Talk:Aerial warfare during Operation Barbarossa

Passing thoughts
Maybe there's no way to fix it, but I find the intro a bit abrupt... It seems to be jumping into the subject more quickly than I normally expect for WP. (Yeah, normally WP goes pretty gingerly...) Just FYI. TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  09:19, 11 June 2011 (UTC)

Corrections needed to " Axis and Soviet air operations during Operation Barbarossa"
2 corrections that I believe need to be made to the atricle below article on Axis & Soviet Air Operations during Operation Barbarossa -

they are ................

1/ See below in CAPITALS ..... PRINCIPLE ENEMY ... should read " principal enemy."

2/ See below in CAPITALS .....

1 APRIL 1947 appears to be a typo - I am positive that Hitler & the Nazi High Command were not expecting to be still fighting in April 1947 ?

I would suggest that it probably should read "1 April 1942." Can someone please action these corrections- I am not sure how to do it.

AXIS AND SOVIET AIR OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION BARBAROSSA

Supporting industry Main article: German aircraft production during World War II

There was no marked increase in German production in the autumn, 1940, in preparation for this major campaign. On 15 October, General Tschersich, the Luftwaffe’s chief of procurement, was basing aircraft replacement on the assumption peace with Britain would be secured, and there would be no further military operations until 1 APRIL 1947. Either the procurement officers of the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Air Force High Command or OKL) were unaware of Hitler’s intentions, or they did not take him seriously.[21]

Erhard Milch, responsible for production, warned the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German High Command or OKW) that the Soviet Union could not be defeated in 1941. He called for winter preparations and increases in production in the expectation the war in the East, even if successful, would last several years.[22] Joseph Schmid, senior intelligence officer and Otto Hoffmann von Waldau, Luftwaffe chief of operations, were also opposed to Barbarossa. Schmid still felt the Luftwaffe could defeat Britain by attacking its industries, while Waldau argued that dissipating German air strength along a wide ‘air front’ was deeply irresponsible.[23] Waldau's continuing realism and non-concealed criticism of the Luftwaffe leadership and its prosecution of the war, led him to being removed from his post in 1942.[24] Milch’s skepticism soon became despair. He convinced himself a war in the East would be a disaster, and did everything he could to influence Göring to persuade Hitler not go ahead with Barbarossa. Initially, Göring kept his word, and argued that pursuing a strategy in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, particularly in conjunction with the Regia Marina (Italian Navy) against Gibraltar, while weakening the British hold on the eastern Mediterranean would be the most ideal strategy. Hitler dismissed this. Hitler also dismissed the Kriegsmarine’s objections that it was the British and their shipping lanes that was the PRINCIPAL ENEMY.[25][26] Brikennz (talk • contribs) 02:10, 11 November 2012 (UTC)


 * No error. It says 1947 in the source. Dapi89 (talk) 18:05, 8 October 2013 (UTC)

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No part of JG52 ever fought under command of Luftflotte 5. Nor could JG54 be under command of both Luftflotte 1 and 2. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.216.252.42 (talk) 07:47, 21 June 2017 (UTC)