Talk:Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River

Nice Job
Nicely done. --Murat (talk) 17:14, 26 December 2009 (UTC)
 * Thanks. Jim101 (talk) 18:27, 26 December 2009 (UTC)

Yes, thorough and well-written, but corrected a few minor grammatical mistakes.Haberstr (talk) 19:03, 5 May 2010 (UTC)

Two comments
The article is a much-needed addition. But one thing confused me. In the lead, it's said that the Eighth Army's right flank was destroyed on November 25. Then in the Background section it's said that the Eighth Army's right flank had already been destroyed on October 25 and November 4. Was it subsequently "repaired"? Then later in the Actions at Tokchon and Yongwon section it relates the November 25 action, but then it says by November 27, the UN right flank fell to the Chinese. Is this the same flank as the Eighth Army one or a different one? Then in the Actions at Kunu-ri section, it talks about the 2nd Division being forced to stay at Kunu-ri in order to hold the Eighth Army's right flank. How can you hold something that's already been destroyed? This needs a little clarification.

And one thing seems really missing, which is a description of the nature and characteristics of the battle as faced by the soldiers. The article doesn't mention "cold" once, but the cold is a central element of every account I've read of this period in Korea. Temperatures were sometimes subzero, and several memoirs and accounts of soldiers say it's the coldest they've ever been in their lives. Also, exhaustion and diminishing food supplies were an issue for the US troops. And what about morale, on both sides? All of this needs some coverage in the article to capture the human element of the battle, and not just the battle piece mechanics of which unit attacked which unit. Wasted Time R (talk) 14:29, 13 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks for the feedback. The Eighth Army right flank was indeed repaired by November 24. The Chinese took it out again on November 25, and after that the US 2nd Division became the effective right flank of the Eighth Army from November 26 and onward. I will check the narrative to see if I missed anything.
 * As for the personal elements, the reason I sort of avoided that because the environment impact on the overall combat performance on both side is somewhat negligible when compared with Battle of Chosin Reservoir. For example, I also read several account on the cold winter, by I did not find any mentions/analysis that the cold weather had actually mauled any unit formations or prevented people from fighting back. On the point of food and ammunition shortage, it is correct that the UN was suffering food, ammunition and clothing shortage and fatigue, but the Chinese were also suffering from the same problem on a much larger scale. My thought on the matter is that since I cannot find any evidence that the weather and logistics significant affected the outcome of the battle, it's best to leave it out lest people start to take details out of context. Now according to you concerns, I may have been neglecting the weather impact on the battle. I will see if I can find more sources that details the weather impact on the battle. Jim101 (talk) 00:21, 14 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I check the weather report, and it appears that the weather was normal. The night was cold, but during the day it was quite warm. The cold front that arrived at the Chosin Reservoir did not actually affect the Ch'ongch'on River Valley. The UN logistics also have problems, but the Eighth Army did spent for two weeks to stock up on supply in order to make up for the weakness. I could not collect any reports of winter clothing problems among the combat troops in November, despite the initial winter shock and logistics chaos at the end of October 1950. The only thing I could find is that a lot of soldiers built bonfires to ward off the cold, and vehicles needs to warm up once in a while at night, and after that, nothing.
 * But it is widely reported that the Eighth Army half-heartedly enter the battle with extremely high moral, and in the aftermath was completely demoralized. But I don't see the point of adding this to the article, since this point is somewhat disputed and also has no impact on the course of this battle. Jim101 (talk) 21:58, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm not disputing what you've found, but here are some examples of histories and soldier's accounts of their being cold, and often bitterly cold, at Kuni-ri: Disaster in Korea by Roy E. Appleman, This Kind of War by T. R. Fehrenbach, And I Haven't Had a Bad Day Since by future U.S. Congressman Charles Rangel (which is how I got here), I Remember Korea: Veterans Tell Their Stories of the Korean War, 1950-53 by Linda Granfield, An American Dream: The life of an African American soldier and POW by Clarence Adams, A Celebration of Life by Cecil Mark Inman, The Useless Servants by Rolando Hinojosa (fictional but apparently based on his own experiences), and so on ... these are just a couple of pages of Google Books hits that are viewable. Wasted Time R (talk) 01:14, 18 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Well, it is cold, I'm not disputing that, since after all it is winter in Korea. The problem is just how cold, quantitatively speaking. The most important impact of the cold is that it made all the soldiers to build bonfire at night, which made them perfect targets for Chinese attacks. The second most important impact was that the weather is one factor that caused the soldiers to drop equipments, but ill discipline within the ranks usually gets the blame for this issue. Without any reports like the total numbers of frostbite casualties, extreme temperature readings, or how fatigue preventing people from moving and firing weapons, generalized statement such as "bitterly cold", "so cold that I can't breath" or "the stream froze" just don't show the importance of weather. Jim101 (talk) 01:44, 18 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Aha, got one, -30 °F...at least now we are working with something more solid. Jim101 (talk) 02:03, 18 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Doing a quick scan again, Fehrenback (page 227) says that "In the ten degree weather, soldiers were becoming exhausted and apathetic" and didn't move even when Chinese fire was coming down on them. This is at 3 pm on the day of the Gauntlet.  Rangel's account says that in the cold, a lot of the soldiers' rifles froze up.  The Inman account says that the cold was one of the causes of panic in inexperienced men.  So I think operational efficiency was affected, if that's what you're looking for.  Wasted Time R (talk) 11:43, 18 March 2010 (UTC)
 * That exhaustion at the Gauntlet is normally attributed to the fierce battle at Kujang-dong, two days before the battle of Kunu-ri, in which after three days of battle the 2nd Division was already exhausted and badly mauled. As Appleman put it, a lot of soldiers and officers at this point were suffering "battle fatigue" after 5 days of constant Chinese attack with no sleep. As for weapons, again, most of the blames were placed on discipline problems that prevented soldiers from maintaining equipment and adequate supplies of ammunition. It's one thing to say the weapon malfunctioned due to the cold during the battle, it is a completely different matter when a lot of weapons were uncleaned with soldiers only carrying one clip of ammunition to battle before the cold weather set in. Jim101 (talk) 13:32, 18 March 2010 (UTC)

I waited to see if any else wanted to voice a view. I respect the amount of work you've put into this article, and that you don't want it to be subject to random anecdotal accounts. Nevertheless, I think you've got a closed mind towards the impact of cold on this battle, and are ignoring a series of sources that indicate otherwise. Moreover, you refuse to include in the article the other human aspects of the battle that you've brought up in this discussion, such as battle fatigue and poor discipline and overall morale. The result is that the article reads like a battle fought by robots rather than a battle fought by people. If I thought you were open towards human aspects, I would suggest that you include in the "Aftermath" section a mention of the "Bugout Boogie", an unapproved folk ballad of the 2nd Division about Kunu-ri – see Fehrenbach book, p. 202ff – but I'm pretty confident you'll say that was another result of poor discipline and ignore it. I won't persist here since it's fruitless, but if I ever happen to see this article up for MILHIST A-class or FAC, I'll oppose it then on these grounds. Wasted Time R (talk) 14:00, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I'll wait for another voice too, since the issue here is beyond the scope of this battle, it is about the Military history of African Americans and exactly what happened to the old Deuce Four (and other black units) during the battle. I'll stick to the military history aspect of the battle and leave the cultural aspect to someone else. Jim101 (talk) 16:52, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I don't know what you're referring to here; only one of the sources I've brought up had anything to do with black units. The role of black units in these battles can certainly be added to the article, but it's got nothing to do with the cold or anything else I've mentioned so far.  This seems like a red herring to me.   Wasted Time R (talk) 17:52, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
 * The "Bugout Boogie" is reputedly created by Deuce Four for their poor performance at Ipsok, and it is a controversial song to the segregation on the US Army. Jim101 (talk) 18:00, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I would have to agree with User:Wasted Time R that the weather aspect of the battle is very important. The weather didn't win or lose the fight for anyone, but it had a significant impact on the morale of the soldiers, and likely caused problems for resupply, communications, and mobility of formations. In the project I'm currently working on, Battle of Pusan Perimeter, I've been trying to add information as to how the heat impacted the battle in a section similar to the "weather and terrain" one here. I wouldn't say it necessarily needs to be added in the narrative, but some of the potential effects the weather had are notable, especially if some of the books published make claims about the impact of the weather on this specific battle. Additions to the terrain and weather section could say something like, "Subsequent research has since attributed this cold weather to difficulties in morale, etc etc etc (ref)"— Ed! (talk) 18:20, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I did add a line about the winter is the coldest in 100 years. Should that be enough? I mean I did not find any military history research and combat analysis that actually factored the weather into the combat performance of the soldiers. The problem I'm now having is the weight between factors...discipline or the weather that caused the problem? If I dwell too much on weather, then it's undue weight, if I dwell too much on discipline, then I will step on NPOV. It's a rather tricky situation right now. Jim101 (talk) 18:39, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I don't think the discussion on the weather needs to be extensive. A Paragraph or two maybe in the terrain section. Unless there is a source that claims the weather had a substantial impact on this battle specifically, all that needs to be said is that the weather at this point in the conflict was contributing to decreased morale and some of the things you mentioned above happened as a result of it. — Ed! (talk) 18:45, 27 March 2010 (UTC)

Well, I added two generic effects of the cold that is not covered by the discipline problems. Unless a new research in the caliber of S.L.A. Marshall or Roy Appleman comes out that discuss the weather issue more extensively, this is much as I can do without stepping on undue weight. Jim101 (talk) 18:57, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I don't understand your concern about weighting. You've got 6,500 words telling how the 24th unit of this joined the 45th unit of that to attack the 31st unit of something else.  A few words about weather or other human factors aren't going to overwhelm everything else.  And if discipline was a factor in these battles, then mention it for Pete's sake.  You're hardly "dwelling" on it, as the word doesn't appear once in the article right now!  It doesn't violate NPOV to relate that human fallibility occurs in war.  Wasted Time R (talk) 20:06, 27 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Alright...this is going to take a while, and a few more months of finding footnotes and organizing information. And since most of the article is on regiment sized combat, creating sub articles for this battle seems to be a more logical way to go. Jim101 (talk) 20:14, 27 March 2010 (UTC)

Germany?
I dont understand this sentence: "Boosted by a Thanksgiving feast with roasted turkeys on the eve of the advance, the morale was high among the UN ranks, and home by Christmas and Germany by spring was in everyone's mind."

Was there a plan to station the eight army in Germany after the Korean war was over? Åkebråke (talk) 23:40, 14 December 2015 (UTC)

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