Talk:Battle of France/Archive 3

Czechoslovakia and Poland?
Why are Czechoslovakia and Poland listed as allied belligerents of this battle? Can someone please tell me what role they played? IMO India has more right to be in their. 60,000 Indian soldiers served in the British army, during the Battle of France.....
 * I've never heard about Indian army unit in BEF (1939-1940). But if it's true, just add India. For your question, Polish exiled armed forces are covered by Wikipedia, as for Czechoslovakia - Czechoslovak National Liberation Comittee - (to-be-Czechoslovak government-in-exile) signed a treaty with France, creating Czechoslovak army in France on October 2nd 1939. Czechoslovak fighter pilots served as members of Armée de l'Air, and till May 1940 no separate Czechoslovak squadron was formed, but army units were formed under designation of 1st Czechoslovak Infantry Division. Because of German attack, the division (parts of which didn't finish full training) didn't serve on the front as the whole formation, instead its regiments served in combat assigned to French divisions on Marne and Loire - 1st Czechoslovak Infantry Regiment to French 23rd Infantry Division, 2nd Czechoslovak Infantry with 239th Light Infantry Division and (briefly) with 4th Division Légère Mécanique. --ja_62 (talk) 15:32, 8 January 2009 (UTC)
 * Just copy from article quoted by Ja 62: Polish army in France counted 85 thousand people, of which 55 were in combat-ready units. They were in separate Polish divisions, part of Polish army - armed force of allied independent sovereign country. Szopen (talk) 10:25, 13 January 2009 (UTC)

German material losses
Does anyone have good data for this, and sources?--Mrg3105 (talk) 00:50, 17 December 2007 (UTC)

I do concerning the Luftwaffe, I have added all that I feel is appropriate, but I have more detailed info - losses between certain dates, air fleets ect.Dapi89 (talk) 14:37, 1 January 2008 (UTC)

I have corrected German tank losses for the Battle of Hannut. French claims of 160 tanks were massively incorrect. The Germans had control of the battle field and repaired many. German losses actually stood at 50 tanks, while the French lost 91. Citations and source were added.Dapi89 (talk) 02:32, 13 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Those were not French claims, but represent the actual drop in German combat-ready tanks. So the German side initially "lost" about 160 tanks and the French about a hundred. Afterwards the Germans were able to recover many of their tanks. Some could be repaired quickly enough to again participate in the campaign, others were eventually rebuilt by the factory and about fifty (not an exact number) were total losses.--MWAK (talk) 08:49, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

49 were destoyed. These numbers have been added using the War diaries of the 3&4 PDs. The French military claimed to have destroyed all of the 160 battle damaged/destroyed tanks, the source says "claimed". The number of combat-ready tanks the PDs lost is unknown for certain. This seems a similar trend for the battle of 15 May. The article text quoted the Germans as losing 120 tanks, when in fact (according to the war diary) it was just 42 damaged and totally destroyed Dapi89 (talk) 10:36, 14 January 2008 (UTC).


 * Yes, but saying "the French claimed" suggests the number refers to some contemporary kill claim. The most we can say is that current French descriptions of the event tend to emphasize the fact that many German tanks were put out of action, whereas the Germans tend to call attention to the fact most were eventually repaired :o) (in fact more than I originally indicated: the 49 number is including the future factory repairs). The 15 May loss number of 42 is however that of all tanks that were destroyed or were irreparable by the Army field workshops (in the last case they were sent back to the factory). So tanks initially disabled but still able to be put in working order by the troops were not included. For example, if a PzKpfw IV was many times hit by a 25 mm gun with as a result the driver killed, the cupola sheared off decapitating the commander and the rest of the crew abandoning the vehicle, the French may justifiably count this as a "kill", but the German statistics would not put it down as a "loss" as the salvaged vehicle would be repaired by the field workshop. To estimate the number of disabled tanks for 4PD on 15 May, we have to consider the fact that of about 230 extant vehicles (down from an original 304) only 137 were combat-ready. The percentage of non-ready tanks was double that of 3PD, suggesting that apart from the 42 becoming (at least for the time being) useless wrecks, an equal number was disabled but reparable in the field, bringing the total (temporary or otherwise) tank loss of that day at about ninety.--MWAK (talk) 12:56, 14 January 2008 (UTC)

I realise this, I did add the figures and note pointing this out! My point was that 160 were not "lost" as the original text seemed to say. This of course suggests to the reader 160 German tanks were totally destroyed (the same with the 15 May action), which tends to overly credit the French. I just felt clarification was needed here. I also believe French losses here were overly exaggerated. Of the 121 tanks lost, some were simply abandoned and destroyed by air-attack. Therefore a breakdown of losses is required here too Dapi89 (talk) 14:52, 14 January 2008 (UTC).


 * I agree. Perhaps also somewhat more emphasis should be laid on the direct fluctuations in fighting power. I'll try to compromise all the different aspects.--MWAK (talk) 13:27, 15 January 2008 (UTC)

Armistice- June 22 or June 25?
I can't seem to find when exactly the armsitice was signed, it seems without question that the cease fire started on June 25 but I keep finding both June 22 and 25 as the date on which the actual armistice was signed, the article on the armistice lists both dates (!) and I've looked through several books only to find one book contradicting the other. The National Arcives web site indicated that the picture of Hitler in Paris was taken on June 23 [], leading me to think that the armistice was already signed when the picture was taken LCpl (talk) 21:45, 9 January 2008 (UTC)


 * The armistice with Germany was signed on 22 June, 18:50 local time. Artikel 23 stipulated it would go into effect six hours after the signing of an armistice with Italy, which took place on 24 June at Rome, 18:35 French time. On 0:35, 25 June, it thus became effective.--MWAK (talk) 22:08, 9 January 2008 (UTC)

Sedan Bombardment and Time frame
The Luftwaffe flew more sorties over the Kerch area in the same time frame. The eight hour claim is a rough estimate. The Kerch action was heavier, in bombload and sorties: in about the same time. The current claim in the article that it was the heaviest bombardment of the Luftwaffe during the entire war is not correct. Dapi89 (talk) 18:21, 11 April 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes, I underestimated the concentrated effort the Luftwaffe could still make in 1942...:o). However, "intense" (as opposed to "heavy") also has a spatial dimension: wasn't the target area at Kerch considerably larger?--MWAK (talk) 06:44, 12 April 2008 (UTC)


 * It doesn't look like it. The literature I have states this was made over the Arma Eli fort and surrounding area only! Dapi89 (talk) 11:38, 12 April 2008 (UTC)

I have added it back in. The Luftwaffe made considerably more sorties over similar sized areas at Stalingrad, Sevastopol, and Kerch. But it is not clear how many were combat missions. Dapi89 (talk) 20:49, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

Dyle and Escaut
The article says that Gamelin wanted to adopt the Dyle Plan from the start, but proposed the Escaut Plan as a "first step". What is the source of this? It would probably be a good idea to give an in-line reference, as some sources seem to contradict this version of events, for example, the article Dyle Plan says "Gamelin was initially against this plan because it seemed more risky than the "E (Escaut) Plan"". --Martynas Patasius (talk) 16:38, 30 May 2008 (UTC)


 * The Dyle Plan statement is an incorrect interpretation of what Jackson says on page 28 of his The Fall of France: "Because it involved moving less far from the French frontier, the former was less risky than the latter". Jackson never claims that this — in itself obviously correct assertion — was the personal motive of Gamelin. It is very clear that Gamelin from the very beginning preferred a French advance as far east as possible — ideally to Liège — and that the initially proposed Escaut Plan was seen as the minimal reaction to a German invasion of Belgium: a set of limited countermeasures both allies could be expected to agree on, that could be executed without much preparation and thus might serve as a basis for further planning. This plan in fact included the provision that, if the situation allowed, the Dyle Line should be reached. However, the issue is complicated by the fact that French intelligence in October predicted that Belgian defences would collapse immediately and as a result Gamelin temporarily estimated that an advance limited to the Scheldt was, regrettably, the only feasible option. However, in November he readjusted his opinion of the Belgian preparedness. Obviously he always remained aware that the Dyle Plan carried a certain risk. As indeed many sources simplify the matter in a misleading way ;o), I'll enhance the level of detail (with proper citation) and change Dyle Plan.--MWAK (talk) 06:44, 31 May 2008 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 00:02, 7 April 2009 (UTC) - MWAK, good to meet you here too (and hardly surprising)! In 1935 Gamelin was still quite rigid in planning any French moves beyond the Dyle (eastwards) and Wavre (northwards). Only later he gradually started to conceive more agressive French dispositions. His considerations to grow into this more progressive dispostion were basically and primarily political with the hope for positive strategic spin-off. He first wanted to commit the Belgian army by flanking it on both sides, forcing the Belgian CIC to submit to French supreme strategic command. When he moreover realized that the possession and sustained defence of Antwerp would weigh heavy for the assignement of the BEF to the continent (Antwerp, being the gun on Britain's belly), Gamelin grew into the Escaut variant. Next he moved a step further ahead, dreaming of stopping the Germans in the heart of Belgium and countering them through the north of Belgium and the south of Holland. That was the birth of the Breda variant. Gamelin saw advantages too in binding a considerable portion of the Dutch field army as a positive side effect of the Breda variant. But it was not particularly Gamelin who saw the huge liability in assigning the mobile 7th Army to the Breda variant. It were Billotte, Georges and Giraud who disliked the ambitious Breda and Escaut variants. And right they were. Gamelin had to tempt these Generals into designing operation plans on the Escaut and Breda variants. It wasn't until Giraud was offered the assistance of a DLM that he submitted to the pressure. But yet Giraud as well as Billotte and Georges built in large safeties in their logistical plans in order to call off Breda any time the battlefield status required such. It led to Gamelin uttering that his Generals were more focussed on organisational matters than operational issues. That was just weeks before the invasion. So it is not quite accurate to state that Gamelin saw the risks. It were the executioners of his strategy who saw the risks and did everything within their power to stall the plan developments. Gamelin only joint them in his fear that the Belgian field army would be unable to withstand the German main push for five days, the time required to deploy the vast Allied formations in the Dyle line and north. Grebbegoos (talk) 00:02, 7 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Hallo Grebbegoos! Well, the present account is of course simplistic. It perhaps has to be: it would be very difficult to describe the enormous complexity of French strategic thinking in a single section. Before the war there was a full range of contingency planning, including a possible "conquest of Germany", even resulting in a design for airborne tanks, to use in strategic attacks across The Netherlands and Switzerland. Of course the actual execution of such grandiose schemes would be dependent on the state of the French armed forces and on this point Gamelin was certainly among the most pessimistic (or realistic, if you will). In 1939 Gamelin seems to become more audacious than many other high officers, but there is a certain ambiguity in the Dyle Plan. Apart from political considerations (not coming to the aid of the invaded Low Countries was "unthinkable") the plan entailed a risk-aversion in the tactical and geostrategic aspects. Meeting the Germans in North-France would have implied a mobile encounter fight (having to cover more ground, there would not have been enough troops to densely man an entrenched line, without the Belgians) and Gamelin was well aware of the French inferiority in manoeuvre warfare. So, that tactical risk was avoided by digging in in central Belgium. Geostrategically in August 1939 the unexpected German-Soviet alliance undermined prewar Entente plans to destabilise the Nazi regime by an economic blockade. With Stalin's help Germany could hold out indefinitely. So Gamelin in his responsibility as a supreme commander had to offer some hope of a final victory instead of the prospect of endless stalemate after stopping a German offensive in 1940. Now, the very reason that the Dyle offered a good defensive line to the allies, the short distance between Namur and the Scheldt at Antwerp, made it an excellent blocking position for the Germans also. To avoid the risk of being locked-in there, Gamelin wanted strategic room to the north, to Breda and beyond, in the direction of the northern flank of the Westwall (which flank, if not the main axis of an allied offensive in 1941/1942, would at least have to be threatened). So his, indeed very real, desire to control the Belgians (and British) in this sector reflected its larger strategic importance. Thus Gamelin, understanding the possible dangers of the Dyle manoeuvre, considered any alternative to be even more risky. But it is true he thought the time element to be the most critical aspect and was not overly worried by a German threat to the Sedan sector. I hoped to have expressed it that way in the article, but when Battle of the Netherlands is finished, I'll give this one a thorough rewriting :o).--MWAK (talk) 07:15, 7 April 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 13:15, 7 April 2009 (UTC) I'd say that this comprehensive addition is 'damn accurate' MWAK. We totally agree. Indeed the prelude is very complex and involves really many external and internal influences and factors. An addition of value could be to state something about Général Georges who actually predicted the actual May 1940 scenario in 1939. In response to the Escaut plans of Gamelin he expressed his doubts openly, and stated that a German offensive via the north (the left turn Schlieffen strategy) could also be used by the Germans as a well conceived distraction, which would then lour the 7th Army into a dead corner of the disposition. That's why Georges proposed to develop the Escaut plan into a staged progressive plan, first ensuring the full deployment of the Dyle line after which the second stage towards a northern expansion could be executed. In fact a very wise and accurate assessment by Georges and the reason why Gamelin avoided him from then onwards. Georges was quite a brain when it came to (passive) strategic thinking, although he (and men like Giraud) proved to be poor operational thinkers. But before we get carried away in details, I fully appreciate your latest addition hereabove! Grebbegoos (talk) 13:15, 7 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Thank you! In any rewrite the rôle of Georges should certainly be mentioned.--MWAK (talk) 11:04, 8 April 2009 (UTC)

Seperate Box?
What do you think about having a seperate template box for the Battle of the Netherlands? There are now 5 (including the Netherlands itself) articles soley on the Battle. There are a few others in which the Dutch took part in. It is starting to crowd up the other Western Front box pretty good. Red4tribe (talk) 23:33, 12 June 2008 (UTC)

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French Defeatism and the Maginot Line
I see a correlation between them. I see the Maginot Line as definitive proof that defeatism played a huge part in the French surrender. They built this wall under the impression that it would protect from all the bad things that lie on the other side.

I remember as a child building walls out of corrugated bricks in front of my door sometimes when I saw a scary movie, thinking it would "somehow" protect me, but knowing full well it would not.

Defeatism breads ignorance and ignorance breads defeatism. This was why France was defeated.

Another thing, it is interesting that Russia, Germany, and Britain defended their cities until they were smoldering rubble. Yet Paris was relatively untouched. This cannot be justified as other than cowardice. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Thiary (talk • contribs) 04:48, 12 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Well, these are arguments that are often heard. In the Historiography section the writers that in the past supported or developed them are mentioned. If you want to know to what extent they make sense in the light of modern historical research, here are some considerations:


 * There is little doubt that a certain isolationism played a part in the decision to build the Maginot Line and that once it was there, it provided a perfect argument to remain as passive as possible. Of course that is not defeatism, quite to the contrary: it is feeling sure that you will not be defeated. Nor was that believe irrational: The Maginot Line was a rational investment and a very useful defensive tool. That is why during Hitler's time Germany invested more in fortifications than France did. Certainly, it is morally dubious to remain passive in the face of rising fascism, but France was no exception on this point: neither the UK, USA nor USSR did much and in 1939 and 1940, France did the most.


 * Was there then an element of ignorance in that the Maginot Line Mentality closed French military minds to modern tactics? If so, there seems to have been no correlation with a special French defeatism as French tactical doctrine of the day was perfectly standard and not very different from that embraced in Britain, the USSR and indeed by the vast majority of German officers.


 * Does the decision to declare Paris an open city indicate a special French cowardice? Not really. The USSR's and the UK's decision to continue resistance despite large-scale urban destruction made perfect military sense: they in 1941 and 1940 had an excellent chance to gain a final victory, so the sacrifice was rational. France's situation on 12 June was however utterly hopeless. True, the Germans often defended their cities fanaticaly on the Eastern Front in 1945, when defeat was certain, but this was to save millions of their civilians from being massacred by the Red Army — and this was not a spontaneous event: a real Volkssturm never materialised.

--MWAK (talk) 08:59, 12 November 2008 (UTC)

France Lacked A Large Standing Professional Army
As the Wikipedia article said, most French divisions were filled with poorly trained reservists and conscripts. Most of them were not trained long enough and thoroughly enough to withstand the rigors of battle. This was perfectly illustrated in the Battle of Sedan when French units ran not on the front line ran off upon witnessing Luftwaffe bombing attacks and hearing rumors of panzers in their rear areas. This was all before they even met the German army divisions in battle! Only the regiment manning the pillboxes in the center fought, and they were surrounded, bypassed, and overwhelmed without support from the units which fled.

Had professionals been fighting for the Allies in the Sedan, the German offensive might have defeated or at least significantly delayed. The French fortifications in the Sedan would have been sufficient to severely damage Army Group A or at least delay them long enough for further Allied reinforcements to arrive. Without Army Group A breaking through, the elite French units and BEF in the northeast would have escaped encirclement and would have been able to redeploy as needed.

Of course, it is very likely that even professional French soldiers in the Sedan would have have been defeated since they were badly outnumbered and out gunned by Army Group A. The French here would eventually run out of ammunition before other Allied units could sufficiently reinforce them. However, even in this scenario, the Germans would at least have been delayed significantly and suffered considerably heavier losses. Such a bravely fought battle against heavy odds might have lessened the tarnish on the honor of the French military and the French people.

The point is moot however. The French could not afford their expensive welfare state and a large professional army at the same time. The socialist French government and people chose to spend more on welfare than on defense. The rest is history. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.176.216.52 (talk) 15:46, 18 November 2008 (UTC)


 * There is a limit to the size of the professional standing army a small country like France can sustain, especially versus a country twice as populated like Germany was. This has nothing to do with welfare policies - the ones France used to be famous for were actually created right after WWII - but is a simple matter of demographic and economic constraints. What could have been improved in France however, is the training of conscripts. Some authors have noted French generals tended to have a lack of interest in training, believing troops would get efficient after a few weeks in contact with the enemy. This somewhat worked in WWI (at great human cost however) but obviously the 1940 decisive battles went too fast for French troops to improve much. They did improve somewhat however, as authors have noted an increase in German losses in June, but the situation was desperate by then. The Sedan/Bulson panic in itself does not tell much about the French army: in many instances during WWII, "green" Allied units facing elite German armoured troops simply collapsed. See Atkinson's narrative of the Battle of the Kasserine Pass for example. I fail to see how this discussion can improve the article. PpPachy (talk) 21:30, 18 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Some other considerations that might be useful:


 * 1) If France had had a professional core army, it would have been deployed in Central Belgium, not at Sedan. A fully professionalised army, i.e. of a hundred divisions, would have been an impossibility. Britain, wealthier than France, had five prewar professional divisions. Germany none.
 * 2) Germany relatively had a lesser number of professional soldiers, on average its conscripts had less training and it even had a lesser absolute number of professional officers than France.
 * 3) France spent an enormous sum of money on defence and that while already having a large existing military infrastructure and artillery and fortification assets. The French Army was better equipped than its German counterpart.
 * 4) Nazi Germany had as its first economic priority to improve the consumption level of the common (Ger)man. Hitler's large popularity was based on his success in "spreading the wealth around". It was much more a welfare state than prewar France ever was. Indeed, as social unrest (strikes) hampered French "re"-armament (not that it was exactly "disarmed", you understand) a bit more welfare might arguably have improved weapons production.
 * 5) Indeed the troops defending Sedan were third-rate. However, even professional soldiers would likely have been routed. The air bombardment was extremely intense and the human psyche can only take so much. A complete loss of combat effectiveness is the normal and expected outcome when any unit has been exposed to such concentrated firepower. So, no "tarnished honour" here.
 * 6) Perhaps German air interdiction would have led to ammunition shortages. However, even a delay of just 18 hours might well have been fatal to the German battle plan. French reserve armour units would have begun reinforcing the already thick defensive belt. Dislodging entrenched armour across a prepared river position is a tactical nightmare — and the French could have poured in ever more infantry, while the insufficient Ardennes road network would have made an adequate supply of the German troops impossible. The Germans could not win an attrition battle in this sector--MWAK (talk) 09:14, 19 November 2008 (UTC)

I think all of you are focusing on moot points. The real problem was the French Government and its military leadership. The former did not have the will to fight and the later was totally inept. It alienated its Allies through self interest and was too big and cumbersome with Generals who were too arrogant to absorb suggestions and intelligence. The result was poor management of operations. Several sophisticated scenarios have been run in various military academies the world over about this campaign. Competent leadership results in an Allied (well, French) victory in 1940. Had the French had this, despite its short comings everywhere else, the disaster of 1940 would not have happened. Sound leadership often overcomes unsound systems. Dapi89 (talk) 22:27, 22 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Indeed it is true that in simulations it is hard to let the allied side lose. Obviously the Germans attained a strategic surprise and almost certainly this was the decisive factor causing their victory. Also it is probably fair to say the French High Command was on 15 May shocked by events and unable to select an adequate strategic response — which even on that late date might have prevented a disaster (see e.g. the recent work of Jacques Belle, suggesting a possibly effective counterattack scenario). Also the French command structure was not conducive to such radical changes in planning.


 * However, it is problematic whether we may conclude from this that the French supreme command was "inept". We cannot blame it for not preparing the French army better for manoeuvre warfare: it was fully aware that it could not best Germany on this point and therefore tried to enforce upon the enemy the kind of battle it had itself specialised in, being better suited to the industrial, demographic and psychological conditions the French faced: the Bataille conduite. That it failed in doing so by not seriously considering the possibility the German main attack might be through the Ardennes, is again no sign of incompetence — to us the German attack might seem "obvious", but in fact it was not a logical choice for a German mechanised offensive in view of the extreme logistical constraints the area inevitably imposed. The German strategy was fundamentally unsound by all (even German) contemporary standards — a complete gamble — and the French could not accept that the German supreme command, solid and thorough by reputation, would embark on such a mad undertaking. It wouldn't have made a German strategic surprise if it hadn't been a truly surprising way to act. Therefore, deciding that all information indicating a main axis for Army Group A, was simply clever German disinformation, was the rational thing to do.


 * And the French government only lost the will to fight when the battle itself was lost. To us, continuing the fight against Germany, seems the correct policy — but we have the benefit of hindsight. We know that Hitler would overplay his hand; for the French it would have been irrational to assume he was so inept ;o).--MWAK (talk) 09:13, 23 November 2008 (UTC)

I believe some of your points are not correct. General Georges foresaw the need to retain a reserve to counter an unexpected advance by the Germans. He told Gamelin not to stake everything on an advance to the Dyle, in case the Low Countries were not to be the area of the decisive German operation. Gort shared this opinion, and both suggested the Germans may exploit the Ardennes gap. In fact Allied intel had warned of a German build up in this region as early as March! But Gamelin ignored their warnings. So did the Germans have strategic surprise? Technically, no. In fact the French government lost the will to fight before the Germans reached the Channel. As early as the 17th May the Government were burning their archives. Allied incompetence was palpable. Gort for example left his intel officers behind during the advance into Belgium, making effective intelligence on the whereabouts and strength of German forces impossible. The communication and mistrust of each others (Belgian, British and French) intentions also contributed to light hearted efforts for a counter-attack. Communication systems were a mess so the Allies had to rely on a civilian telephone system. It was a complete disaster; a strategy for defeat, you might say. To quote Pownhall It was “malignant inaction” that won the Germans victory. Dapi89 (talk) 14:18, 23 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Well, Georges's and Gort assessments were a reflection of simple risk aversion. To cover all contingencies, it was indeed better to keep a strong strategic reserve. Gamelin however, simply could not afford the luxury to cover them all; he had to act under the absolute political imperative of assisting Belgium. It is true nevertheless that all worried about a possible "Ardennes option" but one different from the actual course of events: an advance on the Liège-Namur axis parallel to the Meuse but made south of the river towards Dinant. Gamelin hoped to deflect such a move using the force concentration covering the Gembloux gap.


 * It is a fact that the inaction showed, was the worst possible course to take. The French system, excellent at controlling operations going according to plan, could not cope with swift fundamental changes. It was not Gamelin's task to function as an overarching operational commander, so the modern military communication systems availble at Montry were not used by him, nor did he forcefully intervene. A basic factor explaining all this was incertainty over the German intentions. If they had known beforehand the move would have been towards the Channel, a "hold the shoulders and hit the flanks" response would have been obvious. But most concluded the Germans were heading straight for Paris, which puts Churchill's much repeated story of archive destruction in a different light :o).


 * Then, when things turned bad, the British and Belgians chose to serve their national interests. Not an edifying sight, but that's Realpolitik for you. As a French defeat was quite likely anyway, this all worked out very well in the end. Much of what has been written about the subject is one vast blaming game and lacks all objectivity. Both sides were far from perfect. If things had turned out a bit differently Hitler would have gone down in history as a farcical second-rate dictator, von Manstein as a military charlatan and Guderian would be best remembered as the German general obliterated by a French bomb together with the pontoon bridge he was standing on, dooming the campaign and the Third Reich with it.--MWAK (talk) 08:18, 24 November 2008 (UTC)

Risk aversion it most certainly was not. Georges was certain of a German gamble. After the Mechelen incident he became convinced the Germans would radically change the plan, and he was in a position to do something about it. Gamelin refused to listen. The French had no interest in assisting Belgium, except where it affected the French. They abandoned the defence of Belgium altogether, while the Belgians bent over backwards to help the British and French! The Belgium army collapsed due to over extension to released the BEF and French Forces at Arras (which I note, until yesterday had been stupidly called a British tactical victory!). Its eventual collapse sealed the fate of the French 1st Army, and very nearly the BEF.

A Flexible and competent command would have had reacted sooner. Gamelin was responsible for ensuring his operational commands were efficient, he was the Supreme Allied Commander. But the way the overcomplicated system worked nothing was ever done in time. As for those in command themselves, they were slow to react. Billotte was convinced of defeat on the 15 May! Billotte confided to Gort and Ironside that it was lost as soon as the Germans broke out, and that he hadn’t a plan. Yet it took a car accident to remove him from command, not Gamelin.

But like I said, it was still command and control that was the problem. A swift reaction to the Sedan debacle would have halted the German offensive. The equipment and make up the French Army, though deficient, was not the critical issue in the campaign. Any who, over and out! Dapi89 (talk) 18:05, 24 November 2008 (UTC)


 * You've just read Strange Victory, haven't you? ;o). A very useful book, but not without its flaws of course. I shall read it again myself and see how the text of the article can be improved by this.--MWAK (talk) 08:05, 25 November 2008 (UTC)

Hi. Actually no! Never read it. I have read Harmon's Dunkirk: The necessary myth and The French Defeat of 1940: Reassements is also a good book, as it branches beyond just the military explanation. Dapi89 (talk) 17:58, 26 November 2008 (UTC)

I have just looked, I actually got information about Georges from Britain, France and Blegium 1939-1940 by Brian Bond. Dapi89 (talk) 16:18, 27 November 2008 (UTC)


 * While I have enjoyed watching this, I haven't seen anyone mention the sad fact that, the arogance of the French and their inability to take the war seriously was a major factor in their falling into the jaws of the Manstein Plan. The main difference between Halder's and Manstein's plans was that Manstein had the bulk of German forces (seven out of ten panzer divisions) going through the Ardennes while the Allies were lured to the north by an attack on the Netherlands and Holland.  Hitler said he "could have wept for joy.  They had fallen into the trap."  Also, at the outbreak of the war, France had the largest standing army in Europe.  I don't know enough about it to comment on its professionalism, however.  I do not think that the Allies' defeat is as bizarre as most would guess after looking at how they fell head-first into the trap laid by the Germans, which is why Hitler favored Manstein's plan over Halder's.  Manstein utilized the Blitzkrieg tactics that brought Germany success in Poland whereas Halder would have given Hitler a bloody trench-warfare style conflict that Hitler so badly dreaded.Prussian725 (talk) 16:54, 31 December 2008 (UTC)


 * For information of France's situation(military, political) read, The Fall of France, by Julian Jackson. --Kansas Bear (talk) 17:56, 31 December 2008 (UTC)


 * A very good advice. Some points have to be emphasized:


 * 1) Poland was not a case of the type of Blitzkrieg von Manstein wanted to use in France (deep strategic penetration).
 * 2) Indeed, in view of the strategic mistake the allied defeat was not all that surprising (though far from certain) — but the mistake itself also was not surprising, the result of applying the generally accepted standard tactics of the day, not of "arrogance" or some lack of seriousness. National stereotyping, especially of the pejorative kind, seldom renders valid explanations. The French may be aloof and frivolous ;o), but it is highly doubtful that this caused their defeat.
 * 3) Be careful to avoid a simple dichotomy between "Blitzkrieg" and "trench-warfare". Both doctrine and practice were almost always somewhere in between. Halder's plan would likely have led to bloody action — he accepted half a million German casualties — and to a stabilised front, but the losses wouldn't have occurred in static trench fighting but during the mobile phase of throwing the Entente out of Belgium. The revised (by Halder) von Manstein variant would also have entailed a mobile phase and would have been considered pretty successful even when France had managed to hold the Somme line — provided casualties were low. The differences were in some ways fundamental (high-risk manoeuvre warfare versus low-risk) and in other aspects relative.
 * 4) This talk page has an archived section which might further elucidate matters.--MWAK (talk) 09:57, 1 January 2009 (UTC)

Frieser-the-Geezer points out that the war in Poland wasn't a 'blitzkrieg'. He points out that 'bewegungskrieg' is a better description since there were no strategic armoured penetrations, intentional or not. Tanks were kept close to the infantry and artillery. This is by the way much more like the methods evolved by the British and Allied armies later in the war.
 * The strategic penetration of 1940 he puts down to the gaff being blown about the orginal plan, impetuous Generals up front, a surprising collapse of the French defence of the Meuse and a relative lack of control by Hitler (particularly compared to later in the war).

Tooze points out that the last minute production surge over the winter of 1939-1940 emphasised huge quantities of heavy artillery ammunition rather than vehicles, which suggests the sort of war that Hitler expected in 1940 - 1918 with knobs on.
 * I think it's prudent to remember that the Germans put their shirt on the success of Fall Gelb so they knowingly took great risks and that their opponents (expecting a long war) conserved much of their strength for later operations.

It may also be worth considering that expelling Britain from the continent was a calamity that the German war effort never recovered from. 'Manoeuvre warfare'? Bit of a myth really. Anyone can 'manoeuvre' against a weak enemy, it's against the opponents with parity of effectiveness that it comes unstuck and turns into mutual attrition like any other war in history.Keith-264 (talk) 13:25, 1 January 2009 (UTC)

It might be useful to point out the history of distrust and resentment between the military and political leadership of France. The government didn't avoid a professional military because they couldn't afford it, but because they were afraid of what the generals would do with it. This can be hard for those from an Anglo-American background to grasp, given the extraordinarily strong civil-military relations in those countries.yy 68.2.244.69 (talk) 00:55, 24 February 2009 (UTC)
 * An intriguing point 68.2.244, rather like Weimar Germany or the USSR (until Stalin got busy). Mucho food for thought.Keith-264 (talk) 08:58, 24 February 2009 (UTC)

Manöver H
I've added a page to the german wikipedia de:Manöver_H please feel free to attribute to this entry or add inputs from it to a "south of sedan" section. Sofafernsehfan (talk) 23:04, 30 March 2009 (UTC)

Frieser
Any chance is findings will be incorporated into the narrative?Keith-264 (talk) 23:47, 30 December 2008 (UTC)


 * As can be seen from the references, much of his findings are already incorporated! But I'll soon add some further crucial points.--MWAK (talk) 08:31, 31 December 2008 (UTC)

Yes I followed the footnotes but I think that his analysis about 'Blitzkrieg' vs 'Bewegungskrieg' could do with a little more detail (clearly a recondite debate is a bit OTT for the Battle of France page) because of its historiographical significance. His version of the two 'halt' orders also seemed to me to be definitive. I thought the version as it exists does rather well in describing the way in which the surprise of the French high command was exceeded only by the shock in the German high command when Guderian went off swanning [;-). If you would like any help with references etc for Frieser let me know.Keith-264 (talk) 09:57, 31 December 2008 (UTC)


 * Thank you for your offer! Indeed those aspects are the very same I'll try to elaborate :o).--MWAK (talk) 09:57, 1 January 2009 (UTC)

Hello MWAK, it's been a while. I'm still short of my copy of Frieser but in 'The German Army 1933-1945' by Matthew Cooper (1978!) there is this : 'But Blitzkrieg is a myth. It is a word devoid of any meaning, having substance not in fact but in fiction, serving only to mislead and deceive. For Hitler and the German military establishment, the High Commands of the Army and the Wehrmacht, did not espouse a new, revolutionary idea of war, the German Armed Forces were not organised, equipped or directed according to new revolutionary principles; and the German form of war in the years 1939-1942 was the product not of one new, revolutionary strategy, but of two strategies - one well-defined and traditional, the other ill-expressed and novel - whose mutual conflict went far to hamper the practice of the mode of warfare popularly imagined to be Blitzkrieg. . . . Consequently, the reasons for the German Army's initial victories lay not so much within itself, but in the weakness of its enemies. (Chap 8. The Myth, pp. 115-117). I have only dipped into the book via the index but it seems to go for pretty much what Frieser says about theories of war (20 years earlier) but also follows the Generals' post war scapegoating of Hitler as to grand strategy which has been exploded since then. Keith-264 (talk) 09:50, 7 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Hi Keith! Indeed Cooper's work is very important. It should be remembered that the Myth of Blitzkrieg was really debunked almost immediately: the professional soldiers of WW II of course knew better and the allied ones especially were annoyed by the implicit suggestion they would have been grossly incomptetent.--MWAK (talk) 11:11, 8 April 2009 (UTC)

At last I've fetched my copy of Frieser so I will be adding a few gleanings directly.Keith-264 (talk) 14:25, 15 April 2009 (UTC)

Italians
Hi, i removed the 700000 ilalian soldiers from the infobox. the italians "invaded" france after the the battle of france was over. They had fractional impact!!! . they inflicted about 100 france casualties. when u think they belong in the infobox then please make clear that they joined the battle after the allied lost. —Preceding unsigned comment added by HROThomas (talk • contribs) 11:03, 4 April 2009 (UTC)


 * The last is true — but not something an infobox should mention.--MWAK (talk) 11:34, 4 April 2009 (UTC)

the italians began their show-invasion on 20 june... . AFTER france asked for armistice. when u want to mention 700000 !!!! italian soldiers. then i mention ALL allied tanks ( ft-17 ) 5800 !! tanks. btw the german aircraft-numbers are incorrect. they are to high, i guess they include ALL german aircraft, aircraft in norway etc aswell. —Preceding unsigned comment added by HROThomas (talk • contribs) 13:04, 4 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Well, infoboxes have their imperfections, as the criteria they apply are not always very clear. Personally, I find them quite infantile, unworthy of a serious encyclopedia and would gladly do without them. However, as long as we are stuck with them, they should be as perfect as possible. Removing an entire nation clearly diminishes the factual exactness. The German aircraft numbers are meant to include the matériel reserves available for the Western Front.--MWAK (talk) 19:34, 4 April 2009 (UTC)

on the infobox only northeast divisions of france are mentioned. the french soldiers in the south are not mentioned but the 700000 italian soldiers which never participated in this battle.... . now u have a infobox which includes italian troops but not the french in defence. thats wrong...  . the number of german aircraft is to high, the number of allied aircraft is to low. i have figures of 3xxx allied aircrafts. the infobox is complete unimportant for people which spent time with studying the battles but for the first look they are important. 4000000 axis against 2700000 allies imply something wrong. —Preceding unsigned comment added by HROThomas (talk • contribs) 21:27, 4 April 2009 (UTC)


 * The aircraft numbers are sourced and may reflect newer research, the data of which were not available when the publications were written you are referring to. You have a point regarding the French troops of the Army of the Alps, which in principle should be added. Perhaps you can provide a source for the exact number? However, their absence does not cause a very major distortion of the French troop strength. It is true the Italian army numbers may give the reader a wrong suggestion, but such considerations should not influence the battle box, which simply is not meant to express such higher level analysis.--MWAK (talk) 06:42, 5 April 2009 (UTC)

the infobox should give a short overview. Every book about the battle of france give the same numbers of division's like the infobox but NOT THE ITALIANS. The infobox should show the strenghs of the opponents. At the beginning of the conflict between the allied and GERMANS there were 144 allied division and 141 german. no historian would mention the italianss in the strengh overview but u do this. for me that means u are stupid or u want or imply something wrong. i did research in the books and i find that even your stupid figure of 700000 italian troops is stupid. army group west had 200000 soldiers at the moment of invasion ( i guess not all were engaged ). so i believe your edits are a kind of vandalism. if u want to mention the italian than make clear that the joined on 20 june. btw i found something interesting. the italians wanted to attack on june 23 but heard of negotiation of france and germany. than they decided to attack immediatly only to have parcipated. —Preceding unsigned comment added by HROThomas (talk • contribs) 17:53, 5 April 2009 (UTC) --blaa


 * But you are still not addressing my points. Perhaps I am stupid, but you have not given an argument why such higher level analysis should be part of the battle box. Sure, the Italians had a minimal impact — but then there were plenty of German divisions that saw no serious fighting either. Should they too be left out? But perhaps your suggestion to mention the date from which the Italians participated is very useful. Shall that be our compromise?--MWAK (talk) 19:01, 5 April 2009 (UTC)

200000 italians on 20 june, ok?--HROThomas (talk) 01:31, 6 April 2009 (UTC) btw according to the german division's which never left germany, they were involved in the planings and were reserves so they have to be mentioned. but no german plan included the italians they were unimportant for this feldzug. and i repeat myself the battle was over!!!. i guess u can say the americansand british participated in the battle of kursk. they landed in italy during the operation. ITS THE SAME. but what i learned on wiki its often impossible to get reliable and logic informations into topics, so u have to do compromises -.---HROThomas (talk) 01:42, 6 April 2009 (UTC)


 * We'll mention 20 june; but for the 200,000 number, though a reasonable estimation of the organic strength, you'll have to provide a source.--MWAK (talk) 07:09, 6 April 2009 (UTC)

Material losses
I added material losses to the infobox. allied ~2.000 aircraft ( ~ 1.000 british ~ 800 french ~200 low countries ). allied tanks ~3.400 + 1.700 ft-17 =5.100. german losses. tanks = 753 --blaa —Preceding unsigned comment added by HROThomas (talk • contribs) 18:24, 5 April 2009 (UTC)


 * The problem with such numbers is that it is hard to find serious sources for them. Also it is unclear whether you mean combat losses (seems likely for the aircraft) or total losses (as apparently is the case for the tanks). The last would be a bit silly as they would simply be equal to the total tank fleets present.--MWAK (talk) 19:09, 5 April 2009 (UTC)

all tanks destroyed or captured...--HROThomas (talk) 01:30, 6 April 2009 (UTC)


 * In that case the numbers are confusing as different criteria are applied for the respective categories. And the tank number would then indeed be superfluous.--MWAK (talk) 07:13, 6 April 2009 (UTC)

i have explizit numbers for german tank losses so i wanted to add allied losses too. eventually they lost their entire tankweapon. different criteria ? u mean compared with aircraft losses? iam not sure but aircraft maybe were brought to england or colonies. should we remove 5100 and write "all" ? suggestion? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.89.149.14 (talk) 19:11, 6 April 2009 (UTC)


 * I have reverted all the figures put in by HROThomas - not a single citation was provided. He also has been tampering with other cited figures - this is not acceptable. Lots of different sources give different figures, there is no reason to think yours are right and everyone else has wrong figures. If you have sources then give them. 86.137.125.208 (talk) 14:20, 7 April 2009 (UTC)

that 700.000 italians participated in the battle of france is cited? stop talking stupid shit please... . i added sources!!!

Allied tank losses
Why are they so much higher than the actual strength? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.177.186.81 (talk) 07:18, 12 April 2009 (UTC)


 * 1.700 FT-17 Tanks in reserve... --HROThomas (talk) 01:11, 17 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Well, apart from the present confusing contradiction, there simply were not 1700 FT 17s in reserve. You have been relying on inferior sources.--MWAK (talk) 05:01, 17 April 2009 (UTC)

from the english wiki article for ft-17 "The Wehrmacht captured 1,704 FT 17's. A hundred were again used for airfield defence, about 650 for patrolling occupied Europe." --HROThomas (talk) 18:00, 29 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Ah, but that number was probably including tanks that already had been disassembled by the French to make utility vehicles of their chassis.--MWAK (talk) 18:28, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

utility vehicles cant be used for patrolling or airfield defence, right? --HROThomas (talk) 13:50, 30 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Exactly — and this (partly) explains why the number of 750 is so much lower than 1704.--MWAK (talk) 16:09, 30 April 2009 (UTC)

turrets of this tanks were used for atlantiwall .... . so the germans disabled this tank and used parts of them. of the german wiki articel of Ft-17 "Zu Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs waren noch etwa 1580 Exemplare bei der französischen Armee in Verwendung" my translation: " at the beginning of war there were still about 1580 units used by the french army" --HROThomas (talk) 20:38, 30 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Indeed 1580 would be a better estimate.--MWAK (talk) 17:54, 2 May 2009 (UTC)

Hitler´s secret memorandum to the invasion of Western Europe
find here - in german —Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.62.189.224 (talk) 20:35, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

German dead
In all there were ~49,000 german dead (references: german wiki): 46,000 ground forces, 3,200 air force, about 600 navy. --129.187.244.28 (talk) 14:25, 8 September 2009 (UTC)

Puzzled
I have just finished an extensive copyedit of this article but there are still a few things that range from the incomprehensible to the down-right daft:

1. In the box under "Strength" it states:
 * "Alps on 25 June ~ 150,000 French" and
 * "Alps on 25 June  300,000 Italians"
 * What does it all mean ?

2. In the penultimate sentence of the "Air Battles over the Meuse" section it gives a lot of detail about 'anti-aircraft guns', which is followed by how the Luftwaffe called it "the day of the fighters". Huh?
 * I would clarify the contradiction myself but I do not have the correct information to hand.

3. The figures in the "Casualties" section don't add up.
 * e.g. German - stated total is 156,000; actual total is 156,442; a discrepancy of 442. These numbers do include killed, wounded and missing, but they still seem to bear no relation to 129.187.244.28's above, (nor presumably, the German Wiki). Maybe they only apply to the German Army.
 * Allied - stated total is 2,292,000; actual total is 2,198,947; a discrepancy of 93,053.

What are the correct totals?

4. I have removed at least twenty (20) 'however's' - they are totally unnecessary, at times they are plain irritating.
 * I have also noted some eighty (80) citation needed tags. This in an article of 108k.


 * RASAM (talk) 20:20, 28 October 2009 (UTC)


 * Your efforts are much appreciated — and will, of course, be critically evaluated :o). However, "howevers" are seldom redundant: they create the logical structure of a text. The many tags are simply somebody's way of indicating he desires more references, in which desire he is fully justified :o). As regards your questions:

Ineresting comments MWAK but I have doubts about your defence of 'however'. 'However', 'likewise', 'moreover' and words of this ilk undermine the logic of the full stop at the end of a sentence. They should be extirpated from written English.Keith-264 (talk) 10:55, 29 October 2009 (UTC)
 * 1) It means that on 25 June (end of fighting) there were about 150,000 French troops and 300,000 Italian troops in the Alps; a separate theatre from the German-French frontline.
 * 2) Both German fighters and AA had a field day. That could indeed be made more clear.
 * 3) Sources severely contradict each other on the exact numbers. Also there is no unequivocal way of deciding what is the best source. Therefore it is perhaps preferable if the totals are approximations. Battle boxes really should give only a rough outline. The number of total losses of course vastly exceeded the number of those killed in action.--MWAK (talk) 07:37, 29 October 2009 (UTC)


 * Well, a point contains only a little bit of informative content. "Likewise" and "moreover" inform the reader that the sentence to follow will be in line with what had been said earlier; "however" that some opposition will be made. There are no superfluous words in a language. "George Bush failed as a president. However, he is a true Republican" is different from "George Bush failed as a president. Moreover, he is a true Republican" :o).--MWAK (talk) 11:59, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

Sentences to follow are in line, that's why they are in the same paragraph! 'However' etc aren't words, they're punctuation marks for people who haven't been taught English as a written language. RASAM is right; join us....Keith-264 (talk) 13:34, 29 October 2009 (UTC)


 * Sadly, most things you are taught about the "proper use" of language are artificial precepts that have no basis in scientific fact and would lead to a severely impoverished communication if really applied. Why not use the full richness of real language, so that you can effectively communicate? But are there actually books that prescribe "never use the word 'however'"? I of course agree that it is often inappropriately resorted to. But I would hope this was not the case in the text under consideration.--MWAK (talk) 06:37, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Such reciprocal dogmatism fails to acknowledge that written English is artificial by nature and that without a common standard (to follow or not) richness turns into indigestion. We cannot 'effectively' communicate because communication is either/or. Communication cannot be ineffective only inaccurate. 09:36, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Alleged use of 'Blitzkrieg'
An explanation of the origin of the term and its anachronistic use in writing on the Battle of France (Barbarossa was the first Blitzkrieg) can be found in 'The German Army, 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure' by Matthew Cooper (1978) and 'The Blitzkrieg Legend: The Campaign in the West, 1940' by Karl-Heinz Frieser (Eng trans 2005). Keith-264 (talk) 11:05, 1 November 2009 (UTC)


 * Reading the section I really have to wonder why it is in the article at all..? Its completely unsourced, with unverifiable claims and counterclaims. I really have to wonder why such proportion is to be dedicated to what appears to be a debate of minor nature between military theorists and historians, and breaks the fluidity of the text with something that is little else then POVish ideological battleground. Really it would be sufficient to make note that that there are some debates about the subject, and deal with it in detail in the appropriate article (if its not already done there). Kurfürst (talk) 10:07, 22 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Well, the presumed Blitzkrieg aspect has made the battle famous — and certainly not merely "between military theorists and historians"; this is very much a core issue.--MWAK (talk) 15:39, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

White FLag
What is that white flag doing next to some flags ? What does it mean ? In the battle of france all allied lost, so why does not everyone get the white flag in the battle of poland, allied lost too, I don't understand what does this sign next to nations flag saying "these are the surrender", when the article and the facts shows the opposite —Preceding unsigned comment added by 96.224.15.179 (talk • contribs)
 * The white flag shows nations that formally withdrew and surrendered to Germany. Belgium, France and the Netherlands all gave up and were occupied.-- Coldplay Expért Let's talk  22:21, 3 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Well - the article on Battle of the Netherlands says that: 'When von Küchler demanded that pilots still fighting for the allies should be treated as francs-tireurs, Winkelman's refusal made it clear to the Germans that only the armed forces in the homeland would capitulate, not the country itself'. Did the Netherlands formally withdraw? --ja_62 (talk) 22:40, 3 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Well yes and no, the Netherlands itslef surrendered but it's colonies fought on and formed the free Netherlands.-- Coldplay Expért Let's talk  22:44, 3 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I don't want to cool your enthusiasm down, but colony is per definition a territory dependent on the government of the home country. If the (government of) home country capitulated, then some colony could revolt against the government in order to continue fight, or join some alternative government-in-exile (which was the case with some French colonies when joining the Free French). I always understood that general Winkelman surrendered forces under his command (i.e. Royal Netherlands Army home forces) and the country was militarily occupied by German Wermacht thereafter, but the government refused to negotiate surrender of the country and continued war from exile. Which is certainly not dissimilar to the situation of Poland whose armed forces organised resistance at home country ceased in October 1939, but the country fought on. The situation of Netherlands certainly was different from the situation of France, where the government formally negotiated armistice between France and Germany, not merely a military surrender of forces; and from the situation of Belgium; which is a bit confusing, as the armistice was negotiated on behalf of the King, contrary to his government advice, by which act he probably surpassed limits of his power (King Leopold claimed that he only negotiated military surrender of Belgian armed forces, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces).


 * I see that is the Netherlands capitulation is supported by reference to Shirer's work, but unfortunately Shirer as a journalist is just too often not the most factually reliable source, though he provides interesting insight into the Nazi Germany.--ja_62 (talk) 00:01, 4 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Well with an argument like that, you can go ahead and remove the white flag from the Netherlands, as for France, well they did surrender and so did Belgium. (While Belgium formally surrendered, many were unhappy with Leopold's desision and fought on in the Free Belgian Forces)-- Coldplay Expért Let's talk  00:25, 4 March 2010 (UTC)
 * That was how I've meant it - Netherlands was in a bit different situation than France and Belgium. --ja_62 (talk) 00:30, 4 March 2010 (UTC)
 * The Netherlands surrendered during the course of the campaign. Therefore a flag is quite righlty there. Dapi89 (talk) 22:53, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Can you provide a reliable reference that the Netherlands (and not only the Royal Netherlands Army Home Forces) surrendered? --ja_62 (t 23:08, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

Yes. Dear and Foot's The Oxford Companion to World War II. The Cabinet handed over all Governmental and military powers to Winkelman ho ordered the May capitulation. The cabinet was disbanded until an agreement with the British in May 1944 to set up a military Government in anticipation of the Dutch liberation (although there was a functioning 'Government in exile' as the other countries had). The independent military formations ceased to exist in 1940, and were intergrated into foreign armed forces. Dutch participation in the ETO was over. Dapi89 (talk) 23:22, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
 * As far as I know, the Dutch government evacuated the country with the Queen (though the prime minister was removed from his office ) and general Winkelmann was not made a military dictator of Netherlands (which is what you effectively said), but only authorised to capitulate his forces, when necessary. Moreover, the Navy continued in existence (with headquarters in London) and other military formation (Dutch East Indies Army) continued in existence in Dutch East Indies. As for the Dutch participation in ETO - if you don't know about it, it does not mean that it hadn't happened (the Allied commanding admiral in the Battle of the Java Sea was member of an armed force you claimed ceased to exist) - though in ETO had perhaps operated only smaller Navy units. --ja_62 (t 23:38, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

Excuse me, no I did not. The Cabinet gave full powers to him to deliver the people into German hands with the minimum loss of life. Your assessment of what constiutues capitulation is very odd. According to your version, one could argue the French did not surrender either - if they had Free Forces or a Government in exile. The indepnedent Dutch military formations did not continue as sovereign forces in the ETO.

It makes little sense anyway, given the flag indicates a military surrender of the Netherlands during the course of 10 May -22 June. So I've reverted. Dapi89 (talk) 12:35, 24 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Yes, the cabinet authorised him to military surrender.
 * The legal government of France signed an armistice - Free French were at the time small dissident group, not a continuing pre-war cabinet. (Their position has some interesting intricacy though - De Gaulle first attempted to trace his authority to his position of under-secretary of War, as "the sole member of French government who retained freedom of action").
 * No it doesn't indicate military surrender - see above.
 * The armed force you claimed ceased to exist was engaged in major naval action year later.
 * Are you sure that the Royal Netherlands Navy had existed in Dutch Indies, but not in European waters? Can you prove it somehow?
 * Your opinions on constitutional law is very odd - there's a marked difference between a legal governemnt which hadn't give up and continued her fight from exile (which was the case of Poland, Norway and Netherlands) - and some exilés council, which could be recognised as a legitimate government-in-exile, though.
 * If a military surrender had been indicated, why the United Kingdom is not marked as such - as far as I know, the BEF units which hadn't escaped succesfully capitulated too? --ja_62 (t 14:04, 24 March 2010 (UTC)


 * They are not opinions. The Dutch cabinet authorised capitulation. Thats it. What has the Dutch East indies got to do with the ETO?
 * Regarding the BEF: Now you're just being silly.
 * Conjucture is pointless. On 15 May there was a military capitulation in which the Army and Air Forces were disbanded, in which the country and its people were occuppied and administered by a foreign power until liberated. End of story.
 * And yes I am sure the Royal Netherlands Navy operated only in the Pacific as an independent enterprise. In May 1940 only one cruiser, one destroyer and a number of smaller vessels took part in the battle. The destroyer was sunk, and the rest escaped to the UK. There they were merged into the Mediterranean Fleet as part of the RN. Dapi89 (talk) 15:04, 24 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Well, things were a bit more complicated. Winkelman indeed was delegated full administrative authority over the homeland. However, this does not mean the Dutch government was disbanded, or could not take back that authority. It merely meant that Winkelman could exert that authority in name of the government on the European continental territory of the Dutch Empire. He explicitly had been given the mandate to surrender his forces when he saw fit. But Winkelman's surrender did not imply a capitulation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. He surrendered the armed forces on 14 May, then signed a document on 15 May entailing an agreement between him and the Germans about the details of that surrender. On that occasion he made it perfectly clear that The Netherlands had not capitulated and that the war would continue. As indeed it did, first in the province of Zealand, then from British territory with what meagre means the Dutch had still available and of course in the colonies where much more substantial forces were still present.--MWAK (talk) 06:07, 25 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm not saying the Cabinet disbanded. They surrendered the homeland and conceeded defeat in the campaign. I'd like to see the source in which he made it perfectly clear that The Netherlands had not capitulated and that the war would continue. Because me source indicates he did exactly that. Dapi89 (talk) 13:43, 25 March 2010 (UTC)


 * They certainly conceded defeat in the campaign. "Surrendering the homeland" is somewhat ambiguous and imprecise. I must admit that I was confused in what I said earlier: I should have said that on the one hand the whole concept of "capitulating a country" can only mean that its forces capitulate (you were certainly right in that) but on the other hand that a capitulation does not mean the war is over: a state of war continues to exist until either one (or both) of the belligerent States cease to exist or peace is signed. Also "surrendering" is not the same as "capitulating". The case of The Netherlands can exemplify this: on 14 May the Dutch forces unilaterally surrendered, but on 15 May perhaps formally capitulated — if it is possible to capitulate after you have already surrendered.


 * Now did "The Netherlands" capitulate as a country? Well, no: even though the military forces present in the territory of most of the homeland capitulated (by the way, the Army, its airforce included, was not formally disbanded), you cannot say that the State itself capitulated because the capitulation did not entail all of its forces. So it was merely a partial capitulation, not a complete capitulation. You should in this beware of equating the "Dutch homeland" with the "Dutch State". The one is a piece of land; the other the legal entity. The German officers talking with Winkelman at first assumed there would be an end of hostilities between the Dutch and the German State, but he soon made it clear this was an misunderstanding. There was not even to be an armistice between the Kingdom and the Deutsches Reich. Obviously all relevant Dutch sources reflect this fact; in the Battle of the Netherlands article you can find a reference. Just as obviously the works of most foreign historians, not being able to read Dutch, are riddled with error on the subject. It was foolish of me to claim that Winkelman informed the Germans that the war would continue as this was understood by all concerned; after all he didn't sign a peace agreement. I should have used the word hostilities--MWAK (talk) 17:31, 25 March 2010 (UTC)
 * To Dapi89:
 * Yes the cabinet authorised a military surrender of home forces.
 * Regarding your disparaging remarks on my observation regarding BEF: No, I was not silly. Please avoid personal attacks towards people you don't agree with.
 * The example of Dutch East Indies was a relevant one, as of a territory under Dutch sovereignty which hadn't capitulated to Germans and kept on fighting, ruled by the exiled governemnt in London.--ja_62 (t 18:58, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Don't be ridiculous, look up the definition before you make stupid assertions. Dapi89 (talk) 14:55, 1 June 2010 (UTC)

Scope
This article should include fighting on French soil only. We now have articles covering the other three nations (Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) so I think that perhpas the info box should have its location mark ammended to exclude the Low Countries. Further, the Netherlands and Belgium could be removed altogether. That goes for the Poles and Czechs too, given they were no longer sovereign. To my mind, the French and British (possibly the Belgians) were combatants. In the article, a sizeable amount of space could be saved by cutting down on the Belgium and Netherlands sections. Dapi89 (talk) 23:11, 23 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Czechoslovakia and Poland had had independent armed forces on soil of France, independence of which forces was recognised by the government of France. --ja_62 (t 23:16, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Negative, they were subordinate to the French. They did not have operational freedom. Calling them independent formations (like the BEF) is misleading. Dapi89 (talk) 23:25, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
 * They were not subordinated to the French, though they were largely dependent on them. It's misleading not to call them independent formations - they were not part of the French Army.--ja_62 (t 23:40, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
 * p.s.:BTW BEF hadn't operational freedom too, as Gort was operationally subordinated to Billotte (and later when british government allowed BEF to retreat on his own, they were in exactly in the same position - though Czechoslovakia and Poland certainly had far worse means of transport available).--ja_62 (t 23:51, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
 * you have to include Poland and Czechoslovakia due to their presence. You may also want ot note though that they were not fully independent (basically governemtns in exile) since they were both occupied at the time.-- White Shadows you're breaking up 23:57, 23 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Exactly, at the very least the subordination to the French should be noted. Ja62 is completely wrong to suggest that they weren ot so. Dapi89 (talk) 12:38, 24 March 2010 (UTC)
 * They were formations independent from the French Army, in case of Czechoslovak Army in France this was based upon Czechoslovak-French Treaty from October 2 1939. --ja_62 (t 13:30, 24 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Anyway, by "Battle of France" the events in the Low Countries are traditionally indicated also. It is simply the historical meaning of that term. Furthermore, any limitation to the national territory of France would be artificial and highly disfunctional, as the actions in Belgium are crucial to the battle as a whole and formed an essential part of the integrated strategy of both sides. Even more irrelevant is the nationality of the troops involved.--MWAK (talk) 05:37, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

Aftermath
Could there be an effort by the main contributors to cover as many citations tags with proper citations? Dapi89 (talk) 14:55, 1 June 2010 (UTC)


 * Very soon now, I hope :oS.--MWAK (talk) 05:37, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

Confusion: Battle of France or Fall of France
The first line of this article refers to the Fall of France. Shouldn't this article be about the Battle of France and then the fall? DBlomgren (talk) 15:15, 20 June 2010 (UTC)


 * Traditionally the same sequence of events is indicated by these names. So "Fall of France" does not merely refer to the political downfall at the end.--MWAK (talk) 05:37, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

Allied Casualties - higher estimates of French and British losses, more detailed data on Belgian and Dutch losses
French losses in WW2 until June of 1940 were reported as 52,329 confirmed killed, but as many 352,314 wounded and 1,194,806 captured or missing (reported in "État récapitulatif établi rétroactivement le 10 juillet 1942"). Factual number of killed was probably at least 120,000 (at least 70,000 of those reported missing were also killed) or even more, as there were 352,314 wounded (assuming the proportion of dead : wounded was like 1 : 2,5 (1) - then French dead could number even 140,000+).

This document from French archives (SHDT 7N23) that I mentioned ("État récapitulatif établi rétroactivement le 10 juillet 1942"), dated 10 July 1942, lists French casualties from September 1939 to June 1940. And it gives those numbers that I quoted above. As French losses from September 1939 to April 1940 were close to minimal, vast majority must have been suffered in May and June of 1940

(1) Assuming the proportion of French killed to WIA was similar to that of German killed to WIA.

Now casualties of other Allies (not including captured):

British losses were ca. 5,531 - 6,000 dead (2) and 15,490 wounded = ca. 21,000 - 21,500. Belgian losses were 7,650 killed and 15,850 wounded = at least 22,450. Dutch losses were 2,890 killed and 6,898 wounded = 9,788.

Polish and maybe also Czechoslovakian losses are probably included in French losses, but I'm not fully sure..

(2) British non-combat deaths are included here too, but missing presumed dead are not included here! Also casualties after sinking Lancastria (these numbered a few thousands dead & missing) are NOT included here yet. In fact British dead and missing could number even 11 thousands, including 7 thousands on the ground and 4 thousands on Lancastria.

So we've got at least 472,500 French losses and at least 54,000 losses of French allies = ca. 526,500+ bloody losses (dead, wounded, missing presumed dead) - not including captured.

Peter558 (talk) 13:42, 25 September 2010 (UTC)

Photograph of weeping Frenchman
Please go here for correct information on that photograph wrongly given as a Frenchman weeping while watching German troops parading on the Champs Élysées in Paris on 14 June 1940. The photograph was taken in Toulon at the time French troops were leaving for French colonies in Africa. The picture was used in the 1943 United States Army propaganda film Divide and Conquer (Why We Fight #3, @54:50) directed by Frank Capra.

Why would the Frenchwoman on the right of the weeping man be applauding victorious Germans parading?

--Frania W. (talk) 18:59, 6 October 2010 (UTC)
 * I am aware of the context of the photograph and its erroneous caption, the Frenchman was actually weeping over the departure of French war standards, but there is no doubt that the cause of his grief was the disaster in the Battle of France. Please do not use the caption as an excuse to remove the image altogether (as part of your apparent modus operandi of removing all images representing French defeat in some way). -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 19:17, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

Casualties
The number of casualties presented here for Germany is doubtful. I really put it in doubt because I guess they are much overestimated. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 200.198.204.68 (talk) 19:45, 7 July 2010 (UTC)


 * But on what is this guess based? You just feel it couldn't be that high for an easy victory? Perhaps the victory was not all that easy then...Or can you refer to improved sources?--MWAK (talk) 05:37, 8 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Simple logic. If the German casualties were so great, the events would not have happened as they happened, most of the battles would have lasted longer. You can not take much seriously any historical source when you remember that "history is written by the winners". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 200.189.118.10 (talk) 16:10, 14 December 2010 (UTC)


 * A load of nonsense. In a twist of irony those figures come from the German official history. So to trash your 'point'; history is written by the losers as well.
 * What you write is not logical. There was a lot of hard fighting in June 1940, which is when the German Army suffered most of its losses. The duration of the battle has nothing to do with the amount of casualties taken. One can conduct a year-long siege with no casualties, yet take a village at the cost of 2,000 in a day. Its illogical nonsense. Dapi89 (talk) 13:29, 15 December 2010 (UTC)


 * en:wiki article:
 * German casualties :
 * 28,225 dead[1] (possibly as high as 49,000)[5]
 * 113,152 wounded[1]
 * 13, 307 missing[1]


 * A German site, not taking into consideration MIAs:
 * 27,074 Tote,
 * 111,034 Verwundete.


 * Numbers seem pretty close, and the German article does not seem to be written by "the winners"...


 * --Frania W. (talk) 19:36, 15 December 2010 (UTC)

Historiography
After the war the French Parliament instituted a Committee to investigate the causes of the defeat; its work unfinished, it was disbanded in 1951. French interest in the events was rather limited with few major histories appearing. This left the field to British and American writers. Three important works appeared in the 1960s: Guy Chapman's Why France Collapsed (1968); Alistair Horne's To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (1969) and William Shirer's The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940 (1969). The last two works, also translated into French, had a major influence on the public perception of the campaign. They conformed to some earlier French works, as Marc Bloch's Étrange Défaite ("Strange Defeat", posthumously appearing in 1946) and Jacques Benoist-Méchin's Soixante jours qui ébranlèrent l'occident ("Sixty Days that shook the West", 1956) in describing France as a nation in moral crisis with a weak leadership and the people torn apart by political divisions. According to this view, strikes and budgetary limitations had prevented an adequate preparation for war: France, terminally in decline, had become defeatist and defensive and this was reflected in the attitude of a "sclerotic" High Command, unable to adapt itself to modern tactics. This situation is then contrasted to that in Germany, where the assumed acceptance of Blitzkrieg tactics would have made a German victory almost inevitable. A more modern writer using this conceptual framework is Eugen Weber in his The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (1994).

In France this approach to the subject has always remained popular, as shown by later works as Jean-Baptiste Duroselle's La Décadence (1979). Especially outside France in reaction to these traditional "decadentist" works a more revisionist school has developed. Revisionist historians emphasise on the one hand the very deep structural demographic and economic disadvantages for France, that would have made it difficult to attain parity with Germany in any event, whatever the state of the people, leadership or command; and on the other hand the fundamental contingency of history, indicating the actual choice for a strategy as the main cause of defeat. When the structural approach is dominant it often results in depicting the French defeat as predetermined by the circumstances, whereas the more "contingent" view tends to consider a French defensive success as quite possible.

An early revisionist work was Adolphe Goutard's La Guerre des occasions perdues ("The War of Lost Opportunities", 1956), claiming that the war could have been won with a correct strategy. In the 1960s the "international history" school around Pierre Renouvin saw the low birth rate, the manpower losses in the previous war and a slow industrial innovation cycle as the main factors. At the same time, Canadian historian John Cairns in a number of articles, warned against the tendency to read the defeat into all previous events. In the 1970s, Robert J. Young argued in his In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 1933–1940 (1978) that the French leadership in its military planning, rationally adapted to the conditions present in preparing for a long war of attrition against Germany. The Israeli-American historian Jeffrey Gunsburg in his Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940 (1979), saw the failure of France's allies to match the French war effort in proportion to their population as the main Allied weakness. French historian Robert Frankenstein in his Le prix du réarmement français, 1935–1939 (1982) showed that France made an enormous rearmament effort, in the end surpassing German production in both tanks and aircraft. In 1985 Robert Doughty, in his The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939, tried to replace the image of a merely stagnant French military doctrine with that of an understandable adaptation to manpower shortages in the form of very methodical tactics, as opposed to the more flexible German Auftragstaktik. The traditional presumed antithesis with German Blitzkrieg tactics was made even more problematic by Karl-Heinz Frieser's Blitzkrieg-Legende (1995), which claimed that Blitzkrieg was neither the basis of German long term geostrategy nor the tactical basis of the official German attack plan of May 1940. Pointing out that in strategic battlefield simulations of the campaign it is hard to make the Allied side lose, American historian Ernest May in his Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (2000), emphasises the failure of Allied intelligence to predict the German strategy.


 * Well, I see no reason to remove this. Its is very relevant to the subject, sourced and inevitably people will be inclined by the lack of it to insert comparable information — which will then likely be unsourced and less coherent :o).--MWAK (talk) 06:50, 29 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Eh? MWAK, it contains six citations. Around 75% is not sourced. Besides, Historiography sections are discouraged as they get messy. The above one is a typical example. It eats up too much space and really should be in its own article. I can re-add some of the relevant stuff - meaning those related to the military operations which was my intention. Dapi89 (talk) 20:58, 29 November 2010 (UTC)


 * The section largely follows Jackson's article on the subject, so the lack of sourcing is only a illusion — and obviously the books cited can get their own footnote! Reflecting Jackson's article also means that it is not some arbitrary compilation of literature. Far from being typically messy, its is in fact a rather coherent analysis. I'm not aware that there is some official discouraging of historiography sections — but if there would be it runs counter to Wikipedia's main task: being a tertiary source giving information about secondary sources. Certainly in the special case of the Battle of France the historiography is not some secondary issue that can be safely locked away in its own article. Because the subject is very contentious any account of events must select from many competing theories: the reader must be made aware that this is the case and be informed what the other views are. And consider the practicality of the thing: if we remove the section some "Causes of the Defeat" will soon replace it, probably containing a simplistic story taken from some popular-science booklet. Because the matter of the causes of the defeat is pertinent to the subject such a section could not be simply deleted but would have to be replaced by a more balanced account, ideally consisting of an analysis of what the main historians have said about it. Which of course, is exactly what the present Historiography section represents. I you prefer we can rename it "Causes of the defeat" ;o).


 * Of course, on the whole I have no right to complain about your changes, having shamefully neglected the article for many years despite your repeated attempts to convince me to apply myself :oS. There is much improvement, though I do feel that you tend to get side-tracked a bit and are not critical enough of Frieser's numbers. Remember that his book basically is a reprint of a work that hasn't been able to benefit from the last two decades of research. Perhaps one day I find the time to update the whole...--MWAK (talk) 08:40, 30 November 2010 (UTC)


 * Hi.
 * It is no illusion MWAK. Lines without footnotes = unsourced! Please cite the above with Jackson.
 * I believe this to be the case, which is why you don't find many of the types of sections around. I should remind you this was not a permanent deletion - moving it to the talk page is indicative of a page dump.
 * I think attention to detail is important, so I don't think 'side-tracked' is a fair criticism. I think I've actually managed to cut much of the 'fat' off this article and things do get to the point much quicker. There was also a wealth of things - such as Allied intelligence - that had not been discussed at all.
 * I don't understand what you mean re: criticism of Frieser. The overall trend of his is accurate enough. Dapi89 (talk) 10:23, 30 November 2010 (UTC)


 * Well, a citation might also cover previous sentences. That is a bit ambiguous but at the time I considered it the lesser evil compared to a tiresome repetition of the same notes :o). The danger of "cutting the fat" and adding detail at the same time is that the reader might be left with a staccato account of events, that he will have difficulty to grasp because they are no longer explained to him as a coherent whole, obscured by many facts that are in themselves worthy of interest but divert too much from the main points. That could be a point of concern to you. The main problem with Frieser is that even at the time he was often infelicitous in his choice of sources and today any source from the eighties is often obsolete. Those manpower numbers e.g. had best be kept at a minimum...But I agree that the core of his work is still valid.


 * But what about the practical side of the matter? Do you see, if not the necessity, the wisdom of keeping a Historiography/Causes of Defeat section? After I've added all the required citations of course...--MWAK (talk) 13:34, 30 November 2010 (UTC)


 * I think, MWAK, that, aside from a bit of rewording hear and there, that I have not cut too much of the 'fat' away to cause the senario you suggest. Some of the detail is essential - Allied intell' for one. It has its own self contained section, it isn't too long, and it gets to the point. Moreover, it tells the reader the French should not have been surprised by an Ardennes attack. In fact, the French should have seen it coming a mile away. Their intell' told them several months in advance.
 * MWAK, I say for the third time, I'm in agreement about the above. It was a page dump, not a complete removal. And yes, I have no issue in renaming it or adding the citations to cover all main points. I'd encourage it. Besides, even if I did have a problem with it, my objections are rendered moot by sourced paragraphs. Dapi89 (talk) 15:14, 1 December 2010 (UTC)


 * In that case I'll add the references :o). Certainly I'm not against a Intelligence section, that aspect featuring strongly in e.g. May's work!--MWAK (talk) 16:42, 1 December 2010 (UTC)

Lead photograph and image censorship

 * French users have been deleting a photograph of German soldiers marching in Paris. (User:UltimaRatio User:Frania Wisniewska ). This is unacceptable, and should it happen again it will have to be reported in the proper venue as POV content blanking.
 * The current lead image depicts British prisoners of war at Dunkirk. British forces formed 5% of the military forces engaged in the Battle of France (316,000/6,650,000) or around 9.5% of the total Allied forces (316,000/3,300,000), so imho we can probably do better. This battle was, bay far, the most significant Axis victory of World War II, and imho the removed image best represents the catastrophic nature of the defeat and is a good candidate for the lead. It is also a very famous photograph very representative of the overall outcome of the Battle of France. -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 19:14, 6 October 2010 (UTC)


 * First I'm not French, second I'm not nationalist, third your favourite picture does not picture the battle of France and is redundant with an other nazi propaganda picture in the article.UltimaRatio (talk) 20:59, 6 October 2010 (UTC)


 * Please. The picture does depict the Battle of France (10 May – 25 June 1940) - it was taken on 14 June 1940. Secondly, by your narrow "definition" of what depicts the Battle of France, the picture of prisoners of war does not do so either. You will be reported for repeated content blanking. -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 21:07, 6 October 2010 (UTC)


 * Yeah, do it please. Your very "helpful" contributions on the French history and your intolerable behaviour on the discussion pages will be reported too.UltimaRatio (talk) 21:17, 6 October 2010 (UTC)


 * You do not get to decide and proclaim images "redundant", remove them and then edit-war over it. Your entire rationale is nonsensical. -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 22:15, 6 October 2010 (UTC)


 * The Nazis marching by the Arch of Triumph seems a very fitting image for the article's lead photo, as compared with a generic photo of some POW's. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 22:19, 6 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Damn straight Baseball, this image is famous and certainly belongs in the article mark nutley (talk) 22:35, 6 October 2010 (UTC)


 * As opposed to being deleted entirely from the article... on a whim -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 22:36, 6 October 2010 (UTC)
 * One concern I have is the user griping about "Nazi propaganda". Maybe it was such in 1940, but now it's merely a historical fact, as the Huns were driven from France (how's that for some propaganda?) and the country is mostly in the hands of the French and the tourists now... some of whom are even German. It's an iconic photo. I don't see why the user should have a problem with it. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 22:44, 6 October 2010 (UTC)
 * We should find a photo of tourist formations marching past the Arc. Historical perspective. -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 23:00, 6 October 2010 (UTC)
 * They seem to be marching rather casually; and note the guy in the background, on a bicycle, wearing a primitive version of a cyclist's helmet. Maybe they were tourists... wearing the latest Paris fashions. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 23:07, 6 October 2010 (UTC)
 * There are about three pictures of Nazis parading in Paris in this article (2 marching in front of the Arc de Triomphe)... Isn't it slightly redundant ? UltimaRatio (talk) 13:04, 7 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Not really, the germans walked all over paris. It is kinda the iconic image of france after it`s defeat really, so the images are fine. mark nutley (talk) 15:52, 7 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Yeah, I was surprised to notice this famous photo was under-represented when it is freely available - it depicts in one image an entire period of French history. I'm not so surprised after these discussions, though... -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 19:15, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

On 26SEP10, within 6 minutes, DIREKTOR put this picture in prominence in three articles:
 * Battle of France
 * Arc de Triomphe
 * Paris

Previous to this edit by DIREKTOR on 26SEP10, there was no warring about this picture which has been in article "Battle of France" for many months.

A picture representing nazi soldiers marching by the Arc de Triomphe on 14 June 1940 does not belong as first picture of the article titled "Battle of France"; it belongs to the end of it, as the "Battle of France" did not begin with naz marching through Paris.

There are plenty of pictures available illustrating a "battle", not a march to end the show. For instance, photographs similar to those

Also, please note that out of 15 pictures (last count),
 * 11 show Germans & German actions, including 2 of Germans marching in Paris with view of Arc de Triomphe & one of the naz-in-chief in front of Eiffel Tower;
 * 4 represent:
 * 1) English prisoners,
 * 2) French General Gamelin,
 * 3) French troops embarking on an British ship,
 * 4) one crying Frenchman.

Missing:
 * Towns & villages in ruin
 * Stukas of the Luftwaffe diving on columns of refugees during the exodus, zeroing in on the millions of Dutch, Belgian, French people on the roads, killing an unknown number.

--Frania W. (talk) 00:49, 7 October 2010 (UTC)


 * I'm sure those could all be subjects to be explored in the body of the article. The lead photo indicates a summary of what happened - namely, that the Nazis (temporarily) conquered Paris. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 01:29, 7 October 2010 (UTC)


 * I've added the picture during the same session (within six minutes! :) because I had just finished cropping and repairing the image with my new Photoshop CS5 - along with a very very large number of other files including images of Napoleon Bonaparte and Charles de Gaulle, as well as (finally) introducing proper French colours from the tricolour in the Free French Flag, etc., etc...
 * You should know, the usual method of attacking me with absurd ideological implications is to call me a "communist". I'm rather enjoying the change of pace. :D But seriously, I'm certainly not any sort of "Nazi-sympathizer" (I'm not even German), so I seriously suggest you cease opposing this image on such grounds and with such implications. -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 02:02, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

I'm French, so DIREKTOR, once more, will talk about the French users, nationalists… but This picture is not related to the Low Countries or, more specifically, Belgium or the Netherlands. File:British prisoners at Dunkerque, France.jpg is much more related to the campaign; the Battle of Dunkirk was the turning point of the whole campaign; I put this pict back as lead image. Alvar ☮ 11:05, 10 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Battle of France: In World War II, the Battle of France, also known as the Fall of France, was the German invasion of France and the Low Countries.
 * Battle of Belgium: The Battle of Belgium or Belgian Campaign formed part of the greater Battle of France.
 * Battle of the Netherlands: The Battle of the Netherlands (Slag om Nederland) was part of Case Yellow (Fall Gelb), the German invasion of the Low Countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and France during World War II.

@DIREKTOR: File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-126-0347-09A, Paris, Deutsche Truppen am Arc de Triomphe.jpg can be found on Wehrmacht, Battle of France, History of France and Arc de Triomphe; isn't it too much? Alvar ☮ 11:05, 10 November 2010 (UTC)


 * As there was never a consensus for the change in the first place, I have put the photo of the English POWs back at top of article & that of the marching naz in the section where it chronologically belongs.
 * --Frania W. (talk) 04:11, 11 November 2010 (UTC)

Let me suggest a solution. Why don't you create some kind of collage picture, just like in Eastern Front (World War II)'s infobox ? Naevus 16:45, 11 November 2010 (UTC)


 * Thank you Naevus for the suggestion.
 * Another suggestion (mine) would be the use of a map, which gives a better idea of the evolution of a battle. i.e. what the article is about.
 * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1940FranceBlitz.jpg
 * This would solve the problem of the photographs, which could then be put in their respective place.
 * May I also suggest that at least one picture of refugees on the roads of France, as the illustration of the 1940 Battle of France cannot be summarised with one photograph of English POWs and several of German officers & naz marching through Paris. Nothing in this article represents the civilian population. Millions from the Netherlands, Belgium & France were on the roads.
 * --Frania W. (talk) 19:11, 11 November 2010 (UTC)


 * Or... OR... we could NOT censor an image from Wikipedia? How's that for a suggestion? :P User:Frania Wisniewska & pals are roaming around Wikipedia with a bunch of buddies (likely recruited after a while from frWiki) trying to remove this image because it depicts French defeat. In the Battle of France. :P


 * I don't mind a colage if it includes the famous pic of the German parade, but I think we will all find "User:Frania & pals" is here to REMOVE this image from the lead, not to improve the images in this article. They will not accept any colage idea that includes this image.


 * These folks should not be allowed to get away with this. You'd have to be pretty stupid not to see through this play and its primary goal. -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 10:41, 15 November 2010 (UTC)


 * Apart from the paranoid and melodramatic tone&mdash;your attempt to discredit any opposition to your contentious edits as malicious "censorship" is a deplorable tactic&mdash;your caption is factually incorrect: Paris did not "surrender," but was declared an open city 13 June when the French government moved to Bordeaux. The Armistice&mdash;i.e. the "surrender" of France, if it'll make you happy&mdash;was declared 22 June, meaning there had occurred nothing by the date of the photo that remotely fits your description. Secondly&mdash;and I hold this to be the proper context for any disinterested and honest discussion of the topic&mdash;given the organized, focused, relentless, and extremely effective campaigns, waged in the United States in particular and in English-speaking countries more generally, to besmirch, discredit, and ridicule French military history, your denunciation of other editors' "ulterior motives" are bound to come across as a little disingenuous. The Eastern Front ended with the raising of the Soviet flag over the Reichstag&mdash;an "iconic" image if I ever saw one&mdash;but the editors there apparently did not find it essential to plant that photograph in the Infobox. Albrecht (talk) 22:48, 15 November 2010 (UTC)
 * You're looking for villains in the wrong places. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 23:08, 15 November 2010 (UTC)
 * My tone may be rough I admit, but I think my frustration is not without cause. Why in the world should this image be removed from Wikipedia?? -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 02:39, 16 November 2010 (UTC)
 * I assume you're talking to Albrecht. He's looking for a conspiracy that isn't there. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 02:54, 16 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Oh yeah, I'm a Nazi that hates the French military. I mean, this is the first time I ever discussed (or even thought about) it, but hey why not... :)
 * A couple of times (no time to look, but it must have occurred at the discussion page of either the Battle of France, Arc de Triomphe or the Légion d'honneur), seemingly joking, you mentioned being considered by some as a "communist" and/or a "nazi-sympathizer", which, if any one of us had done, would have brought upon our heads the foudres de Jupiter & immediate dismissal from Wikipedia. Now, upon reading your above comment referring to yourself as a naz, an English-language saying about a duck  popped in my mind and simply won't go away.
 * --Frania W. (talk) 17:37, 16 November 2010 (UTC)


 * @Albrecht Btw, to declare an "open city" is a type of surrender where a city surrenders without battle (quote: "abandoning all defensive efforts") - as opposed to "conventional" surrender, a term which does not imply there was no fighting (e.g. the surrender of Warsaw). Also thank you for the history lesson, however I assure you your efforts were needless. -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 10:48, 16 November 2010 (UTC)
 * When he said "Paris did not 'surrender', but was declared an 'open city'" (in other words, they fled), I was reminded of this guy. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 18:35, 16 November 2010 (UTC)

Baseball Bugs, I am wondering to what extend your constant disparaging remarks about France, the French & French users on France-related articles should not be considered to be libels. I am wondering if others, French or non-French contributors to en:wiki read your defamatory statements the way I do.

--Frania W. (talk) 19:51, 16 November 2010 (UTC)
 * As can be seen, User:Frania likes very much to single out users as "French-haters" for opposing his image removals. :) Subtle Nazi implications included, of course. -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 22:50, 16 November 2010 (UTC)


 * Director, you've got some guts! Who is the author of the following:
 * Oh yeah, I'm a Nazi that hates the French military. ?
 * And you do not have to answer me because I am not going to be dragged into one of your favorite games of ambushing people, then report them to a wiki administrator for daring to stand up to your tactics of intimidation.
 * --Frania W. (talk) 01:34, 17 November 2010 (UTC)
 * Frania. I was being sarcastic. Please read the remainder of the post (along with the context) more carefully.


 * If it will stop these continuous ad hominems... I am a Croat from the Mediterranean coast, a student of medicine, a Wiki user with several years experience and 20,000+ edits, and a WWII buff who always wanted to learn French. I am not a Nazi. I do not "hate" France. I just come from the problematic Balkans articles which made me quite allergic to nationalism influencing encyclopedia content.
 * Bugs is one of the best guys around. You are being far too defensive by far regarding revealing these perceived "anti-French plots" and "schemes". -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 13:11, 17 November 2010 (UTC)

Putting this photo to summarise the Battle of France is a shame. There are obviously too many French-hater people on Wikipedia, this is pure French bashing. You only try to make people believe this battle was a "promenade" for the Germans, but the truth is this battle was bloody and harsh. Why don't you use a photo showing French soldiers on the front? I give you this choice:

http://www.google.fr/imgres?imgurl=http://carlpepin.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/armee-francaise17.jpg&imgrefurl=http://carlpepin.com/2010/09/14/breve-histoire-de-larmee-francaise-2e-partie/&usg=__LP6SHhg01jY8FscLavaJprGhT6Q=&h=277&w=400&sz=42&hl=fr&start=0&zoom=1&tbnid=a2SBhDXIY269RM:&tbnh=130&tbnw=171&ei=gYqgTbPMJ8mh8QPJkYmoAw&prev=/images%3Fq%3Darm%25C3%25A9e%2Bfran%25C3%25A7aise%2B1940%26um%3D1%26hl%3Dfr%26biw%3D1345%26bih%3D551%26tbm%3Disch&um=1&itbs=1&iact=hc&vpx=300&vpy=77&dur=590&hovh=187&hovw=270&tx=164&ty=66&oei=gYqgTbPMJ8mh8QPJkYmoAw&page=1&ndsp=21&ved=1t:429,r:1,s:0 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 79.85.95.224 (talk) 16:40, 9 April 2011 (UTC)
 * Most battles are bloody and harsh. The casuality figures for the germans are included in the article.  However it's an unavoidable fact that this campaign is one of the most decisive victories ever.  And this victory is emphasised by the prolonged stalemate in WWI.
 * As for the image you provide, who owns the copyright? And is it provided with an open license?  88.90.43.140 (talk) 20:04, 12 April 2011 (UTC)


 * It is not what I am talking about! Did I deny the Battle of France was a decisive victory? I don't know if it was the "most decisive ever" but it is not the issue I pointed out. Whatever the victory, this battle can't be summarised by a single propaganda photo, and throw out the window six weeks of fightings. On the wikipage Battle of Britain, you see a Britishman watching the skies; you don't see Churchill greeting the victory on May 8th 1945. So I propose to remove this photo at the end of the article for the chapter about the French surrender, and to put another photo. I didn't know you needed the copyright so take this one, it already exists in Wikipedia.

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:B1_bis_tank_260_Ouragan_Guise_1940.jpg