Talk:2019 Bolivian political crisis/Archive 3

Subsection on Domestic Policy and New Cabinet
I have removed this twice already on the grounds that the quoted articles on the appointment of an indigenous free parliament are incorrect. The Guardian article has a disclaimer on its original claim of "indigenous free" that reads "This article was amended on 15 November 2019 to include the fact that more ministers were sworn in at a second ceremony on 14 November 2019, including Martha Yujra Apaza, wearing the traditional pollera skirt, as culture and tourism minister." It is then implied that her inclusion of an indigenous member happened "after an outcry" in the NYT article, but apart from this one line in that article there appears to be no evidence that she was not originally intended for the position or of any supposed outcry. There is also the fact that the Guardian and NYT commented on events were not yet concluded and this is obscured by the article content. There were further ceremonies on the 15th and 18th Nov, including another indigenous representative. For what it's worth, indigenous blood is not clear cut in Bolivia - it is a very mixed population and these assertions are being made only by some Western media and not at all by Bolivians. Furthermore, there is not much difference, if any, between the indigenous representation in Morales' cabinet and Áñez'. This article comments that "Morales had different cabinets and in many of them the predominance was of collaborators of middle and upper classes of the main cities of the country" and goes further to note that the new administration, in addition to the wipala, flies a further flag that is representative of the eastern indigenous peoples, which Morales did not do. I would encourage further discussion on this and removal of the disputed narrative of the text in relation to this if there is agreement on the premature and implicit conclusions therein. Crmoorhead (talk) 14:03, 12 December 2019 (UTC)


 * It has been a few days since I asked about this. Since the interim government has at least two indigenous ministers and flies a second indigenous flag in addition to the wiphala, the Guardian article is misleading. There was also a comment about the new head of the army swearing to take orders from Anez with a link that did not even mention the new army commanders, so it was removed. There is no evidence provided to imply that the relationship is anything out of the ordinary for between president and military commanders, and unless someone can provide evidence to the contrary, it's dangerous to imply this with the previous wording. Again, as above, there are implications made here that the interim government has a demographic that is wildly different to Morales', which is not true. See the link above to Morales' government. Both had business leaders, both had a less than average (although not no) indigenous representation when compared to the population. Crmoorhead (talk) 01:48, 15 December 2019 (UTC)


 * It has been a few days since I asked about this See WP:NODEADLINE. There is no need to be hasty when making changes which you already know are disputed. It's also good practice to ping editors who you know may be interested in specific changes.
 * Edits that are based on original research (e.g., Wikipedia editors comparing Áñez's cabinet to Morales's cabinet) are not appropriate, and the content you deleted was well-sourced. There is nothing wrong with adding more information, but please stop removing information that is sourced and relevant. I have re-added it while retaining your improvements. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 03:59, 15 December 2019 (UTC)
 * But that is exactly my point, it is not well sourced. The appointment of the indigenous member was not a "later change" as the text states as it is the role of a new president to assign ministers, just as it is in many countries. These cabinet appointments were not finished by the time the Guardian wrote its article even after the disclaimer was added. Hualla is also indigenous. "Initial cabinet" is wrong as the initial cabinet was chosen over 5 days. The initial cabinet contained at least two indigenous members. I think quoting wikipedia policies to defend a point of view which is factually wrong is not good practice. Number one policy is it is an encyclopedia, not a soapbox, even using others as proxy. The fact that Morales had not more indigenous representation and was "predominantly made up of middle and upper class from the main cites" is extremely relevant. I provided links for these statements, which are not under dispute. The guardian's statement is extremely disputable, especially in the light of further inclusion of indigenous flags and activities not stated here.  Furthermore, you keep adding back in the statement that the head of the military pledged to "take orders" from the president. I mentioned above that the reference does not contain this information. Again, not well sourced. This is multiple reverts you have made on the same text. Every time I made the change, I explained why the sources, or source, is poor. The statement "both Morales and Anez cabinets were composed of business leaders and a less than average representation of indigenous peoples" or however I put it is not original research, it is true and backed up by the sources I gave. What is the objection to this as a factual piece of neutral pov content? Crmoorhead (talk) 13:26, 15 December 2019 (UTC)
 * I took the liberty of moving your comment here, as it seemed to be addressed to me. Feel free to move it back if that was where you intended to put it.
 * The Guardian source is not the only source that states that the "initial" cabinet did not contain any indigenous members. See also: . I don't see any dispute in reliable sources about this. If you think it's more accurate, we could reword it as "her initial cabinet appointments" or something, rather than the "initial cabinet", but I don't see a justification for removing it wholesale, as you've done.
 * The source cited does in fact say that the military pledged to take orders from Áñez, which is why I re-added it. Please read it again carefully.
 * Comparing Morales' and Áñez's cabinets is OR because it constitutes editorial synthesis, or combining two sources to make a point not made in either. You would need to provide a source that says their cabinets were similar in order to implement this change. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 18:43, 15 December 2019 (UTC)
 * I don't understand how you don't see the problem with the statement that the initial cabinet is indigenous free. The Guardian and NYT are dated 13th Nov, where the first line of the paragraph directly contradicts this with undeniable evidence that the cabinet had not yet been fully appointed. Do you understand what the cabinet is? It seems not. The Buenos Aires times makes no mention of even one indigenous member, so you see the problem with that article? When the cabinet is appointed, there are at least two indigenous members. The three articles here are demonstrably false statements - it's easy to check who the cabinet is and when they were appointed. There are photos of them being sworn in on each date. Why are we including false statements in this section? NYT say there was a backlash that somehow affected the decision, but there is no evidence of it I have seen from Bolivia. The Buenos Aires Times says there was a storm about tweets in 2013, but that is not related to the appointment of the cabinet. It is an attempt to link it, but it is not based in fact. Not a single tweet or comment or photo shows this backlash existed, never mind, as the NYT claim, forced changes in the intended government. This section lacks neural POV to the point that it ignores factual evidence over the premature judgement of these publications. Again, check the dates. The whole section has an agenda to set up the story that the interim government is racist and fueled by the military, despite having no more diverse makeup or any different relationship with the military when compared to Morales government. Do you dispute the makeup of Morales government or have evidence to imply any difference between how the military is between governments? That is what the article suggests, lacking neutrality. If you paid attention to any news from Bolivia, rather than second hand information from selected publications that are more than a month old, you would see how the indigenous people have been represented and respected by the new government. This is simply because they are the nation of Bolivia - it's a no brainer if you know the country. Many indigenous people are against Morales and MAS, and many people the interim government too, but the president has engaged with them in a respectful way and flies two indigenous flags as symbols of inclusivity. How does this square with the tenor of the Guardian's opinion? Could it be that these are, at best, unreliable, and at worst downright false? Again, Wikipedia's number one function is as an encyclopedia, not to regurgitate provably inaccurate material to support a political standpoint without proper understanding. The statements about Áñez's cabinet ARE making a point - they explicitly say she has no or too few indigenous people. If this point is weakened by the fact that she is not radically different that Morales government, it casts doubt on that point and those conclusions. I tried removing them altogether and I tried countering them with alternative evidence. Crmoorhead (talk) 21:16, 19 December 2019 (UTC)

As I said, changing the way we describe the appointments is fine by me. What's not on is removing sourced and relevant information because you personally think that it's wrong — I recommend having a look at WP:GREATWRONGS. Your statements about trying to "counter" views that you disagree with are worrying in this regard. We go by reliable sources, not by editors' opinions, frustrating as that may be in some cases. You're entitled to a personal opinion that, e.g., Áñez's cabinet is very similar to Morales's, but for that to be in cluded on Wikipedia, a reliable source would need to say something along the lines of "Áñez's cabinet is very similar to Morales's". If you have one, go ahead and add it, but be careful of synthesis. I've restored the material about the new commander, as it's relevant to the section and supported by the source, but left out the quotation. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 21:54, 19 December 2019 (UTC)


 * If the claims about the initial cabinet, not fully appointed until 18th Nov, but written about on 13th Nov are the sole characterisation of the government provided by Wikipedia, then I think there is grounds for removal, updating or reevaluation of those sources, especially when there is contradictory evidence that is more recent. Once sources are there, it should not be the case that they are there forever as with current events it is possible that initial characterisations are wrong. It's physically impossible for them to make an assessment about a process that was not yet complete, so those are my grounds for objection on those being our sole resources. Crmoorhead (talk) 00:43, 20 December 2019 (UTC)


 * My "opinion" that Morales cabinet was similar is not an an opinion. How can the makeup of a government cabinet be a matter of opinion? I can't have an opinion of whether these people have the job or not. They are on public record as being part of his government, just as all members of his governments have been. I provided a link to a major Bolivian newspaper showing the full membership of Morales' latest cabinet and a statement from the NYT saying that Morales government was composed "predominantly of the middle and upper classes from the main cities" (relevant to saying Áñez's included "prominent Bolivian business people") and you removed both citing "original research". I think that is along the lines of "Áñez's cabinet is very similar to Morales's". Crmoorhead (talk) 00:43, 20 December 2019 (UTC)


 * When I heard about the heads of the military being replaced, I asked the Bolivians I know if that was normal (because of course it seems odd) and they said that it was something that all new presidents do, the same as electing a new cabinet. Given the implication in several sources that Áñez came to power in a military coup, mentioning the formation of a new military command and saying that the new chief pledged to take orders from her would naturally set alarm bells ringing for the reader. In this context, we must take more care to be neutral. I think that the "domestic policy" should underline what the interim government has done in terms of significant legislation or unusual events. For neutrality, I think that it should be mentioned that all this is perfectly normal according to the Bolivian constitution. Specifically, Article 172 which says that the among the President's duties and obligations are "To designate and substitute the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Commanders of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy" and "To hold the position of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and to deploy them for the defense, independence and territorial integrity of the state." Article 246 also that states that "The Armed Forces are subordinate to the President of the State and receive their orders administratively through the Minister of Defense as an intermediary, and with respect to technical aspects, from the Commander in Chief." So either we can add in all that extra information, or just accept that this is of no special importance and not quibble about it being removed. There is certainly nobody else reporting on this, despite the context, so why is it so valuable to include? Why do you think it is significant? Crmoorhead (talk) 00:43, 20 December 2019 (UTC)
 * It's physically impossible for them to make an assessment about a process that was not yet complete, so those are my grounds for objection on those being our sole resources. As I have said several times, you're welcome to add additional details, as you've done already. It remains the case that the initial appointment did not contain any indigenous people, and this has given significant weight in multiple reliable sources.
 * My "opinion" that Morales cabinet was similar is not an an opinion. How can the makeup of a government cabinet be a matter of opinion? What is a matter of opinion is whether that is relevant or noteworthy to include in the article. What you are doing is cobbling together multiple sources, one that says Áñez's cabinet contained prominent businesspeople, and another that says Morales's cabinet contained middle-class and upper-class people from the cities, and trying to use them to say "Áñez's cabinet was similar to Morales's cabinet". That's called synthesis: If one reliable source says A, and another reliable source says B, do not join A and B together to imply a conclusion C that is not mentioned by either of the sources. This would be improper editorial synthesis of published material to imply a new conclusion, which is original research performed by an editor here.
 * When I heard about the heads of the military being replaced, I asked the Bolivians I know if that was normal (because of course it seems odd) and they said that it was something that all new presidents do, the same as electing a new cabinet. This is original research.
 * Given the implication in several sources that Áñez came to power in a military coup, mentioning the formation of a new military command and saying that the new chief pledged to take orders from her would naturally set alarm bells ringing for the reader. In this context, we must take more care to be neutral. Neutrality does not mean representing all views, it means representing all views expressed in reliable sources.
 * I think that it should be mentioned that all this is perfectly normal according to the Bolivian constitution. […] So either we can add in all that extra information, or just accept that this is of no special importance and not quibble about it being removed. Actually, there is no reason to add in any that information unless it has received coverage in reliable sources. (Note that your Bolivian friends don't count unless they have been published in a reliable source.) What the constitution says is not relevant to our article unless a reliable secondary source has made that connection for us. See WP:PRIMARY: Any interpretation of primary source material requires a reliable secondary source for that interpretation. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 01:05, 20 December 2019 (UTC)


 * You're far from the only editors doing it, but there's a new wall of text debate here every week. Very little seems to come from such extended arguments, in part because only two or three seem to take part in each of them. If it seems to be coming to this in the future, I kindly request that you ask for third opinion, if just so I can follow the arguments myself. If you want 3O now, could you summarize the arguments quickly for me, and I'll weigh in as best as I can? Kingsif (talk) 02:12, 20 December 2019 (UTC)
 * I would welcome a 3O on the "domestic policy" section. I think some issues have been resolved through rewording, but it is still a problem that premature opinions on the anti-indigenous nature of the cabinet are being propped up by reverts. The timeline of the quoted articles (13/14th) compared to the appointments made (up until the 18th) does not match up with the fact there are at least two indigenous members in a cabinet that we have quoted someone as saying "shows no signs that [Áñez] intended to reach across the country's deep political and ethnic divide". If indeed, as is the case, the fully appointed interim cabinet has no less or more representatives of indigenous origin or the business community than under Morales, how does one prove or provide sources to show that there is nothing particularly notable about her cabinet? One of Morales' cabinets can be found on articles like this., but the information can be found on any of his government ministers from the past decade and more of government. This is not the first link I have provided to show why Áñez's cabinet is not notably anti-indigenous. My original edit was "both her and Morales; government contained business leaders and some, although less than average, representation of indigenous people" was reverted. I don't get the accusations of opinion or original research in these circumstances and I think it is a fair comparison. I don't see how two articles making comments about the makeup of the respective governments is synthesis. Similarly, all but a couple of fringe sources are making a political comment about the appointment of a new military or the general swearing to take orders from the President, how does one that show that this is not an unusual and it is the normal motions of government of the constitution, without quoting the said constitution? This says pretty explicitly what the role of the President is in this regard, but is claimed not usable. It just seems that any reference, claim of personal knowledge of Bolivia or evidence I give is reverted by stating policies rather than looking at the evidence to make a reassessment. Crmoorhead (talk) 04:40, 20 December 2019 (UTC)


 * I think the above comment by pretty clearly illustrates the issues at hand here.
 * If indeed, as is the case, the fully appointed interim cabinet has no less or more representatives of indigenous origin or the business community than under Morales, how does one prove or provide sources to show that there is nothing particularly notable about her cabinet? — Crmoorhead would like our article to say that "there is nothing particularly notable about [Áñez's] cabinet" but is unable to find a source that actually does so, and has resorted to synthesis: citing one article about Morales's cabinet, one about Áñez's, and then inserting their own opinion, not found in either source, that the cabinets are similar.
 * Similarly, all but a couple of fringe sources are making a political comment about the appointment of a new military or the general swearing to take orders from the President — Here NYT and The Guardian are referred to as "fringe sources".
 * how does one that show that this is not an unusual and it is the normal motions of government of the constitution, without quoting the said constitution? Again, Crmoorhead would like our article to state that Áñez's reorganization of the military was not remarkable, but has no source that does so, so is attempting to pull in a primary source and interpret it.
 * It just seems that any reference, claim of personal knowledge of Bolivia or evidence I give is reverted by stating policies rather than looking at the evidence to make a reassessment. — Not all references have been reverted, only ones that are improperly used (e.g., for the purposes of synthesis). "Claims of personal knowledge" are also known as original research and are not usable on Wikipedia, as I've already explained. Policies like WP:OR and WP:SYNTH are important to maintain the reliability of the encyclopedia.
 * Contrary to the suggestion above that I'm reverting all of the changes, I have actually only removed material where it violates policy, and I have only restored material that is relevant and well-sourced. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 17:03, 20 December 2019 (UTC)
 * Reading these, I agree that some of 's preferred versions are SYNTH-y: using a source describing Anez's cabinet and another about Morales' to cite a sentence saying that neither are abnormal doesn't work. You can use those sources to say that both cabinets are similar in make up, preferably with a bit of detail directly from each source. Equally, removing information to re-establish something now outdated needs at least an update tag before consensus on incorporating the new information is reached. Reading the sources, I think that the current version of the text in the article is good - it could note that there were only 2 indigenous members in Morales' cabinet, but I'd be careful about how to source it. If you can't find a source that connects it to the current crisis or compares with Anez, it would be safest to just give the statement of 'Morales' government had X' at the end of the part. Kingsif (talk) 18:02, 20 December 2019 (UTC)
 * Thanks for taking the time. I agree with most of this, but would it not still be synthesis to say that the cabinets are similar in makeup when neither source actually says that? Such a statement would reflect the editor's opinion rather than the content of the sources—both in terms of the judgement of the two cabinets as similar and in terms of the relevance of the comparison to Morales's cabinet in the first place. I also think that if we can't find a source connecting Morales's cabinet to the current crisis, then the safest move is actually not to include it at all. — cmonghost 👻 (talk) 18:46, 20 December 2019 (UTC)
 * Yes, if a source connecting Morales' cabinet to some of the crisis can be used, only then would the statement be relevant; I feel that including direct information from the sources would mean that wikivoice doesn't need to say 'they are similar', it could say 'Anez has X and Morales also had X'. Based on the if. However, a mention of it neutrally at the end - I find this relevant just from the already established context of this crisis; it involves a transition of power, so the background can be useful. Kingsif (talk) 19:30, 20 December 2019 (UTC)
 * I am not saying that the Guardian and NYT are fringe sources, but that in this case we are leading the reader to conclusions and implications that can be regarded as fringe or unsubstantiated. With the best intentions, I can only cite my own personal knowledge of the politics of Bolivia (common knowledge in the country) and parts of the Constitution (cited elsewhere in this article) in order to express surprise at how the section reads. Requiring an article to explicitly state that the selection of the cabinet, appointment of new military commanders and the nature of their oath is normal in order to counter the above is pretty unrealistic. If things are unusual, they are commented on, if not, then the appointments are simply recorded as occurring without saying "this is normal", especially if it is not part of the discourse. Do you understand what I am saying? We are not giving any weight to any of the many resources reporting these activities and yet failing to note that there is anything unusual about any of it. I urge for further and more recent information to backup the implied narrative here, preferably one a little closer to home or quoting a witness or an expert in the area. Given the history of the region, the military renewal and oaths would be extremely alarming and relevant if they were out of the ordinary. There is a difference between saying "the Head of the Military swore to obey Áñez" and "the Head of the Military swore to obey Áñez as the constitutionally designated Commander in Chief". Which is true and which is more neutral?Crmoorhead (talk) 00:51, 25 December 2019 (UTC)
 * I understand that it seems strange to mention, explain, and cite, when things are normal. Except we do often do that on Wikipedia, even with US-related articles, especially when reliable sources mention it. If you can find better sources, or propose an alternative phrasing to be discussed, please do. That may be easier than debating over theoretical points at this point, where it seems to be going nowhere? Kingsif (talk) 22:44, 25 December 2019 (UTC)
 * Thank you for your advice. I am still relatively new to the Wikipedia editing process. My source for them pledging to take orders from Áñez being normal was from the Bolivian constitution, Article 172 which says that the among the President's duties and obligations are "To designate and substitute the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Commanders of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy" and "To hold the position of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and to deploy them for the defense, independence and territorial integrity of the state." Article 246 also that states that "The Armed Forces are subordinate to the President of the State and receive their orders administratively through the Minister of Defense as an intermediary, and with respect to technical aspects, from the Commander in Chief." The above was rejected as being a primary source that I could not use without an intermediate source commenting on this. Áñez refers to herself as being in this role and Morales is described as this in 2012 and 2016. . Maybe a sentence stating that the President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces would be appropriate? As far as military appointments go, it will take a lot of work to show the history of various appointments and whether it is normal or now as I can't find a single resource that lists all the previous incumbents of the positions. I know that Kaliman was appointed in 2018 and in 2016 the top position was held by someone else. They are not commented on in English-language media. Crmoorhead (talk) 13:21, 26 December 2019 (UTC)
 * I found some extra information to support the changes in military changes. The military high commmand (all positions) are subject to what is called the "Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas (LOFA)" which is a law that sets term limits of 1-2 years subject to the decision of the President. It seems the norm that this is one year as the previous appointments have been 13th Nov 2019 (current), 24th Dec 2018, 11th Dec 2017 , 29th Dec 2016 , 30th Dec 2015 , 18th Dec 2014 , 13th Dec 2013 and 3rd Dec 2012 . The names of those in all appointed positions are given in the links. Very few names pop up more than once and none for the same position, feel free to check. The top position was held by, inverse order, Williams Carlos Kaliman Romero (2018), Yamil Octavio Borda (2017), Luis Orlando Ariñez Bazzán (2016), Juan Gonzalo Durán (2015), Omar Jaime Salinas Ortuño (2014), Víctor Baldivieso Haché (2013) and Edwin de la Fuente Jeria (2012) The 2013 appointment citation also specifically mentioned the LOFA and says "The current military authorities were appointed on December 3 of last year [2012] and in accordance with the Organic Law of the Armed Forces, having completed one year of management in in compliance with this law". As I said, this is something well-known in Bolivia that has importance with reference to Áñez appointing new commanders being normal whereas it might not be in other countriesCrmoorhead (talk) 16:25, 26 December 2019 (UTC)
 * Yes, sorry, we can't just take 'the constitution says X' to argue that this definitely happened in this case. And a president by definition is, in most countries, commander-in-chief. That's not the issue. We'd need an actual outside source that either says what happened or that connects the constitution to this instance. Wikipedia can't, that is textbook OR. Similarly, that La Razon source about military changes is just about the change in 2017, which could be used to source the idea that "there is a law that sets term limits of 1-2 years subject to the decision of the President" (and nothing else). Again, saying 'I checked and nobody seems to have lasted more than a year' is OR. Sadly, "something well-known in Bolivia" isn't usable as a source, as much as things like that could help. It's nothing against you, and it's not trying to hide information, it's just being able to verify claims. None of this is really usable, that's the problem. Kingsif (talk) 22:27, 26 December 2019 (UTC)

Interim government recognition map
Should we create a map on the countries that recognize the interim government and who does not, similar to the Venezuelan leadership crisis one? I already have the sources on who each governments position. --cyrfaw (talk ) 09:39, 18 November 2019 (UTC)
 * Maybe at the responses page? Kingsif (talk) 13:09, 18 November 2019 (UTC)
 * I would be careful of creating a map only for Añez's recognition. Unlike Venezuela, Morales already stepped down from power and I feel that countries have been more vocal on the definition of the events rather that on her recognition. The Spanish Wikipedia has an article for the responses to the 2014 Venezuelan protests, and its map focuses on their stance: if they have criticized the government, the "human rights violations" and have called for the "respect of freedom of expression; if they have merely expressed concern and called for dialogue; if they have supported the government the events as "destabilization" or a "coup", and if they have broken diplomatic relations with the country. I would recommend a similar map that also includes the recogniztion of the interim government. --Jamez42 (talk) 17:12, 18 November 2019 (UTC)
 * Ok, then --cyrfaw (talk ) 07:40, 19 November 2019 (UTC)

The Atlantic Council published a superb map regarding the recognition of Añez. I suggest that the creation or modification of a map is resumed. --Jamez42 (talk) 20:09, 27 December 2019 (UTC)
 * I don't think this is a good inclusion, mainly because the map is dated 14 Nov and the interim government had only been in existence for 3 days. Some, like Canada, have since changed their stance on the new government in light of the OAS report. Would be nice to see how the world is reacting to the interim government within the last few weeks, but mainly the western world appears to have got bored beyond the first week of violence. Any articles I have seen are mainly centred on Morales' activities outside of Bolivia. Crmoorhead (talk) 21:33, 27 December 2019 (UTC)
 * Of course; we can use AC's map as a reference, but we can improve any other information, specially if it is outdated. --Jamez42 (talk) 12:09, 28 December 2019 (UTC)

Corruption charges article
While we have some statements from Murillo, arrests and arrest warrants in this article, there is a lot going on in Bolivia and a lot of detail on what these alleged charges are and who are persons of interest in terms of corruption and, to a lesser extent, terrorism, sedition and coersion. There is enough for a new article, but I am not sure on the etiquette on creating one. At the moment, these are just accusations but the details may be relevant and as the weeks and months go on I expect a lot more evidence and details on trials will come to light. All Bolivian newspapers are publishing daily on the development of these charges. Crmoorhead (talk) 15:34, 28 December 2019 (UTC)

Short history of the recent political situation in Bolivia
This is one more template that tries to set facts apart from claims. I think there are two things not mentioned in the article, that are not at all irrelevant to our topic: Number 11 to 13 and number 25. Any references that support or contradict the analysis are of course welcome.

I should also write somewhere, that the reach regions want to separate from the poor. And that in these regions there is a strong representation of ethnic groups of colonialism forces.

It is also important to point out, that Morales is an Apu Mallku. Although the translation of this term in the english pages is often "king", it has actually very little to do with this notion as we know it in western countries, as this title is given to a person from its people and is no permanent title: an Apu Mallku is no longer one, when his people think he doesn't deserve it. It reminds a little bit on the notion of the leader analyzed by pierre Clastres in his book about the tribes in Amazons. Before Morales three Mallkus had to leave this position in less than 4 years...


 * Pretty much all this stuff is unusable as it is opinion. Far from being recent, a lot of it is trying to justify why Morales lost the referendum 3 years ago and the decision of the Constitutional court. It's seen as undemocratic because that was what the referendum was for and he was the one who constructed the Constitution in 2009. He is seen as changing the rules to suit himself. By 2019 he had already served more than the two full terms according to the Constitution and the objections were not only solely based on the term limits, but rather on corruption and coercion within the stagnated MAS government. The natural resources as being a supposed motivation for a coup does not really enter into it and needs referencing. Many sources eg state that the lithium is not so important a motivator. It is much more economical to get lithium elsewhere and there is not a shortage of alternatives. All of your other comments date to events up until the first week of the interim government and, even had it been backed up by sources, is not recent. By your own admission, you can't read Spanish. There are ample sources from Bolivia such as La Razon, Pagina Siete, Los Tiempos, El Deber etc that give more information than what is reported in the rest of the world. Being strongly connected with Bolivia and having lived there for a time during the last two years, I can testify that there is a tendency to oversimplify and inject a Western bias in order to interpret the events there. People fit the facts to match their opinions rather than the other way round. Military coups happened in Bolivia and elsewhere with US backing around 30 years ago - it is not appropriate to lift and apply a template from history to the current day. They have a more acute sense of their own history than you do and many safeguards have been legislated against to prevent dictatorships and military juntas from reoccurring. These include limiting terms on the president and the leadership of the military. Most European sources have no interest in Bolivia, generally speaking and the reporting in the wake of Morales' resignation is rather chaotic and at odds with how things were being reported in Bolivia itself from any number of sources. Morales' is a hero of the Western left and distant observers have a tendency to ignore the problems with the country while at the same time undermining the interim government any way they can without having read a page of sources from the country itself or having been there. Crmoorhead (talk) 16:36, 28 December 2019 (UTC)

You are absolutely right, saying that this table is trying to support Morales from a romantic "left" point of view. So there could be of course much of bias. On the other hand, this is also the case for you (from the other side). So let's stay by the facts and see, which of the things reported here are unsupported or really irrelevant. Please take the points one to one and support your position. The fact that you have connections to Bolivia and maybe are against Morales, should drive you to a more careful approach, than just rejecting referenced facts as "opinion". This is exactly what I'm trying to avoid and I hope that you will too.

You are also arguing, that the Media are currently reporting corruption and so on. This is still not without problems. You know quite well, that if this is a dictatorship, it will of course not allow media to express their free mind and it will of course try to corroborate the reputation of the party of Morales (this even if it is NOT a dictatorship) in order to become as much support from the population as possible. As far as I know, there were media, that belonged to MAS. Is it allowed for them to express their opinion and what is their opinion? Even if they are allowed to express their mind, it would be quite risky to mention any of the media after the decree of Anez (even she now took it back), for reasons I hope you understand. And about corruption: I already red in another article, that the government of Morales had tried to bring a law against corruption in police and army, which he then had to drop because of the reactions of these institutions. Is this true or not? Do you have Spanish sources about this theme? Or do you find this theme also irrelevant?

One more question: I read in the news, that this should be an interim government caring only about making new elections. I red though, that they are making also laws concerning financial issues and working with companies, as well themes about exterior relations. Is this true and are they allowed to do this? Thanks! Yomomo (talk) 18:51, 28 December 2019 (UTC) — Yomomo (talk&#32;• contribs) has made few or no other edits outside this topic.


 * I am not from any side. The Bolivian media is certainly reporting on events that are harmful to Añez and some matters cannot be disputed, such as government appointments, the results of external investigations, Bolivian legal procedures, pieces written before the events of the election and direct quotes and interviews from people not aligned with Anez. That you are saying that the media belongs to MAS is evidence that you believe that MAS is corrupt, so why defend them too strongly? Bear in mind, however, that plenty of the MAS politicians are good people and they want to see corruption within their own party purged as much as anyone else. MAS still have a plurality in both chambers of government. The state newspaper was called Cambio under MAS and the state owned TV was boliviatv, but these are not sources I use. These are also one of the central areas of corruption being investigated, specifically the Minister for Communication called Lopez and the Neurona scandal. What these people are being charged with is still relevant to the discourse, whether they are found guilty or not, but there is not much question that there was a lot going on. I don't know about charges being dropped, but there were certainly accusations of corruption, and convictions, in the military and the police in the past. There was also the same in government and there is a transparency commission that is dedicated to that (ironically, also being investigated). I don't know about any of the financial issues or with companies. They cannot really do this, however, as MAS control both houses of parliament and everything must pass through them. Some things like foreign policy are more under control of the ministers because their purview is described by existing law. Quite a few of the corruption charges involve state owned companies which are now under control of the interim government. The new people in charge are finding huge gaps and unexplained irregularities in accounts. Allegedly, anyway. But ENTEL is saying there is a 1.2 billion BOB gap in accounts and the gas people are saying that the reserves were being deliberately overstated by 15%. People that work for state companies found deductions from their pay and were forced to attend MAS events. The last is one I knew about that was only reported in the media since the directors of the company ended up being investigated for corruption. I have relevant links for all these, but it is a major undertaking to retrieve them all and will be done in a separate article if it is relevant. The interim government will rightly be subject to the same scrutiny over their actions, especially the deaths, as nobody in a government position right now will be there in six months. Morales is somewhat ubiquitous in Bolivia. His face is everywhere, from huge billboards at every Teleferico station, to the sides of milk cartons, but the tide has been turning against him for some time and a lot of his own party members are not interested in furthering his cause. Eva Copa, president of the Senate, and the El Alto MAS collective are not attending his convocation in Argentina, for example. The process of change can continue without him as it is more important than one person. Feel free to explore these issues in your own time though as this is not the place to discuss personal experience. I should not give such a lengthy reply, TBH.Crmoorhead (talk) 21:19, 28 December 2019 (UTC)

OAS Report
I am surprised that there has been little discussion on the Organization of American States report, since it has come out upon analysis that there are quite a few problems with the way this report was done and handled, and with a few congressmen even sending a letter to OAS for clarity.

Hooded-wanderer (talk) 07:12, 30 December 2019 (UTC)


 * There has been quite a lot of discussion of this in this talk page and also the section "Allegations of electoral fraud and OAS audit" in the article. The OAS were invited to investigate the allegations of fraud by Morales who said he would stand by the results. Mexico was one of the countries overseeing the OAS audit and the audit itself involved 18 different nationalities of observers including many political allies of Morales. The CEPR's original criticism and the public letter came out before the final report was released. Quite aside from questions on the organisation's neutrality, they are unlikely to back down on this issue but they include a disclaimer saying "This analysis is not meant to serve as a validation of the electoral results themselves. Rather, it is an analysis of the OAS’s actual findings and of the neutrality and rigor of the audit itself." As I mentioned elsewhere, the CEPR have no access to the resources and interviews used to perform an audit. The beginning of the OAS report sets out the problems with the elections in order of seriousness from page 3 (in Spanish). As far as I can tell, the existence of a server allowing access to results, the existence of someone who had root level access to that server remotely and the accessing of that server during the count (and in fact after the main count had been stopped) is fairly clear with evidence. But there are a lot of things to see in that section that I won't list here, mainly that those in charge deliberately lied to the public. The opinion of the CEPR has shifted from saying there was no need to question the results or the validity of the election to saying that the OAS didn't do it properly and that there should exist another organisation (perhaps more politically allied with them) to perform such audits. Regardless, no such organisation exists. The Spanish-speaking members of the OAS have not said anything explicitly to question the audit findings as far as I know, the main point of contention being that Morales should have been allowed to continue serving as President until 2020 and new elections. This is something that the OAS and Amalgro also said, because they wanted some kind of continuity, but events in Bolivia were really out of control of anyone and things have been relatively calm for 6 weeks now. The second link you provide is dated 25th Nov, again before the release of the final report and the link to the letter they sent leads to "page not found". Including their response to the full report is probably pertinent, but their disclaimer is also relevant, as is the mainstream acceptance of their results by member states. Crmoorhead (talk) 14:45, 30 December 2019 (UTC)