Talk:Battle of Savo Island

article useless
full of editorial, too much verbiage, needs condensed to tell story in this day an age animation should be used  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.130.142.29 (talk) 01:11, 18 October 2023 (UTC)

Not a Decisive Japanese Victory
While certainly a victory for the japanese, it failed in its objective to stop the landings on Tulagi and the transports remained untouched. At best, it delayed Allied victory on Tulagi by a couple of months. The loss ratio was definitely on the side of the Japanese, but to be decisive, a battle needs to affect the course of a war. In the grand scheme of things, the Battle of Salvo Island had no impact on the outcome of Pacific Campaign. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 12.175.119.20 (talk • contribs) 08:21, 5 July 2007 (UTC)

It was a huge missed opportunity from the Japanese point of view. After winning decisively against the Allied naval forces, Mikawa should have stayed to destroy the undefended transports that he knew were there. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 65.216.151.125 (talk) 15:16, 19 March 2018 (UTC)

Mikawa was afraid that American carrier-based aircrafts might attack his fleet. He didn't know that the US carriers had already pulled out. ShauryaOMG (talk) 09:45, 9 March 2021 (UTC)

Friendly Fire Theory on the Canberra
At 14:32, 5 April 2006, 136.1.1.101 changed the article to say:


 * Canberra sped up and turned to avoid enemy torpedoes, then to try to bring her guns to bear. Beginning at 01:44, as the ship's gunners were attempting to aim, she took a torpedo, probably fired by the US destroyer Bagley

As it lacked any supporting source citations, I reverted this claim of friendly fire. In reviewing the "official" account of the battle, I cannot find any confirmation that Bagley torpedoed Canberra. While there are allegations making this claim, others dispute any friendly fire. While it is technically possible that Canberra was struck by a friendly torpedo, I do not feel we can honestly say that she was probably struck by Bagley. Doing otherwise strikes me as being a poster child for what wikipedia is not. --Kralizec! (talk) 21:38, 5 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Loxton's book presents compelling evidence that Bagley torpedoed Canberra. I'm going to include that in the article, but also provide the alternate theory on what might have caused the damage to the Canberra's starboard side, and I won't use the word probably. Cla68 23:06, 10 August 2006 (UTC)

There Was No Chance of a Dawn Airstike by Allies Due to Early Withdrawal of Carriers
"Mikawa ordered a return to Rabaul instead of attacking the now defenseless Allied transports. He may have also been apprehensive of Allied air attacks once dawn broke, which would have found his ships scattered in the vicinity of Guadalcanal if he had gone after the transports."

The Japanese did not know this, but they had no need to fear US Airstikes in the morning -- Admiral Fletcher had, over the objections of the officers in charge of the Guadalcanal invasion, withdrawn his carrier task force on August 8 at 1810, 12 hours ahead of schedule. This was a major factor in the decision to withdraw the transports prematurely.


 * I'll be discussing this in the article. Cla68 23:07, 10 August 2006 (UTC)

Mikawa had every reason to fear a carrier air strike on his cruiser force. His command assumed a carrier counter strike, and his withdrawal to the northwest would merely reduce its probability of success. His information came from his cruiser scout planes, which had not spotted the carriers but their presence was inferred from their actions and the heavy losses incurred by the Japanese air strike force on Aug. 8. His staff had no report from the Japanese army, and delayed information from the Japanese air force. As his command assessed their victory at 0030 hours Aug 9, they calculated that it would take until 0300 to reform and attack the transport force off the north shore of Guadalcanal. With daybreak at 0400, they would expect a carrier strike shortly thereafter. From Captain Ohmae, Mikawa's chief staff officer, Naval Institute Proceedings, Dec. 1957. (https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2017/august/leading-charge-savo-island) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Xperrymint (talk • contribs) 12:22, 6 March 2019 (UTC)

Caption or map incorrect?
The caption on the picture of the Quincy states "Quincy, in a view from either Furutaka, Yubari, or Tenryu". I believe this may be in error. When I compare it to the IJN map, there seems to be a number of problems. For one, the Yubari does not even appear on the map as being attached to any part of the attack, although the article text does mention it. But more interesting, given the angle of the bow compared to the ship taking the picture, it would appear the image would have to come from one of the ships in Crudiv 18, which the map claims is the Tatsuta and Tenryu. The Furutaka would have been on the other side (right) of the Quincy, if the map is correct.

Can someone shed some light on this?

Maury 23:34, 14 August 2006 (UTC)


 * The map is incorrect. The Tatsuta should be Yubari.  Also, the map doesn't show (and the text doesn't yet say) that Furutaka experienced a problem, perhaps with steering, that caused her to switch from the CruDiv 6 column to the more westward column with CruDiv 18.  Richard B. Frank is the source for the photo caption and I believe he bases his assumption on where the picture is taken from due to that fact that the photo shows Quincy from the port side and Furutaka, Yubari, and Tenryu were on that side of Quincy during the battle.  I'll eventually correct the map once I'm back at a computer with image alterating capability software. Cla68 01:24, 15 August 2006 (UTC)


 * Excellent, thanks! Maury 11:53, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

Fletcher's withdrawal
"216.203.96.42", although your change to the text is cited, it has some problems. Almost every one of the other sources listed in the reference section, including Morison's, Frank's, Hammel's, and Loxton's books state that Fletcher didn't withdraw his carrier "as planned," but, in fact, unilaterally decided to withdraw 24-hours earlier than what he had previously told Turner was his projected withdrawal time. The "demoralized" statement comes directly from the source cited, who cites an original source for the statement. I'm going to put Lundstrom's opinion in the footnote, so it won't be deleted. It's just that the preponderance of historians reporting on the event tell it different than Lundstrom. Cla68 04:30, 20 October 2006 (UTC)

Effects of Mikawa's withdrawal
It seems to be historical revisionism for me to alway emphasize that the "The Japanese owned hard, but missed the golden opportunity for the win." Those "missed" transports were withdrawn the next day, without unloading heavy equipment and supplies. The US had plenty of transport ships and supplies, so not destroying them didnt "lose the battle" as they would have been easily replaced. The story could be written as: ''{The "foolish" Americans withdrew the transports while they were in no real danger. (If not counting Betty bombers with torpedoes from nearby air bases. :) ) Thus, they left the Marine division "stranded" on Guadalcanal.}'' The real cause of this defeat is the japanese pilot training system, which was too "elitist", so they had too few "elite" pilots, which were flying with fragile aircraft. So, after the battle of Santa Cruz, the Japans had carriers, but didnt have the naval pilots to fly the aircrafts. There were still a few months for carrier battles, before the Essex-class carriers would have arrived. (Of course, the Pacific War was eventually decided by economical superiority, not battles... ) —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 62.201.95.137 (talk) 21:07, 6 January 2007 (UTC).
 * Actually, at that time, the U.S. didn't have "plenty of transport ships and supplies," at least, not in the Pacific area. Because of the "Germany first" agreement with the UK, most of the U.S. war materiel, troops, and their transportation were in the Atlantic area, not the Pacific.  Thus, if Mikawa had destroyed the Allied transport ships off Guadalcanal and Tulagi on August 8, the U.S. probably would have had to withdraw its forces from Guadalcanal and wait until more forces and transport ships came available, which probably would have been awhile, perhaps as long as a year.  That would have given Japan time to try to finish its conquest of eastern New Guinea (not necessarily assured, since the Australian and U.S. forces under MacArthur had something to say about that) and establish larger, more mutually supportive bases in the Solomons and perhaps even attack the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Samoa, and Tonga to deny them as forward operating bases for the Allies and cutting the support lines between the U.S. and Australia.  The Allied landings at Guadalcanal occurred at a crucial juncture in the war in the South Pacific and Japan's failure to respond effectively, including in the Savo Island battle, is what allowed Guadalcanal to become the "turning point," strategic victory for the Allies that it became. Cla68 00:15, 7 January 2007 (UTC)

What info needs to be restored?
"Cla68 (Talk | contribs) (52,634 bytes) (reverted good faith edits. Some information which was felt to be important by the FA review was deleted.)"

OK, what was the information deleted?

I will happily incorporate it in my revision. I have no interest in altering the effective content of this article, only in improving the mediocre quality of the writing.

I do feel that information should be omitted that is not relevant to the topic of the article - even if it is part of a related topic. For example,

as an airfield (later called Henderson Field by the Allies) under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal

What the Allies called the airfield later is irrelevant to the Battle of Savo Island.

That fact belongs in the article about the Guadalcanal campaign.

I believe in tight focus for an article where possible. When the same subject is covered in several different articles, it becomes much more difficult to ensure that all material is correct, and avoid contradictions. Thus an article on a particular topic should avoid discursions on other topics.

Also, information should appear once in an article, summaries should be brief, and fustian generalities omitted. Links should have a point: why linkify the word "threat"? But all terms that might be unfamiliar should be linked.

--Rich Rostrom (Talk) 19:57, 1 May 2007 (UTC)


 * Sorry about that. I was too drastic in my revision.  I'll revert it back to the version you edited and then re-add the few sentences that I think still belong.  I was wrong to wholesale revert all of the value-added edits you did to the article. Cla68 23:08, 1 May 2007 (UTC)


 * No big deal. I hadn't even noticed this was a "Featured Article." For all my strong opinions, I'm still new at this. --Rich Rostrom (Talk) 06:35, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

The battle was a draw
According to the article, the Japanese failed in their mission and the US succeeded in their's. One could argue that the US won. Yet, the Japanese did sink a lot of valuable US ships and hamper the landings. At best, it was a draw.
 * You mis-understand, it is perhaps ambiguous as to what it's referring to, the battle, this particular contact, was clearly a Japanese victory. However, the Allied pacific campaign wasn't halted only delayed. In a smaller scale you could say the Japanese won the battle and lost the war ( the war being the Pacific campaign). Wolfmankurd 17:37, 5 July 2007 (UTC)
 * How can you say it was clearly a Japanese victory when they failed to achieve their objective? Their objective was to prevent the landing. For the most part, the landing succeeded and it was the landing that was important in the grand scheme of things - not the ships that were lost. Warships serve no purpose other than to fight. They are simple tools used to achive a purpose. The US achieved it purpose. The Japanese did not. I would say the Japanese clutched defeat from the hands of victory.--216.168.95.142 22:01, 5 July 2007 (UTC)
 * In a large part because of the destruction of the four Allied cruisers, Turner was forced to withdraw the transports even though much of the crucial provisions and ammunition was yet to be unloaded.  Also, the Japanese victory kept Allied naval forces from establishing much of a surface warship presence around Guadalcanal until November, 1942.  If Japan had been more aggressive to take advantage of the lack of a U.S. naval presence around Guadalcanal, the campaign might have gone differently.  For some reason, the Japanese continued to underestimate the numbers of Allied ground forces on the island and the importance of the Allied offensive.  In spite of being a flawed victory, Savo Island provided the Japanese with opportunities that they failed to take advantage of. Cla68 09:33, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

"Eastern Group"
"An "eastern" group consisting of two U.S. cruisers and two U.S. destroyers guarded the eastern entrances to the sound between Florida and Guadalcanal Islands.[26]"

The ships were USS San Juan (16x5") and HMAS Hobart (8x6"). Morrison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in WW.II V.P.33

I suggest the wording be changed to name the ships explicitly, or refer to them as "two Allied cruisers and two U.S. destroyers...."

67.163.7.98 05:39, 9 July 2007 (UTC)
 * Good catch. I'll change the text to be more accurate. Cla68 09:37, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

BRAVO ZULU 67.163.7.98

Japanese response?
Morrison is quite clear that the initial deployment of transports carrying Japanese troops was recalled because the largest one was sunk by an American submarine (one of the few things the USN did right in this battle)not because, as this article states 'there were too many Americans on the island." Odds seldom deterred Japanese commanders. As to over all interpretation, who can rationally dispute that the battle itself (not the entire campaign) was a very brillant Japanese victory-one that shook the USN to rapid improvement.
 * I'll check the references again on that one. Cla68 (talk) 23:37, 22 October 2009 (UTC)
 * Frank and Loxton are very clear that the two transports carrying naval troops were recalled after Mikawa learned that the Allied forces were present in greater strenght than initially reported. I amended the sentence somewhat and added the two citations.  The transport was sunk by the US submarine after it had turned around to go back to Rabaul.  The battle itself was a brilliant victory for the Japanese, except for the fact that Mikawa apparently didn't realize that the most important Allied ships off Guadalcanal weren't the warships, but the cargo ships. Cla68 (talk) 08:42, 24 October 2009 (UTC)

Casualties typo
Allied losses: 4 heavy cruisers and 1 heavy cruiser. Is the second entry meant to be 1 light cruiser or 1 heavy cruiser damaged? --AnAbsolutelyOriginalUsername42 (talk) 11:16, 26 January 2010 (UTC) Allied losses should be 4 heavy cruisers, not 3 heavy cruisers, although HMAS Canberra was scuttled many hours after the attack. Plus 1 heavy cruiser (USS Chicago) damaged by 1 torpedo and 1 shell. Wiki article same subject, book Savo: The Incredible Naval Debacle off Guadalcanal, Richard F. Newcomb, 1961. Xperrymint (talk) 11:37, 6 March 2019 (UTC)Xperrymint (talk) 16:41, 27 March 2019 (UTC)

Great Britain
needs to added to the Belligerents.

24.239.23.167 (talk) 22:23, 11 July 2012 (UTC)I am having trouble with my eyes and though I am registered I'm just not up to digging out the stuff.

Please forgive my impertinence. I Am Walter Still Gee 3rd, brotherwalt1@live.com pen name Scuffy Blacksod.

There appear to be a number of items, that at least in my mind, should be at least minimally noted. Please forgive me forwarding to you an unprintable talk. After its submission I fully expect it to be dismissed for being impolite.

1. All of the US naval vessels fitted with radar were withdrawn leaving the remaining forces blind. I do not have the resources to identify precise vessels, but I seem to recall Fletcher rightly demanding that he needed them to screen his carriers. I believe that the new radar picket ships were new American DD destroyers. Perhaps someone can correct me if that is wrong. In other words, the Canberra, Vincennes, Astoria, squadron was effectively blind. They deployed in a manner they sincerely hoped could keep the Marines from being annihilated. Had they been, as disgustingly suggested, lolling in the sun, they would not have been north of the invasion but south in the safety of deep water and manoeuvring room.

2. Having personally known and loved two individuals who were combatants, it is to the best of my recollection that there was absolutely no "Strategic Surprise" at all. Both told me that it was general scuttlebutt that the Japanese on the 'Canal had contacted Rabaul regarding the withdrawal of Fletcher's carriers as soon as the aircraft attacks ceased before nightfall. Admiral Mikawa achieved a notableTactical surprise but definitely not aStrategic Surprise. Mikawa had all the cards and the squadron was bluffing and he knew it.

3. It should also be noted, in my opinion, that Japan's intentions were well known by early 1941. Assignment of blame to any Pacific commander from 9/41 to 8/42 is at best a game frought with doubt. Much, if not all blame, belonged in Washington D.C. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were both early 20th Century brave warrior school commanders, but like McCain, Fletcher, et al, each had serious command order conflicts due to previous uncountermanded standing orders from Washington that in some cases actually countermanded the newer necessitous unachieved orders and caused chaos for months. Everyone was countermanding everyone else's orders. King was responsible in large part for the situation. Firing Betty was a catastrophic blow. To put a point on what I just wrote, Kimmel, Short and others took the fall for the gross ineptitude, bureaucratic muddle, and conflicting orders they were trying to carry out. Catch-22 if you will. The CNO change was anything but helpful. Hiring King who had serious issues with virtually all of the Pacific commanders was never effectively dealt with. That is why Nimitz got the job nobody else wanted. In many cases, these hereincontained thinly veiled indictments of decent men merely trying to follow conflicting, confusing, delayed, and presumptive orders is abomininable. The perpetrators of mass confusion come out smelling like sweet roses. If you are going to point fingers the first should be Rear Admirable Ernest J. King. If indeed any blame at all can be laid at the feet of anyone at all it should be noted that as with 9/11/01; everyone who could have made a difference could not because they were deprived of the necessitous facts and cooperation needed by them and others in order for anyone to have formulated a plan for any sort of an orderly response.

4. In closing, let me say that this article takes no note whatever of flesh and blood and honest mistakes. I have studied the Pacific War as few others have. I learned from men who were there. I worked at the "Iron Works" with many of them. And this argument presented as factual and unbiased does not meet the criteria. The authors inadvertently overlooked the fact they were discussing fallible human beings who willingly went in harm's way. One of them was my cousin and another my mentor. May I also note to wikipedidia that the tenor of this article is personally offensive and unpleasant to me. From my view, armchair admirals and butt covering revisionist theoreticians with an agenda should not write in this manner. And that includes me.24.239.23.167 (talk) 22:23, 11 July 2012 (UTC)

Objection to unsupported commentary and details in "Notes"
There are several detailed comments in the "Notes" section which cite no sources. These should be supported, removed, or incorporated into the main text. In their present form as uncited "asides", they add no value and are non-encyclopedic.Rep07 (talk) 06:40, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

Notes 2, 3, and 14 have been cite-challenged since August. They will be removed shortly if not supported.Rep07 (talk) 21:04, 10 November 2013 (UTC)


 * The notes are from the sources within the same citation. Cla68 (talk) 09:07, 1 January 2015 (UTC)

Prelude and Aftermath
I would like to bring it to the attention of editors of this article that some facts need to addressed in light of this information http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-27/raaf-veteran-wins-fight-to-clear-crews-name/5844958 specifically the acknowledgement of the error in official records that has now been corrected 72 years later. Gnangarra 14:58, 27 October 2014 (UTC)
 * The information has been duly addedThe Dart (talk) 16:32, 29 October 2014 (UTC)

Spelling
Is this article in American or British spelling? Kilometer is spelled both British and American ways? I don't want to change anything significantly due to this being a featured article. Llammakey (talk) 20:53, 3 April 2021 (UTC)

Unreviewed featured articles commentary
I've just run through this article for the Unreviewed featured articles/2020 project. The article remains at FA standard, but two sentences in the 'prelude' section aren't covered by references at present. The material looks OK though, and I'd be guessing that this resulted from someone moving material around or similar. I'll try to chase this up with my references on the battle if no-one beats me to it. Nick-D (talk) 10:30, 6 April 2021 (UTC)
 * The books are lacking page numbers, and some have been inserted using the rp template, resulting in an inconsistent citation style. Sandy Georgia  (Talk)  17:39, 6 April 2021 (UTC)
 * Yeah, it looks like someone set them up as the (irritating IMO) style where the page numbers are noted as part of the in-text cite at some stage after this nomination passed (as I don't think this formatting was a thing back in the day...). WP:V is met at least, but it's untidy. Nick-D (talk) 09:58, 7 April 2021 (UTC)
 * If possible, I'd suggest also reducing the lead to four paragraphs, also, to comply with WP:LEAD. Citation 32 "Hackett, CombinedFleet.com" could also be improved to identify the exact web page. I haven't yet been able to work it out, sorry. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 07:53, 8 April 2021 (UTC)
 * I've tagged some additional issues as well, mostly unsourced notes. CombinedFleet should not be used in a Featured Article. -Indy beetle (talk) 22:43, 10 March 2022 (UTC)
 * HyperWar also isn't good for FA. This one needs some TLC. Hog Farm Talk 22:49, 13 November 2022 (UTC)
 * That citing "The battle has often been cited as the worst defeat in the history of the United States Navy" in the lead needs attention. Sandy Georgia (Talk)  12:22, 18 January 2023 (UTC)
 * I removed that: it was added post-FAC, and the next sentence covers it. However, stuff has been chunked in to the lead post-FAC that is not in the body; the entire lead needs examination. Sandy Georgia  (Talk)  12:28, 18 January 2023 (UTC)

Still has citation inconsistencies and citation needed tags. Sandy Georgia (Talk)  12:17, 18 January 2023 (UTC)

Some additional sourcing work as well. ""ABC Television (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) 7:30 Report 27 October 2014"" is not a great citation - we'd be better off citing what this is backing to an actual scholarly source, rather than just to an evening news report, and the citation is pretty vague, too. I've got rather limited time and sources (just Morison and a recent work by James D. Hornfischer). FWIW, Morison was recently challenged at Featured article candidates/USS Johnston (DD-557)/archive1. Hog Farm Talk 03:37, 19 January 2023 (UTC)
 * I've also flagged " Shanks, Sandy. "The Bode Testament: Author's Interview". Microworks. Archived from the original on May 17, 2008. Retrieved August 10, 2006.." as non-RS - it's an interview with an author who published the book being discussed via a self-publishing service. Hog Farm Talk 03:43, 19 January 2023 (UTC)
 * - I'm starting to wonder if this is better off making an organized push and sending this through an organized "improvement FAR" to get this cleaned up and saved, like has happened with Featured article review/J. K. Rowling/archive1, Featured article review/Climate change/archive1, and is occurring with Featured article candidates/Minneapolis, Minnesota and Featured article review/Andrew Jackson/archive1. This has degraded somewhat over time, standards have risen excluding sources like combinedfleet and others, and with heavy editing over a number of years and the original FAC nominator no longer present, I'm a bit worried about damage to source-text integrity. I've got hard copies of three high-quality sources covering this in good detail - Hornsfischer's work on Guadalcanal, Frank's massive work, and Vincent O'Hara's "The U.S. Navy Against the Axis: Surface Combat" all of which I have read. I'm very willing to help tackle this, but my time available for Wikipedia is likely to fluctuate wildly due to work demands and I don't think I can take this on all by myself (or that the three sources I have will be entirely sufficient for this project). Hog Farm Talk 05:32, 17 December 2023 (UTC)