Talk:Battle of Kursk/Archive 9

Manstein's plan
In his post-war memoirs Lost Victories, Manstein was highly critical of Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle. This criticism has been echoed by officers in the post-war German Army, and by a number of historians.

The source that I looked at (Brand) does not seem to support the statement above. I had a passage Google translated, and it read roughly like this:


 * This discussion leads almost naturally to the question of whether Manstein, with the introduction of XXIV Panzer Corps still held in reserve, could have succeeded in the plan to continue operations in the southern sector of the bulge. Although with this we enter the realm of speculation, the author offers his opinion: Given the almost disastrous defeat of the Soviet 5th Tank Army and the fact that behind this army, Stavka - at least directly and in the short term - did not have further reserves available, Manstein's success would have been temporally conceivable, even if a strong threat to the left flank of Hoth's 4th Panzer army remained. But even if such an assumed, going to Prokhorovka and beyond would ultimately have been in vain, at the operational level and certainly in the Strategic Framework. No matter how successful the Army Group South would have been in destroying enemy forces and winning "operational freedom", after not too long they would have received an order cease the operation because now all forces were urgently required to put out fires elsewhere!

So it does not appear that "the criticism has been echoed" unless I got the translation completely wrong. Here the original passage:
 * It is unclear to me where your confusion lies. Brand states that by committing the XXIV Panzer Corps to the operation the operation in the south could have succeeded in cutting off significant Soviet forces and further degrading them. But he goes on to say that the overall strategic situation would be unchanged, that is the Western Allies still invade Sicily and still threaten Italy, and Germany is still forced to move units west to deal with these threats. So he is agreeing with Manstein that after all the effort put in thus far a significant tactical victory was at hand if it had been pursued further. He is also saying that the operation ended not because it failed in Russia but because of events that took place elsewhere. He also points out in the piece you are quoting from that Manstein had forewarned Hitler of these possible developments before the operation began. He may be right or he may be wrong, but he is in agreement with Manstein. Gunbirddriver (talk) 23:09, 23 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Diese Erörterung führt nahezu wie selbstverständlich zu der Frage, ob der OB der H.Gr. Süd, GFM v. Manstein, nicht doch seine ursprüngliche operative Absicht mit Freigabe und Einführung des noch in Reserve gehaltenen XXIV. Pz.K hätte erreichen können. Auch wenn wir damit den Raum der Spekulation betreten, will der Verfasser nicht mit seiner Meinung zurückhalten: Angesichts der fast katastrophalen Niederlage der 5. GdPzA und der Tatsache, dass hinter dieser Armee die sowjetische Führung - zumindest unmittelbar und kurzfristig - keine weiteren Reserven verfügbar hatte, wäre ein für den Bereich der H.Gr. Süd räumlich und zeitlich begrenzter durchschlagender Erfolg vorstellbar gewesen, auch wenn eine starke Gefährdung der linken Flanke blieb, auf die der OB der 4. Pz.A, GenO Hoth, besorgt aufmerksam machte. Doch auch solch ein angenommener, über Prochorowka hinauszielender und selbst in größeren räumlichen Dimensionen gedachter Erfolg wäre letztlich umsonst gewesen, weil er eben keine Entscheidung im übergeordneten operativen und erst recht nicht im strategischen Rahmen hätte herbeiführen können. Egal, wie erfolgreich nun die H.Gr. Süd in "freien Operationen" nach Zerschlagung von Feindkräften dann noch Raum gewonnen und weitere Feindkräfte zerschlagen hätte, nach nicht allzu langer Zeit hätte sie mit Sicherheit der Befehl erreicht, die Operation einzustellen, weil nun alle Kräfte zur Bereinigung von Krisen an anderer Stelle dringend benötigt wurden!

He is stating in his opinion if the 4th Panzer Army would have been allowed to continue with the forces it had it could have achieved a resounding success on the operational level. Strategically things do not change. To better fill in the details, the paragrph immediately preceeding the one you quote gives us:
 * Da die deutsche Seite ihren Erfolg vor Prochorowka nicht durch weiteres Verfolgen ihrer ursprünglichen Absicht ausnutzen konnte - und zwar nicht wegen des begrenzt erzielten Ergebnisses, sondern weil eben die Kräfte, die die erkämpften Handlungsoptionen hätten nutzen können, nicht verfügbar gemacht wurden -, ist der am 12.7. zweifelsfrei errungene Sieg einer der von Manstein so treffend benannten "verlorenen Siege".

Roughly:
 * Since by further pursuing their original intention the German side could have exploited their success before Prokhorovka – checked not because of the limited achieved result, but because the forces that had won the action were not made available – this makes the battle of July 12th without doubt one of von Manstein’s aptly named "lost victories".

That is agreement.Gunbirddriver (talk) 07:50, 26 April 2016 (UTC)

Please let me know what you think. K.e.coffman (talk) 05:47, 11 April 2016 (UTC)


 * In addition to the above, I suggest that the use of Manstein's memoirs be minimised; they are apologist at best, and possibly unreliable. K.e.coffman (talk) 06:28, 12 April 2016 (UTC)
 * I agree to your assessment, Brand's personal opinion is that with the reserves at hand, a tactical victory in the south might have been achieved, a success that would not have had strategic depth or consequences. However, I am unsure what you mean by Manstein is unreliable? Are you saying that Manstein changed his opinion over time and that he is lying? His opinion is his opinion! I would agree that Manstein's personal opinion should be counterbalanced by the assessment of various historians believing otherwise. MisterBee1966 (talk) 12:50, 13 April 2016 (UTC)
 * I agree with the above. Manstein's own judgments are relevant (his decisions/assessments had a major historical impact, whether his perspective was accurate or not), but need to be tempered with direct critiques of Manstein by reputable historians. I also think we shouldn't rely on the memoirs excessively, anyhow. GABHello! 19:30, 20 April 2016 (UTC)
 * Certainly Manstein is a relevant person to quote from. People are interested in what the commanders thought at the time and after, and there is no question that Manstein's memoir gives us details of his opinion. It is a valid source to quote from, as it gives detail to the event. It is not the final word on what happened. It is not even the final word on what Manstein thought at the time, but it is valuable and worth including. I must say K.e.coffman's readiness to strike all such comments from the article is troubling, as it shows a disregard for providing the reader with the opportunity to hear from the key figures involved. It should not be so. Gunbirddriver (talk) 23:09, 23 April 2016 (UTC)

I agree that Manstein's opinions are relevant and should be included as one of the main operational commanders. What I found problematic is using his memoirs as a source as if it were a standard, neutral WP:RS, such as here:


 * Once committed to the operation, it made little sense to pull them out at the climax, especially since they could not reach Italy in time to impact events there. Manstein argued pulling forces out of Army Group South in the midst of the battle, shifting away Luftwaffe support, and transferring his reserve force deprived his Army of its striking power at what he believed was the decisive point of the battle.

This is stated in Wikipedia's voice, lending credence to Manstein's opinions. (BTW, to the comment above that Brand agrees with Manstein: I don't see how a temporary tactical advance, which in no way could lead to an operational, let alone strategic victory, is a victory at all. Brand appears to criticize Manstein in his assertions. I'm not seeing an agreement with Manstein, and MisterB seems to have arrived to the same conclusion).

Many historians now view these memoirs as biased, and potentially unreliable, as those from the 1950s were written without the benefits of records. For example, David Glantz comments on Manstein's memoirs, in American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II:
 * An important work by an acknowledged master at the operational level of war, Manstein's book viewed operations from 1941 to early 1944 at the strategic and operational level. Manstein's criticism of Hitler reflected active disputes which ultimately led to Manstein's dismissal as Army Group South commander. Manstein's account of operations is accurate although again Soviet forces are faceless, and opposing force ratios are in conflict with those shown by archival materials of Fremde Heeres 0st (Foreign Armies East), Gehlen's organizations, and of the OKH (the Army High Command).11 Again Soviet superiorities are overstated. These three basic memoirs dominated historiography of World War II in the 1950's and continue to be treated as authoritative works today even as unexploited archival materials challenge an increasing number of facts cited in the three works.

See also Jonathan House's lecture on the mythology of the Eastern Front: "The Three Alibis" (Manstein's memoirs are discussed).

Let's take this passage, for example:


 * Model argued that the longer the preparation phase continued, the less the operation could be justified. He recommended completely abandoning Citadel, allowing the army to await and defeat the coming Soviet offensive, or radically revising the plan for Citadel. Though in mid-April Manstein had considered the Citadel offensive profitable, by May he shared Model's misgivings. He asserted that the best course of action would be for the German forces to take the strategic defensive, ceding ground to allow the anticipated Soviet forces to extend themselves and allow the German panzer forces to counterattack in the type of fluid mobile battle they excelled. Convinced that the Red Army would deliver its main effort against Army Group South, he proposed to keep the left wing of the army group strong while moving the right wing back in stages to the Dnieper River, followed by a counterattack against the flank of the Red Army advance. The counteroffensive would continue until the Sea of Azov was reached and the Soviet forces were cut off. Hitler rejected this idea; he did not want to give up so much terrain, even temporarily.

It starts by citing Clark, Glantz and House, and then switches to Manstein. While the first three are reputable historians, Manstein is not :-). I would recommend using sources that are independent of Manstein instead; there are plenty of them, so citing to Manstein is not necessary.

In summary, Manstein's opinions should be included, but via third-party, reliable sources, rather than using his memoirs to construct statements in Wikipedia's voice. K.e.coffman (talk) 01:54, 24 April 2016 (UTC)
 * As far as I can see the only statement in the paragraph you offer as example that one could question would be the last "Hitler rejected this idea; he did not want to give up so much terrain, even temporarily. This is certainly true, and consistent with Hitler's view of territory gained and his concerns of the political impact of losing territory. Since the statement is correct there is no real problem citing it to Manstein, as he was handy and available. If you find another source that supports the same statement that would be acceptable, but not necessary. What would not be acceptable would be to remove the statement altogether, when we know the statement is an accurate representation of the facts. Gunbirddriver (talk) 07:58, 26 April 2016 (UTC)
 * Just to butt in on one small point; Hitler is on the record at a conference meeting, as saying operations in the classic style were over. In other words, the operational art practiced by German arms for 200 years was at an end. The operators and the tacticians, like Manstein, were on the way out the door. The steher (last stand clique) were now going to take the helm. There would be no more retreats, no temporary withdrawals and counter-strikes as at Kharkov. Hitler's dislike of losing territory was not just political, his views on the practice of war had changed somewhat since 1939. Dapi89 (talk) 18:55, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

Note: "Bewegungskrieg"
In passing, I've taken out this passage. Many historians have opinions, and I'm not sure why this one is significant enough to appear in the body of the article, as the only attributed statement on the topic. Perhaps, it can be moved into the Notes area?


 * Historian Pier Battistelli asserts that the operational planning marked a change in German offensive thinking away from blitzkrieg.

For example, Robert Citino, whose book I'm currently using, states, referring to the Order No 6 of 15 April (p. 122):


 * The order was firmly rooted in classic German military traditions, concepts, and phrases: "The goal of the offensive is to launch concentrated, ruthless and rapid blows (...) in order to surround the hostile formations in the vicinity of Kursk and destroy them through concentric attacks." Such phrases [are] the foundational concept of the Kesselschlacht; they had formed the essence of the German way of war."
 * Using a term like "ruthless" in an order is a red flag that the order is not written in the classic German military tradition. Classic German military orders were brief, and allowed the junior officers to achieve the objective by means they best saw fit. Wordy orders with dynamic descriptors as offered above are characteristic of the style of orders that developed under the Nazis rule, orders that were meant to please their superiors and shift blame to the junior officer if the operation failed. Such orders did not fit into the classic German military tradition. Citino should have been aware of that.Gunbirddriver (talk) 22:50, 23 April 2016 (UTC)

In the lecture that I linked in External links, Citino (who opposes the use of the term blitzkrieg), says something along these lines: "The operation misfired from the start. There was no strategic breakthrough -- no "blitzkrieg", no war of movement. Instead it turned into World War I with tanks". :-)

K.e.coffman (talk) 04:53, 12 April 2016 (UTC)
 * The Blitzkrieg yes or no? argument has been hugely covered K.e. Do check the archives. It was discussed in I think, 2014. Consensus was that it was not a blitzkrieg and further that the term had begun to be overly - used, and indeed mis - used. I would not use the term. I think this quote was included to indicate that it was not a classic blitzkrieg. There was a long and quite interesting discussion on what "Blitzkrieg" actually meant. Irondome (talk) 13:52, 12 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Yes, I read some of it :-). What I questioned was why Battistelli's quote was the only one included in the body of the article. For example, Citino contends that Citadel was intended as the traditional war of movement (Bewegungskrieg) culminating in a battle of encirclement (Kesselschlacht) east of Kursk. This was the approach that Wehrmacht implemented in 1941 with much success, and to a lesser effect in 1942. This is essentially the operational strategy that was popularised in the West as blitzkrieg (in my understanding).


 * There are many opinions by various historians. Therefore, I think it was appropriate to take Battistelli's quote out per WP:DUE.


 * Add: the term blitzkrieg was not generally used by the Wehrmacht, so to state that "no one was thinking any longer of blitzkrieg" is odd. K.e.coffman (talk) 05:13, 13 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Battistelli asserted the operation was not a Blitzkrieg operation, which acts as a counterweight to the few historians that claim that it was. Most historians describe the battle, without attempting to characterize it with a vague term like "blitkrieg" The fact that most historians do not describe it as such, while being fully aware that the term exists, would seem to indicate that it either they did not think the term helpful of did not think the term described the battle. An earlier contributor insisted that the phrase should be included, as he wanted to stress the point that the operation was a failed blitzkrieg. He argued that we had to prove the negative, that we had to have a military historian that said outright that the operation as not a Blitzkrieg. Battistellidid just that, and he is included for that reason. Removing Battistelli would give undue WP:DUE weight to the blitzkrieg position. If there is no objection, finding the statement valid and adequately citated, I will return it to the article. Gunbirddriver (talk) 22:50, 23 April 2016 (UTC)


 * I don't think it's advisable, as then we'd have to add a counter-balancing opinion, and there will be more space devoted that needed to this topic. It seems to be fine as it is right now. K.e.coffman (talk) 01:21, 24 April 2016 (UTC)


 * The quote itself is the counter-balance. The article would be better off describing the plan of the operation and making no mention of blitzkrieg, but wikipedia is a collaborative project. If we must state that "some historians" called the operation a blitzkrieg then we must state that most make no such characterization and one at least states it was not a blitzkrieg operation. Gunbirddriver (talk) 02:46, 26 April 2016 (UTC)


 * I have objected -- I can outline why. K.e.coffman (talk) 03:02, 28 April 2016 (UTC)


 * I disagree with you on this K.E. I would like you to outline just why you feel the absurd and misused term blitzkrieg on this context, is noteworthy. What are you trying to push here? Irondome (talk) 03:06, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

Okay, let's unpack the blitzkrieg discussion first.

According to some military historians, the operation envisioned a blitzkrieg attack; other military historians and the German participants who wrote about it after the war, including Manstein, make no mention of blitzkrieg in their accounts of the operation. At least one historian asserts that the operational planning was not a blitzkrieg, and marked a change in German offensive thinking away from blitzkrieg.

What we have is the statement that notes that some historians describe the operation as "blitzkrieg", while participants and other historians do not. Citation to Battistelli follows.

If we interpret "blitzkrieg" as the colloquial term for the German operational doctrine, then indeed Citadel was a failed blitzkrieg. So the premise of the statement, saying that the Wehrmacht was planning to conduct a different sort of operation is problematic. Why could this be the case?
 * "Some historians" include Citino, Glantz, House and Clark -- these are respected specialists on the Eastern front, both on the Werhrmacht and the Red Army.
 * Battistelli is not as well known as the historians above. Here's a brief bio: Battistelli earned his PhD in military history at the University of Padua. A scholar of German and Italian politics and strategy throughout World War II, he is a freelance writer on historical subjects and has worked with several Italian publishers and institutions. from his author page at Osprey. He does not appear to hold a teaching position, unlike is / was the case for the four historians above. That is why I questioned why his opinion is the only one included as it it was more important than anybody's else.
 * Including opinions of the participants to advance the point of "no blitzkrieg" is also problematic; this was a failed operation, of course it would be to the interest of the commanders to blame Hitler and minimize their own contributions to the failure.

Specific on whether or not it was supposed to be a typical Werhmacht operation of pincer movements, meeting somewhere east of Kursk. Of course it was. :-) The article describes it as such. Whether we as editors call it a blitzkrieg, or something else, it's still the same operation.

Clark in The Battle of the Tanks:
 * "An evolution of the theories expounded during the Weimar period, the German fighting method became known to the world as blitzkrieg and embraced maneuvre in a balanced, all-arms approach to war fighting, centered around aggressive use of air power and the employment of tanks in panzer divisions. The aim was to encircle and physically destroy the enemy in a cauldron battle, and through this achieve the annihilation of the enemy's armed forces in a single crushing blow. (p. 21)


 * "The [Kursk] operation was to be a classic blitzkrieg, eschewing a grinding advance for a swift and efficient strike, the kind of attack at which the Wehrmacht had excelled and which would preserve panzers for future operations. A double envelopment with pincer directed at the city, etc. (...) It was a bold plan, audatious even, considering the physical condition of the Wehrmacht and what it had just been through, but Hitler and OKW were confident that Zitadelle would revitalize German strategic fortunes in the East." (p. 178)

Glantz in "Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943":


 * "The consensus after the war was that the German plan had been a disaster simply waiting to occur. That judgement belies the actual situation. Objectively, Citadel was to be the fifth annual demonstration of the power of blitzkrieg, which, since Sept 1939, occurred annually, in late spring - early summer. Every previous operation of such strategic scale had reaped immediate victory, although in 1941 the Wehrmacht did not achieve its strategic objectives, and in 1942 it stretched itself to the limit resulting in the disaster at Stalingrad.


 * If not all the annual exercises had resulted in strategic success, they initially achieved remarkable operational success in their early and intermediate stages. And who could question the absolute tactical successes the Germans had achieved early in each operation? Who could possibly have imagined stopping blitzkrieg in its early stages? In 1943, only the Soviets harbored such a hope, and even their self-doubt forced them to make immense defensive preparations. They were about to attempt something they have never done before -- namely, stop a German strategic offensive before it had achieved a tactical or operational success." (p. 24-25)

I already referenced Citino:
 * In the lecture that I linked in External links, Citino (who opposes the use of the term blitzkrieg), says something along these lines: "The operation misfired from the start. There was no strategic breakthrough -- no "blitzkrieg", no war of movement. Instead it turned into World War I with tanks".

So in summary, the way the current paragraph is constructed, with its reliance on participant accounts and Battistelli ("marked a change in German offensive thinking away from blitzkrieg"), is problematic, as it seems to posit that it was to be a different style of operation. Glantz, Citino and Clark state the opposite.

This paragraph/notes either need to be reworked, or could be simply removed, so that not to muddy the waters. Feedback? K.e.coffman (talk) 04:09, 28 April 2016 (UTC)


 * No K.E it just does not hold. Firstly the northern and southern thrusts were very different in character. The German high command, probably best personified in Mansteins' thinking in April-May was that a quick attack on the salient would have worked, but the massive Red Army defence scheme made a blitzkrieg impossible. The attacks were large scale all-arms offensives. There was no surprise, no attempt to disrupt communications, no real "point of the spear". I feel you are falling into the very trap you have done such good work here in avoiding, i.e. debunking the "romanticised" (ugh) view of the German war. "Blitzkrieg" is the ultimate verbal poster boy of that I would suggest. Simon Irondome (talk) 18:29, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

as a historian, you may have the best understanding of how the term Blitzkrieg fits or does not fit here. Maybe you want to voice your opinion here. MisterBee1966 (talk) 18:11, 28 April 2016 (UTC)


 * The very use of this word is controversial and will involve only a protracted discussion without resolution. Why not simply let the Blitzkrieg page deal with it and discuss the Kursk operational sequence without reference to it? Deep battle was clearly being practiced by the Red Army. Bewegungskrieg was the German operational précis. Both of these terms were codified into doctrine, so we should be using them, not the nebulous Blitzkrieg description. Also, Glantz is not an expert in the German side, as say, Citino is - he is an expert on the Red Army. Dapi89 (talk) 18:43, 28 April 2016 (UTC)


 * I would thoroughly agree with the above suggestion and comment. Irondome (talk) 18:48, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

Bewegungskrieg, Part 2
What I did was drawing the attention to what was a problematic statement that seems to advance the theory that the Citadel preparations was an evidence of the “shift in the German operational thinking”. I do like the suggestion on using Bewegungskrieg (more on that below).

Problematic statement:
 * Originally: Historian Pier Battistelli asserts that the operational planning marked a change in German offensive thinking away from blitzkrieg.


 * Currently: At least one historian asserts that the operational planning was not a blitzkrieg, and marked a change in German offensive thinking away from blitzkrieg.

Clark calls is a a failed “blitzkrieg”; Citino calls it a failedBewegungskrieg. I.e. the operation, envisioned (after breaking through the defenses) as a “war of movement”, was stopped in its tracks. It failed in the North before it could achieve even a tactical breakthrough. The Sourthern pincer fared better because of higher commitment of armor and may have achieved a tactical breakthrough, but was doomed due to yet untapped Soviet reserves, failure of the Northen pincer to advance to meet it, and developing crises elsewhere.


 * Note: The article Maneuver warfare, while it redirects from Bewegungskrieg, does not mention this latter word at all and could stand an update.

I reread the Citino Kursk chapter in ‘’Wehrmacht Retreats’’; he discusses the operation’s origins (Manstein’s proposals to take Kursk, as a follow-on to the successful winter counter-offensive); then the 15 April directive; then weeks and months of debates in the high command. Wehrmacht still could break into the open (such as a Kerch and Kharkov 1942), but only if it could deploy virtually the entire Luftwaffe on a narrow front. Thus, airpower was present in abundance. In any case, given the extensive Soviet preparations, says Citino, Citadel as constructed would have to begin under the conditions of ‘’Stellungskrieg’' (trench warfare). The assault formation would have to break through, "before they could even begin their all important concentric maneuvres”. (p. 128)

At this point, Manstein put forth a number of "backhand" scenarios, envisioning drawing the Soviet forces into the open and trapping them in a “gigantic Kessel” as the culmination of the battle. For Hitler, this smacked of lack of resolve; that’s when he complained of hearing the word ‘’operieren” too much. He turned Manstein down.

Citino begins the discussion of the battle itself with: "After all the debate, discussion and controversy, after all the planning and rescheduling, Citadel turned out something rare at this level of war-making: a complete and utter misfire. … Although a tactical analysis might show that this or that unit managed to get forward, on the operational level, it was something akin to a dead stop." (p. 134)

Citino recaps 1939 to 1942 campaigns discussing how tanks and ‘’Stuka’’ revitalized ‘’Bewegungskrig’’. Coming to 1943, Citino writes: "As the German command was enmeshed in how to proceed, the oldest German operational imperative began to reassert itself". Other schemes were discussed, such as a frontal assault from the west, but were abandoned. Citino also discussed Manstein’s "backhand blow” ideas but concludes they had no more chance for success than the Kursk offensive, as the Soviet formation were now fresh and rested, and not the overextended units that had been operating for five moths following Stalingrad.

Citino writes:
 * What still fascinates about Kursk is the degree to which the German command remained wedded to the old prescriptions of war. In 1943, they had all become so intent on the Kesselschalcht, on destroying the enemy through a series of concentric operations, that they had become blind to the absurdities of trying to achieve one under these circumstances.


 * Whether taking advantage of the Kursk bulge, or conducting a more complex, wider-ranging search (Manstein’s scheme for an encirclement on the shores of Azov), the German high command was seeking a battle of encirclement for which a badly wounded Wehrmacht no longer had the strength. There’s much that separates Manstein from Hitler … But in this case, however, both of them seem more alike then different … For them both, Kursk was indeed a drama. Call it “two characters in search of a Kesselschlacht.


 * Finally, it is time to question the principal underlying assumption of Bewegungskrieg. Manstein believed that it was in mobile battle that the superiority of the Wehrmacht would once again become manifest. By liberating the army from the tyranny of materiel, the war of movement allowed the human factor to have full play. Manstein was certain, as they all were, that they had better trained soldiers and officers than the Red Army, quicker decision making, and much more. By 1943, every one of these points had become debatable.

Commentary

It may help if, instead of blitzkrieg, we use "Maneuver warfare" and construct the note around that. This will greatly clarify thing.

As the Battistelli-sourced statement currently stands, that it was to be a different sort of operation, while discounting reputable historians’ opinions, is giving undue weight to what appears to be a controversial position. Indeed, from my reading of sources, the shift in operational thinking occurred ‘’after’’ Citadel. Following Kursk and the defeat in Ukraine, all the “operators” were gone (Manstein, Kluge, Kleist), while Hitler had assembled a new team of “standers” (‘’Steher) — Model, Schorner, Kesselring.

So my proposal is (1) to remove Battistelli statement as WP:UNDUE, and then (2) relook at the note, with a view of reflecting the Maneuver warfare/Bewegungskrieg concept. K.e.coffman (talk) 02:57, 30 April 2016 (UTC)


 * The problem is that none of the definitions given above reflect the reality of July 1943.
 * From Maneuver warfare:
 * War theorist Martin van Creveld identifies six main elements of maneuver warfare:


 * Tempo: as illustrated by John Boyd's OODA loop.
 * Schwerpunkt (focal point): the center of effort, or striking the enemy at the right place at the right time. According to van Creveld, ideally, a spot that is both vital and weakly defended.

Surprise: based on deception. Combined arms Flexibility: a military must be well rounded, self-contained and redundant. Decentralized command: rapid changing situations may out pace communications. Lower levels must understand overall intent.


 * Virtually none of these tactical requirements were met during the attack phase of Citadel, apart from the successes of the southern pincer, which seems to have stemmed from Van Creveld's last requirement being achieved to a limited extent. The actual techniques were more akin to a contemporary tunneling machine, grinding slowly. I am having great difficulty in fact finding a precedent. Arguably the tactics of the British Army in 1917 is the best comparison, methodical destruction of defensive layers, at great cost. The mythical post breakthrough phase is equally tenuous in both cases. Frankly we need to find a new paradigm in terms of what was envisioned. This will inevitably involve WP:OR and WP:SYNTH. I am at a loss. This was not maneuver warfare. This was more akin to a perverse Battle of Passchendaele with better tanks and without the mud, and with a German army with a massive superiority and a planned strategic counterstroke ready to be unleashed. Guderian, in Panzer Leader, gives the much used quote from Keitel in May; "We must attack, for political reasons", which has the ring of authenticity. The answer to this whole issue lies in a plan which was incoherent, improvised and developed a momentum of it's own, blind to the strategic and logistical realities pressing in on Germany in the spring and summer of 43. It is the most puzzling of German offensives, which bedevils any attempt to pigeonhole it. You have quoted many sources K.E. Frankly, having read almost all of them, I still feel unsatisfied by them. The definitive, "holistic" account of the battle has yet to be written, IMHO. Irondome (talk) 03:45, 30 April 2016 (UTC)


 * I'd like to focus on the planning, as that was the issue I had with the statement "marked a change in German offensive thinking away from blitzkrieg", which seems to assert that it was to be a new sort of operation. Citino (convincingly, at least for me) presents the argument that the traditional concentric maneuvres was all that the German high command could come up with. He looks at their choices and concludes that they were all bad, as it happens sometimes at war. Faced with limited options, they fell back on what they knew best -- Bewegungskrieg.


 * I don't think that any OR is needed here, no? Citino and Clark are quite plain about it. Similarly, Citino writes in his book on 1942 campaigns, about Operation Blue: "Paulus crashed through the Soviet defenders in record time. This was not what the field commanders had expected. Blue, they had felt, was going to require some tough fighting at the outset, a brief Stellungskrieg, they hoped, before the Panzer divisions reached open ground for operational-level maneuvre."


 * So, we have a similar situation at Citadele, only the expected break-through phase (Stellungskrieg) was supposed to be harder, but, with superior armour, air support, soldiers and officers, Wehrmacht was going to break through, the commanders expected, and be victorious. etc.


 * The Kursk planning clearly envisioned breaking through the defences to maneuver in the open, and then for the two pincers to meet up. The Wehrmacht commanders underestimated the depth of Soviet defensive preparations and the amount of Soviet reserves, and overestimated their own fighting qualities. Consequently, nothing went according to plan and we have the battle as it happened.


 * Thus, I still find the Battistelli statement problematic. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:53, 30 April 2016 (UTC)


 * We do have the fact that in effect two separate styles of attack were being attempted also, the northern attack being very different from the southern. This indicates a new and unprecedented German uncertainty and may indicate the "shift in German operational thinking" was evident prior to the unleashing of Citadel. Also we must not overestimate the confidence of the Heer regarding the success of the offensive. Jodl gave orders that the offensive was to be downplayed in the German media, (allow me to grab sources for that, but they are there) and Goebbells concurred. This indicates a presumption of failure. However we can work on the Battistelli claim and rework it somehow. However I think it is fundamentally correct. Hitlers increased obsession with new weapons and superior qualitative advantages, as in the Tiger and Panther V and the elephant Ferdinand assault guns. I think a fundemental rewrite of aspects of the article is desirable. Irondome (talk) 05:27, 30 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Battistelli has pre-empted this a little. Firstly, unlike the mythical perceptions of Blitzkrieg, which is confusingly taken to mean economic, strategic, operational and the tactical execution of war, Bewergungskrieg is purely an operational design. This author's contention that this changed in 1943 is correct. But it did not occur before Kursk. Kursk was the final nail in the coffin for Bewergungskrieg. In fact, in a lecture, Citino pointed out that the standard German military journal that had been in print since the 1816, Militär-Wochenblatt was suspended at the beginning of 1943. Hitler is on record as declaring operations in the classic style were over. In other words, the operational art practiced by German arms for 200 years was at an end. The operators, like Manstein, were out. The steher (standers) were now going to take command. So, yes, it was changing, but only after the battle. Dapi89 (talk) 08:41, 30 April 2016 (UTC)


 * So the three of us appear to be in agreement on Battistelli, and that it should either come out or be reworked. Is that correct? K.e.coffman (talk) 22:06, 30 April 2016 (UTC)


 * A reworking K.E, I think Dapi89 may agree that's do-able. I think so. Irondome (talk) 22:19, 30 April 2016 (UTC)
 * Yes, a reworking to reflect this is in order. I must stress though, doctrine wasn't changed - at least not officially. Late-war German operations reflected a more realistic assessment of the situation. Objectives were much more limited - as at Kursk - but also in the Ardennes eighteen months later. Nevertheless, there was a marked shift from the wide-ranging Bewegungskrieg of 1939-42 to a much more localised version. Dapi89 (talk) 21:31, 1 May 2016 (UTC)
 * How do you guys see the reworking happening? Any ideas? K.e.coffman (talk) 23:19, 2 May 2016 (UTC)


 * Can we first clarify 's statement? The Ardennes objectives were hardly conservative. No less an attempt to do a Dunkirk 2 on the Allied northern army groups. Are you referring to the increasing micro-management of the war by Hitler judging by the excellent and regularly updated editions of daily war conference records? Were these changes forced on the German High command due to resource equipment and manpower deterioration or by Hitler's increasing obsession with holding territory at the expense of tactical flexibility? Basically, how did this change become apparent? The spring of 43 seems to show Hitler giving Manstein almost a free hand strategically for nearly two months, resulting in the victory at second Kharkov. I think we can begin to rework B's argument if we can all agree on what precisely this change actually was and when it becomes apparent in sources. Irondome (talk) 01:59, 3 May 2016 (UTC).


 * A reworking is fine but do not then take license, as you have in the past here and here regarding sections supported in part by Liddell Hart, to remove what he is saying. Dapi89 has gone to some pains to make plain to you that what Battistelli has stated is correct, that the style of warfare that caused the fall of France in 1940 was no longer what Hitler was willing to commit his forces to. Such actions relied on surprise, speed and shock. Hitler was never comfortable with this type of operation, nor did he understand what the officers in the panzerwaffe, Germany's tank men, were after. Hitler wanted powerful forces with superior arms to crush their opponents in Battle of Cannae type actions of complete annihilation, a mark of superior German will. The tank men did not think along these lines. The battle that ended up being fought was waged against the advice of the tank men, who thought it a waste and misuse of valuable and limited mechanized forces. Thus to categorize the battle as a "Blitzkrieg" would not be accurate, either in its planning or its execution. Introducing the term "bewergungskrieg", even less well understood then "blitzkrieg", would more likely confuse the narrative then clarify it. There really is no great need to rework the section. It was included by a rather long argued consensus a couple of years ago and if you want to now remove it then you should request those editors involved comment first. Regardless, I will be watching to see that whatever is done is arrived at not by Coffman asserting the other editors agree with his opinion but that the result reflects what they have actually said. It also would be correct for you to address my earlier question and answer why you mischaracterized your previous deletions. Misleading the other editors is bad form.Gunbirddriver (talk) 06:52, 3 May 2016 (UTC)


 * These two edits were done following discussion above on using Liddell Harts 1948 book as a source: diff1 and diff2. Several editors participated as can be seen. They are explained in the edit summaries, and the editors did not object when I implemented the changes. K.e.coffman (talk) 05:35, 5 May 2016 (UTC)

Bewegungskrieg, Part 3
The Ardennes was limited in comparison to previous operations. The Bewegungskrieg operations in 1939, 40, and 41 tried to devour entire nations. In that context, "more limited" is certainly an accurate description of the Ardennes. Obviously the strength of the Wehrmacht in comparison to it's opponents was a factor in the reduction of the aims of these operations in the aftermath of the Stalingrad-Tunisia nexus. The end of the operators (which I actually said post-dated Kursk, thus 3rd Kharkov) demonstrates Hitler no longer believed in the mobile kesselschlacht. Thus him giving Manstein command flexibility in February and March 1943, is a redundant point.
 * This is a good discussion, but I don't want to give the impression that I'm going to become a content editor here. I was just invited to assist. I prefer to spend my time on the air-related articles. Dapi89 (talk) 20:32, 6 May 2016 (UTC)


 * I believe it's been established that Battistelli is off with the timing, correct? K.e.coffman (talk) 06:19, 9 May 2016 (UTC)
 * Undoubtedly. The Wehrmacht had largely abandoned the offensive in the east upon the failure of Kursk: Bewegungskrieg was an offensively orientated method of war-fighting and cannot really be considered a defensive one. There are vague similarities with it and Manstein's view of elastic defence, but the practice of deep operations by the Red Army blunted elastic defence's effectiveness. German mobile reserves had to be at the right place and time. Soviet deception and insistence on consecutive operations kept the German reserve well off-balance. The loss of air superiority also posses a problem in relation to the former. Practically, the last 22 months of the war was an attempted stellungskrieg - a fighting retreat. The question as to whether all of this was out of choice is unclear in the sources as far as I can remember. The Ardennes operation seems to have been borne out of desperation than a belief in mobile warfare. After all, it began under the cover of rather severe winter weather.
 * Has anyone had a look at Citino's Death of the Wehrmacht ? Dapi89 (talk) 17:05, 14 May 2016 (UTC)


 * Yes, I read portions of the Death of the Wehrmacht relating to the summer 1942 campaign. Citino argues that Bewegungskrieg was already not working for the Wehrmacht in 1942; although massive territories were conquered, there was no Kesselschalcht, just blows into the air. The Wehrmacht had to chase the Red Army "here and yon" because the latter refused to stand and fight, so the carefully thought out and elegant operational sequence was derailed in the first few weeks, according to Citino. I assume that's why the book is titled so, the German way of war was not working in the vast territories of the Soviet Union.


 * Back to Battistelli, should the statement that started this all be taken out? K.e.coffman (talk) 05:01, 17 May 2016 (UTC)
 * Let me have a look at some of my stuff over the weekend. I want to get a definitive handle on what, if any, doctrinal changes were/or were not, taking place. After the Militär-Wochenblatt ceased publication in 1943 there appeared to be little left to say. But this in itself can't tell us much about the shape of future German operations in 1944 or 1945. But the inference is that they were drawing a line under large-scale mobile operations. Dapi89 (talk) 10:47, 19 May 2016 (UTC)
 * It is difficult, I've found, to make a clear judgement through the sources. There is no smoking gun as such. I've found little that discusses this issue in doctrine literature. I had a look at Citino's German Way of War. He does mention stellungskrieg in the context of the failure of Barbarossa. In the 26 December 1941 issue of the Militär-Wochenblatt, an article carries the ominous title "stellungskrieg in the east". Williamson Murray's and David Zabecki's work does not mention anything on this particular issue which is unfortunate since he's an expert on the B-word. Same for Bruce Condell's On the German Art of War: Truppenführung. Unless the author making the contention offers detailed and 'forensic' analysis of why and how Bewegungskrieg supposedly died, then I agree his statements should not be used. Dapi89 (talk) 11:28, 21 May 2016 (UTC)

Unless there are objections, I plan to remove this section. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:30, 25 May 2016 (UTC)


 * If that means the article then spuriously claims the operation to be a failed blitzkrieg, I strongly object. Irondome (talk) 13:17, 25 May 2016 (UTC)


 * Re: removing this sentence: "At least one historian asserts that the operational planning was not a blitzkrieg, and marked a change in German offensive thinking away from blitzkrieg." sourced to Battistelli. K.e.coffman (talk) 23:13, 25 May 2016 (UTC)


 * Since there's not been any further comments, I will go ahead and remove the Battistelli statement, as coming from a non-notable historian and likely inaccurate. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:50, 30 May 2016 (UTC)
 * The simple solution to Irondome's objection is to remove the word blitzkrieg. I think this should be done in tandem with Battistelli - and I agree, that this supposed shift cannot be proven. Dapi89 (talk) 13:50, 30 May 2016 (UTC)


 * I don't see an issue with removing the entire blitzkrieg note area, with its undue emphasis on the opinions of the Wehrmacht generals: "Many of the German participants of Operation Citadel make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation..." etc.


 * One small caveat though it that the term continues to be used in literature, most recently by Lloyd Clark in the Battle of the Tanks: Kursk, 1943, which I referenced earlier in the discussion. This term appears to still have broad public appeal. Even Robert Citino jokingly complained that he did not want to use the term, but his publisher slapped it on his Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare because apparently it sells books.


 * What appears to be not in dispute is that it was an operation designed in the classic "war of movement" scheme, which subsequently failed. K.e.coffman (talk) 01:29, 31 May 2016 (UTC)


 * Everything about Blitzkrieg is in dispute - there has been an ongoing discourse over it for 40 years. It wasn't a doctrine, it's just an anglicised word applied fast moving armies. That's it. Not even the Germans used the word. Bewegungskrieg is the operational doctrine followed by German arms. That some academics (but mostly non-academics) persist in using Blitzkrieg casually, without regard for the controversy, is not an excuse to do the same. It reinforces a painfully exposed myth. Dapi89 (talk) 13:59, 31 May 2016 (UTC)


 * WP doesn't avoid disputes; it reports them. There's some RSs that discuss blitzkrieg and Kursk, so we must as well.  Readers will look for it.  Yes, there isn't anything really bold and definitive to say about blitzkrieg and Kursk, so there's no need to belabor it, but we need at least a paragraph on it.  --A D Monroe III (talk) 16:13, 31 May 2016 (UTC)

Bewegungskrieg, Part 4
Here's the note as currently presented:
 * According to some military historians, the operation envisioned a blitzkrieg attack; other military historians make no mention of blitzkrieg in their accounts of the operation.

There are a couple of issues here (and yes, I read the archives :-)), one of which is reliance on the participant of events (whose post-war memoirs are notoriously unreliable) and non-notable historians to create the counter-intuitive narrative of "no blitzkrieg" (which appears to try to prove a negative, which is obviously difficult). Sources include: George Nipe who appears to be "militaria literature" author, as could be gleaned from his book listing on Amazon, and not a reputable historian. Bruno Kasdorf's work cites is an unpublished monograph; it ma be accurate, but he appears to be a officer of the German army, rather than a military historian, as the note claims:.

Any suggestions on possibly resolving the quandary? K.e.coffman (talk) 05:34, 1 June 2016 (UTC)
 * I've made no secret of the fact I side with the Citino, Frieser group and get annoyed with qualified academics (who all should know better) for using this word without thinking or discussing it. Lloyd Clark is disappointing in this regard, but I don't think we should be taking Mary Kathryn Barbier seriously - her book is not worth the paper it's written on; the title alone raises eyebrows about it's competence. Just because they have a PhD doesn't make them an expert. I have no idea why Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson say the south was a classic Blitzkrieg and north was not so. The German Command intended to accomplish the same goals along both axis. Glantz and House are experts to be sure, but their expertise is on the Soviet doctrine, not the German. As for the German participants, the less said about their opinions the better, I agree there.


 * Citino should have insisted that Blitzkrieg stay out of his title, but appears they published it before he could stop it. There are many more well known academics in this field who discuss this issues, albeit not specific to Kursk. Richard Overy, Adam Tooze to name but two.


 * In the interests of a balanced article, I think that we should describe German intentions to break through the enemy line to encircle and destroy the Soviet forces within it. The operation was limited and it used Bewegungskrieg as its guiding principle. A brief sentence or two about how it is controversially referred to as Blitzkrieg and that should be enough. The subject's home article should take care of the rest. Dapi89 (talk) 15:52, 1 June 2016 (UTC)

Agree with Dapi's line of reasoning. I believe it's already described in such a way in the article. What's stumbling us all is that the literature continues to use the b-word, such as most recently by Clark. So the article needs to mentioned it somehow (as noted in the discussion above), possibly within the confines that Dapi recommends.

I'll begin by trimming the note, to remove the undue opinions by the participants, and some of the authors that have been challenged in the threat (Nipe, Barbier, etc). In addition, Healy gets poor marks from the article linked in External links:


 * Licari, Michael J. A Review Essay: Books on the Battle of Kursk. Archived from the original on 2014-09-11. Retrieved 2014-11-01.

I've not encountered Licari before, but the article seems to be on point. K.e.coffman (talk) 06:01, 7 June 2016 (UTC)


 * I rewored the note -- please let me know of any feedback. In addition to what I mentioned above, I took out Zetterling & Frankson. Similar to Dapi, I was stumped by what they meant in describing only the southern pincer as an intended blitzkrieg attack.


 * While I was working on the note, I thought it would be a good idea to add Citino into both camps, highlighting that he used the term in an informal setting, but did not mention it in his book. Since (I believe) he's considered a pre-eminent expert on the Wehrmacht operational principles, I believe it was due weight to give him the amount of space that I did.


 * In any case, please look it over and share feedback, if any. I'll figure out the cites to Citino a bit later. The "blitzkrieg" part of the note is citing to the video in the External links, and the "no blitzkrieg" is citing to the 2012 work already in Bibliography. K.e.coffman (talk) 06:43, 7 June 2016 (UTC)


 * I think you mixed up the notes for Citino in the citations. The note that talks about no blitzkrieg is in the citation for the passage that supports blitzkrieg, and the one that talks about Bewegungskrieg is in the citation for the passage that supports no blitzkrieg. Unless that was intentional. Also, I think Zetterling and Frankson's reasoning isn't invalid. There was no concentrated commitment of armour on day one in the northern side, like there was in the south. That was their reason for stating that the southern pincer was "a more classical Blitzkrieg attack". EyeTruth (talk) 16:52, 11 June 2016 (UTC)

Bewegungskrieg, Part 5
Here's the statement, with respective footnotes:


 * Some military historians have described the operation using the term blitzkrieg (lightning war); other military historians do not use the term in their works on the battle.
 * Some military historians consider Operation Citadel, or at least the southern pincer, as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or state it was intended as such. These historians are: Lloyd Clark, Roger Moorhouse , David Glantz , Jonathan House , Hedley Paul Willmott . In the informal setting of the International Conference on World War II at The National WWII Museum in 2013, Robert M. Citino used the the term to comment on the failure of the operation: "The operation misfired from the start. There was no strategic breakthrough—no "blitzkrieg", no war of movement. Instead it turned into World War I with tanks".
 * Some of the military historians that make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation are: Steven Newton and Dieter Brand . In The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 (2012), Citino did not use the term "blitzkrieg", instead describing Citadel as an operation in the classical tradition of Bewegungskrieg, (literally: "war of movement", or maneuver warfare), culminating in a Kesselschlacht (literally: "cauldron battle", or battle of encirclement).


 * could you clarify—what appears to be off? K.e.coffman (talk) 23:18, 13 June 2016 (UTC)


 * The first note, which is cited for the part of the sentence that associates the operation with blitzkrieg, talks of Citino's discussion of why the actual operation was no blitzkrieg. Citino's statement, which is dissociating the operation from blitzkrieg, seems to belong in the other note that dissociates the operation from blitzkrieg. EyeTruth (talk) 00:02, 23 June 2016 (UTC)


 * My read on Citino's wording — "The operation misfired from the start. There was no strategic breakthrough—no "blitzkrieg", no war of movement. Instead it turned into World War I with tanks" — was that it was intended as a "blitzkrieg" but failed, hence WWI with tanks. I.e. the operation was planned as a classic "war of movement" but the Soviet response & defensive preparations denied the Wehrmacht the freedom of maneuver that they sought. I included the quote to illustrate that Citino used the word "blitzkrieg" in an informal setting, vs his book (2nd quote) which does not use the term. In the latter case, Citino describes the operation as a "failed bewegungskrieg", essentially the same as the "failed blitzkrieg". Does this help clarify? K.e.coffman (talk) 00:23, 23 June 2016 (UTC)


 * I understand what you're saying, and this is a very minor thing. I'll try to explain better. Like I said earlier, in one of the notes Citino is saying that the actual operation (regardless of intention) did not translate into a blitzkrieg. In the other statement, Citino associates the operation with blitzkrieg on the account of bewegungskrieg, but the problem is that the note that contains this statement is listing historians who didn't associate the operation with blitzkrieg. Citino's statement seems to be placed in the wrong note. EyeTruth (talk) 18:24, 25 June 2016 (UTC)

Ah, that makes sense. Thank you for the clarification. I moved accordingly:


 * Some military historians have described the operation using the term blitzkrieg (lightning war); other military historians do not use the term in their works on the battle.
 * Some military historians consider Operation Citadel as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or state it was intended as such. These historians are: Lloyd Clark, Roger Moorhouse , David Glantz , Jonathan House , Hedley Paul Willmott . In the informal setting of the International Conference on World War II at The National WWII Museum in 2013, Robert M. Citino used the the term to comment on the failure of the operation: "The operation misfired from the start. There was no strategic breakthrough—no "blitzkrieg", no war of movement. Instead it turned into World War I with tanks".( In The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 (2012), Citino did not use the term "blitzkrieg", instead describing Citadel as an attempted operation in the classical tradition of Bewegungskrieg, (literally: "war of movement", or maneuver warfare), culminating in a Kesselschlacht (literally: "cauldron battle", or battle of encirclement).
 * Historians Steven Newton and Dieter Brand  make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation.

This leaves a pretty lopsided note with only Newton and Brand listed under "no blitzkrieg". Oh well. K.e.coffman (talk) 19:03, 25 June 2016 (UTC)

"artillery pieces" vs. "guns and mortars"
There have been at least three reverts from various editors on this point.

The term "artillery pieces" is not generally understood to include mortars. Mortars, at least light and medium ones, are not normally operated by artillery units and do not typically get included in counts of artillery pieces. Thus a count of "guns and mortars" is much more inclusive than a count limited to artillery alone.

The Red Army was unusually dependent on mortars, which are cheap to manufacture, have cheap ammo, but are as deadly as howitzers at short range. Thus if the intent of the edit is to NOT include mortars, the numbers will be misleading. I don't think that's the intent though; I believe that the editor doesn't know that two terms are not synonymous.

Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 16:03, 23 January 2017 (UTC)

Liddell Hart citations
I'm moving this here for storage:


 * Hitler's policy of holding at all costs may have averted a general collapse in the winter of 1941-42, but thereafter it consistently resulted in forces holding ground until their position became cut off, resulting in their inevitable destruction. The 6th Army isolated in the Stalingrad pocket surrendered on 2 February. Hitler's belief in his insights, determination and will as the deciding factor in the conflict resulted in German forces being left tied down in a rigid defence that did not permit them the liberty to move.

This is based on B. H. Liddell Hart's book on German generals; I would not consider it to be RS for this article, given the close cooperation the generals provided for the book. It's also dated and appears to provide unnecessary exposition. Please let me know if there are any concerns. K.e.coffman (talk) 03:56, 19 June 2016 (UTC)

I agree it is hardly an RS. DMorpheus2 (talk) 16:04, 23 January 2017 (UTC)

Mainstein's citation
I am moving this here for storage:
 * Anticipating that the Western Allies would conduct some form of operation in Western Europe, both Manstein and Guderian had argued prior to the battle for forces to be conserved and redeployed as a reserve. Once committed to the operation, it made little sense to pull them out at the climax, especially since they could not reach Italy in time to impact events there. Manstein argued pulling forces out of Army Group South in the midst of the battle, shifting away Luftwaffe support, and transferring his reserve force deprived his Army of its striking power at what he believed was the decisive point of the battle.

Lost Victories is an unreliable source; while Guderian indeed expressed opposition to Citadel at the 4 May conferences, according to Citino and Showalter, Manstein not so much. It's best to keep this out of the article, IMO. Please let me know of any concerns. K.e.coffman (talk) 05:58, 19 June 2016 (UTC)


 * The last sentence is true though. Manstein did make this argument on 13 July. EyeTruth (talk) 03:53, 24 January 2017 (UTC)

Air offensive
I did this add this many years ago, but it seems to have been erased. The Germans began a strategic bombing offensive against industrial plants to disrupt Soviet defensive preparation. Emphasis was placed on tank factories; particularly at Gorkiy with spectacular, albeit brief and rarely acknowledged, results. Any objections? Dapi89 (talk) 17:03, 12 March 2017 (UTC)

Yes. Undue weight and not directly related to the campaign. Also, how could the results be both 'spectacular' and 'brief'? Maybe a good article on its own. DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:11, 12 March 2017 (UTC)

I checked the KG 53 article which cites Bergstrom saying the entire GAZ factory was destroyed. Odd since the USAAF, flying much more capable aircraft, rarely 'completely destroyed' a factory. Since GAZ would have been just getting started making SU-76s at the time, and since the SU-76 was the second most common Soviet AFV of WW2, I am having trouble seeing how this raid was more than a temporary success that hardly could have affected the Kursk campaign. The Red Army made plenty of mistakes but they were not short of tanks at Kursk. Just my thoughts; willing to be corrected. DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:18, 12 March 2017 (UTC)
 * How can be automatically undue weight since only a brief mention was all that I was seeking? Well, easily both actually (I think). Spectacular because 8,000 Soviet tank engines were destroyed or damaged (according to Soviet records). Brief because the air campaign didn't last long. The bombers were diverted to other tasks.
 * It was gutted yes, but Soviet efficiency but it back in action relatively quickly. It succeeded because of very poor Soviet air defences; moreover I've often wondered why people have a sense that medium bombers were not effective in the strategic role. In fact, the air war showed they were.
 * Yes, I' not arguing that it influenced the campaign. I am arguing that there was clear intent to disrupt Soviet preparations. It puts the myth of a short-sighted close air support command to the sword. Dapi89 (talk) 18:16, 12 March 2017 (UTC)


 * A couple thoughts, in no particular order:
 * 1. There's no apparent connection to the Kursk campaign here. An article on German strategic bombing might well be interesting. I for one would have assumed they HAD no strategic bombing effort so I know I'm already interested in learning more, and that is thanks to you.
 * 2. While I would normally consider Christer Bergstrom to be a very reliable source indeed, I am finding it very hard to believe the extent of damage to the GAZ factory at Gorky. Again, if hundreds of B-17s and B-24s have a tough time destroying any German factory (not damage, "destroy") then how did a few medium bombers manage to destroy a Soviet factory? It's not easy to destroy machine tools with HE bombs. Indeed, the Russian history of the GAZ plant during the war says that the same number of engines and tools Bergstrom describes as 'destroyed' were 'destroyed or damaged' and, probably more importantly, that in Q4 1943, production was at 121% of target. That indicates damage could not have been severe.
 * 3. GAZ made standard 4-cylinder truck engines that were paired up to make light tank and SU-76 engines. It is a little misleading to call them 'tank engines'. These weren't big, expensive 500-hp diesels.
 * 4. If you are not even arguing it affected the campaign, then why mention it here at all? Again it sounds really interest for a Luftwaffe-related article. Not here.
 * Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 21:26, 12 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Regarding your doubts of Bergstrom's assertion, I have a few words to chip in. When historians start contradicting each other or make very problematic claims, you will almost ALWAYS find the problem in their sources and/or their methodology of interpreting their sources. Bergstrom could simply be repeating what the Luffwaffe had reported/documented about the air raids. EyeTruth (talk) 00:32, 13 March 2017 (UTC)

GAZ also built trucks and armored cars. Some info: (more background), ru:Бомбардировка Горького more details and inflicted damage. Some workshops/assembly halls were destroyed either by direct hits or resulting major fires but not the whole factory complex.--Denniss (talk)


 * It's inconceivable that anyone in the Luftwaffe knew how many GAZ engines had been damaged or destroyed. There was no significant armored car production during WW2....a small number of BA-64...very insignificant. Bottom line, there is too much doubt about the facts and too little significance to include in the Kursk article. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 01:07, 13 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Air raid reports do include such stats, and they ultimately get passed down as history, but that's not necessarily good history. The German bombing campaign that was aimed to disrupt Soviet preparations has all the reasons to belong in this article. EyeTruth (talk) 02:38, 13 March 2017 (UTC)
 * I don't really think that this is really relevant to the battle. IIRC, the attack was pretty devastating, although its real effect was to force/cause the Soviets to terminate manufacture of the T-70 in favor of the SU-76.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 02:48, 13 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Well, it actually comes from Soviet sources as I remember. I will check later on.
 * I can't understand why editors don't think it was related to the battle, when it was clearly designed to disrupt Soviet preparations. Seven or eight of the KG were put into this operation - that was an enormous effort at this stage. And not even a single sentence to say that the Germans were at least trying to offset their opponent's material superiority?
 * I think this reflects the literature of the Eastern Front in general, which tends to dismiss the air war as a side show. Dapi89 (talk) 11:01, 13 March 2017 (UTC)


 * Fair enough, but let's not make the opposite mistake, overcompensating by losing sight of the fact that Kursk was a ground campaign. I am still opposed to this content *in this article*; as a separate article I'm all for it. DMorpheus2 (talk) 11:33, 13 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Not even a line to say there was an air effort prior to Citadel to improve the chances of success? I agree the article shouldn't be skewed to the 'strategic air' side, but it seems like this shuts it out altogether. Dapi89 (talk) 16:59, 13 March 2017 (UTC)

A sentence talking about Luftwaffe efforts to shape the battlefield prior to the battle wouldn't be out of order. IIRC, that was mostly attacking railyards, but I don't have either of Christer's books on the '43 air war to confirm that, nor to link them to the Gorkii attack.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 18:11, 13 March 2017 (UTC)


 * Sure. Operations in direct support of the campaign are a different set of content. DMorpheus2 (talk) 18:15, 13 March 2017 (UTC)
 * The German principle of air warfare was (or is, it hasn't fundamentally changed) based on Operativer Luftkrieg (Operational Air War). Air superiority, interdiction and strategic bombing were certainly at the forefront. Close air support surpassed the aforementioned only when a decisive point had been reached in the land battle. Sturmvogel's observations are correct. The repeated delays allowed German air planners to plan a much larger operation. Greim c-in-c of Luftwaffenkommando Ost, proposed an air offensive against industry to weaken Soviet defensive preparations, that were obvious and apparent to the German command. On 11 May his command was renamed Luftflotte 6, and nearly, aside from two Gruppen, the entire bomber force (KG 1, 3, 4, 27, 51, 53, 55, 100) was put into it with the agreement of the OKL. Around 681 bombers took part. Had Kursk not taken place, the command intended to take advantage of a static front to put all it's energies into degrading Soviet production in a general effort to ease the pressure on the army (and itself). Also a good deal in Richard R. Muller's The German Air War in Russia about this, all intended to aid land operations in Russia. Dapi89 (talk) 20:09, 13 March 2017 (UTC)
 * The key thing, to my mind, is if the aerial operations were tasked specifically in support of Zitadelle or just generic strategic bombing missions against factories, etc.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 21:43, 13 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Just a quick comment: the German OH (Boog & Co) write about this too. Like Bergstrom, they suggest this was also to support Citadel. Greim won support from Jeschonnek and even the CAS expert Richthofen for expanding bomber operations to industry, rather then just interdiction: it is clear enough this was to support Citadel. I can give you some exact wording later, I am pressed for time now. Dapi89 (talk) 12:58, 14 March 2017 (UTC)
 * German air attacks against industry and railroads in Russia, 1941-1945 by Oleg Hoeffding argues that the German army specifically requested the attacks for Citadel. In fact, Muller rightly points out that this type of request predated Citadel (indeed, when one looks at Operation Paula). But there was an underlying desire to begin strategic bombing operations as a way of freeing the Luftwaffe from acting as the army's fire brigade. Also, it was felt that if Kursk was abandoned it was a way to make the most effective contribution to the war in the east. Close air support, commensurate with doctrine, was only to be made in emergencies. Dapi89 (talk) 16:52, 14 March 2017 (UTC)
 * I think this will be a good addition to the article. EyeTruth (talk) 00:48, 15 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Yes, but Hoeffding explicitly decouples the Gorkii attacks from preparations for Zitadelle on pages 26–27. Unlike the attack on the railyard at Kursk on 2 June.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 02:38, 15 March 2017 (UTC)
 * I don't see that he does. In fact, if he makes a judgement about the purpose of the offensive at all, he says "none too clear". Dapi89 (talk) 07:32, 15 March 2017 (UTC)


 * Army asks for attacks on Soviet tank production in early 1943. LW forms Fliegerkorps IV in response. "It seems, however, that the Army, unwisely, had also asked for other services in preparation of its offensives."
 * Conducts leaflet drop, then raid on Kursk on 2 June.
 * Not having anything else to planned to do with the offensive, it attacks Gorkii, Yaroslavl and Saratov between June 4 and 21.
 * Only conducts token attacks between 22 June and 5 July, although the targets aren't given.
 * The initial request to reduce tank production is entirely separate from any offensives as Hoeffding says in the bolded sentence. Seems pretty clear to me.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 12:46, 15 March 2017 (UTC)


 * I think you've drawn the wrong conclusion. That quotation shows only a dispersion of effort to other things besides the tank production offensive, note the word "also" - suggestive of multiple target sets. It does not exclude tank production. In any case, he has already explained (like Muller) that this type of operation (tank factories) was to be in support of any impeding land operations, curtly put. Bergstrom suggests that it was to disrupt preparations for Citadel. Dapi89 (talk) 13:05, 15 March 2017 (UTC)
 * I agree, two separate and unrelated target sets. Strategic attacks against the tank industry and operational/tactical attacks on the Soviets in the Kursk Bulge. I agree that the first set will have a trickle-down effect on the forces in the field, including those in the Kursk Bulge, but that's about it. Based on Hoeffding, I think that Bergstrom is over-reaching his evidence unless he's referencing something that I haven't seen before.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 14:11, 15 March 2017 (UTC)


 * Two separate sets of targets bombed for the same reason. Thats the crux of the issue. The army made specific requests for tank production and railways to be targeted. The Luftwaffe operated within that framework. Muller interprets Hoefdding's work to mean the tank production attacks were in support of Citadel. Dapi89 (talk)
 * Yes, tank production before detailed planning even began for Zitadelle, and railways after that planning had begun.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 16:31, 15 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Correct, no doubt about that. The fact remains that tank production was attacked, and heavily so during planning, and critically, just before the offensive began. Why? Because the army asked it to. Dapi89 (talk) 17:30, 15 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Yes, but the Army asked months before the offensive began, so there's no direct causal relationship between the strategic bombing attacks and Zitadelle. Unlike the railyard and leaflet missions that were specifically linked to Zitadelle.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 18:17, 15 March 2017 (UTC)
 * The Heer requested the Luftwaffe conduct strategic attacks against Soviet tank production in order to prepare for Zitadelle. There clearly exists expert opinion that says there is. Dapi89 (talk) 20:41, 15 March 2017 (UTC)

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Break up
Two or three decades ago (even up to a decade ago), it would've been totally valid to equate this battle to only Operation Citadel—which this article tacitly does—as that was the popular view in the West. But that's no longer the case, especially in newer treatments of the battle, which tend to incorporate the various major perspectives. and, this is a followup to the brief discussion we had at Talk:Battle of Prokhorovka. I intend to implement this breakup soon if no objections. EyeTruth (talk) 02:46, 29 July 2017 (UTC)
 * Could you elaborate on what would go where? Perhaps in a couple of sentences? K.e.coffman (talk) 03:10, 29 July 2017 (UTC)
 * Everything from preliminary actions till soviet counteroffensives gets moved to new article and then replaced with much shorter summary. The lede and the casualty section will also be reworked. Will see what else can be touched after at least these changes. EyeTruth (talk) 04:04, 29 July 2017 (UTC)

Update. I've started the breakup. So far, I've copied content from here to Citadel (copied everything from preliminary actions till soviet counteroffensives), but nothing has been deleted here yet. I've also edited the lede to reflect the correct structure of the battle. EyeTruth (talk) 23:57, 11 August 2017 (UTC)

Result: Soviet victory
Per recent changes at Template:Infobox battle, any results other than "X victory" or "Inconclusive" are deprecated (my emphasis):

result – optional – this parameter may use one of two standard terms: "X victory" or "Inconclusive". The term used is for the "immediate" outcome of the "subject" conflict and should reflect what the sources say. In cases where the standard terms do not accurately describe the outcome, a link or note should be made to the section of the article where the result is discussed in detail (such as "See the Aftermath section"). Such a note can also be used in conjunction with the standard terms but should not be used to conceal an ambiguity in the "immediate" result. Do not introduce non-standard terms like "decisive", "marginal" or "tactical", or contradictory statements like "decisive tactical victory but strategic defeat". Omit this parameter altogether rather than engage in speculation about which side won or by how much.

Baring further comments, I'll change the results to "Soviet victory" to be in line with this. --A&#8239;D&#8239;Monroe&#8239;III(talk) 17:14, 15 December 2017 (UTC)
 * Done. --A&#8239;D&#8239;Monroe&#8239;III(talk)  16:11, 21 December 2017 (UTC)

Date
Since the article is not about "Operation Citadel", but about the Battle of Kursk, the infobox looks misleading. It says:

which implies we are talking about two different battles. In reality, the Soviet plan from the very beginning was to wait until German attack, to stop their offensive, and, after that, to start their own offensive. In other words, German offensive was a part of a Soviet plans, because they did anticipate it and it was a significant part of their plans. In connection to that, the infobox should be changed as
 * 5 July 1943 – 16 July 1943 (German offensive: 1 week and 4 days)
 * 12 July 1943 – 23 August 1943 (Soviet offensive: 1 month, 1 week and 4 days)

Date

5 July 1943 –23 August 1943
 * 5 July 1943 – 16 July 1943 (German offensive)
 * 12 July 1943 – 23 August 1943 (Soviet offensive)

It was a single big battle, not two different battles. I think it is important to say, because some readers tend to equate the battle of Kursk with the operation Citadel (a German phase), whereas the Soviet counteroffensive phase is considered an aftermath.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:15, 30 August 2018 (UTC)


 * Agree. Thanks for this. I kind of started this a while back, but I have since gotten too busy to give it the time and effort it requires. I started by splitting Operation Citadel into its own article (but there is still so much cleanup to be done), and the Soviet counteroffensives already had their own articles. I'll join you in any way I can whenever I get the opportunity. EyeTruth (talk) 08:50, 2 September 2018 (UTC)

How to read Heeresarzt data
I tried to verify the numbers in the claim "Approximately 52,000 killed or missing and 134,000 wounded". The given source is Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Army/Army Group, 1943. (I'll assume the numbers on that page are correctly copied from the original sources.)

My question is: How do we get the numbers 52,000 (or 50,000, as the article said until a few days ago) and 134,000 from these tables?

If I understand correctly, only Army Group South and Army Group Center were involved in the Battle of Kursk. I copied the data for KIA, WIA, MIA for Army Group South and Army Group Center for July and August 1943 to a Google Sheet and calculated a few sums. Even the lowest sums (11 July until 20 August) are much higher than the numbers given in the article (63,000 instead of 52,000 killed or missing, 163,000 instead of 134,000 wounded).

The Battle of Kursk lasted from 5 July 1943 until 23 August 1943. Since the source data is only given in 10-day periods, we cannot calculate sums that are precise to the day. And the data doesn't specify in which battle the casualties occurred, so we cannot calculate sums that only include the Battle of Kursk and exclude other battles etc. Army Group South and Army Group Center were probably also involved in other confrontations, so it may be wrong to use their total casualties as numbers for the Battle of Kursk. I don't know.

I'm not saying that the numbers currently given in the article are wrong, only that we cannot deduce them from the given source without a lot of original research. I think we need a better source. Chrisahn (talk) 12:18, 2 September 2018 (UTC)
 * you right. May be someone was wrong when his countingUtakem8 (talk) 12:27, 2 September 2018 (UTC)


 * Maybe, but please read No original research and don't add any numbers I calculated to the article. Chrisahn (talk) 12:45, 2 September 2018 (UTC)


 * You need to have the OOB for the timeframe on hand, not all units listed under AGS may have been involved there + some listed as AGA were in Kursk. --Denniss (talk) 15:32, 2 September 2018 (UTC)

Zetterling and Frankson, in their "Kursk 1943, a statistical analysis" give german losses, derived from the ten-day reports, as ~203 000 (p.116). They added losses of Army Detachment Kempf, 4th Panzer Army, 2nd Army, 9th Army and 2nd Panzer from 1 July to 20 Aug and added 1/2 of losses from Aug 20-31. Imho, the reports are not always accurate in terms of when the losses are reported (most notorious example being Bagration losses mostly reported in Sept). My personal counts gave me rather similar numbers, a little over 210 000 with 60 000 dead and missing and 150 000 wounded. Perhaps, the best solution would be just to quote Zetterling and Frankson, as the German losses in the operation appear to be slightly over 200 000 Mudriy zmei (talk) 16:50, 2 September 2018 (UTC) PS. Chrisahn, I suspect your numbers were larger because you simply added Armee Gruppe Sud and Armee Gruppe Mitte losses, while some of the armies of those army groups (namely, 6 Army, 1 Panzer Army, 4 Army and 3 Panzer Army) did not participate in Kursk. Mudriy zmei (talk) 16:57, 2 September 2018 (UTC)