Talk:Attack on Pearl Harbor/Archive 13

Japanese-Americans
There are a few sentences at the end of the article which relate actions taken against Japanese-Americans after the battle. While individual Japanese-Americans and Japanese nationals were taken into custody in Hawaii, there was no wholesale roundup of Japanese-Americans. This was because there were so many of them there (over 30% of the population) that their incarceration would have significantly affected the local economy which heavily supported the military installations. And the 100th Japanese American Battalion was soon raised from these loyal Americans, long before the 442th Infantry Regiment was considered. It was only on the West Coast that Japanese-Americans were rounded-up, and this was again mostly for economic reasons, as many were so productive (especially in farming) that their businesses out competed white American-owned business, and this had caused a long-lasting, anti-Japanese attitude. I suggest that the sentences be changed to reflect that there was no wholesale round-up in the Islands. I'm busy this weekend, but I might swing later to do this myself. Thomas R. Fasulo (talk) 14:22, 24 April 2010 (UTC)

Edit request
you have the wrong date of the attack

63.232.18.26 (talk) 20:34, 25 March 2010 (UTC)
 * a) You could had specified what change you were requesting.
 * b) The date - December 7 1941 - is correct.--ja_62 (t 21:09, 25 March 2010 (UTC)

Please translate ft and inches for non-americans. The rest of the world uses meters and liters! please :( ( This is not the american wikipedia, but the english one, and english is spoken in Scotland, England, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, India... hm. Canada!.. and a lot of other places too.

<21 ft     22-23 ft      29 ft      30-32 ft      33-34 ft      34-35 ft

I'm sorry, but you can consult the MOS on unit conversions and please drop that american-centric nonsense. --Eaglestorm (talk) 01:32, 6 May 2010 (UTC)


 * I added the conversions, per WP:MOS. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 02:08, 6 May 2010 (UTC)

Time of the attack
Does anybody know when the attack actually started in regard to time of day? Jeremy (talk) 22:37, 27 April 2010 (UTC)
 * Read the page? 07.48 Hawaii time, when they first hit MCAS Kaneohe...  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  03:34, 28 April 2010 (UTC)
 * I think I missed that part. Jeremy's messagesto you 21:18, 29 April 2010 (UTC)
 * It's been known to happen. ;p  Matt Murdock   reach out & touch me  22:52, 29 April 2010 (UTC)

The B-17's?
Does anyone have any more information on the angel of the B-17's? Supposedly one of them was shot down, but there has to be more availible about what happened from their perspective...

99.153.3.31 (talk) 02:58, 1 May 2010 (UTC)


 * A bit of googling turned up, , , , other sources. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 04:01, 1 May 2010 (UTC)

As I said before, it doesn't really say much about it.

99.153.3.31 (talk) 11:10, 1 May 2010 (UTC)


 * (mentioned above) says that four B-17Cs and two B-17Es came under fire while inbound but managed to land safely (one on a golf course) and a dozen B-17Ds already on Hickam were attacked, with eight being destroyed. That is sketchy, though, and only from one source. I'd want to crosscheck this somewhere, but I'm located on a small island in the Philippines and don't have research facilities beyond the likes of google available to me. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 11:30, 1 May 2010 (UTC)
 * (added later) I recently picked up a copy of this book. Page 72 says MacArthur received unofficial word of the Pearl harbor attack at 0340, Philippine time. Page 73 says that General Lewis Brereton proposed to General Sutherland that the B-17s, which were airborne but without bomb loads, be sent to strike Japanese bases on Formosa. It goes on to say that General MacArthur eventually ordered such an attack, but scheduled it for the afternoon because of fog over the target area, and that at 1130 when the Japanese struck Clark Field the bombers were on the ground being rearmed and refueled, as were the P-40s. The book says that MacArthur later denied hearing Brereton's proposals, and blamed Sutherland. The authors opine that MacArthur, as area commander, should have sent the planes against the Formasan bases or, if this was not feasable, should have sent them out of range of the Japanese. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 07:43, 14 June 2010 (UTC)

extending into the western Pacific Ocean and Dutch East Indies
I think this is getting better, but surely the main point here is that hammering Hawaii would make Americans wonder if California was safe. The Dutch East Indies could hardly be a consideration from this attack. No? Rumiton (talk) 15:13, 13 June 2010 (UTC)


 * I think we're at opposite sides, here: the Japanese objective was to keep the PacFleet out of SWPA & buy time to build an "impregnable" defensive line, & as phrased, that's what matters: "Finally, it was meant to deliver a severe blow to American morale..." So, whether USN believed Japan would attack the West Coast is immaterial IMO.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  16:19, 13 June 2010 (UTC)
 * Are we looking at the same section? I am reading the Objectives section. The recent version seemd to imply that striking so far across the Pacific was intended to demonstrate to the American people that distance might not keep them safe. Or that is how I read it. I don't have the source, am I wrong? Rumiton (talk) 13:54, 14 June 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm looking at the section right above "Approach & attack". AFAIK, the Japanese never intended to threaten the West Coast. The attack was designed to prevent intervention by the PacFlt (& give IJN a free hand in SWPA & DEI, what Japan called the "Southern Resource Area"), rather than deter it by making the mainland fearful. It had the unexpected consequence of deterrence, creating panic in California (& worry in DC) into mid-'42 (cf Midway). If you're seeing different, I'd be interested to know what your source is, 'cause IIRC, that was never an objective, just an outcome (a side effect).  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  14:35, 14 June 2010 (UTC)
 * That's OK. I am not looking at other sources, just this article. The impression I got previously was that the Japanese were demonstrating their reach across the pond in a threatening way. No problem. Rumiton (talk) 13:34, 15 June 2010 (UTC)
 * Glad to clarify.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  03:06, 16 June 2010 (UTC)

Reports of German participation
Reacting to this edit, I did a bit of googling and quickly came up with this. It appears that there were reports of german participation in PH and in the Philippines including, apparently, some official reports. I haven't read enough of this source to really give me a sense of what effect those reports might have had, and haven't looked for other sources. Some mention that there were reports, of the impact of the reports, and of judgement about them in hindsight might be warranted. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 10:29, 27 June 2010 (UTC)
 * That source seems to be reporting the idea of German participation as an example of the rash thinking that a surprise attack can engender. As a PH Week detail, I would say it has its place in a book, but not a Wikipedia artice. Rumiton (talk) 12:51, 27 June 2010 (UTC)
 * I agree, because such claims are totally unverifiable...nothing more than the West's then-belittling of Japanese military capability (I first came across this while reading a VJ-Day 50th anniversary issue of Time. If there were indeed Germans who joined, how come books such as those written by Prange et al never really delved on them? And why has nobody on the German side ever corroborated the claims? Still, I don't think this is suitable for inclusion, let's not whet the appetites of conspiracy theorists.--Eaglestorm (talk) 16:56, 27 June 2010 (UTC)
 * This was MacArthur's theory in the P.I., as I recall, the contemporary view being the Japanese were incapable of achieving this kind of success without help. It has no basis in fact. It is, OTOH, at bottom, exactly what the conspiracy loons are saying, only they're giving Führer FDR the credit...  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  02:55, 28 June 2010 (UTC)
 * Rumito, I disagree with your interpretation about what the source which I mentioned above seems to be reporting. To me, it reports the fact that in the days following the attack U.S. news media trumpeted German participation in the attack either as fact or as unverified possibility, and that in the days after the attack the U.S. public, and even FDR himself, seemed secure in this belief. I'm not arguing that it is a fact that Germans participated, I'm arguing that it is a supportable assertion that Germans were reported as having participated. It seems to me that this might deserve mention in the article. I'm not particularly well versed in this topic, though, nor am I a regular editor of the article. I thought it best to mention this here for discussion by editors more familiar with this topic and with this article than I.
 * I note that the abovementioned book is itself mentioned in
 * and elsewhere. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 01:54, 29 June 2010 (UTC)
 * To which I suggest you're muddying the waters. What the public believed then is not, rpt not, what we know to be true now, &, as I have repeatedly said before, the page is, must be, written from the POV of what we know now, not what was believed then. Unless you intend to throw out most of the page, because it wasn't known to both sides at the time. That it was believed then is of small consequence unless you can conclusively demonstrate it influenced USG reaction. It didn't.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  03:56, 29 June 2010 (UTC)
 * I was looking from another angle. I saw the talk of participation and turned up reports of participation which struck me as possibly relevant. On consideration, I agree that this did muddy the water. The Hill book seems to have suggested in 2003 that the reports might have had an effect, or have been used for an effect. Trachtenberg said in 2006 that Hill's book isn't very good but does present some interesting evidence on American opinion in December 1941. The opinion info, though, does not seem relevant to the specific topic of this article -- the PH attack itself. I'd agree that this doesn't belong in this particular article, and wasn't arguing for its inclusion in any case -- just mentioning it in case others might think it ought to be noted here. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 05:12, 29 June 2010 (UTC)
 * Hmm... Looking at it that way is kind of interesting. :) If you've got a senior officer/official suggesting it seriously, whether as a question or a way to lay blame on Germany (in the fashion of MacArthur, or in the fashion of the "carrier-launched planes" myth for P.I. 10 Dec), it merits inclusion. I'd still oppose a bald inclusion, in the way it was, which stikes me as giving too much attention to a myth, &, as noted, muddying the issue; without even a senior source, the very most it deserves is a fn, IMO.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  11:35, 2 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I was looking from another angle. I saw the talk of participation and turned up reports of participation which struck me as possibly relevant. On consideration, I agree that this did muddy the water. The Hill book seems to have suggested in 2003 that the reports might have had an effect, or have been used for an effect. Trachtenberg said in 2006 that Hill's book isn't very good but does present some interesting evidence on American opinion in December 1941. The opinion info, though, does not seem relevant to the specific topic of this article -- the PH attack itself. I'd agree that this doesn't belong in this particular article, and wasn't arguing for its inclusion in any case -- just mentioning it in case others might think it ought to be noted here. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 05:12, 29 June 2010 (UTC)
 * Hmm... Looking at it that way is kind of interesting. :) If you've got a senior officer/official suggesting it seriously, whether as a question or a way to lay blame on Germany (in the fashion of MacArthur, or in the fashion of the "carrier-launched planes" myth for P.I. 10 Dec), it merits inclusion. I'd still oppose a bald inclusion, in the way it was, which stikes me as giving too much attention to a myth, &, as noted, muddying the issue; without even a senior source, the very most it deserves is a fn, IMO.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  11:35, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Cause of Hitler's declaration of war against USA and tripartate fact issue
Presently it is stated under "aftermath" that: "In Europe, Nazi Germany and the Kingdom of Italy subsequently declared war on the United States immediately after they began operations against a fellow Axis member, with Hitler stating in a delivered speech:"  As has been noted before in the coments section, the tripartate pact appears to only require assistance when a signatory is attacked. The quoted section is a bit vague, but it seems to imply either that Germany and Italy declared war after an American attack or agreesion/provocation or that as part of their membership in the Axis/tripartate pact they were obligated to declare war after the attack/declaration of war by Japan. Does anyone else agree that it would be better to revise this and all other similar mentions to clarify that Italy and Germany weren't obligated by the pact/membership in axis to declare/wage war on the USA? Regardless of the liklihood of this being the end result anyways, it does seem to bear mention that Hitler was not obligated to declare war on the US, and that he chose to do so without any legal obligation. (Given later statements made by him towards the end about not seeking world war or war with England et cet, it is a bit curious why he jumped in head first into a massive expansion of his allready overly-ambitious war).--Δζ (talk) 11:40, 3 July 2010 (UTC)

Map suggestion.
I think the article could really benefit from a better map, one that would show where buildings were located that were affected. These buildings should be the barracks, hangars at the fields, PX, etc. That is one thing missing on most websites and would make this article a cut way above the rest. I would work on it, but am graphically challenged. MagnoliaSouth (talk) 00:24, 25 September 2010 (UTC)

Nevada
We have Nevada getting under way while on fire forward, but this photo suggests she was actually afire amidships and aft. A little later she was struck by 2 more bombs which did indeed start a forward fire. Rumiton (talk) 16:38, 24 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Went ahead and made the change. Rumiton (talk) 07:18, 7 December 2010 (UTC)

Medal of Honor recipients
The article mentioned 16 Medal of Honor recipients in the "Aftermath" section. I'm nearly certain there were only 15:

Mervyn Bennion; John W. Finn; Francis C. Flaherty; Samuel G. Fuqua; Edwin J. Hill; Herbert C. Jones; Isaac C. Kidd; Jackson C. Pharris; Thomas J. Reeves; Donald K. Ross; Robert R. Scott; Peter Tomich; Franklin Van Valkenburgh; James R. Ward; Cassen Young

The reference listed wasn't well documented (no page number). I've changed it to 15. If anyone can document the 16th, please do so. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Ras07 (talk • contribs) 02:28, 7 December 2010 (UTC)

Commodore Perry's Expedition
Should not the section on the background to the attack on Pearl Harbor include a paragraph on Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan, the opening of Japan to the outside, and the modernization of Japan. That really was a big contributor to Japan's ambition to rival the U.S. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.171.142.138 (talk) 23:52, 6 December 2010 (UTC)
 * I don't get this. Why are you trying to connect Perry with the attack in any form? --Eaglestorm (talk) 09:43, 9 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Actually, the chain of events that resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor did begin with Perry forcibly opening Japan to western trade. Cla68 (talk) 10:51, 9 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Seems to me that would belong in a "Causes of WW2" article, but not in this simple article on the attack. Rumiton (talk) 13:11, 9 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Been there, done that. This isn't a history of Japan-U.S. relations.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  13:22, 9 December 2010 (UTC)

Caption on the USS West Virginia Gallery Link
The caption on the USS West Virginia states:


 * Battleship USS West Virginia took two aerial bombs, both duds, and seven torpedo hits, one of which may have come from a midget submarine.

However, there is no verifiable link to information on the midget submarine. There has been much debate over the years on whether the subs ever made it into the harbor. To avoid the debate on the subject, I would just delete the text to say:


 * Battleship USS West Virginia took two aerial bombs, both duds, and seven torpedo hits, one of which may have come from a midget submarine.

Kturini (talk) 22:53, 7 December 2010 (UTC)kturini
 * Ummm... I presume you mean del any ref midgets? No prob from me.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  11:15, 8 December 2010 (UTC)

Article improvement
Next year will be the 70th anniversary of this event. I'd like to get this article back to FA so it can be featured on the main page that day. I have many of the necessary books, but I'm going to order a few more, including At Dawn We Slept and get started on this article hopefully in about six weeks. Everyone is welcome to help out and I'll keep posting updates on this talk page. Cheers. Cla68 (talk) 06:10, 7 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Is there a list of issues somewhere? A Quest For Knowledge (talk) 18:20, 7 December 2010 (UTC)
 * It ran on the main page once. Sorry, Cla68 for duplicating these thoughts on your talk page just now. I hadn't seen this conversation, but I am definitely ready to help. Jehochman Talk 18:26, 7 December 2010 (UTC)
 * The article has improved substantially over the last couple of years. The main issues I can see are; 1) in some sections (particularly 'Aftermath') there remains a pronounced US point of views. 2) there are a number of major MOS violations (e.g. the image callery). 3) The presence of the 'in other media' sections. 4) In some parts of the article, referencing. Best wishes to those working on it. The Land (talk) 19:31, 7 December 2010 (UTC)
 * I will help where I can too. Strumvogel 66 and I will be collaborating on USS Arizona (BB-39) for the the 7 December 2011 TFA because this ran in '04. Ed [talk] [majestic titan] 19:52, 7 December 2010 (UTC)
 * OK, I don't have any problem with Arizona being on the main page next year. I'm thinking of using the three Prange books at first to expand the article with additional detail, especially putting in more of the Japanese side, then use other sources to flesh it out completely.  I ordered the Prange books yesterday, and, because of where I live, it will probably take a few weeks for them to arrive.  At the same time, I was thinking of improving the Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor article and nominating it for FA as well.  There are other associated articles, such as Japanese declaration of war on the United States and the British Empire, Order of battle of the Attack on Pearl Harbor, Infamy Speech, Results of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate, and the significant ship articles such as Arizona, Oklahoma, the other US battleships present during the attack, and the six Japanese aircraft carriers that could make this a featured topic candidate if all were sufficiently improved.  That's probaby too ambitious a goal for 2011, but something that hopefully we could accomplish before the 75th anniversary.  Cla68 (talk) 00:45, 8 December 2010 (UTC)
 * I was actually planning on working on the other battleships after I finished my South American battleships... :-) Still, if we went down that road, wouldn't we need all of the ships present during the attack? Ed [talk] [majestic titan] 00:51, 8 December 2010 (UTC)
 * I hope not. Perhaps the ship articles should be left out of the topic because that question might be raised.  The bio articles for the major leaders involved could also be potentially included.  Hopefully the core articles I listed above would be sufficient for FT. Cla68 (talk) 01:04, 8 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Aftermath needs definite cleanup. The quotation of Hitler's speech seems out of place, considering the belligerents of Pearl Harbor were Japan and the U.S. only. The link to the declaration of war article that I added suffices now, I think. We definitely need to add more from the Japan POV to this section, however. GunnerJr (talk) 15:12, 8 December 2010 (UTC)
 * "Sterling was shot down and killed by friendly fire returning from the fight."  This is not correct and is not mentioned in the source.  In online searching it reveals Sterling crashed into the sea during a dogfight.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.139.136.197 (talk) 01:19, 13 December 2010 (UTC)

time & duration
Would it not be benificial to state in the article that the attack commenced 0600 and ended 0715 (Local time) rather just say "In the morning". http://www.worldwar2history.info/Pearl-Harbor/ 85.210.106.168 (talk) 13:59, 21 December 2010 (UTC)

New source on the Japanese POV
A new book, ''[http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fb20100704a1.html DEMYSTIFYING PEARL HARBOR: A New Perspective From Japan, by Iguchi Takeo. I-House Press, 2010]'' appears to have some new information from the Japanese perspective on the background and execution of the Pearl Harbor attack. I'll add it to the further reading section and I'll probably purchase a copy. Cla68 (talk) 05:02, 5 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Perhaps what you learn there might help us make the Japanese declaration of war section less schizoid. Rumiton (talk) 15:36, 30 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm not sure. so-called "new perspectives" may even point at some stupid revisionist BS about the attack. And if this book doesn't provide any information that the multiple interviews with the survivors and the actual documents have not covered, well, it is no better. --Eaglestorm (talk) 15:56, 30 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I've just removed a fv tag from that section, though I haven't been able to fully confirm support for the related assertion. I infer from snippets I see here that the book probably does confirm the assertion. I'd appreciate someone with access to a dead tree version of the book reverifying this and either restoring the tag or adding relevant page numbers after better verification. Also, note that the second paragraph of this section relies on info about the work of Takeo Iguchi, the author of the New perspectives book. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 00:00, 31 July 2010 (UTC)

The "conventional wisdom" is that the Japanese plan was to deliver the war ultimatum 30 minutes before the attack began, thereby at least technically adhering to the conventions of war. However, the Japanese mini subs were in US territorial waters before the planned time for the delivery of the ultimatum. Therefore, Japan was already actively engaged in war with the US before the planes took off from their carriers. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/07/science/la-sci-minisub7-2009dec07 24.15.192.81 (talk) 18:07, 7 December 2010 (UTC)
 * "already actively engaged in war"? IMO, you'd get some argument on that score. In violation of conventions on the integrity of territorial waters, yes, & offering (perhaps) sufficient cause for the U.S. to declare war on Japan, but far from "active": not even one minisub fired on anything American before 07.55, not even after Ward detected (attacked!) one of them....  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  18:02, 15 January 2011 (UTC)


 * Given the state of tension between Japan and the United States, the presence of a miniature submarine within territorial waters, especially territorials waters that were part of the Pearl Harbor defensive sea area, was clearly an act of war. That doesn't necessarily mean the two belligerents were in a state of war; that has to be declared by one or both sides. After all, Germany and the United States had each carried out acts of war against the other in the Atlantic without either side formalizing it through a declaration of war.


 * Furthermore, the Japanese had already begun landings on Malaya two hours before the Pearl Harbor attack. The previous day Japanese fighters had shot down a British Hudson snooping the Malay convoy. The British Commonwealth, at least, had an airtight claim that they were attacked without any declaration of war.


 * As pointed out at http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/P/e/Pearl_Harbor.htm, there is some question whether the 14-part message actually constituted a declaration of war or even an ultimatum. It simply repeated the Japanese position and stated that further negotiation seemed useless. While that was certainly ominous, nowhere did the message actually declare that a state of war existed between the two powers, or would exist after a certain deadline unless the United States changed its course of action. Such a plain statement was not delivered until eight hours after the attack, when it was tendered to the British and American ambassadors in Tokyo. It may well be that the Japanese deliberately delivered such an ambiguous note with the intent to later claim that it constituted their declaration of war, but the claim would have been shaky. The failure to deliver it before the Pearl Harbor attack pretty much made it all moot, of course.


 * All for whatever it's worth. If it's worth anything, I'll dredge up citations for each of these points. Will not be hard; these are pretty universally acknowledged facts about the attack. Though I suppose it will remain a matter of interpretation, however stretched, whether the 14-part note constituted any kind of declaration of war. Yaush (talk) 21:56, 15 January 2011 (UTC)
 * ♠"clearly an act of war"? Clearly a stupid thing to do, maybe, & clearly a probable precursor to attack, but "act of war" is going a trifle far IMO. (I may be looking at this too much in contemporary terms; incursions by Sov subs have been pretty common.) It does depend on whether Congress chose to view it as one; shooting (sinking!) a USN DD, or a USN PG, was pretty damn warlike, too, but Congress blew that off.
 * ♠Attacks on Malaya or RAF aircraft amount to nothing in considering Japan's actions at Pearl, both because there's no actual alliance & because the U.S. (as noted) disbelieved Japan capable of acting in both places...
 * ♠The "14-Part Message" is treated as if a declaration (or a de facto one) by most historiographers, but it wasn't one in fact; it certainly gave notice something serious was coming, & that was probably an actual declaration...
 * ♠For the rest, I don't see a need for actual citing, here (on the page, yesh), 'cause AFAIK, none of it's really in doubt...  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  22:44, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

"surprise attack" versus "unannounced attack"
I do not want to get into an edit war over this. But "unannounced" is a very clumsy way to describe the attack on Pearl Harbor. "Surprise attack" is perfectly correct and is the conventional way of describing the attack. You will find it so described in countless works, scholarly and popular, and written by both Americans and Japanese.

Although most military commanders hope to surprise the enemy with their operation, few have achieved as great a degree of suprise as this one. It was one of the outstanding features of the operation.

"Surprise attack" is not a perjorative description. You seem to have this confused with "sneak attack", which is.

"Unannounced" is technically true, but then it is technically true of virtually every military operation of modern times. Not since medieval times has it been common for adversaries to announce to the enemy where they plan to meet him. Yaush (talk) 23:20, 11 January 2011 (UTC)


 * I agree, and I've restored "surprise attack", which is by no stretch of the imagination a pejorative term. An attack may well be unannounced but nevertheless anticipated by the enemy, so in that context "unannounced" and "surprise" are not synonymous. Malleus Fatuorum 23:38, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
 * The sources are fairly clear that it was a surprise attack. Ironically, there is more debate over to what degree the commencement of hostilities was announced or not by Japan.  I'll be getting into that when I get started on this article in a few months. Cla68 (talk) 00:14, 12 January 2011 (UTC)
 * I broadly agree, but the article and sources use the word "surprise" 7 times in total. It seems to me an over-emphasis, especially given the stated Japanese intention which was not to launch an undeclared war on the US. Rumiton (talk) 07:13, 12 January 2011 (UTC)
 * There is some debate on whether Japan's intention was really not to start an undeclared war or not. The Imperial General Headquarters apparently did want to attack without declaring the start of hostilities, while the foreign ministry was reluctant to go along with it.  Again, I'll be adding more detail on it in the future. Cla68 (talk) 07:57, 12 January 2011 (UTC)
 * IMO, Japan's intention only bears on "surprise" v "sneak", & AFAI'm concerned, expecting a declaration was unwarranted anyhow. Furthermore, since surprise certainly was achieved (conspiracy loons notwithstanding :/), "unannounced" doesn't get it. (It's also needlessly clumsy.) If there's repetition, IMO, it bears on removing the redundant refs, not just changing the word.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  14:32, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

Enterprise
Re this edit ("strong winds"? not unless it's a hurricane, & she'd have been (wild goose) chasing Nagumo for some of that time), what the book I cited as a supporting source says is, (p.57) "Halsey had expected to enter the channel at Pearl Harbor at 7:30 AM, but strong headwinds had delayed the refueling of his destroyers. Halsey's small task force, returning to Pearl after delivering some planes to the marine outpost at Wake Island in the Central Pacific, was running behind schedule. They were still 150 miles away from Hawaii. ..." and (p.59) "Halsey was gritting his teeth when Enterprise sailed into Pearl Harbor at dusk on December 8. His attention was immediately drawn to the wreck of the Utah&mdash;in the mooring space that would have been occupied by the Enterprise, had she not been delayed returning to Pearl." I've changed the wording of the footnote added to the article again, but my version might be too wordy. Improve it if you want but, per WP:DUE, issues taken with the meat of the source-supported assertion in the note should be similarly sourced.

According to the book, Halsey's flag secretary took a call (from the radio room, I surmise) and turned to Halsey with the news that the Japanese were attacking Pearl; a moment later, the communications officer burst in with a dispatch from CINCPAC (Husband Kimmel, at the time) saying, "AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NO DRILL". Since the book speaks of Halsey covering the 150 miles to Pearl by dusk of December 8, I surmise that he didn't spend much time searching for attacking Japanese on the way. The book does mention that the Japanese First fleet had six carriers and multiple battleships, cruisers, and destroyers and that Halsey's task force had one aircraft carrier, three cruisers, and nine destroyers; saying that if Halsey had found the striking force that day, his task force would have more than likely been annihilated. The book also says that "after a brief stop at Pearl", Halsey was involved in operations searching for Japanese warships. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 06:52, 25 January 2011 (UTC)


 * I do apologize for disbelief on the windiness. I stand by removing much of it anyhow, because it doesn't bear directly on the attack. Move it here, if it's not there already, & I'll cheer you for it. In addition, unless I'm mistaken, Enterprise did indeed get orders to search for Nagumo; was that later (next day), rather than immediately?  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  07:26, 25 January 2011 (UTC)


 * No problem. I haven't moved it even though I think it could/should be improved. I'm currently reading the book I cited and I thought the near-miss on having the Enterprise present at Pearl at the time of the attack worthy of mention here. It may also be worthy of mention in the USS Enterprise (CV-6) article, but this is a topic area which I don't edit regularly and in which I have very limited expertise. I'll leave it to other more interested editors to fine-tune this. Cheers. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 13:21, 25 January 2011 (UTC)
 * I agree, it's worth mentioning. My only complaint was, it was more ship-specific detail than warranted for a general page. (I will also confess ignorance of her fuelling troubles. : Absent objection, I'm going to trim it back again.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  23:18, 25 January 2011 (UTC)

German spy family, the Kuehns
An editor recently added four paragraphs about the German spies, the Kuehn (or Kuhn) family. The amount of information added was wa-a-ay too much emphasis, but it might be good to put a little bit about them in the article. There's a lot of material to choose from: Gordon Prange emphasizes that Kuehn's information was not very high quality, but the family was certainly working for both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Other sources say the Kuehns collected useful data. Binksternet (talk) 22:51, 27 January 2011 (UTC)
 * An Ordered Life: The Andrew N. Nelson Story. "A master-spy, Dr. Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn and his family moved to Honolulu in 1935. This German Nazi agent worked with the Japanese Consulate there and ultimately watched the Pearl Harbor attack from his house. He was arrested by the FBI on February 21, 1942. In exchange for valuable information, his death sentence was commuted to hard labor."
 * Citizen Hoover: a critical study of the life and times of J. Edgar Hoover. "In 1935 ...Dr. Kuehn, a personal friend of SS chief Heinrich Himmler, and his family landed in Hawaii, and settled in Honolulu. Dr. Kuehn, his wife Friedel, and his step-children Ruth and Hans all went immediately to work gathering data for the Axis."
 * Judgment without trial: Japanese American imprisonment during World War II. "In 1940, a Japanese agent wrote about the dubious quality of Kuehn's espionage work: '...his ability as a spy was so poor and primitive that it was feared he would not be able to get sufficient information for our intention of launching an air strike upon Pearl Harbor...'"
 * well every country has spies, especially when there is a major naval base open to view. Historians have stressed the Kuehns gave the Japanese no useful info, and they do not belong anywhere in the article.  Rjensen (talk) 23:20, 27 January 2011 (UTC)
 * I agree the emphasis is way undue, particularly since the article makes no mention of the highly effective intelligence work by the Japanese consulate. This had far more to do with the success of the attack than anything done by the Kuehns. Yaush (talk) 23:29, 27 January 2011 (UTC)
 * yes indeed-- there was 200 words on the Kuehns that mentioned the kids but failed to specify any information that they actually passed to the Japanese. Rjensen (talk) 23:35, 27 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Even if judged ineffective, Kuehn was the most prominent German national convicted by the U.S. government in the wake of Pearl Harbor. His existence could be mentioned along with more emphasis on Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa who is also not mentioned in this article as it now stands. Crime author Jay Robert Nash says that the Kuehns were the ones who determined December 7 to be the most opportune date. Binksternet (talk) 23:37, 27 January 2011 (UTC)
 * No, Kuehn was convicted as a German spy (which he was) and Germany was not involved. Kuehn invented numbers, says Prange--telling the Japanese at one point there were far more warships in harbor than the fleet possessed. Note that the original posting was a hoax: I looked at the source Total War and it never mentions the Kuehns and the page numbers given are for the book's index. The author was trying to fool Wikipedia. Rjensen (talk) 23:46, 27 January 2011 (UTC)
 * We need not concern ourselves much about User:Marmz10 who is apparently trying to satisfy a school assignment and is not concerned about validity. The School of Wikipedia will come Hard Knocking at his door if he posts trash. I directed him to the article Kuehn Family so as to keep an eye on the next attempt at scholarship. Binksternet (talk) 00:07, 28 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Regarding Kuehn, I was not trying to say he was anything but a German spy who also worked for the Japanese, and I was not trying to say Germany was involved in his trial. If Kuehn really did arrive at December 7 as the most likely date for a full harbor (rather than Yoshikawa) then he is at least notable for that. Binksternet (talk) 19:57, 28 January 2011 (UTC)
 * If Kuehn uncovered 7 December, it'd be about the only thing of value he did; from what I've read, these two should've been spying for Buster Keaton🇨🇦yay🇨🇦 (or had been recruited from one of his movies)...  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  23:54, 30 January 2011 (UTC)
 * It is just as possible that Yoshikawa or somebody else settled upon December 7... I should see if the sources are in conflict, or if they all agree on Kuehn.
 * If you're a Keaton fan, have you seen this beer commercial? He did another commercial for Alka-Seltzer—fitting, I guess. A bunch of Keaton material is free for download at Archive.org. Cheers! Binksternet (talk) 01:25, 31 January 2011 (UTC)
 * If "Tora! Tora! Tora!" gets it right (& I tend to think so...), Rufe Bratton damn near guessed. I wouldn't doubt a few people had guessed, Yoshikawa not being one of them IMO; he didn't have enough information. (I could well be wrong; he may've sensed something afoot by the urgency...)
 * Beyond Keaton being Canadian & having given Chaplin his first film, not really a fan. (I did like this, tho, silent or not. Available on DVD from my local library. ;) ) Great links anyhow, tho. Thx.  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  03:22, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

Dire straits?
I'm a bit concerned about the implied connection between Lee Embree & the pix in the gallery. Unless he actually shot any of them, I'd say mention of him belongs someplace else. I'm also less than sure he merits the attention he's getting. TREKphiler <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  16:28, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

The U.S. planned to go to war even if only the British and Dutch were attacked
This article contains a crucial error--it ignores the fact that the U.S. was indeed committed to fight the Japanese if they attacked the British and Dutch alone.

In April 1941 there was a military conference in Singapore which concluded that action would be taken if the Japan attacked any power. It was exhibit number 50 in the 1946 Pearl Harbor investigation and can be read here. The relevant section:

''26. Our collective military strength can only be developed fully if our Governments agree to act together, should any of them judge that the Japanese have taken action which necessitated active military counter-action. It is agreed that any of the following actions by Japan would create a position in which our failure to take active military counter-action would place us at such military disadvantage, should Japan subsequently attack, that we should then advise our respective Governments to authorise such action:-''

''(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of war". It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognised that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned.''

(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the West of 100° East or to the South of 10° North.

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the Equator East of Waigeo.

(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

This document was referred to in a memorandum on 27 November:

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that Joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

On 17 August 1941 President roosevelt informed the Japanese government that:

this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safe-guarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States

On 7 November 1941 Roosevelt polled his cabinet to determine whether or not the American people would support if "we struck at Japan down there" According to Stimson's notes :

''President Roosevelt took-"what be said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on the question of the Far East-whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be. It was a very interesting talk-the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had since I have been there. He went around the table first Hull and then myself, and then around through the whole number and it was unanimous in feeling the country would support us. He said that this time the vote is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good presentation of the general situation. I told them I rather narrowed it down into a following-up the steps which had been done to show what needed to be done in the future. The thing would have been much stronger if the Cabinet had known-and they did not know except in the case of Hull and the President-what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we are to pitch in (tr. 14415-14416)."''

In a war council on 28 November it was agreed to go to war if the British fought (p. 395):

''It was the consensus that the present move-that there was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere-completely changing the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indo-China. It was now the opinion of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo-China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indo-China, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of going.''

"It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn't think we could do; that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight.

On 29 November they actually drafted a twenty page warning the President was to deliver before Congress. It can be read on page 398.

On 6 December Roosevelt decided to deliver a warning on 9 December according to an Australian telegram (see page 425 .)

It is simply stunning that this information, which has been available since at least 1946, has not beeen included. 71.65.71.145 (talk) 22:58, 1 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Roosevelt's goal was to deter Japan from starting a war, as was made explicit in point number eight of the April agreement: "8. Knowledge by Japan that aggression by her against one of the Associated Powers would immediately lead to united resistance by all might prevent war." Japan ignored all the explicit warnings and decided to attack the United States and Britain and the Netherlands simultaneously on Dec 7/8 1941. That is called aggression. Rjensen (talk) 01:59, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * ♠Well said. Not to mention it was Winston's express goal, too. He knew Britain had her hands full with Germany. He also knew, as Roosevelt did (but as the conspiracy loons seem not to :/), any war between the U.S. & Japan was of sole benefit to Germany.
 * ♠"This article contains a crucial error--it ignores the fact that the U.S. was indeed committed to fight the Japanese if they attacked the British and Dutch alone." No, that was the commitment made by FDR to Churchill. Congress was neither party to nor bound by it. (I continue to be astounded by Americans not recognizing this pertinent little fact...) I'm frankly puzzled Winston bought it. (Grasping at straws?)
 * ♠"(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the Equator East of Waigeo." Persuant to 2), therefore, this would constitute grounds for the U.S. to declare war, since a convoy bound for the Kra Isthmus was detected. I notice Congress never even raised the issue of declaring war when this convoy was detected. (It was this very same convoy which helped deceive DC into believing Pearl Harbor must be safe, since Japan was believed, wrongly as it turned out, incapable of mounting more than one major operation at a time.)
 * ♠"In a war council on 28 November...It was now the opinion of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo-China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines." Notice no mention of Pearl Harbor. I invite you to post this to the loons page. Not that I expect it will change any minds.  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  05:13, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * From what I've read, and the document presented by the IP editor above does give some credence to this, there is some conjecture that the US might have declared war on Japan if Japan had attacked only Malaya, Burma, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies but not the Philippines or other American possessions or forces. I have not seen any source, however, which states that this course of action had been definitively decided upon by Roosevelt or Congress. Cla68 (talk) 07:13, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * It does appear (& I confess, I was unaware of it : Cabinet would have supported FDR if he moved to war. Cabinet is not Congress, & Congress blows like a weathervane. Public opinion, tho it had moved in favor of action, was still over 60% opposed to war: there was strong support of "do something" but also strong opposition to "go to war", which is a clear failure to understand the problem...
 * It's also true Japan didn't respond to pressure, which I suggest is as much to do with misreading the situation by the West as "Japanese aggression". As somebody smarter than I once said, you can only send a signal if the other side understands the signal. In this case, the buildup on the P.I. & the Fleet in Hawaii were supposed to deter; instead, they were seen by Japan as threats: same action, very different perspectives. (Ah, what Kurosawa would do with this... :D ) 07:29, 2 February 2011 (UTC)


 * True, it is a different outcome for something than expected. If the Japanese Military had been more under control of cooler heads then it may not have happened at all. Just as if the US Military hadn't been under control then they would have probably attacked Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Deterrence doesn't always work but is better than War at any time.
 * Big Roger (talk) 12:18, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Japan did get the Allied message to the effect that an attack on one would be an attack on all. Therefore it attacked all of them simultaneously.  It is big problem was oil -- it had no oil of its own, but there was plenty of oil in the Dutch East Indies and in British Burma, which therefore became the main target of attack.  As it happened, the oil wells were destroyed by the companies before the Japanese got there, and by the time they got the wells working again the American submarine system was sinking most of their tankers.  Japan had stockpiles of oil that lasted through 1942, but by 1943 that situation was getting desperate.  For example-there was little aviation gasoline to use for training new pilots, and the skill level of the Japanese pilots declined drastically.  The United States at this time was pumping most of the world's oil, with big fields in Texas, Oklahoma, and California. Rjensen (talk) 14:24, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * ♠"Japan did get the Allied message to the effect that an attack on one would be an attack on all." That was the most unfortunate effect of the (apparent) Allied solidarity. I'm of the opinion it had less to do with "getting the message" than giving leverage to IJN leadership over IJA. IJN was at risk of having its budget deeply cut, & "need for war" would obviate that; ergo, IJN argued for inseparability for its own reasons, having no attention on reality.
 * ♠"by the time they got the wells working again the American submarine system was sinking most of their tankers" That's rather seriously overstating it... For the first 2 years of the war, tanker tonnage actually increased. Tankers weren't on #1 priority (& unless you really care, I'm not searching Blair to find out when that changed; ;p 1944, IIRC). Japanese usage was well above peacetime, but losses to the Sub Force were within Japanese expectations (thanks to the lousy torpedoes...& in some measure to bad doctrine & stupid basing decisions, leaving boats in Oz, & maybe most of all, contrary to common belief, to a single collossal blunder by a Customs guy prewar, which caused Japan to change the "maru code"--which ONI was reading at the time...).
 * ♠"The United States at this time was pumping most of the world's oil" Funny thing is, the U.S. was also supplying most of Japan's oil prewar... IDK about you, but for Japan to then attack the U.S. seems deeply irrational to me. Then again, Japanese military leadership had such godawful grasp of strategic realities, & the meaning of strategic planning, perhaps it was just plain ignorance.
 * ♠"Deterrence ... is better than War" With that you get no argument. It is also unfortunately true, in some cases, it's necessary. I believe Japan could have been dissuaded, with better diplomacy (the total oil embargo was a mistake, playing off Japan & Germany over the SU would have been a good idea, & a deal between Chiang & Tojo was possible almost any time between '37 & '41). Hitler would not be.  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  17:45, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

''Roosevelt's goal was to deter Japan from starting a war, as was made explicit in point number eight of the April agreement: "8. Knowledge by Japan that aggression by her against one of the Associated Powers would immediately lead to united resistance by all might prevent war." Japan ignored all the explicit warnings and decided to attack the United States and Britain and the Netherlands simultaneously on Dec 7/8 1941. That is called aggression.''

The April agreement was made before the July oil embargo, so they didn't know at the time that war would be forced on Japan via the embargo.

''Well said. Not to mention it was Winston's express goal, too. He knew Britain had her hands full with Germany. He also knew, as Roosevelt did (but as the conspiracy loons seem not to :/), any war between the U.S. & Japan was of sole benefit to Germany.''

The U.S. was already committed earlier in 1941 to take on Germany first if there was war with Japan (the Rainbow-5 plan). Obviously, Roosevelt intended to force Japan into a war and then use the war psychosis and the death of the isolationist movement to declare war on Germany sometime later, even if Germany didn't declare war first. He had already started attacking German ships in September, and on 17 November he got Congress to allow U.S. merchant ships to go into war zones which would have created numerous "incidents". You don't have to be a conspiracy nut to figure out Roosevelt wanted war with Germany, by hook or crook, and that Japan was merely a tool being used to that end.

''I notice Congress never even raised the issue of declaring war when this convoy was detected. (It was this very same convoy which helped deceive DC into believing Pearl Harbor must be safe, since Japan was believed, wrongly as it turned out, incapable of mounting more than one major operation at a time.)''

Congress was never consulted in the first place, and Roosevelt didn't plan to consult Congress until the last minute.

''Notice no mention of Pearl Harbor. I invite you to post this to the loons page. Not that I expect it will change any minds.''

I never said FDR knew about Pearl Harbor. All I'm saying is that Japan was 100% correct in assuming that the U.S. would attack it if they tried to conquer the East Indies.

I have not seen any source, however, which states that this course of action had been definitively decided upon by Roosevelt or Congress.

I just showed you that Roosevelt's cabinet made up it's mind on 28 November. Congress was going to be consulted at the last minute.

It does appear (& I confess, I was unaware of it : Cabinet would have supported FDR if he moved to war. Cabinet is not Congress, & Congress blows like a weathervane. Public opinion, tho it had moved in favor of action, was still over 60% opposed to war: there was strong support of "do something" but also strong opposition to "go to war", which is a clear failure to understand the problem...

Yes but FDR intended to only consult Congress either just before or just after Japan struck the British and Dutch, thus putting Congress "on the spot". As you can see in the proposed speech draft of 29 November that I linked to, he intended to present the situation as a direct and urgent threat to American interests. Furthermore, FDR intended to manufacture an incident. On 2 December he personally ordered that the Asiatic fleet in the Philippines charter three small vessels and then put them in the way of the Japanese invasion forces in Indochina. This was ordered in spite of the fact that air reconaissance was already being conducted, and that the Navy didn't ask for it. See page 528, note 1. . 71.65.71.145 (talk) 18:10, 2 February 2011 (UTC)
 * ♠"Obviously, Roosevelt intended to force Japan into a war and then use the war psychosis and the death of the isolationist movement to declare war on Germany sometime later, even if Germany didn't declare war first." Obviously? FDR could count on the public, & more importantly Congress, being willing to declare war on Germany while at war with Japan, which had attacked the U.S. (which Germany had explicitly avoided doing, despite serious provocation) why, exactly?
 * ♠"Roosevelt wanted war with Germany, by hook or crook, and that Japan was merely a tool being used to that end." You're half right. Involving Japan was calculated to benefit Germany, not Britain. You've fallen into the same trap as the conspiracy loons. We know Germany declared war. FDR had no way of knowing an attack by Japan would bring in Germany; in fact, he would know pretty well it would interfere with aid to Britain or war with Germany, since attention would be on Japan. (It was hard enough as it was.) Claiming "war psychosis" is hindsight, & FDR would not have had the benefit of it.
 * ♠"Japan was 100% correct in assuming that the U.S. would attack it if they tried to conquer the East Indies." Well, no. Unless U.S. territory was attacked, there was next to zero chance. It's been suggested even an attack on the P.I. wouldn't get it.
 * ♠"Roosevelt's cabinet made up it's mind on 28 November. Congress was going to be consulted at the last minute." Again, you've missed it: neither FDR nor his Cabinet had independent authority to declare war. He didn't have to "consult Congress", he damn well had to get permission. This is 1941, not 1991. The idea of a President starting a war off his own bat would not occur to anybody, especially the President, in 1941. You seem not to get that. Recall what FDR himself said 8 December: "I ask the Congress delcare a state of war has existed". If he had the authority to do it himself, he would have as soon as the news reached DC the afternoon of 7 December. Notice, he didn't.
 * ♠"he intended to present the situation as a direct and urgent threat to American interests." As opposed to the sinking of a U.S. destroyer in the Atlantic? I suspect Congress already had a pretty good idea Japan was a potential threat. I doubt anyone believed she was an actual threat. I also think the idea was deterrence, not confrontation, since, as noted, FDR & his Cabinet could read a chart (& for those who couldn't, Stark & Marshall damn sure could) & had been asked by Churchill to help avoid a war with Japan, not manufacture one.
 * ♠"FDR intended to manufacture an incident." To what benefit? War with Japan, as already said, does not aid Britain one damn bit. This is the same nonsense as the Pearl Harbor conspiracy loons: it begins from a false premise (war with Japan leads to war with Germany) & therefore comes to a false conclusion. What part of "deter Japan" do you not get?
 * ♠"The April agreement was made before the July oil embargo, so they didn't know at the time that war would be forced on Japan via the embargo." I think that's the only thing you've gotten right.  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  19:05, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

''Obviously? FDR could count on the public, & more importantly Congress, being willing to declare war on Germany while at war with Japan, which had attacked the U.S. (which Germany had explicitly avoided doing, despite serious provocation) why, exactly?''

All he would have to do is claim that Japan attacked at Germany's behest and then point to the Tripartite Pact as evidence. The war psychosis and attacks on U.S. ships in the Atlantic would take care of the rest.

Involving Japan was calculated to benefit Germany, not Britain.

Britain would have benefited most from a U.S. entry into the war, regardless of whether or not that meant some U.S. resources were tied down in the Pacific. Remember. Rainbow-5 concentrated U.S. resources against Germany. There was nothing Roosevelt could do to force Germany to declare war, so he tried the back door with Japan.

Again, you've missed it: neither FDR nor his Cabinet had independent authority to declare war.

This is frivolous. The point is that the Cabinet had decided that it would bring the issue before Congress, which would then proceed to declare war after Japan attacked the British and Dutch. As early as 7 November the Cabinet decided that the American people would support such a move. See my initial post.

I also think the idea was deterrence, not confrontation, since, as noted, FDR & his Cabinet could read a chart (& for those who couldn't, Stark & Marshall damn sure could) & had been asked by Churchill to help avoid a war with Japan, not manufacture one.

Then why on earth did Hull and Roosevelt, without consulting the British, submit a proposal to Japan on 26 November which they knew was totally unacceptable? Why did they do this even though they knew Japan had set a negotiation deadline for 29 November and the previous day they detected a Japanese expedition forming in southern China? 71.65.71.145 (talk) 23:16, 2 February 2011 (UTC)


 * ♠"All he would have to do is claim that Japan attacked at Germany's behest and then point to the Tripartite Pact as evidence. The war psychosis and attacks on U.S. ships in the Atlantic would take care of the rest." And Congress would believe Japan was a German puppet why? As for the Tripartite Pact, it proves alliance, not conspiracy. And that "war psychosis" was not a blank cheque for FDR to do what he wanted, no matter what you think.
 * ♠"Britain would have benefited most from a U.S. entry into the war" That's the uninformed nonsense that underpins the Pearl Harbor conspiracy theory. Britain does not benefit from the U.S. at war with Japan, & Hitler, FDR, & Churchill all damn well knew it. You don't. The conspiracy loons don't. So, some facts. U.S. at war with Japan diverts troops, material, airplanes (VLR Liberators!), & ships (destroyers desperately needed in the Atlantic) to the Pacific. It puts Brit needs below those of the U.S. (You'd expect different?)
 * ♠"There was nothing Roosevelt could do to force Germany to declare war, so he tried the back door with Japan." Not for lack of trying.... It wasn't just Germany: it was Congress, which wasn't yet ready to declare war on Germany, despite German actions. You seem to believe it was all on Hitler (who was going out of his way to avoid war with the U.S., while hoping for a U.S.-Japanese war, for exactly the reasons I mention).
 * ♠"This is frivolous. The point is that the Cabinet had decided that it would bring the issue before Congress, which would then proceed to declare war after Japan attacked the British and Dutch. As early as 7 November the Cabinet decided that the American people would support such a move. See my initial post." Frivolous? Want to bet? Congress wouldn't declare war on Germany after German U-boats sank U.S. destroyers. Do you really beleive Congress would have the U.S. at war for the defense of British colonies in Asia? Don't be ridiculous. There was more sympathy for the Chinese than the Brits, & there hadn't been a declaration of war in their support since 1937, despite Japan sinking a U.S. gunboat in China. And as I said, the "public support" you claim was more than equivocal: the public wanted "something" only slightly more than they wanted "not war". Or did you not notice that little fact?
 * ♠"Then why on earth did Hull and Roosevelt, without consulting the British, submit a proposal to Japan on 26 November which they knew was totally unacceptable?" Because Hull was a nitwit? (He was, to be clear, strongly anti-Japanese.) Or because the Japanese war plan was already underway & it would have made no damn difference? Or because the Army was in charge of Japan's government, so it would have made no damn difference? Or because the U.S. was convinced Japan could actually be reasoned with? Or because, in line with Winston's request, FDR was doing his damndedst to avoid a war with Japan? Or because the U.S. didn't make clear she was willing to grant conquest of Manchuria? (Chiang, too, I'll bet.) Also, how did the U.S. supposedly know this proposal was "totally unacceptable"? I'm unaware of a U.S. agent in Japan's Cabinet. (It was not in PURPLE, so don't go claiming it was.) We know it was, with the benefit of complete information from the Japanese; FDR & Hull could not know. (You've fallen into the conspiracy loons' trap again... You're seeing it with hindsight. FDR didn't have hindsight.) As far as the Japanese "convoy", I fail to see how it matters, since there was no prospect of the U.S. going to war on Britain's behalf. And it's not like she was expecting an attack on the Philippines (let alone Hawaii...).  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  01:08, 3 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Let me remind you both that talk pages are for discussing improvements to the article, not debating on the subject, so unless you discuss how to input fresh material into the article or fix existing stuff, go to some history forum and continue your word play. --Eaglestorm (talk) 02:00, 3 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Anybody wants to pick it up on my talk is welcome.  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  03:51, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

Part II
Someone decided to lock the previous section so I guess the discussion should continue here. The discussion is regarding why this article contains outright falsehoods with regards to the idea that there was no intention on the part of FDR and his associates to go to war with Japan if only the British and Dutch were attacked. I posted the evidence above, and it cannot be interpreted any other way. 71.65.71.145 (talk) 22:19, 4 February 2011 (UTC)
 * ♠"it cannot be interpreted any other way"? Since when? I know of at least one professional historiographer, H. P. Willmott (Wilmott? I always spell it wrong...), who disagrees (in The Barrier & the Javelin). Doubtless he's not the only one. He expressly suggests the better Japanese strategy would have been to bypass the P.I. & accept the hazard because it remains unclear an attack even in the P.I. would have led to a U.S. declaration of war, no matter what FDR wanted. (BTW, FDR really wanted a war with Germany, & despite multiple incidents in the Atlantic, involving U.S. ships, he had yet to get one. In light of this, how do you conclude an attack on foreign colonies was going to move Congress, no matter what FDR wanted?)
 * ♠"Joint defense plans" do not amount to war plans, nor do they amount to Congressional agreement to any part of them. Neither does FDR's Cabinet agreeing. Until, & unless, you can offer evidence Congress agreed, you have nothing. What part of "Congress shall declare war" do you not understand?
 * ♠Your proposal Hull deliberately sent an unacceptable proposal does not stand scrutiny. The Japanese refusal could very well have been seen by Hull as nothing more than a negotiating tactic; it's far from unusual for diplomats to say a position is "completely unacceptable". That does not mean he knew it would lead to a Japanese attack, & saying it does is, yet again, hindsight. You're imputing knowledge Hull did not have & could not have had. Hell, the Japanese negotiators didn't know it would mean an attack! How would Hull? Because his chief advisor was Kreskin? Magic 8-Ball? He's part gypsy princess? Be real.
 * ♠Let me make this as clear as I can. FDR agreed to the "joint defense plan", not Congress. (It was not a treaty of alliance nor of mutual defense, & so not binding on the U.S.) FDR wanted to aid the British. (Congress, not so much.) FDR would not go to war over British colonies, not in Asia nor anywhere else. (He was anti-colonialist & wanted the Brits to give up their colonies. It's part of the reason the U.S. got tangled up in Vietnam: not supporting France taking back IndoChina...) FDR knew damn well war against Japan did not aid Britain. The idea was prevent a war with Japan, not start one. (Your evidence of intent to start one is both flimsy & unconvincing, considering FDR's express objectives.) FDR & Hull could not know the Hull Note was a futile gesture. And I invite you to provide actual evidence it was intended as a provocation, which was contrary to FDR's express policy & stated objectives: which is to say, Hull acting contrary to the express instructions of his President, which would get him fired.
 * ♠In short, your proposition is wrong, & your supreme confidence in it, or in the rightness of your reasoning, do not change that.  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  23:34, 4 February 2011 (UTC) (Post scriptum. Anyone who wants to continue the debate on the issue is free to do so on my talk. I welcome it.)

Yes, of course Congress would ultimately decide whether or not there would be a war. But both FDR's cabinet and the Japanese thought Congress and the public would support a war, so the behaved exactly as if it the agreement was approved by Congress. As for the Hull note, they intercepted Japanese communications which made clear that the proposal was unacceptable. Hull himself admitted on the spot it was unacceptable.

Even if you were right, it doesn't matter because the only thing I put in the article was Roosevelt's warning to Japan and the fact that the military plans existed. 71.65.71.145 (talk) 20:35, 5 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Sorry, but you're also breaking the chronology, changing the header to make the section all about the embargo (it isn't), & deleting the fact Japan was wrong believing the U.S. would help defend British & Dutch colonies, which, depite your fixation, is far from proven. "Remotely controversial"? Not "remotely proven", & your certitude does not make it true.
 * "Yes, of course Congress would ultimately decide whether or not there would be a war." A remarkable concession. It's also fundamental, & the flaw in your reasoning. Japan is certain (for the same reasons you are, it seems) the U.S. will join. She's wrong & so are you, & that is the problem: you're changing it to remove the mistaken certitude, for which there is lack of basis.  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  00:08, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

I have given more than enough explanation for my points. It is a fact that FDR and co. planned to intervene. Your only response so far is that you don't personally believe the U.S. Congress would have declared war. That's not good enough. 71.65.71.145 (talk) 18:55, 6 February 2011 (UTC)
 * ♠"Your only response so far"? I've also got the disbelief of a professional historiographer who probably knows this issue better than both of us, & he didn't believe it, either. More to the point, you're trying to prove something that contradicts what did happen & what the people involved believed.
 * ♠"I have given more than enough explanation"? Then explain how FDR is now willing to defend British colonial interests, when he thinks Britain should give up colonies. Explain how war with Japan helps Britain. Explain why Hull is acting contrary to FDR's objectives (& Britain's requests). Explain why Congress will react with a declaration of war now, & not before. Explain how public opinion which opposes war flips just because FDR & his Cabinet want it to. "More than enough"? You've fallen back on your own certitude & not even bothered to address any other issue raised. If you're right & there's evidence for it, show it to me.
 * ♠All you have now is evidence of FDR's putting up a common front to deter Japan, which was what led Japan to a mistaken belief she faced both the U.S. & Britain in any attack on Britain. It's obviously led you to the same one, with less reason.  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  19:41 & 19:46, 6 February 2011 (UTC)
 * To the anon, I had good reason to lock down the previous thread (and Dmacks with protecting the article), and despite strong agreements by Trekphiler and his invitation to take things up on his talk page, not to mention ignoring article talk page guidelines, you have continued to rant on about your misgivings on the article. It smacks of revisionism. I detest editors who try to railroad their way into the article, thinking they know better than established consensus. To be honest, you're one of them and no different from all those conspiracy theorists. You will drop it right now, and I don't want to hear any more discourses from you.--Eaglestorm (talk) 23:30, 6 February 2011 (UTC)
 * I do regret both were necessary, because I genuinely believe the issue should be aired, if there's doubt about it. (I imagine our IP isn't the only person to think this...) Given that, if anything I've had to say has improved the page, or enlightened anyone, I consider it well worth it (even if it's gone a bit beyond WP boundaries :. And the invitation remains open to anyone wanting to contine with me. (If you've come in late, not to worry. ;p)  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  05:03, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

I haven't been following this discussion but, from skimming it, it strikes me that it would be more pertinent to the Allies of World War II article than to this one. That other article doesn't have a section about the United States, and it should. Also, keep WP:DUE in mind. What matters is not the views of WP editors, but rather what significant viewpoints have been published by reliable sources. I'm no historian of the period, but it seems to me as if there is plenty of meat out there to support a stand-alone article on the runup to the U.S. entry into WW-II (e.g., material starting at, , , , , , etc.) Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 07:13, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

I would urge you guys to actually read the entire Pearl Harbor report before you jump on the attack. I'm not asserting that FDR "knew" about the Pearl Harbor attack, merely that he forced the war on Japan.

Then explain how FDR is now willing to defend British colonial interests, when he thinks Britain should give up colonies.

He wanted to use them in the short term to force the war on Japan.

Explain how war with Japan helps Britain.

The war psychosis would help Roosevelt secure a declaration of war on Germany after a few more "incidents" in the Atlantic.

Explain why Hull is acting contrary to FDR's objectives (& Britain's requests).

Hull was acting directly in tandum with FDRs objective of forcing war on Japan. If they had to sacrifice a few British colonies, he was willing to pay that price.

Explain why Congress will react with a declaration of war now, & not before.

Because Japan was attacking what FDR would have portrayed as a strategically vital area.

Explain how public opinion which opposes war flips just because FDR & his Cabinet want it to

That really is irrelevant. I'm not trying to prove that FDR, his cabinet, and Japan were right, merely that they thought they were right which is far more important to this situation. 71.65.71.145 (talk) 00:47, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * This adds nothing. When you bring contentious material here and argue it, bring citations. Binksternet (talk) 01:08, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Sad to say, this appears to be a case of "Don't confuse me with facts"... I don't recall when I've seen such closed-mindedness outside one of the conspiracy loons. Consider this my final word. Banging your head against a brick wall accomplishes nothing and annoys the wall.  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  06:05, 15 February 2011 (UTC)

Part III
I don't understand why my changes are constantly being reverted. The only changes I made were:

1) Changing the title to "Allied embargo against Japan" since that accurately describes the proximate cause of the war.

2) Adding Roosevelt's warning to Japan of August 17 1941.

3) Adding the fact that the U.S. made plans to intervene if Japan attacked the East Indies.

4) Adding the fact that Roosevelt's cabinet decided that the U.S. public would support war with Japan.

THe source I gave for this was the official Pearl Harbor Investigation. I'm not sure why this is so controversial. 71.65.71.145 (talk) 15:20, 19 February 2011 (UTC)


 * It is not neutral. Your first change to the article content was saying that Japan "needed" natural resources such as petroleum and rubber. They wanted those things, yes, but they did not "need" the amount they sought. The large amount they sought was to support aggressive imperialist plans in China, so no, they did not "need" so much.
 * U.S. plans to intervene in the East Indies were only contingency plans, not an absolute if–then conclusion. There was no mutual support treaty.
 * The U.S. public's notional support of war "unanimously" decided by the Cabinet? The word "unanimously" is too positive, extending its effect onto the people of the U.S. in your version. This decision by the Cabinet leads the reader to believe they were right, which is highly questionable. Nobody can know what the U.S. citizens would have felt if Japan first attacked the East Indies and then U.S. military forces counterattacked. Binksternet (talk) 16:16, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * I'd add the header is too narrow. The section isn't about the embargo, it's about the lead-up & the numerous factors; the embargo is just the final straw.
 * Also, the change in emphasis on posited "U.S. plans" effectively makes it untrue. It's as if the attack by Ward at 04.30 was described as "the U.S. started the war": it's the same event, but by no means a correct interpretation. The U.S. had been "making plans" for war with Japan since 1897 (at least), which is when Orange was first promulgated. The U.S. also had plans at DoW for fighting Canada & Britain (&, for all I know, the Vatican). It's a long step from contingency planning to active war planning (tho I have come across some peaceniks who don't know the difference... :/ ). These "U.S. plans" for the Pacific were more notional than actual, expressions of intent & support for Britain. They were not treaty obligations by any stretch of the imagination. You're treating them as if they are. If they were, I suggest on 27 Nov, instead of getting the notorious "war warning", MacArthur would have been told to begin aggressive recce of Formosan airbases, & Hart told to (at least) place subs on close watch on Japanese bases in Formosa & the Home Islands, if not actually use his surface units to provoke Japanese attacks on them. It didn't happen. That, as already stated a couple of times, is because neither FDR nor Winston wanted war in the Pacific. If it came, FDR's policy had failed. It did, because U.S. leaders misunderstood Japan.
 * Finally, to repeat, it makes scant difference what FDR, his Cabinet, or the public was willing to do. What mattered was what Congress was willing to do. (Nor am I convinced public support was anything like as strong in favor of war as you seem to believe.)
 * It is, therefore, controversial to put forth a view contradictory to the existing evidence, which is substantial, without extremely strong evidence in support of that contrary view. What you have is a stubbornly held point of view, not evidence.
 * As for my "final word"? Oh, well... ;p I continue to hold out hope, I suppose. :D  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  18:00, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

''Your first change to the article content was saying that Japan "needed" natural resources such as petroleum and rubber. They wanted those things, yes, but they did not "need" the amount they sought. The large amount they sought was to support aggressive imperialist plans in China, so no, they did not "need" so much.''

They needed the oil if they wanted to have an effective military. I thought that was implied, but we could make it more explicit.

''U.S. plans to intervene in the East Indies were only contingency plans, not an absolute if–then conclusion. There was no mutual support treaty.''

But everyone--the Americans, British, Dutch, Chinese etc.--acted exactly as if the agreements were binding, so effectively they were.

This decision by the Cabinet leads the reader to believe they were right, which is highly questionable.

Well, I would assume that the cabinet would have had a lot more knowledge about this than anyone else did. But again, I don't say that they were right, just that this was the assumption.

Fundamentally, this article is just misleading. It doesn't convey the extremely relevant fact that the war was completely forced on Japan. Why else would Hull have submitted that humiliating proposal that he knew was not acceptable? The whole alleged reason the embargo was imposed on the first place was to punish Japan for moving into Southern Indochina. When Japan offered to remove it's forces from Southern Indochina, not only did Hull not accept the proposal, he came back and demanded that Japan withdraw from all of China. How on earth could that be interpreted as a sincere negotiating position? How on earth could anyone have expected Japan to agree to those terms? FDR and co. knew that war was imminent in early December, yet the proposal was never modified. Why? The only logical conclusion is that they wanted Japan to go on the attack.

Now I'm not asking that the article put it so bluntly. But the facts need to be present. 71.65.71.145 (talk) 22:21, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * ♠"They needed the oil if they wanted to have an effective military." No, they needed it to carry out offensive operations against the Chinese, & even more, to carry out offensive operations against the Brits & Dutch who were refusing to kow tow. The Dutch had been willing to sell oil out of DEI, just not in the quantity Japan demanded. (Not "asked for": demanded. The attitude was "give or else"; the Dutch chose "or else".)
 * ♠"I don't say that they were right, just that this was the assumption." And you leave the false impression it was FDR & Cabinet who got to decide if there was going to be a war, & that both Congress & the public would support it, & that it was a correct decision, &, most important, that it was what FDR intended all along, none of which are supportable or accurate.
 * ♠"everyone...acted exactly as if the agreements were binding" Where, where, is your evidence for this? They were co-operating to deter Japan. Joint action by nations in sanctions does not imply obligations. By that reasoning, joint U.S.-Russian sanctions against Iran imply an agreement for one to aid the other if Iran attacks! (Leave off how crazy the Iranians would have to be...)
 * ♠"When Japan offered to remove it's forces from Southern Indochina, not only did Hull not accept the proposal, he came back and demanded that Japan withdraw from all of China. How on earth could that be interpreted as a sincere negotiating position?" Did you not read anything I wrote? This kind of thing is routine in diplomatic negotiations. (Note, at the end of the war, Japan's opening negotiating position was, "keep conquered territory", & the U.S.'s was "be turned into a parking lot"...) Also, as noted, Hull was no fan of Japan, & may have (wrongly...) believed she could be bullied. It's also been suggested there was a misunderstanding about what the U.S. meant by "China", & that Hull would have been willing to let Japan keep Manchuria, if she got out of metropolitan China. It also occurs to me Hull considered the Japanese negotiators untrustworthy. (She'd just invaded former French colonies, taking advantage of Germany's success; it might have looked a lot like the Sudetenland all over again, especially since she'd been at war with China, off & on, since 1931.) Moreover, he may have (wrongly) believed he could outmanever them because the U.S. was reading PURPLE & thus knew what Tokyo was saying, not realizing it was the Army, not the Diet, that was in charge.
 * ♠Bear in mind, also, FDR (& doubtless Hull) hoped Japan would do something stupid so the U.S. could offer more aid to China, without violating the Neutrality Acts. Attacking Pearl Harbor, I'm sure, was not what they had in mind... As I said, the total oil embargo was a mistake, & it had exactly the opposite effect intended.
 * ♠"the facts need to be present" Well, as I read it, the negotiatons are presented, the demands of both sides enumerated, the treaty obligations set out, & the objectives named. The only thing left out is the entirely wrong emphasis you want put on the facts, & that's going to continue to be left out unless you've got more than POV to back it up. You seem to believe the same wrong thing Japan did, with less reason. You also seem to be just as impenetrable on it, with much less reason. I don't want to be rude, here, but your ignorance of the circumstances is clouding your understanding of the issues, & a stubborn unwillingness to see the facts isn't helping.  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  23:18, 19 February 2011 (UTC)


 * "It doesn't convey the extremely relevant fact that the war was completely forced on Japan." It would be hard to come up with a better example of a statement violating both NPOV and the scholarly consensus. Yaush (talk) 23:31, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * That also completely captures the total failure of the "Allied" policy: it produced a situation where Japan, with reason, felt forced into war, exactly the opposite of the intent. Toland, IIRC, put it best: Japan was put in a position to either back down, which no self-respecting country would (with national survival apparently at stake, thanks to the embargo), or fight--& the U.S. was surprised by the attack. The U.S., Brits, & Dutch took (apparently) reasonable steps, made (apparently) forgivable mistakes, & it completely blew up on them. If you don't acknowledge that, if you take the view Japan's appreciation was right on solidarity, frankly, you just don't know what you're talking about.  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  23:43, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

I find the idea that Hull and Roosevelt's actions were "mistakes" preposterous. They knew Japan was giving it's final proposal. They knew they were going to attack if the proposal was not accepted. Yet they demanded that Japan withdraw from all of China, without even mentioning Manchuria. They would have to be complete idiots not to know that the Hull note meant certain war. It's a cardinal rule that you don't increase your demands when your near the end of negotiations. This is the same tactic Hitler used with Poland.

But I still don't understand why the raw facts I presented can't be included, regardless of this debate. 71.65.71.145 (talk) 18:29, 20 February 2011 (UTC)


 * If you don't understand, please leave the article to those who do. You have not yet connected your discussion here to a mainstream scholar. This article is based on very careful balancing of mainstream historical research at the highest level, not on the musings of individual editors. Binksternet (talk) 19:00, 20 February 2011 (UTC)


 * ♠"They knew Japan was giving it's final proposal. They knew they were going to attack if the proposal was not accepted." Really? Do you have a source for that? Because in over 25yr reading on the subject, I've never seen any one (outside, perhaps, the conspiracy loons who couldn't tell this story straight to save their lives) saying they did. The policy as executed, from the basing in Hawaii to the buildup in the P.I. to the steel & oil embargoes, was mistaken. It wasn't one mistake, it was a whole string of them, based on faulty understanding of Japan's internal politics.
 * ♠"near the end of negotiations"? Where do you find evidence of that? It smells of 20/20 hindsight, which is another of the cardinal mistakes the conspiracy nuts make. We know the outcome, & see the mistakes along the way as signposts. FDR & Hull did not have that advantage. "Something is going to happen" could very well have meant nothing more than Japan breaking off negotiations as futile. It did not mean war was going to start. That little tidbit was not in PURPLE , no matter what you may think, because even the Japanese diplomats in Washington did not know there would be an attack. So how would FDR & Hull know, exactly? And it assuredly did not mean the U.S. was going to go to Britain's aid in Asia if Japan attacked her.
 * ♠As I think of it, the invasion force bound for the Kra Isthmus had been sighted, if that's what you mean. How would FDR have known where it was bound...? Seeing Japan had occupation forces in northern IndoChina (North Vietnam)...
 * ♠"Yet they demanded that Japan withdraw from all of China, without even mentioning Manchuria" As noted, another mistake.
 * ♠You appear to be all over the map, here. For the U.S. to be at war with Japan is not in Britain's interest. FDR knows it. Winston knows it. Hitler knows it. Probably even the Japanese, not notorious for good grasp of strategic realities, know it. Answer one question, just one: why does the U.S. want a war in the Pacific? The correct answer, "He doesn't", explains everything. And as I've said in response to conspiracy claims, recall always, conspiracy is fashionable, but stupidity is far more common. It is, therefore, exceedingly more likely somebody boobed. I hesitate to blame Hull entire, but his attitude certainly played a part. It's also possible FDR didn't have his full attention on Japan, but on Germany, IDK. (I can only imagine how hard it is to juggle the number of gigantic issues at once a President routinely has to...)
 * ♠So, just answer the "why". If you can do that, with actual sources (avoid Stinnett & Toland's Infamy, won't you?), you might have a hope of getting it added. Otherwise, will you just stop? I'm probably the best informed person here on this subject (at risk of sounding immodest), & I've done this from memory so far. I really, really don't want to make the effort to get the sources to demolish your arguments word by word, but believe me, I can. Save everybody a lot of hassle?
 * ♠Or, failing that, at least take if off this page? Because I see there are cooler heads than mine not agreeing with you, either...& even they won't have infinite patience (just more than I do).  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  20:57, 20 February 2011 (UTC)


 * I'll chime in in agreement at this point. A useful summary of the steps and missteps leading to war are found here: http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/O/r/Origins_of_the_Pacific_War.html (though I add that as a tertiary source it's unsuitable as an anchoring citation for Wikipedia.) War in the Pacific was in no one's interests, except maybe Hitler and Stalin. The Japanese refused to see this and the Allies failed to see how to avoid it -- perhaps because it was unavoidable? Opinions on that will differ. Wikipedia should recite the major facts and the mainstream scholarly interpretations of them. Significant minority interpretations may be mentioned but must be identified as minority interpretations. Tiny minority interpretations rejected by the great majority of historians have no place at all (except perhaps in an article on historical revisionism or conspiracy theories.) That's what UNDUE requires. Yaush (talk) 21:20, 20 February 2011 (UTC)
 * I'd have to say, I don't think it was unavoidable. (No alternate historian will admit that. ;p) IMO, there were opportunities for more astute diplomacy: Chiang & Tojo, with or without U.S. help, coming to a deal, perhaps with (more subtle, more calculated) economic pressure from the U.S., or (my personal favorite) offering Japan an alternative to (evidently perfidious) Germany, which had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan, only to turn around & cut a deal with Stalin to carve Poland. (Recall, Russia was an old enemy of Japan's...) I also wonder if an end to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance couldn't have been avoided; this would have gone a long way to keeping Japan away from Germany, &, I suspect, out of the hands of IJA hotheads. (Was it really Australian protests? Or did Britain hope for debt forgiveness? Or both?) There's also sourcing to support most of these speculations, BTW. ;p (I couldn't add it, tho: synthesis, I think. :  TREKphiler  <sup style="color:#1034A6;"> any time you're ready, Uhura  21:58, 20 February 2011 (UTC)
 * I'm in with the other editors on keeping all of that stuff out of here. The anon's just too - at the risk of getting rapped for NPA - pigheaded to follow consensus. That person is nothing more than a SPA fighting a futile battle. Perhaps there are other Wikipedia articles that maybe need your attention, but given your warnings, I don't think so. I will continue locking down these threads you start unless you just drop this matter.--Eaglestorm (talk) 23:43, 20 February 2011 (UTC)