Talk:Battle of the Atlantic/Archive 2

"aided" by US forces?
The United States Navy only accounted for 4% of convoy duty. You can take my word for that.


 * That's only true in a very narrow sense. For most of 1942 and early 1943, the US was indeed only represented on the main North Atlantic convoy route by a few coast-guard cutters and the occasional destroyer (Escort Group A3). But that ignores: US Navy escorts for all fast HX and ON convoys through the western half of the Atlantic from September to December 1941, US efforts to protect shipping off the US coasts and in the Carribbean from 1942 onwards, US Navy escorts for troop convoys, the contribution of US hunter-killer groups from 1943 onwards, the mid-Atlantic convoy route (US-Gibraltar) that was almost entirely escorted by US ships, and the fact that about a quarter of Atlantic merchant shipping was American. JimmyTheOne 23:06, 30 November 2006 (UTC)

Scientifically wrong
This sentence is scientifically wrong: "These were typically visited by warships only, and the majority of the fleet then underwent a massive degaussing process, where their magnetic fields were reduced to such a degree that it was no longer "noticed" by the mines."

The magnetic field was NOT reduced, since the mines used the concentration of the magnetic field of the Earth induced by the hull of the ships. Thus the magnetic field could not possibly be reduced (unless this degaussing actually changed the magnetic field of the whole Earth, which would have been quite an achievement and a problem, since the compasses wouldn't be working nowadays). Anyways. What they actually DID was to INCREASE the magnetic field of the ships and thus make the mines sense the ships from far away, and detonate too early.--Msoos 10:45, 17 July 2005 (UTC)


 * The field of the ships is caused by the slow magnetization of them as they sail with a fixed heading. For instance, if they sail directly north for a period of time, the ship will eventually have a field aligned in that direction. Ships were specifically instructed to vary course continuously for this reason, as well as to avoid submarines.
 * See for instance, you will note that the very term degausing was in fact invented during this process.
 * Maury 22:24, 15 December 2005 (UTC) hurrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr


 * I am no expert, but the text now simply does not explain degaussing clearly enough. Maybe it is good for someone who knows what degaussing is, but for the layman, not. I am not saying that we should have 20 lines explaining what it is, but the brief explanation should be understandable. Please re-phrase, as I am no expert and you seem so! Thanks, Msoos 10:42, 17 December 2005 (UTC)


 * No, this is an encyclopedia. This article should not wander off-topic but concisely point to the article on Degaussing. � Dunc|&#9786; 12:38, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

Actually the degaussing article was pretty bad too, so I rewrote it too. Maury 14:07, 28 December 2005 (UTC)


 * Just a quick comment -- That rewrite looks pretty good to me! (And I do have a slightly closer association with the topic than some...(:-))
 * And a clarification regarding the first couple of paragraphs above: 'Wiping' warships did reduce the field -- as seen by the mine.  It did this by inducing a reverse (remanent) field in the hull that was just enough to balance the one induced by the Earth's magnetism.  With this protection, the ship could pass safely over the mine without detonating it.  To actually detonate mines safely, a strong pulsed magnetic field was used, produced by current from cables traling behind wooden-hulled minesweepers. -- Pete Goodeve -- 128.32.198.8 22:12, 13 January 2006 (UTC)

ULTRA and the Destroyers Deal
This article does not mention the massive benefits drawn from ULTRA, or the 'Destroyer Deal' with America in 1940.


 * That would be
 * The massive benefits of Ultra
 * The destroyer deal AKA Destroyers for Bases Agreement


 * Both of these are now addressed in the article. JimmyTheOne 20:29, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

H/F D/F
This article doesn't mention the High Frequency Direction Finder technology employed from 1941 to work out submarine vectors from German radio transmissions.


 * This is now addressed in the article. JimmyTheOne 20:29, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

British Bias
Wow, and I thought my great uncle a little paranoid when he talked about the need of the UK to ignore the contribution of the "colonies". The RCN contributed greatly to the Battle of the Atlantic as did the Canadian merchant marine. On my first read of the article I wondered about the sole reference to the Canadian navy. Then I spotted the picture from St. Johns with the caption "Empire Sailors". The picture postdates the Balfour Declaration by 15 years and the Statute of Westminster by 10. At the time the picture was taken, Canada was not part of the Empire and was a self-determining nation. I think I will be taking some time to fill out this article over the next few weeks. OK OK I admit I am overreacting - it is a good article, in need of a little balance. Mkimanderson 01:46, 10 May 2006 (UTC)


 * The Canadian contribution is now at least acknowledged even if the article still doesn't perhaps give the full credit that is due. JimmyTheOne 20:29, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

Article Structure and the RCN
First off, since the many recent additions have been made, this article has become incredibly unbalanced. There is absolutely no reason why the Mine Threat should deserve 8 paragraphs when the role of air power receives only one. This goes the same for support groups.

Although it brings out most of the main points, this article is disjointed and wrongly weighted.

As for the RCN, it is true the part they played has been underestimated somewhat. The pre-war strength of the RNC was 6 destroyers and 5 minesweepers increasing to 3 cruisers, 28 destroyers, 70 frigates 122 corvettes and 60 minesweepers in 1945 (1). These took time to come into service, however, and a number were obsolete. The RCN's escort fleet anywhere around 18 months behind the RN in fitting new detection technologies and other key pieces of equipment. When the RCN was put on to active duty, many of the sailors and escorts were found to be of inferior quality and required additional training. Thus, some were removed from important Atlantic operations to gain experience and such training elsewhere, although the RNC did run its own section of the escorting service (almost numerically half at one point!). This came after March 1943, however, when the RNC was given its own 'Canadian NorthWest Atlantic section'. The RNC came of age unfortunately late. As the Second Battle of the Atlantic was effectively over by 1943 the RCN's input can, and has, been described as 'quantitativeley important but qualitatively poor'(2). The RNC's input into the Second Battle of the Atlantic is unquestionably important, as despite the fact that they performed badly and lost a higher proportion of ships, by just being there the RNC doubtless averted many more lives and ships being lost. A poorly escorted convoy is better than an unescorted one.

I would like to re-iterate my point that this article needs re-structuring and re-weighting.

(1)(2) Sadkovich, James J. (Ed.) (1990) Re-evaluating the Major Naval Combatants of World War Two (Greenwood Press Inc., London)


 * I think you pretty much hit the nail on the head and I agree on reflection with your comment on the 1943 cutoff on the Battle. As an interesting aside, after reading this last night, I went back and pulled out my DVD of the BBC's series on the Battle.  Humbling and sad, when you think of the lot of the merchant seamen. Mkimanderson 22:17, 10 May 2006 (UTC)


 * Some of these points have now been addressed. JimmyTheOne 20:29, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

Re-write
As I mentioned in the post directly above, the re-write needs doing. I have a very detailed essay available that might help.

While you're at it, if the article is going to start off (not to mention be titled) "Second" Battle of the Atlantic, the "First" battle ought to referenced and linked. My own preference would be "BotA (WWI)" or "BotA (WWII)" but the choice is already there at "Battle of the Atlantic", so no big deal. But the article ought to link it.--Buckboard 05:02, 21 May 2006 (UTC)


 * While someone is about it: how about putting the developments in chronological order. It is currently a mish-mash. I B Wright 17:47, 10 October 2006 (UTC)


 * I have tried to do this. JimmyTheOne 20:29, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

Role of the Luftwaffe?
I could not find anything discussing the contribution (or rather lack of it) of the Luftwaffe throughout most of the battle. There were however periods when the Condors were sinking large numbers of tonnage and were a serious threat. Andreas 13:38, 23 May 2006 (UTC)


 * This is now addressed in the article. JimmyTheOne 20:29, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

"Decisive" Allied victory
I accept Allied victory, but decisive? Please, this needs to be discussed.

Kurt.


 * Have a look at the tonnage sunk figures after 1943, in particular in 1944 before the loss of the land connection to the channel ports. Also, in May 43 Doenitz withdrew all boats from the battle for a number of months, due to unacceptable losses, and they never really came back after that.  I think decisive victory is quite appropriate.  The Germans were completely beaten in the battle, due to lack of technological progress, failure to fight a combined air-sea battle, and an absence of appropriate counter-intelligence procedures. Why do you think 'decisive' is not appropriate? Andreas 14:07, 27 May 2006 (UTC)


 * Found the link. Check here. Feb 43 - 310,000 tons lost, 15 U-Boats sunk. Feb 44 - 12,000 tons lost, 15 U-Boats sunk. Andreas 14:11, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

"Winning the battle was however achieved with huge losses; between 1939 and 1945, 3,500 Allied ships were sunk (gross tonnage 14.5 million)." "30,248 merchant sailors 	3,500 merchant vessels 	175 warships"

That doesnt include the personal losses of that Allied war fleets suffered in the hands of U-boats.

I belive that Allied victory is better.

Kurt.


 * Yes there were significant losses. That does not make it a less decisive victory.  In the end, the Atlantic was pretty safe to get across. The German U-Boat arm had been decisively beaten.  In the same way that the Allies had a decisive victory at the Battle of Waterloo, despite the fact that they lost almost the same number of men as the French.  Or in the same way as the Germans were decisively beaten in World War II, even though all their enemies took substantial losses in the process. Your argument is not one backed up by Wikipedia use in other battles, and not by general use either. If that is all you base your edit on, I will revert it to its prior version. Andreas 16:42, 27 May 2006 (UTC)


 * And perhaps answering the RFC against you in a coherent form and in the correct field instead of continueing spreading misinformation would be a more productive thing to do. (Deng 00:51, 28 May 2006 (UTC))

The victory deserves to be called "decisive" because without it, there could have been no Operation Torch and no Operation Overlord. So the victory was crucial in the outcome of the war in Western Europe. (However, a single word like this is not worth edit-warring over.) Gdr 09:32, 29 May 2006 (UTC)


 * Thanks for this. I agree that it is not worth edit-warring over, but it is a matter of principle.  One person's belief should not be allowed to prevail over the opinion of other knowledgeable members.  If Kurt can not play nicely by setting out a convincing case for his change, we'll have an edit war.  It is up to him. Andreas 09:56, 2 June 2006 (UTC)

Kurt - if you can not make a convincing case why your belief is correct, I suggest you stop editing it in until you have done so. It'll just get edited out. Andreas 09:56, 2 June 2006 (UTC)

Regarding the most recent reversion. It was a six-year campaign, but it had been won (decisively) by May 1943. The tonnage numbers outlined above, and Dönitz'decision to withdraw from the Atlantic during summer 1943, make that very clear. It certainly was not an 'eventual' victory, which sounds like the Allies just won because the Germans no longer wanted to fight. Andreas 12:28, 26 June 2006 (UTC)


 * I think there's a difference between decisive and overwhelming. The campaign was 'decisive' in the sense that it decided an issue or contributed to a decision. Had the Axis powers won, the war would have turned out differently. So this was a decisive victory. Whether it was an overwhelming victory, a narrow one or a phyrric one is a different point. JimmyTheOne 20:29, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

Hunter-Killer Groups
The section under "Hunter-Killer groups" says this: "Formed into hunter-killer groups (one of the major tactical reasons for the victory)". This statement appears to be contrary to modern understanding of the actual causes of submarine destruction in the war.

Most modern accounts (see John Keegan's The Second World War and The Price of Admiralty and Ronald Spector's Eagle Against the Sun) agree that the hunter-killer effort was misguided and largely wasted. Convoy grouped the targeted merchant vessels and forced submarines to expose themselves to escorts in order to attack. Submarines simply submerged and avoided Hunter-Killer groups, which found themselves searching a largely empty ocean. Sailboatd2 12:08, 7 August 2006 (UTC)


 * Yes. We could do a better job distinguishing between the Support Groups that operated in the vicinity of the convoys and the roving patrols that did not. JimmyTheOne 20:29, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

Can't see the narrative for the technology
While there are presently a lot of things wrong with this article, the thing which stands out most is the way that the narrative of the battle is broken up with over-long descriptions of the various technologies used in the battle. These should be split into new articles and this article be focused on the actual fighting. At the moment this article is not at all successful in informing the casual reader about the Battle of the Atlantic and requires a lot of work. The First Battle of the Atlantic entry is a much more successful article IMO and may be a good model for the development of this article --Nick Dowling 11:33, 30 September 2006 (UTC)


 * Completely agree. Hopefully you will think it is better now. JimmyTheOne 20:29, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

The Italians Submarines in the Atlantic
You should read the work of Prof. Jürgen Rohwer (a German) about the role of the Italian submarines in Atlantic (Die italienischen U-Boote in der Schlacht im Atlantik 1940-43). He praises the Italian role and fournishes following informations: The 32 Italian submarines in Atlantic sunk 109 ships (= 593,864 T.) among them the Ocean Liner "Empress of Canada" (1943). The best Italian submarine of WWII was the "Da Vinci" which sunk 120,243 T., this means more than the best American submarine (the "Flasher" with 100,231 T.) and more than the best British submarine (the "Upholder" with 97,722 T.). Facts instead of common places!


 * The leading English-language historian of the Battle of the Atlantic, Clay Blair, regarded the Italian forces was being ineffective as their submarines were too large and couldn't dive fast enough. --Nick Dowling 08:10, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

I agree with this technical explication but the formulation of the text could drive readers to the opinion the Italian crews were "bungler" or "coward". This wasn`t true. Using inadequate submarines the Italian crews did a lot.


 * I have tried to incorporate this point into the article to give it a more neutral point of view. JimmyTheOne 20:29, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

The storyline of this article
I’ve restructured and rewritten large parts of this article to try to improve it and, perhaps, move it a little closer to featured article status. I should explain why I’ve made these changes: I hope you will all agree with the spirit of my contributions if not the exact details. I’m sure that what you think of them will soon become clear from your edits. JimmyTheOne 10:16, 4 November 2006 (UTC)
 * In places, the article was simply wrong. For instance, at one point it said that ‘the RN had yet to institute the policy of convoys, primarily because it slows all of the boats down to the speed of the slowest member.’ But the British actually introduced the first convoys before the outbreak of war.
 * Other parts were misleading. For instance, it said that the RAF was able to counter the U-boats and ‘the Western Approaches were soon cleared of the threat’ by the RAF. This simply isn’t true of the first years of the campaign. The RAF lacked the aircraft, weapons, training and tactics to pose more than an irritation to the U-boats until at least 1941, arguably 1942. At another point, the article stated that British destroyers ‘were able to block the exits into the North Sea and the Channel with some success’. This simply isn’t true of the North Sea – and the British weren’t even able to block the entrance to Scapa Flow in 1939.
 * The article was (and still is a bit) unbalanced.  The Leigh Light had a whole section to itself. There are some excellent sections on mining and elektroboots, but these are minor aspects of the overall campaign. I’m not convinced a long section on mining – by definition confined to shallow coastal waters rather than the open ocean – even belongs in an article of the Battle of the Atlantic.
 * The role of the smaller Allied navies was (and still is) underplayed. The huge Canadian contribution to the campaign is hardly mentioned, while the participation of ships manned by Norwegian, Polish, Free French, Dutch and other Allied crews is not mentioned at all.
 * It didn’t convey the ebb and flow of the campaign. Although the overall structure of the article was chronological, some parts of the story were in the wrong place.
 * There was too much emphasis on individual warship types. Too much credit was given to the introduction of Type VIIC U-boats and River-class frigates. What really mattered was not so much that the Type VIIC was a superb design, but that the Germans mass produced it in sufficient numbers to create real problems for the Allied convoy escorts. Similarly, the frigates were good ships, but they were not particularly fast and there were relatively few of them before 1944.
 * Few of the main personalities were mentioned. With the exception of Dönitz, none of the most important or colourful commanders were mentioned – like Günther Prien, Otto Kretschmer, Johnnie Walker or Max Horton.
 * Only one ship was mentioned by name. Seemed a shame really.


 * Thanks for all your changes Jimmy. This article is much better than it used to be. The main outstanding weakness, IMO, is that the coverage of the Battle after 1943 needs to be expanded - the Germans were still sending submarines into the Atlantic to attack allied supply routes until the very end of the European War. --Nick Dowling 23:55, 17 November 2006 (UTC)

Yes. I began at the top and ran out to steam before the end. I'll try to improve the later sections some time. JimmyTheOne 23:06, 30 November 2006 (UTC)

Admiral King
This article's references to Admiral King need to be deleted and completely reworked. Clay Blair irrefutably documented the false nature of the allegations against Admiral King in "Hitler's U-Boat War".ElectricJoe 05:07, 27 January 2007 (UTC)
 * There's no need to wait for other people to fix the article. If you think that something is wrong and have an excellent source like Blair to cite then by all means edit the article. --Nick Dowling 06:27, 27 January 2007 (UTC)

Operation drumbeat
There is a citation that is needed for shore black outs.

There were no US coastal convoys (and no plans for any), and few warships or aircraft for anti-submarine patrol. US merchant ships and tankers were unarmed. Lights in seaboard cities and towns burned as brightly as ever. Samuel Elliot Morrison wrote in "The Battle of the Atlantic" that "Miami and its luxurious suburbs threw up six miles of neon-light glow, against which the southbound shipping was silhouetted; ships were sunk and seamen drowned in order that the citizenry might enjoy business and pleasure as usual." Brocky44 11:01, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Casualties
Shouldn't the lost German warships (and, I suppose, submarines of Allies too) be mentioned? The article already includes a reference to Bismarck Chase. Admiral Graf Spee was also clearly lost within the Battle of the Atlantic. With the Tirpitz I'm not sure. 217.198.224.13 21:03, 5 March 2007 (UTC) hurrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr

'ASDIC' not consistent
Several places this is all-caps, other places all lower case. Seems like it should be consistently all-caps —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 70.181.172.150 (talk) 03:48, 5 April 2007 (UTC). Also, the 'ASDIC' sub-section seems out of place in the 'Opposing Forces' section. Perhaps there should be a 'Key Technologies' section, including ASDIC and perhaps others, such as advances in U-boat technology. 70.181.172.150 03:55, 5 April 2007 (UTC) TimG

No mention of Poland?
I am not a historian so I won't revise the article but it just surprises me that this article doesn't even mention that the Polish Navy participated in this battle. If I recall correctly Polish cruisers, destroyers, and submarines served throughout the entire duration of this battle and sank some number of German ships. A mention at the very least would be appropriate.JRWalko 02:14, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

Newfoundland links
This isn't my field so I'm hesitant to be bold, but some of the links marked Newfoundland link to Newfoundland and Labrador, when they may want to link to Dominion of Newfoundland. Regards, SeveroTC 16:46, 10 January 2008 (UTC)

Proposed structure
The article is a bit difficult to read at the moment. Keeping the rule of seven in mind could I recommend the following framework? (Dates would not be included)


 * Background
 * Course of the conflict
 * Initial skirmishes (Sep 1939 - May 1940)
 * Axis wreak havok: the First Happy Time (Jun 1940 - Mar 1941)
 * Ebb and flow (Apr 1941 - Dec 1941)
 * An unprepared America joins the war: the Second Happy Time (Jan 1942 - Aug 1942)
 * Axis lose the advantage (Sep 1942 - May 1943)
 * Allies control the ocean (Jun 1943 - May 1945)
 * Aftermath
 * Analysis
 * Losses
 * Impact on the war
 * Technology improvements
 * See also
 * External links

Thoughts? Oberiko (talk) 19:31, 26 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Well, it needs something;


 * It’s a good idea to put the “course of conflict" sections together, and the “technical improvements" separately, though I think it’s worth keeping “Battle returns.. and “ Climax… as separate sections.  It'd tally with the introduction; and I think " Axis loses the advantage" is a bit subtle for a period when they appeared to be on the ascendant. And the dates would be useful.


 * Could any of these sections have their own page? “second happy time" has one, but the first doesn’t, which seems like a gap. Or a page on the technical toing-and-froing, maybe?


 * Xyl 54 (talk) 18:23, 30 April 2008 (UTC)

Admiral Horton
Why does the page have a photograph of Admiral Doenitz, who lost the battle, and not of Admiral Horton, who won it?

James Wimberley --62.36.38.209 (talk) 20:34, 13 March 2008 (UTC)


 * Who won the Battle of the Atlantic is kind of iffy. While Donitz was in command of most of the Axis forces for the duration of the war, Horton was C-in-C in the Atlantic along with Noble, Nasmith and King. Oberiko (talk) 23:13, 13 March 2008 (UTC)


 * OK, so should the caption read “Loser”, then? It’s a fair point being made; putting Donitz’ picture in without one from “the other side" looks un-neutral. Or how about Kretschmer and Walker, as leaders in their respective fields, instead? Xyl 54 (talk) 18:28, 30 April 2008 (UTC)

Campaign/campaigns
This:

“The name "Battle of the Atlantic", first coined by Winston Churchill in 1941, is a partial misnomer for a campaign that began on the first day of the European war and lasted for six years”

was changed to

“…for what would be a series of campaigns that began…”

I’ve changed it back as I think this needs discussion: It’s a valid point of view, but all the sources I’ve seen that make this distinction refer to it as a single campaign, to the “longest continuous military campaign of World War II” in fact.

It needs a citation at least; what does anyone else think?

Xyl 54 (talk) 17:02, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
 * I don't mean to insult you, but have you read the article or anything about the "Battle of Atlantic"? I understand that the article is a general one, and does not reflect actual campaigns, but still a rudimentary knowledge of naval warfare would suggest there were at least 20 campaigns based on weather in the North Atlantic alone! Just because its a badly structured and poorly referenced article does not mean the number of campaigns can be reduced like they never happened.
 * And I had not even commented on contradictory and dubious statements like "The Battle of the Atlantic was won by the Allies in two months.", but "Also crucial was the US shipbuilding production, as they could literally build merchant ships at a faster rate than the U-boats could sink them, thus enabling them to win the "tonnage war of attrition".
 * Let's see...
 * Based on what there is in the article now:


 * The North Atlantic theatre - RAN strategic operations
 * Campaign number 1 - primarily operations by anti-submarine RAN surface and air units
 * 2 Submarine warfare


 * Campaign number 2 - trade lane escorting and protection operations
 * 3 Early skirmishes (September 1939 – May 1940)
 * 4 "Happy Time" (June 1940 – February 1941)
 * 5 Great surface raiders
 * 6 Escorts strike back (March 1941 – May 1941)
 * 7 Field of battle widens (June 1941 – December 1941)


 * The North Atlantic theatre - USN strategic operations
 * Campaign number 3 - protection of US coastal facilities and shipping
 * 8 Operation Drumbeat (January 1942 – June 1942)


 * The Mid-Atlantic theatre - combined Allied naval strategic operations
 * Campaign number 4 - convoy operations
 * 9 Battle returns to mid-Atlantic (July 1942 – February 1943)


 * Campaign number 5 - convoy operations (change in methods)
 * 10 Climax of the campaign (March 1943 – May 1943, "Black May")


 * Campaign number 6 - shipping operations in support of amphibious operations: Operation Torch and Operation Neptune
 * 11 Final years (June 1943 - May 1945)


 * So, that's six campaigns. That seems to back up my change to “…for what would be a series of campaigns that began…”, and I'm not even counting the real number of campaigns, not dividing them into RAN, USN and Allied campaigns all that much, not considering separate submarine, surface and air campaigns. I honestly didn't think this would need discussion since it is so obvious!--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 21:34, 16 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Thank you for not meaning to insult me


 * Yes, I have read the article, (and I too/also think it’s a bit of a mess): And yes, I’ve read a bit about he battle of the Atlantic, as my contribution history might tell you.


 * Battle of the Atlantic was Churchill’s phrase, and I’m not sure what he meant by it ( or even if he knew: the fight in the North Atlantic only, excluding the Arctic, the Med, and other oceans; against the U-boats only, excluding surface and commerce raiders; the protection of trade routes only, excluding naval actions; the whole war at sea)


 * There are any number of ways the BotA can be divided ( yours is one, Oberiko’s was another I could come up with a third) but nothing I’ve read even carries a suggestion that it is regarded as more than a single, continuous campaign, that started with the sinkingof the Athenia on the first day, and ended with the Avondale Park on the last.


 * Do you have a source for your contention, that it would be a mainstream historical view?


 * Xyl 54 (talk) 12:14, 17 May 2008 (UTC)
 * I shall look. To me the suggestion that it was a single campaign is simply ludicrous if only because a single campaign would only represent the POV of the Allies! So, there were at least two campaigns, one Allied and the other Axis, right. On top of that if you read the histories of the RAN and USN, you will not find in them much of a mention of operations conducted solely by the naval forces of the other, i.e. RAN does not describe naval campaigns of USN in the Atlantic and visa versa. Same with Germany and Italy, so thats at least four campaigns. Any way one turns this, it is not a single 5-year campaign!
 * I had not seen Oberiko's version of the structure.
 * The bottom line is that if someone can write a book which treats Atlantic operations as a 5-year long single campaign, the its a sure sign they know nothing about Second World War naval operations. Just confused by the continuity of strategic planning--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 13:05, 17 May 2008 (UTC)


 * In the spirit of fair play, I should give you the sources for the original contention. Roskill and Morison, the official historians, use the term Battle of the Atlantic, and treat it as a continuous event; modern historians like Clay Blair and Peter Padfield do the same. The suggestion that it was more than a battle, but a whole campaign comes originally from Dan van der Vat, in “The Atlantic Campaign”. They are all well respected as sources; I wouldn’t say they "know nothing about WWII naval operations" or are " confused by the continuity of strategic planning".Xyl 54 (talk) 16:00, 19 May 2008 (UTC)


 * PS you keep saying RAN; is it the Australian navy you are referring to, or the British (RN)? Xyl 54 (talk) 16:02, 19 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes, its the RN, force of habit of typing RAN.
 * Yes, sadly the official historians have no idea because they don't seem to understand what is a campaign. A quote from Trevor N. Dupuy,

A campaign is a phase of a war involving a series of operations related in time and space and aimed towards a single, specific, strategic objective or result in the war. A campaign may include a single battle, but more often it comprises a number of battles over a protracted period of time or a considerable distance, but within a single theatre of operations or delimited area. A campaign may last only a dew weeks, but usually lasts several months or even a year.p.65, Dupuy, T.N., Understanding war: History and Theory of Combat, Leo Cooper, London, 1992 If the "Battle of Atlantic is properly analysed, and not just written in a long series of chronological events, you will see that there were very distinct phases in the Allied, USN, RN, Axis, Kriegsmarine, and Royal Italian navies during their five years of Atlantic operations from the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 21:32, 19 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Well, it takes a certain kind of nerve to say the official historians don’t know what they are talking about. You are entitled to your opinion, and I’m trying hard not to get drawn into an argument over this, but I'm wanting to be clear. Are you offering Dupuy as a source for your assertion, or just illustrating your point? Because I have to say, it doesn’t even come close.


 * First, there’s nothing there that precludes campaigns of great length; and anyway this is borne out by fact; some campaigns were short (Malaya, Norway) some were long (Burma, North Africa) some were vast (the Eastern front) some were small (Dodecanese, Syria). While it does argue against your division, (above), viz: "Campaign number 2 - trade lane escorting and protection operations (1940-41), Campaign number 4 - convoy operations (1942-43), Campaign number 5 - convoy operations (change in methods)(1943-45)", into 3 separate campaigns; trade protection and convoy operations were continuous throughout the 5 year period, they didn't start and stop. And the strategic aims of both sides were the same at the end as at the beginning: for the Axis to disrupt supply routes, and for the Allies to preserve them. The organization, tactics and technology may have changed, but these were continuously developing throughout the struggle.


 * Second, there’s no mention at all of the BotA in particular. WP is descriptive, not prescriptive; if respected sources refer to something in a particular way ( and v d Vat specifically argues for regarding BotA as a single, continuous campaign) then an alternative source would be needed even to post a contrary view, let alone over-ride it.


 * Anyway, rant over; Xyl 54 (talk) 15:38, 20 May 2008 (UTC)
 * I find aruging against the BotA being a singular campagin pretty much a WP:FRINGE viewpoint, and one that I've never seen. The overall goals never changed (the Allies were trying to move supplies, the Axis were trying to stop them) the location, while drifting, never really changed (the Atlantic Ocean) and the combatants didn't really change (the U.S. assisted the British most the time and joined, officially, in '41). —Preceding unsigned comment added by  Oberiko  (talk • contribs) 16:57, 20 May 2008 (UTC)


 * My library is not well stocked on the subject matter, nor am I prepared to get into the source-countersource argument. When I am again at the library I will collect the sources and offer them here. I note however that the operations in the Atlantic were not oriented towards "Allies [who] were trying to move supplies, [or] the Axis [who] were trying to stop them" and "while drifting, never really changed". The operations in the Atlantic in the first instance were attempts by the RN to blockade the Kriegsmarine from entering the Atlantic in 1939, before the attempt to move supplies had even begun, and only the interdiction of the regular trade sea routes was the objective of the German command. In fact the first action of the Battle of Atlantic took place in the South Atlantic during the Battle of the River Plate by RN forces which were part of the RN's New Zealand Division requiring very much different campaign planning by that command. The attack on Dakar as I recall was also expressly for the purpose of securing South Atlantic trade routes, which is quite a shift from the North Atlantic, never mind that it was a naval offensive and not a convoy operation. In fact the need for supplies was a war need and not one of any given campaign (according to British Parliament) since the supplies were used not only by the RN, but the Army and RAF also, not to mention civilians. In fact the reason the areas of actions shifted, as illustrated more recently by Chris Bishop in his atlas, is because of the different campaign objectives of the RN and the USN in terms of change in methods of conducting campaigns, forces used, and subsequently the areas that were denied to the enemy. Consider at least the widely different campaigns of the German submarine and surface raiding, and the use of aircraft in Norway (and France?) beyond the range of RAF fighters. Of course they were part of the same war, but they used entirely different methods, vessels and aircraft to achieve their objectives that changed over the five years of the war. In any case, it seems to me that the subject was uncritically approached by the original official historians, and is replicated elsewhere since.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 22:57, 20 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Xyl54 said
 * In the spirit of fair play, I should give you the sources for the original contention. Roskill and Morison, the official historians, use the term Battle of the Atlantic, and treat it as a continuous event
 * Turns out your version of fair play is not all that fair Xyl54.
 * I have looked up both Samuel E. Morison's (two volumes) and and Captain S.W. Roskill's (four volumes). Both copiously divide the Atlantic operations into large chunks attached to their specific areas of operation. Both provide start and end dates for these campaigns that span months, and Morison includes any offensives and battles as their components, clearly stating their names, such as the German submarine offensive 1942 (January - July 1942) p.114, vol 1. Are you aware there were eighteen naval areas of operation within the USN strategic planning of Atlantic operations? Roskill is even more explicit. Chapter XXI "The Battle of the Atlantic" (1st April - 31st December 1941) is preceded by "The African Campaign" (1st January - 31st May 1941) and is followed by "The Home Waters and the Arctic" operations (1st June - 31st December 1941).  The Battle of the Atlantic. The Campaign in American Waters, resumed on the 1st January and ended on 31st July 1942. Lest we think that Roskill is talking about the one Campaign, his next three chapters all deal with the same period, but are called "Home Waters and Arctic", "Coastal Warfare" and "Ocean Warfare". This is to reflect the much larger RN naval theatres of war, of which there were ten spanning the globe. Later in second volume he adds in Chapter VIII another curious title "The Battle of the Atlantic. The Second Campaign on the Convoy Routes" (1st August - 31st December) 1942. This is not the second campaign of the Battle of the Atlantic, but the second Convoy Routes campaign, to distinguish from the first. Were there other campaigns on specific theatres of naval operations? Yes, for example the explicitly titled "The Battle of the Atlantic. The Second Campaign in the Western Approaches" (1st January - 31st May 1944). I knew the good Captain could not be so silly as to suggest that the Battle of the Atlantic was a single six-year-long campaign, and I suggested as much.
 * So, can we change my intro edit again to state that the Battle of the Atlantic was in fact a composite of several naval campaigns?--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 10:56, 26 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Well, no; I’ll refer you to Oberiko’s point that what you are presenting is very much a fringe view.


 * And Roskill says that? Looks like it’s my turn to go to the library. But off the top of my head, the word "campaign" seems to be used a lot more loosely than you are insisting; the Normandy campaign is also part of the North-West Europe/Liberation of Europe campaign: the Narvik campaign is also part of the Norway campaign. Maybe we are just arguing about words;


 * Anyway, to my previous point: If you have a source for what you say, you have room to post an alternative view; it doesn’t override what’s already there.


 * So, do you have a form of words to encompass the two?


 * Xyl 54 (talk) 16:19, 27 May 2008 (UTC)


 * (How about this)? Xyl 54 (talk) 16:35, 27 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Xyl 54. I have no idea what we are arguing about. Al I want is for the reader to understand that the "Battle of Atlantic" so named by Churchill in 1941, was in fact a collection of campaigns and operations by at least four national navies over six years throughout the length of the Atlantic ocean. The nature of these participations by different types of naval, air, and in the case of amphibious operations, the ground forces made seeing the "battle" as on monolithic "thing" quite impossible. I refer you to the two works of the official naval histories of the RN and the USN above. Both were written by recognised authorities on the subject, in the case of RN, a serving officer, over a number of years of research. The RN at least would not use the word "campaign" lightly. I do not know what Oberiko thinks my suggestion is a "fringe" point of view. It is not even a point of view, but actual chapter headings in official histories of these forces! Has Oberiko read these histories? I do not own either set of books, but I had spent a couple of hours selectively reading through them. Both describe the logistic and command difficulties of staging long-duration operations dogged by weather and lack of resources quite apart from enemy activity. In fact it has motivated me to write an article on the history of the Royal Navy Fleet Train, and to expand the section on Admiralty organisation articles because people get caught up with ships and battles, forgetting all the support and administrative stuff that has to happen before ships even leaves the base. I left a rewritten introduction in your sendbox--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 00:02, 28 May 2008 (UTC)


 * What are we arguing about?
 * I’m sure I don’t know: I wish we weren’t; I’ve got other things to do and I’m sure you have too. Maybe because I feel your idea of the meaning of “campaign” is overly rigid, and that you are trying to change my opinion and everyone else’s to match. I know what you “want the reader to understand”; that’s part of the issue. I said why I thought it was a fringe issue, and so has Oberiko; your response is to question our competence. I think your reading of Roskill is indeed selective, and I don’t think his layout says what you want it to say, but his use of the word "campaign" in the headings of Ch VIII and … is, indeed,  curious, ( though my observation about campaigns within campaigns applies, IMO) and gives you room to post your view. The rest is a dubious interpretation.


 * Re-wording:


 * as to the 1st part, No!


 * What you had previously was a change of phrase; now you have a 300 word essay expounding your point of view. I’ve suggested you post your change, with your source, even though I disagree with your interpretation of what “the good captain” says (and no, you didn’t "suggest as much at the time", you said in at least 3 places he didn’t know what he was talking about).


 * Your re-jigging of the 2nd part of the intro is fair enough.


 * I am saying this to move this whole thing on: if you are seeking to change my opinion on the subject, this is the wrong place to do it. You can always e-mail me. I've left comments at the sandbox, if you wish to see them..


 * Xyl 54 (talk) 16:51, 30 May 2008 (UTC)


 * I’ve not seen a reply here; I am putting in a source for the phrase “longest single campaign… “ if you want to add your comment about “series of campaigns.. with your source, fine.


 * I think the introduction is OK as it is; I don’t think your re-write improves it any. Churchill created an iconic phrase with “ Battle of the Atlantic”; Someone else (van der Vat?) was able to do the same with “ the longest continuous campaign of WWII, … from the first day ….to the last”. I couldn’t match that, and I don’t think your 200 word essay does either. So I think it should be left alone. Xyl 54 (talk) 17:02, 5 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Michael Gannon in his Operation Drumbeat is very clear that he considers the Battle of the Atlantic to be one campaign. I just finished reading it. Wonderful book, even better than his Black May. I came here to ensure both books were listed as references and added full titles and ISBNs. Thomas R. Fasulo (talk) 18:03, 13 October 2008 (UTC)

Structure based on campaigns
I just noticed that User:Xyl 54 had made earlier proposals for article restructuring, which is badly needed, so I will make my own below.
 * If the article is to convey the enormousness of the Allied naval effort in the Atlantic, they need to appreciate the scale, duration and scope of the "Battle of Atlantic". The operations in the Atlantic were in fact conducted by predominantly four navies: the RAN and USN for the Allies, and the Kriegsmaine and the Royal Italian Navy for the Axis. It seems tome that the limited participation of French naval units can also be included.
 * The "battle" was waged on three distinct naval fronts:
 * The North Atlantic - convoy operations to UK and Arctic USSR convoys from Canada and the USA (1940-45)
 * The Mid-Atlantic - convoy operations to UK (1940-45), North Africa (1940-42), Italian theatre (1943) and southern France (1944)
 * The South Atlantic - trade lanes to Europe from South America, South Africa, India and Asian military theatres (1939 - 1945)
 * The combat operations on these fronts were conducted as part of:
 * Naval intelligence campaign
 * Submarine campaigns
 * Campaigns by surface coastal forces
 * Campaigns by surface escort forces
 * Campaigns by surface major fleet units
 * Naval aviation campaigns
 * Campaigns in support of amphibious operations
 * Merchant marine campaigns
 * All these activities were heavily influenced by the different environmental influences (factors) in the different parts of the Atlantic - the weather, the rate of production, and the competency of command and troops. For reasons of weather the operations were planned for execution during certain times of the year in some cases, most notably the support for the Arctic convoys in North Atlantic seaboard.

The operations were heavily influenced by production, including of certain types of vessels and aircraft, and the command of the forces, notably naval intelligence and transfer of units between theatres and fronts, the ability by combatants to maintain adequate crewing, and naval doctrines used in the Atlantic, including employment of emergent technologies.
 * Each campaign was logically divided into its constituent operations, and prominent combat engagements (battles) between naval forces.

As it is now, the article is a rather confusing and poorly referenced collection of texts seemingly cobbled together as if there was no overall strategic (long term, wide scope) planning on either side although there is a moderately large bibliography section (which does not provide publication dates). This is exacerbated by the Timeline of the Second Battle of the Atlantic which inexplicably stops in May 1943.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 22:14, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
 * Each of these would make an article on its own, and I personally would like to see that. I haven’t seen a general work doing justice to the BotA in less than 400 pages, and most run to several volumes, yet we are seeking to do that in 20. The most this article can offer is an overview, with salient points, and links to fuller treatments in specialist articles.If anything, some parts need trimming, to avoid undue weight.Xyl 54 (talk) 16:33, 30 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Are you planning to do this?


 * The proposal from Oberiko involves restructuring what’s here; your proposal looks like a substantial re-write. If this is what you are intending, I suggest


 * A) you talk to the person who re-wrote it last time, and


 * B) seeing as how you’ve called our competence into question, maybe you could tell us your expertise to do this; you don’t seem to have any edits in this area thus far.
 * Xyl 54 (talk) 17:05, 5 June 2008 (UTC)

The Battle of the River Plate
In the article the Battle of the River Plate it states "In return, one of Exeter's 8-inch shell penetrated two decks then exploded in Graf Spee’s funnel area — destroying her raw fuel processing system and leaving her with just 16 hours fuel, insufficient to allow her to return home. The ship was doomed but this was kept secret for 60 years." So it appears that Hans Langsdorff had good reason to break off and seek a harbour. I have therefore deleted this from the sentence "If the Kriegsmarine had stood and fought when they had good odds Convoys HX-34, HX-106 and SL-67 would have been annihilated, and the British would have likely lost the Prince of Wales as well as the Hood in the Battle of the Denmark Strait." I am not sure about this sentence as it seems to be providing an alternative history, but I have left it.Mathew Rammer (talk) 17:01, 30 May 2008 (UTC)
 * I agree, I think it's dodgy too. I've lifted it; see new section below. Xyl 54 (talk) 16:23, 11 June 2008 (UTC)

Another attempt at a new introduction
Below is my last proposal taken from User:Xyl 54/Sandbox. I have adopted some of Xyl54's suggestions and not others, and changed the wording somewhat in several places.

The name 'Battle of the Atlantic, was a name first coined by Winston Churchill in 1941 over a year after the start of the Second World War, in reference to the naval war for the control of the Atlantic ocean sea lanes.

The name is a partial misnomer for the naval war in the Atlantic ocean that begun on the first day of the European war in 1939 between the German and Italian navies on the side of the Axis, and the British and French navies on the side of the Western Allies that were joined by the United States Navy after the Attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

The naval war in the Atlantic theatre of operations continued for six years until 1945, and included several distinct areas of the ocean which with its adjacent seas occupies an area of about 106,400,000 square kilometers (41,100,000 sq mi); the naval operations were conducted over two-thirds of this vast area. The Royal Navy conducted operations as part of its strategic naval commands responsible for the Local Home Command in territorial waters, the North Atlantic Command, South Atlantic Command, Americas and West Indies Command and the Mediterranean Command dependant of the operations in the Atlantic ocean. The United States Navy divided the same area into eighteen naval operations Atlantic Areas broadly divided into three strategic zones, the North Atlantic Convoy Areas (area north of the line between Nova Scotia and Spain), the Eastern Atlantic, and the Western Atlantic.

The navies participating in the “Battle of Atlantic” were involved in the conduct of several distinct naval and naval aviation campaigns, naval battles, amphibious operations, and numerous smaller engagements, actions and duels between thousands of naval and merchant surface vessels, submarines, military aircraft and significant land forces, including more than 100 convoy battles and perhaps 1,000 single-ship encounters.

Although it begun as a campaign to safeguard merchant shipping between North America and Europe pitting U-boats and other warships of the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) against Allied convoys, the “Battle of the Atlantic” developed into a war of convoys, coming mainly from North America and the South Atlantic and going to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and were protected for the most part by the British and Canadian navies and air forces. From 1942 these forces were aided by ships and aircraft of the United States. The German warships were joined by submarines of the Italian Royal Navy (Regia Marina) after Italy entered the war on 10 June 1940. The hight in the intensity of naval warfare was reached from mid-1940 through to about the end of 1943 in the North Atlantic convoy areas. From 1943 the “Battle of Atlantic” was increasingly concerned with protection of United States and Canadian troopships destined for the great amphibious operations in Africa and Europe.

The strategic advantage switched back and forth between Axis and Allied naval forces for the six years as new weapons, tactics and counter-measures were developed by both sides. The British and their allies gradually gained the initiative and quantitative advantage, and succeeded in driving the German surface raiders from the ocean's trade routes by the middle of 1941, and decisively defeating the U-boats in a series of convoy battles between March and May 1943. New German submarines arrived in 1945, but they were too late to affect the course of the war.

Despite Xyl54's insistence on brevity, I do not see this imperative given the scale of the subject, i.e. all operations by four navies over most of the Atlantic during 6 years. The above is a standard A4 page of typed text, which I think is the least that can be said about this tremendously important area of operations--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 02:09, 10 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Just a couple of minor suggestions regarding dates: (2nd paragraph) United States naval involvement began prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.  United States Navy destroyers were actively convoying British military supplies and attacking German U-boats for a few months prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, and the United States Navy had earlier broadcast locations of German ships being hunted by British and French naval forces.  (6th paragraph) 1943 is an inconsistent date for transfer of attention to troopships.  Allied troopships had always been primary targets, and the invasion of North Africa was in late 1942 before the trade convoy battles of the spring of 1943.  British and then American military occupation of Iceland involved troopship convoys prior to 1942.Thewellman (talk) 04:27, 10 June 2008 (UTC)


 * The involvement of USN before the declaration of war between USA and Germany/Italy will have to be dealt with in the article. Given the scope of the article, and this being an introduction only, the operations of those destroyers are a minor detail. If I wanted to be technical, I would have said 1941 troopships, because the first sailed out to Martinique soon after the declaration of war. However, the really large flow of troops did not start until after Torch in 1943. There were just no troops to send until then.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 04:50, 10 June 2008 (UTC)
 * You may be underestimating the extent of defensive troop deployments with respect to the offensive invasion convoys which tend to be more widely discussed. I invite your attention to Arnold Hague's listing of WS convoys in appendix 5 of The Allied Convoy System 1939-1945.  The series included 82 ships in 7 Atlantic convoys in 1940 and 340 ships in 31 convoy in 1941.Thewellman (talk) 13:41, 13 June 2008 (UTC)


 * To clarify the first point; this proposal is entirely Mrg3105’s authorship, not mine. It is my opinion that the existing introduction (which isn’t mine either), is adequate as it stands. For comparison, the intro currently reads:-

The name "Battle of the Atlantic", first coined by Winston Churchill in 1941, is a partial misnomer for a campaign that began on the first day of the European war and lasted for six years, involved thousands of ships and stretched over hundreds of miles of the vast ocean and seas in a succession of more than 100 convoy battles and perhaps 1,000 single-ship encounters. Tactical advantage switched back and forth over the six years as new weapons, tactics and counter-measures were developed by both sides. The British and their allies gradually gained the upper hand, driving the German surface raiders from the ocean by the middle of 1941 and decisively defeating the U-boats in a series of convoy battles between March and May 1943. New German submarines arrived in 1945, but they were too late to affect the course of the war.

The Battle of the Atlantic pitted U-boats and other warships of the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) against Allied convoys. The convoys, coming mainly from North America and the South Atlantic and going to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were protected for the most part by the British and Canadian navies and air forces. These forces were later aided by ships and aircraft of the United States. The German warships were joined by submarines of the Italian Royal Navy (Regia Marina) after Italy entered the war on 10 June 1940.
 * (I've reversed the paragraphs for clarity)


 * The second point, this article is already 72 Mb long; it doesn’t need extra verbiage.


 * Third, saying more than the most general statement is going to create more debate on what else should or shouldn’t go in. As we are already doing. Xyl 54 (talk) 14:08, 10 June 2008 (UTC)


 * The first point is that you asked me to put my suggestion in your sandbox and had gone over it making suggestions, some of which I adopted and some not, so its not entirely mine.
 * The second point is that the reason the article is so large is because you are trying to cover several large operational areas over a long period of time all in one article. This article really needs to be generalised and other articles spun off as is usually done with a long article. However, when I suggested that the "Battle of Atlantic" is in fact a number of separate campaigns, Xyl 54 told me I didn't know what I was talking about. Xyl54 then admitted that maybe more research is warranted after my "fringe view" turned out to be supported by official histories of two major naval forces involved.
 * The third point is that the current introduction is a mess lacking basic introduction structure that most first year academic essays are expected to have, which in part reflects Xyl54's refusal to admit that the "Battle of Atlantic" was a number of distinct campaigns, operations/battles and etc., that took place not in the "Atlantic" but clearly defined strategic and operational areas, actually Areas as far as the USN is concerned.
 * There is a fourth point. Xyl54's last communication to me was that he was going to do a bit more research and return for a review. Quite obviously this was never the intent, which is rather worrying.
 * Usually the introduction in a large article like this which seeks to summarise numerous campaigns is to include in the introduction: 1) the mandatory introductory sentence, 2) the sentences stating 2a) who was involved, 2b) why, 2c) when, 2d) where and 2e) how the events took place, 3) what the objective/s was, and finally the 4) brief one paragraph abstract of the article, so at least four paragraphs. This is called structured thinking.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 22:22, 10 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Thanks for discussing this text here mrg, but I don't agree with it at all. Some comments:
 * Starting the article by disputing the name of the battle is uncalled for. Whatever the history and exact accuracy of the term, the campaign fought between the Allies and Axis in the Atlantic between 1939 and 1945 is almost universally known as the 'Battle of the Atlantic'.
 * I agree with the comment on including an outright inaccuracy about the USN in the introduction
 * I don't think that including all those red-linked command titles is needed, especially as they exclude the Western Approaches, which was the most important British HQ of this campaign. Nick Dowling (talk) 10:27, 11 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Nick, I'm not actually suggesting the name not be used. All I'm saying is, the "battle" was for the participants a far more complex set of executables over the 6 years then a single campaign.
 * Why shouldn't I include those redlinks? Maybe someone will write at least stubs to cover them, particularly as you say the Western Approaches. I might even do it myself--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 11:56, 11 June 2008 (UTC)

This is getting ridiculous!

To answer your 4th point, My last communication to you said nothing of the sort! My post of 27 May said I needed to go to the library,  to check your references;  my reply on 30 May was that I thought your reading was selective and your interpretation was dubious. But as a compromise I suggested I would offer a source for the opening sentence, and you should add a phrase with your point of view and your source, which is what I put in my sandbox. Instead you offered an essay re-writing the whole introduction which is now on offer here.

And no, (your 1st point) I can’t see anything I said incorporated here, so I object to you trying to pass this off as some kind of joint effort.

To your 2nd point; I said you didn’t know what you were talking about!? It wasn’t me that said “ I don't mean to insult you, but have you read the article or anything about the "Battle of Atlantic"?” on 16 May; Or “Yes, sadly the official historians have no idea because they don't seem to understand what is a campaign” on 19 May; Or “ Has Oberiko read these histories?” on 28 May. But if you think Torch was in 1943, or that there were no US troop convoys in 1942, or that you’ve never heard of Western Approaches Command, I’m starting to wonder.

To your 3rd point, why am I being asked “to admit that the "Battle of Atlantic" was a number of distinct campaigns”? This whole farago is because you’ve taken exception to the description in the first sentence “The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest continuous military campaign of World War II”, which I understand is the mainstream view, and you’ve been angling to replace it with your opinion; the whole dreary story has already been aired at length  in Campaign/campaigns section  above.

So when is this going to end? Xyl 54 (talk) 13:48, 11 June 2008 (UTC)
 * I agree with Xyl54 as well. I do not see the need for a new introduction, and I do not see the need to change the description as the 'longest continuous campaign'. Buckshot06(prof) 21:40, 11 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Firstly you did ask me to place suggestions in your sandbox, and you did annotate them, so that does suggest a collaboration.
 * It is you who suggested that the idea of the "battle" being a series of campaigns was a "fringe view" referring to official histories to which I replied that in that case the official histories must be wrong. As it turned out when I did go to the library, and did look up the official histories that I was not offering a "fringe view", but indeed the "battle" was divided into campaign and operations by both English official histories, as it must if one has understanding of how navies operate and not just quotes from books.
 * I have already established eslewhere, as I hope Buckshot06 will soon confirm, that research by many published authors is not always all that good, so just because many have used "campaign" in their books really means very little as an argument, and only proves they had no clue about naval operations, because in all navies the word campaign has a defined meaning as a military term and not just a literary nicety.
 * The rewrite of the introduction is also not "an essay", but an offering of a structured introduction to the rest of the very large article (which is an essay), with offered explanation why it is written the way it is written. It is largely written to reflect those same two official histories I quoted, and not anyone's personal point of view as you state, so no, I am not trying to push my opinion since I have quoted the page and chapter of the relevant volumes.
 * Your idea of what I know is yours alone. The Western Approaches command in Roskill is initially named the Local Home Command, and Torch was a very small part of the troopship movements compared to the scale that begun to move in 1943-44, and that is what I said.
 * And yes, I would like the introduction reconsidered. What is exactly your problem with that?
 * I don't usually insert references in the introduction unless they are absolutely warranted by controversial claims of the article, but if you continue to insist that I offer a "fringe view" I will do so, if that is what it will take to improve the introduction to this article--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 22:24, 11 June 2008 (UTC)

I'm in favour of sticking with the existing, concise intro. The various commands, specific size of the ocean and other such information really isn't needed to give the user a quick summary of the conflict. Oberiko (talk) 00:19, 12 June 2008 (UTC)


 * I would not confirm anything of what Mrg3105 says above, and indeed he continues to repeat inaccuracies about basic facts. There was no 'Local Home Command,' this is a misreading of a term used to refer to home commands such as Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth, Commander-in-Chief, The Nore, and Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. Roskill may capitalise it once, but he also capitalises several other stations whose correct titles usually start with 'Commander-in-Chief', such as the Mediterranean. A more contextualised usage of 'local home command' can be found here. The Western Approaches Command, as I've just amended and sourced, started out as a additional hat for Admiral Naismith, C-in-C, Plymouth, and then moved to Liverpool and was divided. Mrg would have found this out, as well as many other things about the battle, if he had bothered to extend his reading beyond Roskill. On the point at issue, I continue to be unconvinced of any need to revise the introduction, and I doubt that Mrg's undoubted expertise on Soviet campaigns on the Eastern Front can be applied without substantial modification to an entirely different, oceanic, theatre. Buckshot06(prof) 00:32, 12 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Names of commands is immaterial here. When I looked at my notes, I have discovered that indeed Western Approaches Command is the one that was responsible for the area from west of Portland to Clyde. Northwood HQ was in fact the Coastal Command that included Iceland and Norway in its area of operations.
 * Er, no, that's RAF Coastal Command, with differing areas depending on its groups. Buckshot06(prof) 01:24, 12 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Other local home commands included Belfast, Liverpool, Milford Haven, Falmouth, Davenport and others. So what? I never professed to be an expert in the Royal Navy operations during the Second World War, Roskill was.
 * I'm also not out to convince you Buckshot06 of anything. I am simply stating facts as I see them. The fact is that both the official histories of the "Battle of Atlantic" in English divide the operations into multiple distinct campaigns. Do you dispute this fact?--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 01:02, 12 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Can you provide sources and quotes which states explicitly that it is not one long campaign? For example, the North African Campaign is broken down into several sub-campaigns (Western Desert Campaign, Tunisia Campaign etc.), but it still remains a campaign.  Considering that it was a continuous action, in a single theatre (however large), with the same objectives (shipping vs. anti-shipping) and with relatively stable combatants/forces, I don't see any problem with considering it a single campaign, even it can, perhaps, be divided into sub-campaigns. Oberiko (talk) 01:08, 12 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Endorse Oberiko's postion. Buckshot06(prof) 01:24, 12 June 2008 (UTC)

Mrg: You keep saying your viewpoint is supported by the official historians; I said I thought your interpretation there is dubious, so lets look at that a bit. In your post on 26 May you made much of the following in Roskill ( your comments from Morison weren’t actually that specific) .a) “Chapter XXI "The Battle of the Atlantic" (1st April - 31st December 1941) is preceded by "The African Campaign" (1st January - 31st May 1941) and is followed by "The Home Waters and the Arctic" operations (1st June - 31st December 1941)”, and .b) “Lest we think that Roskill is talking about the one Campaign, his next three chapters all deal with the same period, but are called "Home Waters and Arctic", "Coastal Warfare" and "Ocean Warfare".” Well, Roskill is dealing with the entire War at Sea, as the book title tells you; BotA is one of half a dozen campaigns he deals with, so BotA is bound to be met fore and aft with sections on action elsewhere. What of it? .c) “The Campaign in American Waters, resumed on the 1st January and ended on 31st July 1942.” This is ambiguous at best; the Atlantic campaign where the action shifts to US coast? Or dealing with that action as a discrete whole? Could be either, or both. .d)” "The Battle of the Atlantic. The Second Campaign on the Convoy Routes" (1st August - 31st December) 1942”, and .e)"The Battle of the Atlantic. The Second Campaign in the Western Approaches" (1st January - 31st May 1944).” Your "curious titles", and the only point with any validity. I have interpreted this as examples of a campaign within a campaign, and I don’t think I’m the only one: I gave you the examples of Narvik and Normandy, and Oberiko the Western Desert, as examples of this. But the fact that Roskill said it gives you room to post an alternative view (and that’s all!) to go with what's already there (eg a phrase like “Or as a series of campaigns over several theatres in several phases" and whatever source you think fits the bill); which I originally suggested as a way to avoid deadlock, and a long, futile discussion. (HA!) Anyway, If you want to argue over words, how about the title of the book? “Military Histories of World War Two. Campaigns volumes: The War at Sea, 1939-45” : What? The whole war at sea was a single campaign? And you commented on 28 May that the RN wouldn’t use the word “campaign” lightly: Maybe not, but they also only recognize one campaign for honours; there is a single campaign honour, “Atlantic”, covering service in the entire Battle of the Atlantic. Make of that what you will. As far as what’s in my sandbox, if you want to read anything into my annotations to what you wrote, how about me politely telling you that the intro was fine as it stood. BTW I’ll be deleting it soon, and the link to it you put in here; I’ve been feeling like someone with a guest who’s outstayed their welcome, but now I feel like I’m being burgled. Xyl 54 (talk) 12:04, 13 June 2008 (UTC)


 * I actually could not understand what it was you were trying to say. Do you have Roskill or not?
 * “Military Histories of World War Two. Campaigns volumes: The War at Sea, 1939-45” : What? The whole war at sea was a single campaign? - this verges on the ridiculous since the title of the book uses plural campaigns.
 * In any case, what is your problem with my introduction rewrite? Please be specific
 * What's already there is "The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest continuous military campaign[1] of World War II" and not “Or as a series of campaigns over several theatres in several phases", however, you asked me to make a suggestion on what the introduction should say, and I did.
 * In any case, I am neither your guest not a burglar, whatever that means. I just do not like the shape of the current introduction, and I'm trying to offer suggestions, sources and alternatives. All you are doing is telling me to go away as if you own the article, rejecting the sources, and refuse to discuss the changes I proposed --mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 12:35, 13 June 2008 (UTC)


 * You can’t understand what I said? Try reading it again, I ‘m sure it’ll come to you.


 * “…Campaign Volumes…” too subtle? Fine, I’ll take it back.


 * My problem with your Introduction? Try reading my comments over the past 4 weeks, particularly on 30 May, again. But in a nutshell, a) I think the introduction is fine as it is, and it already covers the 5 points you find essential, while your addition to doubles the length without adding anything of value, and b) it would delete the opening sentence of the article; which seems to be your agenda, as it conflicts with this fringe view you have about campaigns in general and this one in particular.


 * Anyway, You’ve been asked for a specific quote (rather than some convoluted argument) states that BotA wasn’t a single continuous campaign, as is cited, but a series of separate campaigns, as you claim,to justify even mentioning the idea. If you want to use Morison, I suggest you find something better than the vague assertions you made on 26 May; If you want to use Roskill, I will be replying along the lines of what I wrote on 13 June.


 * As for being a guest in my sandbox, don’t fret, you aren’t anymore. Xyl 54 (talk) 07:55, 19 June 2008 (UTC)

Surface raiders: dubious paragraph
I've removed this:

"The German battlecruiser tactics of retreat when challenged stand in marked contrast to the British 'Nelsonian' tactics of closing immediately with the enemy, no matter what the imbalance in firepower was. If the Kriegsmarine had stood and fought when they had good odds Convoys HX-34, HX-106 and SL-67 would have been annihilated, and the British would have likely lost the Prince of Wales as well as the Hood in the Battle of the Denmark Strait. The cause seems to be a mixture of dread of the reputation of the Royal Navy, mixed with the strategic desire to preserve the few German capital ships afloat. A lack of tactical experience is also evident - individual German battle units were in many ways superior to older Royal Navy units, and could have prevailed in set battles if handled correctly."

Can anyone see any merit in it?

This is completely speculative; Pressing on "Nelson-style" might have resulted in a satisfying gun-battle, but there’d be a good chance the raider would be lost, or crippled, and caught and sunk later; either way, it'd would be likely to spell the end of the raider.

And “annihilate the convoy”? Statistical analysis by the BotA committee showed that an attacker would be unlikely to sink more than 5-10 ships, no matter how big the convoy was; it was the argument for larger convoys, with concentrated escorts And the only times a raider did this, that is what they achieved. Xyl 54 (talk) 16:21, 11 June 2008 (UTC)

Framework pt. 2
In the bit of down-time at World War II (while we work out our own introduction issues), think I could lend a hand here for a bit? I'd like to do what I can to try and achieve some consensus for building the new framework and introduction.

When we were doing this for WWII, we started by listing the most critical events (see here for the resulting tables). Since the BotA is smaller, could we try listing everything, chronologically, that occurred within it? I think it might give us some more perspective. Oberiko (talk) 13:01, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

Events

 * Sinking of the Athenia (3 Sep 1939)
 * Battle of the River Plate (13 Dec 1939)
 * Altmark Incident (16 Feb 1940)
 * First Happy Time (25 Jun 1940 - Mar 1941)
 * Operation Berlin (Jan - Mar 1941)
 * Convoy SC-7 (16 Oct – 19 Oct 1940)
 * Convoy HX-84 (5 Nov 1940)
 * Convoy HX-106 (8 Feb - 13 Feb 1941)
 * Convoy OB-293 (6 Mar - 8 Mar 1941)
 * Convoy HX-112 (15 Mar - 17 Mar 1941)
 * U-110 is damaged, British capture a naval version of the Enigma machine (9 May 1941)
 * Unternehmen Rheinübung (18 May - 27 May 1941)
 * Battle of the Denmark Strait (24 May 1941)
 * Last battle of the battleship Bismarck (26 May - 27 May 1941)
 * Second Happy Time (14 Jan - 14 Apr 1942)
 * Convoy PQ-16 (May - Jun 1 1942)
 * Convoy PQ-17 (27 Jun - 10 Jul 1942)
 * Laconia incident (12 Sep - 16 Sep 1942)
 * Battle of the Barents Sea (31 Dec 1942)
 * Operation Cerberus (11 Feb - 13 Feb 1943)
 * Black May (1943)
 * Battle of North Cape (26 Dec 1943)

Italian contribution
Mrg: I notice you’ve changed the sources around and deleted the reference to the Italian contribution: why? Have you read this book, or something, and know for a fact it doesn’t contain this information? Given the title, it would be surprising if such a basic piece of information wasn’t there. And anyway it’s confirmed, more or less, by Padfield. So what’s the problem? Xyl 54 (talk) 12:02, 19 June 2008 (UTC)

Dubious
I've removed this: "This was attributed to insufficient anti-submarine measures and watch officer William Newbigging not being at his post.": From the account of the sinking of Royal Oak. I've never seen this anywhere, and it's unsubstantiated here; and even if it was, I'm dubious whether it's a reasonable item to be included. Any thoughts? Xyl 54 (talk) 12:10, 19 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Concur with removal from this location because of the length of this article. The excuses appear typical of those devised to explain loss of capital ships.  With a proper in-line citation, the statement might be appropriate within the article on HMS Royal Oak. Thewellman (talk) 15:39, 19 June 2008 (UTC)
 * I just came across this. There is no Newbigging (or similar) listed amongst either the survivors or dead of Royal Oak. &mdash; BillC talk 22:33, 30 September 2008 (UTC)

Opening sentence, again!
So, yet again mrg3105 is pushing his agenda to remove the opening sentence of the article, as it doesn’t fit his world view.

mrg: You have deleted the opening sentence "The "Battle of the Atlantic" was the longest continuous military campaign" again, despite being told by several people several times that the opening sentence should stay as it is, and that it is the majority view amongst historian in this field.

And the reason given is, “we don’t cite book covers”? WTF??? You object to the title of the book, so you deleted it?

The title is “The Atlantic Campaign”; you don't think that’s a clue to the content? The reason is explained in the preamble: Although the phrase Battle of the Atlantic is “a brilliant piece of rhetoric”, van der Vat feels “at this distance the Battle of the Atlantic can more clearly be seen as a campaign of many battles spread over nearly six years of war”.

And that viewpoint is throughout the book from the first page of the preface: “probably the most heavily documented campaign in history”, yet general works “covering the entire campaign” are relatively few; to the last page of text “Schroeteler (of U-1023) fired …the last torpedo of the Atlantic campaign…on 7 May 1945 - 5 years, 8 months and 4 days after Lemp torpedoed the Athenia”.

So what is it going to be now, you don’t like Dutchmen?

How about Clay Blair, he’s on the reading list: Page xiii of his preface, The Battle of the Atlantic “was a painful, bitter struggle for both sides, the most prolonged and arduous naval campaign in all history”.

Or what about Woodman? Page 1 “What history calls the Battle of the Atlantic began a few hours after the declaration of war .. on 3 September 1939 ;it ended on 8 May 1945 the day Germany surrendered” and “it was not a battle in the conventional sense but a series of actions around slow-moving convoys…” and “the outcome of this long Atlantic campaign depended on….” (And you “don’t like citations in the introduction”: well tough, now you’ve got 3).

And what are you offering in return? A book on the Soviet Navy during the Cold War? Give me a minute while I laugh out loud. So what exactly does a book about the wrong navy and the wrong conflict have to contribute to our understanding of the Battle of the Atlantic?

(No really, you’ll have to tell me; the nearest copy is in London, and as your track record for accuracy leaves something to be desired, you’ll excuse be if I want proof.)

Finally, I would have thought the view of the BotA as a single continuous campaign being widely held was self evident to anyone who has read a bit about the subject, and that anyone who didn’t know the subject wouldn’t make such a song and  dance about it, but obviously…

If you want to post a phrase with an alternative view, and your reference holds up to examination, then OK (as you’ve been told before). You do NOT have right to delete what is already there. Xyl 54 (talk) 15:10, 9 July 2008 (UTC)

PS I've posted it for you, as a compromise; but I'd like to see the exact wording, if it's going to stay. Xyl 54 (talk) 17:23, 9 July 2008 (UTC)


 * The Oxford Companion to the Second World War also calls it a series of campaigns, and is a much better source than the one Mrg is using. It does go on to say that while the German effort shifted several times during the war (eg, as submarines were focused on different areas), the nature of the battle was constant for the Allies throughout the war (especially as they couldn't predict where the Germans would focus with certainty and had to escort shipping everywhere). Personally, I agree that the weight of references calls this a single campaign but both classifications have some justice. How about changing the introduction to read something like:
 * "The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest continuous military campaign of World War II and involved the Axis powers attempting to stop the Allies from moving supplies across the Atlantic Ocean during the war. The focus of the campaign shifted as the Axis redeployed their naval forces in response to Allied offensives, technological developments and other events, and the battle is sometimes considered to have been a series of campaigns rather than a single campaign. The Battle of the Atlantic began on the first day of the war in 1939, reached its peak in 1943 and did not end until the German surrender in 1945. While the Axis sank many ships, they were not successful in cutting the Allied supply routes and suffered very heavy losses from 1943 onwards."
 * That seems to cover all bases and provides a condensed history of the battle. Thoughts? Nick Dowling (talk) 03:57, 10 July 2008 (UTC)


 * This is just surreal! I offered citations derived from throughout the two official histories in English which were rejected! Instead I am offered a book title, a quote from inside the jacket of a book (is that even citable?!), a preface, and page 1!!! I actually had the occasion to cite a source from page one recently, and that was the extreme example because the subject of the entire book was defined in one sentence in that page. I think I have no recourse but to take it to Reliable sources/Noticeboard lest I become "uncivil" again--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 10:14, 10 July 2008 (UTC)
 * Nick Dowling's version seems an acceptable compromise. In passing, I should add that official histories written in the 1960s are not up-to-date scholarship; better to rely on more recent historical works. Buckshot06(prof) 10:38, 10 July 2008 (UTC)


 * And what sources to you think the "up-to-date scholarship" books refer to? --mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 12:34, 10 July 2008 (UTC)


 * I fail to see what the problem with quoting from the first pages of books is given that we're discussing the first sentance of the article here - these seem to be the obvious place to look for a single sentance summation of the nature of the battle. Nick Dowling (talk) 11:56, 10 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Is this some new guideline that says any reference cited in the introduction can come from books not read past the first page?
 * The introduction is a summary of the article, introducing the subject of the article as a whole.
 * Does the article describe one campaign? Count the sections in the article Nick.
 * I'm sure you have some notion of naval operations. No campaign goes on across multiple hemispheres and continental waters for six years as part of one set of campaign planning. The defence forces have a technical term for it - physical impossibility--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 12:25, 10 July 2008 (UTC)
 * I don't understand the point you're trying to make here, I'm afraid. Multiple direct quotes have been provided to support both interpretations. By the way, the sentance from the Oxford Companion to World War II which I referenced to support the classification you prefer is actually the very first sentance in its article on the Battle of the Atlantic... Nick Dowling (talk) 23:41, 10 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Belated reply!


 * Nick : Yes, your sentence looks OK to me; I didn’t know the Oxford Companion said that (and I suppose I’m surprised), but at least it’s verifiable. So I can live with it ( though I suspect it isn’t me you need to convince.).


 * Mrg : OK, now you don’t like sources from prefaces, or odd numbered pages; so how about Marc Milner’s Battle of the Atlantic, page 8 “ Thus began the Battle of the Atlantic, the longest campaign of the Second World War and the largest and most complex submarine campaign in history”.


 * And before you say another word about how unacceptable these sources are, you need to substantiate your Soviet Navy source; just what does it actually say? ( And lets be clear, you didn’t “offer citations derived from throughout the two official histories” at all; you cited 2 chapter headings from Roskill (your post above, 26 May, my reply 13 June)).


 * And the issue isn’t that you can’t put your opinion, if it’s backed by a decent source; it’s that you keep insisting your interpretation is the only possibility, despite the evidence mounting up against you. Xyl 54 (talk) 13:10, 11 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Xyl 54, Nick, when writing "global" articles, you need to have "global" understanding of the subject, which is not derived from the titles or even the preface of books. The references also need to come from works that specifically deal with the subject and not general references like Oxford Companion. The sad part about Wikipedia is that it is written by amateurs, and while there is no shortage of people generating articles, very few are properly referenced because people just do not understand what citing references means. In the academia this is looked at as the primary source of work assessment, and many academics begin assessment of student works by reading citations and bibliographies first, as do I. Reference have to be appropriate to suit the context of the part being referenced. If you are talking about a "largest campaign" cite a source that talks about the planning and execution of the campaign and not just any page you can find that says "largest campaign" on.
 * My "Soviet" source needs very little substantiation. As with the previous sources, they come from not just a naval writer, but from a former navy officer, in this case a Rear Admiral of the Federal German Navy, and a former operations officer on Naval Staff West in Paris in the Kriegsmarine. He was also Commander, Naval Forces NATO, Baltic Approaches from 63-65. The reason I used him is because he was directly involved in the Atlantic campaigns and operations from the other side as it were, and also had to consider operations similar to the "Battle of Atlantic" after the Second World War. This made the work valuable in terms of experience of the author and the comparative perspective. You will note that the Naval Institute Press is not your average naval history publisher, and Annapolis, Maryland has a notable institution as a source of both contributors and patrons, from the subject perspective.
 * What Wegener says is far from new, but seems to be missing in Wikipedia, namely the element of naval warfare called mastery of the sea (italics in the source). He says
 * Naval warfare is concerned with shipping routes. This was true in the past, is true in our time, and will remain true in the future. He who can put these shipping routes to use for his own commercial and military transports, and manage to exclude the adversary from their use, brings about a condition that is referred to as mastery of the sea.


 * This opening paragraph is intended for reading by serving naval officers, and not Second World War hobbyists, and so there is a footnote that references it to Alfred Thayer Mahan who first defined it, and to the British historian Sir Julian Corbett who was so influential on the British naval strategic thinking that he is still, and will probably always be remembered when the Oxford Companion is no longer in print. I would highly recommend the Wegener book as a read, and having just looked on Amazon, I see that not only is it still available after 30 years (I got mine in early 80s), but is to be had for under a dollar!
 * What Wegener says is that naval power is comprised of three elements: the fleet, the position, and sea-oriented mentality. I am not going to go into descriptions of all three, but suffice it to say he goes well beyond the simple technical merits of specific vessel classes as a means of assessing naval power. When you write the article on the Battle of Atlantic, you need to be aware that people reading it may have a very professional point of view, and will get a good laugh from it because you completely disregard all three factors from the first line in the introduction! In general, and certainly during the Second World War, the FLEET, and the POSITION (in British parlance since the 18th century, the Station) were synonymous, and reflected the naval campaigning from the strategic sea-oriented mentality of the planners. This is why the multi-volume offerings of Roskill and Morison are divided the way they are divided. I only quoted chapters to illustrate the methodology of their research, because when you read a work, you also need to be aware of how it was written, and not just consider the contents!
 * Now that you have had a good laugh at my expense, "what exactly does a book about the wrong navy and the wrong conflict have to contribute to our understanding of the Battle of the Atlantic" is a source of operational comparative research. It is always useful when trying to understand a subject to find another "apple" to compare it with, particularly when the comparison is being done by an expert, and one who has a view from the other side.
 * Quite frankly I am taking leave from military history in Wikipedia for a while (no doubt to your relief) because I find it is associated with too much stress where military history Project is concerned. As far as I'm concerned, I am not happy with either the coordination or the administration of the project, and with the standards being applied to the editing of articles. I accept that some is based in the nature of Wikipedia, however the last experience of trying to prove that an operation name is not derived from the book title proved to be the last straw in my willingness to endure "lowest common denominator" as an approach to editing standards. It is the standard being applied here. Consider that, when you are having a laugh, because while you are just one individual having a laugh at me, there are I assure you many more who are having a laugh at Wikipedia.
 * The upshot of all this - I will never recommend a Wikipedia article to anyone, even if I had edited it in the past--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 00:11, 12 July 2008 (UTC)
 * Hmm. You were asked what it actually said; you presented it as a source for the statement “The Battle of the Atlantic was a series of campaigns” and were asked for the wording, not just your interpretation of what you thought the author seemed to mean. You STILL haven’t done that. Are you ever going to do more than argue the toss to get your own way? Xyl 54 (talk) 10:22, 12 July 2008 (UTC)


 * PS And you can insult me all you want ("amateur"? "armchair historian"? and you are neither of these?).WP is a co-operative venture/exercise, and if you want to play here you’ll need to learn to do more than bluster. Xyl 54 (talk) 11:00, 12 July 2008 (UTC)


 * If people were permitted to call spade a spade in Wikipedia, I would tell you what I think of your approach to editing. Essentially you have taken OWNERSHIP of the article, and now you ask me to summarise entire books so I might explain to you how navies, particularly during the Second World War worked. I am not going to "play to your fiddle". Have better things to do than teach you how to think and read for yourself. YOU go and read the book, and not just cling at odd quotes and book covers. Find out what fleet operations were like in the Atlantic for all sides. Find out how ships and crews worked, and how naval staffs plan operations rather than just copy text from book to book. This article is not passing review from sentence #1 so far as I'm concerned, and I am but an amateur compared to real naval officers. I don't have to explain things that should be obvious to anyone who has read anything of substance on the subject. For the record, I don't care if there are hundreds of books that say operations in the Atlantic was a 6-year long campaign. It just means that hundreds of authors have no idea what they write about. My recent experience with the Manchurian operation confirms low standards of research in military history since no one questioned a fictitious operational name for 25 years, so why would this be different. Some editor(s) say to the author(s), lets call it "The Atlantic Campaign" because we are only publishing one book of 300 pages and not four volumes over eight years, and you think that it was a 6-year long naval campaign. That is just the Google-count approach to military history research, history by online statistics! Well, Atlantic campaign gets more hits in Google, so it must be true :-) best wishes--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 00:22, 14 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Mrg, Wikipedia is not, and is never going to be, a reference tailored for military professionals and people who are experts in military history. Nick Dowling (talk) 11:47, 14 July 2008 (UTC)
 * So who gets to decide how, and to which degree the rest of the prols are misinformed?--mrg3105 (comms) ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣ 05:20, 6 August 2008 (UTC)

Last submarine battle
I’ve removed the account of the “last submarine battle of the war”, because it wasn’t. It wasn’t even the last engagement of the Battle of the Atlantic; at least 3 U-boats were destroyed in action after this.

OTOH the event is notable, so I’ve put it on its own page here. Xyl 54 (talk) 07:55, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

Also I’ve trimmed the account of U-320; this is undue weight for a boat that is entirely un-notable save that she was the last to be destroyed. I’ve moved that to a new page also, which deals with the events of that day. (Which would be the place for such detail, or the U-320 page). Xyl 54 (talk) 08:46, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

B-class assessment criteria
Returning to this article, I was surprised that it's still only start quality. I added B criteria standard explanations, read the article and added the y/n entries. These only hide my personal disappointment. The lack of citations is minor - a mechanical process. Who have we written for? My view is that we write for interested readers who are unlikely to be experts (aka "proles"). Experts would hopefully go elsewhere for specialised info and research, and then write a book. As an interested reader with a broad, but incomplete, knowledge, I find the article a turn-off. It's as if the author(s) have written to show their knowledge rather than to inform. For instance, the section on ASDIC: why is it so early in the article, before the reader has an understanding of events? The info itself is interesting, but too detailed for an overview; such depth is better in the ASDIC article (I don't challenge the accuracy, just the impact on the article's "flow"). Phrasing is also a problem, that's IMO, of course. In the criteria, I put a "yes" for structure, there is a structure, BUT we have long sections with long grey paragraphs; there's something in style guidelines about readability. I could go on but I really don't want to offend when clearly some editors care strongly about the article. It's just a shame that we argue about detail when there's so much to be fixed overall. I'll try to add citations as I find them. I also added more task forces to reflect the wide range of participants - I can make a case for each, if necessary. This is a long grey block of text, a turn-off, isn't it? Folks at 137 (talk) 22:15, 18 December 2008 (UTC)


 * I think that those comments are too kind. I agree with your comments on the over-emphasis on selected technologies and bit blocks of text, and also think that the article does a poor job of covering its topic. The tiny amount of coverage of the U-Boat campaigns of 1944 and 1945 is a good example of this: while these campaigns were one sided and are often over-looked by historians, the Germans maintained a large-scale submarine effort until the last day of the war, and suffered huge casualties in trying to achieve the impossible during these years. Nick-D (talk) 10:40, 19 December 2008 (UTC)


 * This has been discussed before, but without much of a conclusion. Did you have a suggestion for improving this?


 * The comment about content on 1944-45 is fair enough; I tried to add a bit, but it’s difficult to know how much is reasonable in a general article. I’d thought the various stages of the campaign should all have their own articles.


 * The balance between tech stuff and narrative is a problem; maybe all the tech paragraphs should be summarized and moved to/merged with their own articles.


 * This article was comprehensively re-written in November 2006 anyway; maybe we should talk to the bloke who did that first. Xyl 54 (talk) 13:05, 5 January 2009 (UTC)