Talk:Battle of Buna–Gona/Archive 3

Medical situation might be worth more coverage in "Disease"
That old and terrible general, "General Disease", was a major factor in this first offensive in the area. There is some interesting background in The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against Japan (Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, Albert E. Cowdrey). People were sick before they even set out for the north coast battlefields and it took some time to get basic sanitation in rear areas mitigating the situation. Then it got worse, much worse. From the reference:

"By this time Port Moresby was on its way to becoming a major base, with new roads, airfields, and harbor facilities. In public health it resembled a frontier town. American and Australian units put up latrines along the beach, dumped their refuse into open pits, and burned their garbage. The soldiers ate most of their food from cans, discarding the containers. A plague of flies beset the town, and soon almost all troops passing through Port Moresby could report experiences similar to those of the 4th Portable Surgical Hospital, which debarked in November. Seventy-five percent of its personnel contracted diarrhea, “from which several . . . never completely recovered.” At first there was little malaria, but the troops, by creating a multitude of small water catchments exposed to sunlight, provided perfect breeding spots for the local anophelines. [page 128]"

"MacArthur ordered the 32d Division’s 126th and 128th Regimental Combat Teams, which were built around the division’s 126th and 128th Infantry, to New Guinea, although they had scarcely five weeks of training, none of it in jungle warfare. The decision to send green, or untrained, and poorly led troops to New Guinea ultimately had major medical consequences. After assembling at Moresby, they boarded Douglas C–47s or, in some instances, planes of Australian civilian airlines, which flew them to the front, across the Owen Stanleys. The battle for the north coast, already under way, grew in intensity as the November–March wet season began. [page 130]"

It is on that page where the mess of the Kapa Kapa Trail is discussed at some length with this being a part:

"The medics struggled to keep themselves and others going. Medical officers following the column shepherded the stragglers ahead of them, for fear of enemy patrols. They attempted to treat an outbreak of acute diarrhea, caused by contaminated bully beef, that forced some in their distress to cut the seats out of their trousers. Fires could not be built or food cooked, and rain thundered down the matted slippery gorges, swelling the mountain streams to torrents. A young officer scribbled in his diary: “Our strength is about gone. . . . We seem to climb straight up for hours, then down again. God, will it never end?” Between 25 and 28 October the trekkers dragged themselves into Jaure. Their clothes were in tatters, their shoes worn and moldy; many were beginning to have chills and fever. For the remainder of the campaign, they carried the fever with them."

I have not checked for equivalent Australian medical histories but incidental findings show much the same situation. Lack of medical knowledge on the battlefield and lack of medical preparation to deal with what was there in the nature of disease was perhaps even more a limiting factor than logistics. The army was sick to begin with. Palmeira (talk) 17:16, 4 December 2014 (UTC)

Another note on the role of disease. On pages 131—132 of the medical reference is a discussion of the relief of the American commanders, including description that you mention of checking temperatures of that company in which every man ran one, and an Eichelberger comment noted as being from Mayo's Bloody Buna:

"Waiting to starve the enemy into submission was impossible. “Disease,” wrote Eichelberger, “was a surer and more deadly peril to us than enemy marksmanship. We had to whip the Japanese before the malarial mosquito whipped us.”" Palmeira (talk) 17:45, 4 December 2014 (UTC)


 * Hi, already being criticised for the length so I would need a clear consensus before expanding significantly or adding new sections. What I am adding, tends to be in notes, which might develop an idea by way of clarification but is not part of the 'readable text'.  Some of this is a preemptive strike against the citation police or how to handle the 'obvious' without being accused of original research or synthesis (I perceive the issue with this is where the same facts may be synthesised with different meanings).  I am perhaps, struggling a bit with this. I believe that there is a degree of inherent contradiction in this. An encyclopedic history article is not just about collecting information and presenting it. It is also about condensing and extracting the essence from the body of information.  When the body of information (the degree of detail or number of sources) is small, this could be a collection of quotes but the act of selecting applies higher cognitive processes. It is a process of evaluation and is subject to bias.  Even 'simple' paraphrasing is a higher process.  Condensing multiple ideas (such as a chapter or chapters from multiple sources) into meaningful constructs (such as a paragraph) is by definition a process of evaluation and synthesis. The real issue is not whether synthesis occurs but whether it is reasonable and logical and, more particularly whether there are multiple interpretations or inferences, since this is where things could be contentious.  I see this is the role of peer review - to not misrepresent matters. It is also difficult to write in the usual style of: introduction, body and conclusion.  The conclusion is, by definition, the drawing of conclusions.  Even a summation implies a degree of analysis or synthesis. Just putting some ideas out there ...


 * All of this (your suggestions) tends to be an expansion of the existing disease section rather than a broader coverage of medical. Kapa Kapa is more correctly dealt with in its own section.  I think it is McCarthy that comments to the effect that disease is the companion of the siege and that the besieger is often as much at risk from it as the besieged.  If there is some consensus, I could include this in the aftermath. Would need citation details for the Eichelberger quote. Have been through Walker (Australian Medical History) and a few other sources. Your comment about Port Moresby is interesting since other comments indicate that it is in a rain shaddow and malaria is not as significant.  I would be looking to water and water treatment WRT dysentry.  The 126th, 128th and the Australians that came via Kokoda or Milne Bay were all diseased to degrees. Poor training is going to exacerbate problems.  The accounts of dydentry are problematic but no more so than at say Gallipoli?  Not closed on the subject but I think that it is sufficiently covered, given what else I have read on the subject of disease.


 * On the subject of the 2/126th (??) and the reference in the Aftermath to the "Ghost Mountain Boys", I am not comfortable with this. It comes from the original. I found a reference to a nickname of the 'Ghost Battalion' but all reference to the "Ghost Mountain Boys" goes back to Campbell's book.  I am not comfortable with this since this reference may be a reference to the book's title rather than a nickname used by these soldiers or their contemporaries.  Can anybody clarify? Comments? Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 04:51, 5 December 2014 (UTC)


 * Added the Eichelberger quote thanks. Cinderella157 (talk) 10:49, 7 December 2014 (UTC)


 * My "comment about Port Moresby"? That is a quote from the U.S. Army's Medical Corps history—and if you download that book to which I pointed you can find all their cites, some to the official reports of the time. You appear to be arguing with that—or have not checked the document you should be able to download from the link as easily as I. As for disease, yes, if anything the Japanese were debilitated as well, but the point is that out of this first experience with this environment by the U.S. forces there was considerable impact on command thinking and major medical changes. The reference I suggested you check has some interesting comments about that (my emphasis).


 * "At Milne Bay, a particularly hard-hit base, the incidence of malaria among all units reached 4,000 per 1,000 troops per year, and cost the service command an estimated 12,000 man-days a month. During the campaign more than 1.5 as many American soldiers were evacuated from the combat zone for malaria as for battle wounds; disease caused 71 percent of evacuations by air, and three-fifths of the sick were malaria cases. Malaria, said Colonel Miehe, was paramount in New Guinea, and no effective response took shape until after the Buna campaign was over. General Eichelberger considered the health conditions at Buna a command and training failure, and Chief of Staff General Marshall noted the prevalence of disease, reporting that “priorities for munitions overrode those for the necessary [mosquito] screening and other materiel to provide protection at the bases, also there has not been sufficiently rigid sanitary discipline as to the individual soldier. (The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against Japan (Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, Albert E. Cowdrey) pages 137—138)"


 * "The Buna campaign was Southwest Pacific Area’s own school, in which General Headquarters learned the power of malaria and began to adopt measures in hopes of combating it. Why a new lesson was needed, after Bataan, is still far from clear, but the improvised nature of the campaign, the lack of resources, and the divided medical establishment were contributory factors. What a strong chief surgeon with direct access to the commander-in-chief might have accomplished must remain problematical. As matters actually went, the Allies were fortunate that the enemy, here as on Guadalcanal, was also unable to control the disease. At least both sides suffered more or less equally, and by the end of the campaign the Japanese had entirely lost the power to supply either medicine or food to their remaining troops.(The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against Japan (Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, Albert E. Cowdrey) pages 139—140)"

The role of disease needs some added coverage even if some of the "bang-bang" stuff has to be cut. And your "rain shadow" excuse for doubting the Port Moresby thing? You are the expert on disease at that time and place above U.S. Army historians with full access to the records of the medical and command records? I do not think so. Palmeira (talk) 04:09, 10 December 2014 (UTC)


 * Hi,@Palmeira you have misunderstood my comment about the 'rain shaddow'. It is a comment offered in passing that can be substantiated (with a little effort) and was in no way intended to argue against or dispute the information you provided or the sources you have cited. I believe that my comments regarding dysentery (and Gallipoli) are valid and I do have some expertise in the mater of water bourne enteric diseases. Neither of these two comments diminish the cumulative significance of disease (and particularly malaria) to the battle. Have you read all of the section (including notes).

"It is stated in Bergerud[78] that between 85–95% of all soldiers in the area carried malaria during the course of the battle.[notes 6] There were 4.8 men hospitalised through sickness for every one Allied battle casualty.[notes 7] 75% of the cases were attributed to malaria.[72] After he had relieved Harding,

Note: Brig Disher was the Deputy Director Medical Services, New Guinea Force from late November 1942. At the end of December, he remarked in his diary, "that he thought that 100 per cent of the men at Milne Bay and in the Buna area had been infected."[79] By the end of January 1943 the malarial rate for operational areas rose to a peak equivalent to 2,496 per 1,000 per year,[80] or nearly 250%. This would include relapses at an average of two per man. The 163rd Infantry Regiment arrived at Sanananda from early January. It had deployed from Australia in late December, where it had not been exposed to the risk of maleria.

Aftermath: Condon-Rall and Cowdrey have a similar position but a different rational: "Waiting to starve the enemy into submission was impossible. 'Disease,' wrote Eichelberger,[754] 'was a surer and more deadly peril to us than enemy marksmanship. We had to whip the Japanese before the malarial mosquito whipped us.'”[755][notes 59]

Note: McAuley also notes, "history abounds with examples of besiegers defeated by disease"[135]"

You may note, that I have suggested a subtly as I might that that the malaria rate can partially be attributed to an influx of new victims.

I did previously download the reference and consider your opinion. I am not opposed to increasing the the section per se. However, I believe essentially that all of the issues you are raising are covered from the Australian sources. I have also include the Eichelberger quote in the Aftermath section and confirmed the source. On this basis, I suggested that there may need to be a consensus as to whether there needs to be further detail. It might also be a case of identifying specific facts/details that you think should be included rather than broad quotes. I appreciate your input. Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 09:43, 10 December 2014 (UTC)


 * Actually I have read the entire book, as I have done with the entire "Green Book" series over a lifetime and most of the Australian references for this area. I will review your entire draft when you are at a final stage and as always here may edit the article later. You mention "Australian sources"—and yes, this was a heavily Australian operation and much of the U.S. force at this time was very "green" and unseasoned—but expect some push back on the Australian centric viewpoint from U.S. points of view and editors. I may be among those adding that viewpoint. What I saw last time I did a full read is definitely an improvement and pretty thorough. Just keep in mind that citations may support your text but other cited text will be added over time. You do need to remember that despite the so far good work nobody "owns" an article on Wikipedia. That is sometimes to the detriment of good sense (as can be seen in articles such as USS Scorpion (SSN-589) where every crackpot popular author with a conspiracy theory seems to get a platform with citation), but that is the Wiki environment. Palmeira (talk) 15:08, 10 December 2014 (UTC)

Options for dealing with size

 * Ignore it - it is an option.
 * Make linked pages and divide off - the order of battle is an option but these are not particularly big. It will save a under 1000 words. The the order of battle stuff does not count as readable prose and there is text of which, at least some, if not all would not migrate. The structure is such that most of the sections of the draft should not be split off into 'optional' linked pages, eg. battle sections need the fire support sections. I don't see other sections that might be dealt with by splitting off.
 * The Japanese forces section is not intended to be readable prose. It would go as either a note or a linked page. There are other issues to decide before taking any such step.
 * edit out text noting that size alone is not a reason for this.
 * text dealt with elsewhere. On this basis, some of the sea route opened could go. I bought this across. i believe that some are attached to this. I do not tend to support such a step. It would be only a small saving.
 * 32 Div I think that it develops stuff from the 32 Div page but for continuity, it needs to be kept together to facilitate the development.
 * I don't see other options.
 * remove duplicate material - small saving if any.
 * remove off point text
 * remove text from readable prose to notes where appropriate. Examples, explanations, qualifying statements and inconsistencies in material. Stuff off point but necessary for completeness, balance etc. Two conflicting schools on use of notes. Some capacity to increase notes but only small gain expected. I think that the balance is noy too bad now and any more would tend to be detrimental. But doesn't mean there aren't possibilities.
 * Expanding text. What are your reasons for not recommending use? See User:Cinderella157/edit. I have been playing around. Thoughts are that only sections greater than two images deep (high - without caption ie about 8 cm) would be collapsed. Every section would show one or two paras, eg 32 Div shows 2 I think because of Harding image but one would be more usual. I think the 'see more' might need to be more prominent. The Lead, Background, Battle (1st level) and Aftermath would not be collapsed.  Myself, I think this has some promise without doing anything else. Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 11:02, 10 December 2014 (UTC)
 * G'day, my concern with collapsible text is that it reduces the accessibility of the content. Users with different operating systems will have different experiences - some will find it difficult to find the "show" button as it tends to get lost underneath images etc (I myself had trouble finding it on your example here). Equally, I've never seen it used in this manner before (mainly only for tables/lists not prose) and would be concerned that it would be held against the article if/when it is reviewed for assessment. The most appropriate technique for reducing size is to create sub articles and use a summary style here. That said, I wouldn't worry too much about size at this stage. Focus on saying what needs to be said, and when you believe you've said everything that is needed, create the sub articles and look to tighten the wording in this article where possible through copy editing and employing summary style. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 20:56, 14 December 2014 (UTC)

MacArthur's pressure and posturing
Hi all,

I wasn't all that comfortable with Pressure from above as a heading but nor am I that comfortable with MacArthur's pressure and posturing Sensationalising is much too strong but it is the nearest to describing how it comes across to me. I had been thinking of Command pressure. Comment please. Alternatives welcome or which do we go with?

Cinderella157 (talk) 10:00, 14 November 2014 (UTC)


 * I think you have it covered in the opening of "Demands results" but you might be interested in a 1989 study of the general's failures from 1941 through these events. I ran across an applicable study in my digital file while looking at the Hart/Mac enmity from the Philippines and found the on line link at DTIC to the .pdf: Defense of the Philippines to the Battle of Buna: A Critical Analysis of General Douglas MacArthur. The study itself is well cited and drives home Mac Arthur's detachment from reality while sending out self promoting propaganda from Manila through this campaign. Page 42 is interesting from this draft's perspective. The man was in full blame casting, self "glory" accumulating mode. As in the Philippines, he "never got out from behind the desk to find out what was going on":


 * Last of all, and probably the most serious of General MacArthur's failings, he never got out from behind the desk to find out what was going on. On more than one occasion this failing was a life-or-death error for the troops at the front. Had MacArthur bothered to visit the Philippine Army in the field prior to the war he would have known they could not oppose the Japanese on the beaches. Had he regularly visited his troops on Bataan he would have realized that his troops were literally starving to death. Had he gone to the front in Now Guinea, he would have seen the horrible combat conditions under which he directed his units forward “regardless of cost.” [p. 52]


 * It was also an opportunity for MacArthur the consummate publicist. He “stunned his victorious troops by announcing that the utmost care was taken for the conservation of our forces, with the result that no campaign in history...produced such complete and decisive results with so low an expenditure of lives and resources.” (22:327) This It an absurdity and an outright lie. The battle of Buna (commonly referring to the Buna-Gona-Sanananda area) was one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. (1:108) The fighting at Buna, Gona, and Sanananda cost the Allies 3,300 killed and 5,500 wounded as compared to the six-month Guadalcanal campaign in which American ground forces suffered 1,100 killed and 4,350 wounded. (22:328) According to D. Clayton James, “the deepest resentment felt by the veterans of the Papuan Campaign was probably reserved for MacArthur's audacity in depicting the casualty rate as relatively light.” (14:279) These men were, James continued, the same veterans urged to “take all objectives regardless of cost.” (14:279) [p. 45—46]


 * The numbers in parenthesis are cites in the study while those in brackets are study page numbers. As for his and his staff's low opinion of Australian fighting ability, see page 40—41 for the origins in their gross underestimation of Japanese strength. Palmeira (talk) 14:16, 20 December 2014 (UTC)


 * Thanks for this @Palmeira, I can see both of these dropping into place as quotes at the end of the section with a little bashing into place. You will see, that I have already made some reference to this release and comments by Eichelberger. It won't happen straight away but don't let me forget. Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 01:53, 21 December 2014 (UTC)


 * Weaving a bit of that source into the MacArthur section may clarify the origins of some of his blunders in the period. Fortunately he, or at least his staff, seemed to get their act together later (even if his self promotional posturing continued). In looking over the sections this morning I think the most critical new bit may be in the "Negative view of Australian troops" and the origin in the Kokoda push by the Japanese observations on pages 40—42 of that paper. The Kokoda Track campaign could use work similar to what you are doing here and that properly needs to go in that article, but a mention here would help. The key point is contained in this (my emphasis):


 * The Japanese achieved tremendous success along the Kokoda trail against the Australians, causing “amazement and consternation at MacArthur's headquarters”. (32:190) As it turned out, the Japanese had landed about 14,000 men in the Buna-Gona area, but Allied intelligence had grossly underestimated their strength. (19:103, 32:190) This led MacArthur to the conclusion that the Australians “simply would not fight.” (32:190) The attitude that the Australians were poor fighters pervaded thinking at MacArthur's headquarters, and as events proved that attitude was totally unjustified. (32:190)


 * In now a 71 year retrospect and look at the whole history the U.S. GHQ/Australian conflicts can be seen as misconceptions with some "fire" in the smoke on both sides. The SWPA command was a very insular thing with MacArthur loyalist at the core. Despite their obvious misconceptions about Australians there were "Australian problems", particularly in ports, related to labor unions and the war effort (Masterson: pt. 1, vii—viii) that were accurate and true hindrances to logistics. But that is another story. Palmeira (talk) 16:05, 21 December 2014 (UTC)

Providing context
"Author, Peter Brune supports the assertion that pressure [by MacArthur] for results was a factor [that increased Allied casualties], but argues that it was Herring's willingness to respond to such pressure that exacerbated the issue; he also argues that this pressure resulted in inadequate provisions being made to provide sufficient artillery pieces and shells.{sfn"

- Brune

Hi @User:AustralianRupert, Regarding the indirect quote you provided, I think it needs a little clarification/context. I have put a proposed addition in square brackets but these would not be used when inserted. I was hoping you could confirm or adjust. Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 05:01, 3 January 2015 (UTC)
 * G'day, that change seems reasonable. Sorry, I can't check Brune at the moment, though, as I am currently separated from my copy. I am in the middle of moving states, so half my library is across the other side of the country. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 05:59, 3 January 2015 (UTC)

Problematic statement
The statement: "When the Americans saw the few Japanese killed, they were surprised to see the men were robust and well-fed and not in the emaciated, weak state they had been led to believe. " which has gone through a revert cycle, is problematic. I know of no reliable recent history on the Buna-Gona battle that does not emphasize the starving condition of the Japanese defenders. For example, see Collie and Marutani, The Path of Infinite Sorrow: The Japanese on the Kokoda Trail. Perhaps this was an anomalous case, but I think we need a better source than a unit Web site. --Yaush (talk) 05:33, 21 January 2015 (UTC)


 * Hi @Yaush, I would have addressed this to you but you didn't appear set up and I didn't think you would get it. Starving or not starving is all a matter of timing. Most of the Buna-Gona garrison had not been deployed along the Kokoda Tack. They were unaffected by the supply shortages faced by the Japanese withdrawing back to the beachheads. Fresh reinforcements were landed on the eve of the Allied attacks. Most of these troops deployed to Buna, which was the 32nd Div AO. When Gona fell (9 Dec) large stocks of food and ammunition were found. The situation deteriorated so that by about the end of December, essentially all all of the food stocks had been consumed. Sea resupply to the beachheads was effectively curtailed by Allied air power. The statement in question is made in respect to the start of the battle. The reference quoted (http://www.32nd-division.org/history/ww2/32ww2-3.html) supports this statement as do many others. Hope this addresses your concerns. I tried putting more detail in to explain the revision but there wasn't enough space. Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 06:40, 21 January 2015 (UTC)


 * Okay, that sounds plausible. I am a bit allergic to self-published Web sites as substitutes for reliable sources. I recommend adding cite then of one of the "many others." --Yaush (talk) 14:00, 21 January 2015 (UTC)


 * Done. :


 * "Yielding a dozen or so yards at a time when strongly pressed, the Japanese covering troops gradually fell back. Out of rations, and with the greater part of its ammunition used up, the 1st Battalion ended the day a badly shaken outfit. The troops had entered the battle joking and laughing, and sure of an easy victory. Now they were dazed and taken aback by the mauling they had received at the hands of the Japanese. Nor did it escape them that the bodies of the few Japanese left on the field were those of fresh, well-fed, well-armed troops—not, as they had been led to expect, the tired, emaciated, and disease-ridden survivors of the fighting in the Owen Stanleys. It was to be some time before they and their fellows recovered from the shock of finding that the battle was to be no pushover and that, instead of a short and easy mop-up, a long cruel fight lay ahead of them." Palmeira (talk) 17:09, 21 January 2015 (UTC)


 * Good stuff. Thanks. --Yaush (talk) 17:30, 21 January 2015 (UTC)

measurements
, I am a little concerned about the conversion template being applied to the text. The sources mostly give measurements in imperial only. In this article, by convention, the conversion is provided in parenthesis. Conversions in the article may have been rounded to reflect significant figures. In effect, a double conversion may lead to an inadvertent misquoting of the source material. Cinderella157 (talk) 06:45, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
 * My only concern was consistency throughout the article. When I first looked it looked it appeared that you originally presented measurements as metric (imperial) but then seemed to swap to imperial (metric). Feel free to change it back if it is a big issue for you though. Using the conversion template will allow the script to calculate the conversion for you rather than having to do it manually. Anotherclown (talk) 08:17, 20 February 2015 (UTC)

Original text was: "Buna air strip is 5 ft (1.5 m)" The template has convered 1.5 m to 4.9 ft. Decimal ft is uncommon (vs ft and inches) at first glance, it is easily confused with 4'9". The original measurement was 5 ft. The conversion template should be applied with caution. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:12, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Pls feel free to correct it of cse. That said there are ways of telling the template to round numbers which I believe are available through accessing the template documentation available here - Template:Convert. Anotherclown (talk) 09:21, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
 * I changed a few back to imperial BTW as result of your query, although it is now really very inconsistent throughout the article. Anotherclown (talk) 09:53, 20 February 2015 (UTC)

Merge proposal
It has been proposed that Draft:Battle of Buna–Gona be merged with this article (essentially moving that draft over this current article). Please join the discussion and help to establish consensus either way. The discussion can be found here: Draft_talk:Battle_of_Buna–Gona. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 05:26, 21 February 2015 (UTC)

Abbreviations
I note that the matter of abbreviations has been raised previously with the comment: "We generally don't use abbreviations for rank, probably best to write them in full", and "Non-standard abbreviations, for example, '2/6th Ind Coy' ...".

I see no advice regarding this at Manual of Style/Military history, having searched by both 'rank'' and 'abbreviation'. Regarding the use of abbreviations, I note from the MOS:


 * 1) Acronyms states "Unless specified in the "Exceptions" section below, an acronym should be written out in full the first time it is used on a page, followed by the abbreviation in parentheses ..."
 * 2) Manual of Style/Abbreviations (lead) states: "Always consider whether it is better to simply write a word or phrase out in full, thus avoiding potential confusion for those not familiar with its abbreviation."
 * 3) Abbreviations widely used in Wikipedia lists (among others): Lt, Col and Gen, among other ranks.
 * 4) Abbreviations states: "When an abbreviation is to be used in an article, give the expression in full at first, followed immediately by the abbreviation in parentheses (round brackets). In the rest of the article the abbreviation can then be used by itself: ..."

I have utilised abbreviations IAW the MOS. Abbreviations have been (save the possible inadvertent omission) been introduced at the first use, writing out in full, followed by the abbreviation in parenthesis. The use has been generally restricted to large compounds (Maj Gen), relatively large words (Lt) and words used very frequently for units such as Bn, but only when used with a specific unit eg 2/9th Bn.

In response to earlier comments, I had reviewed the use of abbreviations and subsequently made the following response: "I have made some concessions WRT the use of military abbreviations but believe that where these remain, their use is consistent with the MOS. Further comment is welcome, as are any corrections of errors or inconsistencies with the MOS."

I see nothing to mandate a change from the usages of abbreviations in the article? Cinderella157 (talk) 06:26, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Possibly true, and it may indeed be more out of custom that has developed over time than any explicit policy (or perhaps are more stricter interpretation of some of the existing policies you quoted). At any rate we need to write our articles for readers that do not necessarily understand military jargon (e.g. few would know what a Bde or a Bn etc was I assume), so why possibly confuse things when we can say what we actually mean? That said neither of these are technically acronyms AFAIK so they don't really fit the policy you mention above. Regardless, the way the article was written before seemed to make it somewhat inaccessible to me, hence why I rewrote the abbrevs out in full. Equally I don't think you will find many / any of our GA, As or FAs with these abbrevs (certainly not ones that have been recently reviewed) with the possible exception of some US Civil War articles which tend to use abbreviated ranks by consensus. Anotherclown (talk) 09:38, 20 February 2015 (UTC)

Except perhaps by oversight or move to the order of battle, all abbreviations were introduced in the manner explicitly detailed in Abbreviations. Cinderella157 (talk) 13:58, 21 February 2015 (UTC)

Single quote marks
I would note that the convention of usage is that single quote marks have been used in instances where quotemarks have been used for reasons other than 'direct quotes' (such as this). I believe that the MOS is silent (or largely so) since its reference to a preference for double is in the context of direct quotations. I would observe that 'corrections' have left a mixed style. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:29, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
 * The "corrections" have left a mixed style because the article is so long. I might get there in the in end or maybe I'll just give up. I'm getting the impression you not particularly keen on me copy-editing this at any rate. Anotherclown (talk) 09:18, 20 February 2015 (UTC)

Related discussion: WT:MOS. Please participate. —174.141.182.82 (talk) 00:52, 25 February 2015 (UTC)

Progressing
Hi, @AustralianRupert I was wondering about progressing this draft?
 * G'day, yes I would be happy for this to be moved over to article space. To achieve this, I think it would require an Administrator to move and histmerge this Draft page with Battle of Buna–Gona using the special tools that they possess. Before we look to ask one to do this, though, I think it best to ask a few of the other contributors whether they agree or not as well. I think the best way to do this is for a message to be posted proposing this on Talk:Battle of Buna–Gona and here. If consensus is established, then we can look to ask an Admin to do the honours. have you any opinions on this proposal? Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 00:49, 15 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Quick scan only of latest. It looks much better than what is up now. I think it is ready to go on stage. Good work. Palmeira (talk) 12:24, 15 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Looks good, go for it.— btphelps (talk to me) (what I've done) 20:51, 15 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Agree. I've no issue with this being moved into mainspace over the existing article. There is of cse more work which could be done on the article by any editor that wished to further improve it, but this draft certainly covers the topic more thoroughly than the current mainspace version. Anotherclown (talk) 12:46, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Striking own cmt - per the discussion at Wikipedia_talk:Manual_of_Style it seems my involvement in the development of this article is not welcome by User:Cinderella157 so I have no opinion on where we go with this draft. Anotherclown (talk) 00:15, 27 February 2015 (UTC)
 * @Anotherclown, To be clear, your edits have not been welcome where these have been executed contrary to the MOS. On the otherhand, your edits consistent with the MOS have been quite welcome. Cinderella157 (talk) 00:35, 27 February 2015 (UTC)

Import talk from Draft talk:Battle of Buna–Gona
Following sections have been moved from Draft talk:Battle of Buna–Gona to facilitate any discussion of the rewrite that was moved to the article space. Cinderella157 (talk) 22:46, 13 April 2015 (UTC)

Link to history of draft
This article was overwritten by Draft:Battle of Buna–Gona on 02:22, 13 April 2015. A redirect was subsequently place on the draft article. To access the history of the draft document, use the following link.

Draft:Battle of Buna–Gona: Revision history

Cinderella157 (talk) 03:12, 14 June 2015 (UTC)

TOC
TOC left was previously changed and reverted with the following comment:

You may know that TOC left on the Battle of Buna–Gona has recently been changed to TOC by Ww2censor who makes the comment: "TOC left is discouraged - Is there a good reason it is being used?" To do so would leave a large white space, which I think is a good reason.

Cinderella157 (talk) 08:48, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
 * I'm sorry pls just state what you want to occur - unfortunately I'm either too dense or your being too obtuse but I actually don't understand what you mean. Do you want it TOC left (unlike every other battle article we have) or do you not? Thanks. Anotherclown (talk) 09:15, 20 February 2015 (UTC)

Revert your edit please as your edit leaves a large whire space. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:26, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Ack - done. The TOC now of cse squashes a number of images and text but that's the trade off I guess. That said I've no interest in arguing the toss about such pointless thing as an infobox so each to their own. Anotherclown (talk) 09:45, 20 February 2015 (UTC)

This and a number of other matters have been discussed or have been raised and are the subject of discussion. Certainly, this one is a trade-off. Thankyou. Cinderella157 (talk) 14:05, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Is there any way to use TOC left here without having it post below the infobox, as seems to be the case? To clarify, if the height of the infobox extends beyond that of the lead, the top of the TOC (on the opposite side) doesn’t appear until partway into the first section. —174.141.182.82 (talk) 02:20, 25 February 2015 (UTC)

I wasn't aware of this discussion - I should have checked. The problem with the current coding is that it makes the TOC appear about halfway through the 'background' section, which is rather confusing, especially given how long this article is. The white space which results from the standard TOC seems to be the less-bad solution IMO. Nick-D (talk) 08:35, 14 April 2015 (UTC) I tried to move the map which was in the way but it still looks like arse having table of contents on the left. 101.169.170.140 (talk) 09:43, 14 April 2015 (UTC)
 * I worked it out by deleting the "TOC" which then appeared in the right place. 101.169.255.239 (talk) 18:37, 22 August 2015 (UTC)

Floating TOC left appears most consistent with the advice given in Manual of Style/Lead section and Help:Section (particularly Help:Section, notwithstanding that there is an apparent conflict between Manual of Style/Lead section and the fifth numbered point in Help:Section, wrt floating the TOC within the lead. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:32, 23 August 2015 (UTC)
 * You seem to be the only one that thinks that but I guess you own the article so its ok to do whatever you like. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 32dDivGuy (talk • contribs) 20:01, 23 August 2015 (UTC)

By my assessment, there are four substantive options for the placement the TOC. Considering these four options, the last option appears to be the option most consistent with the WP advice given on this subject and most suitable in this particular case - despite not being that option most commonly employed. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:42, 24 August 2015 (UTC)
 * 1) The usual placement of the TOC following the lead but before the first section with no floating text. This is the most usual but creates a large area of white space to the left of the TOC as a result of the length of the TOC. The TOC, with only 2 levels is longer than one viewing screen. This is not desired.
 * 2) A floating TOC (left) could be place within the lead (see example, edit of 01:27, 24 August 2015‎). However,this is expressly deprecated by Manual of Style/Lead section because of interference with screen readers.
 * 3) The TOC could be floated somewhere into the background section. Both sources of advice (see above) advise that a floated TOC should be placed between the end of the lead and the first section but do not expressly deprecate this alternative. However; point 5 of Help:Section indicates that the TOC should (if possible) be visible on opening the article page without the necessity of scrolling down. This option would be contrary to this. I believe that without the recently added flags, the TOC placed just before the first section does satisfy this.
 * 4) Floating the TOC (left) immediately after the lead and before the first section heading. The advices above indicate that this is an acceptable option for a long TOC subject to consideration that the text area does not decrease below 30% of the average user's visible screen width (about twice the size of the Wikipedia navigation bar to the left) - see points 6 and 7 of Help:Section. My observation is that this option complies with these considerations. Forcing breaks immediately before the TOC (to put it just below the info box) would increase this margin of allowance but at the risk of dropping the top of the TOC outside the viewing screen on opening the article.

Inconsistent use of British/Australian and U.S. units of measure
In the section about Climate and weather, the temperature is referred to using both Farenheit and Celcius as the primary measurement:


 * "Temperatures over the period of the battle ranged from an average daily low of 72 °F (22 °C) to 89 °F (31 °C) but with a humidity of 82 percent, this could be oppressive. In the humid conditions, kunai grass trapped the heat and it was not uncommon for temperatures to reach 50 °C (122 °F)."

The terrain is described using a mixture of feet, meters, miles, and kilometers:


 * "Buna air strip is 5 feet (1.5 m) above sea level. The elevation is only double this at Soputa, 7.5 miles (12.1 km) inland and 85 metres (279 ft) at Popondetta, 21 kilometres (13 mi) inland. The water table is reportedly shallow at about 3 feet (0.91 m)."

And a few sentences later:


 * "Average rainfall for December was 368 millimetres (14.5 in)".

Given there were a mixture of Aussie and American units on the front lines, I'm unsure what the preferred measurement method ought to be, but it should be consistent. — btphelps (talk to me) (what I've done) 19:15, 24 August 2015 (UTC)
 * I can tell you what was used at the time: a completely confusing and totally inconsistent mix of U.S. and Australian units. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:56, 24 August 2015 (UTC)


 * Please be aware that Australia used British (imperial) units (as opposed to metric) and, for the most part, these are the same as US units. The two main (contemporaneous) histories were written with US and imperial units respectively. The mixed use of metric or imperial/US as the primary unit originally represented the units quoted in the source. It certainly was consistent in this respect.  However, some subsequent edits by others has changed this to some degree and also introduced a greater degree of implied accuracy than is reasonable - ie 3 ft = 0.91 m rather than 0.9 m or 30 yds = 27 m rather than 30 m as in the case of, "well-trained infantry would look to advance as near as 30 yards (27 m) to the fall of the shot". My concern is that conversions represented as primary data can misrepresent figures cited in sources. To my mind, quoting a figure from a source is equivalent to quoting a passage of text - though perhaps this is a legacy of my scientific discipline. If a consensus is for commonality of primary units, then I would tend to US in this case. Cinderella157 (talk) 22:48, 24 August 2015 (UTC)


 * If it's a figure within quoted text, I can see the sense in retaining the original measurement. But the examples I cited were in such close proximity to one another it caught my eye. I wasn't sure if the Aussies were using Imperial units or not, so the presence of metric units is even more confusing. Given that we're writing a summary, is it critical that every measurement be converted exactly? Will minor differences materially affect the reader's understanding of the topic? — btphelps (talk to me) (what I've done) 23:48, 24 August 2015 (UTC)


 * @btphelps Firstly, conversions should not be made exactly (ie reporting all of the decimal places that result from applying the appropriate conversion factor) but to a number of significant figures that is consistent with the precision of the original observation that is being converted. Hence, it is more appropriate to say 3 ft = 0.9 m not 0.91 m. To clarify (by way of explanation), from the perspective of my profession, writing, 3 ft (0.9 m) is implied to be "3 ft [0.9 m]" - the figure is a quote from the source. Specificity as to date, time or quantity is considered to be quoted from the cited source - though I think you understood this. This is the consistent rational that has be applied to the article (by me). I observe, given WPs pedantic obsession with verifiability and accuracy in citing sources that an obsession with conformity might out-weigh this is surprising. This is a general observation which is in no way intended to be personal.
 * With regard to the question, does primacy of a particular unit system "materially affect the reader's understanding?" I answer as follows. Primacy of a figure conveys to the reader a sense of superior reliability with a sense that the figure in parenthesis is somewhat inferior to the extent of conversion and rounding errors. The significance to the readers will depend on the reader's insight and the reader's intended on-use of the article. Notwithstanding this (and to my perception), the system of units given primacy does not affect the broader understanding of a passage of text or an article provided the conversion is clearly given, either expressly or by clear inference (such as a second identical figure given almost immediately following the first).
 * Your consternation appears to be with why the same system of units is not primary throughout and not with understanding the text. Perhaps this should be explained by way of a note? If this is still all too problematic, then my preference would be for US/imperial units to be primary. A well intended but (I believe) ill considered edit lead to "5 ft (1.5 m)" being changed to "1.5 metres (4.9 ft)" when 5 ft was the figure cited in the source. The text "... kunai grass could grow to over 6 feet (nearly 2 metres)", was edited to "could grow to 2 metres (6.6 ft) and the leaves were broad and sharp".  The reference cited stated that the grass could grow to over 6 feet. My concern is that any broad change or subsequent changes should not affect the integrity of the article, such as has occurred in these two examples. Cinderella157 (talk) 05:02, 26 August 2015 (UTC)


 * Cinderella157, I confess I'm not quite sure what you said, but I think I agree that the figures cited from source material should preserve the "integrity of the article". For ease of comprehension, I agree with your preference for primary use of US/Imperial units. — btphelps (talk to me) (what I've done) 05:51, 26 August 2015 (UTC)


 * btphelps I would be happy to explain any particular point of understanding (perhaps directly with you) if you desire. The key point is that changes indicated by the two examples in the last paragraph can adversely affect the integrity of the article. On a side note, omission of the US equivalent of battle honours was not a bias on my part - rather that I lack knowledge on the subject. I was hoping somebody might address this. Cinderella157 (talk) 06:49, 26 August 2015 (UTC)

G'day, just a quick comment/suggestion, but it is possible to flip parameters and limit the precision in the conversion templates. That might solve some of the issues raised here. See Template:Convert for more details about how to achieve this. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 05:51, 27 August 2015 (UTC)


 * Some, but backtracking the well-intended edits previously made, makes this something of as task. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:37, 27 August 2015 (UTC)


 * Could you "assume" that the first number would be from the source, then either use it or reverse convert it? ReTeam (talk) 13:11, 29 August 2015 (UTC)


 * No, since although that was how the article was originally edited, a well meaning editor has altered this when applying the convert template to the the manual conversions. Cinderella157 (talk) 13:26, 29 August 2015 (UTC)


 * Understood. It's a shame, though, since most numbers seem to be approximations, anyway. Is it one identifiable editor? You could just go to the edit before them. That would be a lot of effort, but the mixed units look terrible.


 * This must have been addressed at some other article. ReTeam (talk) 15:02, 29 August 2015 (UTC)


 * This involved many changes per save, all well intended and some more valuable than others so, unfortunately, it is not a simple fix. Cinderella157 (talk) 23:03, 29 August 2015 (UTC)