Talk:Air Transat Flight 236

Fly-by-wire has nothing to do with it
I took the liberty to correct the sentence which stated that the Airbus aircraft was fully fly-by-wire, hence it could not be flown without the engines unless it could rely on the ram air turbine. This statement was misleading, as the most important effect of losing  both engines is not the loss of electrical power (there are backup power sources - batteries, or even the APU when there is some fuel left), but the loss of hydraulic power. All modern 100+ passenger aircraft have hydraulicaly powered flight controls, therefore cannot be flown manually when all hydraulic power is lost. Hence the need for a ram air turbine, to provide limited hydraulic pressure and ensure some (although reduced, and all the more reduced as the aircraft flies slowly) controllability.

Mandarine--81.56.83.86 19:20, 4 October 2005 (UTC)


 * I've taken the liberty of reverting your change, pending you supplying a source. The National Geographic program portrayed the issue in terms of the electrically-powered flight control systems and fly-by-wire was a significant differentiating factor when the first Airbus was built, and continues to be so to a lesser degree today. The way you worded it is to ignore the issue of fly-by-wire and its total dependence on electrical power completely. --Icd 00:06, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

22:59, 20 September 2006 (UTC) Mandarine's revised text is very accurate and preferable to the previous/current. Take care with terminology. "Fly-by-Wire" refers to the electrical command of systems and is low in power consumption, (being based on 28V DC for the A330). For the A330, it is coupled with hydraulics to provide the "muscle" or "power assistance". Large modern aircraft are too large for pilot input to be transferred direct to the control surfaces, hence the need for assistance.

Mechanical command,no assistance required. Mechanical command, hydraulic assist Electrical command, hydraulic assist Electrical command, electrical assist.

Since the electrical command system is a (relatively) low power consumer, in emergency it can be powered by dedicated batteries, thus no reliance on engines or fuel. Regarding the comment about "loss of landing gear brakes", I consider this mis-leading. An hydraulic accumulator dedicated to the brake system, is sized to perform a complete braking action (and is sized to consider the normal leakage of pressure during the period of flight) - this device also provides the pressure to maintain the "handbrake" function, when the aircraft is parked up and without generated power. In this particular incident, wheel brakes made no difference, upon landing. The landing energy was great enough to cause multiple tire burst. With the tire rubber loose on the wheel rim, braking was useless. The photographic evidence clearly show a Circular Segment ground off of one of the main wheels and the tire was utterly destroyed. (I have around a dozen high quality digital photos taken shortly after the landing). (The high landing energy was due to vertical descent velocity, which was also related to forward velocity. Remembering that the pilot had only limited control of the aircraft, the RAT powered only the primary flight controls, so no high-lift surfaces could be deployed. With a single opportunity to land, there was no option for a go-around. Higher forward speed was the pilot's only option for maintaining lift, i.e. controlling vertical descent rate. It can be concluded that the pilot achieved a satisfactory balance between horizontal and vertical speeds,given that the runway was a finite length!)

For the Air Transat aircraft, from the time when it ran out of fuel, the pilot faced the same challenges as for the Gimli Glider, namely no means of assisting the commands. Note: RATs can power either an hydraulic generator or electrical generator, depending on the needs of the aircraft. Whilst many of the current generation commercial aircraft have 3 different hydraulic circuits, new generation a/c have 2 plus an electrical circuit; thus when primary hydraulic power is lost, electrical power is used to control the primary and secondary flight surfaces.

A very early example of the use of current technologies can be found in the late 1940's Bristol Brabazon : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bristol_Brabazon

[User: Aero-Eng] Aero-Eng 22:59, 20 September 2006 (UTC)

From Wikipedia's own ram air turbine article: "A ram air turbine (RAT) is a small propeller and connected generator used as an emergency power source for aircraft. In case of the loss of both primary and auxiliary power sources the RAT will power vital systems (flight controls, linked hydraulics and also flight-critical instrumentation)." [emphasis mine] The issue as far as control goes is not loss of electrical power; it's loss of hydraulic pressure. Even on a fly by wire aircraft, the actual movements of the controls are caused by hydraulics; it's only the commands that are electrical (a notable exception is the A380, which has a backup electrical control system). Without the feeds from the engines, you need something to generate hydraulic pressure, and that's what the RAT does. -Scott Wilson 01:00, 27 December 2005 (UTC)


 * How does the situation the Air Transat flight found itself in compare to an older non fly-by-wire aircraft, e.g. a Boeng 707 which has hydraulic assistance but mechanically linked flight controls? In a no-engine situation, do the controls become completely inoperative, or just very difficult to move? --Icd 00:20, 28 December 2005 (UTC)


 * While this is a bit late, there is a very important fact missing from this discussion. Namely, that the engines themselves will continue to supply adequate hydraulic pressure to power the controls, so long as the airspeed is maintained above some minimum value that is found in the hydraulic systems section of the flight manual for each type/model of airliner.  That is because the engines "windmill" as the plane continues to fly while descending, and the hydraulic pumps connected to each engine will continue to create the necessary hydraulic pressure, above that stated minimum airspeed.  In other words, the engines become giant RATs, once they run out of fuel.  From reading the story of this accident, the pilot kept the airspeed much higher than it would normally be, as part of his calculation of arriving at the proper section of the runway.  If he had chosen to fly much slower, he would have had to try doing additional 360s, so as to dissipate excessive altitude, but that would have been extremely risky, so better to fly a lot faster and land at a very high airspeed, to ensure making it to the runway and still having enough runway left to get the plane stopped, once on the ground.  EditorASC (talk) 23:36, 17 May 2013 (UTC)

Dirk Dejager v. Dick Dejager
I changed the First Officers name from "Dick Dejager" to "Dirk Dejager" but was reverted. I have seen (and enjoyed) the National Geographic documentary on this and the name was definitely "Dirk". For some written references which use "Dirk", I can mention Now, I did notice that Air Transat referred to him as "Dick" Very odd. Sjakkalle (Check!)  08:16, 25 January 2006 (UTC)
 * CTV news reprt
 * CBC news report
 * CNN transcript
 * St. Petersburg Times article
 * Air Transat media centre

Also, a Google Check turns up more on "Dirk Dejager" than "Dick Dejager", and remember that several of the "Dick Dejager" hits are Wikipedia mirrors. Sjakkalle (Check!)  08:18, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

Ah, good. Glad to see some sources being brought to the table. A Google search for "Air Transat Flight 236" bring up Dick several times in the top levels, including a CBC news report, confusingly giving a different name to the link you posted. What I presume is happening is that Dejager uses Dick as a diminutive of Dirk (or possibly vice-versa). I think both should probably be noted in the article (i.e. 'First officer Dirk or Dick Dejager') to prevent this issue from coming up again unless someone has a definitive answer. --Scott Wilson 11:02, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

Thanks, I have done as you suggested and added both names to the article. Sjakkalle (Check!)  12:54, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

Knots (or Nautical Miles) vs. Kilometers (per Hour)
Parts of the article have information in knots (or nautical miles, or even feet), while other parts have meters, kilometers, km/h, etc. Consistency here (such as giving equivalents) would seem to be in order. 169.199.130.146 17:23, 24 May 2007 (UTC)
 * Perhaps air speeds are given in knots, whereas ground speeds are given in km/h ? Icd 00:39, 25 May 2007 (UTC)


 * When the term is applied to the AIRSPEED of the plane, the correct nomenclature is "knots." When the term is applied to some specified distance, "Nautical Miles, Statute Miles or Kilometers should be used.  Ground speed of the plane should still be stated in "knots."  That can, and should be further refined as to WHAT KIND of speed is being discussed:


 * KTAS is "knots true airspeed", the airspeed of an aircraft relative to undisturbed air
 * KIAS is "knots indicated airspeed", the speed shown on an aircraft's pitot-static airspeed indicator
 * KCAS is "knots calibrated airspeed", the indicated airspeed corrected for position error and instrument error
 * KEAS is "knots equivalent airspeed"


 * EditorASC (talk) 00:02, 18 May 2013 (UTC)

Removed reference to "lukewarm response"
This has been tagged since May and no one has come up with a source, so I have removed it. Harry was a white dog with black spots 16:51, 14 July 2007 (UTC)

Removing unfounded assertion related to context of accident
The assertion, “It was discovered that the technician who worked on the engine had reported to his supervisor/manager that there was a problem with the part and that it did not fit properly. The supervisor/manager insisted that the incorrect part be used rather than wait for a new proper part to arrive,” is false and should be removed from the entry. That assertion originates from hearsay reported as fact, without proper verification, by the Toronto Globe and Mail daily newspaper in its September 3, 2001, issue. It is based on declarations allegedly made by a union official employed by another airline, and possibly further distorted. The union official later confirmed he had been misquoted, as reported in the Montreal daily newspaper La Presse of September 6, 2001. On September 5, the Globe and Mail retracted its September 3 piece, in another article relating an entirely different version of the events—which, as it happened, was also largely erroneous. Following representations by Air Transat, a further article summarizing the entire case was published by the Globe and Mail on September 7 ignores the versions published earlier on the 3rd and 5th. It should be noted that in the same timeframe, the New York Times picked up the story that ran in the Globe and Mail on September 3 (with appropriate attribution), which contributed to disseminating an erroneous version of the events (the NYT is quoted as a reference in the Wikipedia entry). From the start, Air Transat has been on record as firmly denying the aforementioned allegation, as early as September 3, 2001, only hours after the initial Globe and Mail story appeared, through such means as a news release and public statements, which were abundantly reported by the media. Air Transat’s position was further vindicated when the investigation report was published in October 2004, providing confirmation that the allegations in the September 3 and 5, 2001, issues of the Globe and Mail were false and groundless. It should also be noted that the initial story relied heavily on assertions that the alleged conversation between the technician and the supervisor had been taped, whereas: 1) the reporter confirmed in conversations with Air Transat (on September 4) that he had had no access to the tape and had no information on its contents, and that the union official had confirmed he had not been in possession of the tape and had not listened to it (in other words, at the time of publication, the reporter was unable to confirm either the tape’s existence or its contents); 2) the union formally backed Air Transat’s version in a press release and in media statements on September 3, all of which were widely reported in the media; 3) the Globe and Mail stated in its September 5 piece that it had been “unable to confirm the existence of the tape claimed to exist by [the union official],” thus confirming that the initial reporting was essentially based on single-source, unverified hearsay. Given that the union official retracted his version of the facts and that the Globe and Mail disavowed its September 3 and 5 versions, and taking into account the results of the investigation, the version of events related in the above-quoted assertion is not only false, but, as of September 7, 2001, had no proponents.

--Michel lemay (talk) 20:59, 15 June 2009 (UTC)
 * The official report confirms your position (pages 48-50). The whole thing was much more complex than given here are in "Mayday", but no interference of superiors is reported. One would wish that stuff was color coded to make mixups more visible to independend inspections ... JB. --84.186.154.31 (talk) 02:03, 24 January 2016 (UTC)

Mayday vs emergency
The following text appears in the article:

At 05:48 UTC, an emergency was declared with Santa Maria Oceanic air traffic control because of fuel shortage. At 06:13 UTC, 28 minutes after the emergency declaration and 135 miles (217 km) from Lajes[3], engine no. 2 on the right wing flamed out, exhausted of jet fuel. Captain Piché then ordered full thrust from engine no. 1 on the left wing, and the plane descended to 33,000 feet (10,000 m), unable to stay at its 39,000 feet (12,000 m) cruising altitude with only one engine operating. At 06:23 UTC, Mayday was declared with Santa Maria Oceanic air traffic control.

However, as fair as I know an emergency is pretty much the same as a mayday. Therefore can anyone confirm it went in this order, or was the first one an urgency (pan pan pan) instead of an emergency (mayday)? --80.101.66.150 (talk) 17:17, 10 May 2010 (UTC)


 * To answer that question ... reading the official findings ... @5:48 UTC the crew informed Santa Maria about the need to divert because of a fuel problem. No official emergency declaration was made at that time. Later, @6:23 UTC it went directly to Mayday ... 3 minutes later they lost the remaining engine and became a glider ... Don't want to think about all this happening an hour ealier and a nightly ditch into the drink. JB. --84.186.154.31 (talk) 01:42, 24 January 2016 (UTC)

Why is this in British English?
Sorry if I've caused confusion with spelling changes, but shouldn't this if anything be in Canadian English? I'm not that fussed so do revert me if you like (but watch out for "beause") - but I don't quite get it, is all. Best wishes DBaK (talk) 15:05, 1 October 2011 (UTC)


 * I added a couple of corrections because the template at the top of this talk page specifies that the article is/was written in British English. Why it was added I don't know.


 * And AFAIK, the term 'aeroplane' is still the current Canadian aeronautical usage, although whether people outside the aviation field in Canada use 'airplane' or not, again I don't know. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.4.57.101 (talk) 10:15, 2 October 2011 (UTC)


 * Yeah, sorry, I jumped in and messed up what you were doing before I realized what was going on. It's a touch baffling. And yes re "aeroplane" but apparently this is a massive can of worms here so I will not be starting on that any time soon! :) DBaK (talk) 20:26, 2 October 2011 (UTC)

Subsequent ADs realted to A330s and A318/319/3202/221s
The aircraft in this incident was an A330 ("The aircraft was an Airbus A330 manufactured in 1999..."), so why is it relevant that "The incident also led to the Directorate General for Civil Aviation (DGAC) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issuing an Airworthiness Directive,[7] forcing all operators of Airbus model A318-100, A319-100, A320-200, A321-100, and A321-200 Series aeroplanes; and Model A320-111 aeroplanes to change the flight manual, stressing that crews should check that any fuel imbalance is not caused by a fuel leak before opening the cross-feed valve."? Shouldn't there be some reference to any ADs related to the A330? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 199.61.25.254 (talk) 20:54, 12 January 2012 (UTC)


 * This is also not clear to me (and was the main reason I came to the Talk page). However, there was an Airworthiness Directive directly related to the Air Transat 236 incident: "The French airworthiness authority DGAC issued Airworthiness Directive 2002-548(B) on November 13, 2002, Fuel Leak Procedure, which is applicable to AIRBUS A-330 aircraft. The AD amends the A-330 FUEL LEAK procedure. This AD became effective on November 23, 2002." Refer to https://lessonslearned.faa.gov/ll_main.cfm?TabID=2&LLID=73&LLTypeID=11. I shall try to somehow correct the relevant article section. Cangelis (talk) 15:58, 6 May 2020 (UTC)

Confusing or unclear section
We still have a tag concerning a "confusing and unclear section". Me not being an aviation expert, the section following that tag is for the most part clear enough and not that confusing. Maybe the only thing that's not obvious for me as a layman is why "the increased fuel flow would cause both the drop in oil temperature, as well as the rise in oil pressure" (but it might be too much of a diversion to explain this in greater detail in the article). All other things, the cross valve procedure, the flame-outs, etc. are IMHO described in a way that anyone can see what is meant. If someone thinks that the section is still confusing to him, I think he or she should specify that. --Proofreader (talk) 11:22, 10 March 2013 (UTC)
 * I agree. I think the tag can be removed. Julianhall (talk) 21:35, 18 March 2013 (UTC)

Number of people on board...
The lede refers to:
 * "...all 306 people (293 passengers and 13 crew) on board".

However the article used as the source states that there were:
 * "...291 passengers and a crew of 13".

Clearly there is something wrong somewhere! I suspect that there were 306 people in total; made up of 291 passengers, 13 crew members (meaning flight attendants), and the two pilots (who are obviously crew too, but someone has become confused?). Can someone who is more knowledgeable about this incident please fix the Wiki article? Unless it is the reference article which is incorrect, in which case it probably should be replaced with a new one? Further down in the article it states that:
 * "...There were 293 passengers and thirteen crew members on board".

So that probably needs fixing too, as does the Infobox... FillsHerTease (talk) 23:24, 14 November 2015 (UTC)


 * The cited source is inaccurate on that detail. The official accident report gives the 306 figure, and I consider that much more reliable. News stories are sometimes slightly off on such matters, even if the broad picture is correct. Sjakkalle (Check!)  20:11, 15 November 2015 (UTC)

Sugarcoating ?
Where the article describes the development of the crisis it sounds as if the crew did everything right ("standard operating procedure"). This description might be based on the "Mayday" movie instead of the findings of the investigation. Now that we have the official findings I don't see how such a representation is sustainable. As can be read there the "standard operating procedure" would have called for the crew to regularily read the ECAM messages which they accessed only once at the beginning of the flight. In those messages they would have been able to read about automatic compensating fuel transfers from the trim tank (a merry 3.5 metric tons) which could have alerted them 20 minutes earlier to the problem, maybe even earlier then that. It is also interesting to read (page 57) that they left the crossfeed open after the right engine flamed out so that fuel from the good left side continued to drain out at the right at up to 10x the rate an engine would normally consumate. Nobody ever closed the crossfeed ... and so on. I'm not out to cruzify anybody, I have no horse in that race, but if Wikipedia is science and not fiction the reality needs to become clear to the reader. Yes, later on, somewhere down the page there is indeed a mention that the report found the crew at fault but at least I believe that this is a location which half the readers might miss and it is also brushed over right away as is mentioned in the same sentence that the crew came out as heros ... right - first you help creating a problem and then you are a hero when you help solving it ... sorry. I think we are in the area of normal human errors here. In my eyes these guys are not villains and not heros but entirely normal people on a not so good day at the office. Their decision to open the crossfeed was not the brightest as they didn't make sure that there's no leak. Their omission to close the crossfeed after having got glaring demonstration that there actually IS a leak ... sorry again. "Mayday" didn't have the facts, so their reproduction is not entirely in sync with the real facts (in this particular case). JB. --84.186.154.31 (talk) 01:24, 24 January 2016 (UTC)


 * The only real fault of the crew, who based their actions on what was known to them at the time, is that they failed to consider the possibility of a genuine fuel leak until it was too late to save the remaining fuel by closing the fuel cross-feed cocks. At the time of the accident the electronic flight management system was relatively new and the crew suspected a failure in the system or sensors, leading them to discount the diminishing fuel contents reading, suspecting it was erroneous. After following the correct procedure for a fuel imbalance, they then after discovering the fuel imbalance was not being corrected by the transfer of fuel from the other wing, neglected or forgot to re-close the cross-feed cocks, possibly because it was not until the second engine flamed out they realised they had actually been losing fuel. If their initial diagnosis of misleading data had been correct then leaving the cross-feed open would have had no ill-effects. So, while their actions were to lead to the emergency, there were seemingly good reasons for doing what they did.


 * The crew, despite their (perhaps understandable) error, successfully got the aeroplane safely back on the ground with all its passengers unharmed, and the aircraft undamaged except for a few burst tyres. And ultimately, that's all that ever counts. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.172.235 (talk) 12:16, 23 November 2018 (UTC)


 * It appears, that the crew's omissions were not limited to not considering the possibility of a genuine fuel leak. I did not read the official report, but having no reason to doubt JB, there is clear mention of not following standard procedure to regularly check ECAM messages. Not checking for a leak and not shutting down the crossfeed after first engine flame out (whether part of standard procedure or not) are actions that may clearly be considered as crew errors. There is room for further looking into crew actions and article review. For this reason, I shall make a small addition in the article, to initiate a discussion and review.
 * What is more, the comment above (dated Nov 23rd 2018) distorts facts. There were not good reasons for what [the crew] did, there are good excuses. There is not only one real fault of the crew, but probably a series of mistakes. If their initial diagnosis had been correct.. but it was not. The aircraft was not undamaged (but instead sustained landing gear and fuselage structural damage). The crew's job is not only to successfully maneuver the aeroplane, which the pilot obviously did, but to be fully in control of its systems and the overall situation. Cangelis (talk) 15:44, 6 May 2020 (UTC)

"Marco Scocco" listed at Redirects for discussion
The redirect [//en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Marco_Scocco&redirect=no Marco Scocco] has been listed at redirects for discussion to determine whether its use and function meets the redirect guidelines. Readers of this page are welcome to comment on this redirect at  until a consensus is reached. Utopes (talk / cont) 03:53, 25 April 2024 (UTC)