Talk:Bernard Montgomery/Archive 6

How come the story of Montgomery and the Flying Fortress isn`t in this article ?
How come the story of Montgomery and the Flying Fortress isn`t in this article ? It`s well authenticated and accepted as fact by all students of WWII. In fact there seems to be hardly any mention of Montgomery`s infamous ability to upset people including his allies and superiors.--JustinSmith (talk) 12:59, 4 August 2014 (UTC)


 * Do we get any clues as to what story you are talking about, I suspect it is not mentioned because it is probably unheard of and not notable. MilborneOne (talk) 14:06, 4 August 2014 (UTC)

I would say it`s very notable. Not only would a brief web search bring up loads of results but the last two books on WWII which I read (World War 2 by Gordon Corrigan and Alanbrooke`s war diaries) both mention it. However, in an article purporting to be all about Montgomery, its significance is even greater because anyone who knows anything about him also knows he was a very flawed character. Even his "patron" CIGS Alanbrooke himself states (e.g. his war diaries pages 418/9, 516, 531, 550 & 638) he is liable to commit untold errors in lack of tact + I had to haul him over the coals for his usual lack of tact and egotistical outlook which prevented him from appreciating other people`s feelings.

Anyway, the infamous Flying Fortress incident :

Monty bet Walter Bedell Smith that he could capture Sfax by the middle of April 1943. Smith jokingly replied that if Monty could do it he would give him a Flying Fortress complete with crew. Smith promptly forgot all about it, but Montgomery didn`t, and when he did in fact take Sfax on the 10th of April he sent a message to Smith "claiming his winnings". Smith tried to laugh it off, but Montgomery was having none of it and insisted on his FF. It got as high as Eisenhower who was said to be absolutely furious, but his usual skill at diplomacy meant he ensured Montgomery did in fact get his FF, though at a great cost in ill feeling. Even Alanbrooke thought it "crass stupidity" (war diaries p418).--JustinSmith (talk) 21:18, 4 August 2014 (UTC)


 * From memory the plane crashed some time later, and Monty was not allowed to claim a replacement.Paulturtle (talk) 04:04, 9 August 2014 (UTC)


 * The incident may not be that notable to this article. Does it feature significantly in biographies that are solely about Monty? And is it only illustrative of Monty's character rather than affecting his life or work? And what to reliable sources say that it shows about Monty - that he took things very seriously, that he pursued matters even when "diplomatically" unwise? GraemeLeggett (talk) 19:10, 9 August 2014 (UTC)


 * This blog (sketchy referencing) suggests the story is more complex. That Monty's predecessor William Gott was killed as a result of his aircraft being attacked by German aircraft could be seen as a valid reason for taking the opportunity to lay hands on something a bit better protected. But in covering Monty's nature, it would be better to hear what his biographers had to say in general on the matter. GraemeLeggett (talk) 19:33, 9 August 2014 (UTC)


 * Whether or not a story features in an article, or whether or not commentators on the talk page have heard of it, does not usually have much bearing on its notability - it usually just means that the article has grown up piecemeal and that nobody has ever really taken it in hand and transcribed a précis of the contents of some good biographies.


 * It's mentioned in Nigel Hamilton's triple-decker biography, which I read back in the 80s but do not have to hand (I may have misremembered the story of it crashing). Alastair Horne (p60 of "The Lonely Leader") mentions his acquiring the B-17, and how it rubbed the Americans up the wrong way. In his own memoirs Monty claims that Bedell Smith had originally intended it as a joke, that it was useful for flying around large distances in Tunisia, that the RAF had refused to supply him with a plane despite requests, that he made a trip to England and back in it in May 43, and that he swapped it for a Dakota with a jeep on board as airfields in Sicily were too small. Neither Monty nor Horne mention anything to do with Strafer Gott.Paulturtle (talk) 01:10, 10 August 2014 (UTC)

Basically, if even Allenbrooke (Montgomery`s patron) though it worthwhile mentioning it in some detail in his war diaries, that says it all. How could falling out with Bedell Smith and Eisenhower at the same time not be very notable. In fact if Allenbrooke hadn`t been such a supporter of Montgomery I suspect Monty would have fallen out with the CIGS as well ! The incident is very notable, not only in itself but as an indication of Montgomery`s flawed character. There are a few references to the latter throughout the article, I personally think they`d be better off all in the same section. --JustinSmith (talk) 07:59, 10 August 2014 (UTC)
 * It would appear the B-17E was serial "41-9082" that was loaned to Montgomery. MilborneOne (talk) 10:17, 10 August 2014 (UTC)
 * I'm a late comer to this conversation. A couple of things.
 * 1- The B-17 was wrecked in the summer of 1943
 * 2- I have all three of volumes of Hamilton's biography of Monty. Haven't read them in about a decade.
 * If this was deemed notable, Hamilton did go into it in some detail about the B-17. I could source something in the article about it....William 10:36, 10 August 2014 (UTC)


 * Feel free. When you're done, I can add some stuff from Monty's memoirs (if there's anything not covered by Hamilton). One suspects he is telling a selective version of the story.Paulturtle (talk) 10:45, 10 August 2014 (UTC)

"It's mentioned in Nigel Hamilton's triple-decker biography, which I read back in the 80s but do not have to hand (I may have misremembered the story of it crashing). Alastair Horne (p60 of "The Lonely Leader") mentions his acquiring the B-17, and how it rubbed the Americans up the wrong way. In his own memoirs Monty claims that Bedell Smith had originally intended it as a joke, that it was useful for flying around large distances in Tunisia, that the RAF had refused to supply him with a plane despite requests, that he made a trip to England and back in it in May 43, and that he swapped it for a Dakota with a jeep on board as airfields in Sicily were too small. Neither Monty nor Horne mention anything to do with Strafer Gott.Paulturtle"

Allenbrooke`s war diaries (p418) = "When I accused Monty of crass stupidity for impairing his relations with Eisenhower for the sake of an aircraft which might have been provided from our own resources". I`m sure that inter service rivalry would mean the RAF wouldn`t be happy to provide a plane unless they were "encouraged" to do so but I find it hard to believe that the CIGS couldn`t ensure Montgomery got a suitable British sourced plane without the need for the whole sorry episode, which may have had untold effects later in the war as the Americans took over more of the positions of higher command.--JustinSmith (talk) 11:15, 10 August 2014 (UTC)


 * "General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Bedell Smith, had visited me in Tripoli in February and we had discussed the problem of how soon the Eighth Army could join up with the First Army north of Gabes. I had said that I would be in Sfax by the 15th April. Bedell Smith said that if I could do that, General Eisenhower would give me anything I liked to ask for. I said that I would do it, and would like an aeroplane for my personal use. Bedell Smith agreed, willingly.


 * On the morning of the 10th April I sent a message to Eisenhower asking for the aircraft. It arrived on the 16th April, a B-17 (a Flying Fortress). It made me a thoroughly mobile General. Later I got properly ticked-off by Brooke, the C.I.G.S, for my action in the matter. He said it was all a joke on the part of Bedell Smith and that Eisenhower was furious when I demanded the aircraft. I explained that it was very far from a joke on that day in Tripoli when the statement was made. I don't think Bedell Smith had ever told Eisenhower about it, and he was suddenly confronted with having to pay. Brooke added that the RAF could well have provided me with an aircraft; they certainly could, but didn't - in spite of my repeated requests. Eisenhower produced it at once. And, being the great and generous man he is, he arranged that I was provided with an aircraft from American sources for the rest of the war; furthermore, he did this for my Chief of Staff also. He saw the need and acted promptly." ''The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery - 1958, P. 164


 * I think it's usually called 'Calling someone's bluff'.


 * BTW, If the whole affair caused the British embarrassment that was their own fault - they should have provided Montgomery with what he had asked for in the first place. Instead, it was left to the generosity of Eisenhower and the US to do it.


 * ...and Eisenhower can't have been too put out by Monty over the B-17 as later in January 1944 he refused to let Monty fly from Marrakesh to London in Monty's two-engined Dakota, even though it had been fitted with additional fuel tanks, and arranged for a four-engined C-54 to fly him home instead - P. 213 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.24.208.47 (talk) 16:02, 3 September 2014 (UTC)


 * "M 424 Personal for Eisenhower from Montgomery.
 * My dear Ike, Have received the new C/47 you have so kindly lent me and I understand you have sent me one that was intended for yourself. Such spontaneous kindness touches me deeply and from my heart I send you my grateful thanks. If there is anything I can ever do to ease the tremendous burden that you bear you know you only have to command me. And I want you to know that I shall always stand firmly behind you in everything you do." P. 310


 * The previous Dakota had been 'shot to pieces' during large-scale Luftwaffe attacks against airfields in Holland and Belgium on January the 1st 1945 - Operation Bodenplatte. Ike replaced it immediately and Montgomery sent the above signal to thank him on the 6th January. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.24.208.47 (talk) 18:18, 4 September 2014 (UTC)

Character assassination
I may be wrong, but having read a good deal of history and military history for some decades (but not being a professional in any way, or pursuing primary sources), and having read this article, I feel it is to a considerable extent a character assassination. The effort of trying to correct the issues against the constant coutner-effort of the authors who wish to see their views present is of course costly, unrewarding and unremitting, so I'm not going to do so; I will merely say - to begin with, read his own memories. That thorws about a third of the article into question, and then the rest of it naturally enough is questioned also. 92.251.3.177 (talk) 11:24, 19 January 2016 (UTC)


 * I don`t think the article is guilty of character assassination. It is well known that Monty was a rather flawed character, particularly in his lack of diplomacy. In some ways the absolute opposite of Eisenhower, certainly in that respect.
 * You are thinking of his genuine flaws. Discussion of such is not character assassination.  92.251.3.177 (talk) 17:00, 20 January 2016 (UTC)


 * Monty`s memoirs would, I feel, not be an unbiased reference on this point......--JustinSmith (talk) 10:24, 20 January 2016 (UTC)
 * I agree with JustinSmith. Rjensen (talk) 10:51, 20 January 2016 (UTC)
 * I thought someone might say this. It would be superficial to take his memories at face value.  Every book must be weighed and considered in relation to itself (internal consistency) and with regard to other sources.  His memoirs are, I argue, enough *even by themselves*, taking into account that they are a single source and so with the limits imposed thereby on how much we can take from them, to bring a good part of this article into question, and so then by proxy the rest also.  92.251.3.177 (talk) 17:00, 20 January 2016 (UTC)


 * Much of the criticism of Montgomery is ill-informed and perhaps due to the critic's lack of knowledge of factors that Montgomery himself was aware of at the time. The existence of ULTRA - of which Montgomery was aware - was not revealed publicly until 1973, some three years before Montgomery's death, and he himself was banned by the Official Secrets Act from even mentioning it. With the exception of Eisenhower few of his most vocal critics were aware of ULTRA, and the extent to which Montgomery knew what the opposition was doing and going to do.


 * BTW Montgomery was a professional solder, and not a diplomat. He did however often display the patience of a saint. Despite all the petty bickering and sniping against himself he remained silent. He also never criticised subordinates who deviated from his carefully-laid plans - made will the full benefit of ULTRA - thereby semi-ruining them while they themselves thought they were being clever.

Montgomery`s "I`ve torn up all withdrawl plans"
I have to say I`m surprised that any informed observer could dispute the fact that Montomery announcing that he`d "torn up all plans for withdrawl" were anything other than bunkum and self aggrandisement. The fact that The Auk had no plans to withdraw and had carefully chosen the EA position as being the most defensible is in every book on the subject, the last one I read Gordon Corrigan`s World War II. It was also in Dimbleby`s TV programme on the desert war which has only just been on the TV ! But, in actual fact, there`s a reference to it on the same "Montgomery" page ! :

''He was threatened with legal action by Field-Marshal Auchinleck for suggesting that Auchinleck had intended to retreat from the Alamein position if attacked again, and had to give a radio broadcast (20 November 1958) expressing his gratitude to Auchinleck for having stabilised the front at the First Battle of Alamein. The 1960 paperback edition of his memoirs contains a publisher's note drawing attention to that broadcast, and stating that in the publisher's view the reader might reasonably assume from Montgomery's text that Auchinleck had been planning to retreat "into the Nile Delta or beyond" and pointing out that it had been Auchinleck's intention to launch an offensive as soon as Eighth Army was "rested and regrouped ''

This last reversion really is going a bit far...... --JustinSmith (talk) 09:17, 19 November 2014 (UTC)


 * So cite it. Whether as a statement of Monty to impress his new staff, or that there were no plans to withdraw, even contingency ones. GraemeLeggett (talk) 12:44, 19 November 2014 (UTC)

I don`t understand what you`re asking. Cite what ? If you`re saying you insist on a citation for what every historian and his dog knows to be true there`s one on the same page under "Later Life". You don`t even have to look it up because I`ve quoted it for you in the opener. --JustinSmith (talk) 13:36, 19 November 2014 (UTC)


 * A motivational speech intended to impress - related to this declaration? BBC School radio or this to the troops. GraemeLeggett (talk) 16:58, 19 November 2014 (UTC)


 * I have added the cite myself. WP:SOURCE requires all material to be properly cited. I spent some time inserting citations and generally improving the article such that it achieved "B" assessment sometime ago. So please don't add uncited material to an assessed article. Noted that I would not be regarded as "an informed observer"! Best wishes. Dormskirk (talk) 22:43, 19 November 2014 (UTC)

Jolly good.--JustinSmith (talk) 17:48, 20 November 2014 (UTC)


 * On the point of "and had to give a radio broadcast..." Since the BBC have their "genome" project to list every programme they have broadcast, I wondered what the programming was on 20 November 1958. The best match on the day in question is a nominally 45 min "Memoirs of Field Marshall Montgomery". The current phrasing makes it sound more like a modern mea culpa through press conference, though given the length of the programme was it more likely the case that Monty had to include it in an already planned broadcast about the book? Could that be checked in the sources by someone.
 * The google search for more about the broadcast turned up this. The Tablet has this to say in their book review from the 8th November edition "It is natural, but hardly relevant, for Field Marshal Auchinleck to say, as he has done recently, that there was no intention to withdraw behind the Nile; that there were plans to attack Rommel, and that new divisions, tanks and guns were flowing into Egypt to ensure success. The point is that the troops on the ground outside Alexandria did not know this. Rightly or wrongly they assumed that they were going to retreat again. There were rumours that new Headquarters for the Eighth Army had been set up in Jerusalem. No troops could win in such a mood. The new General changed all that."
 * That backs up the morale speech angle. a poor OCR of the memoirs at archive.org gives what presumably Auchinleck objected to "Lt.-Gen. Ramsden, ...explained the situation to me. I cross-examined him about the Army plans for a withdrawal if Rommel attacked; certain orders had been issued about the withdrawal but they were indefinite. There was an air of uncertainty about everything in the operation line" and "During lunch I did some savage drinking. After lunch I wrote a telegram to G.H.Q. saying that I had assumed command of Eighth Army .... I then cancelled all previous orders about withdrawal. I issued orders that in the event of enemy attack there would be no withdrawal; we would fight on the ground we now held and if we couldn t stay there alive we would stay there dead". GraemeLeggett (talk) 19:06, 20 November 2014 (UTC)
 * Or perhaps more likely this bit from another OCR of the memoirs "Auchinleck took me into his map-room and shut the door; we were alone. He asked me if I knew he was to go. I said that I did. He then explained to me his plan of operations; this was based on the fact that at all costs the Eighth Army was to be preserved "in being" and must not be destroyed in battle. If Rommel attacked in strength, as was expected soon, the Eighth Army would fall back on the Delta; if Cairo and the Delta could not be held, the army would retreat southwards up the Nile, and another possibility was a withdrawal to Palestine. Plans were being made to move the Eighth Army H.Q. back up the Nile". GraemeLeggett (talk) 19:15, 20 November 2014 (UTC)
 * I don't know who was doing the 'savage drinking', but it wouldn't have been the teetotal Monty. Valetude (talk) 01:26, 9 January 2015 (UTC)

"Savage thinking" in the original. On the topic of withdrawal plans, Auchinleck's memory played him false. Plans to reorganize Eighth Army into battlegroups and conduct some kind of fighting withdrawal certainly did exist before Monty had them torn up and traces of them survive in unit diaries. Indeed, contingency plans to defend the Delta still survived above Monty's pay grade. It's worth remembering that at Alam Halfa Rommel had just been resupplied and reinforced, and Eighth Army did not yet enjoy the material superiority of Second Alamein. I was preparing some material on this over Christmas before Real Life intervened, but I'll get there eventually.Paulturtle (talk) 00:15, 2 February 2015 (UTC)


 * "I have to say I`m surprised that any informed observer could dispute the fact that Montomery announcing that he`d "torn up all plans for withdrawl" were anything other than bunkum and self aggrandisement." - have you read his memoirs?


 * For the interested among you, before publication he sent the manuscript of his memoirs to the following people for comments and to ensure its accuracy and fairness, and revised the text on their suggestions:


 * Brigadier E.T "Bill" Williams, Warden of Rhodes House, Oxford.
 * Sir James Grigg
 * Sir Arthur Bryant, historian. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.100.255 (talk) 17:29, 26 April 2016 (UTC)

Did Montgomery actually support big army in post-WWII Germany?
|This British parliament record seems to suggest otherwise. 冷雾 (talk) 21:55, 4 August 2016 (UTC)


 * Hi - In the piece quoted in Hansard Montgomery says "In all these bases we must keep balanced ground Forces". This suggests he is neutral on "big army" versus "smaller army". However in the absence of a specific citation in favour of "big army" I will remove the suggestion that he did favour "big army". Dormskirk (talk) 22:38, 4 August 2016 (UTC)

More character assassination
...is in the form of allegations of his sexuality. Montgomery was an oddball but no worse; he was married and fathered David, who is still alive and a successful businessman. 78.151.28.94 (talk) 02:43, 6 September 2016 (UTC)


 * ???? You know this how? Gay or straight, neither is 'worse' or any kind of character assassination except in teh twisted minds of bigots. DMorpheus2 (talk) 13:54, 6 September 2016 (UTC)

Sicily
My bad, there is a (relatively short) section on Sicily, [so short that I missed it], but the rest of my comments above, still stand.

RASAM (talk) 14:37, 6 September 2016 (UTC)

interview
Wilson links him to Boy Scouting, was there a connection?--Kintetsubuffalo (talk) 04:50, 1 November 2016 (UTC)

Normandy
If you read Carlo D'Este's history of the Normandy battles, it's quite clear that Monty intended to take Caen early in the campaign; he was to push forward in his sector, while the Americans wheeled around to take the Cherbourg peninsula. His failure to take Caen for weeks was a major problem, sucking up tons of resources, air and ground, and to cover this failure (which, in fairness, was due to German resistance as much as British dilatoriness), after the war he invented the idea that Caen was a "holding" operation to cover the American advance, tying up German troops, etc etc. What this means is that the Normandy section of the article essentially swallows Monty's b.s. wholesale (as did the BBC in its docu-drama on the topic, From D-Day to Berlin). NB: I am using Frankfurt's definition of b.s., according to which the b.s.-er simply doesn't care whether what he is saying is true or false, he simply seeks to create an impression of himself as wonderful.Theonemacduff (talk) 16:26, 30 September 2014 (UTC)


 * Montgomery knew well what the opposition was like, he had been fighting them for a number of years, and so he would have been well aware that the likely outcome of any attempt at taking Caen would be a hard and lengthy slogging match, possibly taking far longer than he would like. To suggest that a battle against the likes of the forces he was facing, including almost all the German the armour in the invasion area, made up of several Waffen-SS panzer divisions, would go exactly as planned, is ludicrous. The simple point is that if the German defenders had withdrawn then Monty's forces would have taken Caen. Monty however knowing the opposition forces, would have expected to be there far longer than he may have stated in his plans. He also would probably not have told anyone that he expected to be around Caen for quite a time. That would have been bad for morale.


 * To have expected otherwise shows an ignorance of the opposing forces facing the respective national armies. Montgomery eventually had seven-and-a-half full-strength Panzer divisions facing his forces, including all the best Waffen-SS ones, the Americans had one-and-a-half facing them. Of course taking Caen took a long time. What did they expect. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.148.220.15 (talk) 11:38, 23 January 2015 (UTC)


 * Late to the party here but, "To suggest that a battle.....would go exactly as planned, is ludicrous." is pretty much exactly what Montgomery did after it was over. he made the ridiculous claim that all proceeded as he had planned instead of the (just as favorable to him, really) more honest assessment that things did not go as planned so a lot of improvising needed to be done. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 20:12, 28 July 2016 (UTC)
 * "In" Normandy it went to plan but not to timescale. Monty planned to be at the Sein in 90 days. At D-Day plus 90 the allies were ahead. 90.214.240.181 (talk) 19:12, 2 January 2017 (UTC)

claiming the credit
Didn't Montgomery claim the credit for winning the Battle of the Bulge.
 * He did win it. He took control of two US armies the 1st and the 9th putting them in the British 21st Army Group. He was in charge of the 9th until the last few weeks of WW2. The 21st stopped the advance from the west and east and turned them back. The US 3rd Army stalled in the south. 90.214.240.181 (talk) 19:06, 2 January 2017 (UTC)

As the Africa corps was the smallest corp and regarded by Hitler as unimportant and Ultra had told Churchill and Montgomery that Rommel was running out of fuel and ammunition so why was El alamein even fought? — Preceding unsigned comment added by AT Kunene 123 (talk • contribs) 11:07, 29 December 2014 (UTC)


 * "Didn't Montgomery claim the credit for winning the Battle of the Bulge."


 * No he didn't, but some Americans either misunderstood the speech he made at the time, or else for whatever reasons decided to attempt to blacken his name. And it wasn't Montgomery who let it (the battle) happen in the first place.


 * El Alamein was fought because Rommel's army was trying to gain access to the Suez Canal, and the canal was a vital lifeline for British ships coming from India. The eventual German plan was for German forces to get as far as Iran and Iraq, and from there eventually link up with Japanese forces that were intending to invade India. The battle was also fought to give Britain a victory when she had recently suffered defeats in Singapore, Malaya, and Hong Kong, and to destroy as much of Rommel's forces as possible, while pushing him back as far west as they could, eventually forcing him from Africa completely. This they did. Rommel may have been running out of fuel and ammunition but that was only while his convoys from Italy and Sicily could be successfully interdicted by the RAF and RN. His shortage therefore could not be relied upon to be permanent, as it was possible some of his supply ships might get through. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.148.220.15 (talk) 11:17, 23 January 2015 (UTC)


 * It's never a good idea to feed the trolls. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.19.93.193 (talk) 00:22, 24 January 2015 (UTC)


 * I agree but it's the humanity in me. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.148.220.15 (talk) 10:17, 24 January 2015 (UTC)

There have been occasional suggestions that Second Alamein "need never have been fought" but that view is not widely held, and certainly wasn't at the time. Rommel had, after all, briefly held enough of an advantage to attack again as recently as Alam Halfa, before the Shermans turned up. "Torch" was also far from a foregone conclusion - it was felt at the time that a clear victory at Alamein would encourage the defection of Vichy forces in Algeria over to the Allied side.Paulturtle (talk) 00:07, 2 February 2015 (UTC)
 * The heavily armoured Churchill tanks also turned up and some with 6-pdr guns. The Shermans were used against Italian tanks. 90.214.240.181 (talk)

A couple of hundred Shermans were used at Second Alamein, along with comparable numbers of Grants, Crusaders, Valentines and Stuarts. Their impact was clearly important as they were the best-performing tanks out of that selection. According to the relevant wiki page, a grand total of 6 Churchills were used, to see whether they could cope with North African conditions (slightly larger numbers were later used in Tunisia) so I doubt their impact was all that great.Paulturtle (talk) 15:03, 4 January 2017 (UTC)
 * Montgomery took over the 8th Army with orders to destroy Rommel and his Army. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.100.255 (talk) 17:47, 26 April 2016 (UTC)

Market Garden
Removed passage that stated that Monty ignored reports of German armour in Arnhem. The RAF report on it states, "hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September" (the day of the para drop). The report: ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF http://www.airpowerstudies.co.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Arnhem.pdf 94.5.104.222 (talk) 11:05, 21 January 2017 (UTC)

Editing
Having waded through this 123k monster, two things struck me:

1) Its length. 2) Its lop-sidedness.

The first point above is virtually self-explanatory - having not read other articles about other WWII generals (Bradley, Patton, Rommel and so on), I get the feeling that there is far too much detail here.

The second point is the emphasis placed in the latter half of the article. It has about eleven paragraphs after "North Africa and Italy" (but I don't remember seeing anything about Sicily) and twenty-nine concerning "Normandy" and "Advance to the Rhine"

Why is that? I get the impression that some serious pruning is required.

RASAM (talk) 14:24, 6 September 2016 (UTC)


 * Throwing away other people's work without good reason (e.g. that it is complete crap) is unconstructive. As articles grow and become more detailed, people add summaries for the general reader and split them into sub-articles.


 * There is a lot about Normandy and the European campaign of 1944-5 because somebody (not me) has been writing them up lately. Articles often grow in a slightly lopsided way like this as people add stuff. Normandy and Alamein are the two really controversial bits of Montgomery's command record, in the sense that historians have debated them a bit (as opposed to, say, Arnhem or his ongoing needling of Ike, about which there is plenty to be said but which aren't quite "controversial" in the same way). I was preparing some stuff on Alamein about 18 months ago but never got round to finishing it. I may yet, or somebody else may do so.Paulturtle (talk) 04:54, 19 September 2016 (UTC)

Agreed about the unbalanced nature of the Normandy section - are the actions of the commander of the 12th SS really relevant here? There seems an over-reliance on a few sources (Badsey & Powers) and a limited understanding of what the key controversies were. However it will take a lot of work (and references) to tidy it up in a balanced way. 109.148.112.229 (talk) 12:55, 22 September 2016 (UTC)


 * Well, I'm not saying that there isn't room for sharpening up - the focus in a biography needs to be on what the man in question said, wrote and did and what others said and wrote about, and did to, him - but it seems to me that a reasonable effort has been made to cover the issues and to summarise the views of a number of historians. Perhaps we could do with a bit more of d'Este, Nigel Hamilton and more recent books (in my own work on Alamein, currently residing somewhere in development hell, I had gone carefully through Hamilton, Correlli Barnett, Michael Carver, Bungay et al to make sure I understood all the debates about Monty's decisions and intentions and claims made subsequently about them). But even if it were true (which it isn't) that the section is "overly reliant on a few sources" that in itself would not be a bad thing if those sources summarise the debates fairly and accurately. It was over seventy years ago now and most historical controversy of this type, whatever young historians with a name to make try to pretend, usually consists of endlessly rehashing arguments which were had at the time, with elements of truth in both positions.Paulturtle (talk) 06:16, 23 September 2016 (UTC)
 * the balance is set by the RS and they concentrate a lot on Normandy -- that's where the debates are focused. Rjensen (talk) 06:29, 23 September 2016 (UTC)
 * Well indeed - Monty has been the subject of a long 3-volume biography (Nigel Hamilton, early 80s), which is itself evidence that a lengthy, detailed article is not inappropriate. Vol I goes up to the end of Alamein and devotes about a third of its length to that battle. Vol II goes up to the end of Normandy and devotes at least a third to that battle. Vol III goes from the end of Normandy to his death, with about half that book covering the European campaign of 1944-5. The relative focus of different books on the same subject will inevitably differ somewhat, but in this context devoting 15-20% each of a long article to Alamein, Normandy and 1944-5 is not unreasonable. But the article is nowhere near a finished state at the moment.Paulturtle (talk) 04:36, 26 September 2016 (UTC)
 * Most of Monty's work was D-Day and onwards. He was in charge of "all" armies in Normandy, British & American. 90.214.240.181 (talk) 18:59, 2 January 2017 (UTC)
 * In principle yes, but in practice he exercised much more direct control over Second Army than over the US First Army - it was said he treated Dempsey like a corps commander. My comments about following the biographies in the relative weight to devote to different parts of his life story still stand. Normandy was a very important part of that story, both in terms of importance and of controversy (closely followed by Alamein in both respects) but not the whole story - in the same way that there is more to the life story of Marlborough, Wellington or Lee than Blenheim, Waterloo or Gettysburg respectively.Paulturtle (talk) 06:32, 4 January 2017 (UTC)
 * "In principle yes, but in practice" In practice Monty decided where all the armies went, US and British. He was in charge of all but took more direct control of the British 1st Army. The 21st Army Groups was all the armies.    94.5.104.222 (talk) 12:21, 21 January 2017 (UTC)

Montgomery not the inspiration of Monty Python name
No mention of Montgomery in this explanation by Michael Palin. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hbzTzFIE57Q 94.5.104.222 (talk) 12:35, 21 January 2017 (UTC)

Loss of his wife and asperity
I believe the biographical literature makes a link between the loss of his wife, and his well-known somewhat difficult personality, which was magnified after her death. Point for expansion over time, I believe. Buckshot06 (talk) 18:54, 3 February 2017 (UTC)


 * My understanding is that he was "difficult" before, and his unexpected marriage relatively late in life softened him a bit. Then he reverted to his natural state of being "difficult", perhaps a bit harder than he was before. But happy to be corrected.Paulturtle (talk) 16:06, 5 February 2017 (UTC)

Mention of stepsons (Richard Carver)
Montgomery evidently had two stepsons from his marriage to Betty Carver, John Carver and Richard Carver. More relevantly, Richard Carver is the subject of a book, "Where The Hell Have You Been?" (goodreads link), which documents his escape from the Germans as a POW. Should this be mentioned here?


 * I would suggest they should only be mentioned if they become notable enough to get a wikipedia article. MilborneOne (talk) 10:45, 22 January 2017 (UTC)


 * They are mentionable in so far as they impinge on Montgomery's life, both as subjects and as eyewitnesses (they both fade from the picture a bit by the second half of WW2) and are discussed in his biography. Both now added, although I seem to be wading into an edit war about the Battle of the Bulge ...Paulturtle (talk) 05:51, 6 February 2017 (UTC)

Battle of the Bulge edits Jan 31 2017
I reverted the following:

H''itler had a low opinion of the American army so it's not surprising that a NAZI sycophant would make the statement referenced above; however, not even Standartenführer SS Joachim Peiper (commanding 4 panzer kampfgruppe including Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler) made any such statement about the US 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne. The town was the hub of a network of roads the Wehrmacht had to take for operation Wacht Am Rhein to succeed — the 101st (which was completely surrounded) nevertheless chose to deny the Germans passage through the town and held it at all cost (2,548 casualties). The link to The Battle of the Bulge references that this was the largest land battle by the western allies (meaning the US Army) in all of WWII, for anyone to claim that Monty's "planning" accomplished anything beggars any military comprehension on even the most rudimentary level. He told Ike that his army was not ready to go into combat so he did nothing to relieve the US Army. As noted above General Eisenhower gave General Montgomery two American armies with which to attack the enemy and Monty promptly put them to work digging in — the raison d'être for reserve forces during war is to be ready to go into battle when and where they are most needed! −	''It was General Patton's 3rd Army that broke through to Bastogne, the bad weather cleared so that the USAAF could resume air assault operations against NAZI armoured units and the Wehrmacht ran out of petrol. Monty's only contribution to the battle was the press release he put out after it was all over stating that he had saved the day by holding his ditches — which created a diplomatic furor. Therefore historians can only speculate as to why Monty did not fight in this battle: some think he was just as shocked as everyone else at SHAEF, that his army wasn't ready, hubris and some think that he wanted a German victory so that the could then attack, save the day and become another Wellington. The battle is best summed up by P.M. Churchill as follows: ''

This content has some grains of truth in it, but is unencyclpedic and inadequately cited.

The writing is appropriate for an opinion piece or editorial but not for an encyclopedia. There are assertions and opinions in there that are uncited or (as the editor's opinions) cannot really be cited. There are important sources *not* consulted here, e.g. GEN James Gavin's (82 ABN) memoirs, which paint a very different picture of Montogomery's temporarily command during the Ardennes.

There is much to be said on this subject and I would gladly work with other editors on this, but, I think this makes a poor starting point. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:40, 31 January 2017 (UTC)


 * Agreed on the revert. It's soapboxy, POV, editorialising. ( Hohum  @ ) 18:11, 31 January 2017 (UTC)


 * Just FYI everyone, the user inserting this content, which was reverted 5 times, was blocked for 24h. DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:35, 31 January 2017 (UTC)


 * The content now inserted is much better but we still need page numbers per WP:CITE, please. Dormskirk (talk) 23:12, 6 February 2017 (UTC)

The content is NOT much better - it bears little relationship to what actually happened eg the British Army was NOT entrenched protecting Antwerp Aber~enwiki (talk) 15:11, 21 February 2017 (UTC)


 * I agree, it's pretty bad. Very much an opinion piece rather than an encyclopedia entry. DMorpheus2 (talk) 18:23, 21 February 2017 (UTC)


 * I agree that the last paragraph (referring to the British Army's entrenched position) is full of opinion pieces and have removed it. I have also removed some other material which seemed to be speculative or just commentary. Please feel free to remove any other opinion pieces. Dormskirk (talk) 21:29, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

Did Montgomery have Aspergers syndrome?
Towards the end of 2015, it was mentioned on the Radio Four Today programme that the military historian Anthony Beevor has written a book claiming that Montogomery had Asperger's syndrome. The programme mentioned that Montgomery was very tactless. It also said that he was an arrogant man who kept a lot of photographs in his house of himself with heads of state such as Winston Churchill. I really think that his ought to be added to the section of this article which is sub-titled "Montgomery's lack of diplomacy". Vorbee (talk) 20:43, 20 April 2016 (UTC) I believe the book is called "Ardennes 1944". This book is reviewed in the New York Times and you can read a review of it if you click on the link to its website. Vorbee (talk) 04:24, 21 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Eh. It's just one source, and I don't see what it may add to the article.  Besides, with the subject long dead, it's basically just guessing now.  --A D Monroe III (talk) 21:39, 21 April 2016 (UTC)


 * There is another book that postulates Monty had aspergers, "Genius Genes: How Asperger Talents Changed the World", by Michael Fitzgerald and Brendan O'Brien. The Monty chapter is here: https://books.google.com/books?id=iKyytTQI7tEC&pg=PA212&dq=bernard+montgomery&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiJtqX1od7SAhVs0YMKHeQTAso4ChDoAQgdMAE#v=onepage&q=bernard%20montgomery&f=falseTH1980 (talk) 19:39, 17 March 2017 (UTC)

Portrayal in "Patton" (1970): Worthy of listing in "Legacy"?
Montgomery is, of course, depicted in the 1970 biopic "Patton", although it is said the rivalry depicted between him and Patton was exaggerated. Only Patton, it is said, viewed Monty as a rival. Nevertheless, the fact Montgomery is a character in this film would be worthy of mention in "Legacy", would it not?TH1980 (talk) 02:54, 11 December 2016 (UTC)
 * That film was largely fiction. Montgomery was above Bradley who was above Patton. Two levels between. Patton's performance was average. He moved 10 miles in 3 months in the Lorraine. The rivalry is made up by the media. Montgomery hardly mentions Patton in his diaries. 90.214.240.181 (talk) 18:56, 2 January 2017 (UTC)


 * Bradley was a corps commander in Sicily (Patton's subordinate - he leapfrogged him when Patton was sidelined for a year or so after the slapping incident(s)). It is true, iirc, that XXX Corps' thrust to Brussels in late summer 1944 was much the same speed as Patton's advance across France, and when Patton ran into resistance in Lorraine he didn't overcome it significantly faster than anyone else would have done (the idea that Patton "ran out of gas" is, I think largely fiction but that belongs in Patton's article). It is also true that Monty's pursuit after Alamein was much faster than popular mythology would have it, although not alas fast enough to catch up with the retreating Axis forces. But in answer to the question, "Patton" is a classic and widely-watched film, so a sentence or two pointing out that the rivalry between Patton and Monty was exaggerated for dramatic purposes is perfectly appropriate. Carlo d'Este's books might be good places to look: "Bitter Victory" (his late 80s book on Sicily, which has an excellent chapter on Harold Alexander fwiw) or "A Genius for War" (his mid-90s Patton biog).Paulturtle (talk) 06:26, 4 January 2017 (UTC) Slight caveat to the above as Patton did have supply issues in Lorraine, exacerbated by US rear echelon inefficiencies, although there are obviously debates to be had about whether Monty should have improved the Allied supply situation by taking Antwerp sooner than he did rather than undertaking the Market Garden gamble (I'm not expressing an opinion one way or the other - if he had made the other decision he would now be criticised for excessive caution, no doubt).Paulturtle (talk) 15:13, 4 January 2017 (UTC)
 * Would this article from "Armchair General" magazine do? The author specifically cites how "Patton" embellished the so-called "Race to Messina": http://www.armchairgeneral.com/monty-world-war-iis-most-misunderstood-general-part-ii.htm/2TH1980 (talk) 03:29, 19 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Utilizing the above source, what if we put something like this into the "Legacy" section re: "Patton":
 * "Montgomery was a character in "Patton." He was depicted as a rival of General Patton vying to be the first to capture Messina. In the film he leads his army into town assuming he got there first, only to be greeted by Patton and his army. In reality, Patton's "race" with Montgomery to Messina was more imagined than real. Montgomery himself wanted Patton to reach the port first and even made roads available to Patton's army from his own to help ensure this."TH1980 (talk) 00:25, 2 April 2017 (UTC)
 * Or how about this:
 * "The 1970 film "Patton" depicted Montgomery as a rival of Patton's. The high point of the rivalry occurs in the Sicily sequence, in which each general vies to be the first to capture Messina. Montgomery finally leads his army into Messina to the acclaim of the populace, assuming he has reached the town first, only to be greeted by Patton, who had gotten there first. But historically Patton's "race" with Montgomery to Messina was more imagined than real. Montgomery himself wanted Patton to reach the port first and even made roads available to Patton's army from his own to help ensure this happened." How's that?TH1980 (talk) 02:15, 4 April 2017 (UTC)
 * Or, finally, what about this:
 * " Montgomery was played by actor Michael Bates in the 1970 film "Patton". The film depicts Montgomery as a rival of Patton's. The high point of their rivalry occurs in the Sicily sequence, in which each general vies to be the first to capture Messina. Montgomery finally leads his army into Messina to the acclaim of the populace, assuming he has reached the town first, only to be greeted by Patton and his troops. But historically Patton's "race" with Montgomery to Messina was more imagined than real. Montgomery himself wanted Patton to reach the port first and even made roads available to Patton's army from his own to help ensure this happened."TH1980 (talk) 23:27, 27 April 2017 (UTC)
 * It is true Patton was over Bradley in Sicily. Market Garden was not a gamble being a success. Its aims were twofold:
 * It was to form a buffer between German forces and Antwerp, to ensure the only port taken intact was protected. That 65 mile salient was valuable in the Battle of the Bulge when German forces aimed for Antwerp. The Germans never took back any ground taken by XXX Corps.
 * To form the northern end of a pincer to seize the Ruhr.
 * Monty wanted three Channel ports for supplies. All were destroyed. Antwerp was way down the list as it was 35 miles up a narrow river which could be easily blocked by German bombers sinking a few ships. 4th choice Antwerp it had to be as the port was taken intact, then the focus was on the Scheldt, which the Germans had reinforced. Brereton of the First Allied Airborne Army refused to drop on the Scheldt. If Antwerp's port was destroyed the focus would have been to get all the Channel ports and rebuild them ASAP. Dunkirk was in German hands until the end of the war. Bolougne came on line at the same time as Antwerp and Ostend before the two but partially.
 * Patton in the the Lorraine was a wash out. 52,000 casualties for 10 miles in three months. It was not because of fuel shortages. Many authors suggest that if Patton had enough fuel he could have gone to Berlin. Not with that one inadequate infantry tank they had, he clearly would not. Monty would only put US armies as infantry support in Normandy after assessing them. The British would take on German armour, and they did destroying around 90% of it. US forces hardly met tanks in Normandy, or in the whole of Western Europe really - the Bulge was the only time they met German tanks in real force. A US army report castigating Patton: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211668.pdf
 * 94.5.104.222 (talk) 11:53, 21 January 2017 (UTC)
 * Some of what you say is true and some of it isn't. Claiming that Market Garden was not a gamble but a (complete) success is going beyond what any sensible historian says on the topic, whilst claiming that the resulting salient came in handy during the Battle of the Bulge makes neither geographic nor logical sense. Antwerp was a very much bigger and more important port than the ones which you list; Montgomery was strongly criticised at the time for not clearing the mouth of the Scheldt (although you are right that Brereton refused to drop paratroops there) and it was one of the few occasions in the campaign in which the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Alan Brooke, Marshall et al) came close to intervening in operations and ordering Ike to divert resources to this job. The report which you print is an historian's paper, not an official US Army report. It is an interesting read, but it does not "castigate" Patton. It contains some criticism of him for over-optimism during the initial attack on Metz (a failing which he shared with Ike and Bradley) and, having taken a month's break to reorganise his forces, failing to concentrate enough during the fighting in November. But that's about it. Now, this is not a discussion forum, and this really has to be it unless you've got a concrete suggestion for something which ought to go into the article.Paulturtle (talk) 06:12, 6 February 2017 (UTC)

Help needed please
Please help. I am working on building up the article for Battle for Caen, which was obviously part of Overlord. I started on the controversy about the fact that Montgomery failed to achieve some D-Day objectives, specifically capturing Caen, and then pretended that everything went according to his “real” original plan after all. Another editor is fiercely defending Montgomery, ruling that actual correspondence from Eisenhower and other commanders of the time are “primary sources” that must take second place to the secondary sources, even though the actual correspondence from Eisenhower and other commanders are presented in secondary sources, and that all the secondary sources which criticize Montgomery were written by people who simply failed to understand Monty’s genius plans, and who were part of a 1970’s conspiracy. It’s getting to be a bit of an alt-truth situation. Please could some other editors who are knowledgeable on the subject, assist on the Battle for Caen article? Wdford (talk) 21:21, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

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Press conference text
I moved the lengthy text of Montgomery's press conference from the article on the Battle of the Bulge here. This article appears to be relatively "pro" Montgomery and until this point made no mention of his arraogance and conflicts with Eisenhower.. — btphelps (talk to me) (what I've done) 05:56, 22 September 2014 (UTC)


 * Is that particular quote of what he said from Monty's own book? If so, it's copyrighted, and cannot be used here.  (Besides, primary sources are not preferred.)  --A D Monroe III (talk) 22:20, 22 September 2014 (UTC)


 * Monty's "difficult" ways with people are mentioned in article. But it's meant to be a summary not replicate "lengthy" (as you put it )sections from other articles. GraemeLeggett (talk) 05:23, 23 September 2014 (UTC)


 * In fairness, there used - some years ago - to be a lengthy and in my view not unfair summary of Monty's personal oddities and spectacular ability to rub people up the wrong the way, as well as the way he handed his critics a gift by later pretending that everything at Second Alamein and Normandy (both of them difficult battles against an entrenched opponent which he handled far from badly in the circumstances) had gone perfectly according to plan. It got wiped for being "uncited". There is certainly room for more analysis and discussion of these things if somebody wants to take the trouble to write them.Paulturtle (talk) 11:02, 17 October 2014 (UTC)
 * Monty was a level or two in brainpower above most. The US never had any top rated generals. I can give a list of US buffoons. Most US generals would not make it in the British Army. If people were not of the same fast comprehension and logic as him he would become frustrated. he wanted immediate comprehension and men on the same wavelength as him. Time was vital at times. 90.214.240.181 (talk) 19:18, 2 January 2017 (UTC)


 * Unsubstantiated (and unwarranted) attacks of this type on the army that keeps bailing Britain out are not part of this article. We should stick to the attacks on Monty, many of which can be refuted. 213.205.251.18 (talk) 13:33, 24 October 2017 (UTC)


 * The 'arrogance' often reported of Montgomery is people's POV and not necessarily true. There were many petty jealousies within the Allied High Command, and there is no doubt that Montgomery made enemies, however that is as much a reflection on the pettiness of some of Montgomery's colleagues as much as it is a reflection on Montgomery himself.


 * I added the lengthy quote on Montgomery's Ardennes speech simply because it disproves much that has been said and written about his conduct during and after the battle, much of which it would seem are either misunderstandings of a speech made in plain English, or else deliberate distortion of his conduct during the battle. These inaccuracies are it would seem, still repeated as fact.


 * The Battle of the Bulge was not Montgomery's fault, it was entirely due to the mishandling of the defences and absence of the American commanders when they were needed. Thus certain parties had plenty of good reasons to try and distract attentions away from themselves, and direct it elsewhere. As I wrote elsewhere, if the Allied commanders responsible for the Battle of the Bulge fiasco had been German, Hitler would have had them all shot.


 * ... and if Montgomery had been in charge of the American lines in the Ardennes then the battle would never have been allowed to happen, they would have been properly defended. There, think that one over.


 * The only thing that comes out of all the rather petty attacks against Montgomery is that through all this he remained quiet and uncomplaining. Then again, for all the attacks against him, it would seem that his ego was not as fragile as those of some of his critics.


 * ... and if you want opinions on Montgomery then get them from people who served under him and knew what they were facing, like Brian Horrocks, not people who were having it comparatively easy and thinking it the height of difficulty. That simple fact should illustrate how out of touch some of his critics were. Rather like an old whore being lectured and criticised on sex by a newly-deflowered virgin. Montgomery had come out of Dunkirk in 1940 when many of his critics had been sitting at home twiddling their thumbs. And Dunkirk wasn't any of his fault either.


 * BTW, in the unlikely event you want a positive thing to say about Montgomery then how about mentioning his successful planning and execution of Operation Overlord, aka, D-Day. Why - because if anyone else had planned the invasion it would have failed. Why - because Montgomery was the only Allied commander who had a clue what the invasion forces would be facing. Many of the others thought it was going to be easy. They for the most part were the same ones who later thought that fighting one-and-a-half panzer divisions was the height of difficulty. They should have tried the seven-and-a-half the British and Canadians were facing.

There is a lot of truth in all that, but the fact remains that Monty was, throughout his career, an odd and very abrasive fellow (are you aware of the tale, reproduced by Nigel Hamilton, of how at Staff College somebody was made to sit next to him at breakfast as a punishment, and of how it was posted in the college magazine that the best thing about Armistice Day was that Monty would have to shut up for two minutes?), and it also appears that fame and success went to his head a bit. His speech after the Ardennes reads OK on paper but at the time it was very tactless; Churchill had to (as good as) apologise for it in the House of Commons, and he came very close to being sacked afterwards, having finally exhausted Eisenhower's patience after months of badgering. It was a coalition war and Britain was, to state the obvious, very much the junior partner by then.Paulturtle (talk) 00:42, 2 February 2015 (UTC)


 * "His speech after the Ardennes reads OK on paper but at the time it was very tactless;" - it was actually hurriedly written in response to scathing articles in the UK newspapers criticising the US handling of the situation. He wrote and made a speech that showered glowing praise on the US soldier and on Eisenhower - who the UK newspapers had been critical-of for not ensuring his US subordinates had kept a firm hand on the situation beforehand.


 * He did not mention that the whole Ardennes situation was of the American's own making, nor that at the time the two relevant US leaders were both away from the Front, one being in another country altogether - nor that they had actually been given forewarning of the possibility of a German attack. He also did not mention the considerable inconvenience to himself and the British forces who had to then go and get into positions to protect the Meuse crossings - something that never should have become necessary. And again, he also did not mention that because of this he then had to postpone his forthcoming Operation Valediction which then was forced to commence later than planned and after the frozen ground had started thawing, turning into mud that then hampered his armour. As a result of this, the US then criticised him for being 'slow'.


 * Most non-partisan people would say that in all that, he did in fact display considerable tact, not to mention patience and forbearing.


 * BTW, as a result of the newspaper reports and British public opinion Eisenhower came close to losing his job. Montgomery's speech stopped that. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.100.255 (talk) 10:34, 27 April 2016 (UTC)

Again, you are quite right that a lot of criticism of Monty for his alleged "slowness" was and is unfair, and that the British and US press spent a lot of the war slagging off one another's generals and fighting a vicious proxy war. Nonetheless, Monty managed to rub the Americans up the wrong way by his perceived egotism, talking of it being one of the most interest battles "I" have ever fought (I forget the exact phrase). As so often with political gaffes, it's often one or two phrases which get plucked out of context and repeated because they capture the tone of what was said. What is your source for the claim that Monty's speech stopped Ike from being sacked? (I'd have thought that if anyone was in danger of the sack it would have been Bradley, who was largely sidelined during the battle, but I'm happy to be corrected)Paulturtle (talk) 14:55, 22 May 2016 (UTC) Just had a flick through Anthony Beevor's recent "Ardennes 44" which discusses the criticism of US generals in the British press, and says that Monty's speech was written for him by Brigadier Williams, who thought it read well but dreaded how it would be received when delivered by Monty. His fears were justified, especially when Monty launched into an unscripted riff after reaching the end of his notes. Beevor then quotes a British Cabinet paper on the affair, mentioning that Monty's speech read well but had been marred by a certain "smugness of tone", as well as exaggerating the role played by British forces in the battle. That would seem to be the majority view.Paulturtle (talk) 20:39, 18 June 2016 (UTC)

Cobra
The article, which is still pretty bad due to infection by US nationalists, has this gem from a US nationalist apparently called Stephen Power, whoever that is: 'Power noted that Goodwood and Cobra were supposed to take effect on the same day, 18 July 1944, but Cobra was cancelled owing to heavy rain in the American sector, and argued that both operations were meant to be breakout operations to trap the German armies in Normandy.' Anyone who knows anything about Normandy at all knows that Cobra was in fact delayed because the Americans simply hadn't taken their objective of St Lo yet. They didn't take St Lo till 19 July, so Bradley couldn't order Cobra till that point. And then the thunderstorms arrived and put the whole thing off for several days more. It is simply not true that it rained in the American sector on 18 July, or that the initial postponement was due to anything but the failure to capture St Lo, a first objective that eluded the Americans for even longer than Caen eluded the British and Canadians. (On the one hand, St Lo was a little further inland; on the other hand, German resistance in the St Lo sector was negligible compared to the Caen sector. But, as the Germans always said, 'The sound of one machine gun will stop an American division in its tracks.')

The article also makes the false claim that, in Operation Cobra, the Americans had only two-to-one superiority. This is absurd. In Operation Cobra, 77,000 Americans, with 700 tanks, attacked just 5,000 Germans, with 31 tanks. That's counting only the front-line US divisions and not the corps and army troops, who were even more numerous, particularly in terms of artillery and anti-tank units.

The article quotes Stephen Badsey a bit but does not quote the last paragraph of his book (Normandy 1944, Osprey, 1990, p.89), which is of some interest: 'It is a commonplace that an army reflects its society. Having seldom lost a war, the British Army, in false modesty, likes to praise its opponents and denigrate itself. They were almost the best troops in the world, it seems to suggest, what a pity they were facing us. The American style is more of self praise at the expense of all others, conceding merit to an opponent before a rival.' (He can say that again.) 'The German approach turns war into a morality play, the tragic defeat of mere mortals struggling with superhuman strength against the impersonal forces of the machine. If the Americans had been as good as they said they were, the British as bad as they said they were, and the Germans as good as everyone said they were, the Battle of Normandy could not have been fought as it was.' Khamba Tendal (talk) 18:27, 15 September 2017 (UTC)


 * Can you itemize specific changes to make with proper cites? We can't go on "Anyone who knows anything".  --A D Monroe III (talk) 23:45, 15 September 2017 (UTC)

Well... um... for instance, Victory in the West Vol.I by Major L.F. Ellis et al (HMSO 1962), the British official history, ISBN 1-870423-07-0, US reprint ISBN 0-89839-139-8, p.377, has this: 'With the capture of St Lo on the 19th the American First Army had reached a position from which Cobra could be launched, and General Bradley had flown to England to concert with air and ground commanders final co-ordination of the air bombardment and the ground assault.' Or there's The Clay Pigeons of St Lo by Glover S Johns Jr, the battalion commander who actually took St Lo, ISBN 0811730417, which says on p.221, with the author referring to himself in the third person, 'He went over to where Bein had the 300, which he used to call the rear command post, still back at the farmhouse, instructing Captain Mentzer to report to regiment that the city of St Lo had been cleared and was now secure, as of 1730 hours, 18 July 1944.' Goodwood had been in progress for twelve hours by then, and Johns has another 30 pages describing a whole further day of battle before the battalion was relieved and withdrawn. Khamba Tendal (talk) 19:05, 26 October 2017 (UTC)

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Racism
We sayMontgomery held racist views towards Africans, which is cited to Baxter. I cannot see the source but I am wary of this claim: his view of Africans was certainly not unusual at that time and it is a problem exacerbated by poor historians imposing modern judgements on historical issues. Does Baxter actually say this and does he have the expertise to do so? Would some tweaking, such as held what would now be considered racists views ..., be appropriate?

Just FYI, since Jeremy Paxman is certainly not an authority, that writer mentions the House of Lords debate on homosexuality, saying that Montgomery proposed the age of consent should be eighty (!) He also suggests a possible latent or repressed homosexuality in the man himself. - Sitush (talk) 23:08, 28 December 2017 (UTC)


 * Monty's views on Africa were considered somewhat old-fashioned even by the standards of the 1960s. I'd need to refresh my memory about the exact details but my recollection is that it caused difficulties with getting some of his op-ed pieces published (for about ten years after his retirement in 1958 he did a fair bit of journalism, until old age and infirmity finally silenced him). Have a read of the final chapters of Vol III of the Nigel Hamilton biog. And a number of biographers over the years have suggested that he may very well have been a latent/repressed homosexual.Paulturtle (talk) 06:00, 1 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Having just gone through what is available of The Lonely Leader in Google books, I can't see any of the words referring to his relationships cited to page 348, but appear on 393. Is it a particular edition? GraemeLeggett (talk) 08:48, 1 January 2018 (UTC)
 * No idea because I can't see it at all here. - Sitush (talk) 08:53, 1 January 2018 (UTC)


 * My copy of Alistair Horne's book "The Lonely Leader" is boxed up somewhere. No issue with changing page numbers - what matters is that the info is traceable. As for the Swiss boy, whose name I think was Lucien Treub, he is mentioned extensively in the Vol III of the Nigel Hamilton biog as well - I remember seeing him, a middle aged man by then, interviewed in a documentary in the late 80s.Paulturtle (talk) 15:38, 1 January 2018 (UTC)

Death from unspecified causes
"Montgomery died from unspecified causes in 1976"

This is a bit odd. Is there a source which says he died of old age? Or can we just put "Montgomery died in 1976"? cagliost (talk) 12:25, 18 August 2016 (UTC)

... and Montgomery's wife died of a bee sting.--Brenont (talk) 19:15, 4 April 2018 (UTC)

'Affair' with Betty Anderson
This failed courtship cannot be described as an affair. She found him totally off-putting, they never made rapport, and when her parents insisted that she must marry him, she was at her wits' end, until they eventually relented. (See the Hamilton biography.) Valetude (talk) 18:47, 24 August 2018 (UTC)

Casualty conservation policy
The paragraph under this title ought to be deleted. LP Devine's 2014 PhD thesis, for instance, looked minutely at the day-to-day activities of two infantry divisions in Second Army and showed that there was no policy of casualty conservation at all. It's a myth indulged in by US nationalist authors. (I should know, since a late friend served in one of the infantry divisions discussed by Devine and they certainly had no casualty-conservation policy. They were told before the invasion that the battalion would take 100% casualties within six weeks of reaching the front line, and that is exactly what happened, as it did to every British battalion. Overall, each battalion took 250% casualties from D-Day to VE-Day. Numerically, everyone got hit, all their replacements got hit, and half their replacements' replacements got hit. Men were hit in Normandy, returned to duty and then killed in the Rhineland, for example. By VE-Day, only about half a dozen statistical freaks per battalion remained out of those who had sailed to Normandy in June 1944.) https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10026.1/3014/2014devine378959phd.pdf.pdf;sequence=1 The whole paragraph is cited solely to a single work by a single British author, Dr Stephen Hart, who does not in fact take the US-nationalist view that the Wikipedia editor wishes to impose on the article, so the source is being deliberately misrepresented. Although Hart is mistaken in operational terms, and Devine's paper is a factual refutation of Hart, Hart actually argues that Montgomery was doing the right thing in breaking off attacks when the gains were not worth the casualties. Really, because of the obsessive activities of US nationalists, the article, which is notoriously bad and is one of the most-cited examples of why Wikipedia should be shunned and despised, needs to be rewritten by a competent author and then placed under very heavy protection. Khamba Tendal (talk) 17:48, 9 May 2018 (UTC)


 * Montgomery had been at the Battle of the Somme and early in in WW II he had realised that the British Soldier of 1939 was not the same uneducated soldier he had been in 1914, and had to be handled differently, which included not sending men needlessly to their deaths for nothing worthwhile. He decided never to do this and he didn't.


 * One of the most gratifying things on seeing the in-many-cases uninformed and laughable criticism of Montgomery is the knowledge that he himself didn't give a damn what other people thought of him. He never even raised a comment when other people's mistakes or failures were instead heaped upon him, for he had broad shoulders, and he could tolerate the misplaced blame of lesser men.


 * He did after all rise to the position of CIGS and Deputy SACEUR so neither that 'lack of tact', nor the critics, did him much harm. Perhaps that's what annoyed his critics. I suspect professional jealousy also has a bearing too.


 * BTW, most of Montgomery's critics hadn't been at the Battle of the Somme. He had, where as he states, they had "Thirty-thousand men killed before lunch". All for nothing. Under Montgomery men would, if necessary, die, but they wouldn't die for nothing.


 * "War was a highly-professional business, and there is no room in war for the amateur." — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.148.8.216 (talk) 09:42, 1 May 2019 (UTC)

Sexuality
Why is there no mention of the question over his sexuality? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.166.116.65 (talk) 11:59, 30 March 2019 (UTC)
 * Read the talk archives. (Hohum @ ) 14:56, 30 March 2019 (UTC)


 * There are only uninformed questions. He was normal. He abstained from marriage until he was forty in order to concentrate his efforts on becoming a thoroughly professional soldier: — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.148.8.216 (talk) 08:50, 1 May 2019 (UTC)


 * Knew him well, did you? You must be very old. The short answer is that a number of his biographers - including Chalfont and his main biographer Nigel Hamilton - have suggested that he may very well have been a repressed/latent/whatever homosexual. Both men knew him and spoke to others who did. So it ought to be in the article, but it keeps being deleted by hagiographers who "don't like" it, and one gets bored of arguing about these things. I doubt it made much difference to his generalship one way or the other (Hamilton says it did, although I can't say I'm persuaded), and it didn't stop him from being happily married, but lots of men were married, sometimes happily, in those days who might nowadays come out as gay.Paulturtle (talk) 07:27, 19 May 2019 (UTC)


 * Considering what happened to Alan Turing, Monty was wise to pretend to be happily married. Wdford (talk) 16:04, 19 May 2019 (UTC)


 * I wouldn't go that far. His marriage was by all accounts genuinely happy and I don't think it's ever been suggested that he was actively gay, just that he had inclinations in that direction, which he perhaps didn't admit even to himself.Paulturtle (talk) 18:47, 19 May 2019 (UTC)

Re: early command of 8th army
There is a paragraph here which seems to contradict itself. Personally I think it needs rewriting.

''"Montgomery's assumption of command transformed the fighting spirit and abilities of the Eighth Army.[67] Taking command on 13 August 1942, he immediately became a whirlwind of activity. He ordered the creation of the X Corps, which contained all armoured divisions to fight alongside his XXX Corps which was all infantry divisions. This was in no way similar to a German Panzer Corps. One of Rommel's Panzer Corps combined infantry, armour and artillery units under one corps commander. The only common commander for Montgomery's all infantry and all armour corps was the Eighth Army Commander himself. Correlli Barnett commented that Montgomery's solution "... was in every way opposite to Auchinleck's and in every way wrong, for it carried the existing dangerous separatism still further."[68] "''

Whether Montgomery actually transformed 8th armies abilities or not the statement is followed by a citation from a historian saying that one of his major changes made things worse while no t even putting inbetween any evidence of changes that were good. Also it says X Corp was "in no way similar to a german panzer corp" but does not state why. All that is added is a note about how it was different from ones led by Rommel. 2A02:C7D:86B:4A00:9852:A489:27C0:68A (talk) 10:47, 23 February 2019 (UTC)
 * It definitely needs a rewrite, and a look at those two sources. My impression is that they seem to hold opposing views on Montgomery, and that the previous editor made no attempt to reconcile them.--Quisqualis (talk) 03:55, 10 March 2019 (UTC)


 * " ...was in every way opposite to Auchinleck's and in every way wrong, for it carried the existing dangerous separatism still further." - before Montgomery the 8th Army were continuously losing. After Montgomery they only ever won. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.148.8.216 (talk) 08:59, 1 May 2019 (UTC)

Well, Auchinleck had had some partial successes - the Crusader battle at the end of 1941, fighting Rommel to a halt at First Alamein - and lots of people, at the time and ever since, have suggested that Monty's defence of Alam Halfa was rather more dependent than he later admitted on plans drawn up by Auchinleck. However, I don't think there's any doubt that Monty was a new broom who got things moving in the way that new bosses, in any walk of life, often do. He also had the benefit of a massive influx of new resources which Auchinleck hadn't had. Lots of people, at the time and later, felt that the all-armour X Corps (under Lumsden iirc) was a failed experiment. The two propositions are not necessarily contradictory.Paulturtle (talk) 01:03, 26 June 2019 (UTC)


 * Monty had the huge advantage of a supportive boss. Were it not for Alan Brooke's patronage, Monty would be a minor footnote in history. His tactics at Alamein II were straight from the World War One play-book, and he had the advantage of being allowed months to prepare for it - both by Rommel's own supply problems and from Brooke covering his back in London. After the fall of Tobruk he got a lot of American tanks and air support that the Auk did not have.
 * Monty had full call on the British resource base, while Rommel was playing minor fiddle to the massive resource-hungry effort underway in Russia - if just one extra panzer division had been switched from Russia to Africa, Monty would have been toast. Monty also had an American army landing in Algeria etc at the time of Alamein II, forcing Rommel to manage two fronts at once.
 * When the 8th Army went on to Sicily and Italy, they were backed up by huge American resources and American armies - if they had invaded Sicily alone it would have gone very differently indeed. I'm sure Auchinleck would have been very happy to have such powerful political support and powerful allies, but luck went the other way. Wdford (talk) 14:33, 26 June 2019 (UTC)
 * Switching a panzer division from Russia to Africa is not a thing that could have happened. The American landings in French North Africa under Operation Torch took place only at the very tail-end of the Alamein battle, encountered little response from the Vichy French, did not involve Rommel's Afrika Korps in any way and had no effect on the outcome of the battle. (And when the Americans did finally meet the Afrika Korps at the Kasserine Pass, Eisenhower's entire army ran away screaming at their first sight of a single German tank, the point tank of Rommel's 21st Panzer Division. The green American troops only rallied when veteran British formations muscled up alongside them.) There was never any plan for Eighth Army to invade Sicily and mainland Italy by itself: the British talked the Americans into attacking French North Africa and then Italy as part of Alan Brooke's strategy of 'overstretch', keeping the Germans busy on multiple fronts (including home air defence against the Allied bombers) to exploit the enemy's problems in Russia and weaken him in North-West Europe before the cross-Channel operation. The Americans didn't want to go to North Africa or Italy, they wanted to go straight across the Channel in 1942, which would have led to a Kasserine Pass disaster in a rather more vital theatre, but Allied strategy was led by the British, because the Americans were guests of the British in that part of the world and couldn't do a thing without them. Khamba Tendal (talk) 17:40, 18 June 2020 (UTC)


 * Interesting take, but not factually accurate.
 * Moving a panzer division from Russia to Africa obviously WAS possible. Within days of the Torch landings, before Alamein II was over and while Stalingrad was raging, Hitler found an entire surplus panzer army in Italy and started sending it to Tunisia – some of it by airlift. During Overlord the German logistics experts moved multiple panzer divisions from Russia to Normandy – at a time when the pressure on the Eastern Front was far greater than in 1942, and the Allied bombing far more intense. German logistics was clearly up to the task - the only hindrance to sending these reinforcements to Rommel was Hitler's wobbly psyche.


 * The Torch force landed in several areas where they encountered stiff resistance, not just the soft arrival at Algiers. Having a huge force landing behind him obviously affected Rommel's decision-making during Alamein II, as Rommel was in Africa to maintain Axis control of Libya, not just to fight at Alamein in isolation. It clearly affected Hitler's decision-making as well, and probably Monty's too. If Rommel had had the use of even a part of Von Arnim's force at Alamein – or even just its fuel supply – the result at Alamein would have been quite different.


 * "Eisenhower's entire army" included the British and French forces as well, as Ike was the overall commander of Torch. After experiencing a relatively easy landing, the British units in Torch experienced a number of reversals against the Germans too.


 * The US forces initially made contact with the 21st Panzer Division at the Faïd Pass, a few weeks BEFORE Kasserine. There was no running away at first contact – actually the US forces initially destroyed some German tanks and drove the Germans back. The advancing US units were then shot up by the 88mm artillery and their positions were over-run, and the survivors were ordered to withdraw to regroup.


 * At the Kasserine Pass several weeks later, the defending US force was smaller than a division, far less "Eisenhower's entire army". The initial German attack was halted by the US Stark Force - no running away this time either. The Germans only overwhelmed the defences on the following day. Unlike the British at Gazala, who ran all the way back to Egypt, the survivors of the US Stark Force fell back a few miles and regrouped on the CCB of the US 1st Armoured Division, which was coming up to reinforce them. They then stopped the German advance with heavy artillery support, and counter-attacked successfully at Hamra. On the road to Thala the Germans shot up and over-ran the British Gore Force and Nick Force, before being halted by US artillery. On the road to Tébessa the Germans were halted by US artillery and armour. The initial failures were ascribed to poor decision-making and communication by both the American general Fredendall and his British commander Anderson.


 * The American forces in Europe were not the "guests" of the British, they came to rescue the British after years of pleading and wheedling from Churchill, despite the reluctance of many US commanders and many of the US voters who wanted to focus on the Pacific War. (See The Struggle for Europe, By Chester Wilmot, chapters 5&6.) In real life, the British could do very little against the Germans without US material support, and could not hope to invade Europe without massive US forces. Strategy was agreed by the Joint Chiefs, and Brooke had to fight for his ideas against opposition from Marshall and King in particular – including Torch. The US only agreed (reluctantly) to Torch and the Med because the U-Boat menace at that point prevented the build-up needed for a successful invasion of France – not because Brooke was in any way in charge of strategy. You are however correct that there was never any plan for the British to invade Sicily and Italy by themselves – they were never strong enough to do anything more than slog it out in the desert, and even then only with the aid of huge numbers of American tanks and supplies.


 * When finally the western Allies did invade France (disregarding Churchill's on-going resistance), the US forces on D-Day consisted largely of "inexperienced units" – including the 4th Infantry Division and the 90th Infantry Division at Utah, and the 29th Infantry Division at Omaha. These "green" units acquitted themselves well, while the "veteran" British units with the easier beaches and open countryside bogged down at Caen for many weeks.


 * On the ground Eisenhower was in command throughout. Ike over-ruled Monty frequently in the Mediterranean. When Monty was allowed to command Overlord (in name at least, for political reasons), Ike still over-ruled Monty on key decisions such as postponing the launch due to bad weather. After Overlord Ike took direct command of land forces himself, despite the complaints and criticisms of Monty and Brooke, and Ike flat-out blocked Monty's strategy to become the permanent Boss of Everyone. Ike sent Monty to Antwerp when Monty wanted to go to Paris, and he sent Monty to Hamburg when Monty wanted to charge to Berlin. He repeatedly blocked Monty from pursuing his suicidal "dagger thrust to Berlin" scheme, which was conclusively proved to be a stupid idea by Monty himself at Arnhem, and again by the Germans in the Ardennes. Ultimately, the Americans even agreed to let the Russians capture Berlin, against the protests of Churchill and Monty in particular.


 * All of this real-life history should be clearly reflected in this article. Wdford (talk) 16:44, 21 June 2020 (UTC)

No. Just no. Too many deep compacted layers of wrong to go into. Khamba Tendal (talk) 22:47, 20 March 2021 (UTC)

Guys, Wikipedia policy is that we should not use the talk page as a forum or soapbox for a general discussion the topic. The talk page is for discussing how to improve the article, not for exchanging our own opinions. See WP:NOTFORUM --Shimbo (talk) 13:00, 31 July 2021 (UTC)

Market Garden

 * A some useful info about Monty's part in Market Garden here:

Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower, approved and under resourced the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams of the USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:

♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;

♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;

♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;

♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;

♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;

♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;

♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.

General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.

Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed.

XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.

XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.

Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm ''The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong''.

"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time Monty under his own initiative had the Canadians clear it, or were investing in many of the Channel ports" - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944


 * This reads like a not-very-subtle attempt to whitewash Monty. Like most whitewash attempts, you have left out quite a few important facts. The article needs to properly report the realities:


 * Market Garden was totally Montgomery's baby. It was his personal attempt to showcase his "dagger thrust" philosophy, against the advice of everyone else. Monty over-ruled any British officer who spoke out against the plan, including even Dempsey. Monty raged petulantly to Ike to allocate more resources. Even after the war, Monty continued to say that "I remain Market Garden's unrepentant advocate."


 * Ike was the overall commander, and he had to approve all operations, so he carries some responsibility too. Ike knew that the "dagger thrust" was a stupid philosophy, but he allowed Monty to waste resources and men's lives to settle a dispute about the best way forward.


 * Monty continually complained that his pet project had been deprived of resources, despite the fact that Ike loaned Monty the full Airborne Army to test out his theory – the British Airborne strength would never had achieved anything on its own. Monty ranted for his pet project to be given top priority, even when this undermined the two US armies which were poised to enter Germany – probably because Monty desperately wanted to be the first into Germany. Both US Armies eventually got into Germany ahead of Monty anyway.


 * The operation did not fail to be a 100% success "by a whisker". Being envisaged as a "dagger thrust" though multiple choke-points, with a ridiculously tight timetable, it was doomed from the start. The Africa Korps attack in Alamein II came closer to success than this shambles did, in that Rommel merely ran out of fuel.


 * The person who made the operational decisions, and who must carry much of the blame, was the British general Browning, who as the commander of the British 1st Airborne Corps had overall command of airborne operations. The decision to drop troops far from the bridges was actually an RAF decision, and was opposed by General Gavin. There was only one airlift on the first day, specifically because hours of daylight were needed for fighter bombers to first suppress the German flak.


 * The British XXX Corps halted their advance without good cause - they did not perform blamelessly. The entire XXX Corps advance was stopped at Lent by a couple of anti-tank guns, and they bottlenecked yet again – once again demonstrating the fallacy of the "dagger thrust" thinking.


 * General Gavin followed Browning's orders to secure the flank against counter-attack and artillery bombardment, before moving to the bridge itself. This was agreed upon partly because an immediate counter-attack would slaughter the XXX Corps on that narrow road, and partly because the objective of the operation was actually to support a long-range attack into Germany, not merely to capture a bridge for a few days in order to rescue some hapless Brits. If the Germans subsequently wrecked the bridge it would leave a large Allied force stranded without supplies or support on the "wrong" side of that river, as well as artillery fire and counter-attacks posing an immediate threat to any Allied transport on that narrow road before the bridge was destroyed. Immediate German counter-attacks on the Groesbeek Heights showed that Gavin was correct to defend that area, as without his paras those counter-attacks would have swept the bridge easily. With hindsight the balance of the risk could have been handled a bit differently, but even with Ultra the British did not know exactly what to expect, and this affected their planning. Since both Browning and Monty were pointedly ignoring all intelligence reports that informed of a strong German presence, Gavin's caution certainly was required.


 * Ike did warn Monty that a "dagger thrust" would require enormous resources to build and maintain a fortified corridor through hundreds of miles of enemy territory in order to protect the long flanks and the supply lines, and particularly to guard the many choke-points. Monty, as usual, didn't want to hear about this. Gavin was wiser than Monty, and he had less to prove.


 * Ike knew that the Allies needed more ports. The lack of fuel and supplies was preventing the US armies from reaching the Rhine, and the American generals were complaining constantly about this. Monty had long ago been instructed to open Antwerp, which required clearing the river as well. However Monty delegated this critical task to a small portion of the Canadian army so that he could focus on proving his "dagger thrust" concept. The Canadians complained that the allocated resources were insufficient for the task, and Monty over-ruled them.


 * Monty was aware that one northern channel port could supply his army but not the American armies as well, and limiting supplies to the US Armies would give the British Army precedence and leverage – and support Monty's campaign to become the Boss of Everyone. He therefore did not rush to open Antwerp, but rather he focused his resources on trying to prove his "dagger thrust" concept.


 * When Hitler attempted a "dagger thrust" through the Ardennes a few months later, intending to knife through to Antwerp, he was blocked at the choke-points, his advance ran out of fuel, the Germans were chewed from the flanks, and eventually they had to abandon the attempt under artillery fire and air-strikes, and retreat urgently to avoid being cut off by Patton. The Germans only managed to extract a viable number of troops from the trap because Monty refused to attack, and deliberately left a gap in the noose – exactly as he had done at Falaise.


 * Ike's critics simultaneously accuse him both of letting Monty have far too much freedom, as well as undermining and micro-managing Monty. Monty belittled and undermined Ike constantly, because Ike (and Marshall) wouldn't let Monty be the Boss of Everyone. Eventually even Ike had a gutful of Monty's BS, the "dagger thrust" approach was dead as disco and the Allied strategy going forward was always a broad-front advance, with the flanks and supply lines properly secured.


 * The article needs to properly report these realities please. Wdford (talk) 13:41, 31 July 2021 (UTC)

Category

 * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Cultural_depictions_of_Bernard_Montgomery
 * 2600:6C55:7600:14C8:9C03:F9C5:8FFB:254D (talk) 14:51, 7 April 2020 (UTC)

Boys
What about his interest in young boys, detailed in the biography "The Full Monty"? (31.53.205.161 (talk) 19:44, 10 August 2021 (UTC))