Talk:Bernard Montgomery

Race to Berlin
An author has added a summary that "Eisenhower's conservative broad front strategy resulted in the Red Army reaching Berlin well ahead of the Western Allies."

It is my understanding that the US government had agreed in advance to allow Stalin to capture Berlin, so there never was a "race" as such. This was to persuade Stalin to assist with invading Japan, as well as to save hundreds of thousands of American (and British) lives. A "dagger thrust" through hundreds of miles of enemy territory, across many dozens of bridges and other choke-points, far from the UK airfields and the Channel supply ports, would have resulted in a hundred more Market Garden disasters.

This line should therefore rather read: "Since the US had decided to allow Stalin to capture Berlin anyway, Eisenhower stuck to his conservative broad front strategy, despite the wishes of Churchill, Brooke and Montgomery."

Agreed? Wdford (talk) 13:11, 15 August 2021 (UTC)


 * That user was me. My own understanding is that Stalin probably thought Roosevelt had agreed to this, and indeed Roosevelt may have done so, at Yalta. Antony Beevor believes that much of what was agreed at Yalta might not have been properly understood by Roosevelt, who was handicapped by believing he had established a relationship of trust with Stalin (as well, of course, as being terminally ill). But it's pretty clear that Churchill didn't accept that he was bound by whatever Roosevelt had said, and a fortiori neither did Montgomery or Brooke. But Eisenhower was the main arbiter of the strategy and - unless you know better - he may not have been acting in accordance with an expressed view from Roosevelt, merely from a cautious approach to the final stages of the war. I'm happy with your suggested revision, though. Thomas Peardew (talk) 16:30, 15 August 2021 (UTC)


 * For what it it's worth (and trying to avoid infringing Beevor's copyright excessively) here is what he says prior to the "insufferable" reference:
 * The battle for the Rhineland, which began during the talks at Yalta, was also slow and deliberate. Eisenhower was in no hurry. He thought that spring floodwater would make the Rhine impassable until the beginning of May. It was to take another six weeks before all Eisenhower’s armies were ready on the west bank of the Rhine. Only the miracle of capturing intact the Rhine bridge at Remagen allowed an acceleration of the programme.


 * Eisenhower was deeply irritated by the continuing British criticism of his methodical broad-front strategy. Churchill, Brooke and Field Marshal Montgomery all wanted a reinforced breakthrough to head for Berlin. Their reasons were mainly political. The capture of Berlin before the Red Army arrived would help to restore the balance of power with Stalin. Yet they also felt on military grounds that to seize the capital of the Reich would deal the greatest psychological blow to German resistance and shorten the war.


 * From this, it does appear that Churchill, Brooke, and Montgomery would have liked a race to Berlin.Thomas Peardew (talk) 16:40, 15 August 2021 (UTC)


 * Hi there. I don't know if we can really assume that Roosevelt was or was not fully understanding the issues – unless we have serious sources, which I have never seen. On the other hand, the discussions re the occupation zones and the future joint action against Japan etc are broadly accepted.


 * It's quite possible that the Brits did not want to accept the US position, but that is irrelevant. However I doubt that Ike disobeyed orders from above on this point – if Marshall had ordered him to focus on Berlin he would have engaged Marshall on it, but not simply ignored the order. He did undoubtedly have a cautious approach to the final stages of the war – the US still had a lot of fighting ahead of them in the Pacific, and unlike the USSR they could not afford to be reckless with resources or personnel.


 * We should also note that the main reason why the western armies were slow to reach the Rhine was logistical, in no small part due to Monty's blow-out at Arnhem and his failure to secure the use of Antwerp harbour, as well as the Ardennes counter-attack – and Monty's slow response there as well. Bedessem also writes that the Allies were 300 miles from Berlin when the USSR were only 30 miles away, so the "race" was pointless. Ike therefore focused on the Ruhr, protecting Denmark and the possibility that the Nazi fanatics might create a fortress in the Alps, so as to drag the war out further.


 * It is highly unlikely that Monty could have reached Berlin first – it would have been a Market Garden 300 miles long, with reduced air cover, and Allied logistics were always stretched. Here is a quote I found at Operation Market Garden, where Ike tells Monty why a "single thrust" toward Berlin was not viable: "What you're proposing is this – if I give you all the supplies you want, you could go straight to Berlin – right straight to Berlin? Monty, you're nuts. You can't do it. What the hell[?] ... If you try a long column like that in a single thrust you'd have to throw off division after division to protect your flanks from attack.[45]"


 * If Monty had somehow managed to penetrate all the way to Berlin, the Western Allies would have struggled to prevail in Berlin – the Germans had substantial forces left in Berlin, they held out for two weeks against the massive USSR armies and inflicted about 300,000 casualties on the USSR. Based on Monty's performance at Caen, the Germans in Berlin might have held out indefinitely.


 * It is also highly unlikely that Stalin would have waited patiently on the outskirts while Britain tried to claim the glory - Hitler had trashed Moscow and Stalingrad and Leningrad, among others, and Stalin wanted to capture Berlin very badly indeed. Even if the Western Allies had arrived in Berlin first, Stalin's army was about 20 times larger than the British Army, and Stalin would have brushed Monty away – perhaps even with casualties and future hostilities. It would have gratified Monty's ego and Britain's prestige to get there first, but it would not have achieved anything else. Ike and Marshall were not prepared to absorb 100,000 unnecessary casualties to boost Monty's ego or Churchill's re-election chances.


 * Please see our article Western Allied invasion of Germany for an existing treatment of the topic, and also particularly the section "Eisenhower switches his main thrust to U.S. 12th Army Group front (28 March)". To quote extensively from that work: "The British Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff strongly opposed the new plan. Despite the Russian proximity to Berlin, they argued that the city was still a critical political, if not military, objective. Eisenhower, supported by the American Chiefs of Staff, disagreed. His overriding objective was the swiftest military victory possible. Should the U.S. political leadership direct him to take Berlin, or if a situation arose in which it became militarily advisable to seize the German capital, Eisenhower would do so. Otherwise, he would pursue those objectives that would end the war soonest. In addition, since Berlin and the rest of Germany had already been divided into occupation zones by representatives of the Allied governments at the Yalta Conference, Eisenhower saw no political advantage in a race for Berlin. Any ground the Western Allies gained in the future Soviet zone would merely be relinquished to the Soviets after the war. In the end, the campaign proceeded as Eisenhower had planned it.[44]"


 * Please see also our detailed article on Broad front versus narrow front controversy in World War II, although this article is less neutral than it could be.


 * It also seems that Churchill was inclined to trust Stalin, especially regarding the future of Poland. See eg the Yalta Conference article, particularly at Aftermath – Eastern Bloc, and the discussion re the future "zones of occupation". Stalin broke a lot of his promises after the war was over, leading to the Cold War.


 * I will start to tweak the article wording. Please add more as you see fit. Wdford (talk) 22:01, 15 August 2021 (UTC)


 * I agree. This passage struck me when looking at the article. Clearly, Roosevelt had a different approach to Churchill with regards to Stalin. However, the military realities of a race to Berlin remain the same.--Jack Upland (talk) 07:37, 13 January 2022 (UTC)
 * Given the actual balance of forces and the logistical situation at the time, the Germans could not have done a great deal about a full-blooded Allied advance to Berlin with tactical and strategic air support. Recall that it took most of the German army in the West to subdue a single lightly-armed British airborne division at Arnhem. Eisenhower simply chose to direct his troops elsewhere, including the enormous and somewhat ridiculous diversion to deal with the 'Southern Redoubt' that never existed, because of an American political decision that the Soviets should take Berlin, with deeply unfortunate consequences for postwar Europe. The Americans seem to have done this partly to disoblige the British and French and partly to secure a Soviet declaration of war against Japan, which turned out be nugatory. Khamba Tendal (talk) 20:04, 27 April 2023 (UTC)


 * More British delusion. It did NOT take most of the German army in the West to subdue the Arnhem pencil thrust – the best of the German army in the West was gathering east of the Ardennes to launch a counter-attack, and we now know how powerful that assembly proved to be. If Monty had been hit in the flank by the German Ardennes armies while on the road, he would have been pulverised.


 * The Arnhem advance was actually halted by a handful of scratch battalions, and was ultimately undone by the river-bridge choke-points which halted the follow-up units. There are many rivers between the Rhine and Berlin, and the debacle would have been repeated over and over. The Arnhem debacle proved that the pencil-thrust idea is stupid, and the German Ardennes offensive – on a much larger scale – again proved that this idea is stupid. Fortunately, Ike was not stupid.


 * The advance was not "halted by a handful of scratch battalions". it was stopped by the failure to capture intact the bridge at Son and the bridge at Nijmegen, both intended to be seized by US paratroopers who failed, the Nijmegen bridge only being captured with the assistance of XXX Corps when it finally arrived there several days later having been delayed by the need to replace the blown bridge at Son.


 * Market Garden was scheduled to last 48 hours. The British Paras in Arnhem had food and ammunition for this period. Instead of being captured within the first few hours of the operation's commencement so that XXX Corps could quickly advance into Arnhem the Waal bridge was finally captured four days later.


 * Montgomery must have had the patience of a Saint. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.8.126.91 (talk) 17:37, 1 January 2024 (UTC)


 * Into 1945 the German armies defending the Ruhr were still potent enough to do serious damage, particularly when they were defending river crossings. When the Russians got to Berlin they discovered how much German force was still left, and they took huge casualties subduing Berlin. British supply problems would have limited a Monty thrust to a handful of divisions, and the German defenders would have swatted them aside.


 * On top of which, the Russians had been promised Berlin, and they would not have tolerated a Monty presence either. A conceited British general swaggering around Berlin would have made the Cold War worse, not better.


 * The Alpine Fortress was never established, but it was a logical idea, and Ike couldn't ignore the risk. The Ardennes assault had shown that Hitler was unpredictable and occasionally successful in his madness, and the USA had another war to fight in the Pacific and did not want the war in Europe to drag out any longer than the bare minimum.


 * There was no "American political decision that the Soviets should take Berlin" – this was a joint Allied agreement, reached much earlier. Stalin wanted to capture Berlin so as to avenge the huge Russian losses at Moscow and Leningrad etc, and the western Allies would not have prevailed against Germany at any stage without the Soviets soaking up 75% of the German strength. Stalin had to be kept happy - the British army couldn't cope with the school-boys of the Hitler Youth at Caen, and they would have been obliterated if the veteran panzer armies had been released back from the Eastern Front by a Russian "standstill". The British "difficulties" at Caen also illustrated the limitations of using air power against enemies who were not out in the open, and the winter weather obstructed Allied air power considerably too.


 * The massive Soviet invasion of Manchuria proved to be a significant factor in shortening the war against Japan. The very opposite of "nugatory".


 * Why would the USA want to "disoblige" the British and the French? The USA was never obliged to the British in the first place. Why would Ike sacrifice 100,000 American soldiers to boost the egos and careers of Monty and Churchill?


 * The main reason Ike resisted the pencil thrust idea was logistical – they couldn't sustain an advance in strength so far into Germany at that time, whereas the Russians were already much closer to Berlin – and were advancing irresistibly on a very broad front. Go read up at Broad front versus narrow front controversy in World War II and follow the many references.


 * Wdford (talk) 19:29, 28 April 2023 (UTC)

The failure of Market Garden was caused by ridiculously over-optimistic assumptions, a disregard of recon intelligence and Dutch warnings, and Monty's desperate need to do something "amazing" so as to strengthen his self-deluded desire to be the Man Who Won the War. The decision to focus the 82nd Airborne initially on the Groosbeek Heights rather than the bridge was made by the British general Browning, not any US frontline general. A pencil-thrust to Berlin would have suffered from all these same problems, on a vastly greater scale. Read a proper historical source - there is a vey good reason why cherry-picked YouTube videos are not considered to be a reliable source for Wikipedia. Wdford (talk) 19:51, 1 January 2024 (UTC)


 * No. Just no. Market Garden was premised on the false assumption by both Eisenhower and Montgomery that the enemy was about to pack it in, which we now know he wasn't. That is why Eisenhower, despite assuming direct ground-force command, did not order Montgomery to clear the Scheldt and open Antwerp to shipping. (Indeed he failed to do so until October, as the article equally fails to point out.) Like Monty, he mistakenly thought the war would be over in weeks, before Antwerp's vast supply capacity was needed. He also thought the war would be over before he could use the First Allied Airborne Army, as Roosevelt and Marshall insisted he do for American publicity purposes, unless he used it immediately. He therefore ordered Montgomery to make an advance using First Airborne Army, and that formation's hopeless and usually drunk commander, Brereton, would not allow a left-turn attack with a drop on the Scheldt (unsuitable terrain, he said) or a right-turn attack on the Ruhr with Wesel as the target (too much flak, he said), so Montgomery could only go the way he did, north up the middle to Arnhem on the only available road.
 * The operation was then fatally compromised by the refusal of Brereton and Maj-Gen Paul Williams of IX Troop Carrier Command to allow more than one lift per day, even on the first day, for unsatisfactory reasons (they claimed that American ground crew could not 'turn round' C-47s for two lifts in 13 hours of daylight, and also claimed that American escort fighter pilots could neither take off in dawn conditions nor land in dusk conditions, both claims arguably libelling the personnel concerned), these inept decisions making the build-up of the airborne divisions hopelessly slow, which, along with the idiotically distant drop and resupply zones assigned to British First Airborne relative to the objective, surrendered the advantage of surprise which was the main asset of airborne troops and handed the advantage back to the Germans, who duly took it.
 * Brereton's insistence on grounding the fighters and fighter-bombers of RAF Second Tactical Air Force during 'his' lifts, that is, whenever the weather was suitable for flying in daylight throughout the operation, was also catastrophic and had the effect of ceding air superiority over the battlefield to the enemy for the only time in the entire North-West Europe campaign, which frankly was incompetence of a high order.
 * The 82nd Airborne's failure to seize the bridge at Nijmegen the first day was not solely General Browning's fault, because General Gavin ignored him and ordered regimental commander Lindquist to take it anyway, but Gavin gave the order many hours too late, near nightfall (when the Germans had had time to reinforce) and Lindquist fumbled it, attacking in insufficient strength and on the wrong route -- Gavin told him to infiltrate along the riverbank and instead Lindquist's troops marched through the town to unintentionally announce themselves and let the enemy know they were coming. It was amateur hour all round, and that level of planning was far below Montgomery's army-group level, and Montgomery couldn't really interfere with American commanders like Brereton even when they were being obtuse and useless. Browning should have refused the mission once Brereton's ball-and-chain conditions were known, and the excellent General 'Windy' Gale of British 6th Airborne said that Urquhart of 1st Airborne should have refused the mission as well (meaning resignation of command) -- but they didn't, because of a wishful belief in a last chance of glory before the war ended, a delusion shared by Eisenhower and pretty much everyone else. You shouldn't believe everything that American Hollywood movies like A Bridge Too Far tell you. Khamba Tendal (talk) 18:50, 4 April 2024 (UTC)


 * Yet another babbling apologetic to cover up the abject failure of senior British commanders. Where are your reliable sources? Wdford (talk) 22:37, 4 April 2024 (UTC)


 * I don't think you know anything about Market Garden, and your crudely expressed Anglophobia is a mistaken and unreasoning belief. Everything I've mentioned is right there in, for instance, Beevor, if you care to read a book -- though General Sir Mike Jackson, reviewing Beevor's work at the time of publication, disagreed with the historian's view that the plan was bound to fail. The critical failure by Montgomery and Browning was the failure to call the operation off when the air plan presented by Brereton and Williams at First Airborne Army was so obviously inadequate. This happened partly because Browning's self-esteem wouldn't permit yet another cancellation, but mainly because Montgomery was under Eisenhower's direct orders to use First Airborne Army immediately on the 21st Army Group axis, and the central northern route to Arnhem (instead of left to Walcheren or right to Wesel) was the only one Brereton would permit. With the blinkers of hindsight on, we tend not to appreciate how deeply convinced the Allied leaders were that the Germans were on the brink of defeat and that one bold move might finish them. Remember that, during Market Garden, the US and British political and military chiefs absented themselves from their national capitals to attend the not very consequential Octagon Conference in Quebec, because they thought it was all over and they were just cruising to the chequered flag. This mentality got severely and rather brutally readjusted in the week after Market Garden launched, but it was apparently the dominant and accepted view at the time. Khamba Tendal (talk) 17:58, 16 May 2024 (UTC)
 * I'd like top point out the failure of Bradley's offensive in the Hurtgen was far more costly failure than that of Market Garden. The over confidence of allied leaders went beyond Market Garden and only the Battle of of the Bulge and the onset of Winter changed that. Eastfarthingan (talk) 18:15, 16 May 2024 (UTC)


 * @Khamba Tendal - I own Beevor's book. You are cherry-picking big-time - Beevor in no way exonerates Browning or Montgomery. Eisenhower was unambiguously opposed to the pencil-thrust tactic, and only allowed Monty to attempt Market Garden as a small part of the broad-front advance - which infuriated Monty because he wanted to be in command of all resources, and ultimately to ride triumphantly into Berlin. There was indeed pressure to employ the First Airborne Army, but there was no instruction to use it on the 21st Army Group axis specifically. The pressure on the 21st Army Group was to eliminate the V2 launch sites in the Netherlands, and it came from London. The Airborne divisions had already been tested on D-Day, and later they were tested in Bastogne etc, and they always fought well. Wdford (talk) 22:28, 17 May 2024 (UTC)
 * The Huertgen planning was not a matter of over-confidence. The US leaders knew there was a large German force gathering in the area, and they were worried that the German force was gathering in the Huertgen forest to attack their flanks as they advanced into Germany. They therefore included the forest in their advance, to eliminate that risk. With hindsight they could probably have by-passed the forest, but they didn’t know that at the time, and to have ignored the potential risk lurking in the forest would have been seriously incompetent. They were correct about the massing German force in front of them, although ultimately the Germans used that powerful force in the Ardennes instead, a short distance away and a short while later. As in the Ardennes a few weeks later, the weather played a big role, and many of the US casualties were casualties of the weather rather than of the enemy. Wdford (talk) 22:28, 17 May 2024 (UTC)

Prefixes in the Infobox

 * Bernard Montgomery was a hereditary Viscount of the peerage of the United Kingdom. As such and according to the manual of style and that peerage he is afforded the prefix of "The Right Honourable." Furthermore due to his rank as a Field Marshal he is accorded that style in front of his title as well. This means that he is styled "Field Marshal The Right Honourable The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein." Any other stylisation is improper and it does not matter if it clutters the infobox. Accuracy trumps aesthetics. RexAntica (talk) 21:55, 6 September 2021 (UTC)


 * Ranks and awards are already included further down the infobox (please compare with other military infoboxes). Also as you have been repeated told please do not edit war. Dormskirk (talk) 22:12, 6 September 2021 (UTC)


 * Peerages are not awards, they are titles, hence why his honorific prefix is a prefix to his title (that's what prefix means). In any event your honorific prefix ALWAYS goes before your title on first introduction, which in this case is the top of the infobox. Military rank is more variable, as it does not have to be used. However, I will reiterate that your honorific prefix, eg, The Right Honourable, ALWAYS appears at the top of an introduction. Every single article about any peer of the UK you find will be like this. The only time it is excepted is when the peer is a Duke or a Royal. And again, "cluttering the infobox" is no reason to sacrifice accuracy, aesthetics do not trump accuracy. RexAntica (talk) 00:26, 7 September 2021 (UTC)


 * Please see MOS:HONORIFIC. Wikipedia's Manual of Style advises against the use of honorific prefixes such as "The Honourable", which is why few articles use them. Cheers, Abraham, B.S. (talk) 01:00, 7 September 2021 (UTC)


 * The sentence of interest here is, "In general, honorific prefixes—styles and honorifics in front of a name— in Wikipedia's own voice should not be included, but may be discussed in the article. In particular, this applies to: styles and honorifics derived from a title, position or activity, including The Most Noble, The Most Honourable, The Right Honourable, and The Honourable;" One will note that this says "in front of a name" this does not refer to titles, but honorifics derived from titles. For example, it would be improper to style Bertrand Russell as "The Right Honourable Betrand Russell" as it is odd, but one would style the Prime Minister as "The Right Honourable Boris Johnson." In any event, "The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein" is not a name, but a title, and should therefore, according to the way viscountcies work is that he is styled as "The Right Honourable The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein." By the precedent set by just about every article on British nobility, for example the Earl of Stirling, the Viscount St Alban, and the Earl of Oxford and Mortimer, the honorific prefix of "the Right Honourable" should precede the title.RexAntica (talk) 00:01, 8 September 2021 (UTC)


 * That may be but it does not detract from the point that we seek to keep military infoboxes simple and uncluttered with rank and awards further down the infobox. And we do that across hundreds of military biographies, many of which involve peers who are entitled to styles and honorifics. Dormskirk (talk) 10:21, 8 September 2021 (UTC)


 * So you'd like to sacrifice accuracy for aesthetics? Because that's what it sounds like to me. And again, a Viscountcy is not an award, it is a peerage title. It does not matter if other military biographies use honorifics incorrectly. I don't really care if we add Field Marshal, as the inclusion of ranks is and has always been controversial, but I believe we must add "The Right Honourable", even if it is less aesthetically pleasing.RexAntica (talk) 21:24, 8 September 2021 (UTC)
 * I have no idea if "The Right Honourable" should prefix Montgomery, but the argument that it shouldn't be in an infobox military person is out of order: wikiprojects do not "own" articles. The fact that Montgomery's article uses infobox military person does not mean that MILHIST conventions supersede or override general (non-military) MOS conventions for bios that should use honorifics. That is to say, if Montgomery hypothetically weren't a military person and would otherwise be styled as "The Right Honourable The Viscount of Alamein" with infobox peer or infobox officeholder, then just because his article uses infobox military person shouldn't strip his article of the honorific normally afforded peers. Again, assuming that would otherwise normally be correct. &emsp;—&#8239;sbb&#8239;(talk) 20:56, 9 September 2021 (UTC)


 * In the Peerage of the UK Earls, Viscounts, and Barons are afforded the honorific of "The Right Honourable." And I agree wholeheartedly,the honorific should be displayed, being a military person doesn't negate the right to the honorific. RexAntica (talk) 04:59, 10 September 2021 (UTC)

Comments on legalisation of homosexuality
Surely his remarks on homosexuality should be qualified with the fact he was probably a repressed boy lover: https://www.greek-love.com/modern-europe/switzerland/monty-s-little-swiss-friend-1946-50 (86.150.124.93 (talk) 19:04, 23 November 2021 (UTC))
 * There may be some way of including more information about Monty's unusually close friendships with boys, but it would need to be referenced to a reliable source, not a blog. The blog itself quotes Nigel Hamilton and Ronald Hyam, so perhaps you could find something there. Personally, I find it a bit strong to say he was 'probably' a repressed homosexual, as it seems to me that he may, as Lucien Trueb suggests in his account, just have enjoyed their uncritical hero worship and lost interest in them as they got older and more questioning. It's certainly possible that he was just a sad, lonely man who would really have liked to have a family. But, no one can really know for sure, and my opinion is irrelevant, it's what reliable sources say that's important as far as adding something to the article is concerned.--Shimbo (talk) 09:24, 24 November 2021 (UTC)