Talk:2022 Transnistria attacks

Context
@User:Dunutubble As a part of you [|edit] you removed two sentences I added before, mentioning just a week before these attacks Russian commanders of high rank mentioned their plans to conquer the land corridor to Transnistria as a part of their war with Ukraine. I believe this was also followed by some diplomatic back and forth between Russia and Moldova, who wasn't happy with such claims. I wonder your motivation to remove it, and whether you have strong feelings against adding it back? I believe, this is an important and relevant context for the understanding of the incident. The current version of the article kind of mentions the conquest of the land corridor, but says it comes from Ukraine, and without mentioning of the official Russian claims it IMHO kind of downplays the distinct possibility of Russian involvment into this. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Birdofpreyru (talk • contribs) 22:19, 26 April 2022 (UTC)

'Ukraine - alleged'
I don’t think this should be placed in the info box if it is only 'alleged' but I'm not sure how to change it! I've seen several reports saying it was probably the Russians but there isn't really any sense of who is responsible given nobody has claimed responsibility for it yet. Fourdots2 (talk) 23:08, 26 April 2022 (UTC)


 * +1. Your edit looks good to me. Though, I seriously believe it was a Russian false flag attack, so probably Russia should be on the same side as Transnistria, and Moldova and Ukraine on the other side. Birdofpreyru (talk) 23:27, 26 April 2022 (UTC)
 * I removed Ukraine and Moldova from the infobox, as those claims were based only on Russian state media. We don't know enough about who did this to indicate a perpetrator in the infobox, which is only intended as a summary of the article. ― Tartan357  Talk 04:26, 27 April 2022 (UTC)
 * How is this a Russian false flag? Because the Ukrainians claim it to be so? The Transnistrians themselves claim the attacks came from Ukraine. Does Wikipedia only repeat Ukrainian allegations from now on verbatim? 2601:85:C101:C9D0:E8A9:6048:3E0E:68D2 (talk) 20:28, 27 April 2022 (UTC)
 * Without any recent tensions in the Transnistria these attacks come handy about a week after high-ranking Russian officials make statements about a menance to Trasnistria, and the modus operandi is similar to what was happening two months earlier in Donbas / Lugansk republics (Russian claims > Handy explosions in the region > Russia invades Urkaine). Added to this is a great strategic position of Transnistria in the context of Russian's Southern Ukraine operation: these attacks give a great excuse to send Russian military reinforcement to "protect Transnistria", and use them to open the second front for the invasion into the Southern Ukraine. Without any claims, it is the apparent most likely scenario and explanation of these incidents, which cannot be discarded unless solid proofs for other version appear.
 * By the way, as the "false flag" hypothesis does not have serious evidences in reliable sources at the moment, it is never mentioned in the article itself. I said "false flag" in the talk page because it is my current personal opinion, and at the moment I am just watching that any reliably sourced context relevant to this version is not missing from the article.Birdofpreyru (talk) 20:51, 27 April 2022 (UTC)
 * To be honest, there's quite a lot missing from the page, such as that there were already many allegations from Ukraine that Russia would eventually attempt a false-flag operation here, or the grenade launcher type thing I said below, or that a video was released about the attack on the ministry of affairs' building, or many other reactions (Maia Sandu saying Moldova basically doesn't have an army, Arestovych saying Ukraine can destroy Transnistria if allowed to by Moldova, Peskov calling this "provocative", reactions from countries like Germany...). Super   Ψ   Dro  22:08, 27 April 2022 (UTC)
 * We aren't toddlers. I think most of us already have in mind how does Russia act. There were also news reports about helicopter attacks in the border between Belarus and Ukraine to bring Belarus to the war . This isn't anything new. Not for saying that the grenade launcher that was used to attack Transnistria's ministry of interior is a weapon only used by Russia, Transnistria, Jordan and Gabon . There's no problem with calling a spade a spade. As shocking as it may sound, chances are that Jordan and Gabon are not the ones who attacked the building. Super   Ψ   Dro  22:04, 27 April 2022 (UTC)
 * Literally all powerful countries are deceptive, including the US and China, among others. You might want to revisit your first sentence. 2601:85:C101:C9D0:714C:DAD1:3509:1767 (talk) 02:01, 29 April 2022 (UTC)
 * Oh, and it just so happens that the grenade launcher was formerly operated by Ukraine, just as Tochka-U was "formerly" used by Russia. As shocking as it may sound, chances you are speaking with authority when quite simply you (and I) aren't fully informed on the situation. So I guess it is easy to dismiss anything that puts Ukraine in a bad light as "Russian disinformation or false-flag." Very, very easy excuse. I see nothing will be changed on this page, so I will drop the issue. 2601:85:C101:C9D0:714C:DAD1:3509:1767 (talk) 02:09, 29 April 2022 (UTC) 2601:85:C101:C9D0:714C:DAD1:3509:1767 (talk) 02:09, 29 April 2022 (UTC)
 * If RS widely confirm who did it, then it will be reflected as such. Opinions about who is behind it is irrelevant. So yes you are right in that we do not know for sure. Mellk (talk) 15:39, 29 April 2022 (UTC)
 * What I implied is not that we should state that Russia is to blame for the attacks, we should wait until sources refer to this undoubtedly; but that we don't blame anyone else, because it's clear this isn't the case. What does Ukraine have to gain from shooting a few fires in Transnistria? When it could do much more harm more rapidly and without letting them prepare. It is obvious opinions should not be reflected on the content of our Wikipedia, but we should make use of logic when editing. Super   Ψ   Dro  16:21, 29 April 2022 (UTC)
 * Yes, it should be left as "unknown", but we shouldn't always assume someone is acting rationally. Mellk (talk) 21:20, 29 April 2022 (UTC)

Hi, can the Transnistrian president's telegram page be used as a source? I might do some more edits to the page and add information about for example the strange rumours in Transnistria about referendums etc which both sides have denied. Fourdots2 (talk) 23:48, 29 April 2022 (UTC)
 * I would expect such information to have also been released in state-owned Novosti Pridnestroviye . You could look for it there. Super   Ψ   Dro  07:46, 30 April 2022 (UTC)

Thanks:) Fourdots2 (talk) 23:57, 30 April 2022 (UTC)

Transnistria War?
I think we shouldn't think of this attacks as being part of the Transnistria war, not yet. We don't know yet who carried out the attack, and there are suspicions that either Ukraine or Russia could have carried it out. Not Moldova, who is the co-belligerent in this war.Magnetizedlion27 (talk) 02:02, 27 April 2022 (UTC)
 * Any political attack in Transnistria is part of the broader Transnistria conflict. What was inappropriate was indicating Moldova and Ukraine as perpetrators in the infobox based on Russian state media, which I've reverted. ― Tartan357  Talk 04:25, 27 April 2022 (UTC)
 * The Transnistria War ended in 1992. If war erupted again between Moldova and Transnistria, it'd be a new war. Super   Ψ   Dro  13:06, 27 April 2022 (UTC)
 * Correct, which is why Transnistria conflict (which refers to the frozen conflict) is linked, instead of Transnistria War. ― Tartan357  Talk 00:11, 28 April 2022 (UTC)

Perpetrators
So this article has changed the status of perpetrators from "Ukraine - alleged" to "Unknown" and now "possibly Russian false flag?" Why are allegations from belligerent nations being repeated verbatim? The Transnistrians themselves claim that the drones from the drone attack came from Ukraine, implying Ukrainian involvement (unless you're willing to claim that the Russians launched a drone from Odessa, which, judging from their performance in this war so far, is a ludicrous hypothesis). I'm not claiming that Ukraine should be listed as an alleged perpetrator, but neither should Russia or Transnistria. Both sides allege the other, and the most logical thing to do at this point is to simply put "Unknown" back. Any speculation about prior motives is just that, speculation. One could say that the Russians want a war in Transnistria (though I don't see how opening up a second front with undermanned troops will achieve anything), or that Ukraine wants to seize a large ammo depot in Transnistria and is creating the pretext for that through propaganda (again, rather odd as that would be diverting troops from the badly clobbered eastern front). But again, speculation is just speculation and the perpetrator is, for all intents and purposes, unknown, and should be labelled as such. 2601:85:C101:C9D0:C9CC:C371:A389:F64C (talk) 21:12, 4 May 2022 (UTC)
 * The article does keep the "Unknown" part. However, reliable sources have been talking about the possibility of this having been a false flag attack. The claim is backed by four sources right now. It seems that nobody is buying the "Ukraine did it" part. Russia has played that card a lot of times already, including a particularly shameful accussation that they did the Kramatorsk railway station attack even though Russia had said they hit the city before finding out civilians were killed. I am not surprised sources are not believing it, Russia's credibility is practically non-existent anymore. I also did not hear anything about Ukraine potentially wanting to control the weapons depot in sources, why would it? The weapons are outdated and can't be used, and them exploding could be far more problematic for it than anything else Transnistria could do with it. Russia could at least use Transnistria to attack Odesa. By the way, Russian drones have passed completely through Ukraine and ended up in Croatia before . It's not impossible that Russia sent them through Ukraine, although I'd rather believe they were from drones Transnistria held before. As you said, this is speculation, but that Transnistria is not connected to Russia shouldn't be an argument against blaming Russia for this. Anyway, the "Unknown" part is kept, Transnistria and Russia are said to be blamed only as a possibility, and sources analyzing the explosions have given way more attention to the claim that it was a false flag by Russia and Transnistria than to the claim that it was a Ukrainian attack over Transnistria, so I think the accusation here is WP:DUE. Super   Ψ   Dro  21:32, 4 May 2022 (UTC)
 * Agree with the above. The speculation about a Russian or Transnistrian false flag is being commonly made by reliable sources themselves. It's more than a claim passed on from Ukraine. It's common enough in RS that it is due for the infobox. No reliable source has ever suggested Ukrainian or Moldovan responsibility. ― Tartan357  Talk 03:36, 6 May 2022 (UTC)
 * "Russia had said they hit the city:" what do you mean by "Russia?" The government, the people, which one? I still have not found any actual proof that is true. Posts from pro-government social media channels run by private citizens cannot be interpreted as direct statements from the government. And the only actual, official Russian government statement regarding missile strikes at the time did not mention Kramatorsk. How that got spun into "Russia said they hit city then retracted claim," is truly wonderous. But I digress.
 * You did not hear anything about Ukraine and the depot because the RS used here, unfortunately, have a vested (moralistic?) interest in obfuscating anything which portrays Ukraine negatively. I can provide several quotes from Ukrainian officials who stated their intention/desire to acquire said depot, if only to open a second front. How much of that is Ukrainian domestic wartime fibble-fabble is unknown to me, but the statements do exist.
 * And, also, why do you think it is plausible that the Russian Armed Forces, whose troops are overstretched, outnumbered, and engaged in heavy, attritional combat, are willing to open up a second front with a low amount of ill-equipped peacekeeping troops which they can have no hope of supporting in any way, while, at the same time, you think it is impossible that Ukraine forces, with superior numbers due to mobilization, would seek to acquire large quantities of Soviet ammo (outdated?) in order to replenish their stocks, which have been hammered in said attritional warfare? I find this view baffling, perhaps because I do not hold any nation as particularly dishonest, they are all the same in the final analysis. If anything this war has shown just how much crude disinformation the Russian media (cruiser was not hit by missile, Kiev "feint"), Ukrainian media (Ghost of Kiev, Snake Island martyrs), and the Western press (Azov are not really neo-Nazis) are willing to peddle in order to establish their own narrative.
 * Forgive me for the wall of text, but all I'm saying is there no convincing reason, especially in the thick of war, to begin even hinting at attribution, especially when claims used for said attribution come from biased Russian media, biased Ukrainian media, and Western sources whose speculation rests heavily on Ukrainian sources, "Unknown" is just a simple resolution to this issue. If you remain unconvinced, I'll drop the matter. 2601:85:C101:C9D0:18B0:8617:5698:4F09 (talk) 20:44, 6 May 2022 (UTC)