Talk:2022 Kherson counteroffensive/Archive 1

Feedback from New Page Review process
I left the following feedback for the creator/future reviewers while reviewing this article: Thanks for the article!.

&maltese; SunDawn &maltese;    (contact)   01:10, 11 July 2022 (UTC)

Troops
One million troops... How? Did they call in all of their reserves for this attack? Shhssh (talk) 12:54, 12 July 2022 (UTC)

“It's not a million-strong force that will be conducting a counterattack,” Dr Jack Watling, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told the broadcaster. “Normally you would want operational surprise when you launch a counterattack, so announcing it publicly is partly about forcing the Russians to have to commit resources more widely to guard against this threat.”

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-million-army-russia-weapons-b2120445.html

YantarCoast (talk) 18:37, 12 July 2022 (UTC)

Protection
Can this page get the protection that's about the verified email thing and such? Reasoning: IP user going all "garbage propoganda". Dawsongfg (talk) 19:40, 5 August 2022 (UTC)
 * Two of the recent vandalisations were fixed within a few minutes, and other edits might better need talk page discussion. In any case, have a read through WP:ROUGHSEMI, read about what page semi-protection really is (it has nothing to do with email verification) and make a proposal there at the link for making proposals (you'll find this when you read through) if you still feel that semi-protection is needed. Boud (talk) 00:07, 6 August 2022 (UTC)

Subject
Sorry, but there are no real sources for Ukrainian summer counteroffensive. Claims by Reznikov about 1-million people counteroffensive was misunderstood by a journalist. Ukrainian army constantly performs local counteroffensives whenever there are people and equipment for that. "counteroffensive began on 11 July 2022" - why? Why not 10 July or 12 July? UA performed multiple HIMARS strikes in June too. This article is not based on facts. Kanzat (talk) 10:41, 16 July 2022 (UTC)


 * I agree, I've seen multiple sources saying that Ukraine is gearing up for a counteroffensive in *August*, and there's no real evidence of any counteroffensive ongoing right now. All that's listed in the "Battle" section is the recapture of one town, some statements by Ukrainian sources, and the shelling of some Russian positions and depots. I see no reason why this page should exist right now. It should definitely be considered for deletion. It will probably have to be created (again) in a month or two's time, if Ukrainian claims of a coming counteroffensive are true, that is. PixelatedGalaxy (talk) 00:08, 17 July 2022 (UTC)
 * IF that was even a "recapture of one town". Ivanovka is a village (831 living here in 2001, barely increasing later), which, according to my sources, has already been in the "grey zone", not controlled by anyone. --M1911 (talk) 06:29, 20 July 2022 (UTC)
 * So why would Russia store military equipment if there's less than 20 thousand people in Vasylivka? Dawsongfg (talk) 20:18, 20 July 2022 (UTC)
 * I was talking about Kherson Ivanovka village that they "took over". Vasilievka is very far from that part of the front. --M1911 (talk) 13:42, 21 July 2022 (UTC)
 * July 23, 2022 -- no offensive yet... this article should be deleted. 158.51.81.47 (talk) 22:01, 23 July 2022 (UTC)
 * Definitely. Delete.
 * First paragraph is full phrases like "claim", "state", "likely", "unlikely", "preparing to launch or to have already launched" :)
 * Everything may happened and may not, great info. 194.59.242.64 (talk) 14:16, 26 August 2022 (UTC)
 * I agree, there hasn't really been that much evidence for a Ukrainian push, mostly just chest-thumping by Ukrainian officials at the moment. I suggest deleting the article unless the Ukrainians announce major gains. 2601:85:C101:C9D0:3856:42AC:9F0E:9337 (talk) 19:31, 21 July 2022 (UTC)
 * Oppose Then what's with the map and ISW reporting fighting, even in Lozove area PAST the Inhulets river? If anything all that should be mentioned somewhere at least. Dawsongfg (talk) 16:13, 24 July 2022 (UTC)

I've seen a lot of posts on Social Media recently claiming that Ukrainian Forces have surrounded 2000 Russian soldiers at Vysokopillia, nothing has been confirmed yet, and personally I doubt it, but if it turns out to be true then maybe the article can stay, a major encirclement is a clear sign of a major counteroffensive. PixelatedGalaxy (talk) 13:18, 22 July 2022 (UTC)
 * Quite predictably - not even the Ukraine's Army HQs have confirmed such a sorround near Vysokopolye, claimed by Arestovich. --M1911 (talk) 19:50, 23 July 2022 (UTC)
 * as of July 23 2022, there has been no offensive operations that have resulted in gains by Ukraine... where is the offensive? 158.51.81.47 (talk) 22:00, 23 July 2022 (UTC)
 * I agree there's a lack of sourced evidence that there is an active, notable "counteroffensive" going on by Ukrainian forces. This article is premature and was clearly created based on a small amount of optimistic sources at the time of creation. The lack of action at all in the small "Battles" section is indicative of it, and the Background and prelude seem largely copy-pasted from other wiki pages in order to add legitimacy. This page, in its current stage, should be nominated for deletion. Let it be re-created once the Ukrainians officially announce a true, large-scale counteroffensive along a broad front, not just local grey zone skirmishes. RopeTricks (talk) 06:02, 24 July 2022 (UTC)
 * Agree. It appears there isn't actually any confirmation that this counteroffensive is in play. The best I can find is what the ISW said yesterday: "Ukrainian forces are likely preparing to launch or have launched a counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast as of July 23, but open-source visibility on the progress and tempo of the counteroffensive will likely be limited and lag behind events." (https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23). I.e. they can't confirm that it has actually begun yet. YantarCoast (talk) 09:16, 24 July 2022 (UTC)
 * The counteroffensive does not need to be in play to justify the article. Wikipedia is not a news ticker. There are enough reports in WP:RS saying that the counteroffensive is planned. The 2022 Libyan presidential election hasn't happened yet, but we already have an article on it. The 23 July ISW report adds to the other sources, including those describing the Antonivka Road Bridge attacks, and and Serhiy Khlan's statements, which justify keeping this article. I'm removing the PROD notice.The lead did need downgrading from ongoing to planned.Boud (talk) 16:39, 24 July 2022 (UTC) (downgrade ✅ Boud (talk) 17:04, 24 July 2022 (UTC)) (fix garbled wording by me Boud (talk) 17:06, 24 July 2022 (UTC))
 * If using the very same principle, I guess Wikipedia could have tried to make an article called "Russian capitulation before the Ukraine (202?)" or something close, made of solely sources which are eventually based on loose claims by Ukrainian and some international authorities (such as Lech Wałęsa) what would they do in such scenario. Further, in case Russia wins, it still wouldn't need to be deleted, because, you know, "one day "the heroes" will return". :-) --M1911 (talk) 17:30, 24 July 2022 (UTC)
 * Shhh, don't tell them. 2601:85:C101:C9D0:FCB8:52EF:9B52:3095 (talk) 20:12, 25 July 2022 (UTC)
 * Is the rule the same as films and things? Dawsongfg (talk) 17:47, 24 July 2022 (UTC)

Edit request
In the counteroffensive section, please change "In the next months" to "In the next month". These attacks happened in August, the month after July. 38.133.32.198 (talk) 15:42, 26 August 2022 (UTC)

casualty count on side of Ukraine is bad
Casualty count is from 2nd of August NPR interview based on a number that was given from one medical center, not an overall number. At a minimum it should be changed to 26+, best to mark as unreliable source, scrap number, or replace number. Additionally this is only injured. 172.5.152.119 (talk) 16:22, 26 August 2022 (UTC)


 * Casualty count on Russian side is unverified as well, those are just numbers stated in the media. There was no objective evidence as to how many casualties Russian side has actually suffered. Objectivity aside, saying that one side has suffered 26 people injured, and the other lose 1,000 people dead is just absurd.
 * That whole paragraph needs and overhaul, imo. — 91.233.55.16 (talk) 13:55, 29 August 2022 (UTC)

Casualties
The table listing casualties is confusing and doesn't gel properly with the copy above it. The copy states that RF has released "sporadic" claims about UA casualties, whereas the obverse is "daily". The table, however, lists 590+ under the Russian heading with the RMoD as the source, while the Ukrainian heading lists "unknown" numbers. So are the 590+ casualties Russian or Ukrainian troops? AbominableIntelligence (talk) 04:36, 30 August 2022 (UTC)

Title change
I suggest changing the title to Ukrainian Southern Counter-offensive as the year and season isn't necessary. LegendaryChristopher (talk) 02:18, 31 August 2022 (UTC)
 * Several counter-offensives took place in the summer in Ukraine during World War II; this is why the year is needed. Applodion (talk) 22:01, 31 August 2022 (UTC)

Media Bias
Are we making sure the sources we cite aren't biased? Can we put a (claimed) next to the uncertain statistics until we get a report from Reuters, AP, etc. Thanks. Kwondyke (talk) 14:17, 1 September 2022 (UTC)

Casualty count "according to locals"
claim has been removed.

The 1000 and 1500 figures "according to locals" are based on hearsay ("I heard 1,000 Ukrainians and 1,500 Russians [were killed],” said Pantelis Boubouras") and should therefore be removed. 2603:7080:1E39:6663:99D4:6261:5A8:E26 (talk) 23:30, 31 August 2022 (UTC)


 * No, it should be placed AS A CLAIM. 64.82.204.2 (talk) 17:51, 1 September 2022 (UTC)
 * The claim is from ONE local whose reliability isn't established. There is no evidence (to my knowledge at least) of other nearby civilians making similar claims. 2603:7080:1E39:6663:2425:AE84:556A:F9DA (talk) 17:57, 1 September 2022 (UTC)
 * If it's just one then yes no reliability status Dawsongfg (talk) 14:39, 3 September 2022 (UTC)

Units
Please add the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade, 36th Separate Marine Brigade and the 28th separate mechanized brigade to Ukrainian units. Proof: -128th MAB: https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1565411411089657862

-28th OMBR: https://twitter.com/Nikolai11449196/status/1565644741915590656

If you don't like twitter, MilitaryLand deployment map confirms all 3 units presence: https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/ Shhssh (talk) 10:30, 2 September 2022 (UTC)


 * There's a thread by pro-Ukrainian blogger WarMonitor3 showing the Russian/DPR units in western Kherson oblast too. Unfortunately due to that those aren't represented on a proper source, I think we will just have to leave the Russian units blank for now (unless we find some, I will search.) Jebiguess (talk) 19:24, 2 September 2022 (UTC)
 * From the russian side all I know is that the VDV is present, 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Div. to be exact Shhssh (talk) 10:33, 4 September 2022 (UTC)

Usage of unreliable or bias sources
Many of the claims being made are not only unreliable but also bias in nature. Using media news outlet that tend to show biasness towards one side as source should be remove to keep the page authentic as possible. LegendaryChristopher (talk) 22:35, 3 September 2022 (UTC)


 * That's why these are addressed as claims. Dawsongfg (talk) 02:39, 5 September 2022 (UTC)

Bias Sources
Most of the sources use on this page are either from Pro-Ukrainian telegram channels or news outlets. I ask for some of the moderators to please edit and remove any claims that isn't independently confirmed to keep the honesty and reliability of this page. 24.91.190.77 (talk) 12:27, 29 August 2022 (UTC)


 * Twitter is not a reliable source, unless it comes from a known news account or used in a quoting context from a government official. Neither of the accounts you cited would be considered trustworthy, as they don't meet those guidelines. Not to mention, some pro-Ukrainian sources do hold biases, but still report facts. Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv Independent, and Interfax meet those criteria, and statements from the Ukrainian General Staff are marked as such in the article.
 * Could you cite the sources you deem not independently confirmed? Jebiguess (talk) 15:04, 29 August 2022 (UTC)
 * Forget the twitter part, I thought it came from your comment and I didn't notice it was from the one above. Jebiguess (talk) 15:05, 29 August 2022 (UTC)

Kyiv Independent is literally a propaganda news outlet. The Ukrainian government isn't a trusted source as they would over exaggerate claims without basis. LegendaryChristopher (talk) 02:14, 31 August 2022 (UTC)


 * See The Kyiv Independent - the newspaper generally has a good reputation for independence and good standards of fact-checking: it was created by journalists from Kyiv Post, which had a long-term track record of being independent of the Ukrainian governments as they changed during the many post-1991 changes of presidential and parliamentary power in Ukraine. The journalists left Kyiv Post in 2021 because there was pressure for Kyiv Post to become less critical of the Ukrainian government; so they created a new journal to retain their independence. See The Kyiv Independent for the sources of these statements.
 * Ukrainian government sources will very likely be biased in favour of the Ukrainian government. They are good sources for claims by the Ukrainian authorities.
 * See WP:VERIFIABILITY to understand why and how we use sources on Wikipedia.
 * Boud (talk) 18:58, 31 August 2022 (UTC)


 * The International Press Institute has just awarded The Kyiv Independent (and six other Ukrainian media) its 2022 Free Media Pioneer award for "courage, quality reporting, and a steadfast commitment to serving local communities". Boud (talk) 18:28, 1 September 2022 (UTC)
 * This is exactly what a claim is. Dawsongfg (talk) 02:47, 5 September 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 1 September 2022
I think we need to merge Mykolaiv offensive with this article, as the former is too insignificant for it's own page. 72.229.242.36 (talk) 15:57, 1 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Red information icon with gradient background.svg Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the template. Hi there, I've disabled the edit protected template as it's best to start a discussion for merging. --Ferien (talk) 19:02, 1 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Okay, but I don't really know how to set it up correctly. 72.229.242.36 (talk) 19:23, 1 September 2022 (UTC)
 * See WP:MERGEREQ. Though it turns out Applodion has already made a merge request (Special:Diff/1107926724), so there is no point in starting another one now. Kleinpecan (talk) 19:39, 1 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Just to note this, I have only reverted a previous edit which had removed the merge request. Applodion (talk) 19:56, 1 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Okay, so what is the consensus then? 72.229.242.36 (talk) 20:43, 2 September 2022 (UTC)
 * No one (other than you, that is) has participated in the discussion (which is at this very section) yet, so there's no consensus so far. Kleinpecan (talk) 20:53, 2 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Okay, I was just trying to know what other people think of the idea. 72.229.242.36 (talk) 15:43, 3 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Agree - the Mykolaiv offensive page could easily be mentioned in the prelude of the southern offensive. Jebiguess (talk) 00:54, 4 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Merge - It seems like the Russian operation never got off the ground and lasted only three days with nearly no frontline changes, so we might as well merge it. Applodion (talk) 08:18, 5 September 2022 (UTC)


 * I merged the article. Super   Ψ   Dro  19:35, 6 September 2022 (UTC)

The map
The map needs an update soon as the Ukrainian armed forces have claimed from their official page on Facebook that the Russian army is shelling the towns of Lyubomyrivka, Petrivka, Khreschenivka and Myrolyubivka. This implies that the towns have fallen to Ukraine (2nd September) and the towns are currently shown to be in Russian hands on the map at this time.

source: https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07f4kjPEfEHapfSjmsdhCkXcSX44RXmmQx5Tm84P1EC1ka22y1ze7UEWGLcK8vCUjl AnAustralianHistoryBuff (talk) 03:20, 3 September 2022 (UTC)

Facebook post isn't a source. LegendaryChristopher (talk) 22:22, 3 September 2022 (UTC)


 * Facebook posts are acceptable sources if it coming from a reliable, verified source. Although, if another more reliable site uses the Facebook post as a reference we need to change the link. Jebiguess (talk) 00:50, 4 September 2022 (UTC)
 * It works as a claim. Dawsongfg (talk) 02:42, 5 September 2022 (UTC)
 * The daily ISW reports we cite use Facebook and Telegram posts. More than anything else maybe. Super   Ψ   Dro  19:36, 6 September 2022 (UTC)

Scope vs Southern Ukraine offensive
Please add proposals and arguments for/against at Talk:Southern Ukraine offensive for clarifying the relative scope of these two articles. Boud (talk) 13:49, 11 July 2022 (UTC)

This article really shouldn't exist, seems like a crystal ball --LeVivsky ( ಠ_ಠ ) 17:31, 12 July 2022 (UTC)


 * You're not a crystal ball. Have you not seen anything? Dawsongfg (talk) 01:40, 15 July 2022 (UTC)
 * July was a mulligan, lets see who the August version goes. 89.216.29.144 (talk) 19:00, 29 August 2022 (UTC)
 * Far more is going on now. Dawsongfg (talk) 01:07, 9 September 2022 (UTC)

Move to remove page
This page serves no really informative value and has been used as anti-Ukrainian propaganda on various sources. There is no clear "offensive" goals that this article has in mind and only pieces together words by various Ukrainian officials. The casualty numbers are calculated horrendously and serve no informative purpose. I henceforth propose a vote on whether or not to delete this article. Both sides should make their cases below. If need be, we can call in an outside arbitrator. Dvtch (talk) 23:59, 26 August 2022 (UTC)


 * I generally agree that the page in its current form serves no purpose. It is mostly written on speculation, and talks very little about the purported counteroffensive. Maybe it should be rewritten to talk about the speculation of a counteroffensive and have the title changed to something like "Potential Ukrainian Southern Counteroffensive" but no counteroffensive of any merit is currently taking place (as of August 27). I say either rewrite the article to not treat this as an actual battle and instead talk only about the speculation of one, or move it to the draftspace.  Physeters ✉ 00:10, 27 August 2022 (UTC)
 * At least three times a counteroffensive has been announced in the summer. Maybe this time it'll actually go far. 64.82.204.2 (talk) 14:08, 29 August 2022 (UTC)
 * Wikipedia shouldn't be used as someone's propaganda source, so I'd definitely suggest for the removal of this page. Whole topic is very subjective and almost unverifiable, as even the casualties are taken from the media. — 91.233.55.16 (talk) 10:41, 30 August 2022 (UTC)
 * I would have agreed a few days ago, but it does look like something is now happening. Anywikiuser (talk) 18:52, 30 August 2022 (UTC)
 * Same here. The potential AfD should be held off for now.  Physeters ✉ 23:26, 30 August 2022 (UTC)
 * Way more's happening now. Dawsongfg (talk) 01:08, 9 September 2022 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 9 September 2022
Please update the dates in the causalities table (Ukrainian forces, Russian Ministry of Defence). The sources go till 7 September (not 4), the same as the Russian forces part, the numbers sum up. In both cases I guess it's worth checking if these kind of sums are trivial synthesis or original research. 176.247.138.232 (talk) 00:56, 9 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Already fixed with a later update. 176.247.155.162 (talk) 17:52, 9 September 2022 (UTC)

Edit request
Please add to the paragraph that starts with "Russian reserve units are being sent as reinforcements .." and contains "According a Russian military journalist, Yevgeniy Poddubny, reinforcements are being deployed ..." a sentence that this claim is refuted by OSINT community, with source: https://twitter.com/Koeddk/status/1568215305104531456 (archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20220910012348/https://twitter.com/Koeddk/status/1568215305104531456) Dkorduban (talk) 08:41, 10 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Red information icon with gradient background.svg Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. Please provide sourcing better than a non-verified Twitter account. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 11:09, 10 September 2022 (UTC)

Just did a WP:BOLD move
As the counteroffensive at Kharkiv Oblast is being extremely successful, and only in three days there's already news of Ukrainian troops on the outskirts of Kupiansk, entering suburbs of Izium and heading towards Lyman, I've decided that it is important to urgently expand the scope of the article to take advantage of the fact that the counteroffensive is still ongoing to promote article expansion. None of these engagements are being covered in any other invasion article as I've seen it, only in the localities' own articles. This project is a voluntary encyclopedia, and nobody can dispute the fact that the largest volume of voluntary contributions from a recent event will come during the development of that event. If anyone has something against the new title, which I admit is not the best we can get, please discuss it and don't decide to restrict the topic to southern Ukraine again. Super  Ψ   Dro  19:19, 9 September 2022 (UTC)
 * I did a merge too as apparently someone had already made a new page for the Kharkiv counteroffensive earlier today. There were only five paragraphs on the actual counteroffensive on this article prior to my changes while the other article only had three. It all can perfectly fit into one single page for the time being. If that changes in the future, we can do a splitting discussion. Super   Ψ   Dro  19:34, 9 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Thank you so much! It was a little frustrating to me that there was no article regarding this massive undertaking, when small 1 or 2 day battles over tiny towns from earlier  in the war had their own articles. 2601:19C:4080:5B70:466:69EB:1CC6:FCD5 (talk) 20:45, 9 September 2022 (UTC)
 * See 2022 Ukrainian Kharkiv counteroffensive. Wikisaurus (talk) 11:33, 10 September 2022 (UTC)
 * , what is this comment supposed to be? Super   Ψ   Dro  11:36, 10 September 2022 (UTC)
 * @Super Dromaeosaurus, I answered to IP user's "there was no article regarding this massive undertaking": there is 2022 Ukrainian Kharkiv counteroffensive. By the way, take a look at . Wikisaurus (talk) 11:40, 10 September 2022 (UTC)

Balakliia/Kharkiv Counteroffensive
Should this article be reworked to include the Balakliia counteroffensive, or does it deserve its own article?  Physeters ✉ 21:56, 7 September 2022 (UTC)


 * Not unless that one has a major role, such as pinning Russian forces (which they took advantage of that from there). Dawsongfg (talk) 01:01, 9 September 2022 (UTC)

I think it should be it's own article. They're both offensives in two different oblasts and as far as I know, this article is specifically for the Southern Ukraine counteroffensive. DeepCriticalThinking (talk) 23:55, 7 September 2022 (UTC)
 * No. It should all be grouped into one single (renamed) article. The info on the counteroffensive itself is not even that long, just some paragraphs. There's also the counteroffensive at Ozerne that we have to cover. Will we make ten pages out of one? Super   Ψ   Dro  15:33, 8 September 2022 (UTC)
 * The issue is that that's a long way from the Kherson Oblast. Why don't we have a "Kharkiv Counteroffensive" article? Or are you suggesting that we remove "southern" from the title and add all or..? Dawsongfg (talk) 01:04, 9 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Ok nevermid that's it Dawsongfg (talk) 01:05, 9 September 2022 (UTC)
 * I agree on this. There should be two articles; the 2022 Ukrainian southern counteroffensive which talks about Kherson Oblast, and there is actually a second article for the Kharkiv Oblast offensive (2022 Ukrainian Kharkiv counteroffensive) although it is very bare and has many issues. I personally believe the latter should be renamed 2022 Kupyansk offensive or 2022 Kupyansk-Balakliia offensive. The actions in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts are both counteroffensives, although separate. Jebiguess (talk) 15:12, 9 September 2022 (UTC)

I don't agree. Another thing to consider is that Ukraine launched a counter offensive in Kharkiv oblast earlier in the war that saw the Russians pushed back to Kozacha Lopan and Staryi Saltiv. The current counteroffensive in Kharkiv oblast can potentially be seen as a second phase of that sam counteroffensive. DeepCriticalThinking (talk) 20:21, 8 September 2022 (UTC)


 * Strongly disagree. The actions in Kharkiv represent a distinct action to the counteroffensives in April-May. It is under completely different circumstances, it has different objectives and both offensives are separated by several months. I think that this thread should be renamed the 2022 Ukrainian Summer Counteroffensive and the Kharkiv actions merged instead. According to sources both the Kharkiv operations and Kherson operations are linked and are being executed together, and thus represent two separate prongs of the same offensive. FossilDS (talk) 21:30, 8 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Agreed. But summer is ending soon (sadly). I seriously doubt Ukraine will manage to achieve their objectives before. Let's avoid future work and strive for a title that can work after the summer ends. Super   Ψ   Dro  21:54, 8 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Maybe it could be renamed "2022 Ukrainian Counteroffensives"?  Physeters ✉ 23:38, 8 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Well now we need to figure out a way to sort the information. Dawsongfg (talk) 01:05, 9 September 2022 (UTC)
 * maybe there should be a pages "ukrainian general autumn offensive" which divided into "Kharkiv offensive" and this "Kherson offensive" pages. 3 pages AnAustralianHistoryBuff (talk) 02:20, 9 September 2022 (UTC)

I agree, the article should be split. These are two different battles. Givibidou (talk) 08:05, 10 September 2022 (UTC)

I also agree with a split of the article, the two major fronts are too far away from each other. At this point the operations seem significant enough to be called Kherson offensive & Kupiansk offensive I Know I&#39;m Not Alone (talk) 10:35, 10 September 2022 (UTC)

Of course, one should split the Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive into a separate article: there is 500 kilometers between them, ISW describes them separately. I reverted the replacement of 2022 Ukrainian Kharkiv counteroffensive with redirect and moved the corresponding information back to a separate article. By the way, there is a nice article in ruwiki, see ru:Контрнаступление в Харьковской области (2022), which is written using ISW and other Western RS. Feel free to translate it! Wikisaurus (talk) 11:13, 10 September 2022 (UTC)


 * There's now reports of fighting in Lysychansk and Donetsk airport. Due to the unnecessary split there's no place to cover this information. Or will we make a third page for it? Super   Ψ   Dro  13:41, 10 September 2022 (UTC)

User:Super Dromaeosaurus Patience, sometimes it takes two or three days to create an article about this. The information needs to arrive in more detail, it is not possible to create the article immediately, almost live. Mawer10 (talk) 19:29, 10 September 2022 (UTC)
 * I am arguing against creating separate articles. For now at least. Super   Ψ   Dro  19:59, 10 September 2022 (UTC)

We have the article on the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson and the counteroffensive in Kharkiv. It will probably be necessary in the future to create an article on the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Zaporizhia and Ukrainian counteroffensive in Dombas. For now, I think separate articles are better, in the future an article on the Ukrainian counteroffensive in general could be created. Mawer10 (talk) 22:00, 10 September 2022 (UTC)

Source of the casualties
Should we even consider the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation as a worthy source for casualties? DakeFasso (talk) 08:59, 10 September 2022 (UTC)
 * It can be used as a primary source for stating things like "According to Russia, ...". Other news and etc. sources that mention it as the Russian claim can be used in conjunction. 2603:8000:B600:4000:DC16:D35:4841:215B (talk) 02:15, 11 September 2022 (UTC)

This article should be renamed as 2022 Ukrainian Kherson Counteroffensive
It is already common knowledge in mainstream media that while a big "Southern Offensive" was one option considered by Ukraine during the summer, this was then discarded for one (West) Kherson Offensive and one Kharkiv Offensive. In the article and talk page of the 2022 Ukrainian Kharkiv counteroffensive the actual facts have been recognized. This article here, too, should go with reality and public consensus. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/13/us/politics/ukraine-russia-pentagon.html — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2003:CB:2F0C:858D:2495:6B36:90EF:C7E8 (talk) 11:21, 14 September 2022 (UTC)

logistics
additionally I believe that a new section should be added to the page about the logistical situation for the Russian army as the destruction of numerous bridges, ferries and barges along with the destruction of literal dozens of supply depots will have the largest effect on the outcome of this battle and as such need mentioning. a possible list of supply depots and or map could be helpful. AnAustralianHistoryBuff (talk) 03:24, 3 September 2022 (UTC)


 * are there any objections to this idea? AnAustralianHistoryBuff (talk) 23:19, 6 September 2022 (UTC)
 * This could already be included into the counteroffensive page of the article as it has been for various other articles. Making a new content page is not required if it falls into the events of the page. Raymond Kestis (talk) 05:20, 5 October 2022 (UTC)

Requesting a note about the Kherson evacuation mentioned in Wikipedia's news
Make a note about the evacuation of Kherson:

On 13 October, the Russian government announced evacuation of the civilian population in the city of Kherson, after a request by installed governor Volodymyr Saldo via his account on Telegram. 73.72.5.61 (talk) 14:53, 14 October 2022 (UTC)
 * ✅  Physeters ✉ 18:29, 14 October 2022 (UTC)

Order of Battle
A small sub-section at the top of the 'Counteroffensive' section should be added for the units involved, as all their names are now clogging up the Info box. There is also already an order of battle present on 2022 Ukrainian eastern counteroffensive. PixelatedGalaxy (talk) 19:17, 15 October 2022 (UTC)

Crimea
Events in Crimea have their own entries elsewhere but there is no reference in this article that I can see. Given that it must be considered 'south' and is part of Russian supply/logistics etc worth some words here I would have thought.Thelisteninghand (talk) 19:14, 22 October 2022 (UTC) Added to 'see also' for now.Thelisteninghand (talk) 19:19, 22 October 2022 (UTC)

Charivne and Chkalove
Sources like this one say that occupiers withdrew on Saturday from Charivne and Chkalove (north of Beryslav). Should it be added here? Ec.Domnowall (talk) 11:01, 24 October 2022 (UTC)

Andriy Kovalchuk commander instead of Roman Kostenko?
Greetings, so I just read Andriy Kovalchuk, and that article claims it subject is commander of the southern counteroffensive. Given that multiple other sources like Forbes (yes, that one always with a grain of salt) and several others agree on that fact, and the source currently used here, the Washington Post, only indicates that Roman Kostenko is a commander (of someone), I assume that Andriy Kovalchuk is the senior officer responsible, and should be in the infobox. – LordPeterII ( talk ) 16:07, 26 October 2022 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 6 November 2022
I would like to edit this article Gshard (talk) 09:02, 6 November 2022 (UTC)
 * Red information icon with gradient background.svg Not done: this is not the right page to request additional user rights. You may reopen this request with the specific changes to be made and someone may add them for you. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 11:02, 6 November 2022 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 9 November 2022
Add on the info box in "Territorial Changes" about ukraine liberating the town of Snihurivka in Mykolaiv Oblast Lucasoliveira653 (talk) 20:09, 9 November 2022 (UTC)


 * ✅!  Physeters ✉ 20:00, 10 November 2022 (UTC)

Old Analysis Section
Looking at the bottom of the page the analysis section only has two points listed, both of them, from September (One from 9/10 and the other from 9/24). Given how the situation has evolved is there any new analysis that can be added to this section (especially with the recent action in and around Kherson)? BogLogs (talk) 12:54, 11 November 2022 (UTC)

Liberation of Kherson
Kherson was liberation about an hour ago. According to multiple sources. 2601:182:381:6820:8199:C8DF:68E5:14F0 (talk) 14:39, 11 November 2022 (UTC)


 * Slava Ukraini! Euglenos sandara (talk) 14:47, 11 November 2022 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 11 November 2022
Please add this image into the November section of counteroffensive. DinoSoupCanada (talk) 18:58, 11 November 2022 (UTC)


 * Done! (jabz)  19:16, 11 November 2022 (UTC)

Outcome
This should be marked as a Russian victory. The whole offensive stalled with minimal ukrainian gains. I think its fair to say that they have been defeated Shhssh (talk) 12:25, 14 September 2022 (UTC)
 * I do not think so. The West Kherson offensive efforts of the Ukrainian side have not ended at all, and the public sources report ongoing fierce fighting and significant casualties on both sides. Consensus among mainstream media is that this West Kherson offensive certainly is very active. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2003:CB:2F0C:858D:2495:6B36:90EF:C7E8 (talk) 13:20, 14 September 2022 (UTC)
 * To be honest, I think in a few days it will be over. The russians just destroyed a dam in krivoy rog which flooded the ingulets which is a big problem for the ukrainian pontoons Shhssh (talk) 16:54, 14 September 2022 (UTC)
 * While my as well as your opinion on the future is irrelevant here anyway, we just get the news that Ukrainian forces took control of Kyselivka, the last town and settlement before the gates of Kherson. So my irrelevant guess is that Russia before the end of September is in for its worst military defeat since WW2 (and subsequent dissolution of the country). However, what is relevant here is that the offensive is obviously ongoing. 2003:CB:2F0C:858D:2495:6B36:90EF:C7E8 (talk) 19:02, 14 September 2022 (UTC)
 * Still to early to claim a outcome, last alleged Ukrainian advanced have not been verified by other sources, we should wait some weeks more. The offensive lost momemtum but there are fighting being reported.Mr.User200 (talk) 14:58, 17 September 2022 (UTC)
 * With the liberation of Kherson, the outcome has been a clear victory for Ukraine. I'm not sure if the next stage will be listed as a separate offensive but if it is the infobox can list this stage as a Ukrainian victory. BogLogs (talk) 10:32, 12 November 2022 (UTC)

Inviting contributions at Liberation of Kherson
Would love to have other contributors at Liberation of Kherson, which I just created. Adoring nanny (talk) 17:40, 11 November 2022 (UTC)


 * If possible it would be great to add a link to these two articles in the introduction and the point mentioning the recapture of Kherson. BogLogs (talk) 12:44, 12 November 2022 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 12 November 2022
Change the 'Territorial Changes' section of the infobox from "Ukraine recaptures the city of Kherson and the towns of Vysokopillya, Davydiv Brid, Velyka Oleksandrivka, Dudchany, Kyselivka, Snihurivka, as well as other settlements in Kherson & Mykolaiv Oblasts" to simply, and more clearly: "Ukraine recaptures all remaining occupied territory in Mykolaiv Oblast and everything West of the Dnieper river in Kherson Oblast, including Kherson City" Or some variation on this. PixelatedGalaxy (talk) 12:25, 12 November 2022 (UTC)


 * Done! (jabz)  18:23, 12 November 2022 (UTC)

Should we separate into a first and second phase similar to the eastern counteroffensive?
We labeled the first phase of the eastern counteroffensive as from its start to the liberation of Kupiansk and in general, Kharkiv Oblast west of the Oskil. Now that all of Kherson/Mykolaiv west of the Dnieper has been similarly liberated, including Kherson itself, should we label it similarly? The counteroffensive is obviously not concluded considering most of the oblast is still occupied, but the primary strategic goal thus far was recapturing Kherson city. The Kip (talk) 16:42, 11 November 2022 (UTC)


 * No, we should rename this article to 2022 Ukrainian Kherson counteroffensive and mark this as finished. The future new Ukrainian counter-offensive will likely be Zaporizhzhia Oblast towards Melitopol or Mariupol, and will be considered a different counter-offensive from the one mentioned in this article. Mawer10 (talk) 17:33, 11 November 2022 (UTC)
 * WP:CRYSTALBALL. The Kip (talk) 21:32, 11 November 2022 (UTC)

Counteroffensives are not based on oblast boundaries. The counter-offensive spoken of in this article only has a second phase if Ukraine crosses the Dnipro River, in the meantime, it's better to mark this counteroffensive as finished. When the counter-offensive in Zaporizhzhia begins (and it certainly will) I can only envision this as a separate counter-offensive, not part of a second phase of the Kherson counteroffensive. Mawer10 (talk) 01:04, 12 November 2022 (UTC)


 * Once again, WP:CRYSTALBALL.
 * We make decisions here based on events that have occurred, not "when [x happens] I can envision it as [y thing]." The Kip (talk) 07:40, 12 November 2022 (UTC)


 * You're going against WP:CRYSTALBALL thinking that this counter-offensive has a second phase that hasn't started yet and if it does it will probably have a separate article. Mawer10 (talk) 15:37, 12 November 2022 (UTC)


 * There are news that Ukraine has crossed the Dnieper River and is trying to conquer the Kinburn Peninsula, if this is true and especially if Ukraine manages to conquer this peninsula it is a sign that the counter-offensive continues. However, I object to separating this article into phases. The content of the article 2022 Ukrainian eastern counteroffensive is organized into well-defined events, while this article organizes the events by month. Mawer10 (talk) 21:54, 13 November 2022 (UTC)
 * I think splitting the article into events would make it more confusing. And it's too early to talk about future progress, as nothing is concrete for now. (jabz)  22:42, 13 November 2022 (UTC)

There is zero doubt that this operation is finished. There were clear goals and they have been achieved. Wolf359Locutus (talk) 11:06, 12 November 2022 (UTC)

The U.K. Ministry of Defense shows the Kinburn Peninsula under the control of Ukraine. https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1592136449964523520 --Aaron106 (talk) 14:44, 14 November 2022 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 14 November 2022
Change "begin fighting against the civiliian popualtion" to "begin fighting against the civilian population". 120.159.254.149 (talk) 14:12, 14 November 2022 (UTC)
 * ✅ by Nederlandse Leeuw in this edit.  Physeters ✉ 00:29, 15 November 2022 (UTC)

Typo in Analysis section
At the end of the analysis section, "expecially noting the lack of organization of military forces coming from Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic.", the word especially is spelled incorrectly as expecially. 71.44.212.75 (talk) 15:52, 15 November 2022 (UTC)


 * The typo has been fixed.  Physeters ✉ 18:24, 15 November 2022 (UTC)

Ukraine has won in Kherson.
This offensive started with a clear goal. That goal, to recapture Kherson and liberate the entirety of the Right Bank of the Dnieper, has been achieved in full.

The ISW and President Zelenskyy today hailed Ukrainian victories in Kherson Oblast. Ukraine now controls all territory on the right bank of the Dnieper, and the Russian withdrawal has been completed with the destruction of the Antonivsky and Nova Kakhova bridges.

By all indications, Ukraine is now diverting the bulk of its fighting force to southern Donetsk Oblast to halt the Russian offensive there near Pavlivka and Bakhmut and potentially recoup territory there as well. Thus, this counteroffensive is over, and there is no need to mark it as ongoing when there is no fighting and territorial changes occuring anymore in the Mykolaiv/Kherson theater. Whilst the 2022 Ukrainian eastern counteroffensive is still ongoing, as there are still minor territorial changes/Ukrainian gains occuring there every day, by all accounts and independent media the Kherson counteroffensive has achieved its goal: to capture Kherson, and regroup/stop there.

If there is a renewed effort by the Ukrainians to retake the rest of Kherson Oblast and attack towards Crimea, that should deserve its own article, as the fighting has stopped for now and most likely will not resume until Ukraine has stopped the Russian momentum (however slow) in the Donbas and retaken territory there (this could take weeks, months, or even years).

Thus I have marked the offensive as over & included the necessary sources and analysis. Pinging editors who've been involved with editing this article or have been involved in other similar issues: @Applodion @(G)jabz @Mellk @EkoGraf @Mr.User200 @YantarCoast @Super Dromaeosaurus PilotSheng (talk) 03:49, 14 November 2022 (UTC)


 * The lead says the original goal was to recapture all of Kherson, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts still remain partially occupied. Mellk (talk) 04:33, 14 November 2022 (UTC)
 * The first sentence also literally says to "expel Russian forces occupying the southern regions of Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts". Mellk (talk) 04:36, 14 November 2022 (UTC)
 * The longer time goes on without any new territorial changes, the more I feel this offensive should be marked as over.  Physeters ✉ 19:31, 21 November 2022 (UTC)

“This offensive started with a clear goal. That goal, to recapture Kherson and liberate the entirety of the Right Bank of the Dnieper, has been achieved in full.”

Do you have a source for this “clear goal”? The lead of the article claims otherwise, that the goal was wider than just Right Bank Dnieper and Kherson. Perhaps it should be a partial Ukrainian victory, if such things are allowed?

Also, given the speculation around Russia potentially launching a Mariupol-style campaign against Kherson now, I would say it’s too early to claim “it’s over”. YantarCoast (talk) 05:16, 14 November 2022 (UTC)

If you read the source cited for the “original goals” in the lead, it doesn’t mention Mykolaiv or Zaporizhzhia. Additionally, it talks of a goal— the successful offensive towards Kherson, which has been accomplished. There was no real talk in the information space about Zaporizhzhia, just hopeful speculation, similar to how Ukraine talks of reclaiming all their Donbas territory. The thing that sets this apart is from the outset you had Ukrainian officials setting the information conditions for an offensive towards Kherson specifically, the goals of which have now been fulfilled. PilotSheng (talk) 06:38, 14 November 2022 (UTC)
 * You need to actually provide sources for your claim that the offensive started with a clear goal. That goal, to recapture Kherson and liberate the entirety of the Right Bank of the Dnieper, has been achieved in full. Because the first sentence and the body contradict this. The sourcing nor the rest of the article does not say anything about only reaching the Dnieper as being the goal. The source you added for the goal being reached does not say anything about this. The sources in the infobox are also about the retreat and celebrations. So can you please quote a source that explicitly supports the statement that the recapture of Kherson meant achieving the goal of the southern counteroffensive? Otherwise please self-revert because this looks like WP:OR. Mellk (talk) 01:17, 15 November 2022 (UTC)
 * "Having repeatedly announced plans for a counterattack on Kherson, it seems that today the Ukrainian army has begun implementing orders to liberate the South of Ukraine from Russian occupiers." Strange I can't find anything about the goal always being to recapture only the right-bank specifically. Mellk (talk) 01:24, 15 November 2022 (UTC)

And if Russia were to launch an offensive against Kherson, the subject of this article (the Ukrainian counteroffensive) would be over because the Russians would have started a counterattack of their own, and Ukraine would thus be on the defensive, not the offensive. Regardless of how you see it, there are no more major territorial changes happening. The only thing I can possibly think of is the retaking of the small occupied peninsula, but waiting for that that (which in itself doesnt constitute much of a territorial change) could take months, which doesn’t make sense especially when compared to the scale and pace of the operations Aug.29 to Nov.11. PilotSheng (talk) 06:44, 14 November 2022 (UTC)


 * Ukraine has recently done an amphibious assault on Kinburn Peninsula, south of the Dnipro. The southern counteroffensive continues. Though, I am not opposed to a split if this article gets too large when Ukraine liberates southern Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. But that is a future discussion. Super   Ψ   Dro  14:22, 14 November 2022 (UTC)
 * Apparently the alleged amphibious assault on the peninsula was untrue (confirmed to have not happened). For now, I agree with the closure of this offensive article as a Ukrainian victory. If a new military operation starts we will open a new article. EkoGraf (talk) 17:06, 14 November 2022 (UTC)
 * I've seen the opposite. There are reports that Ukraine reached Hola Prystan from Kinburn Peninsula. Time will ultimately tell, but if there has indeed been a renewed Ukrainian offensive on the south one or two days after the liberation of Kherson, I don't think we should count them as separate operations, for now. Super   Ψ   Dro  20:45, 14 November 2022 (UTC)
 * I agree with Super Ψ Dro. There have been some additional unconfirmed reports of river crossings and potential areas recaptured. If these are confirmed so soon after the capture of Kherson city it would seem to be part of the same campaign. BogLogs (talk) 07:59, 15 November 2022 (UTC)
 * These reports are ultimately unconfirmed. I agree, if Ukrainian units are confirmed to have established a beachhead on the left bank of the Dnipro, then we should continue adding to this article.
 * Euromaidan Press has said these reports are unconfirmed, and Critical Threats (which is an extension of the ISW) observed here that Ukrainian forces launched artillery strikes against Russian concentrations on the Kinburn Peninsula and Hola Prystan, indicating that Russia still retains control over the territory. PilotSheng (talk) 18:53, 16 November 2022 (UTC)

Since PilotSheng has not provided any sources that directly support the claims (hence there does not seem to be consensus), I will revert them later if he does not respond with sources that explicitly support the claims (without OR). Mellk (talk) 18:14, 16 November 2022 (UTC)


 * Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) -- "Moreover, the Kherson offensive should be seen as limited in its objectives. The conduct of a broader offensive to liberate occupied oblasts east of the Dnipro is a separate question to operations against Kherson"
 * Institute for the Study of War -- "Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives, so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine." (ISW assesses that the current counteroffensive has achieved its goals and has stopped.)
 * Al Jazeera -- "The ultimate goal of the counterattack is to retake the strategic city of Kherson, with a population of about 300,000, from the Russians – the first significant urban centre to fall after the invasion on February 24."
 * CNN -- "Ukrainian forces are making gains in the south, with the ambitious goal of taking back most of the Russian-occupied region of Kherson by the end of the year, senior US officials and Ukrainian officials tell CNN... According to Ukrainian officials, the goal is to take at least all territory north or west of the Dnipro River" (This has been achieved)
 * Politico -- "For two months, Ukraine has been signaling its intent to recapture the southern city of Kherson in what has been billed as a major counteroffensive and the moment that Kyiv turns the tide against Russia."
 * All five of these sources are well-used, reliable Western media sources. @Mellk PilotSheng (talk) 18:46, 16 November 2022 (UTC)
 * @Mellk At the very least, the protracted pseudo-state of fighting in Kherson right now should not be seen as a continuation of the current counteroffensive. There has been no fighting at all or very little fighting at most in the week since Ukraine liberated Kherson.
 * If Ukrainian forces decide to attack Russian forces on the left bank of the Dnipro, that should be a separate article. This current counteroffensive is over. PilotSheng (talk) 18:50, 16 November 2022 (UTC)

Syrians?
Are we really going to use gossip from SOHR as a source for alleged Syrian casualties? There has been literally no proof (in other words, zero, "0," nada) of Syrian mercenaries being deployed to fight with Russia, besides from anonymous claims from government officials. There have been no images, no POWs, no videos, nothing. In fact, there are images that have been circulated with pro-FSA Syrians fighting with the Ukrainians!... but I don't care because I have not seen a reliable source verifying that image. Thus, same attitude should be held with pro-gov Syrian mercenaries. SOHR isn't the most reliable source anyways to be reporting on this. Unless genuine evidence pops up to make this claim (which is what this is and nothing more) true, there shouldn't be mention of proof-free Syrian casualties. 2601:85:C101:C9D0:D047:D125:399E:36D7 (talk) 01:06, 17 October 2022 (UTC)


 * SOHR is generally accepted, but since it doesn't explicitly say the 25th is fighting as a coherent unit in Ukraine (as opposed to members of the 25th having been deployed there), I'm supporting removing it from the infobox. Lightspecs (talk) 03:57, 17 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Actually, SOHR does say that the Syrians are fighting as a unit: "Russian-backed 25th Division forces fight alongside Russian forces in their battles in Donetsk, and southern front in Kherson [...] hundreds of the division’s members, who have been in Ukraine for months, started participating in the fighting operations led by Russia against Ukraine". In all honesty, this sounds more like a hired expeditionary force instead of just Wagner mercs. An early report by SOHR also claimed that the Tiger Forces seemed, at the time, to be training as a coherent unit to prepare to move to Ukraine. Applodion (talk) 10:07, 17 October 2022 (UTC)
 * I know SOHR is generally accepted, but you do understand that these are just alleged claims, right? With no proof? SOHR also alleged in 2021 that Shia militants were going to commit a genocide in Daraa after regime shelling there, allegedly preparing with swords at the city's entrance: it didn't happen. Their reports should be taken with a grain of salt, especially since the claims of regime involvement in Ukraine have been circulating since March with no photographic or video proof to substantiate anything. At any rate, the infobox now only has Syrian gov troops as alleged in the infobox. I didn't make the edit, but considering Wikipedia I think it is a fair compromise and I'm dropping the issue. 128.6.36.74 (talk) 20:19, 19 October 2022 (UTC)
 * As I understand it, the training of Tiger Forces at Russian bases in Syria for possible deployment to Ukraine was filmed. I also agree that SOHR is definitely a partisan source, but they have been correct more often than not, and they do possess a network of informants in Syria. In the end, we will probably only understand the extent of Syrian involvement in Ukraine in the future, when accounts of veterans as well as relevant documents surface. Anyway, I have added "per SOHR" next to Syria and the Tiger Forces in the infobox to clarify the origin of the claim. Applodion (talk) 12:15, 20 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Can you please provide a source of the training film? And, of course, can the video be verified that the training is explicitly for Ukrainian operations? Same IP as above. Because all I'm getting is rumors of possibly verified conjectures about supposed actions, which amounts to nothing, really. 2601:85:C101:C9D0:2068:4A94:EEC2:FDEB (talk) 00:26, 24 October 2022 (UTC)
 * I personally support the removal of the "Syria" mention, specifically if the only source used is SOHR.
 * Despite what many people believe SOHR is not a reliable source on Syrian matters. It frequently make up news, cites even less unreliable and biased websites and often use zero evidence to back its claims.
 * There is, so far, no evidence on any deployment of Syrian units in Ukraine. When Syrian mercenaries from SAA, SAA-allied militias or SNA forces, got deployed abroad immediately a lot of evidence came up online: photos on plane, photos at the frontline or in the country of destination, ID of killed fighters, corpses etc. etc.
 * This is not the case, most likely because they are not there.
 * Hence the it should be removed. 22Chev22 (talk) 14:52, 10 November 2022 (UTC)


 * Comment The representation in the infobox of Syria as a cobelligerent on the side of Russia here has been used to justify the same at 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine‎. There have been many reports of nationals from various countries on both sides, including units of volunteers and mercenaries of a particular nationality.  This is not the same as a unit of a nation's military forces engaging in hostilities.  To make such a claim of a nation being a cobelligerent is a WP:EXCEPTIONAL claim that would require an exceptional source or a clear consensus in good quality reliable sources. This report by SOHR on 4 October 22 is being cited to justify this claim.  I have read the article and, apart from reporting the deaths of five Syrian nationals, in its fullness, it is vague, ambiguous and even contradictory.  While SOHR might be a WP:RS, this report falls well short of being WP:EXCEPTIONAL.  Furthermore, the same source has been used to justify inclusion in the infobox of the 25th Special Mission Forces Division as a participating unit and as such, that the unit has been deployed complete. Now a brigade sized formation defending the Dnieper is pretty hard not to see - a bit like an iceberg unless your blind or the Titanic.  There appears to be a lot of journalistic licence in this report and I wouldn't be placing my left testicle in jeopardy on the basis of this report alone. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:49, 29 November 2022 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 3 December 2022
In the sentence "These referendums were held from 23-27 September[47], with Russia officially annexing Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts about a week later later on 5 October" (subsection 1.1.2 Annexation), please remove one instance of "later". This is a simple mistake. Thank you for fixing it. 2A02:AB04:2C2:E300:F9A5:8D3B:1FC9:94E5 (talk) 10:09, 3 December 2022 (UTC)
 * ✅ DigitalChutney (talk) 18:31, 3 December 2022 (UTC)

Liberated territory on the left-bank
Ukraine has liberated a small part of territory on the left-bank of the Dnipro, so I think a section should be added for December and content about this be written for it.

Sources: 🍁 DinoSoupCanada 🍁 (talk) 01:04, 5 December 2022 (UTC)