Talk:Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia

assassination of Kraljević
The text currently says:


 * On 9 August, under Croatian government order,[26] Kraljević and eight of his staff were assassinated by HVO soldiers [...]

The 26th reference in turn says:


 * In August 1992, Zagreb arranged through the HVO for the ambush and assassination of Blaz Kraljevic, commander of Hrvatske Odbrambene Snage (the 'Croatian Defence Forces', HOS)

The source transcription of Croatian is shoddy (it's Obrambene), and the sentence is internally unreferenced in the book, so coupled with the fact that the linked articles don't make any such far-reaching claims, the implication that it was the Croatian government that expressly ordered the hit fails WP:EXCEPTIONAL. --Joy &#91;shallot&#93; (talk) 15:37, 14 April 2013 (UTC)
 * Some people say "odbrambene" others "obrambene" while elsewhere some people say "color" others "colour" so let's not get into that. What about adding "suspected" or "alleged"? -- ◅ PRODUCER  ( TALK ) 01:26, 15 April 2013 (UTC)


 * No, this is a proper name we're talking about, not a random word. Adding weasel words won't fix this - just find a better source that describes the situation in more detail, preferably qualifying who exactly ordered it. Indeed, even that is a problem - "Zagreb" is a very broad term. --Joy &#91;shallot&#93; (talk) 08:53, 15 April 2013 (UTC)


 * The October 22 NYT article says "in August, these accounts say, Croatia arranged for Croatian Defense Council troops to ambush and assassinate Blaz Kraljevic." I think my proposal is a good one. -- ◅ PRODUCER  ( TALK ) 11:30, 15 April 2013 (UTC)


 * These accounts would be According to Bosnian officials from the previous paragraph? That's also pretty much hearsay, a primary source at best. Note that the same article clearly says Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian president, ordered Croatian forces under the control of the Bosnian wing of Croatia's governing party to pull out of Bosanski Brod earlier in the text, so the claim is subpar internally even. Surely someone somewhere investigated this in a less sloppy manner and published a secondary source that discusses it? --Joy &#91;shallot&#93; (talk) 14:16, 15 April 2013 (UTC)


 * I'm not going to evaluate primary sources myself nor am I going to try to predict what knowledge the officials had. At a minimum it should be noted that Bosnian officials thought that Tudjman's government was involved. I'll see what more I can find on the incident. -- ◅ PRODUCER  ( TALK ) 18:19, 15 April 2013 (UTC)


 * That's just what I meant - the NYT article didn't evaluate those sources, it just reported on them. It inherently lends a bit of credibility to them by reporting them at all, but not much, it's still a primary source itself. Please do rephrase that until better sources are found. --Joy &#91;shallot&#93; (talk) 09:06, 16 April 2013 (UTC)


 * Done. -- ◅ PRODUCER  ( TALK ) 06:34, 17 April 2013 (UTC)

Bosanski Brod
Hoare's assertion that Bosanski Brod was surrendered without any struggle on 8 Oct (p.128, used as ref) seems quite off. For instance, Balkan Battlegrounds pp 145-146 contain a brief description of fighting in the area in June-October 1992, and a specific attack on the Bosanski Brod bridgehead starting on 27 September. The BB source also proposes a possible deal on abandoning of the town by the HV/HVO in favour of the VRS, but bases the proposition on HV/HVO success in orderly withdrawal of troops and equipment which looked "suspiciously like a prepared or planned withdrawal, either because Zagreb had already concluded the enclave was untenable or as a part of a deal."--Tomobe03 (talk) 08:16, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

On a further note, Hoare is off by two days as well regarding VRS capture or HV/HVO pullout from the town. The BB p.146 identifies the day when the VRS took the town was 6 October. This date is supported by General Stipetić here. He claims the town was abandoned on the night of 5/6 October by elements of the HV 108th brigade and the elements of the HVO 101st and the 103rd brigades. He further claims that the town was largely deserted on most of 6 October, until VRS entered it that evening. In conclusion, Stipetić dismisses any quid pro quo re Dubrovnik specifically, but indicates hopes of bartering elsewhere (explicitly mentioning securing Novi Travnik and Busovača, both conspicuously close to Jajce where HVO signed a ceasefire on 9 October, with supply of electricity thrown into the deal), while implicating Slavonski Brod defence commanders in pullout of the 108th bde.--Tomobe03 (talk) 10:37, 16 April 2013 (UTC)


 * What do you recommend? -- ◅ PRODUCER  ( TALK ) 06:34, 17 April 2013 (UTC)


 * As far as date is concerned, Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building And Legitimation, 1918-2005, p.433 also supports 6 October, so I'd say Hoare is definitely mistaken there and that need be changed.


 * As far as any deals, whether actual or percieved, are concerned, I think it is 1) significant that the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities (Izetbegović, presumably) perceived Bosanski Brod pullout as a sellout and this should be noted by the article as it is significant for the article topic in terms of failure of the agreement, 2) significant that the perception of the deal is largely based on orderly withdrawal of the HV/HVO as described in the Balkan Battlegrounds and that should be noted by the article, 3) significant that Croatian political leadership withheld permission for Stipetić (HV commander in Slavonia in 1992) to conduct offensive operations in the are aimed at cutting the corridor, the second such a request leading to his removal from the command post. I would not like to introduce too much detail from Stipetić's account in this particular article, as the exact timeline would probably be better used elsewhere per summary style. Furthermore, the denial of authority to attack is significant politically for the international relations of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina - it is however hard to tell why was the authority withheld (as per Balkan Battlegrounds quote above). Finally, i think it is 4) significant to note that sources disagree what exactly was supposed to be done in return for surrender of Bosanski Brod - Dubrovnik, security in Jajce area, whatnot. Burg p.198 speaks of "speculation" and Bethlehem&Veller p.xxxix of "rumors" of the link. Perhaps the most fortunate formulation would be to report those as such in the article. In that vein, the Burns NYT article of 11 October is misused in the article as it does not support the claim that the deal did in fact take place, but that the situation was perceived as such (as summarized in the report title in "hints at a ... deal").


 * In my personal opinion the Dubrovnik (Prevlaka) area being involved in the bartering here seems fairly implausible as the VRS and the HV both raced to fill in vacuum left over by Yugoslav Army pullout from Konavle. It should be noted that the Yugoslav army withdrawal from Konavle was requested by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 779 of 6 October. Given the fact that such resolutions are normally prepared in advance, following hostilities between the VRS and the HV in the area after the pullout (especially 20-31 October) and no direct supporting evidence of the link to any such deal, I find the Dubrovnik "theory" quite implausible. I'm not so sure if the article should dwell on the Tuđman-Ćosić agreement on pullout and the UNSCR 779 though.--Tomobe03 (talk) 10:46, 17 April 2013 (UTC)


 * In a side note, p.147 of the Balkan Battlegrounds takes note of 21 October exchange of gunfire between HVO and ARBiH along a supply route to Jajce, and VRS seizing on the thus weakened defence of Jajce to renew its push towards the town (suspended on 9 October through a ceasefire agreed with Bosnian Croat authorities) on 25 October, capturing Jajce four days later. I'm not sure if you need the extra information, but just thought to let you know.--Tomobe03 (talk) 10:55, 17 April 2013 (UTC)


 * I'll look into this in detail next week when I get the time. I have to note the official report largely pins the withdrawal on Susak while Tudjman's role unclear in Magas it says Susak "played a key role in this outcome by issuing instructions to the lower-level commanders that bypassed the HV high command, by spreading defeatism among the HV soldiers and the Croat population, and by preventing the local civilian authorities from organising an effective resistance alone or in collaboration with the Bosniaks. Although the Bosnian Posavina was defensible from a purely military point of view, the HV units and the units of the local Croat Defence Council (HVO) withdrew from the area in disarray in September 1992." I have to note the Dubrovnik quid pro quo agreement is also mentioned in Silber and Little and in regards to the misuse of Burns the term "apparent" is key in the article's sentence. -- ◅ PRODUCER  ( TALK ) 05:03, 18 April 2013 (UTC)


 * Re Šušak and bypassing the chain of command, Stipetić adds to that really. He explicitly says that reinforcements were effectively denied by Šušak's order that only volunteers were allowed south across Sava, and blames Slavonski Brod city defence command explicitly for issuing orders contrary to his own - and they were supposedly subordinated to him as the commander of defence in Slavonia. He does not say specifically that the Slavonski Brod command post received instruction from Šušak though (although that is inferred by the text). Re defensibility of the bridgehead, the Balkan Battleground analysis says that the VRS started a direct attack on Bosanski Brod on 27 September but that the defences held until 4 October when the VRS reoriented its attack axis and broke through the defences. In essence, any piece of territory is militarily defensible, it is only a matter of how bad one wants to hold onto it and if resources to do so are available. The opposite is also perfectly true - any piece of territory can be captured, and the same two conditions apply. Ipso facto I think that Magaš statement about defensibility adds nothing if it does not say "it was defensible and the resources were there, but no will to do so". True, Silber and Little say it's quid pro quo, but I seems to me that most sources speak of suspicions or rumors of a deal. I think you are unfairly dismissing those per WP:DUE and presenting a deal as a definite thing with zero evidence to show for it. For all one knows those events could be coincidental, but they are sure suspicious. Let me put it this way, there was talk after the Operation Flash that the territory was exchanged in a deal, and when the VRS attacked Orašje later that month everyone was certain that was the part of the deal. And then the Orašje pocket held. The fact is that the deal is inferred and nothing more. It sure is possible and even likely, but nothing more.--Tomobe03 (talk) 09:28, 18 April 2013 (UTC)


 * I don't feel strongly either way. I didn't want to dwell on any one incident too much since that can be focused on in the Croat-Bosniak War article. The quid pro quo agreement should of course be mentioned since reliable sources mention it as a possibility. If you have any suggestions on how to formulate the new sentence I'd love to hear it. -- ◅ PRODUCER  ( TALK ) 18:58, 19 April 2013 (UTC)


 * I agree completely on keeping the focus tight. As far as the qpq is concerned, I'd say something along the lines that "It is suspected that the town was abandoned by the HV/HVO to accommodate JNA withdrawal from Konavle agreed upon by Tuđman and Ćosić and/or securing HVO held territory near Jajce. The impression was reinforced by an orderly withdrawal from Bosanski Brod, and two instances when Croatian political leadership withheld authority to the HV to counter-attack south from Bosanski Brod." The last part of the first sentence could be backed up by the Stipetić interview, and the second sentence by the Balkan Battlegrounds (ahead of the comma) and Stipetić interview (following the comma). For the first part of the first sentence there are ample sources. I would keep the "suspected" because most sources speak of suspicion, rumors, hinting at etc and because Stipetić points to possible deal elsewhere (i.e. not in Dubrovnik area). What do you think?--Tomobe03 (talk) 20:00, 19 April 2013 (UTC)

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Opening paragraph
"Izetbegović, who had hoped to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from falling under the influence of Croatia or Serbia, signed the agreement after Stjepan Kljuić, president of the Croatian Democratic Union's (HDZ) branch in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was replaced by Tuđman with Mate Boban, who blocked the delivery of supplies to Sarajevo where a siege was under way and had proclaimed an independent Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia (HR-HB)."

I think perhaps what would make this clearer is explicit mention of Mate Boban was much more of a Croatian nationalist than Kljuic. In fact, maybe Kljuic wasn't even a Croatian nationalist, at all, as it sounds like he was more simply fighting for Bosnian Croats' interest within Bosnia. And I'm not sure if Croatian nationalist is even the correct term for Mate Boban; perhaps federalists would be a more neutral description. But, whatever their ideologies, I think they should be explicitly mentioned and attached to these names in the opening paragraph to give a clearer picture of why Izetbegovic felt pressured to sign this agreement.--Criticalthinker (talk) 12:06, 25 April 2024 (UTC)