Talk:Battle for Narva Bridgehead/Archive 1

Due
Due to the nature of the fighting around Narwa / Dünaburg / Sinimäed during 1944, the battle is to be split into at least two, possibly three sections

and possibly
 * The Battle for the Narva Bridgehead (Jan-Jul 1944)
 * The Battle for the Tannenbergstellung (Jul onwards)
 * The Battle for Dünaburg

EDIT: This is now complete, and as a 2 section article, with a main link page.

--Ansbachdragoner 05:35, 24 May 2005 (UTC)

Hello, an really marvelous Article, but I think that the part of the SS ist to great an the common Wehrmacht troops are forgotten.

The following Wehrmacht Divisions were stationed on the Narva Front from Lake Peipsi to the Baltic See: e.g. 11. Infanteriedivision 58. Infanteriedivision 61. Infanteriedivision 122. Infanteriedivision 170. Infanteriedivision 225. Infanteriedivision 227. Infanteriedivision

So a much greater part of the Narwa front line was held by common Wehrmacht units. A greater Front line than that line held by the SS. No doubt, that the SS stood partly in exponed position in the City of Narwa.

Even the 227. Infanterydivisio, who who held the Narva River line in February 1944 from Narva city up to the Baltic Shore stood in the surrounding of Riigi (app. 6. km northwarth of Narva-City) in heaviest fights against the Soviets who attacked the german lines over the frozen Narva River (227. Infanteriedivision mentioned in the “Wehrmachtsbericht” on 12th February 1944). Otto Carius took place in the action and helped the 227. Infanteriedivion in clearing the trenches.

It is true that in spring 1944 there was a relative quiet time in Narva city an the Narva city Bridghehead, because end of March 1944 up to mid April 1944 the Krivasoo Bridghead was in the focus of the Soviet an German leaders. This Bridgehead was established on 2. February 1944 by the Soviets on the western Bank of the Narva river by pushing back the 29. Estnische Polizei Batallion to the railway lines in the north, to cut of Narva City and the supply lines of Narva by a strike from the south to the Baltic See. This “new” front line was held by regular Wehrmacht troops. Only the Ferldherrnhalle (in the surrounding of the southern city border of Narva) held eastern parts of this front line. The Bridgehead was mostly attacked by regular German Wehrmacht troops and the two salients Westsack and Ostsack were cleared by normal Wehrmacht Units. Even the s Pz. Abt.502 and Otto Carius fought in the so called Strachwitz I (Westsack), Strachwitz II (Ostsack) and Strachwitz III (Krivasoo Bridghead) Operation. During the Strachwitz II Operation “Ostsack” (6. April 1944) the snow was melted and the mud period begun. In the West- and Ostack Affair quite a whole soviet division was captured. App. 6.000 soviet soldiers in the Ostsack. With heavy losses on both sides.

The Westsack and the Ostsack were cleared only by regular german Wehrmacht troops, but the remaining Bridgehead of Krivasso could not be cleared during Strachwitz III, so that the Strachwitz operations were only partially succesfull.

Please don’t misunderstand my critic, but the focus of this article ist laying too much on the SS while the greater number of the fighting troops, the normal Wehrmacht units, were mentioned in passing and seemed to be forgotten.

Quelle: Frontberichte des 366. Grenadierregiments Frontberichte des 412. Grenadierregiments Kriegstagebuch der 227. Infanteriedivision Diaries of several veterans 227. Infanteriedivision —Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.1.190.87 (talk • contribs) 20:50, 4 June 2007 (UTC)

wrong operation
Hi Mr.Wilson. This paragraph:

"Lieutenant-General Fedyuninsky's 2nd Shock and General Maslennikov's 42nd Armies fell on the sector of SS-Obergruppenfüher Felix Steiner's III (Germanic) SS Panzer Corps, hitting the area of the 9th and 10th Luftwaffe-Feld-Divisions. By the third day of the offensive, the 2nd Shock Army broke through the German lines with a penetration 23 kilometers wide. The Luftwaffe units crumbled quickly, and soon Army Group North was falling back to new positions around the Narva river in Estonia. In a key Soviet assault on January 19, two regiments of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division (42nd Army) seized German positions to the front of Krasnoje Selo, resulting in Soviet officers A. F. Schtscheglov, F. A. Budanov, and W. G. Massalski being made Heroes of the Soviet Union. On January 19, the 2nd Shock Army took Ropscha and the 42nd Army liberated Krasnoje Selo. By January 30, the Soviet attacks by the 2nd Shock and 42nd Armies cost the Germans around 21,000 casualties, captured 85 pieces of artillery ranging in caliber from 15cm to 40cm, and pushed the Germans back 60 to 100 kilometers. Overall, the operations of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts broke the Siege of Leningrad, concluding a 900-day struggle."

is related to the earlier operation to raise the siege of Leningrad.

The operations against Narva (bridgehead) and Narva (city) were carried out by the 2nd Shock and the 59th Armies, and were so 'notable as a success' for the Waffen-SS because this was the best defensive position possible, with the Chudo lake on the southern flank, the Baltic sea to the northern flank and two rivers (read moats) on the very short front in quick succession. The only time the defensive line could be breached was in the middle of winter when the rivers were frozen solid, hence the February window had to be achieved (so the earlier offensive had to be continued despite exhaustion) as a continuation of the earlier offensive to lift the siege due to the need to avoid early March thaw, and the relatively fresh 59th Army was sent in to maintain momentum while the 42nd Army was shunted off to the eastern shore of the lake, and from there to Pskov (see here http://hamster02.narod.ru/114.jpg). This was actually a double bridgehead with the need to bridge the Plussa river also before bridging Narva. Bet you don't read these operational 'details' in Waffen-SS histories :o)--mrg3105mrg3105 06:53, 18 January 2008 (UTC) PS. The Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation actually comprised five operational Operations that included four Fronts. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Mrg3105 (talk • contribs) 06:55, 18 January 2008 (UTC)

Auvere lahing (Auvere battle)
Is this really required here. The Auvere 'battle' is a wild claim that a single Estonian battalion held up 20 Soviet division at a VERY small village. The village is actuality located West of Narva and marks the culminating point of the Soviet offensive to achieve a Narva river bridgehead. The name does not represent the entirety of either the Soviet operation, or the German one, but a very small, probably insignificant tactical combat. I am therefore removing it--mrg3105mrg3105 07:43, 18 January 2008 (UTC)


 * No, this portion of the battle in known in Estonian as either the Auvere lahing (Auvere battle) or Auvere sillapea (Auvere bridgehead), and precisely refers the battle to establish the Narva river bridgehead by the Soviets. Therefore will restore the sentence. Martintg (talk) 07:45, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

I can't imagine why. The Auvere settlement is not in any way significant from any POV, but if that is what Estonians call it, so be it. --mrg3105mrg3105 00:02, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

Tactical victory?
The Soviet's aim was to penetrate the far left flank of the Panther Line and force Finland out of the war early. However they failed to take Narva until the Germans withdrew six months later when Operation Bagration commenced. This failure resulted in Finland remaining in the war until September when Estonia was finally conquered. Martintg (talk) 19:52, 25 January 2008 (UTC)
 * Agree the German defense was successful in the early months of 1944. However, I find the original way the article was written (cutting off at July 24 to avoid mention of the Soviet conquest of Narva two days later) to be disingenuous. The issue here may partly be the scope of the article; six months is a long period of combat history to cover.  What properly occurred around Narva was not one battle but a series of battles in which the Soviets ultimately prevailed.  From the viewpoint of what ultimately occurred, it is hard to accept Narva as a "German victory" of any kind other than perhaps a symbolic one.  Perhaps more importantly, this article's scope is the events from roughly January through July, 1944 -- and I don't think anyone will deny that by the end of July, the Soviets had clearly achieved their goal in capturing Narva and that the German forces in the area had been forced to retreat. --W. B. Wilson (talk) 20:13, 25 January 2008 (UTC)


 * However it must be noted that the Germans gave the order to withdraw on July 23, Govorov's reconnaissance detected the withdrawal in progress on July 24th and immediately launched the attack that eventually took Narva on July 26th. The goal wasn't limited to capturing Narva, but to break through the Northern flank of the Panther line, they failed to do this, hence it was a tactical victory for the Germans. Martintg (talk) 20:21, 25 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Martintg, can you quote a source for the assertion that the Germans gave the order to withdraw on 23 July? I found the following in the Soviet official history which implies the Soviet attack on the 24th was already planned, -not- a sudden reaction to German withdrawal: On 21 July the high command confirmed the decision of the commander of the Leningrad Front, on 24 July 1944 to commence the offensive to destroy the enemy's Narva group of forces and to liberate Narva. (Page 84, Volume 8 of Geschichte des Zweiten Welt Krieges, Andrei Grechko (ed.) ) --W. B. Wilson (talk) 08:29, 26 January 2008 (UTC)


 * A tactical victory can only be applied to a tactical formation, that is to say nothing larger then a reinforced division. Are we dealing with a reinforced division here? In fact the "Panther Line" had nothing to do with Finland which Hitler had been unable to budge in the southerly direction since 1941. The Narva river line, situated where it was, was an excellent anchor to the rest of the Army Group North flank (what with two large water obstacles to the flanks). The Stavka realised also that it had a planning constraint. When the Leningrad siege was to be lifted, the troops of the Leningrad Front in exploiting the success would face this formidable position (with two rivers to the front (read 'moats') in the middle of winter, at the end of the operational tether. It was realised that if the Narva river line was not breached as part of the Leningrad operation it may become the festung Hitler had intended it to become for months due to the spring thaw. Turning the negative into a positive it was also realised that the middle of the winter was also the most vulnerable time for the defenders because the rivers were frozen solid. The decision was therefore made to try and create a bridgehead at least, so the offensive can be launched from it at a later time. This beachhead had to be an operational one, i.e. to accommodate at least a Crops-sized formation. Amazingly, not only was this achieved (it is very hard to launch a (double) river assault crossing at the end of a strategic operation; reserves had to be retained throughout the Leningrad offensive) by exhausted troops of the 42nd Army, but the bridgehead was established for a force that quickly enlarged to accommodate an Army force in size. This bridgehead made the entire position untenable for the 18. Armee, and the commander chose to withdraw rather then face a narrow front assault in the spring. The claim that Waffen-SS "stopped" the Red Army is something tantamount to someone claiming to have stopped a speeding train just in time...at a train station! Not only did the Waffen-SS not stop the offensive, they failed to prevent the formation of a bridgehead, and its expansion to operational size, and this facing exhausted troops that had just completed a major strategic operation and therefore at the extreme stretch of their logistic support in the middle of a winter quite a few degrees to the north of Stalingrad. I would say that this was an astounding operational victory for the Red Army, if not a strategic precursor to what was to come (Courland cauldron). The article completely lacks the strategic insight into the reason behind the position's importance. The Chud and Pskov lakes were important strategic geographical features that combined with the Panther Line were security for the AG Nord coastal flank. If the terrain to the south of Pskov is considered, the possibility of performing two assault crossings in the middle of winter at Narva were a far better option then performing over a dozen such crossing in the spring. The AG Nord had to be induced to vacate the Baltic region, and Narva was the key. At a cost of two armies (42nd and 2nd Shock) this was done.--mrg3105mrg3105 23:09, 25 January 2008 (UTC)
 * I think there is a misunderstanding on what a tactical victory is. It does not mean a victory of tactical formation, but rather a "success in battle without substantive or long-lasting gain", as opposed to a strategic victory which is "a success in a military campaign". If one sets ones sights low enough, and claim the goal of the operation was merely to establish a bridgehead, then it was a clear Soviet victory. However I seriously doubt the goal was only to gain a bridgehead, but rather to punch through the Panther Line and take Narva, which the Soviets clearly failed to do for six months. While the overall campaign was a clear strategic victory for the Soviets because they won the campaign in the end, it was a tactical victory for the Germans because they were successful in holding Narva even though it was not long lasting, i.e. six months. Martintg (talk) 23:31, 25 January 2008 (UTC)
 * Every military event needs to be contextualized. The Narva bridgehead is a Red Army operation, and not a German one. From the German perspective it may have been seen as important, but in Soviet operational context it is described as part of the 'tail' end of the Leningrad strategic offensive. Was the Narva bridgehead an important objective of the Leningrad offensive? No. Does it fit into the operational context of the Pskov-Ostrov offensive operation? No. It was an operational afterthought in the strategic planning of the Leningrad offensive. The troops allocated to the assault crossing could not possibly "punch through" the Panther Line as they were already overextended. The clear strategic victory can only be assigned to the lifting of the siege of Leningrad.

The reason the later position was held by the Wehrmacht was due to the ongoing preparations and execution of the next strategic offensive, Operation Bagration. Be careful not to misuse terms. 'Tactical' has a specific meaning. If you want to say that the outcome was far less then the intended, just do that. The English language is surprisingly accommodating in expression of degrees of success. Otherwise you would be making a 'quantum' leap to assumptions and confusion. A tactical victory in the context of Army operations means that one of its divisions was successful while the Army as a whole was not. For its commander and Staff this means a planning failure, and not a "tactical success" (though no doubt the divisional commander will get his thank you). For definition of 'operational' please see here. Cheers--mrg3105mrg3105 00:00, 26 January 2008 (UTC)


 * For a definition of "tactical victory", you ought to consult "Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy" By William C. Martel, which goes into some depth on this topic. Operations can also result in tactical defeats. Your definition of "Operation" has no bearing. For example, Operation Goodwood which was an attempt by the British to outflank the German defenders at Caen (just as the Soviets attempted to outflank the defenders at Narva) is considered a tactical defeat for the British (p68, "Patton Unleashed: Patton's Third Army and the Breakout from Normandy" By Tim Ripley). Martintg (talk) 03:14, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
 * Well, do share what the good Mr. Martel has to say. In what way does my "Operation has no bearing"?

Goodwood was also an operational Operation. Do Mr. Ripley and Mr. Martel agree on how 'tactical' is defined? You may want to examine this article also.--mrg3105mrg3105 03:30, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
 * Ditto for Operation Market Garden. When an operation falls short of the original aim, it is a tactical defeat. Arguing that the Battle of the Narva Bridgehead is an operational victory because the Soviets merely established a bridgehead is like arguing Operation Market Garden was an operational victory because the allies established a bridgehead Nijmegen, even though the original objective was Arhnem. So the key question is: what was the objective of the Soviet operation at the Narva sector between February to July? Martintg (talk) 03:40, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
 * May I remind you that Arhnem was not the sole objective of the Operation Market Garden? Technically Arnhem was not even the objective; it was actually the bridge that was the objective. However, the question I ask is, how do you, or Martel, define 'tactical'? If you are using 'tactical' to mean 'small', then why not use that word?

The objectives are related to the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive, and liberation of the Leningrad region being the strategic goal.
 * Initial operational objectives were Peterhof-Strel'niki-Novgorod
 * Secondary operational objectives were Kingisepp-Luga river line
 * Final operational objectives were Narva (river)-Pskov-Idritsa (river) line
 * The Narva river was reached in the first week of February and assault-crossed over ice. This is where the article becomes one-sided. There is continuous references to destruction of the "Soviet bridgeheads". In fact penetrations were made over ice, and the river presented only an obstacle of a large ditch which German artillery tried to make difficult by attempting to break the ice. Now, consider what you are talking about. I think you are talking about the Narva city. I just looked at the map included at the bottom of the article, and it is the map of the city sector. The Narva river line was breached south of the Narva lake. Hence why the Estonian name is Auvere, because the Red Army's crossing outflanked the city garrison from the south but stopped, having secured sufficient ground. On the 24 July Narva operation, 1944 was a follow up (not even an offensive) because as you say the German force had no choice but to withdraw. The unit was predominantly the 8th Army, and it liberated the city of Narva by the 26 July. There could be no suggestion of an offensive in the area between March and July due to the terrain, weather and preparations for the Bagration.

--mrg3105mrg3105 05:49, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
 * For an idea of what bridgeheads were destroyed during that period, see this image, there was one on the coast, two north of Narva, and three attempted breakouts on the southern sector (the areas indicated by the red hashed lines). Martintg (talk) 12:33, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

Assessment of the outcome
With all due respect, you can not use your own analysis as a reference for the assessment of the outcome of the operation by stating that "The Soviet's aim was to penetrate the far left flank of the Panther Line and force Finland out of the war early. However they failed to take Narva until the Germans withdrew six months later when Operation Bagration commenced. This failure resulted in Finland remaining in the war until September when Estonia was finally conquered." Where do you source the "Soviet aim" from? Was it the intention to secure a bridgehead and to assault the Narva city within the scope of the same operation? All other such operations conducted during the war suggest that the preferred operation was to blockade the city rather then conduct an costly assault. Where is the sourcing that this operation had any impact on Finish strategic decision-making on the continued participation in the war?--mrg3105mrg3105 00:20, 26 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Where is your source that the Soviet aim was merely limited to establish a bridgehead? If the aim was purely to establish a bridgehead on the east bank of the Narva, which you seem to be suggesting, this was already achieved by February. Why then did the Soviet throw three whole Armies at this sector if it was just some tail end of some larger operation. Why did they attempt an amphibious landing on the north coast at Meriküla, two failed bridgehead north of Narva at Riigiküla and Vepsküla-Sivertsi and three attempts to break out from that original bridgehead, during March at Pukti, Reidepõlu on March 29th and Auvere April 6th, not to mention the subsequent 200 bomber raids on Narva and surrounds, all events that occured after the initial bridgehead was established in February. BTW, the title of the article refers to the German bridgehead on east bank of the Narva, a classic German tactic of defending a riverline. Continued Finnish participation was one of the reasons why the Germans made such a determined effort at Narva, there are plenty of references to support this. Please give us a reference that the objective of the 3 Soviet armies thrown into battle for six months at Narva was limited to merely establishing a bridgehead as you claim, a bridgehead that was already established in February. Martintg (talk) 02:49, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
 * If you have or can get "Soviet Military deception in the Second World War" by Glantz, I point you to the chapter on the Summer offensive of 1944 (p.348). It explains that there were many deception operations (false offensives) to deceive OKH on the true place and magnitude of the Belorussian Offensive.--mrg3105mrg3105 03:08, 26 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Regarding sources about the Soviet objectives. Volume 8 of the German official history (p. 287), states (translated): The "strategic Leningrad-Novgorod Offensive Operation" (14 January until 1 March) had long since been hand prepared by the Stavka.  On this topic, a meeting with the commanders of the three fronts had taken place. It was decided, with the Leningrad Front and the Volkhov Front to crush the German 18th Army on the north wing while at the same time the German 16th Army was to be held in place by the 2nd Baltic Front. Thereby it was desired not only to break the siege of Leningrad, but to subsequently push to the frontiers of the Baltic republics.  This is precisely what happened, as the Narva River was just beyond the Estonia-USSR frontier.  That the Soviets desired to seize a bridgehead as a springboard for future operations is nothing surprising; it was standard Soviet operational art in the war to do so.--W. B. Wilson (talk) 05:51, 26 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Okay, I'll attempt to get my hands on it, but I sincerely doubt this was a deception operation, since the German already began drawing down troops from Army Group North to reinforce Army Group Centre in February since the front at Narva was stabilised for six months and they did not commit any more troops from other sectors into the later Narva battles, apart from local conscripts. Martintg (talk) 03:29, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
 * The Wehrmacht command (at least OKH) was convinced the attack will come in Northern Ukraine. Troops were moved accordingly. However, again I urge you to consider the wider context of the Eastern Front if not the war as a whole. While Hitler forbade retreat anywhere, there was combat in Italy, and expected Allied offensive into France. The 18. Armee was in a precarious situation of having a very slender link to the rest of the AG Nord, and a real possibility of being cut off if the Panther Line was outflanked from the south (as happened). Even small local offensives could have tipped the balance to force its retreat so far as the Stavka was concerned. The Baltic sea was now made relatively safe, and the Luftwaffe no longer had air superiority in the area. There was no reason for the Leningrad Front to sit on its hands--mrg3105mrg3105 03:40, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

A proposal for representing victory and defeat at Narva
The problems with assessing victory and defeat at Narva in this article stem from two issues. First, the title of the article is misleading - there were a series of battles at Narva, not a single, easily assessed action. Secondly, I find it intellectually dishonest to insist that the article cut off at 24 July 1944 just as the final, and successful Soviet attack in the Narva area commenced. It makes no sense to start the "Tannenberg Line" article at a point of time when there was still fighting going on around Narva itself.

What I propose is this: The editors interested in this article identify the individual battles of any size that took place between February 1 and July 26, 1944, however many there may be. For each individual battle, it will be far easier to assess victory or defeat for either side than to regard the entire six month affair as a single "battle" for which the assessment of victory or defeat hinges upon a host of pertinent details. These battles, and their outcomes (for which I expect most will actually be "draws") can be individually listed in the battle box. These battles will also be discussed in the article to make the article more comprehensive in its description. While this may seem an awkward way of presenting information, it allows more detail to be brought out and credit to be given where it is due, rather than trying to assert the totality of the German experience at Narva was any kind of victory or that the Soviets achieved a victory without enduring German rebuffs.

Comments?--W. B. Wilson (talk) 08:40, 26 January 2008 (UTC)
 * Well, I agree. The only problem is that from the Soviet POV the 'first' battle of the Narva (river) starts with the Third Phase of the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation, and has no name to speak of other then the actual continued advance of the Red Armies (42 and 2 Shock), while the Narva (city) 'battle' was really an advance to occupy a vacated Narva citadel. I am still trying to match all the Soviet and German operations over the four years into one whole, and can not devote time to individual articles (as I have done in this case). I do so now only in so far as I would like to convey the context and enormity of the Eastern Front to those interested in helping me, and support them in turn in any way I can in terms of structural design of articles and placement in the context of the whole (for now). If I start editing individual articles now, I will never finish the project, nor will I be able to assist others. I think that if the article structure I suggested is followed, then questions of timeline, sequence, planning and motivation issues raised can be solved without me. Most of the terminology should be used as defined in various articles within the Wikipedia, or at least referenced and definitions "quoted". I am NOT the ultimate authority, but I have a wide and authoritative scope of sources that I use. I abhor POV (except for sake of methodology), so I feel that I am NPOV, though I am not perfect.--mrg3105mrg3105 09:20, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

I agree that the difficulty is that this operation/campaign spans six months and I was also thinking along the same lines of User:W. B. Wilson in that the overall campaign/operations should be split further into a series of the individual battles. I'll give it some further thought in the next couple of days and propose here some way to represent this series of events in a more clear and coherent manner. Martintg (talk) 12:24, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

Maps
I will try to find the 1942 maps so all this information including that posted by --Ansbachdragoner 05:35, 24 May 2005 (UTC) can be correlated. This is part of the problem that the map link in the article is only for Narva city and from 1973.--mrg3105mrg3105 12:52, 26 January 2008 (UTC) Just so you know, the map resource often used, but not all that useful for Eastern Front is from here http://topmap.narod.ru/ --mrg3105mrg3105 12:54, 26 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Rkkaww2 also has maps. L4405 and L4406 address the Narva situation. --W. B. Wilson (talk) 15:34, 26 January 2008 (UTC)


 * In addition to the one I posted previously, here is another map, which shows the entire Narva front with the positions of the three Soviet armies and the various units on the German side . Martintg (talk) 17:02, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

Hi, I have the official German Heereskarten from 1944 concerning the Situtation February, March and April 1944 (West- und Ostsack) Maybe I can help you-what do you want to know? Greetings


 * I think it's not as much about what we want to know (because we have a pretty clear picture of the geographic setting) as about getting a proper map of the situation into the article without copyright infringement. The current map is primitive - it is not readable without clicking and zooming in, and the design looks like a small kid's drawing. No offence towards the author - it's way better than nothing, but if anybody volunteered to produce a proper map, it would make this article, Battle of Narva (1944), and Estonia in World War II articles look much more respectable. What we need, is a theme map of the deployments and the front line against the background of a closeup on a terrain map of the 20x20 km area from Krivasoo swamp in the south to Narva-Jõesuu in the north dated before 1950 (when the water reservoir was created). Now, I have a Master of Science degree in geography and I have the data for producing such a map, but my drawing skills suck. I could provide the data and the design, if somebody volunteered to do the final drawing of the map. --Erikupoeg (talk) 13:46, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

Interesting tangentially related BBC report
Here —Preceding unsigned comment added by W. B. Wilson (talk • contribs) 15:41, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

Article restructure
I've started to restructure this series of articles, developing Battle of Narva (1944) with material from this article to reduce the scope a bit here and to ultimately create additional articles for the other battles. Martintg (talk) 03:38, 27 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Which battles have you identified as being part of the campaign? Two that seem apparent at the start are the initial Soviet establishment of bridgeheads, and the mid-February attempt of the Soviets to take Narva in response to Stavka's directive that the city be captured by 17 February.  --W. B. Wilson (talk) 11:02, 27 January 2008 (UTC)

"Battle of the European SS"
This footnote was removed from the article regarding the use of the term "Battle of the European SS": ''This term apparently originated as Nazi propaganda wishing to paint the actions of a relatively small number of international SS volunteers as being the emergence of an all-European army that would secure Europe against the "Bolshevik Hordes". On a purely numerical basis, this name for the battle is inaccurate because it ignores the larger, less heralded presence of two corps of the German Army in Armeeabteilung Narwa, the command that also included the single Waffen-SS corps to which the term "European SS" refers.'' An editorial comment has been made to the effect that the term is valid for this particular battle, i.e., the actions concerning the German (SS) bridgehead on the east side of the Narva River. So far as it goes, that comment is valid. This assessment, however, fails to recognize the propagandistic nature of the term. The campaign for Narva in 1944 was not solely defined by the presence of one Waffen-SS corps in their bridgehead, in fact, it was driven by another, Soviet bridgehead to the south of Narva, against which much of the fighting was done by regular Wehrmacht troops and in which the SS played only a partial role. The problem with the term "Battle of the European SS" being joined with the actions at Narva is that the common perception becomes that the Narva campaign was solely a battle of the Waffen-SS versus the Soviet Army, as if there were no other German troops present -- a significant distortion of history. It should be noted that this term is not commonly accepted as a description of the Narva campaign or even of the battles around the German bridgehead; for example, this term is not used in Ziemke's Stalingrad to Berlin, Glantz's The Battle of Leningrad, or even in the German official history (Volume 8) published in 2007. If such terms are to be used in Wikipedia, their context should be made absolutely clear, as it serves no one for Wikipedia to become a springboard for any kind of propaganda. --W. B. Wilson (talk) 04:50, 5 February 2008 (UTC)


 * You are quite correct in the context of the wider campaign/operation, but since the scope of this particular article has been markedly reduced with the general restructure of the articles, the term is quite valid, as you agree, and is supported by atleast two references to recently published works. I don't see any propaganda in the term, it seems to me just a simple statement of fact observed by two independant authors. However if you have a reference that supports your case that there exists some modern propaganda value in this term, then please list it. Martintg (talk) 06:53, 5 February 2008 (UTC)
 * I am far from an expert in Waffen-SS, but the term is just too general to be applied. There were other non-German SS units spread through the length of the Eastern Front, so the term is misleading as it can suggest this was a battle where ALL European SS (presumably except German) participated. To use it, you would have to explain this also. Has anyone identified the source of the term?--mrg3105mrg3105 If you're not taking any flack, you're not over the target. 07:20, 5 February 2008 (UTC)
 * If the term was "Campaign of the European SS" you would have a point, but the scope is restricted to a battle on a very narrow sector of the front, so I don't see how you could claim it was too general or misleading. I've found two published sources that independently verify it: Christopher Ailsby, Hitler's Renegades: Foreign Nationals in the Service of the Third Reich, Brassey's 2004, ISBN 1574888382, page 145; and Tim Ripley, The Waffen-SS at War: Hitler's Praetorians 1925-1945, Zenith Imprint 2004, ISBN 0760320683, page 189. Martintg (talk) 09:12, 5 February 2008 (UTC)
 * Martintg - simple repetition of propaganda does not make it valid. I'm sure with only a small bit of effort, we could find numerous volumes and articles, many of questionable scholarship, that use the term "Battle of the European SS".  That the term is at the least imprecise is indicated by the wording - what, pray tell, was the "European SS" -- there was no such thing.  We both know very well what the formal structure of the SS was, and there was no entity called "European SS".  And this leads me to question why precisely this wording is used -- because since the 1950s SS veterans have made inflammatory claims that they were a sort of all-European precursor of NATO.  The term "Battle of the European SS" rings very close, too close in fact, to dismiss as simple slipshod phrasing.  To bring out this out more formally, a series of quotes follow from serious works whose authors were more interested in bringing out historical truth than waxing nostalgic over the Waffen-SS.  The first and large set of quotes is from Kenneth Estes A European Anabasis — Western European Volunteers in the German Army and SS, 1940-1945 (available on-line at http://www.gutenberg-e.org/esk01/frames/authorframe.html).  The second, and briefer quotes are from Gerald Reitlinger's The SS: Alibi of a Nation (Da Capo paperback edition).  From Estes:
 * The only full-length study of the volunteer phenomenon is the apologist work of a former SS commander, General Felix Steiner, entitled Die Freiwilligen: Idee und Opfergang. Based largely on personal notes, memory, and contemporary literature, this book overemphasizes the notion of the SS as a pre-NATO anti-Bolshevik European army and exaggerates the numbers of participants. George Stein, in his classic study, The Waffen-SS, opened a chapter on the Western European SS volunteers with the remark that "no serious study of the mobilization of non-German manpower for the German armed forces has yet appeared...."  He exposed the notion of the SS as Euro-army as a myth and established the essential facts of its organization, composition, and operation, but developed none of these to any extent.


 * I have been surprised to find that a right-wing branch of the historical revisionist "movement" has revived notions of the Western European SS as a forerunner of the NATO alliance and a precursor of the united stand against the ambitions of the USSR in Europe. Typically, J. Lee Ready, in his Forgotten Axis, offers an ethnic interpretation of European warfare, replete with crusades and exaggerated numbers. He even has the Waffen-SS conducting the training of the French Legion, which served only in the German Army. He labels the USSR a "prison for nations," and portrays Russians as bloodthirsty and sneaky throughout. The Waffen-SS is described as "Europe's first army." Equally disheartening is Christopher Ailsby, who in SS: Hell on the Eastern Front, declares, "The Waffen-SS was an organization that had fought in a manner never encountered before ... and was to lay the foundation for the integrated NATO defenses after the war," with nary a mention of how this sleight of hand actually was accomplished.


 * The historiography of wars frequently demonstrates that a vital waiting period must elapse before sound historical analysis can begin to supplant the 'war as I knew it' brand of memoirs and the more tendentious and politically-tainted types of polemics. Thus, the 1980s brought considerable improvement to the field. The essay by Jurgen Förster and Gert R. Überschär in Volume Four of the German Military History Research Office series on Germany in World War II provided essential development of relevant themes, and Bernd Wegner's book on the organizational and ideological components of the Waffen-SS became a required adjunct to the surveys by Stein and Robert Koehl. However, the apologist line has regrettably gathered new momentum, under the guise of "revisionism," and even the myth of the Waffen-SS as a NATO progenitor is rising again with new fervor. The best of these remains the work of Hans Werner Neulen, who frequently provides most interesting details but without satisfactory documentation, more in the line of Duprat's earlier work. In the last decade, a number of studies by national historians have detailed the activities of volunteer contingents from France, Spain, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium in a manner that stimulates my hopes that we may eventually free ourselves from the apologist line.


 * The Germanic character of the Nordland Division and the parent III (Germanic) SS Armored Corps scarcely extended beyond the three regiments of infantry. The armored regiment, divisional artillery, and other support units were filled by German SS personnel and volksdeutsch recruits recently obtained by Berger from Romania. To make matters worse, Himmler and his staff found that the foreign volunteers and their supporters in the homeland did not relish such close association with each other in a Germanic division, after having experienced a degree of independence in the national legions.


 * Far from being a large multinational corps command, the III Germanic SS Corps had taken shape as a German SS Corps under which the several expanded legions had been grouped and some of the new volksdeutsch drafts from Romania attached. The language of command was German, as were the senior commanders: Steiner commanding the corps, Brigadier General Fritz von Scholz commanding the SS Nordland Division, and Brigadier General Jürgen Wagner (formerly regiment commander of SS Germania) leading the SS Nederland Brigade. German officers commanded all the regiments, and foreign SS officers held command only at the battalion and company levels, filling about half of these positions.


 * And Reitlinger's quotes on the origins of the "European army" myth:


 * (SS General) Hausser is responsible for a creed, not altogether popular in the newly armed Federal Republic, that the Waffen SS was the first 'European Army', the forerunner of NATO.  (page 77), and Paul Hausser and Gotlob Berger may still write from time to time, urging NATO to consider the claims of the men who trained the first European Army in the struggle against Bolshevism. But to most Germans the SS is a name to be forgotten, not because of the concentration camps, gas chambers, and extermination commandos, but because of Himmler's breakdown and ignoble end. (page 450).


 * Hm. Considering that last comment, it sounds like the people of the 1950s saw through this propaganda far more clearly than many do so today. I realize these quotes do not address the term "Battle of the European SS" directly -- however, it is clear that the term is very closely linked to the above-mentioned propaganda effort, and for that reason I say you should either remove the use of the term from the article or restore my footnote so that laymen readers of Wikipedia will be aware of the propagandistic context of the term.--W. B. Wilson (talk) 04:53, 6 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Coming from Australia, this is the first time I have heard of this WaffenSS/NATO connection. Being European yourself I can understand your sensitivity to the term "European SS", terms like "German SS" and "Estonian SS" would probably be more comfortable from your point of view. But the fact remains that some 2 million non-German Europeans did serve the German military. You have given a very detailed synthesis of the connection between the term "European SS" and NATO, if you could find a reliable source that articulates this synthesis, that would be great. Martintg (talk) 06:14, 6 February 2008 (UTC)


 * This is not a matter of POV. I trust you understand the text I posted above is not mine; it is taken directly from an academic work by Ken Estes -- therefore, I am confused as to your request for a "reliable source".  You may wish to view the author information for Mr. Estes on the page -- among other things, he is not European. The sources that report on the propaganda efforts of Waffen SS veterans postwar are, among others, Estes and Reitlinger. --W. B. Wilson (talk) 05:04, 7 February 2008 (UTC)


 * I wasn't saying it was a matter of POV or that the texts you quoted were in any way unreliable, but it seems that you are drawing conclusions that are not present in the original texts you are quoting. You contend there was no "European SS", yet in the very book you quote, Gerald Reitlinger's The SS: Alibi of a Nation, has two sections titled "Towards a European SS" on page 147, and "The Eastern European SS" on page 188. It is ironic that the realities of war should force the vanguard of Germanic racial purity, the Waffen SS, to recruit/conscript foreign nationals into it's service, but it is a fact. The synthesis comes in when linking the term "Battle of the European SS" with some kind of propaganda that the Waffen-SS was a NATO progenitor, this linking is not in the sources you quote. Martintg (talk) 06:03, 7 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Martintg, there was no "European SS" - period. It is a phrase which may be very loosely employed and which almost 100% guaranteed had its birth either in wartime propaganda or as part of postwar SS apologist writings and/or speeches.  I acknowledge that some writers have used it, as some writers have used the phrase "Battle of the European SS".  As I have pointed out before, it is telling that serious works on the history of the Eastern Front do -not- employ this term. Frankly, I have presented more than adequate documentation for my statements. Wikipedia articles should be encylopedic and not simply mimic loose practices that can be found in literature.
 * All I want is that a footnote be placed in the article, for the consideration of interested readers, to the effect that the term "Battle of the European SS" is a loaded term that almost certainly has propagandistic connotations. How readers choose to interpret such a footnote is their business.
 * You will note that I really don't care if the phrase is used in the article. What I care about is that, if the phrase is present, that the footnote be present, and quite honestly, your arbitrary removal of the footnote and refusal to consider restoring it in the text is wrong.
 * It is wrong because you are arbitrarily deciding that your interpretation of the information I have presented to you is the only correct one, and, much worse, you are arbitrarily denying readers of Wikipedia access to an interpretation different than your own. I would guess you understand that Wikipedia belongs to no one and that it is a cooperative effort.  And this is why it is difficult for me to understand why you are so against the inclusion of a brief footnote that in no way detracts from the main presentation of information in the body of the article.
 * If the particular wording of the footnote is troubling you, I am quite ready to rewrite it and am more than willing to entertain suggestions from you as to how it should be worded. But, I do expect cooperative endeavor and not simple refusal to include a footnote simply because you disagree with it. --W. B. Wilson (talk) 18:41, 7 February 2008 (UTC)


 * I have no objection to adding a footnote to clarify the issues, I merely removed the previous one because it no longer seemed to fit in the context of the reduced scope of this article. Perhaps we are talking cross purposes here. I'm saying it was dubbed "Battle of the European SS" simply because of the relatively high number of foreign nationals present at this narrow sector of the front, you are saying that mention of "European SS" relates to the myth of a European Army, where according to George Stein, the Waffen SS was portrayed as "a multinational European army composed of idealists fighting to preserve western civilisation from the onslaught of 'Asiatic Bolshevism'". Perhaps a footnote along the lines of "in the context of this battle the term "Battle of the European SS" merely refers to the high proportion of foreign nationals present . It should be noted that the concept of a "European SS" was a post-war myth created to falsely portray the Waffen SS as a multinational European army composed of idealists fighting to preserve western civilisation from the onslaught of 'Asiatic Bolshevism'. No such army existed, since the majority of foreign nationals were East Europeans conscripted in 1944 who fought to save their own countries from Soviet domination in a situation where Germany was clearly losing the war, rather than for any alleged pan-european ideal". How does that sound? Martintg (talk) 21:59, 7 February 2008 (UTC)
 * That sounds great, thank you for the suggestion. BTW, if you haven't had time to review Estes work, you may wish to do so.  He has some interesting information regarding German losses at Narva. --W. B. Wilson (talk) 04:45, 8 February 2008 (UTC)


 * The two references above I found at my local bookshop in Melbourne last weekend. In fact we have six books that refer to the "Battle of the European SS"


 * As a point of curiousity, are any of the works in a language other than English? I scanned the German Wiki version of the Narva Bridgehead Battle article today and the "Battle of the European SS" phrase is not used. This matches the non-use of the term by the German official history.  Do you have Tieke's book on the III. SS-PzK, and if so, does his work use this term?  Thanks.--W. B. Wilson (talk) 17:36, 11 February 2008 (UTC)

Martintg (talk) 09:26, 5 February 2008 (UTC)

Draft revision of the article
Interested editors: Following is a draft revision of the article posted here for discussion. The draft's objectives are: 1. Provide a brief explanation of how the battle came to take place. 2. De-personalize the article by removing the names of many individuals to footnotes. This is done to provide a higher perspective of the battle, something that is often lacking in this article, and which should be present considering the scope of the article's topic. 3. Remove terms like "enemy" as they cast the article into a single national viewpoint. 4. Use more common English names for German units so that non-specialist readers understand what the units are, and stop the bouncing between the use of numbers and names for SS units. SS units are introduced once with their full number/name, as well as that name in the German language. Thereafter the units are referred to by the numerical designation. 4. Begin an "Aftermath" section of the article. The article is still far too vague about the identity of specific units in the Red Army whose actions drove the battles mentioned in the text. This initiative is offered in good faith. Because I have changed a lot in the article, I have posted the revision to this talk page for discussion and revision prior to actually modifying the article itself. Your comments and recommendations are requested. W. B. Wilson (talk) 07:34, 3 August 2008 (UTC)
 * Battle of Narva was not a 'sideshow' for the Soviet Armed Forces, but no less than the Baltic Offensive brought to a halt by German forces. "It is mandatory that our forces seize Narva no later than 17 February 1944. This is required both for military as well as political reasons. It is the most important thing right now. I demand that you undertake all necessary measures to liberate Narva no later than the period indicated. (signed) I. Stalin" Soviet-occupied Estonia would have provided the Soviets a favourable base for amphibious invasions and air attacks against Helsinki and other cities, and would have strangled Finnish access to the sea. Mannerheim repeatedly reminded the Germans that in case their troops in Estonia retreated, Finland would be forced to capitulate on extremely unfavourable conditions. Narva is not a port and thus a strategically worthless point. Tallinn as the closest major port was the real target. The 150,000-200,000 Soviet soldiers lost in the campaign was the same amount as in Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive and three times the size of Soviet losses in Operation Bagration. The only reason, why the Soviet history books attach the Battle of Narva to Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation, not the Baltic Offensive is to make it a part of a successful operation (like "Keep Tallinn to yourselves, we didn't want it anyway"). Erikupoeg (talk) 12:10, 3 August 2008 (UTC)
 * 'Sideshow' might be too strong a word, but in comparison to operations like Bagration and the invasion of Romania in 1944, the fighting around Narva was really quite small. Perhaps "secondary effort" would be better phrasing.  I can appreciate that from the Estonian POV, the defense of their homeland was anything but a 'sideshow', but the context of the statement is addressing the scale of operations and scope of the entire front.  I stand by my statement that the battle has received an disproportionate amount of publicity (in western literature); there were other actions of comparable size on the front that have had barely any attention, and I suspect the reason for this is that they were fought by plain old field-gray German army troops,    i.e., there were no SS troops present in the battles.  This is an oddity of this front's historiography that should be mentioned. I would contest that Narva is a strategically worthless point, as would the German official history, which characterizes it as the "Gate to the Baltics".  Any advance to Tallinn would have to go through Narva as it was the hub for the rail and highway lines of communication. I think your statement "and the emotionally charged actions of the Estonian conscripts." is perhaps exaggerated in the context it has been placed.  If one reviews the article, the Estonians are mentioned only briefly and article appears to contend the bulk of the desperate fighting was done by the Dutch and the Danes.  Perhaps this phrase could be replaced "and the bitter resistance of the III. SS Panzer-Korps." Cheers, W. B. Wilson (talk) 12:46, 3 August 2008 (UTC)
 * I agree with 'secondary effort', while I hope we agree that the Battle of Narva was mainly about access to Tallinn and Finland, i.e. the Verdun of the Baltic Operation.

While I agree with the 'bitter resistance' statement to be added to the lead, the extra boost given to Estonian troopers by hopes of keeping the Soviets out until peace was signed, needs to be mentioned in the conclusive part of the lead as a reason why the Baltic Offensive was stopped.Erikupoeg (talk) 14:22, 3 August 2008 (UTC)
 * I have no issue with mention of the Estonian motivations to defend their homeland. The problem I have with the statement in the header as it is now is that it damns the efforts of the rest of the III. SS-PzK by mentioning only the Estonians.  I realize that isn't your intention, but the text could be read that way as it is now.  My suggestion is to highlight the Estonian motivation and emotional commitment in the section of the article where the 20th Division is first mentioned. About your statement that Narva represented the halting of an "initial Baltic offensive" vice being the end phase of the Kingisepp-Gdov Offensive Operation - can you provide sources for this?  I ask because Volume 8 of the German official history (p. 287) states (translated): The "strategic Leningrad-Novgorod Offensive Operation" (14 January until 1 March) had long since been hand prepared by the Stavka. On this topic, a meeting with the commanders of the three fronts had taken place. It was decided, with the Leningrad Front and the Volkhov Front to crush the German 18th Army on the north wing while at the same time the German 16th Army was to be held in place by the 2nd Baltic Front. Thereby it was desired not only to break the siege of Leningrad, but to subsequently push to the frontiers of the Baltic republics. - this is pretty much what happened; the Soviets established bridgeheads over the Narva while the Germans held onto one of their own.  Cheers, W. B. Wilson (talk) 17:17, 3 August 2008 (UTC)
 * Sure, the first one I came across, was documented in the memoirs of General Fedûninskij, Commander of 2nd Shock Army (http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/fedyuninsky/08.html): "Итак, Ленинград был полностью освобожден. Перед нами стояла задача изгнать врага из Советской Эстонии. Учитывая ошибки, допущенное в прошедших боях, мы начали готовиться к ее решению самым тщательным образом." Translated to English, it says:"So, Leningrad was entirely liberated. Before us stood the task of driving the enemy out of Soviet Estonia. Taking the mistakes of past battles into account, we began to prepare to solve it in the most exploratory way." I don't think, this is a lone example. And the opposite, that the Baltic Offensive was designed to be executed from the Southern side of Lake Peipus and the halt of the attack in Narva was designed by the Soviets, makes no sense. Nor is it supported by the 150,000 dead Reds. Erikupoeg (talk) 20:17, 3 August 2008 (UTC)


 * Not quite sure what you are saying Erikupoeg--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 11:51, 4 August 2008 (UTC)


 * That it wasn't just about securing a bridgehead. Erikupoeg (talk) 12:03, 8 August 2008 (UTC)

The Battle of Narva Bridgehead was a battle fought on the Eastern Front during World War II between the forces of the German Heeresgruppe Nord and the Soviet Leningrad Front. Although it was not on the main direction of the Soviet attack, the Baltic Sea seamed the quickest way to take the battles to the German ground, breaking into Western Europe, and seizing control of Finland. The battle was a part of the Panther-Wotan Defensive. The Soviet offensive stalled after securing the bridgehead. After five months of fighting, it pushed westward to the town of Narva near the northern shore of Lake Peipus.

The battle is sometimes referred to as The Battle of the European SS. A number of volunteer Waffen SS units from Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium fought on the German side, while tens of thousands Estonian conscripts fought to defend their country against the looming Soviet re-occupation. From the Soviet perspective, it was the beginning of liberation of Soviet Estonia.

Although the Soviet Armed Forces achieved the crossing of the Narva river and captured Narva, the operation was an overall German success, as the small German force managed to block the Soviet advance for five months due to the nature of the terrain in the area of operations and the emotionally charged actions of the Estonian conscripts.

Casualties
According to the data of the Headquarters of Soviet Armed Forces, the casualties of the Leningrad Front in February 1944 were 227,440 men, 56,564 of them dead. The loss of armoured vehicles was 462 and the loss of planes 260. The share of the battles around Narva is unknown, but considering the length of the operation, roughly half of the losses can be accounted for the battle of Narva, being around 100,000 men lost, 25,000 of them dead. According to the data by Soviet researchers, the 2nd Shock Army lost 10,000 people as dead and over 30,000 as wounded. Major General Rodin has tried to refute the claims, proposing 6033 as the number of the dead by the Leningrad Front and 7144 as wounded. These numbers are mistaken and do not make sense, as the ratio of the dead to the wounded is generally 1 / 3 or 1 / 4. In March 1st – September 14, the Leningrad front lost 379,592 men in the Narva campaign, 76,301 as dead. An estimated half of them account for March and April, being 190,000 men were lost, 38,000 of them dead. Excluding the losses in the battles at the withdrawal of Army Detachment North to the Tannenberg Line (accounted within the losses in the Battle of Tannenberg Line), the Soviet losses in the Battle for Narva Bridgehead total at approximately 300,000 men lost, 65,000 of them dead.

Army Detachment Narwa lost 23,963 men as dead and wounded in February 1944. In March, more than 3,000 men were lost. In April, 13,274 men were lost, totalling the German casualties of the Battle for Narva Bridgehead at approximately 40,000 men, 10,000 of them dead.

The article uses reference for russian casualties by Mart Laar(anti-russian propagandist). Is this some kind of joke? Why are Krivosheev's casualties not used? What is written above is simply put a speculation that can not be justified in any way. If we do not know the casualties, it is better to put "unknown". 99.231.50.255 (talk) 06:50, 23 November 2009 (UTC)Pavel Golikov.
 * It would be our own research to present "unknown" as the number of casualties when an analysis is available. Has any reputable historian deemed Laar anti-Russian? Until a citation for that is presented, it is merely a POV and has no purpose here. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 13:05, 23 November 2009 (UTC)

User W. B. Wilson comments and recommendations for edited article 6.8.08
Text: Although the Soviet Armed Forces achieved the crossing of the Narva river and captured Narva, the operation was an overall German success, as the small German force managed to block the Soviet advance for five months due to the nature of the terrain in the area of operations and the emotionally charged actions of the Estonian conscripts. Comment: The last phrase places great emphasis on the actions of the 20th SS Division as if the actions of other III SS Corps units were not significant. Recommendation: (1) Change the phrase to "... operations and the bitter resistance of the III SS Panzer-Korps." (2) Move the comment about Estonian committment to the battle to the section of the article where the 20th Division is first mentioned. Comment: The battle box description for Nazi Germany trails off with "... and". Recommendation: Fix. Text: ... joined German formations in the defense of the river line. Comment: Sounds as if these foreign nationals moved up as the battle was going on and joined the German defense. Recommendation: Change to  ... were part of the German defense of the river line. Text: Estonian Government in Exile served to carry the continuity of the Estonian state forward until 1992, when Heinrich Mark, the last prime minister in the duties of the Head of State, handed his credentials over to the incoming President Lennart Meri. Comment: Although interesting, the text is not directly related to the Battle of the Narva Bridgehead. Recommendation: Make this text a footnote. Text: Thus, the battles of Narva avoided the Soviet occupation of Finland, helping to sustain its capacity of resistance and to enter the negotiations for Moscow armistice with terms of its own. Comment: The comment about Finland not being occupied because of the Narva Battle is a strong assertion about which I am not convinced. While the battle doubtlessly bought the Finns more time, I see no clear linkage to Moscow's later approach to Finland's exit from the war. Even had the Red Army more quickly overrun coastal Estonia, other factors may have restrained them from leaping the Gulf of Finland with an amphibious force. Recommendation: Alter the sentence so that it does not conclude that the Battle of Narva automatically resulted in Finland not being occupied. Comment: One editor wrote the Red Army landing by Merkula occurred on 5 February. I have changed this to 14 February, based on the German official history's account. Recommendation:If there is a difference in dates in various sources, then identify, research, and establish the correct date. Other editors: Request your comments. Thanks, W. B. Wilson (talk) 17:16, 6 August 2008 (UTC)

Name
We don't usually put 2+ names in the article's title. This should be renamed to Battle for the Narva Bridgehead.--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus 17:41, 12 August 2008 (UTC)
 * I agree, perhaps even shorter - "Battle for Narva Bridgehead" Erikupoeg (talk) 21:03, 12 August 2008 (UTC)
 * Whatever happened to the seeking of consensus and requesting moves?--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 05:22, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

if anybody doesn't have any valid objections and there is an agreement, this is what WP:Consensus is all about, and that's exactly what has happened here.--Termer (talk) 17:30, 22 October 2008 (UTC)

Aftermath section
Is it really necessary to have identical "Aftermath" sections in Battle of Narva (1944), Battle for Narva Bridgehead and Battle of Tannenberg Line? I think it is enough to have it in Battle of Narva (1944), since it is the main article and Battle for Narva Bridgehead and Battle of Tannenberg Line are sub articles. Martintg (talk) 01:37, 22 October 2008 (UTC)

Magic?

 * Precognition: Estonian Counterintelligence knew about the 1944 Soviet landing in Meriküla already in 1939. Most formidable, that. (Tried to reformulate, please clarify further: I guess they knew that a similar operation was planned in 1939, and my reformulation follows that assumption)
 * Agree with the reformulation --Erikupoeg (talk) 16:36, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * Necromancy: By the end of March, the Soviet 2nd Shock Army had lost around 150,000 men, out of a total 100,000 lost during the entire period of fighting. It seems even retreating into the grave was not allowed by the all-powerful political commissars, who must have promptly resurrected the fallen and forced them back to the frontlines. (added "wounded," probably doesn't need any further attention, but if the sources do say "dead," please add it back)
 * Agree with the changes --Erikupoeg (talk) 16:36, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * It would also be nice to add a little on the Soviet strength in the infobox, as, currently, the idea that they lost twice the manpower they had, reinforces the thought that unholy magicks were at work on the battlefield. Perhaps add "Initial" and "Total for the period," rows if such detailed information is available. --Illythr (talk) 00:16, 17 November 2008 (UTC)
 * The strength is neither initial nor for any period, but the standings on March 1st. This is already pointed out. The casualties are for the whole period, but that's pretty obvious. Just like the 30,000 strong French army lost 150,000 men in the Battle of Verdun, did the 150,000 strong Soviet army loose 300,000 in Narva. You might get confused, if your idea of an army is as of a static unit, but I think it would be too trivial to explain it here, that troops were constantly brought in by trains. --Erikupoeg (talk) 00:44, 17 November 2008 (UTC)
 * You don't have to explain that to me. A random reader might get surprised, though. BTW, I was referring to that version, where this wasn't pointed out in the lead. --Illythr (talk) 18:51, 17 November 2008 (UTC)
 * You were right, the date wasn't pointed out before. --Erikupoeg (talk) 13:22, 18 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Mind control or teleportation: Following Commander Strachwitz's tactics, small tank units in two groups broke through the lines of the 109th Rifle Corps in several places, splitting the bridgeheads in two halves. Fierce air combat followed, with 41 German dive bombers shot down.[lentsman] On March 29th, Strachwitz gave an order to break out as small platoons. - the German units broke through, crippled the bridgehead and then were suddenly ordered to... break out? Out of what? How come they had to break out if their section of the bridgehead was destroyed? (needs explanation)
 * I don't see the problem. The text does not state that the bridgehead was crippled. It was alive and kicking all through to the German retreat to Sinimäed. It is clearly stated, that after forcing a wedge into the Soviet bridgehead, von Strachwitz's forces broke out to destroy the western tip of the bridgehead. --Erikupoeg (talk) 16:36, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * Breakout is something an encircled unit does to in order to survive. You don't have to breakout from a successful engagement, unless something goes very wrong. According to the surrounding sentences, everything went very well, but then, instead of finishing off what was left of the bridgehead, the troops were ordered to breakout from the destroyed bridgehead half. Huh? --Illythr (talk) 21:53, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * So which terms are you suggesting? --Erikupoeg (talk) 23:12, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * I'm not suggesting a term (from the context, the term seems correct), I'm rather asking you to clarify what happened there, perhaps by adding a sentence or two from the sources you have on hand, so that the sudden reversal of German actions would not look so, well, sudden. --Illythr (talk) 00:04, 17 November 2008 (UTC)
 * Sheer, Absolute Evil: In their bloodthirsty drive to destroy the Estonian people, the Reds have accidentally inflicted heavy damage to the German army in their bombing runs! Whoa, baad Reds! (will get back to this later) --Illythr (talk) 03:39, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * The goal of the bombing of Narva was the destruction of the town as a German military base, while the negative Soviet emotions against the town are also worth mentioning. The goal of the bombing of the rest of the Estonian settlements was to intimidate the local people out from supporting the German side and yet again to charge down the negative emotions regarding the local people. All of that is clearly stated in the article. What exactly is the problem? --Erikupoeg (talk) 16:56, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * If you read the section it says much more than what you say here (Estonian nation "joining" the Nazis; evil Soviets committed to the task of attacking the civilians, and, of course, the bombing of Tallinn Narva, presented in a most... amusing manner). In short, opinions by historians exhibiting strong bias are best avoided, or at least directly attributed. --Illythr (talk) 22:42, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * You are not making any sense. None of the presented facts are a matter of opinion and the word "amusing" you are using, sounds gibberish in the context. The section presents the major facts on who, why, when, and how bombed what, and the effect it had on the town and the people, citing the major sources that have studied that. The text does not state, that the Soviets were evil, just that at the moment they considered it strategically necessary to intimidate the largely anti-Soviet local people. The parallel with the Allied air raids in 1945 is obvious. I can look for some Soviet reference, but it won't change the facts. --Erikupoeg (talk) 23:12, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * Amusing: The Soviet airforce was tasked with mass murdering Estonian civilians but, purely by accident, their bombing run had inflicted heavy damage on German military structure within the town. Right.
 * Outside Narva, 95% of the hit objects were dwellings and factories of no strategic importance (like a paper factory). I've updated on Narva in the current version of the article. --Erikupoeg (talk) 00:38, 17 November 2008 (UTC)
 * Indeed, linking the phrase "Allied air terror on German cities" to an article named "Strategic bombing during World War II" sums up the POV problem of the section quite succinctly.
 * If you can manage to replace the (exclusively) Estonian sources in the section with Soviet ones, while keeping the content (largely) intact, this will be a different story altogether, and most impressive, too. --Illythr (talk) 00:04, 17 November 2008 (UTC)
 * PS: Argh, sorry, I meant Narva, not Tallin. Indeed, with "Tallinn," that post didn't make much sense and was actually evil by itself. Shucks. --Illythr (talk) 00:45, 17 November 2008 (UTC)
 * There's been no progress in finding Soviet sources to indicate that the the Stavka hoped to to press down the national will of resistance, especially considering that, from its own POV, the Red Army was liberating its own territory and that Estonians were part of the force as well. If the sweeping reference to the Strategic bombing during World War II as "Allied air terror on German cities" is any indication of the quality of research done by the source used here, first and third paragraphs of that section should either be completely rewritten, or ascribed directly to the authors (as they clearly present someone's analysis). Compare how the same issues are handled in the lead section of the strategic bombing during World War II article to see what a neutral account of these events should look like. I have also removed the mention of Theodor Lippmaa as a casualty. Why was he mentioned? If he is an iconic image of the raids' victims, like for example, Tanya Savicheva, then he should be included back (with appropriate background explaining that person's special notability). If he's just a name picked at random - then not. --Illythr (talk) 01:04, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
 * Unlike the British bombing of German cities, the bombing of Tallinn is not described in Soviet historiography. It claims, the German aviation destroyed the town and killed the people. The archives of the Soviet Armed Forces are closed for non-Russian investigators. The article gives the best available knowledge on the subject. You are welcome to improve the tone of the article while keeping the relevant facts. --Erikupoeg (talk) 08:28, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
 * I don't get your drift, Illythr. It is common sense to say, the Long Range Aviation were out to kill the civilians and destroy the dwellings in Tallinn and Tartu, when they actually did it. It would be notable as the #1 double blooper in the history of aviation, if it were actually targeted on military objects. This would be original research, as would be the claim that the Stavka considered Estonians "their own". The fact remains that hundreds of civilians were killed and great proportions of dwelling destroyed. The Estonian historians conclude, it was on purpose and discuss, what was the expected outcome. The conclusions are presented here in the article. The tone may need some work, but otherwise, I don't see, where do you want this to go? --Erikupoeg (talk) 08:44, 10 March 2009 (UTC)
 * You know, if they'd use exclusively right-wing German sources for articles about things like allied strategic bombing, they'd look quite differently than they do now. Any mention in modern Russian sources? Anyhow, as no further sourcing is available, I'll make use of your second-from-the-end sentence here.
 * FYI, I removed the "without warning" part because it is not customary for long-distance bombing runs to announce their arrival in advance, so that local AA emplacements can be better positioned to greet them. I also changed "no shelter in winter" to "...cold Baltic spring" as March is not winter. The "cold Baltic" part is purely my own conjecture as to what the sentence was meant to accomplish. --Illythr (talk) 12:37, 10 March 2009 (UTC)


 * Perhaps if you'd cut the sarcasm it would become more clear what exactly are you talking about. Not that your figurative speech is not entertaining but what, where, how exactly needs to be improved would be much more clear if you'd keep it straight to the point. Currently, based on your comments I personally wouldn't know from where exactly should anybody start fixing the things that you have found to be magical in the article.--Termer (talk) 04:08, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * Sorry, couldn't help it. Maybe all the magic appeared because information got lost in translation. To find out what need fixing, please use Ctrl+F, as this article has become so huge it may indeed be difficult to look for stuff. I have marked the keywords in my first post that will help you look. --Illythr (talk) 12:34, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

General remarks

 * The article is rather large. Consider removing some unnecessary details. However, it is well structured (no section is larger than a screenful, which is good), so it's not a big deal right now.
 * Like the rest of them, it still relies overwhelmingly on Estonian and German accounts, presenting them almost everywhere with Soviet sources mainly used for things like the order of battle; only sources 10 and 12 appear to be used to a significant degree). In fact, the entire article is largely a translation from some language other than Russian (what's the deal with all these prepositions and definite articles in Estonian?). Still, the POV is now manageable (except for the Evil section) and with possible future introduction of impartial (or at least better use of Soviet or Russian) sources, it has a chance of achieving NPOV.
 * Article authors seem to confuse encirclement with a siege.
 * There is also no need to replace "dead" with "irrecoverable" everywhere, because authors are not always consistent with each other (many use KIA and WIA, whereas "irrecoverable" includes wounded - irrecoverably; Krivosheev uses "sanitary losses" for the "recoverably" wounded or sick). Use the form the source employs. If Laar uses "dead" for Krivosheev's "irrecoverable" throughout - let him (once properly attributed): it's his competence as a historian that is at stake, not ours. --Illythr (talk) 12:34, 16 November 2008 (UTC)


 * The points seem valid and should be addressed by Erikupoeg who has done the translation work. I would add that the use of sources such as "(Estonian) H. Saare's notes. (Unpublished)", "Memoirs of Ago Loorpärg (in Estonian). unpublished." as unpublished primary sources should be avoided by all means and removed ASAP as something that do not help the article in any way. It's very easy to call the unpublished memoirs WP:OR as something not possible to WP:Verify.--Termer (talk) 19:22, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * It is not a translation but a mixture of a lot of sources. If there are errors in grammar, just correct them. I don't see, what are we discussing here? --Erikupoeg (talk) 19:41, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
 * You are doing an excellent job Erikupoeg. Martintg (talk) 20:04, 16 November 2008 (UTC)