Talk:Armoured warfare

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Moved from Talk:Armoured forces
I'm adding this tag, but I think this should probably be merged with Armoured warfare--Nobunaga24 07:16, 13 July 2006 (UTC)


 * Actually, this would make a better disambiguation page. SSG Cornelius Seon (Retired) 15:35, 27 August 2006 (UTC)


 * I agree. I created this page to alleviate confusion about the use of the word and fill a gap between armour and vehicle armour, but it's really a dictionary definition.  It should probably become a separate disambiguation page, or better yet, be merged into armour (disambiguation). —Michael Z. 2006-08-29 15:42 Z 

Untitled discussion
This is one of the funniest articles on Wikipedia I EVER saw, honestly. Do you want to know why? Because in WW2 section, US is mentioned, France and Britain is mentioned, but the country that had most powerful and most numerous tanks, that fought most tank engagements than all other allies is NOT mentioned, it's doctrine (which helped win the entire conflict) is NOT mentioned. I am not going to call this disrespect or offensive, I am going to call it ignorant, biased, like most western sources ;). You want to improve the article? INSERT a huge part about soviet tank warfare doctrine of WW2, as big as german, since it played strategically important part in entire WW2 and was no less interesting. Good luck improving wikipedia, you're gonna need it.99.231.59.7 05:39, 30 September 2007 (UTC)Pavel, September 30, 1:39 am.


 * Well, that's what Wikipedia is all about, no? Articles are in a constant state of improvement, which they couldn't be if they were perfect. The fun part is, you can actually have a try at it yourself :o). The problem in this case is that due to the prevailing political conditions in the Soviet Union it is very hard to get a reliable picture of the true state of its armour doctrine, as most sources reflect the party line rather than reality.--MWAK 06:18, 30 September 2007 (UTC)
 * So is anything going to happen about Red Army doctrine before WW2 and Soviet Army during the Cold War?--Mrg3105 (talk) 05:54, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
 * I did some editing, and would like to create a new article with a table, but having a few problems formatting the table. Can anyone help?--Mrg3105 (talk) 08:58, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
 * Ok I have made some edits and additions, adding some references in the process. The article is far from being a credit to research, but its a start despite many holes and omissions. Opinions, criticisms?--Mrg3105 (talk) 11:40, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
 * Well, beware of putting too much technical detail in about tank development. It's best to concentrate on the doctrine. And further additions to this talk page, not pertinent to already existing subjects, are best placed at the bottom of the page :o). There is a "insert a table" icon in the top row.--MWAK (talk) 13:01, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
 * Yes, I agree, however the design of the tanks had a lot to do with how they were used, and visa versa, the theorists in different schools of thought influenced the designers and designs. It seems to me there needs to be a shown relationship there. The "insert a table" icon only inserts a sample HTML code? It would be nice if I could just insert an Excel spreadsheet or a table from Word, but I guess that's too much to ask for By the way, I find the contrib on the discussion page quite interesting, but how can it be incorporated into the article? :)--Mrg3105 (talk) 20:42, 15 December 2007 (UTC) 20:41, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
 * With difficulty :o). Word and Wordperfect codes don't fit in, I'm afraid...--MWAK (talk) 08:28, 16 December 2007 (UTC)
 * Hey MWAK! Is there any way we can talk outside of the discussion page? I think this article is actually way off mark in structure. Its supposed to talk about the method and not history. Sure there is a history of development, but this should be in the footnotes and links to other articles and not the main body of the article.--Mrg3105 (talk) 09:41, 16 December 2007 (UTC)
 * I would say that the historical development has its legitimate place in this article. But you're basically right: the art of armoured warfare should be central. However, I sadly lack the time to contribute much to a possible change and I'm at present not part of the wiki e-mail network.--MWAK (talk) 13:27, 16 December 2007 (UTC)

Erich von Manstein is not a notable practicioner of armoured warfare? --Trithemius 11:52, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
 * This is a bit tricky. He wasn't a typical Panzergeneral like Guderian or Rommel. As a higher level strategist he let himself be influenced by personal talks with Guderian when creating his plans for Fall Gelb. Of course he didn't put this plan himself into practice. His famous Charkov campaign in the winter of 1943 was obviously an excellent use of armour, but again he didn't himself lead the forces.--MWAK 06:04, 11 July 2006 (UTC)

A great deal of the Contemporary Tank Tactics section is equally applicable to WWII. Could we just change it to Tank Tactics, and let the text indicate whether particular tactics were limited to certain eras? &mdash; B.Bryant 13:27, 23 Mar 2005 (UTC)

I'm concerned that this is all being from a narrow scope, with bias and unattribution, and completely unreferenced yet grand and universal assertions such as "Four tanks have sixteen times the combat power of a single tank". At the very least, who argues four tanks have such combat power? Who argues the Allies did not properly practise armoured warfare, that they had "improper tactics"? 119 19:36, 1 Apr 2005 (UTC)


 * Good points.

I. The old rule of thumb (technically the Lanchester square law) that the fighting power of a unit increases with the square of the number of (e.g.) tanks it holds isn't empirically proven; but it reflects an important first principle: that the ratio of the respective ratios between your tanks and the enemy's will change this way. So if you increase your number of tanks by two, obviously each of your tanks will on average have to fight only half the original number of enemy tanks. And the enemy's tanks will obviously have to fight twice the original number of your tanks. Anybody can understand this. However most people I've known are at first puzzled by the logical implication that therefore the relative work load of your tanks improves by four, being the ratio between 0.5 and 2. Fighting power is always relative, as you're always fighting someone else.

Of course in practice an attacker especially will have great trouble bringing all his force to bear at once, so a disparity in numbers wouldn't be as nearly as advantageous. This has been confirmed by modelling in the last 25 years.

II. The old tale that before the war the French, British and Soviets had "inferior tactics" is of course a complete myth. The name "Lidell Hart" comes to mind as its main inventor. But you see, it's such a good myth. People need myths. Soldiers need myths most of all. It's all nice and well to expound some boring abstract theory, but then cadets won't get it. They need a real-life story - even if in real life it didn't happen. We have to invoke the power of the narrative. Should you care for historical fact though, here it is:

1. There's a difference between mechanised manoeuvre warfare in general and Blitzkrieg in particular. What is it? The difference is that in Blitzkrieg you take the collapse of the enemy for granted. That premiss allows for a much simplified operational planning. You can attack on a narrow front. You don't need superior numbers. There will be no concluding Kesselslacht so you don't need a large mass of divisions. There's no need to consolidate by digging in your mechanised forces. All your logistic efforts can be directed to supplying fuel for the strategic envelopment. There's no need for large production to sustain a prolonged war.

2. Blitzkrieg is a very dangerous tactic. If the premiss proves to be wrong you will be obliterated. For this reason all armies rejected it. Yes, the German too.

3. But then Guderian was a lone voice? False: he too rejected Blitzkrieg! All his writings were about mechanised manoeuvre warfare in general. And that doctrine was embraced by the German army.

4. So the true nature of German tactical superiority lies in the fact that the Germans tried to execute mechanised manoeuvre warfare, whereas the others were stuck in WWI tactics? False again: all major armies had mechanised manoeuvre warfare as their official doctrine. Yes, the French too.

5. But surely there must have been some difference between them? Now that's true. And the difference was between them advocating mechanisation and those proposing motorisation. All countries were too poor to fully equip their forces with both tanks and trucks, so a choice would have to be made. The French and Soviets chose for tanks. And the British and Germans chose for trucks. Surprise! Much of Germany's tactical superiority was based on the superior motorisation of its standard infantry divisions. This is what Guderian's Achtung:Panzer is all about: to get a bit more money for his tanks nevertheless.

6. But at least the Germans had superior combined arms tactics? Well yes, in as far as their infantry was more motorised (they had very few half-tracks). But it's a mistake to suppose that the French had such different ideas. It's only that when French texts speak of the need for close cooperation between infantry and tanks this is caricaturally interpreted as backward WWI tactics, whereas when German texts do the same it's seen as a sign of modernity. But the tactics are the same. Still in practice the French were more Fullerite: far from making the infantry tanks subservient to the infantry by giving each Infantry Corps its own organic tank battalion, they concentrated them in tanks-only units. On this point cooperation with the infantry was very poor, while at the same time infantry had become addicted to tanks: they wouldn't attack without them. The same isn't true of their cavalry tanks though.

7. How then can it be explained that Fall Gelb was planned as a Blitzkrieg campaign? Answer: it wasn't. Classic manoeuvre warfare: broad front, lots of infantry divisions, planned consolidation phase, logistics optimised for infantry support. But Guderian wasn't dogmatic. Though he rejected Blitzkrieg as a general doctrine, he understood this particular situation called for it. Convinced of his intellectual superiority he did as he saw fit and simply imposed it on his superiors.

8. Blitzkrieg then became the official doctrine for Operation Barbarossa. It had to. German production capacity was insufficient to build both enough submarines to defeat England and enough tanks for a prolonged war against the Red Army. So it became anathema not to assume the Soviet-Union would collapse. And if collapse is certain, Blitzkrieg is allowed. It nearly worked too. The Red Army had too few trucks, remember? And they still thought they could imitate the Germans and beat them in their own game...

As you can see historical reality is complex (of course I know you already knew this :o). Even this still very simplified account of it doesn't make for a good story. We have to find a balance between truth and explication.

MWAK--84.27.81.59 09:04, 2 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Don't stop there! Integrate the above with the German Great General Staff plan to begin a war no earlier than 1944, so all units would have trucks (instead of going to war with horse-drawn artillery and having the troops do forced marches in too many actions) then add the effect of thousands of trucks flowing from Detroit to the Red army, then factor in airlift, sealift and rail transport capacities during the cold war, and after all that maybe we will have a backbone to write a neutral, factual encyclopedia article on armoured warfare. --AlainV 10:50, 3 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Yes, but there are a few problems:

I. You and I might know this is truth but others don't. The myth has been too successful. They wouldn't see it as neutral but as horribly POV. Read the talk page of Blitzkrieg and you'll see what I mean. We would never reach consensus. And if you include the Cold War things would become real ugly. There are too many alive who built their career (or worse: their entire belief system :o) on alarmism. Those people really don't like their pet theories debunked.

II. As the article is now, it's more about armoured combat as an art. Historical events then function as examples - and so don't have to be historical! Myth will suffice. :o)

III. The scope of the article would change into something like Logistics of Modern Battle. Of course that's the clue to really understanding warfare. But for most people "combat" means something much more tangible. They would like to know things on a much lower level like "If I were a Tank Battalion commander what would I have to do to defeat the enemy?" And that's perhaps the real trouble with the article: should they only have the present text to guide their behavior they would surely lose...

--MWAK 20:19, 4 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Arrgh! I have just followed your link to the Blitzkrieg article. It treats tanks as if they were magical vehicles which do not need long motorised supply lines to feed them diesel oil, lubricants and spares. And of course, the tankers and the supporting infantry can eat fresh air and drink ether. --AlainV 00:12, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC)


 * Most people hold indeed very romantic views on the subject. They also see Blitzkrieg as some Magic Tactic. :o) Use Blitzkrieg and victory is guaranteed. As Operation Barbarossa showed, in reality it's the other way round: far from guaranteeing the collapse of the enemy, that collapse is a necessary condition for Blitzkrieg to work. The German army was already doomed in July 1941.

--MWAK 08:59, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC)


 * This is an extreme simplification of the complex strategic and economic situation that led to failure of blitzkrieg on the Eastern Front. --Trithemius 11:52, 12 June 2006 (UTC)


 * The situation was indeed extremely complex. But its fundamental parameters spelled doom for the German army, unless there would have been a total Soviet collapse. At least if they wanted to continue the offensive :o). It wasn't as if severe strategic mistakes surprisingly spoiled a certain success, as if the Germans had easily won if they had just done what was sensible.--MWAK 13:29, 12 June 2006 (UTC)


 * On the Eastern Front by 1944 the Soviets outnumbered their German opponents by 300%.


 * In Normandy the same year the Western Allies' advantage over the Germans was 25%. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.247.48 (talk) 07:53, 20 September 2016 (UTC)

India-Pakistan war
New section on India-Pakistan war of 1965 and 1971 added which is one of the Biggest armoured wars in History. --Chanakyathegreat 14:29, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
 * Isn't Longwela more an example of the use of strike aircraft than having anything in common with Kursk?GraemeLeggett 15:04, 26 July 2006 (UTC)


 * It's not really a section, merely "see also" links to two articles, so I've removed it, until someone writes something about the armoured tactics or relevant context of these conflicts. —Michael Z. 2006-07-26 16:13 Z 


 * Battle of Asal Uttar - 1965 war
 * Battle of Longewala - 1971 war

Aircrafts are used in most of wars in modern times. In Assal Uttar tank battles have taken place. In Longewala it was Pakistani Armour against Indian Infantry till next day morning after which the IAF took part. This may not fall into the Armoured warfare section but the Battle of Assal Uttar can be considered as it was a armoured battle. Also if we take the large extend of the 1965 and the 1971 wars a large number of armoured fighting has taken place here and there and some of the famous ones are the Assal Uttar type of armoured battle. Also the brilliant tactics employed like flooding the fields to slow down enemy tank movements and waiting for them till they reach very near must be noted. If the said wars cannot be added here, I will be adding it in the air warfare section. Also the Gulf war must me added as it is seen as the modern armoured warfare that took place.

--Chanakyathegreat 04:09, 28 July 2006 (UTC)

Why no mention of India-Pakistan war? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 117.227.147.74 (talk) 04:59, 20 January 2013 (UTC)

Merge
The relatively weak articles mechanized force and mechanized warfare should be merged into this article, the best developed of the three. Let's work on one strong article on military motorization, mechanization, and armoured tactics, which can later spin off reasonably good new articles on the sub-topics.

This would be a general article on the subject of motorized/mechanized/armoured warfare and not a dictionary definition, so I suggest we don't launch into a discussion on the precise differences between the three, but put the energy into the article. There has also been some relevant discussion at talk:Mechanized warfare.

This merge doesn't stop us from moving the resulting combined article to another title, but that would be a separate issue to vote on. —Michael Z. 2006-10-14 02:25 Z 

Support

 * 1) (nominator) —Michael Z. 2006-10-14 02:25 Z 
 * 2) Certainly.  It might also be a good idea to merge Armoured forces in. --Carnildo 04:44, 14 October 2006 (UTC)
 * 3) Yes. We can demerge them if necessary later. Buckshot06 01:45, 15 October 2006 (UTC)
 * 4) Yes, please. Jigen III 05:30, 30 March 2007 (UTC)
 * Yes, a small article with no many chances to be expanded in the near future. Eurocopter tigre 16:15, 31 March 2007 (UTC)

Ambrose Is Wrong
Please see: "Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of the US Armored Forces, George F. Hofmann and General Donn A. Starry, editors. In particular you will want to read Hofmann's chapter entitled "Army Doctrine and the Christie Tank," as well as Christopher Gabel's chapter, "WWII Armor Operations in Europe."  And finally, General Starry's comments on the subject in the final chapter.

"Infantry divisions were assigned separate tank battalions to assist with infantry attacks. Armored divisions [during WWII] expanded on the cavalry's traditional missions of pursuit and exploitation, fighting as combined arms teams with the tank as the main maneuver element." pp. 130-131.

Armored force doctrine, that is to say how the Sherman tank was used in combat, was reflected in the operational art of the armored divisions, not in the misuse of the GHQ tank battalions by infantry officers who were ignorant of the correct armored force doctrine. The improper use of the GHQ tank battalions by infantry officers was the subject of much controversy during and immediately after the war, as evidenced in the relevant "Reports of the General Board, European Theater of Operations US Army."

Wake up children. Just because Ambrose is popular, does not mean he is right.

24 October, 2006 1450 Hours.

A little question
I made some slight modifications and reorganizations. Are they okay? AllStarZ 05:38, 2 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Well, such large headings are not conforming to the usual Wikipedia style.--MWAK 07:24, 2 November 2006 (UTC)

ArmOUred or ArmOred warfare?
On a link to "Armored warfare", I was directed here. What's Wikipedia's policy on American or British spellings? The armor article is "Armour", but the color article is "color". Kevin 19:13, 26 June 2007 (UTC)


 * It varies from article to article: either what's appropriate for the article (e.g. Canadian English for Ram tank), or what was used in the first major contribution. Details at Manual of Style.  This article appears to be written in UK English. —Michael Z. 2007-06-26 21:02 Z 
 * Seems to me the article should be renamed Tank Warfare because armoured also can mean personal armour as used in the middle ages, while tank, aside from being the initial designation in English, and in Britain where the first were made, is far less ambiguous.--Mrg3105 (talk) 05:52, 15 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Well, not all armoured vehicles are tanks. And it is simply the more usual term, to which fact we are obliged to conform...--MWAK (talk) 09:05, 15 December 2007 (UTC)

It seems we're going with British spelling then? I'm fine with that as long as we stay consistent. Let's just make a decision, stay consistent, and avoid splitting hairs. -Comatose51 (talk) 03:53, 29 September 2009 (UTC)

Ending the War
With regard to WWI I find written: "tanks were used at the Battle of Amiens ending the stalemate imposed by trench warfare on the Western Front and effectively ending the war". I think that's a very sweeping statement, implying that the use of tanks was solely responsible for the end of the war, when in fact there were many factors. OK if I remove it? 199.71.183.2 20:54, 14 November 2007 (UTC)


 * The sentence is ambiguous. What was probably meant was that the Germans never recovered from the defeat at Amiens, not that the teanks were the sole cause. In such cases it is better to improve then to remove :o).--MWAK 08:21, 15 November 2007 (UTC)

Proposal for a new article structure
Objective: to create a higher-order text that shows not so much the development of armoured warfare as such, but the development of how military historians thought armoured warfare developed

1. Definition

a means of overcoming entrenched high levels of firepower by infantry use of automatic weapons from defensive positions, supported by artillery, and introducing manoeuvre as a method of severing enemy's lines of communications

2. The need for a 'tank'

expediency of the need due to lack of precognition of trench warfare before the conflict to overcome stalemate of trench warfare

3. Strategic, operational and tactical premise of 'the breakthrough'

strategic - defeat of Germany

operational - allow manoeuvre

tactical - reduction of casualties due to machinegun fire

4. 19th century legacy of L'art de la manoeuvre

The art of war as inherited by the turn of the century military commanders involved, as it had done during the preceeding centuries of overcoming firepower of the infantry weapons, supported by artillery, from defensive positions, and introducing manoeuvre as a method of severing enemy's lines of communications

5. Scientific war - a paradigm shift?

In the thinking of the contemporary military theorists the unstopable mechanical power of machinegun and artillery were halted by the immovable trenchlines and field fortifications made from reinforced concrete. A force multiplier was required to smash the 'wall' in the same way a demolition ball does. In reality the art and science of military thinking took a retrograde step into the age of siege warfare, but on state level

6. The Infantry school of thought

Since tanks could only breach the defenses and offer a limited firepowe in support, there was a school of thought that they must be subordinate to the Infantry Arm who's job would remain to complete and exploit the breach in the enemy defences as accopmpanying Artillery

7. The Cavalry school of thought

An alternative view was offered by the Cavalry Army that saw the object of using tanks not as breaching the defences, but as exploiting the breaches and severing the enemy's lines of communication. Since the breaking of the infantry defenses had always been a job of the heavy cavalry accompanied by horse artillery, the tanks, see nas a combination of both, belonged in the Cavalry Arm

8. Mechanised or Motorised

With increased availabiity and reliability of all manner of cumbustion engine powered vehicles afte WW1 it became apparent that mobile reserves could counter the breaches made in the defensive lines. Therefore the breaching and the counter-breaching forces had to be combined arms in nature, and prepared to fight on the move. There was a split in thinking by the theorists, with one school of thought advocating giving priority to the fast moving infantry mounted in trucks, or motor-vehicles over roads. The other school of thought argued for an all-metal track vehicles capable of advancing over field terrain to reach its objectives

9. Designs for doctrine

Sige mentality persisted throughout the preWW2 and during the WW2 period with defensive walls constructed in France, Germany and USSR. Field fortifications were seen to be an effective solution agains armoured warfare as late as 1944

Where the doctrines prevailes as military policy of using forces, the designs of armoured vehicles were tailored to the doctrines. In France where there was a substantial reliabnce on the strategic Maginot Line of fortifications, the infantry was seena s a real stopping force and the tanks as largely supporting mobile artillery although 'cavalry' tanks were also designed to counter operational or tactical breakthroughs by German attacks

10. Doctrine for designs

In other military forces the doctrine was develped based on the capabilities of the vehcile designs. In the USSR these designs pushed the limits of speed and performance with fast and amphibious tanks and tanketts as well as very heavy tanks with multiple turrets. All these designs used innovative and unusual solutions to create new methods of employing forces for the commanders Subsequently the Soviet strategic defensive line was desmanted in preference to an offensive doctrine that sought to use large numbers of tracked or mechanised troops. Despite this, the fast Red Army tanks were designed to be dual-traction capable based on the thinking of the US designer Christie

11. Theory to application - the pre-WW2 years

Lessons of Spain, Manchuria, Finland

12. Further doctrinal developments

Effect on German armoured warfare doctrine due to abandonement of heavy tank and tankette, and formation of all-armoured and mobile infantry units

Effect on Soviet armoured warfare doctrine due to adoption of a light, medium and heavy tank designs for its TO&E, and adoption of the T-34 to replace all medium roles and formation of all-armoured and mobile infantry units

Attempts at integrating Close Air Support into use of armoured and mobile formations by Germany and USSR

13. The great test - Part I

German Polish and French campaigns

14. The great test - Part II

German invasion of Soviet Union

15. The great test - Part III Effect of the North African campaign on the armoured warfare doctrines of United Kingdom, Italy, France and the United States Armoured warfare doctrine application in mainland and island campaigns of Asia and the Pacific

Development of German and Soviet armoured warfare doctrines during intermediate and final periods of the Second World War

16. Evaluating wartime experiences - view from the East

Development of the Operational Manoeuvre Group concept in the post-war period

17. Evaluating wartime experiences - view from the West

Effect of economic impact on maintenance of large conventional forces in Western Europe and emergence of the nuclear deterence strategy as a counter to armoured warfare

18. Armoured warfare on the nuclear battlefield

Soviet perception of the effect of nuclear deterence on armoured warfare planning and attempted solutions

19. Armoured warfare in the post-nuclear Cold War doctrines Development of armoured warfare during introduction of the anti-tank missile Arab-Israeli wars describes as examples of these doctrinal developments

20. Armoured warfare in the Information Age The impact of Information Age on armoured warfare Desert Storm described as an example of this doctrinal development

21. The future of Armoured warfare

Impacts of top attack precision (TAP) munitions and rising cost of fuels on armoured warfare

--Mrg3105 (talk) 06:50, 17 December 2007 (UTC)

--Mrg3105 (talk) 05:18, 18 December 2007 (UTC)


 * This is a very ambitious plan! Certainly such a change would be an improvement of what still is a very deficient treatment of the subject. But it surprises me that you first deplored the emphasis on historical developments yet now propose an article that is completely organised along historical lines ;o). If you care for some advice: try not to rely too much on a single source, use the most recent sources possible, try not to be too anglocentric and never forget this is an encyclopedia, so the ultimate goal is to create a higher-order text that shows not so much the development of armoured warfare as such, but the development of how military historians thought armoured warfare developed. And the final advice is: Be bold! (But don't be surprised if others are too :o)--MWAK (talk) 07:52, 17 December 2007 (UTC)
 * What would be a sufficient treatment of the subject?

The alternative structure I'm proposing is not so much historical as chronological. The use of a tank, which until the appearance of the fully-tracked infantry AFVs epitomised armoured warfare, was very much a theory in development, so there is a somewhat of a 'lab' view of "so what will we do today" sense about the whole thing. For example WW2 was begun in 1939 using designs dating from the early 30s. The US M60 was a design that had not (significantly) changed and owed its legacy to the M26 of WW2, etc. An excellent example is the KV-2 armed with the 152mm gun developed (with great difficulty, but on Stalin's orders) to break through fortified lines, which shocked the Germans since they had none in 1940, but French did (since their proletariat also needed liberation...eventually ;). The next people to use such a weapon were the most surprising in who and where; the US Army in Vietnam of all places!

In any case, if you have suggestions on how the article can be better structured, or sources, please contribute. I have access to older sources, but also hopefully in the new year will gain access to a much larger library resource. In any case, I don't see that there were significant rethinks on the subject since the late 80s when Glantz (after Erickson) forced a rethink on the application on the Eastern Front. I have access to the Symposium notes that served as basis for most of his books, and include uncomfortable questiones posed to the former Wehrmacht officers usually answered with even more uncomfortable ummm, well, yes :)Mrg3105 (talk) 22:56, 17 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Such a chronological treatment would of course be useful. On the other hand explaining some basic general principles would not be amiss either!


 * On the matter of sources: Simpkin is obviously an excellent choice and it gladdens my heart that his name is even mentioned. But the last 25 years considerable progress has been made. New research by Doughty and Frieser has shed light on the development of the Blitzkrieg concept; the somewhat better access to the Soviet archives has substantially changed our perception of Soviet tactics in 1941. And old caricatures of the French armour doctrine have been largely debunked; it is no longer tenable to describe it as "defensive" or in terms of "mobile artillery".--MWAK (talk) 08:09, 23 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Friser would never get published on Wikipedia given a comment on his book by someone on Amazon "The author has an impressive command of the huge literature on Case Yellow, and has done considerable original research in the archives. He systematically destroys many myths and illuminates some obscure aspects of this pivotal campaign" However, he as never had his book edited 20 times a day before he finished one chapter! :)

Seriously though I have not kept up that much. I know about developments such as "swarming" (there is a new article for perusal on Wiki) about which I have some doubts. However, given this is about Armoured warfare, and there hasn't been that much of it lately, maybe you will do the honours and add a post-scriptum? :)

I recently had to break it to someone that the chances of sighing a real Tiger tank on the Eastern Front for the average soldier was about the same as that of an average Indian sighting a real tiger today. In many ways post-war armoured doctrines in the West were extrapolated from small unit tactics. It is interesting that Soviet tactics are derived from extrapolations of massive use of armour never available to the Germans :)

In any case, I have been thinking, and it seems to me that the place to start is at the very start with the evolution of thinking about protected manoeuvre in combat, and moving on to M-RAPs and such of the present. Start with the basics as you say, or the Middle Ages going to far back in theory?--Mrg3105 (talk) 08:55, 23 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Well, mentioning armoured cavalry of mediaeval times is correct; but an in-depth account of their tactics would be out of place here. The 19th century manoeuvre war concepts are of course relevant. The narrative should soon reach Swinton and Estienne (he already advocated "swarming" :o).


 * Indeed German tanks in general were quite scarce on the Eastern Front. In the summer of 1943 a platoon of experimental T-34-57s tried for a month very hard to engage any enemy tanks, but failed. But after the war even the Americans and British were wary of using too large concentrations; these had brought them little success in WWII. Whether Soviet large formations could have repeated their triumphs against the much denser defence system in the FRG, is an interesting question. Modelling strongly suggests that the answer is "No" — unless nuclear or chemical weapons had been used.--MWAK (talk) 14:32, 23 December 2007 (UTC)
 * I think the use of cavalry, indeed armoured cavalry, in the introduction need only be restricted to early 20th century senior officer frame of mind (most were born and raised on tails of 1856 and 1871 in Western and Central Europe) :o)

However, this frame of mind substantially influenced early thinking as a time when officer gentlemen still went on morning horse rides well into WW2. I don't have Estienne, adn Swinton only through the local defence library. See what I can do when I move.

I did read in the late 80s in a Soviet article a gleam of sobriety which suggested that the lessons of WW2 while relevant dealt with a very much more contracted front in Germany, with a very much expanded NATO air capability compared to Luftwaffe (proportionately). In general there is something I call conceptual friction in militaries where the concept an officer corps were educated in in their 20s, and used in their 30s they either try to destroy or raise to beyond reproach or questioning in their 40s, and build 'walls' around in their 50s. Fortunately most retire before they get to the 60s these days :o) In the immediate post-Cold War years the US Army was still transforming to the 'tune' set by the 'paratroopers' of the 60s. Seems to happen less so in the navies where they understand that FULL STOP still requires a certain distance to travel to come to a stop, and should be commenced a good distance away from the peer :o) Alas, I lack inspiration to write anything today so will go back to editing Barbarossa --Mrg3105 (talk) 00:30, 24 December 2007 (UTC)

Other Arms and Services
Just a poll to see how much space in the article should be given to aircraft, helicopters, logistics, etc, given this is supposed to be Armoured Warfare (and no need to remind me the Mi-24 is known as a flying tank, and is armoured as are many helicopters):)

A simple percentile guidance would do, such as 10%, 20%, 25%, etc. Seems to me that at least 51% of the article word count should deal with (preferably Armoured and Warfare as concepts. Thank you in advance --Mrg3105 (talk) 07:39, 22 December 2007 (UTC)


 * The article should not develop into a Land warfare tactics of the 20th century, so any mention of close air support, infantry, artillery etc. should be subservient to the treatment of armoured warfare as such (however, keep in mind that the article is supposed to be about mechanised warfare in general). The same is true for logistics — but in this case it concerns a much neglected aspect, so more space might have to be dedicated to it than you originally had in mind ;o).


 * It's hard to give percentages. Let the necessities of the logic of your narrative balance the text; treat both history and principles adequately — and afterwards we'll see how things were portioned out.--MWAK (talk) 08:29, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

"Early in the 1930s after the seizure of power by the Nazi Party in Germany, German officers were sent to observe and participate in development of armoured doctrine in the USSR." Really? I thought that the military cooperation was by the Reichswehr in the 1920's and that the nazis squelched it until the nazi-Soviet Pact. I've altered the term 'elected' because the nazis never were. Keith-264 (talk) 14:42, 24 July 2008 (UTC)

World War One French Tanks..
Disappointed, although not surprised, at absence of reference to French tank development in WWI. It was quite separate and independent from the British; the French ordered larger numbers than the British; they designed the first modern, turreted tank, and manufactured more tanks than all the other combatants combined. But all we get here is the familiar story of the British vehicles and, of course, the German A7V.Hengistmate (talk) 22:33, 6 August 2012 (UTC)

Lede pic
Can we get a better picture for the lede? The current one is mostly dust, with a few vague shapes that may be tanks. --A D Monroe III (talk) 18:05, 31 October 2014 (UTC)
 * Agreed, although it is an image of an actual operation, it's hardly lead image material. The one I have replaced it with is more obviously representative of armoured warfare in my opinion, even though it is of an exercise. ( Hohum  @ ) 19:13, 31 October 2014 (UTC)


 * Thanks; this new one is certainly better. The fact it is an exercise instead of a true battle is fine, since the article is about "armoured warfare", something more broad than just tank battles; even a pic of such vehicles lined up for service would be fine.  But thinking about it, I'd guess it would be nice to include some non-tank armored vehicles -- APCs or whatnot.  But if we can't find such, this current pic will do.  --A D Monroe III (talk) 19:06, 1 November 2014 (UTC)

Images
Why are most of the images of the French and (of course, as always) the americans? We need some diversity up in here! Let's have some Leopards & Challengers. As in, some decent tanks ;) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 31.54.64.45 (talk) 20:43, 20 July 2015 (UTC)

Armoured corps article
Armoured corps article has been converted from a disambiguation page to an article that includes a list of specific armoured corps of various nations (by me, per wp:DABCONCEPT). I propose there and at Tank Corps that "Tank Corps" be merged in. I further suggest that Mechanized force, currently a redirect to this Armoured warfare article, be redirected to there, instead. Could editors here consider these changes and possibly help develop the Armoured corps article to be a good complement to this one. Basically there is a need for a wp:SIA (set index article) or other list-article to the various significant armoured forces (however they are named) that have Wikipedia articles. And there is a need for other articles to be able to link to the topic (which they cannot if it is a dab). (BTW, I came to the Armoured corps article, which was a disambiguation page, as part of helping in wp:DPL's effort to eliminate disambiguation pages with incoming links.) Help/comments at Talk:Armoured corps would be appreciated. Sincerely, -- do ncr  am  15:38, 2 August 2015 (UTC)

WWII section
The entire Germany section has been tagged with citation needed from Mar 2015, but none have been provided since. I plan to remove this section, per WP:V. Please let me know if there are any concerns.

The same applies to much of the content in the section on the Red Army, and WWII content in general. Some of the content is dubious, such as: "The Red Army's initial strategic withdrawal relegated the armoured forces to a secondary role" -- how was 1941 a "strategic withdrawl" for the Red Army? There were a lot of counter-attacks, encirclements and retreats, if they were lucky. Some of it also appears to be WP:OR: "This can be visualized when looking at two opposing defensive lines..." There are 51 "citation needed" tags in all. K.e.coffman (talk) 06:17, 12 March 2016 (UTC)


 * The tags were placed in mass by user Pensiveneko, not so much out of a concern for improved sourcing but because he apparently genuinely doubted the content. However, this doubt is largely unfounded as that content is often based on more modern insights developed by military historians during the last thirty years. These obviously deviate somewhat from the "comic book version" of WWII still prevalent in popular-science publications on the subject. I'll go over it, add sources and improve the text where necessary, balancing the NPOV. May take a few days :o).


 * In general, it is not a good idea to remove enormous chunks of an article if one is unable to replace it with improved text. In this case, the disappearance of the total Second World War chapter would have left a maimed text of little use to the reader. If you lack the knowledge to substitute it, this is a good sign you are also incapable of judging whether it should be replaced in the first place!--MWAK (talk) 07:11, 12 March 2016 (UTC)


 * I'm glad you are taking a look. I'm sure it would be an improvement. K.e.coffman (talk) 07:18, 12 March 2016 (UTC)


 * I added a few sources to, and edited, the Germany section, and will continue improving in the next few days. Eric.mehnert (talk) 07:37, 2 December 2019 (UTC)

Overwrought sentence about Panzer divisions in Fall of France
We have been taking turns adding incremental improvements to one of the article's sentences, which currently reads:

At the time, "Blitzkrieg" was not defined on the strategic level, but concentrated Panzer divisions in 1940 in the Battle of France nevertheless managed to exploit breaches in the allied defensive lines made by their organic or attached motorised infantry regiments (sometimes working in combined arms with their tanks), to great effect.

While I've agreed with each of our contributions individually, I'm not so pleased with the combined end result; the sentence seems somewhat wordy and unclear.

Maybe we can we step back for a bit and review what is the intended main point(s) of this sentence, to allow it to be rewritten in some way that improves it overall?

Other editors are free to comment as well, of course. --A&#8239;D&#8239;Monroe&#8239;III(talk) 22:01, 13 December 2019 (UTC)


 * Perhaps it's helpful to give a short list of possible points to be made. The situation was quite complex.
 * 1. In 1940, Germany did not have a strategic Blitzkrieg doctrine.
 * 2. Guderian and von Manstein had in late 1939 devised a strategy that precisely entailed what later would be seen as the essence of the Blitzkrieg concept: swift deep strategic penetrations.
 * 3. This strategy was not accepted by German High Command that, however, adopted the element of a Schwerpunkt at Sedan.
 * 4. Although official doctrine acknowledged the option of using tanks to break entrenched defence lines, this was avoided in May 1940.
 * 5. Motorised regiments established the Meuse bridgeheads.
 * 6. Rommel and Guderian contrary to plan and explicit orders executed deep strategic advances.
 * 7. The organisation of the armoured division was not conducive to combined arms tactics as the motorised infantry regiments did not have a tank component. Armoured regiments operated separately from them, to increase the total of manoeuvre units.
 * 8. In 1940, there were but a few companies equipped with halftracks. Combined arms teams were only regularly deployed from 1942 onwards.
 * 9. In June 1940, motorised infantry closely cooperated with tanks on an ad hoc basis to break the thinly held French line, as that seemed practical.--MWAK (talk) 22:51, 13 December 2019 (UTC)


 * Oy, that's a whole lot to try to put in one sentence, which is likely the source of my concern. Multiple sentences are probably in order.  But I'm not sure all of this notable enough to merit inclusion, at least as stated.


 * Points 1 to 3 are, I think, good to be combined into one or a couple sentences separate from the rest. It's important that we correct any leftover impressions from older sources that blitzkrieg was a German strategy even before the war started.  Combining this with other points is likely to dilute this message.  But perhaps we could add that this later did develop into a "blizkrieg" strategy, as part of Barbarossa.


 * Points 4 and 5, to me, aren't significant. Then as now, combined arms has each element of a division engaging in opportunities that suit it, so as to enable opportunities for the other elements; it isn't about all elements being mixed together at all times.  Of course the Germans didn't attempt to cross major rivers with tanks; that's a lack of amphibious tanks, not a lack of doctrine.  In contrast, the allies at this time did seem to promote tanks breaking lines by themselves; the Germans tended to avoid this, not just in 1940, but as basic armored warfare.


 * Point 6 is certainly notable in general, but, to me, not significant in the larger view of this subject. It may well have been critical to the Fall of France, but as noted, it wasn't generally accepted armored warfare -- just some special-case isolated occurrences with no lasting impact on doctrine (except as "do this again and you'll be fired").


 * Point 7, I think, is misleading. Typical WWII armored divisions, even at the end of the war, had separate regiments for tank, mechanized infantry, and motorized infantry, but followed combined arms operations.  The infantry were trained to fight along side tanks, and vice versa.  That ability to cooperate may have been weaker in 1940 than later (especially for the Allies), but it's not as if each regiment could only operate on its own.  Where this training was lacking, such as when regiments from infantry divisions were suddenly reassigned to infantry-depleted panzer divisions, the division's effectiveness fell apart; this shows the existence and effect of the combined arms training between regiments.


 * Point 8, I think, is also misleading. While mechanized infantry is generally preferred over motorized infantry, it's not required for combined arms.  Mechanized infantry avoided moving into a firefight mounted (after all, halftracks are weaker than the lightest tank).  Mechanized infantry engaging mounted was an option to be used when the situation warranted it, but it was common for both mechanized and motorized infantry to engage dismounted; they were more alike than dislike.


 * Point 9 seems to capture the whole of German armored tactics in general. "Ad hoc" here is effectively the basis of Auftragstaktik (mission-based tactics).  The wording used in this point implies this wasn't part of their doctrine, and had no lasting impact on it.  I think the opposite is true.


 * So, we now have several different points of discussion; likely it's too much to get completely resolved any time soon. Perhaps, for now, we should focus on getting just points 1-3 stated clearly in the article, as we basically already agree on these, and as these points alone are more than sufficient to make a sentence.  We can tackle the rest of the points later, either separately or in small groups, break even breaking these into separate discussions.


 * Anyone is free to implement this now while the rest of the discussion(s) continues. --A&#8239;D&#8239;Monroe&#8239;III(talk)  20:11, 15 December 2019 (UTC)


 * Well, if we especially mention "combined arms tactics", this can only be justified if the Germans did something different from the normal cooperation of tanks, infantry and artillery that always takes place on some operational level. The difference could be that very close cooperation was the preferred procedure or that tanks and small infantry units were structurally integrated into permanent combined arms teams. However, if we read D645, the Weisung that officially prescribed training and praxis, little of this can be found. It is obvious from the text that tanks were supposed to be able to break lines without accompanying infantry — and that functioning as a "shock front" even was their role par excellence. Motorised infantry is mentioned as a means to exploit gaps made by tanks, or to annihilate remaining pockets of enemy resistance. Optionally tanks should provide infantry support, advancing behind regular infantry progressing in jumps, to eliminate machine guns. In that case, the tank unit was subordinated to an infantry commander. Nowhere it is mentioned that infantry units were to be subordinated to armour commanders. Generally, foot soldiers are treated as a liability. "Infantry should support by observation and reconnaissance". No other way of direct support is indicated. "During the tank battle, motorised infantry should remain under cover".


 * Of course, actual operations could be very different. During Fall Gelb 9. PD first exploited gaps made by regular infantry in the Dutch Main Defence Line and on 13 May its tanks dispersed a Dutch infantry division and tried to take the historic city of Dort — all without any significant infantry support. The 3. and 4. PD fought a tank battle (infantry duly keeping cover) and then 4. PD tried to break the French MDL without infantry support and was beaten back with heavy losses. Next day, motorised infantry broke the line, without tank support. During the drive to the Channel by the other divisions, the motorised regiments largely fought separate battles and often were a lot more effective than the armoured regiments. So, also the actual events contained little of what today would be understood as "combined arms tactics".


 * Then again, German armoured divisions were superior in being very balanced forces. On that higher level, they certainly were more operationally effective.--MWAK (talk) 21:52, 16 December 2019 (UTC)


 * So, the main complicating issue is the development of combined arms, or lack thereof? I agree that development was gradual, but why go to lengths to state how it didn't happen officially, but only unofficially?  If combined arms is specifically stated in sources as not existing in the German army in 1940 (avoiding SYNTH and primary sources), I guess we could state that, but I don't see that as very significant at this point in the article.  Maybe there's nothing definite to say about combined arms here.
 * Should we set combined arms aside as confusing and contradictory, and just go with the "strategic blitzkrieg" points? --A&#8239;D&#8239;Monroe&#8239;III(talk)  20:53, 18 December 2019 (UTC)


 * I think that's best :o).--MWAK (talk) 20:00, 19 December 2019 (UTC)


 * Okay, I changed the sentence to be only about points 1-3, incorporating most of the text from these points. After some CE for flow, the one sentence is now 4 sentences, and separated into its own paragraph.  I'll leave it at that for now; editors are free to improve as they see fit.
 * With this part clarified, I see the flow of the whole section could use help. It jumps around between technical aspects of panzers, tactics, strategy (per this discussion), to a timeline, in no particular order, with some points scattered and repeated.  After the change I just made here has settled for a while, I think I will reorder the section to primarily follow chronology (unless someone beats me to it).  I believe I can eliminate the opening couple of "citation needed" tags in the process, relying on later cited texts that basically cover the same point.  --A&#8239;D&#8239;Monroe&#8239;III(talk)  18:34, 21 December 2019 (UTC)

So, in the Soviet Army which sought to adopt its existing doctrine evolved during World War II to the nuclear battlefield - ?
And what about the US or the West, were there no such projects ? What's about Pentomic structure, for example ? --129.187.244.19 (talk) 12:24, 1 March 2021 (UTC)


 * Indeed, during the Fifties and Sixties for all NATO armies the primary motive for mechanisation was to increase mobility and protection in order to survive the nuclear battlefield.--MWAK (talk) 12:53, 1 March 2021 (UTC)