Talk:Battle of Jutland/Archive 2

Tactical victor?
The side box calls the battle a tactical German victory, the text calls it a minor British tactical "gain". Which is correct is, I'm sure, a matter for debate (British losses were much higher but the Germans fled the "field" which could be interpretted as a tactical, rather than strategic defeat). I don't want to make the edit without consensus, but one way or the other the article should be internally consistant). Epeeist smudge 07:46, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

germans were narrow tactical winners, but strategic loosers as they did not succeed in weakening the british fleet enough to even the balance--85.180.6.63 23:58, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

It is hard to call Jutland a tactical German victory, given that the High Seas Fleet spent the overwhelming majority of the battle in head long retreat. In my opinion, the side box ought to make it apparent that the 'victor' of Jutland is a matter of fierce historical debate. InfectedWithRage 20:24, 28 June 2006 (UTC)


 * This battle is really a case where it depends on what you consider a "victory". I like to say you've won when you are better of after the battle than you would have been if you hadn't fought (e.g. evaded) it. Basically the battle was a draw, neither side gained anything. The strategic situation after the battle was exactly the same as if the battle hadn't happened at all. The british fleet was still strong enough to uphold the blockade and even with half their fleet under repair the Germans could still block access to the baltic. Tactically the British succeeded in crossing the German T twice and forcing the Germans to run, on the German side we have two successful escapes from their T being crossed and succeeding to escape by outmaneuvering the british fleet between them and their base.-- Nevfennas 21:08, 28 June 2006 (UTC)


 * I fully agree that who is the victor is debatable. The issue for me is that the article is inconsistant. The side bar doesn't agree with the text. I'd be inclined to put some sort of neutral words (contested or something smilar) in the side bar where brevity is neccessary and have the discussion on who "won" in the text (which is largely there already). Any views? Epeeist smudge 10:37, 23 August 2006 (UTC)


 * I'm of the opinion that the article should reflect the generally stated view that Jutland was marginal tactical victory for the Germans, but that the Royal Navy maintained the Strategic advantage overall. The fact that the Germans spent much of the battle in retreat is irrelevant to the eventual outcome.  During WWII the American army spent most of the Battle of the Bulge in defeat, but that doesn't mean the Germans were the victors of that particular engagement...  The High Seas fleet managed to out maneuver and evade the Grand Fleet, despite being twice caught in a disadvantaged position, and at the same time inflicted more damage than they received.  Tactically, that sounds like a victory to me.  Getztashida 16:57, 5 December 2006 (UTC)

Submarine details?
This is in here now: "The German U-boats were completely ineffective; they did not sink a single ship and provided no useful information as scouts." I think this is a non-sequitur. A U-boat could be somewhat effective/somewhat ineffective if it damaged a ship, broke up a formation, delayed the advance, etc. The "sunk or nothing" thing doesn't work for me. Can anyone add some insight here?--Thatnewguy 00:48, 4 June 2006 (UTC)

Combat Turnaround /gefechtskehrtwende)
nothing about the germans making three combat turnarounds in battle? a manouver seldom executed. it sure is worth mentioning--85.180.6.63 23:58, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

Victory and Defeat again
An anonymous edit has changed the result box to make it inconsistent with the text. It seems to me that referrng to defeat and victory positively invites such inconsidered edits. So I've modified it to Tactical British failure, debatable strategic outcome. Viv Hamilton 07:26, 29 July 2006 (UTC)


 * Yet the outcome down the bottom describes it as a marginal tactical victory; German fleet returned to port, RN ready again in shorter time... GraemeLeggett 18:21, 30 July 2006 (UTC)


 * Although it does say that, and I will happily go along with whatever expert analysed that, one also needs to bear in mind that at the time the British felt it was a defeat. I think the words victory and defeat are just too strong to be used in the summary table, given the debatable nature of the outcome (marginal and pyrrhic at best).  After all, the German intention was always to inflict asymmetric losses on the British and not hang around for a pitched battle with the main fleet - although they skirmished with the fleet, they achieved their objective.  The British, on the other hand, intended to crush the German fleet, which they did not do, and their losses were much greater; shockingly so from the British perspective.  But one could argue that it was a strategic victory for Britain because the British remained in command of the seas and the Germans remained in port!  Viv Hamilton 18:44, 30 July 2006 (UTC)


 * reverted edit to table result as POV and inconsistent with content of article. Strategic German victory would have conveyed some long term benefit to the Germans.  No such benefit is described in the article Viv Hamilton 08:13, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

Whilst the Germans sank more tonnage than the British, the German High Seas fleet was effectively neutralised - it never took to sea in force again. I'd say whether it was any kind of German victory is debatable in itself - despite the fact that more ships were lost by the british, the considerably larger size of the Royal Navy meant that their losses were little more than a minor scratch. Consider calling the Battle of Stalingrad a german victory because the Russians lost more men! The idea is ridiculous. The German fleet was also on the retreat throughout the battle. Given that the battle did not benefit the Germans in any way, shape or form, but did away with the threat of the German Navy, I think there should be mention of a British Strategic victory, even if Pyrrhic [which it hardly was], in the 'battlebox.'


 * Sorry but I fail to see any significant strategic gain for the British here. Before the battle the Germans were controlling their side of the North Sea and blocking access to the Baltic (shortest supply route to Russia). After the battle they were still controlling their side of the North Sea and blocking access to the Baltic, even in the short time directly after the battle when most of their heavy units were repairing the battle damage. It was not neutralised, as it could have sortied any time and thereby forced the british to concentrate their forces in the North Sea. In fact it did sortie several times in the Baltic and fought several skirmishes against the Royal Navy as well. So after the battle it was more or less the same situation as before. Nevfennas 13:11, 3 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Ok, we're probably never going to reach a consensus on this, but I must point out a few more things.
 * 1. The intro of the article states "The intention of the German fleet was to break the British naval blockade of the North Sea and allow German mercantile shipping to operate again" and the article on blockades states that [the Blockade] "[was] one factor leading to Germanys Defeat in world war one." The blockade was not lifted, therefore the German mission failed, therefore one could say that TACTICAL victory goes to the British. The actual tonnage lost is irrelevant [but you weren't disputing that].
 * 2. Whilst I'm not saying that it would not have been to the British advantage to open up the supply route to Russia, this was not the Grand Fleet's intention when they left port. I do take your point about neutralisation, though. I should have said that the German High Seas Fleet never again constituted a serious threat to the Grand Fleet. The 'small skirmishes' you mentioned were never a threat to british strategic planning, therefore the effect Jutland had on keeping the high seas fleet in port can be seen as a british strategic advantage. [by the by - the Naval Warfare in World War I page needs serious attention. it only mentions the blockade, the falklands, jutland, submarines and a cursory glance at the beginnings of carrier warfare. you seem to know your stuff regarding this area, so perhaps you could give it a look over? just a thought...] anyway:
 * 3. the german failure to defeat the Royal Navy in one of the only significant naval engagements of the war could be seen as having been a direct cause of their decision to declare unrestricted submarine warfare, which in turn led to the USA allying against her - British strategic advantage.
 * 4. The fact that the germans managed to keep the status quo in the baltic does not make Jutland a german victory, it makes it a stalemate.
 * I could go on, but we get the message - listing this battle as a 'German tactical victory' is both misrepresenting and over-simplifying a significant engagement. Your points are valid, but so are mine - there was more to Jutland than simply a greater loss of tonnage on the British side and I think this really ought to be reflected in the battle-box. You must be able to see where I'm coming from.


 * I think I am able to see were you are coming from and that I understand now why we are in disagreement here. The main point is that what you refer to as a tactical victory in point 1 is IMHO actually a strategic point. As stated in the article (section German plan) the German strategic goal was to destroy the Royal Navy. Because the Royal Navy was stronger they tried to employ a tactic of luring major british forces into the North Sea by attacking the blockade-forces at Shetland-Bergen passage, ambush and destroy them with their entire fleet and be gone before the british main-body arrived on the battlefield. Breaking the blockade was actually an unrealistic goal, because even if the Germans would have broken the blockade at Shetland, the british could have simply fallen back to the blockade-lines later used in WWII at Iceland, which were out of range of the German WWI ships. Anyway the Germans clearly failed here, but it's a strategic failure. Same for the Royal Navy, their goal of sinking enough German ships to assure that the German Navy would no longer pose a serious threat  was not achieved, though they came close by crossing the T twice and then being between the Germans and their home base. Strategic failure on both sides -> strategic draw, nothing gained by the battle.


 * That the German High Command then decided to change the strategy and adopted another one (and with unrestricted submarine warfare they picked the worst of all possible alternatives) is at best an indirect consequence of the battle, because the strategy of destroying the Royal Navy had not suddenly become unfeasable by it's outcome (maybe one should rather say it had not become more unfeasable than it had been before). The Germans simply decided that after one close call they didn't want to risk another.


 * Those who consider Jutland a tactical German victory mostly refer to the sunk tonnage during the battle in relation to the size fleets) and the successful escape during the night. I agree that in the end that didn't matter as any gains were neglible at best. Personnally I consider the battle a draw, because from the consequences or rather the lack of them it might as well never have happened. Nevfennas 09:28, 5 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Ok, I'd be willing to accept that. We just put 'stalemate' or 'draw' in the battlebox rather than 'tactical german victory' [which i think we've established is inaccurate]. Would anyone have any objections to this? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Psidogretro (talk • contribs) 12:05, 5 December 2006 (UTC).

My only objection is that the majority of sources describe Jutland as a marginal Tactical victory to the Germans. Bearing in mind that the German objective was to inflict asymetrical losses on the Royal Navy, and that they most certainly achieved this, then I would contend that the High Seas Fleet did achieve it's tactical objectives (although possibly at a higher price then they were prepare to pay). The manner in which they achieved this is irrelevant, so fact that they spent much of the battle "in retreat" has no bearing on the outcome, their purpose from the outset had been to hit and run. Also, to describe the German Navy as "neutralised" because it didn't take to sea in force again is disengeneous. The High Seas Fleet actually remained in dock for much of the rest of the war because of the changes in German Naval Strategy. The German Navy could and did sail when required (Battle of Moon Sound anyone?) but unlike Royal Navy practice, ships stayed in dock and the crews lived in Barracks unless they were about to actively sortie. The German decision to switch to Unrestricted Submarine warfare meant that the High Seas Fleet became a reactive rather than proactive force. They had little to respond to after Jutland and sortied a correspondingly few times. Sometimes the High Seas Fleet is viewed as a spent force after Jutland as they were not significantly reinforced whereas the Grand Fleet received several new units. However,the switch to Unrestricted Submarine warfare also resulted in the cancellation of Dreadnought construction. Although the Germans had no way of matching British Ship production, the two extra Bayerns and the Mackensen class Battlecruisers could have been completed before the end of the war had the politcal will to do so existed. In short, the decline of the High seas Fleet post Jutland is more attributable to the switch in German Naval strategy than to the damage inflicted upon it at Jutland by the Grand Fleet. The wider point that those changes in strategy were informed by the outcome of the Battle of Jutland shouldn't be ignored, but the Royal Navy most certainly did not cripple the High Seas Fleet with Gunfire... Getztashida 17:26, 5 December 2006 (UTC)


 * What you say is true, and i must say you have almost talked me round. However, I still think that, despite what 'most sources' say, calling this a 'tactical german victory' is an oversimplification. There must be another way to concisely describe the outcome in the battlebox. Also, if it was the german intention to 'inflict asymetric damage' on the RN, then why does it say 'The intention of the German fleet was to break the British naval blockade of the North Sea and allow German mercantile shipping to operate again' in the intro? In every account i've read, the latter has been described as the primary objective, and this objective failed. This failure needs to be accounted for in the 'result' column of the battlebox, otherwise the battlebox is misleading. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Psidogretro (talk • contribs) 10:59, 6 December 2006 (UTC).


 * The Lifting of the Blockade was the High Seas Fleet's long term strategic aim, which they intended to achieve by whittling away the Royal Navies strength in small fleet engagements. I would be inclined to adjust the article slightly if it suggests that the High Seas fleet expected to break the blockade with a single decisive battle, as that was not the case.  Getztashida 15:09, 6 December 2006 (UTC)


 * ok, then this needs to be reflected in the introduction.
 * Also, I'm sorry to go on about this, but I still think that the long-term failure of the High Seas Fleet to present a serious challenge to the Royal Navy needs to be reflected in the box. Even if it wasnt the goal of the Germans to break the blockade in one action, the fact stands that Jutland was the beginning of a strategic campaign against the blockade, and due to Jutland such action was cancelled and the German Navy resorted to other means. The blockade was arguably one of the greatest contributors to Germany's defeat in WWI. The Navy failed to break it, and thus there was a strategic gain for the British. One cannot deny that this battle must be seen in its wider Strategic context, rather than just in tactical terms, because the results were so far-reaching. Noone seems to be answering my point that to call this simply a 'German Tactical Victory' is an over-simplification [sorry to overuse this phrase]. Psidogretro 12:52, 7 December 2006 (UTC)
 * I agree, to me the British had the strategic advantage before the battle and after the battle it was strengthened to the point where the Germans changed tactics. I think people change it to 'German Tactical Victory' just because of the number of ships lost on each side. CtrlDPredator 13:26, 7 December 2006 (UTC)

No arguments from me about the need to expalin that Jutland represented a strategic failure on the Part of German Naval strategy, although Jutland was not their first attempt to bring the Grand Fleet to battle under favourable conditions. The Battle of Dogger Bank was the result of similar aims (the Germans raiding the British coast in an attempt to draw out and annihilate small elements of the Grand fleet). However, none of this detracts from the fact that the Germans did achieve their tactical aims at Jutland (inflicting asyemtrical losses on the Grand fleet) where as the British didn't (inflicting a decisive victory on the High Seas Fleet). The fact that the Germans decided to change strategy - even in the light of apparent success at Jutland - tells us more about the Germans realising that their orinal plan was unrealistic. Anyway, in my opinion for the purposes of the infobox we should look at the battle in isolation, and in those terms the it was a marginal win for the Germans - they achieved their tactical objectives, which the Grand fleet did not, and sank more ships and killed more people into the bargain. Putting the battle in context - explaining that the Battle of Jutland did not materially effect the naval balance of power, and therefore the German naval strategy was a failure overall, is the job of the article proper - ideally in the introduction so that casual readers are made aware of the context immediately. Getztashida 14:35, 7 December 2006 (UTC)
 * I dislike this "Force A lost more people than Force B, therefore Force B won". To me, this is a very narrow view of the battle, basically ignoring everything else and not putting the battle into a proper context. The British could and did absorb higher loses than the Germans and as a direct consequence of the battle, the British were in a stronger strategic position after the battle, irrespective of their operational plans and objectives for the battle itself. You can not simply dismiss the Germans aim to break the blockade as 'unrealistic' and yet stick the British to their aim of breaking the German navy. They are both ambitious plans. To me, the Germans inflicted more damage on the British than the British did to them, yet it had no strategic benefit after the battle and strengthened the British's hand. To me, the battle was a British Strategic Victory, even if they were not fully aware of the consequences of the battle at the time, which is supported in the article. I won’t object to it also having German Tactical Victory, yet that should be backed up in the article.CtrlDPredator 04:08, 8 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Okay, how about we put "Inconclusive" in the info box and explain the various claims in the introduction? So long as it's made clear early in the article that both sides could, and did, claim victory we should be fine.  Getztashida 13:41, 8 December 2006 (UTC)


 * "At the end of the battle the British had maintained their numerical superiority and had twenty-four dreadnoughts and battlecruisers still able and ready to fight while the Germans had ten." - thats not inconclusive to me CtrlDPredator 14:10, 8 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Listen, I'm not the one flying in the face of ninety years worth of recieved wisdom. Wikipedia is an Encyclopedia, not a place to conduct original research.  If you want to go and prove that the Germans didn't achieve a marginal tactical victory at Jutland then there are other places for you to go and publish your essay.  I have already laid out the reasons why the Germans could (and did) claim that they bested the Grand Fleet at Jutland and I have also explained why the British felt that they had "lost" the battle as well.  We've also demonstrated that the Strategic balance of power was not in any way significantly effected by the battle.  The Grand Fleet had always enjoyed an overwhelming numerical superiority over the High Seas Fleet.  To claim that they "won" because they still did after the battle is to completely miss the point.  If the Germans had destroyed five British battlecruisers (which they very nearly did) and not lost the Lutzow the Grand Fleet would still have enjoyed an overwhelming numerical superiority after the battle, but would you still be claiming that the Germans had not infilcted a tactical defeat on them?  I've offered you a compromise with the "inconclusive" suggestion - do not mistake it for climb down.  The onus is on you to discredit ninety years worth of original research and wrangling, not on me to support it...  Getztashida 17:30, 8 December 2006 (UTC)


 * "At the end of the battle the British had maintained their numerical superiority and had twenty-four dreadnoughts and battlecruisers still able and ready to fight while the Germans had ten." - taken from the article, this lays out the strategic situation after the battle, a situation that has turned even further to the British's favour. I have stated before that if people wish for it to be a German Tactical Victory then that is ok, yet it should be backed up in the article itself.CtrlDPredator 04:12, 9 December 2006 (UTC)


 * I dont think 'inconclusive' is accurate. the battle was far from inconclusive. there was a minor german tactical gain, ie. they sank more tonnage than the British, [noone is disputing this] but a clear British strategic gain [this seems to be the thorny side of this issue]. We really need to reach a consensus on this, because i think we all agree that 'german tactical victory' is unsatisfactory.
 * I propose we put 'Minor German Tactical Victory, British Srategic Victory (disputed)' in the battlebox. This seems perfectly reasonable to me. Any objections? Psidogretro 16:38, 9 December 2006 (UTC)

I don't think that the "Disputed" is neccessary. There is no doubt that ultimately the Germans failed to achieve their strategic aim whether they "won" at Jutland or not. Getztashida 22:55, 10 December 2006 (UTC)

Further to my last point, I suggest we word it something aong the lines of "Tactical German Victory but Strategic Faliure" as it sounds less self-contradictory. However, I'm still of the opinion that we should be looking at the battle in isolation... The Articles describing the Battle for France in WWII don't feel the need to point out that the although the Germans captured France and "won" ultimately they lost strategically because they lost the war. The Battle of Jutland was a single engagement which took place over one day. The High Seas Fleet inflicted a marginal defeated on the Grand Fleet. End Of Story, at least as far as the infobox is concerned. The Strategic implications of the battle (of lack of them) can be discussed until the cows come home in the article (or better yet, an article dedicated to the overall WWI naval war) but to suggest the Grand Fleet won because the Germans didn't kick their tails hard enough is preposterous. The Germans won the battle but lost the war, nobody is disputing that, but to claim the British won at Jutland is to mistake the War for the battle...

Incidentally, with reference to the "24 Dreadnoughts to 10" quotation - that rather overlooks the fact that the Germans had returned their fleet to full operational status with four months and the High Seas Fleet could have sailed with about 75% of it's fleet the following day if it had needed to. There were only a few vessels (most famously the Seydlitz) that were very seriously damaged. Had the Grand Fleet sought another battle immeadiately after Jutland some of their most powerful vessels (the fast battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron) were too heavily damaged to fight and they would have been obliged to sail without Scouts (most of the Battlecruisers were seriously damaged - if not actually sunk - and they had no Armoured Cruisers either) so the unspoken implication that the Grand Fleet was battle ready the following day but the High Seas Fleet was not is simply not true. Getztashida 23:20, 10 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Ok, so you admit that there was a British strategic gain. I believe it was a considerable one. Why not mention it in the battlebox? I am not confusing the battle with the war - the fact that the Germans did not achieve their objectives IN THIS BATTLE meant that the blockade was never lifted, which arguably broke their back. When talking about 'strategic victories/defeats,' by definition one is talking about the bearing any battle has on the direction of the war. Jutland had a great bearing on the direction of WWI, being one of the only major naval battles, and thus i think the strategic advantage gained, or rather maintained, by the British is worthy of mention in the synoptic table.
 * Your point about the RN's readiness to fight is valid to a certain extent, but the fact remains that the British could still have fielded a far greater force than the Germans had there been immediate further engagements. I do not see how this is relevant to the matter in hand, however.
 * You said that the inclusion of 'disputed' in my suggestion was unnecessary. I dont want to seem impertinant or confrontational here, but you are disputing the British strategic gain right now! What exactly is your position, just to clarify? Psidogretro 05:49, 11 December 2006 (UTC)


 * My position? I would prefer the British Strategic gain to discussed in the article rather than the infobox but I am not opposed to it being there, in which case there is no need to include the disputed proviso, as I am not aware of anyone seriously disputing that point.  However, I am dead set opposed to the removal of the German Tactical Victory part.  I was disputing the notion that the British long term Strategic gains (which were only indirectly tied to the battle) somehow overode the fact that the Germans "won" at Jutland (if only by the slenderest margin).  So, in short, I agree with you.  Getztashida 09:47, 11 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Ok, seems fair enough to me. One point however - i'm not in favour of the removal of the reference to a German Tactical Victory. There was a german tactical victory. My position is that if the German victory was significant enough to warrant mention in the battlebox, then surely the element of british victory is also great enough. given that the british arguably gained more out of this battle than the germans, i think it worthy of mention. But of course,there is the problem of sources - my historiography is worse than sketchy on WWI topics so i really couldnt provide a source that explores the idea of a British strategic victory. Perhaps someone more knowlegable than me could furnish us with some sources to that effect? Psidogretro 18:25, 12 December 2006 (UTC)


 * OK. In which case, how does this sound?


 * "German Tactical Victory but Strategic Failure"


 * That way it's clear that although the Germans claimed victory they achieved nothing through it, without the confusion of attributing Victory to both sides. Getztashida 01:10, 14 December 2006 (UTC)


 * There is NO confusion with different sides winning different aspects of a battle. Both sided claimed victory, not just the Germans. I dont like the use of 'but', nor that statement since it implys that the Germans overall won the battle, which again neither side can claim. British Strategic Victory or at least British Strategic Gain should be mentioned. CtrlDPredator 11:02, 14 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Yup, sounds great. Ammend it, my negro. Psidogretro 02:21, 14 December 2006 (UTC)

First of all, am I right in assuming that we have reached some kind of concensus, that being that the Infobox should attribute a tactical victory to the Germans, but acknowledge that the British enjoyed the major strategic gain?

If that's correct how would prefer to word it, CtrlDPredator? I would remind you that we are writing an article for laymen, and possibly school children, which is why I feel that the outcome should be described in terms of a single country ("British Stategic Success but Tactical Defeat" would amount to the same thing, for example). Getztashida 12:28, 14 December 2006 (UTC)


 * With reference to that, how does this sound?


 * "German Tactical Victory but overall British Strategic Gain"


 * Is that more to everyone's liking? Getztashida 12:33, 14 December 2006 (UTC)


 * German Tactical Victory; British Strategic Gain, no problem with that. There is no need to describe it in terms of one country, in fact I feel that by doing so would add some sort of bias towards whichever side was solely mentioned. Other battles mention both sides, for example the Battle of Timor. CtrlDPredator 20:10, 14 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Okay, I have gone ahead and changed the Infobox accordingly.


 * On a related note. I intend to go over the article a make sure it is internally consistant - for example altering the section that Describes the the Battle as a British Tactical Victory.  I'm aware that this is a rather sensitive edit so I will let you know once it's done and than hold my effort up to appropriate peer review.  Are there any sections that you guys feel need attention while I'm at it.  Getztashida 20:34, 14 December 2006 (UTC)

Okay, as threatened I've made a made a small edit to the introduction and the "outcome" section to remove it's inconsistancies with the Infobox. This has included a fuller explanation of the opposing side's objectives (in the introduction) and couple of adjustments to the text in order to make it flow a little better in the light of the other revisions.

Finally, I've changed the text regarding the operational readiness of the Grand fleet slightly - None of my reference material agrees that the Grand fleet could have sailed with 24 dreadnoughts in full fighting order immeadiately after the battle, but there is no clear consensus as to exactly how many ships they could put to sea. In the absence of a citable revised figure I have changed it to "over 20" dreadnoughts, which I believe still illustrates that the Grand Fleet retained their overwhelming numerical superiority, conceeds that at least some of their ships were temporarily taken out of action and doesn't saddle us with an artificially precise (and almost certainly inaccurate) number - it also softens the equally over-precise assertion that the Germans had only 10 operational Dreadnoughts after the battle. Getztashida 11:33, 15 December 2006 (UTC)

Yey. I love a trolless agreement on topics such as this. So satisfying. It has been lovely having a sensible discussion with you gentlemen. Psidogretro 20:20, 17 December 2006 (UTC)

At the risk of reopening this debate, shouldn't the victory, whomever it be attributed to, be properly described as "pyrrhic"? A pyrrhic victory is one won at unaffordable cost. This need not always mean that the victor lost more than the loser. It just means that the winner doesn't fancy too many more "victories" like that one.

On this basis, if this was a British victory, it was a pyrrhic one because they lost three heavy ships to 1 (or perhaps 1.5, if you include Pommern). If a German victory, then they got such a beating in doing so that, on the basis of Jutland, they abandoned the plan of cutting off and defeating isolated GF squadrons, and went for U-boat warfare instead. That decision incidentally was taken right after Jutland, by the German commander at Jutland, so it doesn't sound like he rated his own victory very highly. I think it is in Gordon that I read that Scheer himself, in his report to the Kaiser, claimed a victory and simultaneously said that U-boats were now the way forward.

Just a thoughtTirailleur 11:48, 11 April 2007 (UTC)

My two cents for what it is worth, the RN was still in the area the next day perfectly willing to renew battle. The HSF ran for home under the cover of night. The outcome was not in doubt or the HSF wouldn't have retreated from each encounter with the Grand Fleet quickly and very effectively but run they did. I think that the dual of the Battlecruisers often masks the fact that the main fleets answered every question quickly and effectively. Let us remember that while Germany declared victory its ships were not allowed to be seen and had the battle taken place even 100 miles further from port Sedlitz would have been lost too. Tirronan 17:25, 13 April 2007 (UTC)


 * But she wasn't, so she wasn't...


 * ...and by the same token, the Lutzow could probably have been saved had she not been driven so hard whilst trying to escape. But she was, so she wasn't...  Speculation on what might of happened is all very interesting, but is of no consequence to the analysis of what actually did happen unless it throws light on something that has otherwise been overlooked.  I don't see how theorising about the loss of the Seydlitz tells us anything about the battle that isn't already apparent from the actual events.  Most Grand Fleet advocates treat her like a de-facto loss as is, ignoring the fact that she was back in service by November.  They also tend to ignore the fact that the HSF sortied in August and again in October of 1916 - so they hardly remained "bottled up" in their bases for the rest of the war as the popular myth holds...


 * As to the Possession of the "field," which is often cited as a reason why the RN won - the simple fact is that that's a non-sequiter. The Germans never sailed with the intent to "take the field" so the fact that they did not do so can hardly be held against them.  The strategic objective of the German sortie that would ultimately become the Battle of Jutland was to tempt out a portion of the British fleet and inflict asymetrical losses upon it, and in the event of an encounter with the main body of the GF, the HSF was always planning to withdraw.  So what happened in realit?  The High seas fleet inflicted asymetical losses upon the Grand Fleet and disengaged rather than face the main body of the Royal Navy...


 * Also there seems to be some kind of idea that the Royal Navy ruled the North sea undisputed, but the truth of the matter is quite different. Throughout the war the North Sea remained a maritime no-mans-land made far too dangerous to operate in for either side by mines and submarines.  Because fleet could operate for extended periods of time within it safely, both fleets remained in their bases for most of the war.  The Royal Navy no more possessed the North Sea after Jutland than the British army possessed the mud of Flanders after the Somme.  There was an indecisive scrap and then both sides returned to their trenches to think again...  86.132.66.110 22:24, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Forget this "tactical victory" and "strategic victory" business. Since the strategic situation was largely unchanged after the battle, a description of "Inconclusive" seems perfectly apt.

No inline citations
This is an FA article with no inline citations. Someone want to insert some before this page gets stripped of its FA status? - Vedexent 15:28, 16 September 2006 (UTC)

Dirty laundry
Took out bolded part of "But at Jutland they were not used in this fashion &mdash; and indeed, British fire control was not sufficiently developed to permit them to be so used &mdash; but instead closed recklessly with enemy battleships (Please cite references for this, as the British battlecruisers did not at any time in the battle close German battleships and engage them!) while lacking the armour to stand up to the pounding they received." Belongs here, not in the article. Clarityfiend 05:54, 17 September 2006 (UTC)


 * There is no reference to cite, suggest a change. The same applies to -- Beatty used his battlecruisers in a manner for which they were not designed. They had been intended for use as cruiser-destroyer, rather than for a direct attack on larger and better armored dreadnought battleships. A battlecruiser is disadvantaged in a slugging match against a dreadnought battleship – the entire statement seems superfluous and incorrect discourse, not relevant to Beatty’s actual action of his six battlecruisers against Hipper’s five, all eleven of roughly equivalent tonnage.--Gamahler 01:36, 15 October 2006 (UTC)


 * No reaction - will remove passages in question.--Gamahler 01:18, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Germany's flag in the table
The german flag displayed in the table is the jack, and not the naval Reichskriegsflagge (war ensign). See this link: http://flagspot.net/flags/de1871~'.html or take the german article as reference. 80.171.81.242 21:28, 22 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Done --Gamahler 20:35, 31 December 2006 (UTC)

Practice
Removed – Beatty's battlecruisers shot poorly due to lack of adequate gunnery practice (because there were no facilities at the battlecruisers' base in the Firth of Forth) – an absurd statement; two years into the war, ships of the greatest naval power of the time were not unpracticed and did not lack facilities!--Gamahler 03:48, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

They certainly had the facilities, but they were unpracticed. Gunnery drill was conducted at the discretion of the squadron Commander and Beatty, in line with Royal Navy Practice at the time, was more interested in rate of fire than accuracy. Royal Navy ships throughout the war (although especially in the early party) invariably were able to sling out an impressive number of shells over a given time period, but had a hard time hitting anything with them, (Dogger Bank being the classic example). Getztashida 17:35, 5 December 2006 (UTC)

The reason most commonly cited for the BCF's poor gunnery is that it wasn't feasible to practice in the North Sea because of the U-boat danger. This did not apply to the GF, which was able to practice in the northern Atlantic west of the Shetlands, well beyond the operational reach of any 1916 submarine. Hence the BCF stinted on gunnery training and tried to make up for this with a high rate of fire. What Beatty should have done was rotate his squadrons through Scapa Flow so that each got a chance to practice in safety. Hood's squadron had recently done just this and shot much more effectively at Jutland as a result.

At the Falkland Islands engagement, Sturdee's two BCs shot so poorly there was a risk they'd shoot out their whole magazines without sinking the German cruisers. To prevent this, Sturdee had to get close enough to them that his hit rate improved, which was also close enough that they were able to reach him with their 8.2" guns. Likewise, Beatty at Jutland let the German BCs get close enough that their secondary batteries were able to join in. It seems an appalling risk to take - exposing 1907-vintage BCs to plunging fire from 5.9" guns - but probably no worse than staying out of their range and scoring no hits at all.

When Sims' squadron joined the GF in 1917 their gunnery was excruciatingly bad too, but no worse than you'd expect given that they hadn't been practising. Once they had, in the GF's gunenry ranges, they rapidly came up to the same standard as everyone else at Scapa Flow. Tirailleur 09:43, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

A Little Idle Speculation
Famously, HMS Lion and Tiger both came perilously close to destruction at Jutland. In my opinion the loss of two more battlecruisers would have been unlikely to have masively effected the course of the actual encounter, but how do you think it would have altered the subsequent perception of battle and it's wider impact on the war? Even if the Germans had lost the Seydlitz as well as the Lutzow I don't think there would be much doubt that the Germans would have felt much more confident in the surface fleet after the battle and perhaps the decision to switch to unrestricted submarine warfare may not have been made... Getztashida 15:27, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

Interesting. Turning it around, how about if the battle had been 20 miles further west so that Seydlitz sank 25 miles from home? That would have meant rough parity in capital losses: two first-generation and one second-generation British battlecruisers lost against one first- and one second-generation German battlecruiser and a pre-dreadnought. Would it then have been a draw?

I think what this shows is that we can either judge the victory by the events and outcome or by the losses. In the example you gave it would feel distinctly like a German victory and in the latter distinctly like a British one. I am not sure whether the losses alone make it so.

By way of analogy, at Busaco in 1810, Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese army inflicted 5,000 casualties on the French for the loss of about 500. He did what he intended to - inflict disproportionate losses - but the French still pressed on and forced him to retreat. Who won? This outcome is usually characterised as a "check", because to call it a British victory overstates what it achieved, to call it a French victory is absurd because the French were mauled, and to call it a draw is inaccurate because that implies a stalemate when in fact one player was forced to quit the battlefield. Tirailleur 11:59, 11 April 2007 (UTC)

It wasn't a Pyrrhic victory ('another such victory and we are lost') because the GF was ready and eager to do it all over again within a week. They achieved perhaps 30% of their aim - they prevented the HSF from any further significant action, but failed in that they did not remove the threat of the 'fleet in being', thus were unable to redeploy elsewhere. The strategic objective was not 'to sink more ships than they lost'. That is professional pride, not operational necessity. Greglocock 19:47, 11 April 2007 (UTC)

It wasn't a decisive victory and it never could have been. Scheer was trying to catch part of the GF and eliminate it. He was determined to get back to port and every manuver (except the return which I still can't figure out) was to bring his fleet back home. Running within 15 minutes of the start of both main fleet actions and the Grand Fleet didn't have enough speed to force the action. I don't see how it could have turned out much different. Tirronan 22:49, 20 April 2007 (UTC)

I would maintain that Jellicoe actually achieved all his strategic objectives. Jellicoe's aim was simply to avoid defeat, because this permitted the blockade of Germany to continue. Winning would not have made the blockade any more effective. So Jellicoe didn't need to win nor have to care about how many ships he sank - he just had care about whether he was still there. This is of course partly why he declined to pursue the HSF after the first turnaway. Why risk it? All he'd achieve, at best, would be to defeat a fleet that he didn’t need to defeat, while at worst, he might lose ships on a scale that would jeopardise his control of the sea. To get back to port, the HSF would have to reverse course anyway, and hence come to him.

This is a pretty Fabian way to win wars, and Jellicoe was aware of it and aware of how it would look to the public if he ever passed up a chance to defeat the HSF, so he took the precaution of telling Churchill quite explicitly about his intended approach and its likely perceptional issues in advance, and of keeping a copy of the letter in a safe. He wouldn't have done this if he had not, from the outset, had a goal of avoiding defeat at any cost in passed-up opportunities.

I'm not sure it is the case that Jellicoe was trying to remove the threat of the fleet in being. What threat was it? Who else did Britain need the GF to fight? There is a point of view, Andrew Gordon's I think, to the effect that Britain's was the fleet in being. While the GF was at Scapa Flow, the HSF could do absolutely nothing except retreat headlong when it sortied.

The idea that the balance of losses inflicted should determine who won is wholly fallacious in my view, unless one can demonstrate that the balance of losses negated the victor's success. Claims that the HSF won amount to just this, however. They are based either on the odd notion that the RN couldn't afford to lose 3 ships for 1, or on the idea that only the casualties matter, not the tactical course of the battle (Hipper tries to ensnare Beatty, fails; Jellicoe crosses Scheer's T, twice; Scheer runs away; Scheer is fiercely attacked by light forces during the night who suffer losses doing it, while his own light forces do little and suffer correspondingly few losses; Scheer is desperate to avoid going through that again, so immediately advises Kaiser to abandon fleet actions as a plank of naval strategy).

If balance of losses alone decide the outcome, then logically we should alter the Wiki entry to show that the Germans won the Battle of Kursk. Tirailleur 16:11, 20 April 2007 (UTC)

Nicely put - I can't remember where I read that ideally the GF would have been redeployed if the HSF had been comprehensively defeated. My only quibble is that just because Jellicoe decided that bottling up the HSF was 'good enough' that doesn't mean that achieving that makes it a 100% success, in more general terms. But that is only a quibble. Greglocock 21:55, 20 April 2007 (UTC)

As the debate above puts all the points in support of either position that I would have made, I have nothing to add that would justify changing the article as it stands. One thing that only struck me upon reading Andrew Gordon was how effective the Grand Fleet became under Jellicoe, and how ineffective the BCF was under Beatty. In fact I think it is Gordon who asserts that Beatty's BCF may have been one of the worst naval formations ever deployed by Britain.

Germany is usually given credit for superb gunnery in this battle, but as I recall from "Jutland: an analysis of the fighting", the hit rates among various formations were actually quite close with one glaring exception. It was something like Hipper 4.5%, Jellicoe 4.4%, Scheer I don't remember and Beatty 1.1%.

That is, Hipper scored 4 times as many hits on Beatty as he received in return (44 against 11 I think). Jellicoe's score is statistically indistinguishable from Hipper's but unlike Hipper he didn't have all day to find the range: he managed to score at that rate despite having only glimpses of his enemy. Hipper, of course, scored his percentage despite being heavily engaged for most of the time he was doing it, which must have been a bit distracting.

The German battlecruisers in particular fought absolutely superbly I think but the more accurate point one could perhaps make in the article is that Beatty's force's gunnery was noticeably deficient compared to others. Part of this was undoubtedly down to the lack of secure practice ranges for the BCF, but given the obsession with rate of fire, one wonders if he'd have taken advantage of it anyway even if it had been. Tirailleur 09:29, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Norman Friedman noted in his book on U.S. Battleships that joining the GF as the sixth Battle Squadron found (despite the U.S. Navy's pride in its gunnery) that it had much to learn from the British, precisely two things, they would use half battery salvos to halve the range corrections time to target, the second being that Grand Fleet was using massed fire on one target from a squadron on a single ship. The idea being that many shells swamping one target would result in a sinking rather than a return to ship of the line pummling ship to ship with no result. It should be remember this was 2 years after Jutland and apparently the GF had taken much to heart with the problems revealed at Jutland. Tirronan 18:28, 26 April 2007 (UTC)


 * "(Hipper tries to ensnare Beatty, fails; Jellicoe crosses Scheer's T, twice; Scheer runs away; Scheer is fiercely attacked by light forces during the night who suffer losses doing it, while his own light forces do little and suffer correspondingly few losses; Scheer is desperate to avoid going through that again, so immediately advises Kaiser to abandon fleet actions as a plank of naval strategy)"


 * That's an interesting way of describing the battle... Most of my reference books describe the sequence of events a little more like this - Hipper tries to ensnare Beatty, fails; Beatty tries to ensnare Scheer, fails; Jellicoe crosses Scheer's T, Scheer skillfully extricates himself then turns back to renew the attack but misjudges the position of the GF and is forced to turn away again;  Darkness falls and the German fleet uses it's cover to punch through the tail of the GF whilst mauling the British light forces.  RN battleship captains twiddle their thumbs ineptly while this happens and the HSF gets home.  HSF sorties just over a month later and the GF sails out to meet them but the fleets do not make contact.  It is after this second sortie (which presumably proved to Scheer that he could not Sortie without drawing out the entire GF, rather the smaller units he is trying to trap) that Scheer decides to switch to unresticted Sub warfare...  Getztashida 19:53, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Which reference books are those? I'm looking at Bennett, Tarrant, Massie, and Gordon. When you say Beatty failed to deliver Scheer to Jellicoe, how do you get to that? Jellicoe crossed his T - I'd call that delivery. And when you say Scheer renewed the attack - what attack? He retreated instantly.

Others have clearly been round this before here, and we could do so indefinitely, but TBH, it is very difficult IMHO to make out a case for a German victory of any kind on any basis other than the balance of losses. This, as I noted above, woud by extension mean that Germany won the battle of Kursk (actually every other battle on the Eastern Front too, probably), so is obviously unsatisfactory.

To support a claim of German victory, one would have to show, I think, how Hipper and Scheer put into effect a tactical plan which successfully them into a position to do the enemy significant damage, following which they skilfully withdrew.

To take the phases in turn, none of this is in evidence. Neither Scheer nor Hipper had any idea the Grand Fleet was out. So although Hipper did his job in delivering Beatty to Scheer, the effort failed because Beatty was able to outrun him, inept signal work notwithstanding.

Hipper and Scheer then delivered themselves to Jellicoe; the first inkling Scheer had of his presence was when he got his T crossed. He did his first Gefechtskehrtwendung to get out of it, but then according to Massie and Gordon he basically lost it; he did another turnaway and headed straight back into the same trap, getting his T crossed again. Scheer himself gives no coherent account of this at all; he was unable to explain, even after the war, what tactical ploy he had in mind when he got his T crossed again.

Scheer then ordered the battlecruisers to expend themselves so he could extricate himself.

In the night action, the British light units took losses, but then as Massie puts it, each side's light forces took losses in proportion to their efforts.

The most charitable view one can take is that Scheer successfully improvised an escape after being outmanoeuvred. The fact that individual German ships fought excellently means that the scoreline flatters their commanders, who quite frankly were not very good.

The broad aim of HSF operations was to whittle the GF down by cutting off isolated squadrons. They didn't succeed in doing this, even at Jutland, where the losses they inflicted consisted of individual ships within formations they never stood a chance of cutting off. Tirailleur 01:05, 30 April 2007 (UTC)


 * "Which reference books are those? I'm looking at Bennett, Tarrant, Massie, and Gordon. When you say Beatty failed to deliver Scheer to Jellicoe, how do you get to that? Jellicoe crossed his T - I'd call that delivery. And when you say Scheer renewed the attack - what attack? He retreated instantly."
 * If we're going to trade names, I'm looking at Bennett, Massie, Staff, Hore, Burr and Bonney. I've read Gordon but don't possess it and haven't read Tarrant

Well, you had indicated that "Most of my reference books" in effect or indirectly supported an account that upheld the German claim of victory, and since I have never read one that did, I wondered which they are.


 * In either event. If Hipper failed to deliver the 3rd BCS and 5th BS to Scheer then by the same reasoning Beatty failed to deliver the HSF to Jellicoe.  Beatty escaped Scheer's trap just as Scheer escaped Jellicoe's.  To suggest that Beatty's flight from the HSF was somehow superior to Scheer's evasion the GF is to impose a double standard...

I don't think so. Scheer met Beatty head-on in column, in apparent surprise, and shows no evidence of having thought about how to overwhelm Beatty's smaller force once the supposed "plan" came together. He simply pursued him in column, using only 40% of the firepower of his leading ships, and lost contact. Jellicoe crossed Scheer's T and completely took the initiative.Tirailleur 17:58, 9 May 2007 (UTC)


 * As to the renewal of the attack, although Scheer never really disclosed the reason for his turn eastwards after the first gefechtskehrtwendung, both Bennett (p105, The Battle of Jutland) and Bonney (p184, The Battle of Jutland 1916) acknowledge (and Bonney supports) the theory that he was attempting to pass just to the north of the GF and cross the T of their tail - hopefully inflicting serious damage on the weaker units at the rear of the GFs sailing order. Even Scheer admitted that the move was rash, Bennett quotes him as saying "If I had fought such an action in a peace exercise, I should have lost my command..." and Burr describes it as a "display of complete tactical unawareness" but it's hardly the action of a fleet in full rout...

The only trouble with this account is that there is no reference to it in Scheer's after action report and he does not, as I recall, offer any such analysis of his attentions in his own memoirs. Gordon argues quite persuasively that he panicked. Tirailleur 17:58, 9 May 2007 (UTC)


 * Hore describes the battle of Jutland as "a material and tactical victory for Scheer and the High seas fleet" and acknowledges that it was a strategic defeat, but the whole point of Scheer's strategy was to inflict "material and tactical victories" upon the Grand Fleet until he had whittled it down to a size the HSF could hope to take on in full battle. Whether this strategy was sensible or even possible, does not alter the fact that Jutland represented a successful (although not dramatically so) execution of the plan.

It was only successful if one's definition of success includes being outmanoeuvred and bundled back to port. There is nothing in the tactical sequence that shows the whole thing running like clockwork from the Luxusflotte's point of view. What Scheer was supposed to be doing was cutting off and destroying individiual squadrons, which he didn't - Hipper got lucky with his gunnery but at no stage did the HSF successfully execute such a cutting-off.Tirailleur 17:58, 9 May 2007 (UTC)


 * Certainly Scheer did not want to face the entire Grand Fleet, but that is why the HSF effectively cashed in their chips while they were still (just about) ahead. In fact, the HSF sortied again in August and then October with the intent of attempting to trap and destroy further elements of the GF, and it would appear that it is after these sorties that Scheer gave up on surface actions.  The August action resulted in the GF putting to sea, but neither fleet found one another, and the October sortie withdrew after the Westfalen was torpedoed.  This leads me to believe that Scheer had come to the correct conclusion that the GF knew in advance when he was about to sortie so there was no chance of trapping detatched squadrons(the Germans suspected spies to be responsible for the British Intelligence, rather than radio intercepts) and besides, the Sorties were becoming too risky because of submarines and mines, quite aside from the risk of a fleet engagement...  Getztashida 19:59, 3 May 2007 (UTC)