has regulatory delays.  That's why I wrote it the way I did.  It's ATC which DOESN'T have regulatory delays, at least not sufficient to prevent it from having been installed within days of the incident.  Go back and re-read what I wrote.    I also have to laugh when you said, "and of course Amtrak wouldn't roll out ATC when it was in the process of rolling out PTC, a far superior system."  Hey, buddy, people DIED precisely because PTC wasn't yet installed, and many others were maimed.   Millions of dollars of equipment was destroyed.  Are you saying that the mere possibility in 2008 that PTC might be completed in 2015 would justify keeping ATC inactivated for 7 years?!?  How many dead bodies do you consider acceptable?  Are you really suggesting that Amtrak could justify failing to install ATC, merely because someday PTC will be better?!?   Remember the old saying, "The perfect is the enemy of the good".  People DIED because of that principle. It appears you have no problem with that.  Sluefoot (talk) 00:40, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
 * I'm not sure what you're trying to argue here. ATC was never installed on this curve, and there were no plans to do so in 2008, unless you have a source which claims otherwise. There are many places in this country where ATC is not installed, on the Northeast Corridor and elsewhere. As indicated in the article and elsewhere, ATC is installed in those places considered dangerous or otherwise suitable. Amtrak apparently judged that this curve wasn't sufficiently dangerous. The safe operation between 1943-2015 may or may not have justified that view. Without the final word from the NTSB on why the accident occurred, we don't know. As I said, I expect the NTSB to address this issue in its report (conversely, if it does not, that amounts to the NTSB saying that the issue was irrelevant). Regarding the FRA, it saw no need to install ATC on that curve prior to the crash, unless (again) you have a source which says otherwise. That Amtrak was able to carry out the order quickly has no relevance unless it was supposed to have done something and had not done so.
 * If I may, your mode of engagement on this talk page isn't very helpful to your argument, or the article. Wikipedia needs to be written from sources. What you're lacking is sources prior to 2015 criticizing Amtrak for not expanding ATC on the Northeast Corridor, especially around Philadelphia, or maybe a reliable source urging Amtrak to expand ATC coverage as the PTC rollout was delayed. Otherwise, as I've said elsewhere, it's just original research. Mackensen (talk) 01:23, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
 * The 1943 derailment at the Frankford Curve was not even a speed related accident. That train was moving at a speed of 56 miles per hour where the maximum authorized speed was 70 miles per hour when the train became derailed. The derailment was the result of the left front journal of the front truck of PRR1860, the seventh car of the consist, being broken off. Centpacrr (talk) 02:25, 6 September 2015 (UTC)


 * Mackensen: You said "ATC was never installed on this curve".  Wrong!  It was indeed installed at this curve...but it was installed only on the southbound track, not on the northbound track.  As for your statement, "and there were no plans to do so in 2008", I say, "Precisely!!!" You finally got the point! Amtrak COULD HAVE installed ATC on the northbound curve as early as 2008, and perhaps even years earlier, but chose not to do so:  Presumably, and if you're right, they failed to do so because they were waiting for the superior system, PTC, to be ready to install and activate. (you said, "and of course Amtrak wouldn't roll out ATC when it was in the process of rolling out PTC, a far superior system.")   And in the end, they finally waited until late May 2015, AFTER the derailment, to do that.  They deliberately failed to install ATC, because they were waiting for PTC.  Exactly what I have been saying all along.  If the public realized what they had done/failed to do, they would be enraged.  I will add:  I don't think it's necessary to cite a source (before 2015) criticizing Amtrak for not installing ATC while waiting for PTC:  It would certainly be proper to find and quote such a source, but it's sufficiently damning to find a source pointing out that Amtrak DIDN'T install ATC prior to 2015, when ATC had already been installed on the southbound track at that curve.    Sluefoot (talk) 21:10, 7 September 2015 (UTC)


 * The decision to install ATC in particular locations, and the decision to install PTC over an entire route, are completely separate. You've ignored my comments above, in which I noted that no one (not the Pennsylvania Railroad, not Penn Central, not Conrail, not Amtrak, not the FRA, not the NTSB), considered it necessary to install ATC on the northbound track. If there is a reliable source which demonstrates otherwise, then that's a different matter. I'll ask the same question I asked below: are you planning to bring forward a source? Otherwise, this is all original research. Mackensen (talk) 21:38, 7 September 2015 (UTC)


 * I guess you must have missed the earlier stated justification for not installing ATC at that curve. It's in some of the media articles.  The reasoning was that the curve was close to the Philadelphia terminal, so the limited power of previous locomotives was thought not to be sufficient to allow a train to exceed the safe speed allowed on the curve.  However, a new, more powerful locomotive became available, and was ordered in October 2010, was purchased, and was operated beginning on February 7, 2014.   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siemens_ACS-64  This means that Amtrak had at least 4.5 years to prepare the track equipment to accept the more-powerful locomotive, until the eventual accident.  It was plenty powerful enough to accelerate a typical Amtrak train, leaving the Philadelphia terminal, to dangerous speeds by the time it arrived at that curve, and in the case of the Philadelphia derailment, it did exactly that:  106 mph was the maximum speed it reached prior to the brief application of the brakes prior to the derailment. In other words, Amtrak had 4.5 years to fix the upcoming problem, but failed to do so.  Amtrak's decision to not install ATC, when they knew or should have known PTC would not be available by the time they began running the Siemens ACS-64, was inexcusable.  The hypothetical excuse, that a better system, PTC, would eventually become available did not fix the problem until PTC was actually installed and operating.  Critical note:  If it was a reasonable excuse in, say, early 2014 to not install ATC at the that northbound track at that curve, why wasn't it also a good-enough excuse _after_ the accident (May 2015) to continue to not install ATC until PTC was scheduled to become available and operating at that track and location in about December 2015? What had changed?  Maybe Amtrak was sufficiently embarrassed that it "had to" do what it had previously failed to do.   Sluefoot (talk) 00:13, 8 September 2015 (UTC)


 * There's two issues here. The first is that the FRA ordered Amtrak to install ATC after the accident. The primary purpose of this order was public-relations, although there's some safety benefit as well. This is not unusual. The FRA often issues emergency orders after an accident. This has no bearing on previous decisions, as I've said above, unless you have a source which says otherwise. As to the second, you're now saying that the potential delivery of the Siemens ACS-64 changed the safety situation for the curve? I suppose that's possible, although I would expect that the acceleration of the Acela Express is also superior to the AEM-7. For all that, the Metroliners and TurboTrains which operated on the corridor in the 1960s and 1970s may have had superior acceleration. I don't know. What I do know is that this discussion is becoming farcical. Do you have a reliable source for any of this, or is it all speculation on your part? If you don't have sources then this is a waste of everyone's time. Mackensen (talk) 00:27, 8 September 2015 (UTC)


 * As I noted in the now closed discussion below, NTSB investigations, determinations of probable cause(s), and the adoption and publication of final reports in complex accidents such as this one always take at least a year and often considerably longer to complete. There is no "deliberate slow-playing" of the "release of the information" in this case. This is how it is always done and properly so. So Sluefoot you just need to relax and keep your personal speculation and interpretations of incomplete information to yourself. They do not belong here. Discussion of this matter will not be ripe until the NTSB releases its report. You can be sure that the details of its findings of fact and conclusions will be added to the article very quickly and completely then. Centpacrr (talk) 21:57, 7 September 2015 (UTC)