Talk:Argentine ground forces in the Falklands War

Guanca
The only Guanca I could find, was a corporal and a crew member of the corvette/frigate ARA Guerrico. Hence, he's not "Argentine ground force". He did died April 3rd at South Georgia. Necessary Evil 02:39, 4 April 2007 (UTC)
 * Yes, I already fix my mistake. Jor70 03:02, 4 April 2007 (UTC)

Cleanup
This article is a bit of a mess. The background section states two reasons, and only gives one. It is then confused, and I can't make head nor tail of what it is trying to say to copy edit it. If someone can either say under here in a list what they are trying to say I am willing to change it, or better yet, if it could be changed into an intelligible paragraph it would be a large improvement. LeeG 01:21, 24 April 2007 (UTC)


 * There were two limiting factors, regarding the Argentine ground forces on the islands:
 * 1 - The initial landing force had been redrawn shortly after April 3rd and it wasn't before the British recaptured South Georgia, that the junta reinforced the Argentine garrison. Because of the Royal Navy submarines, these forces had to be flown (the two mechanised infantry brigades didn't had many vehicles with them).
 * 2 - Because Chile was marshalling troops close to her Southern Argentine border, Argentina had to reserve forces to deter Chile from a surprise attack. These forces both needed quantity and quality. E.g. without Chile, all the cold adapted marine infantry could have been send to the islands and the British bridgehead could have been attacked by paratroopers.
 * Necessary Evil 02:27, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

??, '' Two, ultimately wrong, factors decided how the ground component of the Argentine garrison at the Falklands (Guarnicion Militar Malvinas) will be composed. The assumption that the British would not use force to retake the islands and the Chilean threat due the still pending Beagle Conflict.''. If the text is confused perpahs you could help us to rephrase it  Jor70 11:21, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

I think I get it. Oh, apologies for the above, that reads far more aggressively than I had intended. Clearly a bad day! Does this convey the points then: The Argentinian authorities used two assumptions in deciding which ground troops to garrison the Falklands, they were the belief that the British forces would not use military force to retake the island, and that a domestic issue with Chile required troops to be deployed in Argentina. These two factors led to a depleted garrison defending the islands. As events unfolded,both assumptions were incorrect, leading to the garrison being undermanned for the task it then faced. If that's better feel free to drop it in. I don't want to edit the article directly as I don't know much about the subject, and could be writing erroneous nonsense! LeeG 22:09, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

no problem but not offense, I will also like something more similar of what Necessary Evil wrote. What about this:

There were two limiting factors, regarding the Argentine ground forces on the islands (Guarnición Militar Malvinas)  :
 * 1 - The initial landing force had been redrawn shortly after April 3rd in the belief that the British would not use force to retake the islands. It wasn't before the British recaptured South Georgia on April 23, that the junta reinforced the Argentine garrison with a large number of troops on the ground in an intention of dissuasion. Also, because of the Royal Navy submarines, these forces had to be flown so the two mechanised infantry brigades selected for the task didn't had most of their heavy equipment with them.
 * 2 - The still pending Beagle Conflict. Because Chile was marshalling troops close to her Southern Argentine border, Argentina had to reserve forces to deter Chile from a surprise attack. These forces both needed quantity and quality. Without Chile, all the cold adapted marine infantry and mountain warfare regiments could have been send to the islands and the British bridgehead could have been attacked by paratroopers. Therefore, the units sent were from the tropical Mesopotamia region and the Buenos Aires Province.

These two factors led to a depleted garrison defending the islands. As events unfolded, both assumptions were incorrect, leading to the garrison being undermanned for the task it then faced.

that would be ok ? Jor70 00:39, 26 April 2007 (UTC)


 * I don't like the "undermanned" word, since there were more Argentine infantrymen than British on the Islands. Perhaps unsuited, since they were trained for another battle environment, with heavy equipment. Necessary Evil 02:35, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Reference:

ok, and Im not sure yet what depleted means Jor70 03:01, 26 April 2007 (UTC)


 * How about: "These two factors led to a far from ideal garrison on the islands." Necessary Evil 10:11, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Hey Jor, I have done a bit of copy editing, I think this still works (oh, does the Spanish refer to the ground forces or the islands? If the former, I think it needs moving to after the word forces, but I'm relaxed about it). In point (1) does redrawn mean "withdrawn" or "redeployed" or (for want of a better word) "redesigned"? The tense seems a little confused, so I have tried to sort it. See what you think... Two assumptions governed the deployment of the Argentine ground forces on the islands (Guarnición Militar Malvinas):
 * 1 - the junta did not believe that the British would use military force to retake the islands, so the the initial landing force had been redrawn shortly after April 3rd, not to be reinforced until after the British recaptured South Georgia. The intent was to place a large number of troops onto the islands to dissuade the British from any military action.  As the Royal Navy had submarines patrolling the immediate area reinforcements had to be airlifted in, which limited the heavy equipment that could be deployed; and
 * 2 - an attack was feared from Chile, which was marshalling troops close to its Southern Argentine border (the so called Beagle Conflict), hence the Argentinian authorities had to deploy highly trained forces to deter a Chilean attack. As a result the cold adapted marine infantry and mountain warfare regiments were not available to be deployed on the islands, preventing an Argentinian paratrooper attack on the British bridgehead.

These two assumptions, which proved ultimately incorrect, led to inappropriate troops being used on the islands. LeeG 10:17, 26 April 2007 (UTC)


 * Hi LeeG, I'm not Jor, but I'll comment it anyway. Nice work! Regarding your initial landing force question; just as firemen are being redrawn to the fire station, after they've done their job, so the majority of the Argentine troops were redrawn to their mainland bases. Only a few military police officers, coast guards or something like that were left on the islands.
 * Details: 1) The Beagle Conflict was from 1978 to 1984, you wrote it as the Beagle Conflict was the 1982-deployment. 2) The garrison was given one marine infantry battalion. 3) The Argentine paratroops is a third unit, I read it as you think they were part of the mountain or marine units. 4) IMHO High command sounds better than Argentinean authorities.
 * The last sentence is perfect. The replaced two sentences repeated the same thing. Necessary Evil 11:06, 26 April 2007 (UTC)


 * Ok with NE's new additions Jor70 12:02, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Here we are, another go. I think I am now a little confused about why the paratroopers did not attack the bridgehead, is it because they had the wrong training/equipment, or because they were too few in numbers, or some other reason? For the moment I have left that out, as I don't see the link between paratroopers. I have redone the rest to incorporate your notes, so here we go (Oh, I used Argentinian High Command to save confusion with Chile or Britain):

Two assumptions governed the deployment of the Argentine ground forces on the islands (Guarnición Militar Malvinas):
 * 1 - the junta did not believe that the British would use military force to retake the islands, so the the initial landing force had been redrawn shortly after April 3rd, and were not reinforced until after the British recaptured South Georgia. The intent was to place a large number of troops onto the islands to dissuade the British from any military action.  As the Royal Navy had submarines patrolling the immediate area reinforcements had to be airlifted in, which limited the heavy equipment that could be deployed, and only one marine infantry batalion was added; and
 * 2 - an attack was feared from Chile due to the ongoing Beagle Conflict, as Chile was marshalling troops close to its Southern Argentine border, hence the Argentinian High Command had to deploy highly trained forces to deter a Chilean attack. As a result the cold adapted marine infantry and mountain warfare regiments were not available to be deployed on the islands, instead troops from tropical areas (namely the Mesopotamia region and the Buenos Aires Province) were deployed.

These two assumptions, which proved ultimately incorrect, led to inappropriate troops being used on the islands.

How does that look? LeeG 22:45, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

I think the last sentence should actually read "These two assumptions, which ultimately proved incorrect, led to inappropriate troops being used on the islands." It's tiny, but the word order is better that way. LeeG 00:46, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

I will only change the 2nd paragraph : As a result the cold adapted Navy's marine infantry battalions, Army's mountain warfare regiments neither the paratroopers brigade were available to ... Jor70 21:18, 29 April 2007 (UTC)

So (just using paragraph 2) - "an attack was feared from Chile due to the ongoing Beagle Conflict, as Chile was marshalling troops close to its Southern Argentine border, hence the Argentinian High Command had to deploy highly trained forces to deter a Chilean attack. As a result the Navy's cold adapted marine infantry, the Army's mountain warfare regiments, nor a paratroop brigade were available to mount an attack on the British bridgehead. The troops deployed were from tropical areas (namely the Mesopotamia region and the Buenos Aires Province), and not trained for action in the terrain." LeeG 22:23, 29 April 2007 (UTC)


 * The two sections contradict each other; in section 2, the marine infantry were not available and in section 1, one marine infantry battalion was deployed.
 * According to Argentina, the Northernmost part is 'only' subtropical.
 * I don't know why the prefixes: Army's and Navy's, isn't obvious?
 * Regarding the paratroopers; I once read an US Army review of the war, with some "What if"s (Can't remember the source). When the British infantry was yomping towards Port Stanley, the bridgehead would have been vulnerable to an Argentine paratroopers' attack. But later, it turned out that Galtieri was reluctant to provide Mario Menéndez with more manpower, later in the war.
 * Regards Necessary Evil 22:46, 29 April 2007 (UTC)

Ugggh - sorry - Jor70 - what's the story on the "tropical" part? Is "temperate" a better adjective? I'd agree with Necessary Evil that the Navy and Army descriptors are redundant, and I think it reads better if we lose them. I read it as saying that there were marines there, they were just not cold weather trained/equipped. LeeG 23:06, 29 April 2007 (UTC)

ja What a discussion!, Jor70 23:38, 29 April 2007 (UTC)
 * instead of "to mount an attack on the British bridgehead" I think just "deployed." would be ok
 * subtropical would be ok, (they use to have 40 C  in their home bases)
 * regarding the contraction you can put more marines units, due only one (of a total 5) was used.

Okay - I'm going to go for it at this point! I've changed subtropical, lost "army" and "navy" but left the rest in (bar some minor tweaking). I think that's fine, but feel free to edit the article! Good job team. LeeG 23:58, 29 April 2007 (UTC)

601st
Looking at the army units on the Falkland Islands the number 601 is popular. Was 601st specially created for the garrison on the islands? regards Necessary Evil 01:32, 25 April 2007 (UTC)
 * Batallón 601° de helicópteros — 601st Army Aviation Battalion
 * Grupo de Artillería Antiaérea 601° — 601st Air defence artillery group
 * Batallón Ingenieros 601° — 601st Engineer battalion
 * Compañía de Comandos 601° — 601st Commando


 * Nop, AR Army traditionaly number its support units according the Corps its belongs. e.g. 10x (101,102) were units of I Army Corps (now disolved), 12x from II Army Corps, 14x III Corps, 16x IV Corps and 18x V Corps etc.  6xx units are units depending directly of the Army General Staff and not of a specific Corps. There are plenty of that units: like those you mention plus, 601th Logistic Battalion, 602 Aviation Attack Squadron, 603th Aviation Support Group, 601th Militar Hospital, 602 Arsenal Battalion, etc  --Jor70 11:59, 25 April 2007 (UTC)
 * Thanks Necessary Evil 18:59, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

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