Talk:Battle of Copenhagen (1801)

Old talk page post
Why were the names of the ships removed? Peregrine981 03:45, Nov 30, 2004 (UTC)


 * Garden-variety vandalism, I reverted. Unsummarized deletion by anons is almost always malicious. Stan 05:56, 30 Nov 2004 (UTC)

Huh?
Why does this article suggest that the Danish-Norwegian army lost ships? When Nelsons terms of peace reached the Danish King not a single Danish-Norwegian ship had been sunk and not a single Danish-Norwegian ship had been captured.

Not to mention that three of Nelsons line ships had just gotten into the firing range of the fortress of Trekroner. Had the Danish king only consulted with his admirals before agreing to the peace treaty Nelsons ships would have been devestrated seriously damaging the naval poweress of the English.


 * Judging by your ignorance of the article and pure speculation, I'm guessing you're Danish? (RockDrummerQ (talk) 18:28, 10 September 2009 (UTC))

Parker's Signal
See this for reference to Parker's motives http://www.aboutnelson.co.uk/copenhagen.htm

''"Judging from what he could see, and the fact that the wind and current prevented his bringing his own division into the action, Parker told his flag captain: "I will make the signal of recall for Nelson's sake. If he is in condition to continue the action, he will disregard it; if he is not, it will be an excuse for his retreat. . . . "''

It is claimed that Parker was aware of the consequences to his own personal reputation; but it would be cowardly in him to leave Nel;son to bear the whole shame of the failure, if shame it should be deemed." Dabbler 20:26, 14 July 2005 (UTC)

Nelson turned to Captain Foley and said ‘You know…I have only one eye. I have a right to be blind sometimes’ and raising a spyglass to his right eye added ‘I really do not see the signal’ (Hibbert, page 261). From the National Archives seen March 2006. Midgley 14:51, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

Danish casualties?
This is written rather overmuch with the British in mind. It says that 350 men died and 850 were wounded on the British ships but I'm pretty sure there were Danish casualties as well considering they lost the war... Does anyone know how many died? I'd be grateful :)


 * About 2000, killed and wounded, I couldn't find a more exact figure or breakdown. Dabbler 16:31, 10 October 2005 (UTC)


 * More precisely, 1135 killed and wounded. The British figures are also debatable. The figures given for British casualties in this article was according to Admiral Nelson himself &mdash; a notorious lier. Admiral Parker, who was a larger admirer of the truth, gave the figure 2237 dead and wounded on the British side. Boreanesia 15:57, 19 October 2005 (UTC)
 * As all the British ships maintained crew logs 2,000+ killed would show up clearly, but they don't reflect this figure.Alci12 11:50, 25 March 2006 (UTC)

Dudley Pope, in "The Great Gamble" has British casualties at 256 killed, 688 wounded, with a detailed breaksdown between officers, seamen and marines, soldiers. His figures for the Danes are: 370 killed, 106 died of wounds, 559 wounded (total 1,035), with abreakdown between officers, 'officials', seamen, warrant & petty officers, army NCOs & soldiers, volunteers & pressed men.Cliff 14:18, 9 February 2007 (UTC)

Aftermath
I had edited it to read:

After the cease-fire, formal negotiations for peace ensued. These talks lasted for more than a week focusing on the British demand that Denmark-Norway leave the League of Armed Neutrality. The negotiations were difficult and at times almost called for the resumption of hostilities. When it was learned that the Russian Emperor Paul, who was the driving force behind the League of Armed Neutrality, had just died, the British demands suddenly became irrelevant. A 14-week armistice was signed on April 9, 1801, as a beginning of peace between the two parties. The final peace agreement was then signed on October 23, 1801.

This was not to be the end of Danish-Norwegian difficulties with the British. In 1807 similar circumstances led to another British attack, in the Second Battle of Copenhagen.

Back in England, nobody was decorated for the battle. Nelson's conduct during the battle, wherein he disobeyed Parker's orders and thereafter sent a deceptive note to the Danish-Norwegian Crown Prince, was seen as an unworthy conduct.

But most of this was deleted on the grounds that it was POV. Why? I see nothing POV about it. Boreanesia 17:37, 19 October 2005 (UTC)


 * I think there was an edit conflict and your edits and mine clashed. However there is a factual inaccuracy in one of your edits. I would point out that Nelson was created Viscount Nelson of the Nile as a result of the battle, hardly a sign of disapproval. I have reinstated the comment about the 2nd battle and will also put in the part about the Tsar's death and the peace negotiations.Dabbler 18:14, 19 October 2005 (UTC)


 * We need to consider the background when considering the viscountcy. See Horatio_Nelson for an explanation of his anger over his barony. It was generally accepted at the time that Copenhagen would probably not of itself have gained him that distinction had it not been for the feeling that perhaps an error had been made previously.Alci12 12:25, 25 March 2006 (UTC)


 * I concede that Nelson was indeed decorated. As for the British casualty figures, all of my Danish sources say the same thing: i.e., 2237 killed and wounded according to Parker. Danish casualty figures range from 1135 to 2215 depending on which source you look at. Fischer's report, which you have so kindly shown me, does indeed show that nobody really knows the exact figures. In fact, the Danish ships were hastily manned by volunteers from the streets of Copenhagen, not many of whom had any naval experience. Boreanesia 18:36, 19 October 2005 (UTC)

Bomb vessels: Range cf shorebased cannon
"Supporting the British line were smaller British bomb vessels, which were positioned where they could bombard the city without fear of retaliation."

The high trajectory of a bomb vessel's weapon was useful and intended for attack on fortifications. It didn't provie long range compared to a cannon. If the designer of the shore defences had built forts which commanded the roads, except for positions convenient to shell the defences and the city at short range, then perhaps he didn't do it very well? In that cae something to that effect might go in the article there. Midgley 14:32, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

I think during the battle, the bomb vessels will have been there to fire at the Danish shipd, not the city. They were positioned hard up against the Middle Ground, as far from the city as possible. MAG1 11:25, 30 April 2006 (UTC)

Bomb vessels were usually used to fire on cities and forts rather than other ships. They were not very accurate and hitting another ship would be difficult (though easier if they were moored in lines), for examples of their use and their threat see the Second Battle of Copenhagen, the threatened bombardment of Cadiz. Basically they were there to intimidate the political leadership with the fear of mass civilian casualties and to encourage surrender. Dabbler 11:55, 30 April 2006 (UTC)

But they were sited far away from the shore, so it is unlikely that they would have been intimidating to the city itself, see the map here. The Danish ships and forts were fixed, and so they might have been effective against them. Incidentally, the map was published in 1899- anyone know whether that means it is out of copyright? MAG1 14:22, 30 April 2006 (UTC)

This link gives ranges of up to 4200 yards for mortars fired from ships and although its hard to see from the map above, the bombs would be in range of the city from the edge of the Middle Ground. However, once the Danish ships had been subdued, there would be nothing to stop the bombs from approaching closer to bombard the city. The web site also suggests that it was this threat (later carried out in 1807) which prompted the agreement for a ceasefire once the Danish ships started surrendering. Dabbler 15:39, 30 April 2006 (UTC)

You're completely right- it's what it says in the DNB as well, though the idea was for the bomb vessels to move towards the city once the Danish ships had been silenced, hence their little huddle out of harm's way. I've changed the article. MAG1 21:14, 4 May 2006 (UTC)

The 6 bombardier ships were completely irrelevant other than a nuiceance. The british intention undoubtably was to use them to attack the city IN THE CASE that the danes didn't give battle. And the use of the bombardiers was only to make "a show", a demonstration (to avoid the situation that the RN would just sail around outside the reach of the costal fortresses, allowing the danes to claim that nothing really happened).

It's like the historical geniuses writting this article havn't really understood what the attack on Copenhagen and the operation against the armed neutrality leaque was about? 85.82.169.61 23:27, 6 September 2007 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.82.169.61 (talk) 22:57, 6 September 2007 (UTC)

Revision
I've added quite alot that explains much of the contoversies. I can find no support for the assertion that Parker reported 2237 casualties- perhaps he was referring to Danish casualties? In any case, this is a thing that would have been known exactly from ships' records. I am afraid I have taken out the paragraph suggesting that 'Danish historians' stating that somehow the battle was not a British victory, partly because of the weasel 'Danish historians', partly because it was not at all clear what was being asserted. MAG1 11:25, 30 April 2006 (UTC)

William Bligh
I notice that the text here about the flag incident is inconsisteny with that in the article William Bligh which says "When Nelson feigned not to notice the signal 43 of Admiral Parker to stop the battle and kept the signal 16 hoisted to continue the engagement, Bligh on the Glatton was the only captain who could see the conflicting two signals." whereas this article says "Seeing that Nelson had not repeated the signal, nearly all the Captains also ignored it." Which is true? --Richard Clegg 12:22, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

Search me- what's your article? I gleaned this from the Dictionary of National Biography, which is pretty authoritative, and included the story about Graves. It seems a bit unlikely that Bligh would be the only one, but it's possible: all accounts from battle participants are amazingly confused. I've made the wording in the article cagier. MAG1 21:42, 5 May 2006 (UTC)


 * Afraid I know nothing which would help. I was browsing Wikipedia and I happened to notice the inconsistency.  --Richard Clegg 23:48, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

It seems strange that The defiance, The Monarch and The Ganges who was ahead of The Elephant and The Clatton, but behind the frigates (who did see the signal) couldn't see the signal 193.88.185.185 12:43, 10 September 2007 (UTC)

Comments (moved from article space)
Some comments to the above: Largely the above is correct, though the timing isn't. It's clear that around 1400 hours (the time of the dispatchment of Nelson's Cease fire proposal) the situation was that while both sides had taken heavy damage (The Danish-Norwegian had taken clearly most damage, due to the british superiority of guns and higher rate of fire due to it's well trained crew), the Danish-Norwegian line was not defeated and still offering stiff resistance. In the time span it takes to deliver the Cease fire proposal, and the stalling manouver by the danish crown prince (asking for more details/motivation) the battle swings in british favour by most of the southern DK-NO line falling out of the battle. In that situation the Crown prince accepts the ceace fire proposal, conversively Nelson is honorbound to accept the acceptance of his   own  proposal, eventhough the development in the situation between 1400 and 1500 would suggest "capitulation" and thus clear victory  rather than a "cease fire" (in the form of a formal draw). So one can say that Nelson, formally, "looses" his victory, by allowing the danish command all the time in the world to accept a cease fire proposal - which they do when it's clear that they are loosing.

The reason behind Nelson's cease fire proposal at 1400 hours, can only be speculations, though having the danish side accept the cease fire proposal would mean that the royal navy had reached it's main political and strategical goals at Copenhagen (having DK-NO to drop out of the armed neutrality allience with Sweden, Preussia and Russia - that in a sense allready had shown to be a bluff). At the same time the Royal Navy had to continue to Landskrona, Sweden to make the same manouvre against the swedes, so Nelson could not afford a costly victory at Copenhagen. And at 1400 hours the situation is unclear and the british position was dangerous, particulary if it should be forced to break off contact, a situation which would be even more worring if the coastal fortresses would have to be engaged at some point to force the DK-NO units from the "kongedyb". Lastly (and this is a common misconception) it was not the RN's primary goal to destroy the danish-Norwegian navy, and the RN was not given the possibility to do so, since the (unmanned) main force of the danish navy (the newest and strongest units) was kept in the fortified port, while the battle line consisted mostly of smaller or older vessels and "floating batteries".

A reasonable secondary source to the battle is the  newly published "Danmark i Krig" (H.C. Bjerg, O. L. Frantzen, Politikens Forlag).

(original post was made by User:85.82.169.61).

Valentinian T / C 21:22, 6 September 2007 (UTC)

OK, fair enough. Though I suggest that the comments are encorporated, since the confusion of time in the article is misleading and adds to the article's  distinct "english bias".

Another issue is the article's "insitance" on the importance of the Bombardier ships. Not only do it overexaggerate their value and insist that somehow some few mortars would surely bring a strong fortress like Copenhagen was to it's knees, it adds to the tantrum; "This was surely a british victory", "This was surely a british victory", "This was surely a british victory" that is prevalient throughout the article. When infact the battle ends with a written "cease fire" porposal by Nelson. 85.82.169.61 23:29, 6 September 2007 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.82.169.61 (talk) 21:50, 6 September 2007 (UTC)


 * I see your point, but one could call it a "house rule" on this project that we only add comments to the article discussion page and then work on issues from there. I'll move your latest comment here as well to avoid somebody else accidentally erasing it completely. I have no opinion for or against you edit, btw, this area is beyond my expertise. Regards. --Valentinian T / C 21:56, 6 September 2007 (UTC)

Comments to the aftermath section
The section is misleading. The purpose of the british action was to so to speak to call the bluff of the armed neutrality leaque not to force terms on to the danish capital - which the avialiable forces would have been unable to (the writer seems to mix together the situation in 1801 and  the bombardment of Copenhagen 1807 in which an army of 30000 soldiers and  large  siege artillery batteries were besieging Copenhagen). The brits did call the bluff, not only didn't the closest member of the neutrality leaque (sweden) send it's substancial navy to Denmark's aid, it didn't even participate in closing of it's side of  the narrow straight between Helsingør and Helsingborg.

Further I find the nice and derogating story "At this point one of the Danes turned to another and said in French (perhaps thinking that he would not be understood) that disagreement might lead to a renewal of hostilities. (...)"

To be obviously wrong. First of all the lanquage spoken at the danish court would certainly not be English, since broadly speaking not a single dane would understand a word at that time. It would either have been French or German. Secondly should a dane want to communicating something that he didn't want the brits to understand he would not choose french, a major lanquage that any man of some education could speak, but ofcourse he would say it in danish - I hope this is so obvious that I don't need to find a reference?

Again a myth that displays Nelson and the english as trumphant victors and the danes as unintelligent and scared peasants, adding to the article's distinct bias. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.82.169.61 (talk) 22:47, 6 September 2007 (UTC) (moved from article space), originally posted by User:85.82.169.61).

It doesn't matter if you or I think it's a myth: it's a story that is reported. If you have a reference which says something different happened then add it. MAG1 09:06, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

NO, MAG, I am challenging the trutfullness of the myth, by pointing out that it is highly unlikely. It must then be upto the author of the myth to provide hard core evidence in surport for the myth. 85.82.169.61 12:10, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

Just to continue pointing out some weaknesses adding to the distinct bias. The story that Parker signals retreat, but in fact didn't mean his navy to retreat is weakly sourced as well as unlikable. It's illogical for a commander to issue an order not to be followed, because he's affraid that his orders will be followed....

The most reasonable explaination is that Parker, like the danish command, at the time judge that Nelson's battlegroup is in deep troubles and that Parker wants it to disengage. This is also consistent with Nelson's cease fire proposal, and that the danes do not accept it straight forward, but stalls time. 85.82.169.61 23:30, 6 September 2007 (UTC)

Why Parker might have done this is explained in the article. MAG1 09:06, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

I have (or rather had, before somebody deleted it) also kept that story, eventhough it strongly smells of Parker's own "after rationalization" of the events - and a story his own time apparently didn't buy. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.82.169.61 (talk) 12:12, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

Deletions and Corrections in section "aftermath section"
I have taken the liberty to remove the part

''At this point one of the Danes turned to another and said in French (perhaps thinking that he would not be understood) that disagreement might lead to a renewal of hostilities. "Renew hostilities!" responded Nelson, and turning to his interpreter said "Tell him that we are ready in a moment; ready to bombard this very night!" Hurried apologies followed (the British fleet was now in positions that would allow the bombardment of Copenhagen) and agreement was reached and signed the next day. ''

Since it's not only obviously an (untrue) myth (see the above section, for explaination) but also because it has a clear intent of  being derogatory towards the Danish-Norwegian side (Myths are OK imho, but only when they are fair, else it's just propaganda).

I will also make corrections to the confusement, that gives the misleading impression that the danish goverment was forced into an agreement against their will. (The case being that Czar Paul 1 dies in later part of March 1801, the news arrives in Copenhagen late 8th april which gives the danish goverment free hands to dishonor their duties towards the armed neutrality leaque, and thus the danish goverment had no problems in accepting the british demand of danish withdrawel from the leaque. The problem was that the danish goverment feared giving Russia a Casus Belli against Denmark, and thus refused to do anything that would be a clear breach of their obligations towards Russia. But the timely arrival of the news of the death of Paul 1, removed this problem and at the same time the armed neutrality leaque had exactly shown to be a "paper tiger" and thus not only worthless, but a liability for the security of Denmark-Norway. The agreement was signed early 9th april. Deleted

''The armistice was reduced to fourteen weeks, but during it Armed Neutrality would be suspended and the British were to have free access to Copenhagen. Danish prisoners were also paroled. In the final hour of negotiations, the Danes found out (but not the British) that Tsar Paul had been assassinated, which made the end of the League of Armed Neutrality very likely. ''

and successfully intimidated the Swedish fleet into staying in the port

Have been changed to "where the Swedish fleet stayed in the port" Since the situation was that the leaque of armed neutrallity had in practice siezed to exists and neutral Sweden had thus no interest at all in making a battle with the RN, endangering it's Neutrality. I don't know whether or not the swedes were intimidated by Nelson, though such a claim would probably be hard to substantialize, though one can speculate that since it took the RN 3-4 hours to fight a danish riff-raff of floating batteries and old hulks manned by lightly trained volunteers and pressed men to an unclear cease fire agreement, the larger and better prepared Swedish navy would probably have thought it doable - but we can't know.

In 1807 similar circumstances led to another British attack

Have been changed to:

In 1807 neutral Danmark-Norway was subject to another undeclared british surprise attack

Since the circumstances weren't at all the same, and that the new text display the fact of the nature of both attacks.

85.82.169.61 07:58, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

Historical Fraud?
The current version of Nelson's initial note to the danish goverment:

To the Brothers of the Englishmen, the Danes:

''Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson has been commanded to spare Denmark, when she no longer resists. The line of defence which covered her shores has struck to the British flag: but if firing is continued on the part of Denmark, he must set on fire all the prizes he has taken, without having the power of saving the men who have so nobly defended them. The brave Danes are the brother, and never should be the enemies, of the English.''

I am sitting with a photo copy of the original note kept in the "departementet for udenrigske anliggendes arkiv i Rigsarkivet" (the departement of foreign affairs at the danish national archive). The problem is that the sentence The line of defence which covered her shores has struck to the British flag (clearly stipulating that the danish line is defeated) is not in the note! Also the sentence The brave Danes are the brother, and never should be the enemies, of the English. doesn't seem to be there either (Though I must confess that I have troubles  making out the hand writting in the later part of the note, which is hasty, and what seems to be a patch of blood further wittnesses the situation aboard the HMS Elephant at the writing of the letter).

I will remove the two fraudulent sentences. 85.82.169.61 09:45, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

Now this is dead interesting. If it is allowed, could you u[pload an image of the note? MAG1 09:08, 8 September 2007 (UTC) http://www.navalhistory.dk/danish/Historien/1801_1814/Englandskrigene_nelsonbr_PO.htm

Maybe you will restore your incorrect alterations to the more correct version you just altered? 85.82.169.61 11:25, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

Yep, that's dead interesting and the correction, with reference made. I wonder where the other version came from? . I bet that there is an interesting story behind it. However, I think the splodge at the bottom is nothing more exciting than an ink blot. MAG1 11:24, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

Actually the story goes that Nelson asks for paper to be brought up, but on his way the courier is killed, and the paper has blood stains on it, Nelson says "that won't do, it will signal hurry from our part", and new paper is brought. Though I don't know if it's a myth (though the ink and handwriting does signals hurry).

I can't tell you where the other version came from, but I can tell you "why". There are two old persistent myths surrounding the battle: One is perpetrated by the danish side and it originates in Danish officers who fought in the battle. They spread the "stab in the back" legend that the Crown prince had fallen for Nelson's ruse de querre (the letter) and accepted CF in a situation where the danes were winning (One of the arguments was that the letter had been sendt to and the decision made by the crown prince, and not the commanding officer, Olfert Fischer, who unlike the crown prince, it's claimed, knew the true millitary situation - but this was probably mixing in discomfort with the Crown Prince's authoritarian style of management). Another myth is that the battle was over and won by 1400 (the time of the letter) and thus Nelson's letter was a gesture of mercy rather than the claimed humanity. Both of these myths are wrong, and amoung many things - and disregarding the actual timing of the events of the battle - they are contradicted by the simple fact that the battle lasts almost another full hour (very long time for navys looked in close quarters, the battle of the nile takes one hour and the actual engagement at trafalger is, if memory serves we correctly, even shorter) and the fact that disregarding the defense of the "inner run" and Trekroner the entire danish line is defeated by 1500 hours (when the CF originating in the letter of 1400 hours comes into effect). A more reasonable theory (it can only be theories, we don't know what went on in Nelson's head at the fighting on the bridge of the Elephant) and one perpetrated by recent historians is that Nelson's letter was in fact a letter of humanity, understood in the way that further killing was useless because both sides had gotten what they wanted: The brits had shown the leaque of armed Neutrallity to be bluff and more so directly dangerous for the three smaller participants in this "Russia's socalled neutral allience", and the danes had fought valiently in defense of the same, which was something the danes could show the russians, and at the same time it was clear that the defenses around the  "inner run" would in any case withstand a possible attack.

Another plausible theory is that at 1400 Nelson doesn't like the look of things and wants the battle ended, instead of riscing too heavy damage. Half an hour later the danish line does give in (see section Danish cassulties for the factual time dates of the indivdual ships's surrender/withdrawel/sinking, but Nelson is caught by his own note (Correction: Have made a time interval more precise 193.88.185.185 12:25, 10 September 2007 (UTC)).

I am making a quite detailed version, in which I encorporate some of your initial critismn. Because the current article is somewhere between myth and dreams of grandeur. 85.82.169.61 20:58, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

Deletions The battle
. Of the Danish ships, three escaped, two sank, one exploded, eleven taken and burnt, and one, the Holsteen, added to the Royal Navy and renamed HMS Nassau

I have removed the ship cassualty numbers since they are contradicted by information in the header of the article. 85.82.169.61 10:45, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

No they don't, they're the same. MAG1 09:11, 8 September 2007 (UTC)


 * Some of what has been done is good, some of it is is commentary, some of it is original research. There has also been some deletion of material because it does not fit a point of view.  I've restored the deleted stuff, tried to add the new information, and deleted the commentary and OR.  The idea is not to arrive at "The Truth", but report the different facts as they are reported by differnt historians.  MAG1 09:00, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

This is absurd!

You have basically restored the entire incorrect heresay, biased view points and outright lies and disinformation that characterized  the article.

The corrections and deletions I have made are firmly surported by leading authorities in the field and are based of new publications, but that's apparently not interesting.

You write that there has been deletions of material that did not fit a "view", the entire sections was and now is again POV - a point of view that surports the false notion that the battle was over and won when Nelson dispatched his famous note - that is simply not historically true. I will maintain that my work had a balanced view both acknowleding the the factual course of the battle, the danish view and the british view.

Secondly the article asserts this wrong notion of the state of the battle around 1400 f.ex. by outright disinformation (F.ex. the inserted sentence "The line of defence which covered her shores has struck to the British flag" in Nelson's note - which is factually fraudulent.

Thridly you have maintained the untrue and unlikely myth of Nelson "telling the danes" in the largely incorrect "aftermath section".

MAG if you have little knowledge of the matter, you should desist from interfering and deleting other peoples work while not making a copy. 85.82.169.61 11:19, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

It doesn't matter what I (or you) think or know: all we can do is write down in  published sources. The anecdote is clearly reported in literature, and so needs to go here. If there is any direct evidence from verifiable sources that it did not happen (e.g. reports from those that were there) then that goes in as well. There is a disagreement over timings. This is usual for Napoleonic battles as the participants were generally too busy being shot at to make careful records at the time and the clouds of gunpowder smoke obscured most of the battle from people. In addition, there is a particular problem with this battle because, for the reasons described in the article, some Danish ships struck their colours and then resumed fighting later. If you check the edits then you will see the timings you give are preserved in the article. All past edits are preserved via the history list. MAG1 11:42, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

By the way, what went on at the negotiations (including the renew hostilities anecdote)was described by Colonel Stewart, who was there. MAG1 11:48, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

Show me the source 85.82.169.61 21:37, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

The secondary source is Pocock,I'm afraid- paper book.MAG1 22:35, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

Seems very strange that Pocock would relay that, besides Pocock isn't exactly well known for his indepth knowledge of the case at hand, his expertize lies in other fields, and I only have your word that it's Pocock. I must insist, that since I am required to find on-line evidence for every factual correction I make from the wording of Nelson's letter (that should be well known to people with interest in the subject), to the times and status of danish warships, that highly unlikely stories are also properly sourced. If it can't be sourced proberly (and some John Doe's webside doesn't count) sourced, then it should either be omitted, made clear in the text that it's unsourced or moved to a section in which it's clear that the content are "legends". 193.88.185.185 11:23, 10 September 2007 (UTC)

Well Pocock's book was runner up for the Whitbread Prize for Biography, which is big deal, and Pocock was the former Naval Correspondent of The Times (he got the text of Nelson's dispatch right, by the way). Lt Col. William Stewart's eyewitness account was published in Nelson's official life, Clarke, James, and John M'Arthur, The Life and Services of Horatio Viscount Nelson (1809). I certainly haven't been asking for on-line evidence- books are fine by me; however, where there are conflicting accounts from reliable, verifiable,referenced sources then they should both go in, not a selection made. MAG1 09:19, 11 September 2007 (UTC)

I accept your points about Pocock, though I still regard the story as highly unlikable (First of all it doesn't seem to be the case that the Crown Prince did speak english at all (though not certain) it seems very unlikely and against ettiquette that the negociations would have been in English, that it's unlikely that a danish diplomat would not know that english people, like all people of education at that time, spoke french and that the diplomate didn't choose to speak his native tonque (danish) which could be expected not to be spooken by englishmen), regardless of what Pocock writes. Your The Life and Services of Horatio Viscount Nelson (1809) is so old that it's not really credible, it has to stand back for modern history works. Jomsviking 11:57, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

In this case its age is a virtue as it (at least it says) presents eye-witness accounts rather than a historical interpretation. MAG1 23:00, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

Well the story appears in several secondary sources, all from Stewart's original publication as far as I can see, and he was there at the time. I have a bald statement that the Prince did speak English, and that is not unlikely given that his mother had been born and brought up in Britain. Furthermore, Nelson could understand, but not speak French: like other professional naval officers, he joined the navy as a boy and was at sea from the age of 13 and so had an adequate, not an extensive liberal education. MAG1 22:55, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

For a secondary source or infact tertiary source "Age" is absolutely not a virtue. We don't use "Gibbons" (Decline and fall of rom. Emp) as a secondary source to the roman empire - Gibbons work, as influential as is was, is old and outdated and it's main interest today (apart from it's litteary qualities) is as a primary source to how the history of "the history of the Romans" evolved. Citing 200 years old contempoary works (this work even written in a time of war in which Nelson was the heroic martyr) is simply not a decent manner to refference historical claims, we have to use modern up to date refferences when we can, and when these doesn't surport the old myths, it's probably because that's what they are: old myths. Jomsviking 18:43, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

It's a primary source, not secondary or tertiary: Clarke and M'Arthur's book contains an account written by Stewart. We may not use Gibbon, but we do use the contemporary Roman accounts of events. What would be interesting would be to have some Danish eye-witness accounts. MAG1 19:03, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

Yes they might "contain" primary sources, but the treatment of these primary sources is 200 years old and probably outdated. F.ex. This "Steward guy" was he belivable? Did he have a personal interest in displaying the factual events in a specific light? Did the authors have such an interest? etc. History as an science is not a question of "book keeping", but more a carefull analysis of the sources and their motives. Today citing a book published in 1808 as a credible source is equivalent to citing the german war time propaganda as a source to the events on the eastern front. Jomsviking 11:50, 15 September 2007 (UTC)

Ship numbers
"No they don't, they're the same" When you go into battle with 17 ships, how can you then save plus loose 18 ships? I don't know what the ship looses were, around 1500 men were taken prisoner, which would correspond to 1/3-1/2 of the line. 85.82.169.61 11:36, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

So the problem wasn't the casualty figures, but the total number involved. From the list of ships further down, it looks like the number should be 18 ships. MAG1 11:42, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

No I mean that the numbers are wrong, 15 ships either surrendered or sank of these two unrigged lineships, 5 hulks (3 of these strikes their colours after the signal to cease fire is given around 1500, and are thus not formally lost in the battle) and 1 frigate the rest gun rafts and floating batteries. Se relevant section below 85.82.169.61 21:37, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

Furthermore I add that around 1800 danes were taken prisoners, 5800 men (minus the around 400 dead) manned the fleet. Which is the same as saying that 1/3 of the danish navy surrendered/was saved from the sinking/burning ships by the brits. The ships was left to sink or burn, because they (with few exceptions) was old and damaged (all the ships in the main line was choosen because they were expendable old hulks - ships cost money, men are made for free - though the high admirals did give thanks to the many wounded and dead, who so unselfishly had sacrified themself so that the beautifull (and costly) ships in the harbour wouldn't get damaged). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 193.88.185.185 (talk) 12:10, 10 September 2007 (UTC)

Danish casualties
http://www.sa.dk/lak/saxo/1801/text/skibe.htm

For those not familiar with danish: "Folk" ="crew" (in this context) "Døde" = "dead" "Sårede" = "wounded"

Different categories under "Status" "Stryger flaget" = "Strikes colours" "Sunket" = "sunk" "Ude af kampen" ="retreated" ("out of the fight"). "Ikke i kamp" ="Not in the battle".

The source of the numbers are O. feldbæk (University of Copenhagen). The web site (www.sa.dk) is the offical archives of the danish state (Statens arkiver). 85.82.169.61 21:37, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

Re-writing of the section "Battle"
I have re-written a part of the section "Battle" corrected wrong dateings and thus strived to present a correct time order of the events around 1330-1430 hours, to allow the reader to form a more correct oppinion about the circumstances around Nelson's note and the conclusion of the battle. My sources are primarely works by O. Feldbæk, H. C. Bjerg and O. L. Frantzen (particulary H. C. Bjerg and O. L. Frantzen recently published "Danmark i Krig").

H. C. Bjerg is Cand Mag (University of Copenhagen) his CV includes; Archiver of the national archive of Denmark (1971), Supervisor of the archives of the armed forces of Danmark (1982-2002), The danish Navy's consultant in historical matters. professor at the danish academy of war (navial war history), together with a number of positions in official socities of the danish history.

O. L. Frantzen is Cand phil (history, University of Copenhagen)) Direktor of the danish museum of war (Tøjhusemuseet), Direktor of the state's mussems of war (Tøjhusmuseet and Orlogsmuseet) and Colonel of the reserve.

85.82.169.61 16:13, 7 September 2007 (UTC) I will include the unaltered text here:

FURTHER MORE, I will comment in [...] mistakes, unsourced claims and erronious information, to make it clear why this has to be reworked.:

Parker would have been able to see little of the battle owing to gun smoke, though he could see two British ships flying distress signals, and another aground. Thinking that Nelson might be being fought to a stand-still, but would not feel able to retreat without orders (the Articles of War demanded that all ranks do their utmost against the enemy in battle), Parker told his flag captain, "I will make the signal of recall for Nelson's sake. If he is in condition to continue the action, he will disregard it; if he is not, it will be an excuse for his retreat and no blame can be imputed to him." Nelson ordered that the signal be acknowledged, but not repeated. He turned to his flag Captain, Foley, and said "You know, Foley, I only have one eye — I have the right to be blind sometimes," and then holding his telescope to his blind eye, said "I really do not see the signal!" If any of the other captains saw the conflicting signals, they ignored Parker's. Nelson's second-in-command, Rear Admiral Thomas Graves, repeated the signal, but in a place invisible to most other ships while keeping Nelson's 'Close action' signal at his masthead. Riou, who could not see Nelson's flagship, the Elephant, did obey Parker's signal and withdrew his force, then attacking the Tre Kroner fortress [Must be wrong or a very light attack, since TreKroner practically didn't suffer cassulaties, the frigates would have been attacking "Indfødselsretten and Hjælperen]. This exposed them to heavy fire, in which he was killed.

It was at this time that the battle swung decisively to the British as their superior gunnery told [Unsourced claim]. The dozen southernmost Danish ships had started to fall silent owing to the damage sustained [Wrong, the southern most units cease fireing :Jylland at around 1430, Wagrien, Prøvestenen after 1500 and the signal to stop the hostilities], and the fighting moved northward: by 1:50p.m. several Danish ships were reported to have struck their colours, sunk, or were burning [Wrong: One capital ship had left the danish line, but had not struck colours, The Flagship was burning but continued the fight to around 1430]. This left the way open to the British bomb vessels to approach Copenhagen [Not at all]. In addition, the reinforcements of the ships from the shore batteries were causing the latter to become ineffective [Wrong: ]. The Nyborg tried to leave the line with the Aggershuus in tow, but both sank (Nyborg and Aggershus was rafts each armed with 20 medium guns, hardly a decissive moment]. The most northerly ship, the frigate Hjaelperen, successfully left [Yes the 16 gun Hjælperen withdrew ]. The Danish commander, Olfert Fischer, moved from the Dannebrog at 11:30a.m. when it caught fire, to the Holsteen. Once the Infødsretten immediately north of the Holsteen struck its colours at about 2:30p.m. [Wrong it strikes colours at 1500], he moved on to the Tre Kroner fortress [Wrong he does that at 1330]. There he lightly engaged with three of Parker's ships [Must be wrong, since the British frigates were retreating at this point], which had been able to tack to within range. By this time only two or three of the Danish ships were reported to be still fighting [If by this time is meant around 1400 hours only 3 rafts and the two small frigates have left the battle, the entirety of the danish line is fighting - hard]. Perhaps because of inexperienced crews, several Danish ships fired on British boats sent out to them after their officers had signalled their surrender [Who knows, before 1430-1500 no Danish ships (perhaps with the exception of Holsteen - strikes colours at 1415, in a position were it might have been taken during the fight) surrenders to the brits, some minor units strikes colours and retreats behind the danish line into the area protected by the costal fortresses ]. Rather than send in fireships to burn these ships [Rather???? What does that mean - it implies that Nelson had the ability to send in the fireships - that has to be substanciated], Nelson sent a note with a Danish speaking officer under a flag of truce to the Dano-Norwegian regent, Crown Prince Frederik, who was watching the battle from the ramparts of the Citadel [At this time he would have been at sixtus - which is not the citadel, but a battery - though that's not so important]. The note read:

To the Brothers of the Englishmen, the Danes:

''Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson has been commanded to spare Denmark, when she no longer resists. The line of defence which covered her shores has struck to the British flag: but if firing is continued on the part of Denmark, he must set on fire all the prizes he has taken, without having the power of saving the men who have so nobly defended them. The brave Danes are the brother, and never should be the enemies, of the English.''

[Which is fraudulent] Some British [As well as about all danish officiers] officers thought the offer of a truce a skilful ruse-de-guerre, and some later Danish historians have suggested that Nelson would have lost the battle if it had not been adopted [Well, perhaps some has - the claim originated in danish officers who had fought in the battle]. Though no British ships were lost, many were severely damaged. The Tre Kroner fortress was still very much active [Unthouched, and at 1400 all danish capital ships are fighting, though Sjælland can't keep it's position in the line], and a withdrawal under its fire with badly damaged ships and difficult navigation would have been very difficult; the alternative would have been to wait for a change of wind [Now that would have been a very bad idea, the wind was south, south-west. If the wind sprung to east the british ships would be blown on the danish line and within range of the coastal batteries and onto the Refshalen reef. If the wind went in the west the british ships would be blown to the Middelgrunden Reef - the wind direction was perfect for Nelson ]. However, while the truce spared British as well as Danish lives, it was clear by this time that Nelson had won the battle [At 1400 that was not clear since the danish line was still fighting with all it's major units] and Copenhagen was now open to bombardment [Wrong - well yes I imagine that the bombardier ships could have throwen some bombs, but fails to see the millitary significanse]]. When Crown Prince Frederick sent an aide-de-camp, Hans Lindholm, asking for the reason for Nelson's letter and offering a twenty-four hour truce, Nelson was pleased to accept it, writing:

''Lord Nelson's object in sending the Flag of Truce was humanity; he therefore consents that hostilities shall cease, and that the wounded Danes may be taken on shore. And Lord Nelson will take his prisoners out of the Vessels, and burn and carry off his prizes as he shall see fit.''

Lord Nelson, with humble duty to His Royal Highness the Prince of Denmark, will consider this the greatest victory he has ever gained, if it may be the cause of a happy reconciliation and union between his own most gracious Sovereign, and His Majesty the King of Denmark.

At 4:30p.m., the Danish flagship, the Dannebrog exploded, killing 250 men [Must be wrong During the entire battle Dannebrog suffers 105 dead and wounded ]. On their way out from the channel, three further British ships were grounded, including the Elephant. The Dano-Norwegian ships had been partly manned by volunteers, many of whom had little or no naval experience, so it is not clear what the exact Dano-Norwegian casualties figures were, but estimates vary between 1,135 to 2,215 killed and wounded [A modern quess is 367 dead and 637 wounded to that is added an unknown number of unregistred people shipped to the line during the battle]. The official report by Olfert Fischer estimated the Dano-Norwegian casualties to be between 1,600 and 1,800 killed and wounded. Of the Danish ships, three escaped, two sank, one exploded, eleven taken and burnt, and one, the Holsteen, added to the Royal Navy and renamed HMS Nassau [Number of ships are wrong]. According to the official returns recorded by each British ship, and repeated in dispatches from Nelson and forwarded by Parker to the Admiralty, British casualties were 264 killed and 689 wounded.

Suggestion to a re-structuring
I think that MAG1 has made a great work in sourcing some of the many unsourced claims in the article. I also think that Mag1 has contributed with many bits of information that are making the current article a little bit less biased and POV. Though much is left back which gives misleading impressions or outright disinformation, or is "old" myths generally not believed to be believable by modern historians, or simply by leaving a lot of information out. So I suggest that we try to make a subsection that describes what can be said to factually have happened (Sourced by modern and reliable sources) and then we make a section describing the controversy and the many theorems and myths that surrounds the battle. Some key points that we have to cover and are controversial  are: The situation on the battle field at 1400 hours (the time of Nelson's note), The importance of the Bombardierships and the political situation after the battle. Jomsviking 14:30, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

Problems with a part of section battle
Much of the section is OK (though I don't like the "prosa style"), but there are many bits of information that are weird or theoretical:

Parker had given Nelson twelve ships-of-the line, those with the shallowest drafts, and all the smaller ships in the fleet and he stayed with the remainder of the fleet to the north-east of the battle, screening it from external interference and moving towards Copenhagen to engage the northern defences. One of Nelson's ships, the Glatton, was commanded by William Bligh of Bounty fame. Nelson's plan was for the British ships to approach the weaker, southern end of the Danish defences in a line parallel to the Danish one. As the foremost ship drew alongside a Danish ship, it would anchor and engage that ship. The remainder of the line would pass outside until the next ship drew alongside the next Danish ship, and so on. The frigate Desiree with small gun-brigs would rake the Danish line from the south, and a force of frigates, commanded by Captain Riou of the Amazon, would attack the northern end of the line. The Tre Kroner fortress would be assaulted with troops (source? the water depth from the Trekroner extending 500m was only between 1-3m, awfully long way to row in small boats subjected to the fire from 68 36-pounder guns, Further more subduing the fortress by direct fire from lineships would have to happen (because of shallow waters) from around 500-700m, a distance at which the guns of the fortress would hold great advantage, not to mention the ships in the inner run, completely covered by reefs and the batteries of Kastellet.)   once the Danish line of ships had been subdued. Bomb vessels would sit outside the British line and bombard the Danes over it (This doesn’t sound millitarely plausible, what is meant the city? or the navial base?). Even should the stronger, northern defences not be subdued, the destruction of the southern ships would be enough to allow the bomb vessels to approach within range of the city and force negotiation (Source? why should 6 bombardiers fireing at 2-3Km at a target they cannot see, “force” negociations? ).

Jomsviking 14:43, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

I've yet to finish the referencing, but my opinion on your points is:
 * For the Tre Kroner, presumably concentration of fire would have done the trick eventually, but it probably would have been expensive. It will be referenced (I think the plans were publicised- it was generally Nelson's method).
 * The bomb vessels were used in just this way to shell the arsenal- see Nelson's dispatch to Parker on the battle.
 * I think more than the bomb vessels could be used. on the 4th-9th April, the British fleet was arranged to allow the bombardment of the city.  The idea was intimidation rather than conquest, to make staying in the League more costly than leaving it (as used in 1807).  Apparently the Danes thanked Nelson for not shelling the city.

However, opinion is not here or there: the point is to include material from reliable, verifiable sources. MAG1 22:50, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

Yes oppinion, other oppinions could be that after 4-5 hours dirty fighting and not the one hour Nelson planned
 * TreKroner The battled Lineships would not have survived an artillery dual with heavy stationary guns. An assult with troops would not have been possible in the face of raking fire of the ships in the inner run etc.
 * Bomb vessels: Yes intimidation, but it's entirely speculative, and besides the danish goverment saw it's interest in leaving the leaque at the 8th.
 * "I think more than the bomb vessels could be used." Which would have required the defeat of the defenses on the inner run, which Nelson failed to do on the 2nd. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jomsviking (talk • contribs) 12:12, 15 September 2007 (UTC)

"However, opinion is not here or there: the point is to include material from reliable, verifiable sources." Exactly, and the talk of Bombardiers and attacking the fort of trekroner is pure speculation. It didn't happen and we can't know how it would have played off - regardless of what Nelson had planned. Secondly I find the qouting of Nelson as "evidence" to be ammusing from a historical point of view. First of all most of the quotes are qoutes of quotes  originating in people that might have heard the famed words: it's often second or third hand. Secondly Nelson - in the extend that the quotes are historically true to begin with - was a party to the conflict. He's not unbiased, He had a clear interest in the conflict (of natural reasons).

I also find large part of the "battle" to be cluttered with fragmented bits and pieces of information and qoutes that goes either a long way in confusing the reader if not outright mislead him.

Jomsviking 18:43, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

Neither of these things are speculation: the assault on the Tre Kroner forts was in the orders published by Nelson before the battle (and in fact, each of the large British ships had a flat-bottomed barge attached to it to allow the assault by the marines and infantry), and the use of the bomb ships are in his official report (and I cannot see any reason why he would lie about this). If you followed the link you would be able to see the original document, by the way. MAG1 18:59, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

Well it's fine enough to write that it was "the master plan" etc. but that it not the impression one get when reading it. Claims like " the destruction of the southern ships would be enough to allow the bomb vessels to approach within range of the city and force negotiation" is taken out of the clear blue sky, it might have been "the plan" but we didn't see it (and frankly I believe it to be a misunderstanding: The bombardiers were meant for the situation in which the danish didn't come out and fight). It stands as an entirely hypothetical situation that really has no room in an article and again it underlines the feel one gets when reading it that the article is strongly biased and aims at irradicating any controversy and doubt about the action that day. Jomsviking 19:12, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

Battle


Nelson wanted a pre-emptive show of force, but was overruled by Parker and demands were made by a single frigate. The Dano-Norwegians refused to negotiate.

Parker had given Nelson twelve ships-of-the line, those with the shallowest drafts, and all the smaller ships in the fleet and he stayed with the remainder of the fleet to the north-east of the battle, screening it from external interference and moving towards Copenhagen to engage the northern defences. One of Nelson's ships, the Glatton, was commanded by William Bligh of Bounty fame. Nelson's plan was for the British ships to approach the weaker, southern end of the Danish defences in a line parallel to the Danish one. As the foremost ship drew alongside a Danish ship, it would anchor and engage that ship. The remainder of the line would pass outside until the next ship drew alongside the next Danish ship, and so on. The frigate Desiree with small gun-brigs would rake the Danish line from the south, and a force of frigates, commanded by Captain Riou of the Amazon, would attack the northern end of the line. The Tre Kroner fortress would be assaulted with troops  once the Danish line of ships had been subdued. Bomb vessels would sit outside the British line and bombard the Danes over it. Even should the stronger, northern defences not be subdued, the destruction of the southern ships would be enough to allow the bomb vessels to approach within range of the city and force negotiation.

The Danish-Norwegian command, choosed not to deploy the line in continuation of the coastal fortresses: Quintus, Sixtus and Kastellet as well as the sea forts: Trekroner and Lynetten. Instead they deployed the line beyound the mentioned fortifications, 1/3 into the “outer run” (or Kings’s deep: the deep water between the reefs Refshalen infront of the harbour entrance and the reef “Middelgrunden”) The sailable water in the “outer run” was about 1.5 km wide, and hence there would be around 1 km from the danish line to the beginning of the shallow waters of the Middelgrund (the eastern reef). The fortifications would then control the waters behind the danish line (F.ex. giving protection from dublication of the imobile ships and hulks) The hulks  were primarely unrigged old lineships not deemed seaworthy, though armed as a ship of the line. The danish ships is layed out on a line and moured by anchors. The Line is drawen out South-North with the southernmost defensionsskib (Defenseship) “Prøvestenen”   placed near to the foot of Refhalen-reef  and just south-east and at a distance of about  1.3 km of the land battery “Quintus”. Then the hulk “Wagrien”, followed by two radeau’s (Gun rafts) “Rendsborg” and “Nyborg”, then the Hulk “Jylland” followed by the floating battery “Sværdfisken”, then the frigate “Kronborg”,  then the flagship (hulk) “Dannebrog” flanked by the two floating batteries: “Hajen” and  “Flaadebatteri no. 1”  (commanded respectively by the two teenage lieutenants Muller and Willemoes who would win  much reckonition)  behind “Dannebrog”, the frigate “Elven” and the radeau “Aggershus” was placed as a second line. Then followed the “Sjælland” (which was a 1st class unrigged ship of the line), followed by the frigate “Charlote Amalie” and the radeau “Søhesten”, then the “Holsten”  (which was a 1st class unrigged ship of the line), and as the northen most point of the line  and due east of the sea fortress “TreKroner” was placed the hulk “Indfødselsretten”. The line was about 3 Km long. The “inner run” (the entrance to the harbour, to the west of Trekroner) were guarded by the two hulks “Elefanten” and “Mars” together with the radeau’s “Nidelven” and “Sarpen”. Behind them the two rigged 1st class ships of the line: “Danmark” and “Trekroner” (not to be confused with the fortress). In the space between the northen most hulk of the line, “Indfødselsretten”, and northern most hulk in the “inner run”, “Elefanten”, some 1 km wide shalow waters, the frigate “Hjælperen” was placed. The ships in the inner run did not see action in the battle. In the inner harbour the unmanned and unprepared main force of the danish-Norwegian Navy (some 16 1st class ships of the line) was kept in protection behind the fortifications of Copenhagen.

The intention behind the placement of the main line were to deny the enemy manouvrebillity in the narrow patch of water between the danish line and the reef Middelgrunden, and thereby “force” the enemy into close quarter artillery duals, in which the immobility of the danish ships would be of little significance. The weakest point was the northernmost hulk “Indfødselsretten”, south of that the hulk “Holsten” was angled slightly and slightly withdrewen from the line in such a way that it (in the likely case that “Indfødselsretten” was defeated) could only be subdued to raking fire if the attacking ship   exposed it self to raking fire from either the heavy guns at the sea fortress “Trekroner” or the hulk “Elefanten” (in the inner run). The danish command anticipated that the british would approch from the north and not the south, which Nelson did. The importance of the approch is unclear. On one hand it surprised the danish side and forced last minute alterations to the line, on the other hand the approch through the reef filled waters south of the “Middelgrund” reef, probably meant that Nelson lost 3 lineships for the battle.



With a southerly wind on the 1 April, Nelson picked his way through the shoals and  formed a line coming in from the south: First the frigates: “Arrow”, “Dart”, “Alcemene”, “Blanche” and “Amazone” followed by the ships of the line: “Definace”, “Monarch”, “Ganges”, “Elephant” (Flagship of  H.N.), “Glatton”,  “Ardent”, “Edgar”, “Isis”, “Polyphemos” and then the frigate “Desiree” who attacked “Prøvestenen” from an obliege angle. The lineships “Russell”, “Agamenon” and “Bellona” had run aground to the east on Middelgrunden severely restricting the part they would be able to play, requiring hurried changes in the line and weakening its northern end.. When the lines had fully joined battle, the British frigates would be facing the frigate “Hjælperen” and the hulk “Indfødselsretten” (and behind them the sea fortress “TreKroner”), “Defiant”, “Monarch” and “Ganges” would be facing “Søhesten” (floating battery) “Charlotte Amalie” (frigate) and the lineship “Sjælland”. “Elephant” and “Glatton” would be facing the hulk “Dannebrog” and her two flanking floating batteries: “Flaadebatteri No. 1” and “Hajen”. “Ardent” against “Kronborg” (frigate) and “Sværdfisken” (floating battery). “Edgar” against “Jylland” together with the two gun rafts “Nyborg” and “Rendsborg”. “Isis” and “Polyphemos” surported by “Desiree” would have “Wagrien” and “Prøvestenen”.

As the battle unfolds the british line moves slowly north, at 1400, “Definance”  reaches (the allready battered) “Indfødselsretten”. At this time the british frigates would have retreated north and have been north-east of the reef Middelpulten.

The Danish batteries started firing at 10:05 a.m. and the battle continued for around four to five hours. Once the British line was in place there was very little manoeuvring. The British ships anchored by the stern about a cable (240 yards) from the line of Danish ships and batteries, which was relatively long range, and broadsides were exchanged until a ship ceased firing. The bombardment from both sides was very heavy. The British encountered heavier resistance than they expected, partly because they had not spotted the low-lying floating batteries, and partly because of the gallantry with which the Danes fought. At 1p.m. the battle wass still in full swing. The Prøvestenen's heavier fire (56, 36 pounder guns) would have destroyed the Isis if it had not been raked by the Desirée and assisted by the Polyphemus. The Monarch suffering badly from the united fire of the Holsteen and Siælland. The Belona and Russel were flying signals of distress and the Agamemnon one of inability. . The “Dannebrog” and her two flanking foating batteries suffered cruel looses in their fight with The “Clatton” and The “elephant”.

Time line of the battle
From 1000 -1300 hours :

At the center the flagship “Dannebrog” is enganged around 1100 by The “Elephant” and The “Clatton” at a range of around 300m, after a half an hour of heavy fighting, “Dannebrog” catches fire and commander Olfert Fischer moves command to the yet unengaged “Holsten” to the north. The radeau’s (gun rafts) “Rendsborg”, “Nyborg” and “Aggershus” retreats from fighting on the southern part of the line (“Aggerhus” sinks). 10 gun frigate “Elven” (placed at center) retreated at 1130. The 20 gun “Flaadebatteri no. 1” under command of 17 years old Willemoes. (situated just north of The “Dannebrog”) withdraws at 1300 hours after having suffered 46 killed and wounded in it’s fight with The “Elephant”. 16 gun frigate “Hjælperen” (at the extreme North of the line) retreats at 1300 hours.

1300-1400 hours:

At 1300-1330 Admiral Parker signals retreat (see below). The unrigged lineship “Sjælland”, cannot stay on her position after a cruel fight with The “definance” and The “Monarch” (The “Monarch” sustained 58 killed and 168 wounded, Sjælland’s looses was 39 dead and 125 wounded),  it’s beached on the Refshalen reef some 100-150 m behind “Charlotte Amalie” (“Sjælland” strikes her colours at 1400). . Around 1330 “Indfødselsretten” fighting 5 british frigates strikes her colours after her Captain, De Thura, has fallen, a new captain is sent (Capt. Schrodersee) and aided by the retreat of the british frigates  (see parkers signal)  fighting is resummed (“Indfødselsretten” finally strikes her colours at 1500 hours).

1400-1500 hours:

1350-1400 Nelson dispatches his Note (See below) to the danish government. At 1430 the burning flagship “Dannebrog” strikes her colours (it blows up at around 1630) at the same time: The hulk “Jylland”, the unrigged frigate “Kronborg” and the gun rafts “Sværdfisken” and “Søhesten” strike their colours. At 1445  the floating battery “Hajen” just south of Dannebrog under the command of the teenager Muller, strikes it’s colours together with the unrigged frigate “Charlotte Amalie”. The center of the danish line is defeated. At this time (Around 1500 hours) Signal is sendt to cease hostilities after the Crown Prince’s acceptance of Nelson’s note from 1400 hours.

1500+:

The main Hulks to the north: “Indfødselsretten” (1500 hours) and “Wagrien” and “Prøvestenen” to the south (1515 hours),  strike their colours.

The reconstruction of the time line of the battle is sourced on and.

At 4:30p.m., the Danish flagship, the “Dannebrog” exploded. On their way out from the channel, three further British ships were grounded, including the “Elephant”. The Dano-Norwegian ships had been partly manned by volunteers, many of whom had little or no naval experience, so it is not clear what the exact Dano-Norwegian casualties figures were, but estimates puts it around 1000 dead and wounded (Dudly Pope, O. Feldbæk ). The official report by Olfert Fischer estimated the Dano-Norwegian casualties to be between 1,600 and 1,800 killed and wounded. According to the official returns recorded by each British ship, and repeated in dispatches from Nelson and forwarded by Parker to the Admiralty, British casualties were 264 killed and 689 wounded.



Parker’s signal
Parker would have been able to see little of the battle owing to gun smoke, though he could see two British ships flying distress signals, and another aground. Thinking that Nelson might be being fought to a stand-still, but would not feel able to retreat without orders (the Articles of War demanded that all ranks do their utmost against the enemy in battle), at 1.30 p.m. Parker told his flag captain, "I will make the signal of recall for Nelson's sake. If he is in condition to continue the action, he will disregard it; if he is not, it will be an excuse for his retreat and no blame can be imputed to him."

Nelson ordered that the signal be acknowledged, but not repeated. He turned to his flag Captain, Foley, and said "You know, Foley, I only have one eye — I have the right to be blind sometimes," and then holding his telescope to his blind eye, said "I really do not see the signal!". If any of the other captains saw the conflicting signals, they ignored Parker's. Nelson's second-in-command, Rear Admiral Thomas Graves, repeated the signal, but in a place invisible to most other ships while keeping Nelson's 'Close action' signal at his masthead. Riou, who could not see Nelson's flagship, the Elephant, did obey Parker's signal and withdrew his force(the frigates Blanche, Dart, Arrow, Alcemene and Amazon), relieving the hard pressed danish northern line as they were attacking the frigate Hjælperen and the hulk Indfødselsretten and perhaps  the TreKroner fortress (at long distance). This exposed them to heavy fire, in which he was killed.



Nelson’s Note
Around 1400 Nelson on the elephant sends a note containing a cease fire proposal (see below) with a Danish speaking officer under a flag of truce to the Danish-Norwegian regent, Crown Prince Frederik, who was watching the battle from the ramparts of the Citadel, the crown prince  received the note around 14.30.

The Note sent by Nelson To the Brothers of the Englishmen, the Danes:

''Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson has been commanded to spare Denmark, when she no longer resists. But if firing is continued on the part of Denmark, he must set on fire all the prizes he has taken, without having the power of saving the men who have so nobly defended them.

''

On receiving the note The Crown Prince  in principle accepts the cease fire proposal, but demands to know the “intention” behind Nelson’s formulation. Thus a danish officer is returned with the british parlamentary, who arrive at Nelson at around 1500. At this time the signal for cease fire is given on both sides . Nelson sends the following letter back to the Crown Pince with the aide de camp Hans Lindholm:

''Lord Nelson's object in sending the Flag of Truce was humanity; he therefore consents that hostilities shall cease, and that the wounded Danes may be taken on shore. And Lord Nelson will take his prisoners out of the Vessels, and burn and carry off his prizes as he shall see fit.''

Lord Nelson, with humble duty to His Royal Highness the Prince of Denmark, will consider this the greatest victory he has ever gained, if it may be the cause of a happy reconciliation and union between his own most gracious Sovereign, and His Majesty the King of Denmark.

The initial note is in the words of the historian Ole Feldbæk (who in great detail have studied the battle)  “Short and unclear” and it is a fact (O. Feldbæk, H. C. Bjerg, O. L. Frantzen et al., ,   ) that at the time of the dispatchment  of the note, no ships had been taken. The crucial formulation is when she no longer resists which is clearly an offer of cease fire and not a demand of capitulation. On the otherhand Nelson makes clear in the later part of the note that he consider himself as in a victorious position. So in a certain extend one can read both meanings into the note. What is clear is that the Crown Prince read the cease fire meaning into it, and that was confirmated at the HMS Elephant to the satisfaction of danish parlamentarian Hans Lindholm.

The Controversy
Much of the controversy surrounding the battle focusses on Nelson’s note:

Some British as well as danish officers thought the offer of a truce a skillfull ruse-de-guerre,  and amoung the danish officer corps there was a wide spread “back stab legend” which was fueled by the fact that Nelson’s note had been sendt to the Crown Prince and not the commanding officer Olfert Fischer at TreKroner. The core of the legend was that the Crown Prince had made up his mind without consulting the leadership of the Navy (Olfert fischer and Steen Bille) and that the Crown Prince did not have a good overview of, or the competence to assess, the action (and thus made a wrong asesment of the factual state of the battle). The legend branches off in two major versions: One (and probably the oldest) stipulates that the danish navy was infact in a winning position at 1400 hours, and the acceptance of the cease fire stole a brilliant victory from the Navy. This view is not factual, and at 1430 hours, the defenses of the outer run had in a large extend been defeated. It’s also known that the Crown Prince did infact have a good view of the battle and that in his staff there were men cabable of assesing the millitary situation. The other version stipulates that while the Northen and center defense of the outer run had practically been defeated at around 1430, the southern part was not defeated and more importantly the defenses (Fortress TreKroner, two large hulks and two modern ships of the line, a couple of other units and the costal batteries)  around the “inner run” (the entranche to the harbour)  had not (or only lightly) been engaged  at 1430, and it was unlikely that Nelson’s Navy at this point would have had the strength to defeat it. So by continuing the battle the Danish Navy would have repelled the attack. This version, more correct in it’s assesment of the true situation at around 1430-1500 hours, does not take into account the strategical and political circumstances of the action on the “outer run”, which by the defeat of the defense of the outer run had clearly given Britain the political as well as strategical win. It is the modern view and shared by all leading authorities that the Crown Prince did right in accepting Nelson’s offer when he did it around 1430-1500. Another view is that at 1400 hours (the time of the note), the danish defense had been defeated, and Nelson’s note was, as claimed by Nelson, infact a letter of humanity and an ultimatum. A number of modern historians (f.ex. (O. Feldbæk, H. C. Bjerg, O. L. Frantzen et al., ) do not consider that view to be consistent with the historical facts of the battle: At 1400 the danish line was fighting, no ships had been taken and the defenses around the Inner Run had not really been engaged.

A modern view (suggested f.ex. by H. C. Bjerg, O. L. Frantzen )  is that at 1400 hours it was advantageous for Nelson to end the battle having achived his political aims, but not having defeated the defenses who still offered stiff resistance. At the same time it was advantageous for the danish side to stop the battle and hence the Note containing a cease fire proposal is sendt and accepted. In the timespan the parley takes place, Nelson achives a complete millitary victory on the “outer run”, but the Note of 1400 hours so to speak catches Nelson and the Cease fire is agreed.

Jomsviking 19:14, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

There is alot of really good stuff in here which definitely should go in the article, but there are problems:
 * The idea of a complete re-write is a non-starter as it eliminates too many referenced points already in existence, and Wikipedia is never stable anyway, it has to be approached in a piecemeal fashion.
 * A lot of things have vanished which should be there.
 * It's lacking detailed, in-line references and has too many assertions.
 * There is a lot of speculation about motives, which is best left out unless it is an illustration of different schools of thought.
 * The detailed listing of the positions and fates of the various ships is dull. There is a map with the positions of individual vessels.  What I was going to do was transfer the information about the fate of the various Danish vessels from the Danish record office to the list of Danish ships.  If you have the casualty figures for the British ships, the same thing could be done.
 * In the account above, north an south appear to have been switched.
 * I am afraid that it's badly organised and needs a lot of copy proofing. In particular, the tenses used make meaning obscure.
 * The separate section on the contoversy I think is worthwhile.

On the more interesting historical points:
 * I think the 1400 controversy is a non-controversy at heart. Clearly the British thought some Danish vessels had surrendered and clearly the Danes thought they had not.  There are good reasons to believe that both of these positions were held in good faith.  I think it is counter-factual (considering the events before 15:00) to argue that Nelson was not winning the battle by this point.
 * The stab-in-the-back theory seems to date from a report by Fischer shortly after the battle, for which Lindholm apologised to Nelson. I hope to write something about this.  I don't know much about the politics of the Danish court at this time, but I wonder if they were important.

MAG1 22:13, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

I'm not a native english speaker so grammer and spelling certainly be better.

"A lot of things have vanished which should be there" Changes were made so fast that I had a hard time including them.

"There is a lot of speculation about motives, which is best left out unless it is an illustration of different schools of thought. " But isn't that exactly in the section "Controversy" - if not point it out. "The detailed listing of the positions and fates of the various ships is dull" The positions might be, but the fate of the ships is quite important since the timing of the batle is of importance to properly judge one version of the battle form the other.

" It's lacking detailed, in-line references and has too many assertions" Yes, I had troubles making them, as it is no references are added by wiki in the "Talk page" though the links in the text does hint where there are refferences.

"has too many assertions" Plz point them out so that they can be either removed or refferenced.

"north an south appear to have been switched" I don't see that, give a hint?

"The separate section on the contoversy I think is worthwhile. " Tkz, I think it's necessary, because there are a lot of controversy surrounding the battle, now 200 years after, we should get it right by having a modern view of the battle as the dominant view: F.ex. by meticulous list what can be said to be factual, and then divide that from the many later accounts of the battle who (from both sides) are tainted by distict bias.

I would like to underline, again, that I think that the uncritical quoting of Danish as well as british officiers is highly questionable. Of all the sources to the battle particulary those from the ones fougth it must be subjected to a throughly historical analysis - that's why we should refference reliable and esteemed modern secondary sources where a proffesional historian have analysed the primary source material.

"I think the 1400 controversy is a non-controversy at heart. Clearly the British thought some Danish vessels had surrendered and clearly the Danes thought they had not." No, I don't think so. There is no "thinking" the times and the fate of th ships are as factual as "history" can get. We can't know what the participants "thought" - that would only either be hypotetical or "after rationalizing". But we can know the status of the ships from primary sources.

Jomsviking 08:20, 14 September 2007 (UTC)

british cassualties


Don't know whether or not they are reliable. Jomsviking 19:46, 14 September 2007 (UTC)
 * Clowes was a well known early historian, and is usually fairly reliable. The ship's records, sent to the Admiralty, would have given detailed returns of casualties after the battle so they are probably pretty close. I see the figures currently in the article given match quite closely for the wounded (689 to 685) and we currently show more killed than Clowe's does (264 to 255). Dabbler 20:24, 14 September 2007 (UTC)

I wonder how this british assult would be seen,if it happened today? 1.Attack on a neutral nation 2.The commander threatens with actions who in the modern geneva convention (II)identifies him as an war criminal. 3.The oddly low casulties on british side is normal for warfare since "the first victim in a war is the truth" —Preceding unsigned comment added by 217.251.215.40 (talk) 12:22, 5 January 2008 (UTC)
 * If you can find authoritative casualty figures which differ from the very well-sourced ones given here then I suggest that you add them. Your assumptions about the probability are not evidence.Dabbler (talk) 17:48, 5 January 2008 (UTC)

Casualties (again)
I just corrected the danish casualties to be between 1600-1800, as estimated by olfert Fischer after the battle.

1-: the danish casualties are historically based on an estimate from the danish commander (It was impossibe to figure out precisely since a large part of the danish crew where civilian)-

would it not be more correct to show the british casualties in more rough numbers, due to their (after all) speculative nature? Davamb (talk) 23:27, 13 January 2009 (UTC)

Cable
From the article: "The British ships anchored by the stern about a cable (240 yards) from the line of Danish ships" I don't know the source of the distance "a cable", but if it's from an original British report, it would be British cable length, which is 1/10 nautical mile, 185.2 m, 202.5 yards. That difference of about 20% seems significant even as this is given as a rough distance. ospalh (talk) 14:00, 6 November 2011 (UTC)

Strategic and tactical victory
At the moment the article describes the battle as a strategic British victory. The Danish fleet lost 15 ships and the British fleet lost none — surely this was a tactical British victory as well as a strategic one. --89.27.103.116 (talk) 04:54, 27 November 2011 (UTC)
 * From the article: "Furthermore, neither side had deployed the ships which they both held in reserve, of which the Danish reserve was arguably the larger, and the truce effectually prevented this deployment at a moment where the British fleet was exposed. Though the British had lost no ships, most were severely damaged and three ships of the line had lost all their manoeuvrability and had at the time of the truce drifted within the range of the Tre Kroner's heavy guns which, up until then, like the other fortresses, had been out of range of the British ships." As such it cannot be said to have been a conclusive tactical victory. Especially since it was vital for Nelson to have a full strength fleet ready for action against the expected mission against the Russians, something he might likely not have had had he continued the fighting. --Saddhiyama (talk) 10:42, 27 November 2011 (UTC)

Syntax glitch
... a discretion Nelson declined.

Discretion is the permission or latitude to use one's own judgment. One does not "decline a discretion," one has or is given the discretion to accept or decline a suggestion or direction. Changed to "and Nelson declined."

Sca (talk) 13:59, 2 April 2013 (UTC)

Is this for real?

 * Parker, aged 61, had just married an eighteen-year-old and was reluctant to leave port in Great Yarmouth.

I should rather think he was reluctant to "leave port"! I can't be bothered to dig through the history to see who wrote this; is it meant to be a very dry bit of innuendo? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 195.188.176.146 (talk) 12:17, 2 April 2014 (UTC)

Battle timeline is contradictoiry
There seems to be two glaring inconsistencies within the Battle section with respect to the timing of events. First issue is with the date: The infobox says 2nd April, but the text says 1st, and goes on in aftermath section to say "The next day, 2 April, Nelson landed in Copenhagen to open negotiations". The second issue is with the timing of events in the battle: paragraph 5 states "The Danish batteries started firing at 10:05am, the first half of the British fleet were engaged for about half an hour, and the battle was generally over by 11:30am" (my italics): next paragraph starts "At 1 pm, the battle was still in full swing". Does anyone know what was supposedly "over by 11:30" and can they reword the text to suit?. I am changing the date of the battle, as the references agree with the 2nd. IdreamofJeanie (talk) 13:43, 2 April 2014 (UTC)
 * found suspect edit dated sept 2010 which i have reverted user idoj ( no tildes on my phone)

Contradiction between this and Turning a blind eye
This article says Parker gave Nelson permission to withdraw at his discretion, but Turning a blind eye says otherwise. Can someone do some research to resolve this? Esszet (talk) 02:46, 7 September 2014 (UTC)


 * Hmm, that is a pretty severe contradiction. Can't we just edit the turning a blind eye article? It belongs in Wiktionary and it is weakly sourcd at best. It can be pared down to a single sentence since 99% of the current content is talking about this battle. Alicb (talk) 02:30, 21 September 2014 (UTC)


 * It's Pope's contention, and it's discussed in some depth in Mark Adkin's The Trafalgar Companion as well, that Parker's signal to withdraw was a definite order, and that Nelson simply disobeyed it. The story that Parker put about after the battle was that it was intended to be discretionary (Parker's reasoning is as is reported in this article). The imputation by Pope, Adkins et al was that faced with a successful outcome to the battle after it was fought on Nelson's terms, Parker found it expedient to disclaim that he had been on the verge of throwing away the victory by ordering a withdrawal. He explained away his signal with the justification that he had expected Nelson to ignore it. Adkin and Pope make short shrift of this reasoning. This article explains the signal but does not include Pope/Adkin's reasons for suggesting that Parker's story was contrived and false. The 'turning a blind eye' article goes a little further to include these studies. The two are not really in contradiction, but both at least ought to be edited to show there are two points of view concerning the signal. One is Parker's story, as it was reported by quite a few histories, and the other is the studies that suggest Parker was being economical with the truth. It's probably too much to definitely say that Parker was lying, or that he was definitely telling the truth. So both articles need a little work, this one to cover the possibility that Parker's signal was a definite order to withdraw that he expected Nelson to obey, and the turning a blind eye one to cover Parker's story, and the sources which consider it implausible. I'd do this myself but I don't have either of my copies of those books to hand. I'll make some edits when I do, if nobody brings up the sources beforehand. Benea (talk) 02:59, 21 September 2014 (UTC)
 * That's a good point. I will check to see if I have those sources in my local library later today. My concern honestly though was that the article on turning a blind eye is pretty much just a paraphrase of part of this article (apart from the contradiction). If the only content that that article has is related to this one, we might as well delete that article and redirect it to a section here explaining that some people believe the phrase is from this battle. Alicb (talk) 16:39, 21 September 2014 (UTC)
 * I read Pope's book. It is probably this article that needs correction, not that one.
 * But 's suggestion we change the article Turning a blind eye to a redirect does not seem to be a very good idea to me. The phrase is more famous than the battle.  They phrase is routinely used by people who have never heard of the battle, who are uninterested in the battle.  In my opinion this makes a redirection a disservice to readers.  Worse, redirections to subsections of articles - that is what you were suggesting, wasn't it?  They aren't fully supported by our underlying wikimedia software.  You can't put a subsection of an article on your watchlist.  A subsection doesn't show up on "what links here".  And, if someone makes a minor edit to the subsection's spelling, punctuation, capitalization, the link is silently broken.  Geo Swan (talk) 17:10, 19 July 2019 (UTC)

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1800 alliance
The current lead section reads: "The British already in August 1800 had entered Øresund with a navy, in order to force Denmark to sign an alliance with Denmark". While I'm pretty sure the purpose of the incursion was not to force the Danes to sign an alliance with themselves, I'm not certain if the alliance was to be with the British or some other third party. Doonesman (talk) 14:49, 9 February 2017 (UTC)

Why Roskilde Fjord?
Under a map of Zealand the article comment on the difficulties in entering the Isefjord and the Roskilde Fjord. This is certainly true but I find it hard to believe, that the british ever considered entering these narrow waters with a fleet of sailing ships. And for what purpose? Copenhagen and the naval base there cannot be reached by ships via the fjords.

Much later - in the first world war - the possibility of an enemy landing ground forces in the bottom of Roskilde Fjord was considered a real threat and some forts was build to prevent it, but at that time the warships was no longer sailing ships and much more manoeuvrable. It may have been possible for a small fleet of sailing ships to enter the more wide Isefjord but again: for what purpose? In 1801 the British did not bring a big landing force as they did later in 1807. The only target for the guns of the ships would have been the small town of Holbæk.

To say it short: the caption of the map is not incorrect but it is rather absurd.

Laluha (talk) 23:47, 10 February 2021 (UTC)