Talk:Battle of Wanat

Source for the outcome
The discussion about whether this was a tactical defeat/ victory, strategic defeat/ victory or indecisive appears to be all about personal opinion. It doesn't appear that there is any independent, authoritative source which makes the statement one way or the other. In the absence of any source should the statement be removed completely?

I'm sure everyone is familiar with the needs of verifiability, and it appears that the outcome as statement doesn't meet that at present.

ALR (talk) 09:11, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

talk:Top Gun|Top Gun]])


 * Where is your source for an assessment of the military effect, in the context of the local operational environment, potential canalisation effect of the platoon house and the resulting freedom from canalisation risk which any withdrawal brings into play. What indicators and warnings could the location have allowed, and what's the depletion of I&W capability for the NATO force commander.  Where is this discussed in an authoritative manner, which could be used to source the statement about the outcome.
 * Loss of life at the platoon level is largely incidental to the military effect, unless it was a platoon with very specific capability and the depletion of forces in theatre is significant. It doesn't appear form the commentary that this was a particularly esoteric capability, so the loss of life isn't particularly significant (militarily).
 * ALR (talk) 10:47, 21 July 2008 (UTC)
 * I agree that we need a authoritative source for the outcome. As a matter of fact, I was just about to suggest the same thing.Lawrencema (talk) 10:50, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

Let's simply cut this "strategic taliban victory" description, it seems to be unproper to describe it here, as this is rather small engagement with with no significant impact on a strategic situtation. Additionaly in my opinion suggesting that this batle is "strategic taliban victory" seems simply as pro-taliban propaganda and I think this violates NPOV. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Amakthea computer (talk • contribs) 14:25, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

And putting a "NATO tactical victory" wouldn't be pro-NATO propaganda?(Top Gun)

Not if it was a NATO tactical victory. And again, militarily, there is no strategic victory here to either side. AND it's not NPOV to say one side won half and the other side won the other half. If anything, the tactical indecisiveness of this engagement is, as thefeargod gleefully points out, "an enormous propaganda victory for the taliban", as clearly, the NATO forces did not "win" this engagement.Cillmore (talk) 19:01, 1 August 2008 (UTC)


 * The same principle applies, without some independent, authoritative, assessment the article can't come to any conclusions about the significance, tactical, operational or strategic, of the event. Hence, inconclusive.
 * fwiw the article you referenced engages in some journalistic speculation, the closest it gets to an assessment is will be considered a victory by the insurgents, which is an assumption about the conclusions of the OPFOR.
 * IMO it was tactically an insurgency victory, since the post was evacuated. I don't believe it has any real strategic or operational significance, given the distribution of these posts in the region.  Until there is something independent to support that the article should stick with indecisive.  The UK tried a similar approach in Helmand a couple of years ago, with 16AAB, and stopped it as having minimal operaitonal effectiveness.
 * ALR (talk) 15:13, 22 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Well there seems to be a determination to try to use an activity to describe the result, rather than an outcome. Whilst this is sourced I'd disagree that it's an outcome, as it doesn't consider the broader context of what the impact of the activity was.  essentially the statement that the US/ Afgh fore withdrew merely leads one to ask so what.
 * I've highlighted a number of points upthread, which haven't been responded to, that I would argue need to be considered in identifying an outcome, not least is an independent authoritative source which assesses the outcome. In the absence of anything credible I'd suggest we either stick with indecisive, or unknown, until such time as something is developed.
 * ALR (talk) 12:28, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

Pre-battle chatter?
I believe this is the battle that I read about on CNN that said one of the American soldiers who was a casualty had called home before hand to speak with his father and predicted the battle would be a bloodbath. Is this kind of detail something that would be included in a WP entry? Or is that beyond the scope of this site's intentions? (I'm still learning the ropes around here.) Here's the article: http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/07/17/airborne.soldiers.family/index.html?section=cnn_latest

Would this be the kind of thing to include in the article given that the soldier's statement proved prophetic? Medleystudios72 (talk) 14:19, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

In some media accounts, family of the fallen soldiers recount the misgivings the soldiers had communicated to family back home about the mission. There are typically POV issues with the mass media vs what would be considered "encyclopedic content", but the article does document a current event, so there should be some leeway. The story is still developing, and the army will eventually report its findings about the defensibility of the patrol base, the appropriateness of the unit's strength, and particularly the support infrastructure. I've personally heard chatter that there were problems. There is also good background on the overall mission in publicly available army sources, for example the brigade and garrison newspapers. 66.190.82.16 (talk) 01:40, 22 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Here are the facts as I understand them
 * 1) A small group of American soldiers (platoon strength) repelled an attack on their outpost by an enemy which outnumbered them, sustaining heavy casualties (up to 50%) in the attempt.
 * 2) Following the Taliban assault, the US platoon withdrew from the outpost for some reason (probably because the position was not defensible, and to regroup the shattered platoon, but that's just speculation on my part)
 * I wouldn't go as far as saying the battle was a tactical or strategic anything, but it's definitely a operational failure on the part of the US paratroopers. However, these things IMO should be judged from the perspective of the side that initiated the battle when discussing the outcome. The Taliban wanted to overrun the outpost and wipe out the American platoon, something that they failed to do (barely). So neither side comes off looking particularly good here.
 * For the result, the infobox needs to make it clear that the Taliban assault was repelled, AND that the outpost was subsequently abandoned. Things like tactical/strategic victory don't really belong here IMO. It's only POV that doesn't really tell the reader much.
 * And for "asses kicked", the paratroopers were outnumbered and fighting from what appears to be a poorly chosen site as far as defensibility goes, but still managed to repel the assault. I'm not saying it was a victory for the Americans, but to say asses kicked is a stretch. Lawrencema (talk) 00:12, 31 July 2008 (UTC)
 * I do think that you need to consider the operational situation and the vacation of the location does factor into any discussions, it can't be ignored. Whilst I do not think that the vacation was an outcome per se it could lead the ill informed and militarily unaware to the conclusion that it might have been.  The operational implications are what's important and that should be what's reflected in the info box, preferable sourced from somewhere verifiable and authoritative.
 * We can't say what the OPFOR intent was; this may have been an effort to deny the location to allied forces on a long term basis, or it may have been a diversionary effort to allow through a supply package by diverting the attention of the I&W capability whilst it passed.
 * Proportionately the damage to the allied unit was significant, although numerically they inflicted more damage on the OPFOR than they incurred. In all honesty from a military perspective the loss of life is an irrelevance, since what's important is the operational effect.
 * ALR (talk) 08:13, 31 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Well that little bit of venting I'm sure must have made you feel better, but it doesn't actually respond to any of my questions presented above. Nonetheless, until such time as there is a verifiable, authoritative source for any outcome other than indecisive, or unknown, any statement otherwise fails to comply with the Wikipedia guidance on verifiability.
 * I'll restate the points which I believe you should be capable of answering before synthesising any other outcome:
 * What was the operational purpose of the post; was it intended to be an enduring position or was it a short term tactical site? Essentially was the task element intending on vacating this location anyway?
 * Is the I&W capability that this post offered available through other locations on the adversary supply route, and does the absence of this locaiton significantly deplete the I&W capability in the area.
 * Is the ability of the allied command to disrupt the supply route significantly depleted through the absence of allied forces from this location?
 * Kindly respond to these points before forcing your POV onto the article again.
 * ALR (talk) 08:13, 31 July 2008 (UTC)

New Army Report
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/23/wanat_viii_an_army_report_finds_a_major_coin_failure- This report, which is currently in its draft form and should be publicly released in the next month or so, takes apart the Regimental command for putting the soldiers in such a vulnerable comparison. I added a couple lines about it after the ones from Col. Preysler, but I don't know if I either went too far or not far enough. Suffice to say, it sounds like this guy got a lot of good men killed because he didn't do his job. Even ignoring the pop-centric COIN doctrine issues, that platoon didn't even have enough water and were dehydrated at the time of the attack- it's a damned good thing the Taliban attacked when everyone was up and had their weapons by them or this could have been even worse. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.23.162.51 (talk) 03:09, 25 July 2009 (UTC)

Third Opinion
Hello! A third opinion was requested by a user. My response is this. I do not think it possible to arrive at a balanced conclusion about the significance or "big picture" outcome of this engagement, using reliable sources, at such an early stage. My advice would be to agree to desist for the moment from drawing any conclusion beyond the statements issued by involved organisations. The article seems reasonable as it stands. Redheylin (talk) 19:44, 31 July 2008 (UTC)
 * Thankyou for taking the time to review this.
 * ALR (talk) 21:30, 31 July 2008 (UTC)

I am inclined to favor Topgun’s points in this affair; Military science terminology and benchmarks (objective and goals) are different in irregular/guerilla warfare. The goal of the Taliban and their allies is similar to that of the Foco Principals designed by Guevara: Their goal is to engage Isolated elements of the enemy, Inflict damage upon those forces and deny them the use of the countryside, while simultaneously Inflicting visible propaganda type attacks and “Victories” to gain recruits and supplies along with population support. The effective destruction of a engineer platoon and the death of their officer may be inconsequential in itself. However the subsequent NATO retreat from the border district allowing supply lines across the border combined with the major propaganda victory from this engagement and the Raid or Saraposa will allow the militants to present themselves as a viable military force and gain thousands of new recruits. Such methods were used by the Mujaden two decades ago against Soviet the forces who were able to control all major urban centers but found themselves under escalating attacks in the rural highlands, particularly in the Pakistan border where they received covert aid. Freepsbane (talk) 04:44, 2 August 2008 (UTC)


 * I wouldn't, in principle, disagree with the general thrust of your argument, although I don't believe that it actually supports the statement made in the info-box as there are a number of unsupported assumptions around the operational environment. Despite that I'd disagree that the objectives per se are different; area denial is a legitimate military objective, as is demonstration of capability.  The operational level approach to achieving that is through small, attritional, engagements at the tactical level.  I have to say I thought the asymmetric warfare is different school of thought went out of fashion some 5 years ago...
 * On the specific case I think there are too many unknowns to make a firm statement of the outcome. Using an activity to substitute for an outcome is intellectual laziness, implies an outcome that is unsupported by the available evidence and the intellectual fraud of obfuscating our lack of information does itself take a pro-insurgency position.  As articulated above, we don't know if the countryside has been denied and whether this supply route is now unmonitored.  The US forces claim to still be operating, and the Economist article highlights that the current operational use of the platoon house house approach tends to be within artillery range of a more significant base, suggesting that a more significant presence remains in the region.
 * Notwithstanding all of that I would agree that this is something which can be used as a recruiting tool, and I'm sure it is, which would allow it to be sourced and used in the article. Although I'm unconvinced that jihadi recruiting websites would pass muster from a verifiability/ reliability perspective in wikipedia-land...
 * I think it's worth being honest with ourselves, if not the reader, and acknowledging that we have no source for a declaration of any outcome at all, hence sticking with a declared ambiguity.
 * ALR (talk) 07:49, 2 August 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes, I think the above discussion, intelligent thought it be, demonstrates an inevitable strong reliance upon OR and POV rather than secondary sources discussing the final success of each side's strategy, which sources, of course, can barely be held even to exist. I can guarantee that such opinions, even if sourced, will not endure long in the article. Redheylin (talk) 22:45, 2 August 2008 (UTC)

Article assessment
If someone would like to nominate this article, I believe it now meets WP:GA standards. With a little more background and aftermath information and a graphic or map, I believe it could make A-class or even FA. Cla68 (talk) 23:46, 4 November 2008 (UTC)

Not possible...
As a two-tour veteran of OEF, I can tell you that there is no possible way for US Forces to accurately assess enemy combatant casualties in Afghanistan or Iraq. The policy is this:

They are Muslims. America must respect Muslims to appear peaceful. Muslims don't allow non-Muslims to touch their dead.


 * WE ALLOW THE LOCAL VILLAGERS AND FAMILIES TO RETREIVE MOST OF THE DECEASED, WHETHER CIVILIAN OR COMBATANT*

No possible way to know. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.168.101.102 (talk) 23:28, 7 August 2009 (UTC)

Wikileaks report
Wikileaks has a detailed report on the battle: https://wikileaks.org/afg/event/2008/07/AFG20080713n1298.html --93.202.56.239 (talk) 14:28, 28 July 2010 (UTC)

Result
The Taliban attack was repulsed. They failed to overrun the outpost despite overwhelming numbers. Taliban casualties were five times greater than ISAF forces defending the garrison. Sounds like a tactical ISAF victory to me.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 04:47, 12 December 2010 (UTC)
 * No argument on the tactical side. This battle had undeniable ramifications at the strategic level though. Please see the below thread. --Airborne84 (talk) 03:10, 20 December 2010 (UTC)

Result of Battle

 * The "result of battle" has changed recently from the consensus that was arrived at before. The below list captures the modifications.


 * 1. "Indecisive, Strategic results favorable for Taliban; ISAF withdraws from town."
 * 2. "Indecisive, ISAF withdraws from town."
 * 3. "Insurgent attack repulsed, ISAF withdraws from town."


 * I have my own feelings on this matter, that actually align with the changes. However, this is a tricky subject. The original version (noted in #1 above) was discussed, and was not changed after it was input some time ago (see "Indecisive?" thread in talk page). Thus, it achieved a consensus. I feel that these recent changes, without a new consensus, may be problematic; some editors may feel that they violate WP:NPOV. That would conflict with its current GA assessment. It's better in this case, and IMO, to achieve a new consensus before changing these sentences since they may be challenged.
 * I should note that the current version in the article stands as stated in #2 above.
 * I welcome further discussion on this matter. --Airborne84 (talk) 03:09, 20 December 2010 (UTC)


 * As an added note, some of the problem before was the lack of published sources giving reasonable statements regarding the result of the battle. I think that the recent history of the battle published by the US Army's Combat Studies Institute may provide useful language in describing the battle if needed.
 * I won't argue the point and defer to your judgement.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 06:25, 20 December 2010 (UTC)
 * I think #3 is a neutral description of the result of the battle. Cla68 (talk) 12:24, 20 December 2010 (UTC)

Battle of Nam Dong
Compare this battle with 1964 Battle of Nam Dong in Vietnam where communist forces also attempted to overrun a special forces camp. This battle was fictionalized in the The Green Berets (film) in which they are surrounded and nearlly overrun by attackers who have destroyed much of the camp, but are driven back by airpower and artillery. Australian member of the Australian Army Training Team (Vietnam) AATTV, Warrant Officer Kevin Conway was in a forward weapon pit and alone fired his mortar upon the assaulting enemy in ever decreasing range fire until he was forced to bring his mortar fire upon himself to save the perimeter of the base before he was killed. There were 360 allied defenders vs. 900 communist attackers. Also see the Battle of Khe Sanh which communists wanted to make into another Battle of Dien Bien Phu. In both cases, the attackers failed to destroy their objective, though the allies eventually withdrew. The incident at Wanat hasn't been give it anywhere near the importance that was given to either battle, but given reports that Al Queda, Taliban and various other militant groups from Pakistan were involved in a very well organized attack, it is certainly possible that the attackers saw it as a very important battle, and that they were disappointed in the outcome. The common viewpoint that it was all for nothing and poorly excecuted may not fully appreciate the strategic importance and sacrifice of this small American force holding on to the base at considerable personal cost. Redhanker (talk) 00:39, 30 December 2010 (UTC)

Construction of the outpost
I removed an unsourced statement regarding the construction of the outpost and the status of the defenses at the time of attack. One of the biggest misconceptions in the press and the public is in this area (although there are others to be sure). For example, one sentence still in this article states that there was no heavy equipment. The contractors were not on site due to various issues, but there was a Bobcat on the scene (see pages 96–98 of the reference below).

I'd ask that further material on this particular topic be sourced carefully. Now available is the recently released history of the battle published by the US Army's Combat Studies Institute. Pages 89–106 cover the construction and the state of the defenses in depth.

The history is comprehensive and draws from interviews with multiple primary sources. In my opinion, there is little need now to add unsourced material to this article, except for non-contentious prose that helps fulfill Featured Article criteria 1a, which would be the next natural progression because this is already a good article.

I've read the history and made some notes, but it it may be many months before I am able to use them to improve this article. Other editors should feel free to do so—all of the information needed to make this a Featured Article is in that history. --Airborne84 (talk) 02:23, 30 December 2010 (UTC)

Taliban side

 * Did the Taliban fighters involved in the battle ever get their side of the story published anywhere, such as in a Pakistani newspaper? Cla68 (talk) 23:37, 31 December 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm sure there's some stories in Al Jazeera. If there's a particular angle that still needs to be covered, I'm sure it's available in the press somewhere. Why do you ask? --Airborne84 (talk) 00:19, 1 January 2011 (UTC)
 * The Taliban side of the battle isn't detailed in the article as well as the NATO side. Cla68 (talk) 02:40, 1 January 2011 (UTC)
 * I see. Al Jazeera or one of the other news agencies in the middle-east/Asia would be the place to check. I don't think it will help that much though. The Taliban undoubtedly got one or more early stories out to news agencies with their spin on it. They're very good at information operations. However, I suspect that whatever they put out grossly overstated coalition casualties and understated theirs. Whatever they put out will be easily contradicted on the coalition side because the U.S. and Afghan casualties are pretty reliably reported by now. What you might get that could be useful would be the Taliban statement of the casualties on their side. Again, it will likely be understated, but that doesn't really matter on Wikipedia. You know as well as I do that verifiability is the only thing that counts. Just thoughts. --Airborne84 (talk) 03:50, 1 January 2011 (UTC)
 * I was thinking more along the lines of who the Taliban forces were, i.e. which villages or units they were from, what their plan and strategy was for that area, their relationship with the locals, and what they did after they retreated from the battle. Cla68 (talk) 08:09, 1 January 2011 (UTC)
 * This "senior Afghan" official evidently got his numbers from the Taliban, and he thinks it was 200 to 500 fighters. This was a joing operation of Taliban, Al Queda, and seemingly every other anti-American force from Pakistan to Kashmir. This was not just the local villagers defending their homes, it was not their idea to stage a firefight there where the town buildings would have to be targeted with rockets and hellfire missles.. The American press is spinning it as a discouraging defeat, but IMHO, the small allied force did a magnificent job under less than ideal circumstances. After all the US went into Afghanistan to challenge and clear out the Taliban and Al Qeda, the result was not a Dien Bien Phu as was clearly their objective. If you check out various Battle of Wanat youtube videos, there are lots of taunting comments from Taliban or their sympathizers. From Long War Journal: The assault was carried out in the early morning of July 13 after the extremist forces, numbering between 200 and 500 fighters, took over a neighboring village. "What they [the Taliban] did was they moved into an adjacent village - which was close to the combat outpost - they basically expelled the villagers and used their houses to attack us," an anonymous senior Afghan defense ministry official told Al Jazeera. Tribesmen in the town stayed behind "and helped the insurgents during the fight," General Mohammad Qasim Jangalbagh, the provincial police chief, told The Associated Press.Redhanker (talk) 22:00, 4 January 2011 (UTC)

Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/07/joint_al_qaeda_and_t.php#ixzz1A6dt2uuE
 * This also uses the 500 taliban number. Has discussion of whether withdrawal from base and ceding territory to Taliban amounts to strategic success for insurgents. Seems it doesn't take much to convince US forces to quit and pull back, the Taliban don't seem to mind putting up a big fight or taking casualities as long as they know the US will pull out if they cause enough damage with a couple hundred fighters or so. July 13, 2008

Nuristan province A large, joint Taliban and al Qaeda force consisting of upwards of 500 fighters killed nine US soldiers during an assault on a combat outpost in Wanat in Nuristan province. An unknown number of Taliban fighters were killed. US and Afghan forces abandoned the outpost days later. Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/taliban_have_control.php#ixzz1A6id5mNr Redhanker (talk) 22:16, 4 January 2011 (UTC)
 * That's very good information, Redhanker. If the Taliban publicly claimed victory after this battle, then that needs to be added to the article also. Cla68 (talk) 01:38, 5 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Yes i imagine it would be considered a United States Tactical Victory, since they repelled the taliban. But a Taliban Strategic Victory since they ultimately gained control of the district through this battles influence on us troop deployments, for example the shift away from small bases was widened after this battle.XavierGreen (talk) 22:50, 5 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Disagree. The post was evac'd because it proved to be too vulnerable but the US did not abandon Nuristan province and still vigorously patrols there. The mission is just carried out differently in a way that minimizes casualties without sacrificing results. In no way can this battle be described as a Taliban strategic success. It can best be described as a tactical US victory with inconclusive strategic results.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 02:08, 10 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Xavier, don't be too quick to try to label battles in ongoing conflicts as strategic victories for one side or the other. Its difficult to tell, IMO, which battles were strategically significant until the conflict if over. Cla68 (talk) 07:11, 10 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Correct. "Strategic" results for the Taliban could include the erosion of U.S. popular support for the intervention in Afghanistan. However, remember that our opinions are irrelevant at Wikipedia. It's only the opinion of reliable sources that matter here.
 * My thoughts are that this will continue to go back and forth for some time until someone includes some reliable secondary source material that provides for some results. The last part of the Army's CSI history may do so. I haven't combed through specifically for that. I'm sure there are some news agencies that have offered analyses on this also. --Airborne84 (talk) 11:58, 10 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Jiujitsuguy, i didnt say that the US abandoned the province, they abandoned the district and i believe it is still under taliban control. Are there any statements by Dost Mohammed about what his objectives were when launching the operation? That might help clarify some things. If the talibans goal was to eject the Americans from the district then they succeded (strategic victory) if they had any other goal (such as defeating a force in detail) then i would agree that it would be indecisive. But as Airborne84 said we would need secondary sources in order to include such information in the article.XavierGreen (talk) 00:19, 11 January 2011 (UTC)

COP vs VPB
The article mentions the acronym VPB Kahler twice, but the official history uses COP Kahler. Plus the unofficial history, leaked by the Washington Post states:


 * "First, within US Army doctrine there is no such thing as a “Vehicle Patrol Base.” “VPB” is not a recognized US Army acronym. It is not defined in any Field Manual; nor is the concept, or any Tactics, Techniques or Procedures (TTPs) for a “Vehicle Patrol Base” taught at any US Army schools or institutions."

The term should be removed and maybe a clarification added. --DelftUser (talk) 18:39, 31 December 2010 (UTC)


 * I agree. We don't have to adhere to US Army doctrinal terms in this article, but there's something to be said for consistency. The only caveat is that, if VPB is used in a source (and it is), then it should be mentioned—regardless of statements made in one of the sources that it's "not a word."


 * One possibility is to take the first use of "COP" and add a note mentioning the use of "Vehicle Patrol Base" in some sources. --Airborne84 (talk) 19:06, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

US commanders & leaders
Captain Matthew Myer arrived at COP Kahler on July 12th, he should be listed in the infobox as the commander. --DelftUser (talk) 05:14, 1 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Agreed. I made the change. --Airborne84 (talk) 05:21, 1 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Is there a citation for this? I dont doubt its correct but it should have a citation.XavierGreen (talk) 22:47, 5 January 2011 (UTC)
 * It's in the Army's recently published history (discussed above). I don't think it needs a citation, but if someone wants one, it's available there. --Airborne84 (talk) 11:49, 10 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Alrighty, though i noticed his name isnt mentioned in the background section. It should likely be incorporated into it somehow.XavierGreen (talk) 00:25, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Agreed. Cla68 (talk) 00:34, 11 January 2011 (UTC)

Article overhaul

 * I notice that there still seems to be a lot of interest in this article. With the recent publication of the CSI's history of the battle, we are not left wanting for information published by reliable sources, IMO.
 * I read the CSI's history thoroughly and made notes for possible additions. I even made a new tentative outline that would better encompass the information on the battle. I'd be willing to collaborate on a major upgrade. I've taken one article to FA status, and don't mind bringing this there as well. However, I just don't have time to do it myself now.
 * If there's interest in a collaboration, let me know. --Airborne84 (talk) 02:01, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Id be happy to help with a collaboration, i too have taken one article up to FA status. Ive been reading the CSI history as well but i havent finished it yet, though i agree that there is enough detailed information that FA class seems feasible.XavierGreen (talk) 02:09, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
 * OK, take your time with the CSI history. Better yet would be to have someone else pitch in. We probably just need to agree on a new outline (if in fact it is needed) and farm out the sections to whoever is interested.
 * Of course, I'm open to other ideas as well. Thanks for your interest. --Airborne84 (talk) 02:28, 11 January 2011 (UTC)

More upbeat assessment
From Final Report on Battle of Wanat- A victory with a high cost Posted By Uncle Jimbo • [December 29, 2010] Any story where 9 American soldiers die is tragic by definition. But tragedy does not automatically impart blame and it certainly does not inhibit heroism. The Battle of Wanat deserves to go down in the annals of the airborne as an example of brave paratroopers repelling an attack from the high ground by an enemy with vastly superior numbers. The fighting spirit and esprit de corps of the Punishers of 2nd Plt, C Co, 2nd of the 503rd carried the day and in the end they held their ground.That would have been a victory in any other war and we should make sure it is remembered as one in this war.

When the battle was initially reported and every step of the way since inaccurate information has been used to characterize the situation. The narrative became one of command failure in planning and supporting the opening of a new base. This led the families of some of the fallen to request an additional investigation which was initiated. At the same time a contract historian at Leavenworth named Cubbison had been working on a historic record of the battle and released a draft of his work to some colleagues. It was eventually released to the families and the public and it read like an indictment of the command structure of the entire Brigade. It was a nakedly, transparent attack on the judgment and professionalism of the officers involved with planning and executing the operation to build the new patrol base. Leavenworth has since done extensive editing to the draft to turn if from an attack into a legitimate record which is available here.

This is a point of view which is not reflected in the article, which still seems to reflect the original report which spent more emphasis on placing blame than on praising the performance of those who in the end succeeded in holding their ground against a determined and skillful attacking force. Redhanker (talk) 04:51, 11 March 2011 (UTC)

Blockquote
I'm not sure what the issue with the Natonski block quote is. The edit removing the block quote formatting ends up plagiarizing the source because it's a direct quote and would be left without quotation marks or the distinction of a block quote as per WP:MoS. That can't be an improvement. I'd be happy to hear what the issue with the current quote is; the edit summary was a bit vague. Thanks. --Airborne84 (talk) 22:55, 9 July 2011 (UTC)


 * OK. First off, if you're actually quoting someone using the blockquote template you need to actually have quotes in the passage. Secondly, the sentence just broke off midway (no punctuation, no quotes)... please see MOSQUOTE as the same rules apply to all of journalism. Wikipedia articles aren't immune to basic journalistic writing style. Thirdly, looking into the cited sources it appears that none of what is in the quote block appears word-for-word in those cites. Are quoting Natonski directly? Or are we adding the quoteblock because we cut and pasted from the article? I'm confused. The way is looks now is how it's properly done. The problem is that the sources don't support it. If you're quoting Natonski directly, with sources, then you use the bq template. If you're using this article as a cite, you have to rewrite the passage yourself, nonverbatim, then add said cite as a ref. --Travis Thurston+ 00:35, 10 July 2011 (UTC)


 * Blockquotes do not get quotation marks at Wikipedia. It's redundant. MOSQUOTE states "Do not enclose block quotations in quotation marks." That seems pretty clear.
 * I'm sorry that you didn't like my method of introducing the blockquote, but it's not incorrect. It's a style choice, and is specifically noted as a method in the Chicago Manual of Style, for example, among other style guides. Because you prefer a different way of doing it does not make other methods "incorrect" and your way, "how it's properly done". I defaulted to the CMoS method because the Wikipedia MoS didn't mandate a method (that I saw). There's probably a good reason for that: it leaves room for multiple style choices.
 * As far as the quote, the block quote is taken verbatim from page 3 of Natonski's report as noted—and linked to—in the citation. If you think the citation is not properly formatted, a good way to address the problem would have been to adjust the citation template.
 * Finally, I don't have an issue with the way you formatted the introduction to the block quote. That is another way to do it; another style choice.
 * Thus, I didn't revert, I simply removed the quotation marks from the blockquote IAW WP:MoS. --Airborne84 (talk) 01:20, 10 July 2011 (UTC)
 * I just looked again. Since you added the words "The officers" to the block quote, the direct quote is now incorrect. Since my method of fixing the problem will no doubt be "incorrect" to you, please fix the issue that you introduced. Thanks. --Airborne84 (talk) 01:27, 10 July 2011 (UTC)
 * I think I see what you may have been talking about. General Campbell's report was attributed to Natonski. I changed the attribution. I also modified the introduction of the block quote to fix the noted issue. Perhaps this solution will be acceptable. --Airborne84 (talk) 01:53, 10 July 2011 (UTC)

Problem with "most [deaths] in a single battle"
Article states that:

"The U.S. deaths were the most in a single battle since the start of U.S. operations in 2001"

Even if the writer meant single day or single engagement this is not true. 16 SEALs and Airmen died in one helicopter in Red Wings II.108.31.79.145 (talk) 06:48, 13 July 2014 (UTC)

unsubstantiated sources
What is JSalazar and what makes it or them a source of information worthy to be considered factual? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 121.244.94.132 (talk) 10:40, 29 January 2016 (UTC)

Al-Qaeda a combatant
The only source I can find stating that Al-Qaeda was a combatant in this battle is the Long War Journal, which is a blog (the blog post also wrongly states that Bin Laden was probably sheltering in the region). Otherwise, the US Army Combat Studies Institute merely states that according to some US intelligence, Al-Qaeda had been active in the region. According to US intelligence many other groups may have been active as well. Such a possibility or even reality - of regional activity - does not mean that we have substantiated Al-Qaeda was a combatant in the Battle of Wanat. -Darouet (talk) 07:06, 20 February 2016 (UTC)