Talk:Battle of Borodino/Archive 1

The largest battle in history?
Correction - The Battle of Leipzig was a much larger battle in numbers involved than Borodino, so i personally disagree with calling it "the greatest battle in history" (admitedly, it was, but a year later it was eclipsed by leipzig) However, the casulaties were greater here, but on the other hand, Leipzig is much more strategically important. As such, some sort of correction should be made to the opening paragraph - Warmaster 26/06/05

I cut the claim
 * and arguably the greatest battle in human history up to that date

since (a) anything is "arguable" and (b) I think this is going to be very hard to substantiate. There are a lot of older battles that are claimed to be larger (cf. Battle of Wagram, Battle of Red Cliffs, Battle of Plataea, Battle of Gaugamela). Of course, the older claims are likely to be exaggerated, but it would take a lot of effort to sort through the many claims and adjust them; so this kind of debate is best moved to its own article. In the case of naval battles, where there were similar claims, a separate page was created to handle the issue; see Largest naval battle in history. Gdr 12:23, 13 July 2005 (UTC)


 * How about "among the largest battles in human history up to that date"? Rl 15:19, 15 August 2005 (UTC)

The bloodiest battle in history?
So why do you keep deleting the sentence about the battle being reputed to be the bloodiest battle in human history up to that date? If you feel like it was not reputed to be such, please explain yourself and cite your sources. So far, your repeated unmotivated deletions should be interpreted as vandalism. --Ghirlandajo


 * I deleted it because (1) I see no evidence that the battle has such a reputation; and (2) even if it had such a reputation (among whom?) then the reputation would still be false. It's up to you to demonstrate that such a reputation exists, and that it is held widely enough to be worth discussing in this article. Gdr 15:58:02, 2005-08-15 (UTC)


 * Being far from my library, I still may recommend you to consult (tinyurl.com/ded28 this). Google is wikipedian's best friend :) --Ghirlandajo 16:09, 15 August 2005 (UTC)
 * I de-linked tinyurl because it is a blacklisted host for Wikipedia and the software would not let me link to it.


 * You've forgotten to exclude Wikipedia and its many mirrors from your search. Compare for example . I see many claims that Borodino is one of the bloodiest battle of the Napoleonic Wars, which is certainly true, and some claims that it was the bloodiest single day of the Napoleonic Wars, which is possibly also true. I see few claims about the whole of history, and among those claims there is the usual confusion between "casualties" (i.e. killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners) and "deaths".


 * If the question is "bloodiest" (i.e. most killed) rather than "largest" (most troops) then there are many more candidates to consider, because battles that ended in a massacre can have larger death tolls while involving fewer troops. Possible examples to consider include Cannae, Marignano, Lepanto, Issus, Salamis, etc etc. Gdr 16:22:10, 2005-08-15 (UTC)


 * The google search found that "All historians agree that Borodino was the bloodiest battle since the introduction of gunpowder" - perhaps we should settle on this phrasing? --Ghirlandajo


 * The sentence you quote is from Regimental Losses In the American Civil War by William F. Fox, published in 1889 . It may have been true of historians in 1889, but I don't think it is true now; see for example which is based in part on Dupuy & Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, published in 1970.


 * I think a sentence beginining "One of the bloodiest battles..." or "The bloodiest day of the Napoleonic Wars..." would be fine. Gdr 16:22:10, 2005-08-15 (UTC)

It seems to me, like User:Philip Baird Shearer in the past, you strive to downplay Russia's decisive role in the victory over Napoleon and to swell up certain events of lesser importance enormously hyped up by the British imperial historiography, notably the Battle of Trafalgar and the Peninsula War. --Ghirlandajo

Well apparently it was the largest/bloodiest battle of the 19th century. Shouldn't that figure in the article? Kazak 03:40, 22 November 2005 (UTC)


 * Seconded. --Ghirlandajo 12:22, 22 November 2005 (UTC)


 * It seems a shame to go over this issue again. Borodino was not the largest battle of the 19th century, nor the bloodiest (compare Battle of Leipzig, Third Battle of Nanking). It was, however, probably the bloodiest single day of the Napoleonic Wars, and this is prominently mentioned in the opening paragraphs. Comparisons with other bloody days are given in the "Statistical discussion" section. Gdr 21:03, 30 December 2005 (UTC)


 * I miss a comparison with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, depending on which estimates we take it could surpass Borodino, if you count a strike with no American victims a "battle". I am not doint it because the estimates for each are very variable.


 * The current sentence about it being the single bloodiest day in military history "even if the lowest casualty figures" are used is inaccurate. British casualties on the First Day of the Somme were 57000, only 9000 less than the lowest Borodino figures.  If one added in the French and German figures for the First Day, it would easily surpass 66000.  --Silbey

There is actually a great deal of uncertainty regarding the casualties at Borodino. Typical numbers are 30,000 casualties for the French and 45,000 for the Russians (total of 75,000, not the 66,000 you imply), but there are variations to this. Both sides may have lost as many as 50,000 each, which pretty much puts every other day of battle to shame.UberCryxic 20:04, 22 October 2006 (UTC)

The lowest casualty estimates noted in the "Statistical discussion" section of the article talk about 66,500. Therefore my mention of that number is accurate. The exact quote is: "The lowest casualty estimates (28,000 French and 38,500 Russians) together give a combined total of 66,500. Even using the lowest casualty figures, the battle of Borodino is the bloodiest single day battle in human history, surpassing the First Day on the Somme during World War I and the Battle of Cannae during the Second Punic War." It is clear that the lowest casualty estimates do not make Borodino the single bloodiest day in human history as I said above. Silbey 21:55 22 October 2006


 * Oh ok I see now. Still, the most cited casualty rates are 30,000 for the French and 45,000 for the Russians (give or take a few thousand)....so 75,000 total. The real figure is undoubtedly higher, though no one knows how much. This is the bloodiest single-day battle in history; there shouldn't be much doubt about that.UberCryxic 02:48, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Bloodiest single-day battle in history? Firstly what means bloodiest? Most casualties or most killed? Probably you mean most casualties because cannae clearly had bigger number killed. But even if we look at casualties then quite many battles dispute borodino's first position: Battle of Cannae, Battle of Vercellae, Battle of Arausio, Battle of Aquae Sextiae, Battle of Plataea, Battle of Gaugamela, Battle of the Sit River, Battle of Kōan, Third battle of Panipat and Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. So I have very serious doubt that borodino was bloodiest single-day battle in history.--Staberinde 11:19, 22 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Hilarious. There are no reliable contemporary sources for the battles you cite. If sources exist, they belong to one side of the battle and tend to overestimate the casualties. If you dispute that the Grand Armee was the largest in history up to that date, you should raise the issue on that (featured) article's talk. -- Ghirla -трёп-  15:54, 22 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Ridiculous. What has the fact that Grand Armee was biggest army up to that date to do with that how bloody the battle was? Not all of the the Grand Armee participated in battle.--Staberinde 17:10, 22 November 2006 (UTC)

Once again, the lowest casualty estimates for Borodino do not confirm it as a bloodiest single day in history. 66,500 is less than occurred with all combatants accounted for on the first day of the Somme. --Silbey 2:15, 27 February 2007

There is a further problem here in that many people don't realise that Borodino was actually a three day battle, with major action both on the 24'th and the 26'th of August. The French casualties are only estimates, since the archives of the Grand Armee did not survive the journey. They are however losses over 3-days since there was no intermission for separate totals to be drawn. There is actual evidence for this in the raw Russian records, which did survive. Losses for the Russian army, which can now be quoted fairly accurately as data is available on a per-regiment basis (minus two cavalry regiments), are 39297 from 24'th to 26'th August 1812. (See http://www.1812panorama.ru/1812/lvov2003.html). This influences considerations if one wants to quote on a losses-per-day basis.
 * The battle was fought on the 7 September! not 26 August!--Bryson 03:07, 25 June 2007 (UTC)

The original Russian sources quoted in the refernce quote dates as per the calendar used in Tsarist Russia (two weeks behind). Julian Calander, see the introduction! But you are right I should have given the converted dates as well (which is the 5 - 7 September).

I should also make a comment regarding the large variation in casualty estimates. From 20 to 30 thousand on the French side, and from 35 to 58 thousand on the Russian side. The French raw data has been lost, and so it does not appear that an improvement is possible. But the variation in the Russian data has had some light thrown on it recently. The quote of 58000 was originally made in a book authored by Mikhailovsky-Danilovsky published in Russia in the middle of the 19'th century and subsequently quoted in the west. That number, as is stated in that book, is based on some 38 thousand casualties tallied and signed by an adjutant of the 1st western army Kikin, plus a round estimate of 20000 casualties for the 2nd western army, whose true casualty data it was thought was unavailable. However casualty figures in a per-regiment basis have been retained in the Russian archives. Reanalysis of these in the 1960's has shown that tallying the numbers for regiments of both western armies gives numerical results in agreement with the numbers of Kikin, which were thought to pertain only to the first western army. Thus the losses for both armies (minus a couple of cavalry regiments as mentioned in the above source) are actually included in Kikins figures, and the estimate of 58000 is based on a misunderstanding.

History revisionists
I am sorry, I am a newcomer here, but I feel that this article has anti-Russian bias. My feeling is based on following observations. 1) The author pretends to follow "most recent" developments, referring to unspecified "historians" in "The opposing armies" section. The controversial number 155 thousands Russian troops is put into the summary table as an established fact. It should be contrasted to the French article, German article in Wikipedia. It should be compared also to the information on the provided link (General description of the battle, Eight Attacks on Bagration Fleches), where it reads clearly " Napoleon's 130,000 Against Kutuzov's 120,000 Men."   In any case, Russian militia which supposedly stood behind the lines (10 km behind?) could not be equalled to elite Young Guard at Napoleon's disposal, contrary to implications by the author.   2) The author pretending to follow most recent developments seems to ignore the overall consensus, what concerns the 'background' paragraph. Most historians agree that Barclay's tactics was not a preconsidered tactics of the scorched earth. His retreat before the rapidly advancing Grande Armee of some 600 thousand regular troops had no real alternative. Kutusov's preparations of Borodino defenses were particularly criticized by Klausewitz. 3) The author should be careful with relying on Polish historian who apparently failed to be impartial in describing Napoleon's "second Polish campaign". Otherwise the Wikipedia readers will consume the products of history revisionists. Regards, dariush 12:58, 9 September 2005 (UTC)


 * Where does Clausewitz criticize Kutusov's preparations at Borodino? I can't find any mention of Kutusov or his preparations in On War. Gdr 14:13:35, 2005-09-11 (UTC)


 * The 155,000 troops figure is based on some Russian academic research done in the very early 1990s. Basically it talks about records indicating that General Miloradovich's militiamen -- all of whom were located well to the rear of the Russian position and who didn't partake in the battle -- may have been some 40,000 troops strong, as opposed to just 10,000 strong, as had been previously thought.


 * Whatever the case, the 40,000 militiamen were not well trained and they were very much inferior to their French opponents. Having them in reserve at Borodino doesn't seem to have inspired the confidence of the Russian generals.


 * Kenmore 04:57, 26 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

The outcome
The point that the previous writer made about numbers is correct; virtually all of the sources I have seen state that the French and their allies outnumbered the Russians (this was, in fact, the first time I have ever heard the contrary position).

However, I am not so sure about anti-Russian bias. My main indicator is the listing of the battle as a 'draw,' a clearly ridiculous assertion. Most authorities agree that Russian casualties were 45,000 compared to about 30,000 for the French. Furthermore, by the time the battle ended, the Russians had been thrown back roughly 1,700 yards from their original positions, and to prevent more damage the Russians retreated a further 1,000 yards, completely fleeing the sector by the next day and leaving the way open for Napoleon to march on Moscow. Borodino, Utitsa, the Fleches, and the Great Redoubt all fell to the French and their allies. In light of what I've already mentioned, and considering the high morale of Russian troops and the ultimate objective of safeguarding Moscow, there is no rational basis upon which to call this battle a draw. One would have to be a Russian nationalist or plainly dishonest to hold such an opinion. I am going to change the result to 'French victory,' and since I saw meddling with this decision before, I humbly request that there be no more interference. --User:UberCryxic

It is useful to look at the outcome of the battle in the context of each side's goals. Russians' goal was to not let the French pass and take Moscow, and they clearly failed in that. On the other hand, Napoloeon did not achieve his goal either, of destroying the Russian army. Therefore I think a label "Indecisive (or Nominal) French Victory" is appropriate. - anon

I am going to weigh in here, the Russians lost and had a pretty good idea they were going to lose before they started. The change of command was all about having a battle to uphold national honor. Once that was completed the Russian command was (either commanders) was more than happy to allow the French to continue to melt away. It is strictly my opinion and not a fact but I consider it stupid to have given battle to a army that was already sustained 2/3 of casuailties of the campaign. It was already apparent that the French were going to die in droves regardless of the Russian Army's giving battle. Regardless of how you figure it Borodino was a failure to the Russians from the the long term or the short term view. It did however allow the Russians to say they had attempted to defend the capital. Nothing in the battle effected the long term continued dissolution of the French Army. Tirronan 20:03, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

Copied from User_talk:Ghirlandajo
I wrote a previous message but for some reason it didn't show.

I do not want a conflict, and I hope I can remain to contribute to wikipedia as I think I would be beneficial.

The dispute you mentioned was largely the work of Russian historians; in fact, they have always scrutinized what happened at Borodino and many have come to opinions like 'draw' or Kutuzov was a great general, and so on. Western scholars largely agree that the French won the battle. All the books which I have on the subject treat the battle as a French victory (as in they explicitly mention a victory for Napoleon), however Pyrrhic. If we judge the battle on its own merits, and are not influenced by the wider campaign which ended disastrously (which is where I think the real problem is; it's so difficult to view this disaster for the Russian army as anything other than a draw or victory in light of what happened to the French in general) for Napoleon, then we can see a French victory. By the end of the fight, the Russian army was in a pitiful state, and even the boastful Kutuzov, who for some reason kept insisting he'd won hours after the fight (more for pomp and show), had to order a retreat.

Perhaps third party mediation is needed here, since I insist the French were victorious as much as you do that it was a draw. But either way, I just want you to know I am not 'warring' or anything, nor do I have any nationalistic aspirations (I'm from Albania, never been to France). I love military history and I want to set the record straight.

Thank you --User:UberCryxic


 * It's great that your aim is not revert warring. I moved your comments to Talk:Battle of Borodino where more editors can see them. IMHO the article has a clear pro-French bias. The battle had gave Napoleon no clear advantage, as he failed to annihilate the Russian army, as was his intention, and was constrained to follow it further away from his power base in Poland, which eventually resulted in a catastrophe for him. I checked Britannica for a NPOV source; it doesn't speculate which victory it was noticing that "Although the Russian army was badly mauled, it survived to fight again and, in the end, drove Napoleon out of Russia". I am going ask for a third opinion on the subject.--Ghirla | talk 16:55, 16 January 2006 (UTC)


 * The wikipedia article that discusses the battle is woefully uncultivated, and if one were to read it they would actually gain the impression that it was a draw. For example, it leaves the dangerous impression that the Russians had control of the 'Raevsky Redoubt' (bias? You bet) at the end and merely retreated, allowing the French to occupy it. But this is far from the truth; the French evicted the Russians from the Redoubt by brutal force, courtesy of a murderous (mostly) cavalry charge. That's what ended the battle.


 * So yeah, going by this wikipedia article then the label of 'draw' is fair, but that means that the article itself needs to be fixed. --User:UberCryxic

"..he failed to annihilate the Russian army.."

"eventually resulted in a catastrophe for him."

See, this is what I meant; if you keep analyzing the Battle of Borodino that way, then yeah you are right, there's no way it was a French victory. However, when we talk about the battle, I am under the impression that we are talking about the battle and the battle only, not what happened before or afterwards.

If you look at just what happened on the field of Borodino, then you'll see that the French outdid the Russians on the day. They did not annihilate them, true, but is that suddenly the requirement for adjudicating victory on wikipedia? There are plenty of battles here that say "[Enter nation] victory" where there was no catastrophe in either side.

Andrew Uffindell writes, "Napoleon had won the battle, but indecisively at an horrendous cost." The statement stands on its own.

Now, let me again point out that the damage was greater for the Russian army than for the French (just look at the numbers). Also, there was a 'minor' engagement at the Schevardino Redoubt on the 5th where the Russians lost 6,000 men and three guns.

"Although the Russian army was badly mauled, it survived to fight again and, in the end, drove Napoleon out of Russia".

This is a ridiculous statement; the French defeated the Russians in every set-piece engagement except one (and that was one was very minor). The scorching summer and dreadful winter, along with poor infrastructure and a hostile Russian population had far more to do with the French disaster rather than any heroics of the Russian army. The Russian army merely hurried the flanks of the French, but whenever they attempted a stop, they were either bypassed (ie. Ney) or thoroughly routed (ie. Krasnoe, where 16,000 Imperial Guardsmen mauled a Russian army of 35,000). But when the retreat started the damage had already been done, and it definitely had not been done by the Russian army. Were it not for the stupidity of his brother Jerome (who would screw up spectacularly at Waterloo as well) early in the campaign, the Russians would've been thrashed way before Borodino.

Furthermore, if we can for one moment move past the Russian propaganda and futile nostalgia about the 'Great Patriotic War,' we'll find that war damaged Russia almost as much as it did France. Russian losses were catastrophic (I've seen as low as 250,000 and as high as more than what Napoleon lost) and Moscow lay in ruins.--User:UberCryxic
 * I concur with your arguments that we should distinguish between the battle's immediate outcome and its eventual result. If we look at the matter from the point of view of military science, the victory could have been claimed by Napoleon. If we look at the facts that he achieved none of his goals and the battle contributed to his eventual defeat and downfall, then the battle was won by the Russians. So, a draw. I'm alarmed that you give so much credit to the old-fashioned theories of Russian Winter, however. The war waged on the Russian territory was of course detrimental to the national economy, but when you go on to state that Naopleon's 1812 campaign was a Russian failure, it demonstrates your unrestrained puerile enthusiasm for Napoleon's persona and disregard of stubborn facts. --Ghirla | talk 17:26, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

Reply
In my previous comments I mentioned the "scorching summer and dreadful winter," so I was not being exclusive. I'm not sure what you mean by "theories of Russian winter," but I am well aware that over half of Napoleon's army died in the summer and that the winter has long dominated popular view of the campaign. That admitted, however, the winter was catastrophic in the final toll it took, and I don't think I have to provide evidence of this.

Regardless, the objective of that paragraph was to show that the French didn't actually have trouble beating the Russian army; they'd been doing it effectively since 1799. While they were a factor in ultimate victory, they did not single-handedly, as your Britanica article ostensibly claimed, "[drive] Napoleon out of Russia." The record shows that by far the vast majority of the Grand Army died from causes unrelated to Russian regular troops, particularly weather, a hostile population, and horrendous infrastructure which ruined Napoleon's supply system, leading to disease and starvation in the summer (and practically the elimination of all horses, which would be needed so desperately in the 1813 campaign). The Grand Army lost this campaign that summer, and as you can see, the Russian army had nothing to do with it. In fact, in line with Barclay's strategy, the Russians were retreating (quite wisely, might I add). Had they fought the French in the early stages, as some of the senior commanders wanted to do, they would've been annihilated.
 * Yes, and the Wehrmacht was destroyed by the French, Anglo-Americans and extraterrestrials. Please keep your nationalist mythology at bay. --Ghirla | talk 18:50, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

I actually didn't say that the 1812 campaign was a Russian failure. What I said was that that "war damaged Russia almost as much as it did France." Symbolically, the 1812 campaign was legendary and laid the roots for Napoleon's eventual downfall. That can't be denied. In the interest of wikipedia fairness and equity, however, I mentioned that the Russians suffered severely from this conflict and that fact is barely covered in Russian history.

Anyway, the battle itself (again, strictly the battle) did not contribute much to Napoleon's eventual fall (the campaign did), as in order for that to happen he would've had to be reversed and forced to march to the Niemen. Although, what one could argue, in one of those weird historical twists, is that because Napoleon won and could march on Moscow, he wasted precious time in the smouldering Russian capital and decided to retreat too late to save most of the men he still had left. From that angle, Borodino looks a lot more impressive, but then we'd be stretching a few things.

On that note, I will offer a compromise. Calling the battle a draw would be a serious disservice, so I propose that we simply say "Marginal French victory," having seen that first word in some other descriptions of battle results.--User:UberCryxic 17:15, 16 January 2006 (UTC)
 * It's OK with me but I would like to know what other editors think. --Ghirla | talk 18:50, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

Nationalist mythology? Why would you say something so blatantly impertinent and fallacious, especially when I told you I wasn't French? I am not mythologizing. What I said was the truth; the French had been beating the Russians pretty badly since 1799. Refer to the Second Battle of Zurich (1799), the Battle of Austerlitz (1805), and the Battle of Friedland (1807) as some of the prime examples. As a good student of Russian history, you would probably know that Zurich in 1799 tarnished Suvorov's hitherto impeccable reputation, even though he himself was not directly implicated in the engagements. It's not a matter of nationalism, and it's not like the French were beating just the Russians; during this time (the first two coalitions), they were defeating the Austrians, the British, the Russians, the Spaniards, the Dutch, and pretty much anyone who could raise arms against them. The dynamic sociopolitical forces unleashed by the Revolution were unequalled in European history, so it was no surprise French armies were so successful for about two decades. Again, I reiterate because I feel I must make this point explicitly clear, there is no nationalism going on here, just a regurgitation of an often-talked about history.

The charge of nationalism is silly as I am Albanian (I already told you my nationality, so it's infuriating for you to suggest I'm being a French nationalist) and have no particular ties to the French nation or French culture. I'm a student of military history and it appears on these points that I've been reading a little more than you. If you have to use such despiccable treachery to make your point, I am really worried about the other articles that you monitor on wikipedia.--User:UberCryxic 17:15, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

In point of fact and I do have the books and sources to refer to you are both right. The Russian army suffered horribly in the campaign and the French worse. However the Russians were able to make good the losses and continue whereas the for the French it was the beginning of th e end. I will state it again, Borodino was a Russian loss, the 1812 campaign was unmitigated French disaster. There was nothing in the 1812 technology of logistics or command/controll that allowed .6 million troops to be supplied over poor roads in hostile territory over hundreds of miles. Cossacks and Russian light cavalry caused more damage by denigning supplies than all the armies of Europe. Enough is enough, Borodino was a French win but winning battles will not win a war. At the beginning of the campaign 650,000 troops marched in and 25,000 to 35,000 marched out. This article is on the Battle of Borodino keep it focused on that as a French win and the outcome was that it contributed to the French loss of the campaign. Napoleon would have been far better served had he been soundly defeated and had to retreat out of Russia on the spot. Tirronan 20:17, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

Picture
Most pictures of battles on wikipedia have the victor in the main frame, so I'd appreciate it if you left the one I put up alone.
 * First of all, Napoleon was not a victor but a loser in this battle, see above. Secondly, the battle was one of the least successful in his career; it was more the battle of peoples than personalities as per Tolstoy. Thirdly, the copyright status of your picture has not been specified: who painted it? when? what is the title? These concerns are valid, so please address them. --Ghirla | talk 18:09, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

Your personal proclivities aside, we decided to leave it at marginal French victory, so Napoleon won. Please do not mention Tolstoy when talking about Napoleon; War and Peace is my favorite novel, but Tolstoy got just about everything wrong in his 'historical' analysis. Just to get to the point, we shouldn't him as a guide for history. Listening to Tolstoy you'd think Kutuzov was a great general. Your third concern is the most valid one, and even if I didn't find the name of the painter, I know the picture can be distributed publicly. I specified the status of the picture when I uploaded it in wikipedia commons. I will look into other information as soon as I can. And if I find it, what will you do about that picture being in the main frame?--User:UberCryxic 17:15, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

Ok, I've found the information: Vasily Vereshchagin. Napoleon I on the Borodino Hights. 1897. Oil on canvas.--User:UberCryxic 17:15, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

RfC
The question at RfC is whether Napoleon won or lost this battle. Looking at the talk page and the article itself, this looks like one part of a larger dispute. There does seem to be some bias in the article. I'm not sure if this bias is intentional. The opening paragraph fails to name the Russian general. Later when the article does introduce Kutuzov it calls him a new commander. This is misleading: he was a veteran returning from retirement.

There's some good material here on the talk page that could fill out the article. Who won? What was the significance of this battle in the larger picture of the 1812 campaign? From the very narrow definition of who held the field and who retreated, I'd have to chalk this up to the French. It's listed as a French victory on Napoleon's tomb in Paris. That said, it was far from a decisive victory. It's hard to divorce this from the surrounding campaign and the article doesn't really need to treat this in a vacuum. Just list the reasons why each side claims victory and include a separate section for context. Regards, Durova 00:08, 21 January 2006 (UTC)


 * The rule of thumb to decide the victor is to see who advanced and who retreated after the battle. The French advanced. The other clue we can get is who lost more. Russians seem to have lost more although numbers are not solid. So, based on this "Marginal French victory" could be used. OTOH, the battle and its concequences were a catastrophe for the French. A Pyrrhic victory term seems very much applicable. So, we can say "inconclusive", if you ask me. --Irpen 00:40, 21 January 2006 (UTC)
 * I think it natural that the French would obviously chalk Borodino as a victory to them, but to me that is just one point of view. Everything I have ever heard or read about it, it was so devastating, that it could hardly be even called a "victory". I agree with Irpen that it was pyrrhic. So have it a victory if you will, but at what costs? the word victory must have sounded like a joke even to Napoleon. Gryffindor  13:31, 21 January 2006 (UTC)
 * For me it was a draw. Simply because Napoleon didn't reach his goal to destroy the main Russian forces in a single decisive battle. The retreat of the Russians from Borodino was absolutely voluntarily and controlled. They just continued their strategy to bait Napoleon further into the Russian territory, making his supply routes longer and thus more vulnerable. The casualties in the battle were comparable and the tactical situation didn't change at all, compared to the eve of the battle. Voyevoda 02:57, 22 January 2006 (UTC)


 * Actually, I doubt that "Borodino" is marked as a French victory on Napoleon's tomb. No victory monument in France I have ever seen mentions "Borodino" - because French historians have always talked about the battle of Moscow, not of Borodino. Only in recent years some of them switched to "Bataille du Moskwa" (as if the battle was fought in, or over a river). Look at the French version - it specifically states that "Bataille de Borodino" is waht the Russians call it. Of course, it is easier to present the taking of "Moscou" as a French victory than the blooth bath at Borodino. User:Gryffindor is 100% right about what Napoleon himself thought- judging from his memoirs.--pgp 15:58, 25 March 2006 (UTC)

I think the point of NPOV is to present both arguments to the article readers. Durova 16:07, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

I must make some points here in the interest of equity. First off I'll respond to Voyevoda. Speaking of goals, it would be nice to recognize what that of the Russians was: preventing the fall of Moscow. The reason why Alexander and much of the ultra-nationalist Russian nobility disliked, even hated, Barclay was because they perceived him as a foreigner feeding 'Mother Russia' through Napoleon's jaws. Most did not approve of his defensive strategy, even though it almost certainly saved the Russian army from catastrophe. Worried by a political fallout, Alexander placed the trusted Kutuzov as commander of the Russian armies. When the article says the 'new Russian commander,' that's what it means (this is to Durova). It doesn't intend to belittle Kutuzov or anything. Anyway, the Russian goal was to prevent Moscow from being captured and they failed. Napoleon's goal was to destroy the Russian army and bring Alexander to the peace table, and he failed too. The Russian retreat from Borodino was voluntary, but I'm afraid you're arguing behind semantics a little. The Russian army was in a desparate state after the battle (even worse than the French); it could not possibly have stood to block Napoleon's advance. They did not retreat because it was their strategy, since by this point they wanted to save Moscow, they fell back because they were no in no position to fight a second large battle. The Russian strategy which you've described was actually carried out, again, by the real hero of 1812: Barclay. Once Napoleon took Smolensk and headed east almost everything was done to preclude the fall of Moscow, but seeing as the Russian army was still intact, there was no reason for Alexander to seek for peace.
 * Comment I understand this much about Kutuzov because I come to the article with background knowledge. A reader without that knowledge wouldn't infer his veteran status from the version I read.  Durova 21:43, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

Once again, judging the battle on its own merits, it must be recognized as a French victory. Those talking about anti-Russian bias should look at the section 'battle' for a moment. The description given does elicit a feeling of inconclusiveness; it doesn't mention at all that the French stormed and captured the Great Redoubt, the Fleches, and the Semionovoskaya, albeit at terrible cost and after repeatedly failed charges. User:UberCryxic


 * You still didn't explain why if both sides don't reach their goals, it must be declared as a victory of one side. Moreover, I wonder whether your conviction of Russians being in a "desperate state" and unable to fight another battle is based on solid documented knowledge or mainstream western prejudices. Voyevoda 19:12, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

The request in your first sentence was explained in my previous comments; when we talk about the goals of each respective side in this conflict, we have to keep in mind they are not consigned to one individual battle. The Russians drove Napoleon out even with Borodino, and Napoleon could still have stabilized the situation by withdrawing to Smolensk after Borodino. That Borodino did not satisfy the overall objectives of either side, however, does not mean that there was no victor. As I wrote before, many wikipedia battle articles feature victory statements even though the actual fighting produced a quasi-stalemate equivalent to, but not exactly like, Borodino. In light of this, why should I not call Borodino what it was, a French victory? The battle itself ended when the French finally took the Great Redoubt for good, and by that point, as has been repeatedly mentioned, the French held all the other major positions as well. Militarily, that is a victory. Tactically, in light of heavier Russian casualties and the aforementioned situation in the battlefield, it was also a French victory. From that point of view, I'd be moderately comfortable with changing the result to "French tactical victory" (many wiki articles have this phrase).

I don't mean or want to get nasty, but when it comes to prejudices and misconceptions about the battle and the campaign as a whole, the Russians are far more at fault than Westerners. Admittedly, however, both sides share the blame. I'd rather not get into this particular side of the subject as I'm afraid it would arouse unhelpful feelings, but if you feel we have to, then I'll reluctantly follow. The "desparate state" that the Russian army found itself in after the battle mostly involved the excessively tired soldiers. Both sides were exhausted, hence why the French didn't pursue after the initial Russian retreat from the frontline positions. Had Napoleon sent the Imperial Guard at this time, the entire Russian army might well have fled without a fight, not on account of cowardice or anything like that, but for the simple reason that they were too spent to continue fighting. There are many reports of soldiers on both sides simply falling on the ground following the suspension of the battle. Keep in mind that before this battle both sides had completed herculean feats of marching, Napoleon to position himself centrally between the two main Russian armies, and those two armies trying to escape from him. As for documented evidence, I know that Kutuzov sent Colonel Toll to inspect the army following the battle, and the latter reported huge losses and low levels of ammunition (this is a Russian source, so you can't claim bias). While Kutuzov boasted about a 'great victory' to the Czar, the reality of the situation forced him to order a retreat and abandon Moscow. The Russians simply could not fight anymore at that instant and needed time to recuperate. Essentially, that's what I mean by the statement, "desparate state."--User:UberCryxic


 * Add to the above that both sides were not only overworked and sleep deprived, but dehydrated. A substantial number of French soldiers died on the journey to Borodino.  From what I understand, Russian casualties throughout the campaign were nearly as severe. Durova 21:50, 23 January 2006 (UTC)

Someone changed the result to draw again. Can we please stop making those impulsive decisions? If you want to change the result, discuss it here first and see what the 'consensus' is. --User:UberCryxic

Inconclusive is a weasel word :-) Who opposes "Pyrrhic victory"? And to those who oppose calling it a victory: didn't Napolean end up in Moscow? Didn't the Russians want to keep him out? He may have lost the war at Borodino but he definitely won the battle. As Pyrrhus said (or maybe didn't say): "Another victory like this and we're finished." In fact the term seems to have been made for this battle. Piet 16:42, 3 February 2006 (UTC)


 * It seems likely that no short description of the outcome will please everyone, so maybe "see text" would be the right thing to use. Gdr 17:06, 3 February 2006 (UTC)


 * Seconded. --Ghirla | talk 17:21, 3 February 2006 (UTC)


 * Agreed. "Disputed" might work.  I'd have to object to calling this a Pyrrhic victory.  A brief quote on that point: For he had lost a great part of the forces he brought with him, and almost all his particular friends and principal commanders.  This didn't happen on the battlefield at Borodino.  Napoleon still had a substantial force when his army entered Moscow. Durova 08:51, 6 February 2006 (UTC)

It's quite interesting to check the French version of Wikipedia here. It calls the battle of the Moskowa (=Borodino) a French victory. It calls the battle of Maloyaroslavets a French victory. It even shies away from calling the Bérézina a Russian victory. Non, c'est une Victoire de Mikhaïl Koutouzov. However, if we have a look at the French article on the victor of the Bérézina (obviously, revisionists have not been at work on that one yet), what is said there about Borodino? "Une exception : de la bataille de la Moskova, à l'issue incertaine." Uncertain outcome, even today. Piet, when you say the Russians wanted to keep Napoleon out of Moscow, you forgot to take into consideration what Napoleon wanted. His tactics on the day can only be explained by the fact that his desire was not to enter Moscow, but to annihilate the Russian army. Which he failed to do. I vote for indecisive. Or "read the article". --pgp 10:35, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

I agree that if there was a victor it would be the French, but there victory was exremely marginal. Although the French were in control of the field at the end of the battle, the russians retreated in good order and really the French accomplished none of their real objectives. I'm changing the result to nominal French victory.- Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg | Talk 01:26, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

One of the external links quotes this from Zamoyski: "Although the Russian front line had been withdrawn that evening some 2 km back from its positions in the morning, the French did not follow it, and as soon as night fell Cossacks, singly or in groups, ranged over the battlefield in search of booty ... The French did not post forward pickets or fortify their line, as, having beaten and pushed back the Russians, they felt no need to do so. They just camped where they were. For obvious reasons, nobody bedded down in the charnel house of the Raievski redoubt, and this permitted a small party of Russian troops to 'reoccupy it briefly." (Zamoyski - "Moscow 1812" p 285) This does not really look like the French were in control of the battle field after the battle. If what Zamoyski is saying here is correct, I wonder how the same people who call Borodino a French victory also manage to call Maloyaroslavets a French victory. These people are trying to have it both ways, since what happened after Borodino completely mirrors what happened after Maloyaroslavets. --pgp 15:49, 25 March 2006 (UTC)

Aftermath
I'd just like to bring up a point I think wasn't introduced yet concerning the aftermath of the Battle of Borodino. The current reasons given for why the battle should be termed a loss are:

1) Russian objective of defending Moscow failed. 2) Russians retreated 3) Russians lost more troops

However,

1) It is correct that the Russians didn't achieve their goal and Napoleon still took Moscow. However, Napoleon didn't achieve his goal either - which was to completely destroy the Russian army. One could argue that Russia could still be said to have lost the battle if they retreated, but

2) "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812 " by Tarle states that the Russians did not retreat, but rather withdrew. This makes all the difference since it means that officers still had control over their soldiers and the army was still battle-ready. The loss of the village of Borodino itself never mattered to the Russian high command.

3) You can't look at numbers and compare them so objectively. Yes, the Russians lost more troops in this battle, but that doesn't mean their losses were more important. On the contrary, the Russians could replace petty much any amount of soldiers quickly by drafting. The French on the other hand had no such reserves available.

The fact that Napoleon lost 48 generals, plus a good unreplaceable portion of his army seems more important than only around 50k soldiers of the Russian Army. French losses are much more important in this battle, and neither side accomplished the goals they set, hence the status of "draw" or "inconclusive" seems justified.--Yarilo2 19:52, 4 August 2006 (UTC)


 * Your points are good and well taken, and I could easily raise some objections, but this is not the right time. We have already had this argument before and I presented a reputable source that stated the battle was a French victory. In Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars, Andrew Uffindell writes, "Napoleon had won the battle, but indecisively and at an horrendous cost." We compromised to "Nominal French victory" (before it used to read "Minor French victory").


 * And since you've brought this up, I want to say something that may be unpopular. I have read many Western authors commenting on this subject, and really most of them hold Borodino as a bloody French victory, but victory nonetheless. On the other hand, it has almost been (almost, not always) exclusively Russian authors who have treated Borodino as either a defeat for the French or an inconclusive engagement. Our Wikipedia adventure here reflects that; almost every single person who has raised an objection to this battle being labeled some sort of French victory has been Russian. Sorry...I feel like that's a little biased. This article will not suffer because of it. There is much mythology in Russian history surrounding 1812, but it should not enter this article. The only casualty would be Wikipedia itself.UberCryxic 06:32, 14 August 2006 (UTC)


 * Personally I agree that this battle has been heavily mytholigized in Russian History. Notice I tried to distance myself from fiction - 2 of my 3 arguments deal with objective facts. The Other argument just is the difference of a 'withdrawal' retreat and a 'rout' retreat, which i would argue is quite significant in military matters.Yarilo2 15:26, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

I saw no russian sources for casualties... only western ones. Please let's present the opinions of both sides of conflict on losses suffered. Russians for example state that Napoleon suffered 40-58,000 casualties, while russians themselves estimate losses at 30-40,000 casualties. Why should we only take for granted western accounts of battle?

Comments on UberCryxic’s remarks
UberCryxic:

While your knowledge of the events of Napoleon's 1812 Russian campaign is impressive, I strongly disagree with your views regarding the role played by the Russian army in Napoleon's defeat. The remarks in italics below are yours, and are followed by my replies.

Regardless, the objective of that paragraph was to show that the French didn't actually have trouble beating the Russian army; they'd been doing it effectively since 1799.

You are incorrect. In Napoleon's advance to Moscow between June and September 1812, all of the French victories were won only at high --one might even say prohibitive-- cost. Russian resistance in these encounters was obstinate, and the French had to struggle to succeed. All of the French successes during this phase of the campaign were very indecisive and costly: they were wins that militated against Napoleon's long term interests in the war. Armies that win victories of this sort soon find that they cannot afford to win the war.

Also, you overlook the fact that the Russians won numerous victories over the French and their allies in the early stages of the war, particularly in the northern sector, where the Russians were commanded by Wittgenstein, and in the southern sector, where Tormassov was leading.

As a good student of Russian history, you would probably know that Zurich in 1799 tarnished Suvorov's hitherto impeccable reputation, even though he himself was not directly implicated in the engagements.

Zurich has not tarnished Suvorov's reputation as far as creditable historians are concerned. The actions of Russia's unreliable Austrian allies, as well as the mistakes of General Korsakov, are in the view of most historians, the catalyst behind the allies' defeat at Zurich in 1799.

'On that note, I will offer a compromise. Calling the battle a draw would be a serious disservice, so I propose that we simply say "Marginal French victory," having seen that first word in some other descriptions of battle results'

I agree with you here. The French did indeed win at Borodino, as they induced the Russian army to retreat and evacuate Moscow. However, any judgment about "who won" here would be incomplete if it did not state also that at Borodino the Russians succeeded in inflicting crippling losses on the French, and that Napoleon's inability to replenish his losses in personnel and horses was the direct cause of the balance of power shifting in favor of the reinforced and highly motivated Russians six weeks later (by the time he got to Moscow half of Napoleon's cavalry was dismounted ..this meant he could not afford to fight another major battle anytime soon, and it meant that his troops were in danger of starving because there were not enough calvarymen to escort their foraging parties -- read Richard K. Riehn's "1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign" for an excellent analysis of this situation). It is important to note that Borodino was a kind of "Trojan Horse" victory for Napoleon: he won, but in doing so, he complimented the Russians' strategic goal of gutting the French army and ensuring that it would be too weak to prosecute the campaign much longer.

Anyway, the battle itself (again, strictly the battle) did not contribute much to Napoleon's eventual fall (the campaign did), as in order for that to happen he would've had to be reversed and forced to march to the Niemen

Borodino had everything to do with Napoleon's eventual defeat! See my remark above.

And your remark about Napoleon not being "forced to march to the Nieman" doesn't really make sense: after all, did Napoleon not have to "march to the Nieman" only three months after Borodino? Who do you think "forced" Napoleon "to march to the Niemen? If it wasn't the Russians, then who was it?

In light of what I've already mentioned, and considering the high morale of Russian troops and the ultimate objective of safeguarding Moscow,

You are wrong again. The Russians knew they couldn't safeguard Moscow; Napoleon's juggernaut was too powerful for the Russians to accomplish this. Kutusov fought at Borodino against his better judgment: he did it only because the Russian aristocracy demanded that he not give up Moscow without fighting a major battle. Kutusov's goal, then -- one shared by all the leading Russian generals -- was only to put on as strong a display as they could at Borodino before resuming their retreat. In this respect the Russians succeeded...a success that would prove to have fatal consequences for Napoleon's 1812 campaign, and his empire.

By the end of the fight, the Russian army was in a pitiful state, and even the boastful Kutuzov, who for some reason kept insisting he'd won hours after the fight (more for pomp and show), had to order a retreat.

Okay, but you need to remember that the Russian army did retreat from Borodino in a relatively organized fashion, and of its own volition. More telling is that because of Russian tenacity, the victorious but beaten-up French army could not --and dared not-- attempt an immediate pursuit.

French losses at Borodino were frightful too: Napoleon ordered all records of French casualties destroyed in the days following the combat, admitting to only 28,000 casualties. The truth may have been considerably higher. Many reputable historians put the French losses at Borodino at 40,000 to 50,000.

Whatever the truth about the losses incurred by the two armies, the fact is that the Russians could afford to sustain their casualties. The French could not. This fact rendered Napoleon's "victory" at Borodino not only meaningless, but practically turned it into a defeat for the Grand Armee.

That the Russians, who were falling back on their own resources, could replace their losses at Borodino while the French could not compensate for their own, was the factor that decided the course of the war (again, see Riehn for more on this).

The Russians drove Napoleon out even with Borodino, and Napoleon could still have stabilized the situation by withdrawing to Smolensk after Borodino

I applaud you for realizing this truth about Borodino. Had Napoleon not advanced to Moscow after this carnage, but instead returned to Smolensk to husband his army for the winter, then Napoleon probably would have won the war. Under this scenario, Russia would never have been able to drive the French out of their empire's western hinterlands. The Grand Armee, adequately supplied and close to its depots, would not have been defeated by the Russians. Ultimately the tsar would have had to sign away everthing Russia had acquired in Europe since the time of Peter the Great.

The irony of Borodino, really, is that the side which chose to "lose" the battle (i.e., retreat of its own volition in order to replenish its catastrophic losses) was the side that would be destined to win the war.

I don't mean or want to get nasty, but when it comes to prejudices and misconceptions about the battle and the campaign as a whole, the Russians are far more at fault than Westerners

You are wrong once more. The truth is that Western ignorance about the 1812 campaign is abysmal.

Had Napoleon sent the Imperial Guard at this time, the entire Russian army might well have fled without a fight, not on account of cowardice or anything like that, but for the simple reason that they were too spent to continue fighting.

Yes, perhaps. But its also possible that the Imperial Guard might have been decimated by massed Russian artillery, and forced to settle for an incomplete victory at unacceptably high cost.

Just for the record, the famed Napoleonic historian David Chandler argues that Napoleon's decision not to send the Guard into combat at Borodino was the correct one: two months later, only the intact quality of the Guard saved the French from total destruction at the Battle of Krasnoi (see "Campaigns of Napoleon").

On the other hand, it has almost been (almost, not always) exclusively Russian authors who have treated Borodino as either a defeat for the French or an inconclusive engagement.

The Russian authors have a strong argument. Napoleon's failure to win a decisive victory at Borodino condemend him to losing the war. This is a fact. Without Borodino, the French army could have occupied Moscow at the height of its strength, and then, if necessary, launched a successful offensive southward, to Kaluga, later in the war in order to protect the army from starvation during the winter. The French army's enormous losses at Bordodino were the reason why Napoleon could not afford do so later in the campaign, when he needed to; this is why Napoleon lost his nerve and retreated after the Battle of Maroyaroslavets (excellently articulated by Riehn...get his book if you haven't already).

I have read, too, that there is a growing trend among professional western historians to reexamine Borodino, and to credit the Russian historians with perhaps being correct in their assessment of the battle as a practical defeat for the French.

'''Regarding the chronicle of battles won and lost in 1812, UberCryxic wrote: The French defeated the Russians in every set-piece engagement except one (and that was one was very minor).'''

You are incorrect on this count. The Russians bested the French and their allies in many medium and small sized battles during the war.

What do you think happened at Polotsk II, Tarutino, Vyazma and Krasnoi?

As a primer, just to get a better overview of the dozens of medium and small scale encounters won by the Russians throughout 1812, you should pick up Digby Smith's "Napoleon Against Russia: a New History of 1812." Smith summarizes the dozens of battles in 1812 very neatly, pointing out who won or lost. Overall, the tally favors the Russians by a considerable number.

'The scorching summer and dreadful winter, along with poor infrastructure and a hostile Russian population had far more to do with the French disaster rather than any heroics of the Russian army. The Russian army merely hurried the flanks of the French, but whenever they attempted a stop, they were either bypassed (ie. Ney) or thoroughly routed (ie. Krasnoe, where 16,000 Imperial Guardsmen mauled a Russian army of 35,000).'

This remark is very much in error.

Napoleon left Moscow with approximately 100,000 troops, and although they lacked the calvary necessary to fight another major battle and were short of foodstuffs, the army otherwise was still fully equipped and organized. Marching quickly to Smolensk with a starving army no doubt would have entailed high troop loss due to attrition, but still, as long as the French weren't in danger of Cossack raids or attacks from the Russian army, the march to Smolensk would have been successful.

Yet, when Napoleon's army finally arrived at Smolensk three weeks later, its combatants numbered no more than 42,000, with perhaps another 30,000 as stragglers. Much artillery and wagonry had been abandoned, and the entire army aside from the Imperial Guard had the aura of a defeated, disorganized, demoralized rabble.

In other words, in just three weeks of marching (October 18 through Nov. 9), the Grande Armee was as shattered as it would have been had it fought and lost a major battle.

It is naive to postulate that the French reached Smolensk in this decrepit condition because of the "dreadful winter", or "poor infrastructure", or the "hostile Russian population". There was much more to Napoleon's military disaster than just economics and weather.

That the French reached Smolensk in such a battered, defeated condition had everything to do with the tenacity of the pursuing Russian army, even though it is a fact that Kutusov refrained from seeking a decisive engagement with the French.

True, the starvation within the ranks of the French army did cause its troops to lose their discipline, and to devolve to the status of weakened, demoralized stragglers on a daily basis. That the French army imploded from within for logistical reasons is not to be denied. It is a fact, though, that this self-destruction of the French army was set in motion by conditions of war imposed on it by the pursuing Russians. Without the Russian pursuit, the Grande Armee would have survived.

Russian military acitivity during Napoleon's disastrous march to Smolenks consisted of: 1) daily raids by Cossack cavalrymen on all sides of the French army, in which French stragglers or isolated units were constantly being captured; and 2) conventional set-piece battles at Maroyaroslavets (Oct. 28) and Viazma (Nov. 3), in which the French suffered heinous casualties and incurred great disorganization as a result of the shock and disorder caused by the Russian attacks.

The Battle of Viazma in particular illustrates the Russian army's role in routing the French. Here, the Russian advance guard under Miloradovich fell on the French rearguard under Davout, and would have destroyed it if not for the timely arrival of Ney, Eugene, and Poniatowski, who fought Miloradovich off and created an escape rout for Davout. Miloradovich, however, kept his troops within firing range of the retreating French, and subjected them to withering cannonfire for the rest of the day. Many of the troops in the corps of Eugene, Davout and Poniatowski, fearing another Russian attack, fled from Viazma in panic, thus reducing their ranks to the level of a disorganized mob. These troops never recovered their discipline and organization in the following days, and thus became easy targets for the pursuing Cossacks.

Calaincourt, in his famous memoir "With Napoleon In Russia", ruefully wrote that the disordered flight of so many French units from Viazma had a chain reaction effect on the rest of the Grande Armee, with panic, disorganization, demoralization and loss discipline spreading from the hindmost French units (those defeated at Viazma) through the rest of the army.

That Napoleon marched his army at an unusually fast pace from Moscow to Smolensk, thus running his troops into the ground in the process, was due to his need to escape the clutches of the pursuing Russians. It was the Russian army that kept the French army on the run: without having to deal with this kind of menacing pressure, the French army might have still been a viable fighting force later when it finally arrived in Smolensk.

UberCryxic claims the French defeat in 1812 was due to the "The scorching summer and dreadful winter, along with poor infrastructure..."

Regarding the "scorching summer", you overlook that the retreating Russians had to march and manuever just as quickly, and under conditions just as oppressive, as did the French. In spite of this however, the Russians, in the months of June, July, and August, lost virtually no troops to attrition, while French troops fell in droves.

Quite clearly, then, during the oppressive summer months, the Russians outmarched and outmanuevered the pursuing French. This was a remarkable feat of arms, and its well noted in many accounts of the campaign. You need to realize that wars are won by soldiers' feet as much as they are won by guns.

As for the backward Russian roads and communication routes being the cause of the French defeat, you must understand that it was deliberatey the plan of the Russians to put these geographic and logistic elements to work in wearing the Grande Armee down. In this respect, the Russian strategic plan worked spectacularly.

It may interest you that there is some evidence that Barclay de Tolly was planning the so-called "Scythian Defense" of Russia as early as 1807, before he even became war minister.

The real reasons for France's defeat in 1812 were, in equal measure, the two circumstances I outline below. Neither of these circumstances could have unfolded independently of the other: they were mutually supportive.

1. The Grande Armee imploding from within later in the campaign due to lack of food, and not being able to replenish its losses after Borodino. It is important to note the stunning mistakes of the great man himself, Napoleon, put the Grande Armee in this position when it could easily have been avoided by his going no further than Smolensk.

2. The tenacity and military skill of the Russians. Let's face it...the Russians first outmarched and outmanuevered the French in the summer months, thus denying Napoleon an early victory and weakening his army in the process. Next, at Borodino, the Russians inflicted crippling losses on the French, forcing Napoleon to settle for an indecisive victory which he could not afford. Then, while Napoleon was at Moscow, the Russians choked his communication lines, thus isolating the Grande Armee deep in inhospitable territory (in the five weeks Napoleon was in Moscow, the Russians captured 15,000 French troops along these roads, believe it or not). Finally, when Napoleon accepted defeat and attempted to use Smolensk as a safehaven, the Russians effectively pursued him and ensured that his army was too shattered to continue the war after a three week long, ongoing series of skirmishes on the Smolensk-Moscow road.

It is worth noting also that as Grande Armee was being routed during its retreat to Smolensk, Napoleon's northern and southern flanks were collapsing too.

In the north, the Russians under Wittgenstein inflicted a serious defeat on the French army facing them at the Battle of Polotsk, leading to the loss of the important supply depot of Vitebsk and Wittgenstein's subsequent ability to threaten Napoleon's main army from this direction. In the south, the Russians under Chicagov and Tormasov, due to their overwhelmingly superior numbers, forced the Austrians and French facing them to retreat into Poland without fighting a battle. This successful manuever was literally a defeat for Napoleon, because Chicagov then captured the French supply depot of Minsk and threatened Napoleon from yet another direction.

By the time Napoleon reached Smolensk, on Nov. 9th, the Russians had defeated the French on every front. Three Russian armies were now converging on Napoleon to finish him off.

Accept it: Napoleon was destroyed by the military activity of the Russians. It is insensible to deny this.

'''Regarding the Battle of Krasnoi, UberCryxic says the Russians were: ...thoroughly routed (ie. Krasnoe, where 16,000 Imperial Guardsmen mauled a Russian army of 35,000).'

You are wrong about the events surrounding the Battle of Krasnoi.

First of all, a "rout" is a disorderly flight of the defeated from the field of battle. In the entire 1812 campaign, the Russians were routed only once, and that was at the Battle of Volkovisk, in November, when the combined forces of Schwarzenberg and Reynier defeated a small force under Sacken in the south.

As for the Battle of Krasnoi itself, you don't seem to understand that it consisted of much more than just the Imperial Guard's successful counterattack against the Russians on Nov. 17th. In truth, Krasnoi was a five day series of combats, and on balance, it was the Russians who were victorious, not the French. The corps of Eugene and Davout were very badly beaten, and the corps of Ney was destroyed.

The event you refer to -- when Napoleon led his Guard's in an attack against Kutusov's main body of troops in an effort to gain Davout a respite from Russian pressure -- was by no means a "rout" or "mauling" of the Russians. In fact, it wasn't even a combat...the Guard never made contact with the Russians. The Guard merely made a resolute forward-moving maneuver, and that was all that was necessary to induce the extremely cautious Russian commander to order his army to assume a defensive posture behind the safety of its artillery. There was no combat, and there was no Russian retreat. It was a face off between the rivals, and little more.

--User:Kenmore 9/16/06

Reverts
70.27.27.76 and Daborhe seem to be randomly changing the numbers in the info box. I agree with Daborhe's change of 154,000 to 154,800 as the minimal strength of the french because this is exactly what's written in the article. However the changes to casualties are completely contradictory to the article. Please explain here what sources you are using for your casualty estimates. I am changing the info-box so that is agrees with the rest of the article, please do not change the numbers without explaining why here first.--Yarilo2 21:37, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

→I have now changed the infobox, not to reflect my own ideas, but ONLY to reflect what is written in the article. If you think this is wrong, please discuss it here.--Yarilo2 22:05, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

Problem
I suppose it's fine if you guys want to have another argument about the result here, but the fact is that no one has initiated a new discussion. We are just reverting endlessly. As you can see from above, Ghirla and I already reached an agreement on what the result should read. Here is part of our conversation:

Me: ''On that note, I will offer a compromise. Calling the battle a draw would be a serious disservice, so I propose that we simply say "Marginal French victory," having seen that first word in some other descriptions of battle results''.

Ghirla: It's OK with me but I would like to know what other editors think.

The result is fine as it has been for months now. You guys felt like changing it one day and we're back to this? Not appropriate at all.UberCryxic 23:20, 17 October 2006 (UTC)


 * The situation was defused at the time, but circumstances changed. After there have been repeated attempts to claim every battle of the 1812 campaign as Napoleon's victory (in particular Battle of Krasnoi), I don't see much sense in conniving addition of pro-Napoleonic bias into articles about those catastrophic battles which actually spelled his downfall. Enough is enough. Every tendentious editing has its limit. -- Ghirla -трёп-  13:38, 18 October 2006 (UTC)

That's funny. No it really is. Do you see me going after Tarutino or Maloyaroslavets? If I feel like the historical literature is pointing in a certain direction, then I believe the article should be taken in that direction. If the historical literature changes over time, then the article can change accordingly. Krasnoi is an example of this; the historical literature that I have, at least, mainly treats it as a French victory. The same here. That's why we are labeling it a nominal or marginal French victory. I think it is unwise on your part to assume tendentious editing when we are having controversy over only two articles.....and there were how many battles in the Russian campaign?UberCryxic 17:28, 18 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Perhaps we read different literature. -- Ghirla -трёп-  09:55, 19 October 2006 (UTC)


 * In all fairness to Uber, it is a fact that most Western historiography on the 1812 war is heavily distorted by a pro-Napoleonic bias. Western historiography of this war is heavily influenced by French 19th century historiography, much of which is one-sided in nature, and which reduces the Russians to the status of shadows.


 * I am familiar with many basic texts on the 1812 Russian invasion, so I know the popular themes that are circulating. Much of it leaves me stunned in terms of its mispresentations of facts.


 * No doubt there is similar "bad history" of the 1812 war that's popular in Russia, which we aren't familiar with in the West.


 * On the discussion page of "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia" I am going to start a section on Western misrepresentation of facts regarding 1812. I will cite specific examples.
 * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Napoleon%27s_invasion_of_Russia


 * Kenmore 22:34, 19 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

While it is certainly reasonable to acknowledge that there are problems with the typical Western account of the campaign, I would take that any day over the typical Russian account of the campaign. The distortions evident in many Russian histories and popular imagination are on a whole other level than those of the West.UberCryxic 22:56, 19 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Uber:
 * I've got your book here..."The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and Fall of an Empire", by Fisher and Fremont-Barnes. I am very disappointed in it's handling of 1812...all the more so because the authors have excellent academic backgrounds and I think they should have known better than to write some of the things they did.


 * More on this at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Napoleon%27s_invasion_of_Russia. I will keep the Krasnoi article out of this for the sake of civility. My stated views are for everyone to read and comment on, and not meant as a criticism of Uber.


 * Ghirla:
 * I would like you to go to your local library in Yaroslavl and pick up Denis Davydov's "Voennie Zapiski". I will then show you some very interesting things about how Davidov is outrageously misquoted by biased Western authors, thus distorting the events of 1812 in a pro-Napoleonic way.


 * Kenmore 02:09, 20 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

The label "your book" is somewhat demeaning and unappreciated. There are plenty of other, more detailed accounts of the Russian campaign that reach essentially the same conclusion as Fisher and Fremont-Barnes. The most influential in shaping my impressions has been Palmer's Napoleon in Russia. Palmer essentially states that the Russians benefitted from a great deal of luck, not so much strategy, in order to come out on top. This has been a very popular historiographical position, and while I certainly support questioning and analyzing it, I think its fundamental elements are correct. More than half of Napoleon's main strike force was lost during the summer, before Krasnoi and before Berezina. That's just one fact that indicates the elements were finishing off the French before they even got to Moscow. As I said, fundamentally, the distortions have been more pronounced and entrenched on the Russian side, which makes more sense because.....well, they won. As a winner you get to do many things with history, and the Russians certainly have made 1812 into a number of things that it clearly is not.

How important was the Russian army in driving out the French? I would say extremely important. The essential point, however, is that they were not the decisive factor, but only a contributing one. Napoleon personally commanded an army of 422,000 in June 1812. By the time of Borodino, this had shrunk to some 130,000, and most of those deaths were not caused by the Russians. You can see the disconnect between what I'm saying and what you're saying (I hope).UberCryxic 02:20, 20 October 2006 (UTC)

The battle summary needs to address the two basic truths about Borodino:

1.	The French won the battle, and occupied Moscow.

2.	The Russians gutted the French army in the battle, the result being that the victors could not much longer sustain their offensive, so the balance of power soon shifted in favor of the defeated, thus turning the tide of the war.

It is foolhardy to deny that Borodino was the turning point of the 1812 war: that was proven six weeks later at Maroyaroslavets when Napoleon declined battle with Kutusov because the Grande Armee had not yet recovered from its losses at Borodino.

Possible summaries are:

“Indecisive French victory”

“French tactical victory/strategic defeat”

“Inconclusive French victory”

“Pyrrhic French victory”

“French tactical victory, Russian strategic success”

And yes, the best works on the 1812 war do indeed support what I’ve written here. Cates, Riehn and Zamoyski – three current authorities – support what I’m saying.

Kenmore 18:34, 19 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore


 * Interpretation issues aside, "Pyrrhic French victory" is fine by me.UberCryxic 18:53, 19 October 2006 (UTC)


 * "French tactical victory/strategic defeat" is the best summary. It could be footnoted to a couple of summary paragraphs as JiHymas suggests.


 * Kenmore 21:57, 21 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

How important is it to sum up a battle involving over a quarter of a million men and the death of over 75,000 of them in three words? "Disputed - see text" with a couple of paragraphs summarizing the above arguments - buttressed by references and links - would improve the article. Some things are complicated - that's just the way it is. JiHymas@himivest.com 18:34, 21 October 2006 (UTC)


 * That's an unhelpful solution. The result is really only disputed in the Russian popular imagination and, more rarely, among Russian academia, but most of the historical community regards this as a Pyrrhic French victory.UberCryxic 20:41, 21 October 2006 (UTC)


 * JiHymas:


 * That’s a helpful solution, as the Grande Armee’s downfall was rooted in the battering it absorbed in winning Borodino. This fact is really only disputed in pro-Napoleonic popular imagination, in simple-minded Western popular history books, and more rarely, among creditable Western academics. But most of the historical community acknowledges that the Grande Armee was crippled at Borodino.


 * Kenmore 21:47, 21 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore


 * The article contains no justification whatsoever for any kind of French victory, beyond a passing reference to the Russian retreat. "Possession of the battlefield" as a criterion of victory is a little shaky - there was no pursuit phase. If it was a French victory, whether Pyrrhic, nominal, marginal or imagined, say so in the text and explain why. With references, links and footnotes. Otherwise it's a mere unsubstantiated assertion. JiHymas@himivest.com 22:00, 21 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Also, note that most readers of this article will not have the benefit of detailed knowledge of the views of the historical community. This is why they're reading an article in an on-line Encyclopedia. JiHymas@himivest.com 22:33, 21 October 2006 (UTC)

JiHymas:

The article does indeed indicate that, as a result of the battle, the Russians were compelled to retreat and abandon Moscow to Napoleon. That is justification for calling Borodino a French victory, in my opinion.

However – and my guess is that you agree with me based on your words (correct me if I’m wrong) – no summary of Borodino’s outcome would be complete or accurate unless it explained that this battle, ultimately, shifted the balance of power in favor of the Russians.

This paradox about Borodino puts the historian, amateur or professional, in a difficult position.

I believe that to deny the reality of the French victory would be every bit as incorrect and misleading as to deny that the battle ultimately turned the tide of the war in Russia’s favor. Both truths must somehow be woven together by the historian.

The article would be more complete if it added a final paragraph explaining how, in the five weeks following the battle, the Russians replaced all of their lost men, horses, and material, while the French army, isolated in Moscow, was unable to replace any of its losses. Such a summary would thus clearly establish how Borodino proved to be the wound that killed the beast, so to speak.

Richard Riehn's account is an excellent starting point for analyzing how the gutted condition of the French army after Borodino translated into the turning of the tide.

Kenmore 00:03, 22 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

Borodino was a crucial event, no doubt, but we should note that the French were in many ways already crippled before September 7. It's difficult to make a claim like "the strategic situation changed here" for this campaign. The French generally lost this campaign sometime during the summer, when they failed to trap the Russians after three tries. I doubt that even a decisive victory at Borodino would have meant an overall French victory; the best Napoleon could have done was to regroup and retreat back to Smolensk, prolonging the campaign until spring time. History has shown the most effective way (thought not necessarily the only one) to defeat Russia is to see it break politically, which is what happened in World War I. Well...that did not happen in 1812, nor was it going to happen despite any sort of great French victory at Borodino. Maybe I'm assuming too much in making that claim, but the Russian leadership and nobility at this point were against even harboring the thought of peace with France.UberCryxic 01:03, 22 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Uber:


 * If Napoleon was "crippled before Sept. 7th" he would not have fought at Borodino. He would have remained in Smolensk.


 * If Borodino did not change the strategic situation, then how come until this battle was Napoleon was eager to engage the Russians, and after Borodino he sought only to avoid battle with them?


 * As for the attrition losses the French suffered in the summer, you are overlooking that the Russians put the French in the position of having to suffer that attrition. That was the Russian strategic object.


 * How come the Russians suffered almost no attrition losses during the summer, even though they were marching just as far and desperately under difficult circumstances as the French were? Clearly the Russians were outmarching the French.

Kenmore 07:33, 22 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

Of course they were outmarching the French; that's why they were not trapped. However, outmarching another army will normally indicate greater casualties for your side. The reasons why the Russians did not suffer as heavily is because their problems of logistics and supply were not as accentuated as those the French had. Even the food supply that Napoleon stocked for the army, which was supposed to last nearly a month, could not be distributed to many French troops because of poor road conditions. You also have to remember that many of these French soldiers were young conscripts who had marched all the way from France to the Niemen; it's expected that they would be far more tired than the Russians. The Russian army had a spectacular strategy - thank Barclay for that - that did goad the French into getting deeper and deeper, but the Russians themselves did not directly and greatly impose physical hardships on the French at this stage, hence my assertion that the elements rather the Russian army was what doomed the French.

I've circulated this stat in some other places, but here it is again: Napoleon's main strike force was 422,000 when it entered Russia in June. It was roughly 130,000 when it fought at Borodino. Over half of Napoleon's army was lost during the summer. That's what I mean by "crippled." Hopefully you can appreciate the difference a few more tens of thousands of soldiers would have made at Borodino (on the French side, that is). Napoleon more than realized the difficulties his army had experienced so far, but he fought in order to satisfy one of his central tenets in warfare: destroy the enemy army. He also thought that capturing Moscow would lead to peace. Napoleon's personal emotional states and dispositions, however, do not decide the strategic outcome of the campaign. Regardless of what Napoleon felt, the French were in trouble before Borodino, and they all knew it. It wasn't a big secret that the army was going to hell fairly quickly. Napoleon knew what was going on and pushed for a decisive battle to end it all, not because he was looking forward to it; it was more of an expediency.UberCryxic 16:24, 22 October 2006 (UTC)


 * The bottom line is that the Russians imposed upon the invaders the conditions which caused such attrition in the summer of 1812. This means the Russians achieved their strategic objective (to impose attrition losses on the invader) while the French failed to achieve their own strategic objective (to destroy the Russians).


 * Regarding food supply, Russian and French logistics in the summer of 1812, I believe you are mistaken. I want to know the source (including page number) where you think you obtained this data.


 * Are you forgetting that the French set-up massive supply depots at Minsk, Vitebsk, and Smolensk...and that supplies were abundantly available to the French throughout the summer?


 * It is silly to say that the young French conscripts were exhausted by marching from “France to the Niemen”. Their Russian counterparts had to march even longer distances in getting from Russia’s deep interior to the Niemen.


 * I am not impressed with your argument that Napoleon having “only” 130,000 troops at Borodino (down from 422,00 at the Niemen) means the French were “crippled”…that argument lacks perspective. The French were forced to leave troops behind them, to garrison captured territory and guard roads, as they moved deeper into Russia. Also, Napoleon’s 130,000 strong army at Borodino could hardly have been “crippled” given that it’s combat potential was no less strong than that at any other battle where Napoleon commanded up until that point in time.


 * And I have never seen a single book on 1812 which supports your notion that leading up to Borodino, the French were in deep trouble, that they knew it, that Borodino was a desperate attempt to change their fortune, etc. Even if this were true – and it’s not – that would only serve to buttress the argument that the Russians deliberately put the French in that position.


 * Kenmore 16:34, 23 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

The Russians did not impose the losses on the French themselves though. The elements had to do that. That was in accordance with Russian strategy (well, with Barclay's strategy; most Russians did not want to give up an inch), but it does not mean the Russians caused the losses on the French, at least not directly.

In Campaigns of Napoleon (p. 758), Chandler talks about the food supply that the French stored. The main point is that they prepared a lot for this campaign, but despite that, they had no idea how tough it would really be, especially the horrible conditions of the roads. In fact, the poor roads aided the Russian strategy because they slowed down the French considerably. In a better-paved country, who knows....

Most Russian troops did not march as far as the French did (nowhere near even). The reason why their marching distances are important is because many of these men were not used to it; their feet developed dangerous infections and diseases. Only a small fraction of the Grand Army was used to the 30-mile a day routine reminiscent of the Lodi and Ulm maneuvers.

Well let's clarify something, because I'm not sure that it is clear from your writing: the difference between 420,000 and 130,000, 290,000, were all casualties. It is true that the French did leave behind garrisons, but these were not a part of Napoleon's main strike force; they involved later units (the Grand Army invaded with a total of 690,000 men; some of these later units took on garrison and administrative duties, kind of like the Gestappo after Operation Barbarossa). So we can clearly see that the French suffered a whole freaking lot. I don't understand why it's not plausible to presume that had they not lost so many men, Napoleon would have much better odds of scoring a decisive victory at Borodino. The assertion that Napoleon or the French were not worried about their situation is complete folly, and the assertion that it's not mentioned in any historical works still much weirder! The French had a lot of difficulties deciding what to do during this time: pursue the Russians or stay behind (maybe around Smolensk) and regroup. French commanders obviously knew that the men and the horses were dropping like flies every day. Napoleon knew this....everyone was aware that the army was in a pathetic state. And it goes both ways: the Russians were also in a pathetic state. The Imperial Guard was basically the only properly functioning French unit even before Borodino, and this was no secret.

But none of this means that they couldn't fight; if it came down to it, both sides could, and did. The important difference between the pathetic state of the French and that of the Russians is that the latter could always replenish losses much faster than the former. In many ways, that's what decided the outcome of the campaign. Both the French and the Russians suffered horrible casualties throughout this whole affair (estimates vary, but the French suffered nearly 600,000 and the Russians nearly 500,000). The Russians, however, could always replace their losses at a much faster rate (and, in a sense, the French could not replace them at all because the overarching administrative apparatus was in Paris, way too far from the main theater of operations).

Once again, the Russians did not really impose anything. By retreating, they merely created a set of conditions that were favorable to them and disfavorable to the French. That's smart! That's what you want to do in war. But certainly the Russians did not compel the French to follow them; the French did that on their own. Napoleon could have easily kept his army in Poland (would've been weird) and not done anything. The Russians realized that the way this thing was going to go was: the French will attack and we have to get away while ruining their advance routes. But that's not imposing anything on the enemy. It was the French that imposed themselves on the Russians, causing the latter's retreat. Or you could argue that both sides imposed themselves on one another, but the French more sternly since they were dictating the pace.UberCryxic 18:19, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

'''The Russians did not impose the losses on the French themselves though. The elements had to do that.'''

It was the Russians who put the French in a vulnerable position relative to the elements. The French wouldn’t have willingly done that themselves. Your argument here is like that of certain Americans who claim the U.S. wasn’t beaten in Vietnam by the Viet Cong, that it was beaten by the jungle. Drivel.

In Campaigns of Napoleon (p. 758), Chandler talks about the food supply that the French stored. There is absolutely nothing on page 758 that supports your claim that in the summer of 1812 starvation and a lack of supplies caused huge attrition losses for the French.

'''In fact, the poor roads aided the Russian strategy because they slowed down the French considerably. In a better-paved country, who knows....'''

But the Russians had to use those same roads…it is foolish to claim that the French were hindered by the poor quality of the roads while the Russians weren’t…that makes no sense whatsoever.

Most Russian troops did not march as far as the French did (nowhere near even).

Nonsense. Many of Russia’s chief population centers in 1812 were around and beyond Moscow, which puts them 500 to 700 miles from the Niemen. The French border was less than 500 miles from the Niemen. The roads the French used to march to the Niemen were certainly better than those used by the Russians.

The reason why their marching distances are important is because many of these men were not used to it; their feet developed dangerous infections and diseases.

So Frenchmen are vulnerable to dangerous infections and diseases while Russians’ aren’t?

Only a small fraction of the Grand Army was used to the 30-mile a day routine reminiscent of the Lodi and Ulm maneuvers.

I believe this is a figment of your imagination. I request that you tell me where you found this data…source and page number please.

Well let's clarify something, because I'm not sure that it is clear from your writing: the difference between 420,000 and 130,000, 290,000, were all casualties.

Now you are contradicting yourself in the most flagrant way…first you claim that Napoleon’s pre-Borodino losses were due to only to disease, starvation and attrition, and you you’re saying that the 290,000 were actually killed in combat by the Russians?

It is true that the French did leave behind garrisons, but these were not a part of Napoleon's main strike force; they involved later units

Nonsense. Riehn documents how many Grande Armee troops were left behind to hold the flanks and garrison outposts, including Victor’s reserve army at Smolensk, among others.

''' So we can clearly see that the French suffered a whole freaking lot. I don't understand why it's not plausible to presume that had they not lost so many men,'''

That’s what I’ve argued all along…hordes of French troops fell during the summer due to attrition caused by interminable forced-marching. The Russians imposed these conditions on the French, therefore it was a strategic success for the Russians.

The assertion that Napoleon or the French were not worried about their situation is complete folly, and the assertion that it's not mentioned in any historical works still much weirder!

You are arguing that the economic privation, attrition and loss of combat ability that characterized the French army after Borodino existed, in fact, before Borodino. Not a single one of the sources extant on 1812 supports this claim. None whatsoever. If Napoleon really was in such dire straits before Borodino, he would have terminated the campaign at Smolensk.

Napoleon knew this....everyone was aware that the army was in a pathetic state. This is a figment of your imagination…it’s not supported by any the texts.

'''And it goes both ways: the Russians were also in a pathetic state. The Imperial Guard was basically the only properly functioning French unit even before Borodino, and this was no secret.'''

Nonsense…your imagination is getting the better of you.

The important difference between the pathetic state of the French and that of the Russians is that the latter could always replenish losses much faster than the former.

This is true of the situation AFTER Borodino…and not before Borodino. The reason is that the Russians inflicted such heinous casualties on the French at Borodino. Borodino made the difference here.

The Russians, however, could always replace their losses at a much faster rate (and, in a sense, the French could not replace them at all because the overarching administrative apparatus was in Paris, way too far from the main theater of operations).

True, but this situation wouldn’t have become operative if the Russians hadn’t battered the French army so severely at Borodino.

Once again, the Russians did not really impose anything.

You just claimed that the Russians killed 290,000 French in combat (above)…now you’re saying the Russians “didn’t impose anything”?

By retreating, they merely created a set of conditions that were favorable to them and disfavorable to the French.

That’s called altering the strategic balance of power between the combatants. It’s as much a focus of the generals as is fighting battles. This was Barclay’s and Kutusov’s strategy, and they were better at it than the French were.

''' But certainly the Russians did not compel the French to follow them; the French did that on their own. Napoleon could have easily kept his army in Poland (would've been weird) and not done anything.''' Your reasoning here is perverse.

By that token, the Russians could easily have chosen to lose the war by fighting Napoleon on the Niemen, as opposed to seeking victory by imposing the consequences of their Scythian tactics on the French.

'''The Russians realized that the way this thing was going to go was: the French will attack and we have to get away while ruining their advance routes. But that's not imposing anything on the enemy. It was the French that imposed themselves on the Russians, causing the latter's retreat.'''

That’s like saying that a hunter who shoots a charging lion doesn’t really kill the lion…but that rather, the lion killed himself by imposing himself on the hunter…

That kind of logic is circular and it doesn’t hold any weight.

Kenmore 21:05, 23 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

Some corrections to avoid strawmen arguments: the vast majority of Napoleon's troops that died in the summer fell prey to starvation and disease, the greatest cause of military casualties prior to the 20th century. The same is true for the Russians; most of the 1 million or so men that died were victims of fever, typhus, fatigue, and so on. I apologize if this wasn't clear somehow in my writing, although just because I say "casualty" does not mean it has to be in battle.

I do notice some of the analogical aspects between Vietnam and 1812, but I should point out some inaccuracies on your part. The United States lost in Vietnam primarily because it lost its political will. The Tet Offensive in 1968, which changed American public opinion about the war, was a complete disaster from the Viet Cong perspective. In military operations throughout the conflict, the Americans displayed a marked tactical superiority over their Vietnamese opponents. It is also important that we highlight the all-encompassing nature of warfare: war is not something restricted just to the battlefield, as Clausewitz understood, but involves whole national efforts and their corresponding social fabrics. This last factor completely ruined America in Vietnam, and hence they lost the war.

The French lost because of a variety of factors, chiefly among them underestimating the task at hand and a great Russian strategy. What we have to be careful about is thinking that only the Russians were key in the strategy that they devised. As I've said before, this view is simply just false. The Russians had fortunate circumstances that hurt the French; they did not - could not - beat the French on their own military terms. They realized this (some did), hence the wise defensive strategy. When the French had gotten too far, the Russians were determined to stop them. You've mentioned Borodino as an event that changed the strategic situation, but amazingly at the time it was a very gloomy moment for all of Russia. Kutuzov initially wrote to the Czar about a "great victory," but when Alexander learned that Moscow had fallen, he was devastated. In fact, one could say that the primary Russian objective at Borodino was to stop the French from reaching Moscow, and in this they failed (one of the main reasons why I say this should be counted as a French victory). Now, what they did not realize is how helpful this series of events would be later on, but that's another story.

Continuing the theme of poor understanding, I am noticing that you are a tad unaware of the position of the Russian armies that actually faced Napoleon. The core Russian armies, some 127,000 under Barclay and 66,000 under Bagration, were erected on Russia's western borders, near the theater of operations. Russia did have some 400,000 troops in total, and many of these were indeed deployed in garrison duties throughout the empire, but they also did not see much action, at least initially. The main forces of Bagratian and Barclay were supported by armies from Finland and the Danube valley, and then much later on by peasant conscripts and volunteer militias. Generally speaking, the average soldier of the Grand Army marched far more than his Russian counterpart and, often but not always, at a faster rate.


 * You need to understand that many Russian conscripts were from the deep interior of the country, in the region of Moscow (500 miles from the Niemen), or even further east and north. Moving human and material resources from the interior to the frontier has always been a struggle…it is a salient theme in Russian military history. The average Russian conscript marched further than his French counterpart for this reason. As for the troops dispositions in June, 1812, I am very much aware of them.
 * Kenmore 16:37, 24 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

I sense recurring allegations that no texts state that the French were in a bad state. They, in fact, do, and at some points they even emphasize it. In the Campaigns, Chandler describes some of the troubles the French were having around Smolensk from page 790 to 793. He even quotes a passage from Jomini that identifies Murat, the 'First Horseman of Europe,' as wishing to withdraw, most likely because the French cavalry was in a disastrous state of affairs (for obvious reasons). Robert Asprey describes some further issues in The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte:

Over half of the army consisted of foreign troops, many of them untrained, unwilling, and undisciplined, already sowing "terror and desolation" in Poland.

That's before the campaign even started....there are many reports of downright insubordination and frustration among the soldiers. Asprey goes on:

''After an abortive attempt to block Barclay's retreat - the villain appeared to have been sluggish movement on General Junot's part - Napoleon spent almost a week in Smolensk, described by a young quartermaster clerk, Henri Beyle (know to history as Stendhal), as this "ocean of barbarism...coarse, dirty, stinking." Perhaps the surroundings formed a factor in Napoleon's shaping up his army for the march on Moscow, well over 200 miles distant. This was a dubious decision considering the lateness of the summer, his recent losses, the generally unsatisfactory condition of the army, the shaky state of its supply lines, increasing lack of forage for horses and the enemy scorched-earth policy carried out mainly by Cossacks''.

You'll find several historical and personal accounts like these prior to Borodino. It's quite odd that you refuse to acknowledge the sad state of the French army.

Barclay's strategy is certainly clear, but Kutuzov's wishes are mired in uncertainty. He actually wanted to retreat further still after taking command; he was only forced to stand and fight because the xenophobic Russian nobility could not allow the French to enter Moscow. And though the French suffered heavily at Borodino, the Russians were decimated beyond recognition. All units of the Russian army participated in the battle and by the end men on both sides were having difficulty standing on their feet. The Russians were like a twig after the battle, lucky that Napoleon did not send in the Imperial Guard to break them.

"as opposed to seeking victory by imposing the consequences of their Scythian tactics on the French."

??? What an odd comment. I don't see how the Russian retreat imposed bad roads, poor logistics, and fatigue on the part of the French, or the sweltering heat on the part of nature (and that's something popular imagination forgets since it's so concerned with the icy winter; the summer was very hot and discomforting). The Russian retreat certainly created a situation where those things could happen - no doubt about that - but it did not impose those things by itself. It merely created a context where other factors could impose them. I hope you see the difference, but if not, you can request another explanation.UberCryxic 02:10, 24 October 2006 (UTC)


 * I am fully aware of the western positions of the Russian armies at the beginning of the campaign (I first saw the West Point maps years ago, and have played some excellent historical simulation games since, in addition to being well read on the subject).


 * My point though is that the interior of Russia was even more spacious than the entirety of Europe. The Russian conscripts definitely marched further distances than their French counterparts. One of the salient themes in Russian military history is the extreme difficulty they’ve had in transporting human and material resources from the country’s interior to its frontiers.


 * Check a map…you’ll see that the Russian heartland around Moscow is as far from the Niemen River as is France. Russian population centers north and east of Moscow are even further away from the Niemen.


 * The Russian conscripts marched further distances than their French counterparts.


 * As for your other remarks, I've addressed all of them several times already on various 1812 discussion boards, addressed specifically to you.


 * Kenmore 13:40, 24 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

The Ozharovsky Question Is Now Solved
Uber:

I've done some research that should solve the Ozharovsky question once and for all.

Note that this map is dated one day behind what the actual date should be...Nov. 15th should be Nov. 16th, etc.

On the map below, Ozharovsky's flying column is the solid black unit next to the village of Kutkovo, at the bottom of the map. You will notice the uncolored box north of it representing the Young Guard. The erratic arrows representing the movements of these forces indicate that the Young Guard hit Ozharovsky, then turned back to Krasnoi. Ozharovsky's troops' wild flight is also indicated.

Note that Ozharovsky's unit is isolated from Miloradovich, far to the right of the map, and isolated from the main Russian army, more towards the right/center.

Of Ozharovsky's flying column, Riehn says the following on page 337:

"The pursuit was to take the Russian army on a parallel course. Only Platov was to stay direclty on the heels of the French. For this purpose, his Cossack corps was reinforced with some infantry. A flying column was formed under Ozharovsky to go to Yelnia."

Riehn, on page 345, describes Ozharovsky's flying column thusly:

"The column included 1 jaeger regiment, 1 hussar regiment, and 4 Cossack regiments, with 6 guns."

Also, Riehn describes a "flying column" thusly in his glossary on page 410:

"Flying Column: Generally a raiding party of unspecified size, a flying column could run to several thousand men at most. Operating only on general directives, it did not have a fixed base of operations and was not responsible to any intermediate headquarters. i.e., the column was detached and therefore "flying".

I know from internet research that the average strength of such units was:

1 jaeger regiment: average strength = 600 to 1300 troops maximum

1 hussar regiment: average strength = 800 to 1600 troops maximum

1 Cossack regiment: average strenth = 300 to a maximum of 1000 troops

Thus, Ozharovsky's flying column, at most, was an isolated detachment numbering between 2600 to 7900 troops. The figure of 7900 is impossible, in my estimation, for Krasnoi, as all regiments on both sides were underpopulated due to attrition at this late stage in the campaign.

See these links for average strengths of regiments:

http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Russian_army.htm

http://home.att.net/~superspy/russorg.htm

Proposal

Can we put the Krasnoi argument behind us, in which case I will proceed to finish the article?

I propose that we compromise...I will add a section describing the Imperial Guard's action on Nov. 17th (the "two southbound columns 16,000 strong") as a successful feint by Napoleon, and describe Napoleon's strategic success in getting most of his combatants out of Krasnoi intact.

I will expand the section regarding Roguet's destruction of Ozharovsky on Nov. 16th.

Perhaps we could change the name from "Battle of Krasnoi" to "Skirmishes at Krasnoi" or "Actions at Krasnoi", and the result could be changed to "Inconclusive", or something indicating the heavy wreckage of the French noncombatants, the destruction of Ney, but also Napoleon's strategic success in extricating his combatants.

It will have about 50 footnotes...every sentence backed up by references.

I insist however that Chandler's account must go...he is dead wrong. Very sloppy research.

Kenmore 04:51, 24 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

Popular history vs. genuine academic research
Let me give you some more perspective on the general problem.

David Chandler in the Campaigns of Napoleon:

''The Russians, meanwhile, semmed in little hurry to get to serious grips with their adversaries. A great deal of skirmishing and minor actions took place at various points along the column, but nothing really serious happened until the 17th. By that date Napoleon had been at Krasnoe for two days, waiting for his extended column to close up. He was not altogether satisfied with the situation, however, as is shown by the dispatch of two regiments of the Young Guard to aid Eugene's IVth Corps, which was held up by Davidovitch at Nikulina for much of the 16th before finding a way round the block through Jomina...

'''Correction: Eugene was defeated with the loss of one third of his troops and all his baggage and luggage. Miloradovich let Eugene go at nightfall because Kutusov ordered him to settle for ambushing the French as opposed to engaging them in full battle.'''

...Indeed, his anxiety to ensure that the main road should remain open induced Napoleon to order an attack against Kutusov by the Guard on the morning of the 17th. At first he thought to entrust this operation to General Rapp, but then changed his mind and placed General Roguet of the Middle Guard in command.

'''Roguet replaced Rapp in the attack on Ozharovsky in the early hours of Nov. 16th, and not before the Nov. 17th feint by the guard. Chandler is either lying or his research is sloppy.'''

The operation was a complete success.

'''On Nov. 17th the Guard -- at best-- did some insignificatn skirmishing with the Russians, and even there, it was beaten (accounts written by contemporaries will be part of my upcoming article documenting this)...furthermore, the Guard generally didn't get within musket range of the Russians that day, while the Russian artillery bombarded the Guard mercilessly. The Young Guard was massacred...losing half its troops. Why doesn't Chandler tell us this part?'''

The southbound French columns (16,000 strong) caught Kutusov completely unawares...

Kutusov was not caught "unawares"...it is known that he ordered his army to assume a defensive posture in anticipation of aggression from Napoleon."

..,so accustomed had he become to the idea of a passive French opponent...

'''Kutusov, for almost the entirely of the pursuit, kept quite a distance from the Grande Armee because he didn't want to deal with a French counterattack. How then could have become "accustomed to the idea of a passive French opponent? Chandler, I am afraid to say, was probably drunk when he wrote these words.'''

The Russian partisan leader, Davydov, fancifully recorded that "The Guard with Napoleon passed through our Cossacks like a hundred-gun ship through a fishing fleet,"

'''Davidov was talking about an incident on Nov. 15th, not Nov. 17th. I have already established this. Go to the library and pick up Davidov's memoirs yourself. Again, sloppiness from Chandler.'''

and in no time the Russian commander in chief was ordering his 35,000 men to retreat south.

'''Kutusov never retreated from Krasnoi...not at all. He merely ordered Tormasov not to follow through on the enveloping manuever to the west. Chandler is either misinformed or he wants to misinform his readers.'''

The Russians subsequently tried to misrepresent the outcome of the action...

'''That's like being called black by the kettle! The truth is that propaganda-churning, pro-Napoleonic historians like Chandler have misrepresented the truth.'''

... claiming that "Bonaparte commanded in person and made the most vigorous exertions, but in vain; he was obliged to flee the field of battle." But this was flagrant propaganda. It was Kutusov who had very much the worst of the encounter.''

Certainly a writer like Chandler knows what "flagrant" means...given all his flagrant misrepresentations!

''This action - known as the Battle of Krasnoe - is of significance for two reasons. First, it reveals the degree of moral ascendancy retained by napoleon: his very name could clearly still strike terror into the hearts of his opponents; secondly, it proved the correctness of the not to send in the Imperial Guard at the later stages of Borodino, for had this formation been severly mauled near the River Moskva, it is unlikely that it could have pulled off this notable coup some eight weeks later.

'''But aren't the one crowing that if only Napoleon used his Guard at Borodino, then he would have destroyed the Russians right then and there? Don't you realize how your quotes constantly contradict the very arguments you try to champion on these boards?'''

Strategically, the French attack at Krasnoe proved fully effective. It ensured that the road to the west remained open,

'''No it didn't...the road west out of Krasnoi had already been left open when Kutusov ordered Tormasov not to occupy it. Kutusov's intent was to play defense at Krasnoi.'''

allowed the greater part of the army (less Ney) to rejoin the Emperor by the evening of the 17th, and made the enemy warier than ever.

It is a fact that Napoleon was in psychic pain over having to abandon Ney...but he had to retreat immediately because of the possibility that the Russians would wake-up and cut him off...this is known from his dispatches...abandoning an entire corps (Ney's) amounts to a defeat for Napoleon.

Fremont-Barnes and Fisher in the The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and Fall of an Empire:

''That night Napoleon sent his Guard Infantry in a risky night attack against several Russian encampents, reflecting his increased desparation.

'''They're talking about the Ozharovsky attack on the morning of Nov. 16th...and Napoleon knew it was not risky! Not at all! Ozharovsky had merely a lightly equipped "flying column"...3500 troopers only. The Young Guard was 6000 strong...how is that risky?'''

The bitter cold prevented the enemy from properly deploying pickets,

There were no pickets because of Ozharovsky's stupidity...he was a sloppy, cocky commander who encamped within 1 mile of Krasnoi...without any major bodies of Russian troops around to protect him...your book is wrong.

and the Guard exacted a terrible revenge upon the dazed Russians.

'''As would be expected, given that Ozharovsky's detachment was weak. But even so, the Guard suffered heavy casualities in that encounter. More telling is that Ozharovsky's detachment was reinforced a little later, and it took up a second position not far from its first one.

Remember: Ozharovsky's "flying column" was 3500 men strong...that is not the entire Russian army, as these lying or sloppy historians (I'm not sure which) are telling us.

This French success made Kutusov cautious and he went back to striking only when Napoleon was in the process of retreating.

'''That was Kutusov's strategy all along...he never became aggressive with Napoleon at any point. Even at Krasnoi, with the entire Russian army lined up south of the town chanting "Moscow! Moscow!" in unison, and with aggressive generals like Bennigsen, Ermolov, Doctorov, Toll, Wilson and others imploring him to advance...Kutusov insisted on playing defense. Your historians are nuts.'''

The road was open again, at least for a time.''

The road was never closed in the first place...least of all by Ozharovsky, who's detachment was encamped 1 mile south of Krasnoi...nowhere near the road.

The victory at Krasnoi allowed Napoleon once more to gather his army, with the exception of Ney's Corps.

How could Krasnoi be a French victory when:::The Russians were not driven one inch southward by the Guard's attack on 11/17?

When 80,000 Russians were lined up south of Krasnoi, waiting to attack the defenseless French...with only Kutusov holding them back?

When the French fled Krasnoi, not the Russians (the scene in the town...with Friedrich's defeated rearguard...looked practically like Saigon 1975!)?

When the Young Guard was slaughtered on 11/17 by Galitzin's artillery...losing fully half of its 6,000 men?

When the French lost 39,000 killed, wounded and prisoner to the Russians' losing 5,000?

When Napoleon was forced to abandon Ney to the wrath of the Russians, who subsequently destroyed Ney's corps?

Something's not making sense here...and it's obviously your slanted, tendentious, Napoleon-worshiping popular history books.

Robert Asprey in The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte:

''The army marched again on 12 November, but Kutusov had used the pause to bring his divisions parallel to the French line of march.

Ignorance...Kutusov's parallel march had started almost immediately after the Battle of Maroyaroslavets in late October.

Shadowed by this unwelcome presence, Napoleon lost patience. At Krasnoe a few days later he sent his Guard against the Russians,

'''Drivel...Napoleon sent his Guard on a feint...just a feint...not a full scale attack. The Guard could not have executed a full scale attack in the state it was in...no artillery or cavalry.'''

a stubborn fight

'''Ignorance...the Guard barely made contact with the Russians on 11/17...at best, there was some skirmishing. Even Palmer's overgeneral account (you say Palmer's book is your favorite) mentions only skirmishing and nothing else. Didn't you read the part in Palmer's book were the Dutch contingent of the Guard is reduced to just a handful of men during the 11/17 skirmishing?'''

and a victory that caused the cautious Kutusov, his troops also hungry, cold and tired, to back off to the south, enabling the French to reach Dubrovno the Dnieper river to Orsha.''

'''There is not a single account out there that details Kutusov's alleged "retreat". Popular history books say Kutusov retreated, but they don't elaborate. In-depth accounts of Krasnoi never say anything about a Russian retreat. All Kutusov did was cancel Tormasov's enveloping manuever to west, while simulataneously telling Wilson, Bennigsen, Ermolov, Galitzin and others that they could not move forward to finish off the French until he said so...and the order never came. There was no retreat.'''

FIND ME ONE ACCOUNT THAT SPECIFIES WHAT VILLAGE, RIVER OR RAVINE SOUTH OF KRASNOI THAT KUTUSOV "RETREATED" TO...HAVE YOU EVER NOTICED THAT YOUR BOOKS NEVER GET THIS SPECIFIC?

Dupuy in the prestigious Harper Encyclopedia of Military History describes the Battle of Krasnoi (November 16-17):

'''Popular history books are not "prestigious"...they are simple, general textbooks for people who have no motivation to seriously study the battles at hand. Why don't you read a serious, highly detailed account of Krasnoi?'''

''West of Smolensk, Kutuzov's advance guard, which had circled west of the French, barred the road.

'''The only columns operating in advance of Kutusov were Ozharovsky's flying column south of Krasnoi, and Miloradovich's corps east of Krasnoi. Ozharovsky didn't bar any roads leading into or out of Krasnoi. Miloradovich temporarily barred Eugene's passage into Krasnoi on 11/16. Nobody barred Napoleon's Guard on any of the days of the battle. The western road out of Krasnoi was never cut by anyone.'''

Napoleon collected his few effective elements and, in a brilliant display of leadership, drove the Russians off.

Again, someone please tell me exactly what villages, ravines, towns, rivers, creeks, cities, etc. that Kutusov was "driven" to...the more serious accounts of Krasnoi say nothing about any Russian retreat...

Ney's corps, reduced to 9,000 men, sacrificed itself in a desperate all-day rearguard action to save the rest of the army, losing all but 800 men.''

'''Kutusov had already allowed the "rest of the army" to escape Krasnoi before Ney even arrived. Napoleon was gone from Krasnoi on the afternoon of 11/17...Ney ran into Miloradovich, east of Krasnoi, at 3:00 PM on 11/18. How could Ney have fought any kind of rear guard action in such circumstances? Ignorance.'''

What emerges here are two points:

1) A larger theme of ignorance on your part about what actually happened at Krasnoi.

2) A distinct drive by much of the historical literature to identify this event as a battle, not as a series of skirmishes.

You have solved nothing, but you certainly like to think otherwise.UberCryxic 00:08, 25 October 2006 (UTC)


 * You are calling me "ignorant" regarding Krasnoi, when in fact I have done far more research on this subject than you?


 * I would like you to answer a question for me.


 * All of your books are just general histories -- popular histories --which don't address the battle on a deeper, more analytical, and more specific level. Why do you only use these kinds of books?


 * Richard Riehn's book is genuine academic research...analytical, highly specific, and richly laden with data. Riehn's chapter on Krasnoi (notice he wrote an entire chapter, not a single paragraph)says something entirely different than what your popular history books say about it.


 * How do you explain that discrepancy?


 * It seems to me that you are hiding.


 * Your books are just popular history books that generalize about Krasnoi in a very sloppy way...and they are grossly inaccurate as well.


 * I am going to finish the Krasnoi article myself...it will be copiously footnoted, and it will draw on a variety of sources. I will submit it to a review committee here and we'll let them decide which article stands.


 * Kenmore 02:36, 25 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

Krasnoi: More serious problems with Chandler
I want to throw out Chandler's account of the Battle of Krasnoi. It is totally inaccurate. Please consider the latest evidence regarding massive inaccuracies.

David Chandler's account of Krasnoi, below, uses Davidov's "100 gun ship" quote to characterize what happened on 11/17/1812:

''The Russians, meanwhile, semmed in little hurry to get to serious grips with their adversaries. A great deal of skirmishing and minor actions took place at various points along the column, but nothing really serious happened until the 17th. By that date Napoleon had been at Krasnoe for two days, waiting for his extended column to close up. He was not altogether satisfied with the situation, however, as is shown by the dispatch of two regiments of the Young Guard to aid Eugene's IVth Corps, which was held up by Davidovitch at Nikulina for much of the 16th before finding a way round the block through Jomina. Indeed, his anxiety to ensure that the main road should remain open induced Napoleon to order an attack against Kutusov by the Guard on the morning of the 17th. '''At first he thought to entrust this operation to General Rapp, but then changed his mind and placed General Roguet of the Middle Guard in command. The operation was a complete success. The southbound French columns (16,000 strong) caught Kutusov completely unawares, so accustomed had he become to the idea of a passive French opponent. The Russian partisan leader, Davydov, fancifully recorded that "The Guard with Napoleon passed through our Cossacks like a hundred-gun ship through a fishing fleet," and in no time the Russian commander in chief was ordering his 35,000 men to retreat south.''' The Russians subsequently tried to misrepresent the outcome of the action, claiming that "Bonaparte commanded in person and made the most vigorous exertions, but in vain; he was obliged to flee the field of battle." But this was flagrant propaganda. It was Kutusov who had very much the worst of the encounter.''

Meanwhile, in his memoir "Diary of Partisan Warfare 1812", Davidov uses the remark to describe what happened on 11/15/1812:

''On Nov. 3rd the detachment of Count Ozharovsky joined Kutkov's and Seslavin's party and, reinforced by Figner's, reached Zverovich. On that day at surnrise our reconnaissance unites reported that eneemy infantry wsa stretched out in marching columns between Nikulino and Stesnam...Finally, after midday, we sighted the Old Guard, with Napoleon in riding in their midst. We mounted our horses and stationed ourselves beside the highway. The enemy troops, sighting our unruly force, got their mustekts at the ready and proudly continued on their way without hurrying their step. They resisted almost contemptuously every attempt we made to breach their closed ranks and wrest a single man from their midst. Like blocks of granite, they remained invulnerable.''

''I shall never forget the unhurried step and awesome resolution of those soldiers, for whom the threat of death was a daily and familiar experience. With their tall bearskin caps, blue uniforms, white belts, red plumes and epaulettes, they looked like poppies on the snow-covered battlefield...As fi it were now, I see Count Orlov-Denisov prancing about on his light brown mare amidst myt Akhtyrka Hussars and orderlies of the Cossack Life Guard Regiment....our horsemen threw themselves at the front line, but all was in vain! Column followed upon column, dispersing us with musket fire and ridiculing our useless display of chivalry...During that day we captured one more general, countless supply wagons and up to 700 prisoners; but the Imperial Guard with Napoleon ploughed through our cossacks like a 100-gun ship through fishing skiffs.''

Calendar Calculator

Check this link for a calculator to translate the old, Russian Julian Calendar dates into modern, Western, Gregorian equivalents. You'll see that Davidov's stated date of Nov. 3rd, 1812 -- on the Julian Calendar -- translates into Nov. 15th, 1812 on the Gregorian Calendar.

http://5ko.free.fr/en/jul.php?y=1812

Clearly, Chandler's account of Krasnoi is unreliable. More and more evidence mounts. Can't we just pull it out of the Krasnoi article?

Kenmore 03:22, 26 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

Notes

Sources


 * The Campaigns of Napoleon, David Chandler, The MacMillan Company, ISBN 0025236601
 * In the Service of the Tsar Against Napoleon, by Denis Davidov, includes Davidov's "Diary of Partisan Warfare 1812", Greenhill Books, ISBN 1853673730

Outcome
the table must match the article. The article intro says "ended inconclusive". The rest is speculations. That Kutusov retreated later is of no relevance to the immediate result of the battle. `'mikkanarxi 23:27, 31 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Well I guess since you called me a troll for talking on your talk page then I'll write here. My reasons were given there and are public for anyone to see should they wish to scroll through the history.UberCryxic 23:37, 31 October 2006 (UTC)
 * My reasons are right there and you dont have to scroll. Opinions of historians are split. The outcome was way far from black/white. You cannot capture it in one prize given to one side. As for troll, my talk page clearly says I dont wish to discuss articles in my talk page. I can name seven reasons why. `'mikkanarxi 23:44, 31 October 2006 (UTC)

Actually, most historians appear to treat it as a Pyrrhic French victory, hence the result we have.UberCryxic 23:47, 31 October 2006 (UTC)

Something else: I've shuffled through a few other language wikipedias and they generally label this as a French victory. Some just flat out say "French victory" without recourse to whether it was minor, decisive, or something else.UberCryxic 23:51, 31 October 2006 (UTC)
 * "most historians": Since the issue is dusputable, you better write a section that quotes these "most historians", as well as of those who have different opinion. As for other language wikipedias, of note is polish wikipedia. Everyone knows that Poles quite dislike russians and love french. Still, they write "inconclusive". `'mikkanarxi 23:57, 31 October 2006 (UTC)
 * How about "tactical victory" ? The French held the ground on this day, but the consequences of the battle were catastrophic, so... Rama 16:47, 1 November 2006 (UTC)

"Disputable"??? Really? Find me one historian that explicitly calls this a Russian victory and I'll be impressed. Make the same request for the other side and we'll be here until we're old and decaying.UberCryxic 16:54, 1 November 2006 (UTC)

The outcome was of course a French victory after which Napoleon lost the war, cause that's what people did back in those days; they won the battles, and then suddenly lost wars. Napoleon had a victory at Borodino, and then decided: "Hmm, I think I've beaten up these Russkiis enough, now I shall beat up myself, and lost the war". The lone fact that Napoleon's objective of capturing the Russian Army was miserably failed, does not warrant defeat, because in wars and battles objectives no longer matter, and if you think they do, why you are a communist, who defeats nazis, not the miraculous soldiers who retreat (leaving all of their equiptment and ammunition to the nazis) from Dunkirk (with little fighting); now that's a miracle, a real victory.

Irony

At this point it's apparent that nobody is seriously interested in actually improving the article, but some might find the following anecdote of interest: ''WHEN the young Count Leo Tolstoy was visiting Paris in 1857, he paid a visit to Les Invalides to see Napoleon's tomb. As he examined the base of the sarcophagus with its engraved list of French victories -- Rivoli, Jena, Marengo -- he came across the words La Moskva and flew into a terrible rage. As all Russian patriots knew, the battle fought 45 years before, outside of Moscow, was called Borodino, and it had been a Russian victory, not a French one.'' http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000797741&er=deny with a picture showing the claim of victory (oddly, not "La Moskva" but "Moscowa" ... as it been changed? Is the anecdote accurate?) at http://www.lindsayfincher.com/gallery/d/5113-2/napoleon_tomb_2.jpg

Deleted text
Speculations removed.
 * His conduct during the battle suggests that his tactical decisions were marred by his efforts to avoid a "Pyrrhic victory". He was also suffering from a fever at the time, which may explain his uncharacteristic detachment from the battle as well as his unusually simplistic battle plan.

"may explain" by whom and to who? `'mikkanarxi 23:52, 31 October 2006 (UTC)


 * I've given a citation for this now, although I should add that this is fairly well-known.UberCryxic 23:58, 31 October 2006 (UTC)
 * Quotation good. As for "fairly well-known", not everyone loves french fries. Still it sounds apologetic, but at least we know who said this. `'mikkanarxi 00:00, 1 November 2006 (UTC)

All-right I'm fine if it goes in the Background section.UberCryxic 00:03, 1 November 2006 (UTC)
 * I support mikka in that the apologetic statement should go. The only reason for including such naive statements into the article is excessive Napoleonophilia. -- Ghirla -трёп-  13:08, 1 November 2006 (UTC)

Yes, of course, that's the only reason. Nevermind that it's mentioned by so many major historians of the period. As far as this battle is concerned, Napoleon's illness was relevant. Let's take an example and look at Uvarov's feint to the north. An energetic Napoleon and one on horseback would have probably realized that it was not the threat that the Napoleon on the stool made out to be. But because he couldn't analyze the situation personally, Napoleon took incoming reports at face value and panicked for no reason, disrupting French battle plans. That's one other reason, just in case you wanted one.UberCryxic 13:19, 1 November 2006 (UTC)
 * The history does not have "ifs on a horseback". It is a stupid childish excuse. It is sick apologetics of Napoleon to repeat this several times in the article. I collected all this illness in one place for future editors to stylistically make one piece of it. Im not against leaving it in the text, referenced, as a demonstration of slavish apologetics and Russophobia among Napoleonic historians (it is clearly relevant to the topic). Kutusov was also old and sick man and didn't show himself off on horseback, yet he kicked Napo's ass in a clever way, similar to Eastern martial arts: let the opponent defeat himself by his own stupidity. `'mikkanarxi 17:11, 1 November 2006 (UTC)

Your accusations are not constructive and without merit. Furthermore, historians do make note of Kutuzov's poor state, often in a critical way though. This is what Andrew Uffindell writes in Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars:

''The truth is that Kutusov was too out of touch to know the state of his army and had to sent Colonel Toll and another adjutant on a tour of inspection. On their return, they reported devestating losses and low levels of ammunition, finally forcing Kutusov in the early hours of 8 September to announce a retreat''.

The last thing Kutusov did in this battle was to be clever. He, in fact, made many mistakes that could have cost the Russians so much more, primary among them committing too many reserves too quickly, especially since he had earlier cautioned on the need to maintain reserve forces for the end of the battle. UberCryxic 17:21, 1 November 2006 (UTC)

My accusations are with merit.
 * I don't care about historians. Whatever they do make note, this didn't find way into this article. How would you like to rewrite the intro kinda: "Kutusov had a bad cold and made a number of mistakes by not being outdoors and too much relying on panic reports he would not have done seeing the battle with his own eyes and surely kicked the Frenchie's asses."
 * Lame excuse is lame excuse, and I am constructively pointing at it and constructively fixed the article a bit (at least I don't see my changes reverted). So it is your accusations that are without merit.
 * About historians: you yourself confirmed their bias: Napoleon's poor state is yet another occasion to glorify his genius. Kutusov's poor state is yet another chance to degrade Russians.

Unfortunately I am not an expert in the topic and don't dare to make any changes in real detail. All I can do is to attract attention to elements of bias in the article. `'mikkanarxi 18:10, 1 November 2006 (UTC)

Map, please
A map of the battlefield/battle would be very helpful for the uninitiated. -- 201.51.211.130 09:12, 26 December 2006 (UTC)