Talk:Aleksandr Akimov

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Photo of Alexander Akimov: http://i46.tinypic.com/29bkhp5.jpg —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.229.113.78 (talk) 06:07, 23 November 2009 (UTC)

Speculative and inaccurate ?
This article includes often repeated statement that Akimov did not want to proceed with test, but was ordered to. In some versions he is threatened with being replaced with the previous shift supervisor. In other versions he is threatened with loosing his job. But where is the primary source that supports it?

The Will Mara book that is reference does includes the assertion, but without evidence or reference. It's not clear how an American author can know what is was said in a soviet nuclear reactor control room without a reliable reference. Akimov died after the accident and I can find no reference that reliably records him saying he was threatened or that he didn't want to go ahead with the test. Dyatlov survived both radiation injury and imprisonment, and denied anything other than a calm control room right up to the moment where the reactor explode. No concerns voiced by Akimov and no threats of replacement or firing. The international atomic energy agency report (INSAG 7) makes no mention of it either.

The sequence of events given - a power surge followed by pressing the AZ5 SCRAM button is also suspicious. Dyatlov asserts that the AZ5 was pressed to shut the reactor down as standard procedure as part of the test but this Initiated the surge, because of the control rod design flaw. INSAG7 seems to support this.

And the boron control control rods were not covered with graphite. The boron rod had a graphite rod slung beneath it, with a 1.5 meter separator between them. INSAG7 has a nice diagram that explains this.

The final sentence regarding the crew and directors not following safety guidelines is outdated. This was the story presented by the initial soviet report, which sought to hide the fundamental design flaws in the RBMK reactor, which were vying to the be the first to make it blow up. It became clear later that many of the safety guidelines that the crew were supposed to have ignored did not exist at the time of the accident, but were written later e.g. Not operating reactor at less than 700MWt. Again INSAG7 explains how the soviet authorities Initially released incorrect and misleading information that focuses on crew errors rather than design faults. NickArmstrong21 (talk) 21:59, 28 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Doesn't matter. See WP:TRUTH and WP:VERIFIABLE. As long as the claim is backed up by a WP:RELIABLE SOURCE, in this case a published book by Marshall Cavendish a reputable publishing company, it not up to the editors to decide the providence or accuracy of the statement.81.141.33.185 (talk) 13:29, 15 February 2019 (UTC)
 * 1000 people died 71.10.21.97 (talk) 12:27, 3 September 2022 (UTC)

Education?
Can we find information about his level of education? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Eahket (talk • contribs) 14:10, 5 June 2019 (UTC)

I've added some of his biography that I managed to find to the page. — Preceding unsigned comment added by B10111 (talk • contribs) 17:14, 6 June 2019 (UTC)

False mainstream assumptions regarding the graphite displacers
When the control rod are fully retracted (inactive during normal operation), the the graphite displacers are not outside, but exactly in the middle of the core: "When the control rod is fully retracted, the graphite displacer is located in the middle of the core height, with 1.25 m of water at each of its ends" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RBMK#Control_rods It is true that as the rods are falling down thel lower water column is replaced by the grapithe - but at the same time the former position of the graphite part is replaced by water - and then eventually by the boron. This means that the rectivity in the lower part of the reactor is going a bit up - bat at the same time the reactivity of the middle part of the core is going down. Because the central part of the core was until that OK even with the graphite displacers -  the lower part of the core can become prompt critical only if the axial power distrubution is changing. But exactly because of that "24 shortened rods are inserted from below and are used to augment the axial power distribution control of the core" (same source). This means that the reactor operators are very well informed about the need to take in account also the axial power distrubution. But the most important aspect is that primary use of the RBMK type reactors was the production of weapon grade plutonium and the electricity was only a byproduct. Therefore UdSSR exported only WWER types which are not suitable to produce plutononium. It was of course as confidential as in all other countries producing nuclear weapons, but known to the staff. The negligible operational problems with the positive void coefficient and the graphite displacers have been silently accepted as an acceptable trade off. The system trusted the choosen best specialist, because it was not easy to become a reactor operator. Besides the university grade also practice and party membership was mandatory. And for the working intelligentsia it was really very difficult to become a party member. Additionally Dyatlov was a high grade military submarine reactors expert. I am wondering nobody was evaluating sabotage or psychical disorder. Because it is physically it not possible to create more damage and the staff did the worst possible :( 85.216.197.77 (talk) 21:12, 7 June 2019 (UTC)


 * The article has since had a lot of work. Previous versions contained a lot of bad translation which was at least art of the problem. Andrewa (talk) 20:49, 6 June 2020 (UTC)

Ficionalized/sensationalized information from Midnight in Chernobyl (and G. Medvedev)
This is my explanation for reverting two recent edits concerning Dyatlov and Toptunov (which were borderline off-topic anyways, since the Akimov article should simply link to the more detailed [Chernobyl Disaster] article). I know that Midnight in Chernobyl describes dramatic arguments between the personnel, but this is not a reliable work of history. It is entertaining non-fiction with a very low standard for reinforcing its claims. In this specific case the author explictly cites a source which is itself notoriously unreliable and proven to invent episodes out of whole cloth (G. Medvedev). There are other sources where eyewitnesses directly rebut the claims in question. Rather than re-fighting this old battle in this tangentially-related article, I would ask everyone to refer to the main Chernobyl Disaster article.Sredmash (talk) 21:11, 12 February 2022 (UTC)
 * I eventually found this discussion of sources, which is very interesting. It certainly throws the account of Toptunov refusing to raise the power and Dyatlov threatening him into doubt. I guess Akimov disagreeing with running the test at 200MW is based on court testimony which is also of uncertain reliability.
 * I am wondering why Akimov's role in the disaster can't be explained in this article? Is it really tangentially related?--TimSC (talk) 22:07, 12 February 2022 (UTC)
 * Cheers! The court testimony about Akimov arguing is also very interesting, because the witness explicitly stated that he did not *hear* their words. He just read their facial expressions and body language and said he thought it must about the power level. In other words, there could have been no confidence about 200 MW specifically. This witness was also very lucky to avoid prosecution himself, and must have been under terrible pressure. He never mentioned this story in his own account of that night, written later. I don't disagree with having a bit more detail about the accident, but it should focus more on Akimov than his colleagues. What kinds of additional details would you like included in that section?Sredmash (talk) 21:43, 13 February 2022 (UTC)
 * I'm reading around the subject before making more edits. I guess I was interested in what the control room staff thought about the safety of what they were doing. I'm just now reading the account of the trial and Fomin blames Dyatlov for deviating from the test plan. The judge asks Fomin about Akimov's testimony, to which Fomin replies "The key deviations were made according to orders of Dyatlov." But, that doesn't clarify if Akimov thought those deviations were dangerous. Food for thought I guess.TimSC (talk) 00:09, 17 February 2022 (UTC)
 * Dyatlov stated at the trial that Akimov's written testimony (apparently it was read out during the session) did not contain any mention of arguing over the power level. The trial did not dwell on the opinions of Toptunov and Akimov for two important reasons: the two engineers were also considered heinous criminals by the prosecutors, and it would also be awkward for the prosecution to dwell on the fact that the reactor was SUPPOSED to be safe in the prevailing conditions of the test. Akimov is widely reputed to have said 'we did everything right,' which is not really compatible with being forced to break safety rules. In general the question of personal interactions in the control room is too unsettled to be unambiguously summarized on Wikipedia. You have a few eyewitness statements claiming that there were no arguments, and then some very popular rumors and hearsay on the other side, which has been repeated in books and documentaries.Sredmash (talk) 16:31, 17 February 2022 (UTC)

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