Talk:Bismarck-class battleship/Archive 1

Beam
So, on the one hand she had a very broad beam, and on the other, her beam was too small. I suggest someone who cares admits that you can't have it both ways and edits the article one way or the other. As it is it looks like a fanboy article. Greg Locock (talk) 02:03, 3 January 2008 (UTC)

Old discussions
I made some heavy modifications and tried to get this as wikified as possible. I'm sure it still needs a little work done though. There was a bit of point of view material that I attempted to neutralize, but there may be some of that floating around as well.

The original version of the article also had this note about halfway through the article:
 * *Note* To simplify the text, the Bismarck Class of battleship (two vessels) will simply be called "Bismarck" henceforth.

To avoid confusion between the class of ship and the actual battleship, I deleted this and reworded the entire article where it said "Bismarck" to say "Bismarck class".--ScottyBoy900Q ∞ 17:12, 26 July 2004 (UTC)

There were some obvious mistakes in the text:


 * – Prince of Wales had no 8 inch guns and did not participate in the final engagement
 * - Calibers of secondary and AA-Battery were wrong
 * Nevfennas 19:06, 24 November 2005 (UTC)


 * I'm not doubting this information, but could you please provide some evidence of this. I've got no clue one way or the other, would just like to verify. --ScottyBoy900Q 15:29, 26 November 2005 (UTC)

On the Prince of Wales: Take http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/ships/html/sh_072200_hmsprinceofw.htm as one example. But nearly every page dealing with the King Geoge V class of 1939 will confirm it's armament as ten 14 inch heavy artillery, sixteen 5,25 inch dual purpose secondarys plus additional flak.

Same on Bismarck http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/ships/html/sh_012000_bismarck.htm. On all German capital warships the 6 inch gun was used as secondary and the heaviest AA-Gun was the 4 inch (105mm) twin-mount Nevfennas 16:35, 26 November 2005 (UTC)
 * Looks good. Thanks. Was just curious.--ScottyBoy900Q 03:58, 28 November 2005 (UTC)

Was the Tirpitz really involved in 'Operation_Rösselsprung'? That sounds like a infantry/paratroop assault... inland. Deep.... inland. At least from the Baltic. If the Tirpitz had ever made it out of the waters north of Germany, we'd have heard a lot more about it.


 * Yes, Tirpitz was involved. That 'Operation_Rösselsprung' was the aborted attempt to attack the convoy PQ17, not to be confused with the linked 'Operation_Rösselsprung'. Nevfennas 05:56, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

Two things may probably be added: link to Bismark, the person and link to what HMS is. Stan 22:02, 29 July 2006 (UTC)

One thing struck me when reading the article for assessment... What was the "curious oversight in the design of the Bismarck's AA gun directors"? -- Medains 08:04, 5 September 2006 (UTC)


 * Here is an article comparing the quality of German ship-design during WWI and WWII. The AA gun directors are mentioned as being an overly complex and overloaded design, which probably was the origin of the problem. No idea however about the specific overlooked detail. --Nevfennas 20:24, 5 September 2006 (UTC)

It perhaps refers to the old story (I beleive something close to an urban legend) that the Swordfish were too slow to be targeted, that the Bismark's AA directors didn't have a setting low enough for them. I'm pretty sure the story is false, but it is a common one.


 * I agree. Since torpedoes are launched more or less at the target the closing speed of the a/c is relatively unimportant in the firing solution. If you want a detailed discussion of the faults with the AA system try www.kbismarck.com/AVKS-700.zip Recent discussion on warships1 suggests it is is as simple that the attack occurred around nightfall. The Swordfishes had radar, so they were OK, whereas the AA gun crews would have been blinded by their own flashes and would not have been able to see the a/c. Sounds pretty likely to me. Greglocock 01:25, 20 February 2007 (UTC)


 * I serioulsy doubt that Swordfishs were equipped with radar in early 1941. Nevfennas 07:03, 20 February 2007 (UTC)


 * Well then, you need to read some serious books. Or visit www.warships1.com and read the discussion on Bis and swordfishes. Greglocock 21:27, 20 February 2007 (UTC)


 * Well, I stumbled over this [page]. Mark III had Radar, but was only used from 1943 on. And as all swordfishs that attacked Bismarck carried torpedos, this would rule out radar. Nevfennas 07:34, 21 February 2007 (UTC)


 * All but one of 825 Squadron's aircraft nine aircraft (Victorious) were "new" ASV equipped Swordfish. Interestingly, the one aircraft that did not find and attack Bismarck was the one non-ASV equipped plane.


 * Ark Royal was still using much older Swordfish, and had only received a few ASV equipped aircraft for use by the Squadron COs and some of the section leaders. Of the 30 aircraft embarked only about six of those operational had ASV. Since they needed ASV-equipped planes for shadoweres, their were only about three ASV-equipped planes available for s the strike force. But those planes were critically important elements in locating the target of the attack. It was the direct cause of the attack on HMS Sheffield. quote from warships1 Greglocock 11:07, 21 February 2007 (UTC)

I don't know how much the posters in that forum know, but the sources avaiable to me (including the wiki-article) say that
 * 1) the ASV-variant (the Mark III) of the Swordfish of was not avaiable until 1943
 * 2) both the weight and placement of the radar prohibited the use of torpedoes. The Mark III could still carry lighter bombs or depth-charges, which made it an excellent sub-hunter.

If all Swordfishs on Victorious had radar that would have negated it's striking capability against surface-ships. Again I consider that highly doubtful. But if you want you can raise that point at Fairey Swordfish, there the topic would fit better (we are getting highly off-topic here) and the guys managing that article will certainly know more about it than I do. Greetings, Nevfennas 18:42, 21 February 2007 (UTC)


 * Done. One of the references for the Swordfish page is in agreement with my statement above - not too surprising, it was written by the same bloke!Greglocock 00:07, 23 February 2007 (UTC)

Conclusion
The whole paragraph was misleading and unreferenced. Understanding that anything can happen in war, even at close range I'd have to give the edge to the South Dakota class battleship (1939) because American fire control radar allowed the ship to maneuver AND fire without losing it's target. Optical targeting is hard to maintain when the ship is turning, which means Bismarck would have presented a nice straight moving target as the South Dakota took evasive action AND fired accuratly(whether or not they chose to use a smoke screen).

I'd give them slightly better chances against a North Carolina class battleship simply because Bismarck's guns fire shells heavier than their armor was designed to be effective against. However like the South Dakotas it too could present a an evading target. (The South Dakota like the Iowa class was designed to offer protection from other battleships firing 16" shells so even a lucky hit on the evading South Dakota would probably not have been a show stopper.) Anynobody 09:30, 5 June 2007 (UTC)

Removal of shell trap feature
Please reinstate the shell trap, it is mentioned in the admiralty report from 1942, and is clearly visible in Breyer. Greglocock 06:00, 20 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Don't bother I've done it. Greglocock 06:58, 20 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Okay, now that the sourcing is clearer, then it perhaps should be included. However, I would point out this from Garzke and Dulin, which seems to imply that this was a good design feature: "The armor slopes considerably reinforced the...belt. Such an arrangement was intended to increase the protection against high-angle hits on the side armor belt, where a shell would be exploded, ricocheted, or rendered inert. It also provided increased protection against bombs for the wing fuel-oil tanks and side-protection system. As a result, the Bismarck-class ships were exceptionally well protected against close-range shell fire."


 * I also wondered about the immune zone discussion from the Admiralty report; what is the yardstick they were using? If they were saying that the Bismarcks were more vulnerable to shellfire from British guns than British ships at similar ranges, this might be true. However, it is also clear the British 35.6, 38.1, and 40.6 cm guns were all markedly inferior in range and velocity compared to the German 38 cm, and the German gun out-penetrated the 35.6/38.1 guns, while roughly matching the penetration power of the British 40.6 cm. In other words, the British ships would have a reduced zone of immunity against the German 38 cm than they would against their own weapons. This should be examined more thoroughly, if the assertion is to be considered valid. Sacxpert 23:03, 20 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Then this is one instance where G&D are wrong. They have correctly identified White's reason for introducing it. They ignore practical experience (from Jutland) with its side effects.


 * The adm report is a war time report, so it compares the IZ of each RN vessel against Tirpitz, using a reasonably accurate (stolen) armour layout. It was not concerned with the classic IZ analysis of a ship fighting its mirror image, it was offering tactical advice to captains. Greglocock 04:25, 21 August 2007 (UTC)


 * I'd be interested in reading more about shell traps, as I don't recall reading anything about them in the context of Jutland; could you give me some sources/instances?


 * DK Brown's book 'From Warrior to Dreadnought' includes a lot of the reasoning behind why they went in, and his 'The Grand Fleet' explains why they were never used again. Greglocock 05:34, 21 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Also, did the Admiralty realize the full striking power of the German 38 cm? Did they have accurate data on that gun's performance in '42? That makes a difference. Doubly interesting b/c of this note from Garzke & Dulin, Allied Battleships in World War II: against the 16"/45 of the USN, the KGV class could protect the machinery spaces from 25,000 to 28,000 yards, and the magazines were protected from 23k to 31k yards. Quite interesting, since the Bismarck was immune to such fire out to a range of 25,000 metres. Since the British guns were less powerful and of lesser range than that, it seems the Bismarck's protection to crucial areas was even better matched. That reinforces the Bismarck's vulnerability to long-range fire, but demonstrates that its critical spaces were better protected at lower ranges, even if the AD was vulnerable beyond 11 km. Sacxpert 04:47, 21 August 2007 (UTC)

New Info, Changes
I've made a few changes, from Anthony Preston's book; I hope they are constructive. I'll add the references when I've checked the ISBN and page numbers. Xyl 54 18:09, 3 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Your additions are mostly good and helpful. However, I think your addition about the QE and R battleships is a bit off-topic. There's not much point comparing the Bismarcks to pre-Washington battleship designs. The older ships had inferior armoring for modern combat, deficient AA batteries, far slower operational speeds, and their main battery, while similar in size and layout, was capable of far less performance, as range and penetration tables show. They're radically different ships, and comparing them isn't particularly germane, even though they could faced each other in battle. Sacxpert (talk) 06:25, 5 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Thanks


 * Yes, I can see what you mean; I was trying to make sense of this section, and it referred to the Nelsons. it struck me that Warspite and the others, with the same armament, were a better example; the caveat about ‘earlier design’ and ‘other compromises’ was there already.


 * The thesis here seems to be that the Bismarks were under-gunned for their size, so examples of similar sized ships with larger armaments, or smaller ships with similar armaments, would be relevant, I thought;


 * on the other hand/ the antithesis,that those ships were slower, or, like Hood, were less well protected, isn’t so well developed.


 * It occurs to me that a good comparison is the Littorios, which, with a similar armament, speed and protection, were also of a similar displacement. Xyl 54 (talk) 16:22, 6 December 2007 (UTC)

New Source
OK, I've added the details of Preston's book; despite the lurid title, it's has good technical detail for the beginner, and backs up some of the design flaws mentioned in the other sources.

( —Preceding unsigned comment added by Xyl 54 (talk • contribs) 16:37, 6 December 2007 (UTC) : that was quick! I was only gone 5 minutes! )

He also gives a useful caveat:-

"In the light of the extraordinary admiration for the Bismarck and her sister Tirpitz, their inclusion in the ranks of the worlds worst warships might seem eccentric, or downright perverse. The real facts, however, point in the opposite direction to the widespread reverential attitude to any example of German technology, particularly that of the Hitler era." Xyl 54 (talk) 16:57, 6 December 2007 (UTC)

The stern
I've brought this here:

"the freak torpedo hit (described as a "one in a million" shot) scored on Bismarck's rudder"

(I thought it had a "citation needed" tag last time I was here, but there isn't one now.)

“one in a million shot” ?

Well if the stern was 40 ft long and the ship 800 ft in total, then it was a one in twenty shot, at least.

What is this trying to say? That it was a pure fluke that Bismarck was damaged?

She wasn’t the only ship damaged in this way during the war, and she wasn’t the only ship that was disabled by air strike.

I thought that was the point at issue in this section, that the damage might have been less serious, if the stern had been designed better. And the section title, "Achilles heel"; it implies something invulnerable save for a tiny weak spot. My impression is that it was more of a glass jaw. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Xyl 54 (talk • contribs) 17:54, 21 January 2008 (UTC)

(Sorry, I forgot to sign this on monday. Xyl 54 (talk) 13:17, 23 January 2008 (UTC))
 * Well, one-in-twenty shot is a bit high. Consider first that a torpedo had to strike the ship and detonate in the first place, which was by no means guaranteed. Then it would have to hit extremely proximal to the rudder in order to disable the steering gear. The odds are certainly better than one in a million, but far worse than one in twenty that a "shot" (or drop in this case) would inflict such crippling damage. Someone might have called it that, and it should have a cite tag.


 * As to the idea that other ships were disabled from the air, this is undoubtedly true. However, I'm having trouble remembering any capital warship disabled by a single torpedo hit in this fashion, making it more of a fluke. Moreover, the rest of the underwater protection scheme appears to have been quite adequate; the torpedo attack from the Victorious produced little in the way of damage, and the ship also appears, based on the testimony of the Bismarck survivors, to have endured the torpedo attack from the Dorsetshire without taking much damage, either. Thus, Achille's Heel seems apropos. Sacxpert (talk) 07:16, 22 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Out of 11 (or so) torpedo hits on Yamato 2 were aft of the rear turret. So, if you are just counting proportion of hits then 5% seems a little parsimonious. Given the known weaknesses of the Bis' stern any hit there is a cause for concern. As to the proportion of  torpedoes dropped by Swordfishes (I think you do have to be specific about the a/c and the nationality) that hit, sorry, I don't have any good numbers. 1 in 5 or 1 in 10 maybe? Greg Locock (talk) 07:36, 22 January 2008 (UTC)


 * I wasn't that serious about the 1 in 20, I just cavilled at the 1 in a million.


 * The section reads as if it was the merest fluke that brought down the "invincible" battleship. The alternate explanation was that the stern was poorly designed, and the ship was crippled by a hit any other battleship would have sailed away from. I’m trying to determine which, because if it's the latter, then the section needs re-writing. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Xyl 54 (talk • contribs) 13:22, 23 January 2008 (UTC)


 * (Sorry, again!Xyl 54 (talk) 13:42, 23 January 2008 (UTC))
 * Replies:


 * Sacxpert: "I'm having trouble remembering any capital warship disabled by a single torpedo hit in this fashion"; well, so am I. Is it because they weren't hit, or because they weren't disabled?


 * Greg:"Given the known weaknesses of the Bis' stern"; Are we? Is it agreed that the stern was poorly designed?


 * Xyl 54 (talk) 13:45, 23 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Note that other BBs were NOT immune to trouble with hits on the stern, think Jutland, and there are several other examples of steering problems. The Germans obviously thought so by inference since their subsequent designs paid a great deal more care to sorting the stern out (see Breyer). I don't have a good dead tree reference for the general criticism, from memory, although no doubt Preston says as much. I'm not really convinced that Preston is a great independent source since he talks to the same people I do! The point about the 3 shaft layout wrecking the integrity of the keel was why RN and USN avoided it where possible. Quite possibly the Germans would have liked to use it but the beam problem prevented a 4 screw layout - the beam problem also causing me to have the relentless emphasis on her great beam etc - they couldn't fit 4 screws in when everyone else could. Maybe the TDS was a lot wider than most peoples. Oops, wrong emphasis!Greg Locock (talk) 21:27, 23 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Concerning other ships: USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) was effectively wrecked by a single torpedo hit in her stern. Nevfennas (talk) 22:57, 23 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Pennsylvania was a pre-Jutland design with all the inadequacies of torpedo defense and underwater protection that implies. On top of which, she was struck by a Japanese torpedo, and Japanese torpedo design and warheads were by far the best in the world during WWII.  To say that Bismarck was no better protected against an underwater stern hit than a pre-Jutland battleship design of only 60% her own tonnage is to say that the Bismarck had a catastrophically ill-designed stern and completely inadequate protection over a vital part of the ship.75.139.94.211 (talk) 17:03, 25 April 2009 (UTC)

I am by far and away not an expert in this field, but having just read Bob Ballard's book he identifies a systematic design weakness in the stern section of all German capital ships, not "defective welding", as the cause of the Bismarck's loss of its stern section during foundering. Can someone more competent than me comment on this discrepancy, please?  Pyrop e  16:38, 18 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Can you dig out the actual quote from ballard? Are you saying that Ballard has been (ahem) misquoted? That's not exactly unusual with articles edited by fanboys. I'd certainly agree that the stern design was old-fashioned compared with what other navies did, and the third shaft fundamnetally introduces a weakness that cannot be designed around (well, it can, by adding a lot of weight). Ship design is a compromise and the compromise they went for led to a weak stern. Greg Locock (talk) 02:58, 19 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Sure. The quote runs "...there was no structural support to hold the end of the stern in place once the ship turned over. These facts strongly suggest that a structural failure occurred before the ship sank and that the stern broke off at the surface. This hypothesis is supported by what had happened to the pocket battleship Lũtzow during the invasion of Norway and the subsequent career of the Prinz Eugen, which were both similarly weak in the stern. In 1940 the Lũtzow took a torpedo hit aft and suffered a stern collapse, although separation did not occur. In February 1942 off Norway Prinz Eugen was similarly hit and damaged, and her stern collapsed at approximately the same spot as the Bismarck's broke off ... Naval architects now know that the Bismarck's stern was the only structural weakness on the ship, and its fatigue failure represents the largest such event we know that has affected a warship ... Only after the damage suffered by the Prinz Eugen were German warships of heavy cruiser size and larger modified to strengthen their sterns." (Ballard & Archbold, 2007; p. 215-216) Not a mention of welding anywhere, defective or otherwise. In addition, looking at the photos he provides of the detachment area before and after failure it is quite clear that this section of the hull was riveted in the traditional manner, not welded. Unfortunately there is no discussion of this in the text so that's just my OR. However, one of the captions runs "Students of battleship design were excited by our discovery of the severed stern. Such a spectacular structural failure is suggestive of a serious weakness in the Bismarck's design." (Ballard & Archbold, 2007; p. 209) Another indication that a design fault was their preferred cause. I'd also like to throw the Lũtzow and Prinz Eugen examples in to the earlier debate over the "one in a million" torpedo hit. Three German capital ships disabled by a single torpedo to the stern during just three years is hardly long odds. In fact, Prinz Eugen's rudders ended up locked to port before the collapse, in a manner identical to the Bismarck's experience. Anyway, the citation is: Ballard, R. & Archbold, R. 2007. Robert Ballard's Bismarck. Chartwell Books, Inc., New Jersey. pp. 232. ISBN 978-0-7858-2205-9 Hope that helps?  Pyrop e  14:26, 19 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Thank you very much for that. I don't know if Ballard has any engneering/naval architecture experience (I don't think so) so he is not necessarilly in a fit position to judge some of that, but at least it kills the welding red herring. Greg Locock (talk) 01:53, 20 May 2008 (UTC)

Torpedo Bulges
So we have one part that says:

"The underwater protection system was built around a single torpedo bulkhead of 45 millimetres thickness,[11] coupled to an outboard void space; no bulges were fitted."

and another that says:

"Interior ROV footage showed that the "terrible destruction" the Anglo-American expedition reported was in fact the torpedo bulges, which were specially designed to absorb the energy of torpedoes and plunging shells. Underneath the torn bulge sheeting, the ship's 320 mm (12.6 inch) thick main belt armour appeared to be intact."

These are contradictory, not only on whether the ships had bulges, but also on the depth of the armour belt. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 217.155.40.13 (talk) 18:49, 30 April 2008 (UTC)


 * The main belt is not the same thing as a torpedo bulkhead. The main belt is on the exterior of the ship, and was at its thickest, 320 mm, near the waterline. This trailed off to 170 mm, and then the rest of the hull, down to the ship's bottom, was unarmoured. A torpedo bulkhead is mounted inboard, and is intended to absorb the explosive energy of a torpedo detonating against the external hull, or inside the outermost compartments of the hull. The Bismarck had a TD 45 mm thick, completely separate from the outer armour. It was inside the ship, mounted perpendicularly to the ship's bottom.


 * As to the question of bulges, Breyer's diagram of the Bismarck's armouring scheme (pg. 301) clearly illustrates the vertical side of the hull. A torpedo bulge, as the name implies, curves outward from the line of the hull. Also, Garzke and Dulin describe the outer spaces as a void space, not a torpedo bulge. So, I don't know where the "torpedo bulge" comments originate, but they don't accurately describe the ship's construction. Sacxpert (talk) 03:18, 1 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Yup, Bis did not have torpedo bulges, and her torpedo defence system was pretty much below the line of the belt (there was a the sloping deck that formed the upper limit of the TDS, which was the main armor deck). So, I think we can assume very safely that the ROV quote above is either incorrect or false. So it does not belong in the article. Greg Locock (talk) 09:22, 1 May 2008 (UTC)

Purpose
I see someone has fixed the statement about these ships being primarily designed to be commerce raiders, but it still says:- "The Bismarck class was not intended to be a line of battle ship as British capital ships were designed. A battle line is a naval squadron of at least four heavy ships that act in concert to engage a similar squadron of an opposing navy in an extended gun duel" Where does this come from? Does this mean an engagement with less than 4 capital ships isn’t a proper battle? What about Matapan? Or the Coral Sea? That's going to surprise some people! Will anybody object if I delete it? Xyl 54 (talk) 12:10, 30 July 2008 (UTC)
 * The precise definiton of "battle line" might be deleted; however, I think the whole question of purpose needs to be tweaked. Just re-read Mulligan's fascinating article, "Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider", and it seems obvious that the German Navy had no clear idea how to employ these warships at all. Their design specifications were a response to foreign developments, with the primary goal of exceeding the French Dunkerques and matching the HG calibre of the Venetos. Armouring and propulsion were traded back and forth based on assumptions about maximizing defensive power and range, along with total confusion about what sort of powerplant should be installed. The ships came first, based on the old military principle of bigger is better, and then a strategic vision was crafted around that, and then a new strategic vision was divined when Plan Z was outpaced by Continental events. Perhaps it would be better to expand on the Kriegsmarine's strategic uncertainty, and as to the ships' purpose, simply say, "The Bismarcks were designed to outmatch the French Dunkerque-class battlecruisers, as well as rivalling the anticipated French Richelieu-class and Italian Vittorio Veneto-class battleships. Their strategic employment was a matter of much confusion." Thoughts? Sacxpert (talk) 03:25, 31 July 2008 (UTC)
 * Yes, that would be a better first sentence, certainly, and resolves the problem. What does anyone else think?Xyl 54 (talk) 12:34, 31 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Just read the Mulligan paper, it certainly lays the "designed as a commerce raider" issue to rest. I've put in a very preliminary section on that and removed the uncited apologista paragraph, but the numbers are from memory, I'll check them tomorrow. Funny to think that if H class had gone ahead as envisaged then Bis would have been reduced to refighting Jutland. Greg Locock (talk) 22:09, 2 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Great integration of Mulligan's points. Helps the article a lot, IMO. Sacxpert (talk) 05:19, 3 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Looking good. I must admit I was keen to get a globe out and try and put 8000 and 16000 miles into context. Greg Locock (talk) 05:33, 3 October 2008 (UTC)

Plan Z
I already raised this on the talk page for Plan Z, but I figure more people watch this page, so I wondered if anyone knew anything about it, which might help me find sources to make an edit. "Plans X and Y: I recall a visit to a college library a few years ago, where I found a book that said that Plan Z was the third version of a plan for a greatly expanded German navy, and that it was a more moderate version than earlier proposals. According to the book, these were known as Plan X and Plan Y, if I recall correctly. Does anyone remember reading anything similar? I'll also see if I can't track down that book again. If I'm correct on the particulars, then this should go into the article as well." Sacxpert (talk) 08:35, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

I kicked this around on a different board where the consensus is "there seems to be no real documentation, in English sources, of a detailed plan earlier than the Z plan, although presumably the earlier ships were designed to fill some strategic vision." So, if you can find that book then you will be doing us all a favour. Greg Locock (talk) 01:34, 7 October 2008 (UTC)

[outdented reply] You're in luck, Greg. I went looking for the book today, and found it. I'll copy the text verbatim from the relevant pages. Citation: Gray, Edwyn. Hitler's Battleships. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. pp. 26-27.

"[Hitler instructed] Raeder to go away and prepare plans for an immediate increase in warship construction."

"It was not, of course, as easy as that. There were many matters to be discussed and considered before any building could begin: whether, for example, to produce a balanced fleet capable of meeting the Royal Navy on equal terms in conventional battle, or to construct a force of heavy surface ships to launch an all-out attack on Britain’s seaborne commerce, or, perhaps, to concentrate all available resources on a U-boat war. Raeder left the problem to others. He set up a committee under Vice-Admiral Gunther Gruse to consider the options and ordered his youngest staff officer, Command Hellmuth Heye, to prepare a plan for waging a successful war against the British Empire. The he sat back and awaited results, content that time was on his side, for the Fuehrer had assured him that the new fleet would not be needed before 1946."

"The preliminary groundwork was completed in September and the committee met on the 23rd to consider the first proposal -- or Plan X -- which comprised an exhaustive schedule of all the ships and logistical facilities needed to make up a balanced fleet. Rear-Admiral Werner Fuchs, the Chief of Naval Construction, hastily poured cold water over the idea by pointing out that the massive numbers envisaged were utterly beyond the capability of Germany’s shipbuilding industry. Heye, too, opposed the scheme but for a different reason. He argued that any future Battle of Jutland was unlikely to improve Germany’s strategic situation and that, in any event, the prospects for achieving success against Britain with a conventional battle fleet were virtually zero. Heye’s conclusion did not please the senior admirals. To expand the navy without building newer and more powerful battleships was tantamount to an act of sacrilege and the younger Commander was told to think again."

"A second exercise, Plan Y, was considered and rejected and, in October, Heye produced two alternative Z plans each of which was based on a sustained attack on Britain’s oceanic trading routes. One version -- which enjoyed the twin advantages of being both cheap and quick to implement -- proposed a joint operation using pocket-battleships, U-boats, and surface raiders. The other visualized a hard-hitting and fast surface fleet designed to carry out raiding operations against convoys in the Atlantic and merchant shipping anywhere in the world. And as such a fleet must be able to fight its way through the British blockade, it followed that it must consist of the largest and most powerful battleships that Germany could design and build."

"The two alternative Z plans were submitted to Raeder on 31 October and, the following day, he placed them before Hitler. The Fuehrer had always favoured battledships…. And as a battle-cruiser veteran of the High Seas Fleet Raeder naturally had no hesitation in recommending the alternative big-ship version of the plan. Having repeated his earlier assurance that war with Britain was impossible before 1946, Hitler accepted and approved Raeder’s recommendation. There was, he pointed out, adequate time to build the proposed ships."

Sorry about the length, but I wanted to let the text speak for itself. I'm not exactly clear on the sources Gray used for this, since his book is something of a layman's history, with no footnotes or endnotes. There is a listed biography at the end of the text, which I can append to this if anyone wants to look into the background information. It would be quite interesting, I'm sure. There must be documentary coverage of Heye's various plans, and even though it seems that Plan X was never particularly serious, its specifications would be fascinating to examine. Sacxpert (talk)


 * Great work. So plan X was "what would you like for Christmas?", Plan Y we still don't know about and Plan Z we already knew about. At least the Za version offered some prospect of an Emden-like campaign. Zb was crazy as others have pointed out - as soon as you add BBs then it becomes a target that will attract massive and concentrated attention. More to the point, don't you really get the impression that X and Y were more works in progress than fully thought through plans? The 1946 date is interesting. Greg Locock (talk) 03:35, 8 October 2008 (UTC)


 * "X" looks to me like the most realistic assessment of what was required to defeat the Royal Navy. I would suspect, given the timeframe, that X was well-thought-out, that Y took this planned and subtracted some percentage, and then Z was developed thereafter as a set of compromise solutions. The 1946 date is indeed interesting; it's what I've seen in most every work discussing Hitler's and Raeder's discussions of war with Britain. I'd still like to see what "X" projected; it must have been mammoth. Maybe I can find something in one of the primary sources. Should try to contact Mr. Mulligan, since he obviously had access to a lot of primary documents in writing that article. Werner Fuchs, as he did several times with Hitler's fantasies, had to step in and scale back expectations.


 * Just pulled out another book (Greger, Rene. Battleships of the World. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg. 56), and found an odd note:


 * "'In mid-January 1939 Hitler ordered that the completion date for the second variation of the Z-Plan (Zielplan, or Target Plan) should be the beginning of 1946, earlier than the Naval Staff had suggested to him. The plans authorized in March 1939 proposed that by that time the Kriegsmarine should have at its disposal eight battleships, five battlecruisers, three Panzerschiffe (armoured ships, i.e. 'pocket battleships'), four aircraft carriers, five heavy cruisers and 249 U-boats. A further six battleships, three battlecruisers, two aircraft carriers and 120 U-boats would then follow, together with numerous smaller units.' [Emphasis added]"


 * What to make of that? The first set of numbers does fit the Z-Plan, with the H-Class, the Bismarcks, the Gneisenaus, and the OPQ triplets, but then another nine heavy warships following? I'd love to know if that's some sort of scramble of numbers, or a legitimate appendix to the Z-Plan with secondary targets. Sacxpert (talk) 08:34, 8 October 2008 (UTC)

This article has some serious problems...
Chief among those are that it's too heavily oriented towards criticism of the design. Sure, it's fine to have criticism, but we need more plain facts. Take Iowa class battleship (an FA) or Nassau class battleship (a GA) for examples. Just looking at the armament section, a good chunk of the section is criticism of the 15" gun and 4 x 2 mountings and criticism of the secondary battery. Another issue with the secondary battery section is that it goes on and on about how British and American battleships had dual-purpose guns, and that Bismarck did not was a serious design flaw. But then it says that 128 mm guns of the quality necessary to operate in a DP role weren't available when Bis was built/the German designers were more concerned with British destroyers in the North Sea. So which is it? Was the design flawed, or were the German designers operating under a different operational assumption/set of technical limitations than the British and Americans were? The same goes for various criticisms of the ships' armor arrangement. Specifically, the note about the citadel armor; the article states that it's anachronistic, and then immediately states that the Germans retained it because they were operating under the assumption that the ship would be fighting British cruisers and destroyers at close range in the North Sea. So...it's not anachronistic, it's again the product of the design staff operating under a different set of criteria. A lot of this smacks of synthesis.

It would be far better if the article were rewritten, almost from scratch, closer to the lines of the articles I mentioned above. Certainly, there is room for criticism, but that needs to follow the basic facts. Give a description of the armor layout/armament/etc., and then explain why certain elements were inferior to US and UK battleships of the period. And we need to refrain from being self-contradictory (i.e., don't make a claim and then immediately explain why that's an incorrect assumption).

Another major contradiction: the lead section states that the ships were designed as line of battle ships, but were employed as commerce raiders. The first sentence of the "history" section states that the design originally called for fast commerce raiders. Which is it?

It seems to me that the editors who wrote this version of the article are/were overly concerned with debunking fanboyisms, to the point of unbalancing the article (please do not take that as an attack on your work, I know how much time goes into writing these articles). I am aware that this is a well-known and somewhat controversial topic, but that's all the more reason why we should strive to remain as factually based as possible. Sure, this is not a typical NPOV issue (in that a basic description of the armor layout would mean nothing to the layman; they can't tell whether it's an effective or crappy design), so some interpretation is necessary. I'm just saying don't go overboard. At some point (when I get some free time), I may get around to working up a draft in my sandbox. I hope this all made sense. Parsecboy (talk) 03:32, 18 March 2009 (UTC)


 * I sort of agree. The structure of the article is a mess, perhaps it might be better to gather all the criticism/commentary into its own section IF everyone agrees. As you can tell the fanboi element is alive and kicking, and currently have their lederhosen in a twist over the stern section. So until you get buy-in from them, then make haste slowly. Incidentally the two articles you chose weren't very helpful as those designs were not very controversial, Iowa being one of the better designs of WW2, and Nassau had such an unexceptional history that no one is really interested. Another thing that could be done is to strip out the operational history redundancies, this article is about the ship class, not the ships. Greglocock (talk) 04:37, 18 March 2009 (UTC)
 * And yes, the Nassaus are pretty obscure ships, but the Iowas certainly attract their share of fanboys . Yes, Iowa was a generally solid design, but that doesn't stop people from speculating over "Yamato vs. Iowa", and comparing the capabilities/deficiencies of both. Parsecboy (talk) 21:35, 18 March 2009 (UTC)


 * Here's the section from the Bismarck article, with some fanboi 'howevers' removed, it does at least have the virtues of brevity, sources, and by and large coherence.

While Bismarck was a powerful ship, the long hiatus in German capital ship building from 1919 until 1933 led to a conservative design that was flawed and outmoded. The ship's design borrowed from the design of the World War I Bayern class battleships, as the ship was completed with some of her vitals above her armoured belt. This particular weakness left many communication systems, including her main damage control centre and foretop fire control director, open to destruction which contributed to her relatively rapid silencing in her final engagement. Three features the designs for bayern and Bismarck had in common were their armament, three-shaft propulsion plant and the armour layout.

A further example of outmoded design was the provision of both a secondary armament of twelve 5.9 in guns and the inclusion of a separate battery of sixteen 4.1 in high-angle (anti-aircraft) guns. This fitting of two types of weapons lagged behind the dual-purpose secondary armaments of Allied ships that allowed them to engage both air and surface targets, thereby saving on weight used elsewhere in their designs, eliminating the need for carrying two sizes of secondary ammunition and facilitating superior fire-control systems.

A critical weakness of Bismarck was the relative fragility of its stern section. On discovering the wreck, it was found that the whole stern section had broken away. Due to the fact it was not near the main wreckage, and has not yet been found, it can be assumed this did not occur on impact with the sea floor. The missing section came away roughly where the torpedo hit was made, raising questions of possible structural failure. The stern area had also received several hits increasing the damage caused by the torpedo hit. This coupled with the fact the ship sank "stern first" and had no structural support to hold it in place suggests the stern became detached at the surface.

In 1942 Prinz Eugen was also torpedoed in the stern, after which her stern collapsed. This prompted a strengthening of the stern structures on all German capital ships.


 * Greglocock (talk) 05:31, 18 March 2009 (UTC)


 * I agree that the article has gotten top-heavy, and that there's too much back-and-forth regarding various sections, to a point. I do think that it's valid to examine the layout of the Bismarck-class design, but there ought to be less editorializing, less game theory, and fewer rationalisations. I say that, even though some of it is probably additions I made.


 * However, I think it's important to consider some of it. As I see it, since ship histories are the province of individual articles, the class page should examine the class as a whole, and place it in a historical context. For example, the Bismarck-class secondary battery is a hallmark of Axis design practice, and the exact opposite of Anglo-American practice. It may not be necessary to devote pages to the topic, but a split secondary battery had, as the article shows, tremendous implications for weight, fire control, armour, and speed/range, due to its greater deck and weight requirements. I think that's a very relevant point. It's also worth noting, though, why these choices were made. The section Greg talks about is brief, but it's also skewed too far in the other direction. Reading it, one would simply conclude that German designers were idiots for not adopting a DP battery. The reasons, if they can be reliably sourced, are important.


 * I think the biggest problem is that different rationales and justifications have been added ad hoc to this article, and so it seems to contradict itself, sometimes sentence by sentence. That does require streamlining. More broadly, though, a thorough examination of design principles is valuable, and places the Bismarcks in an appropriate context by illustrating the constraints and compromises that forged them. It's appropriate in precisely the same way that one should always discuss the Iowas in the context of anti-cruiser and fast-carrier operations, and the Vittorio Venetos in the context of confined Mediterranean operations. If not for those design considerations, the ships would have emerged in completely different form.


 * I'm not trying to be a fanboy here, and I'm not one of the people who wants to analyse the Bismarck-class stern to death, but I do want to keep things historically insightful and accurate, where possible. Cleanup is useful, and brevity likewise, but let's not purge factual, informative content if we can separate it from equivocations. Sacxpert (talk) 10:20, 18 March 2009 (UTC)


 * That's exactly what I'm saying. It's perfectly fine to examine the design and point out flaws, but let's not go overboard here. The article needs to be more heavily tilted towards straight facts and less towards editorializing. Parsecboy (talk) 14:41, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

refactored comments re:purpose contradiction
''Another major contradiction: the lead section states that the ships were designed as line of battle ships, but were employed as commerce raiders. The first sentence of the "history" section states that the design originally called for fast commerce raiders. Which is it?'' Parsecboy (talk) 03:32, 18 March 2009 (UTC)
 * Not when I read it! - please read the Purpose section above. Greglocock (talk) 05:31, 18 March 2009 (UTC)
 * There's a gap between
 * "According to the prewar German naval program, Plan Z, the Bismarcks were to operate in conjunction with Scharnhorst class battleships[Note 1] as a home fleet set against the Royal Navy."
 * and
 * "The original design for the warships provisionally dubbed F and G [Note 2] was as a fast commerce raider with 33 cm (13 in) guns, and slightly thicker armour...This reduced the cruising range by almost half, to 8525 nm, along with a substantial reduction in cruising speed, to 19 knots."
 * The prewar plans called for Biz and Tirpitz to be line of battle ships, but the ships were ordered as commerce raiders. That doesn't jive. Parsecboy (talk) 14:41, 18 March 2009 (UTC)


 * That may need clarification, but is nonetheless true. The Bismarcks were ordered in the 1935 fiscal year, IIRC. Bismarck was laid down in 1936. So, the design process had been underway for some time. Plan Z was adopted very late in 1938, after months of drafting (which still makes it a pre-war plan). The H-Class battleships became the core of Plan Z, designed for commerce raiding and single-ship engagements. The Bismarck class was built without a clear strategic framework; long-term plans were created ex post facto, and the Bismarcks were made to fit within that framework. So, they were envisioned as commerce raiders, but were compromised late in the design process by the unavailability of diesel engines, then meant to serve as a home-based "risk fleet" against the Royal Navy, and then were used for commerce raiding (their original task, for which they were no longer ideally suited, due to range limitations and battery configuration). Sacxpert (talk) 21:53, 18 March 2009 (UTC)


 * Then that information needs to be added (and sourced) to the article. Thanks for the clarification. Parsecboy (talk) 21:56, 18 March 2009 (UTC)


 * How about we put in a design history, covering the evolution from the F design and the X plan, as Sacxpert found some good stuff on that, then a longish description of the ship as built, then a short design criticism section? Greglocock (talk) 03:02, 19 March 2009 (UTC)


 * I don't know, Greglocock. I think that if we have a criticism section, the article will appear unbalanced, and that section will become a magnet for fans and haters to do endless revert wars and listkruft. Plus, you could criticize any warship design, after all. They are all compromises. Many authors admire the Iowa class, forgetting that the Iowas had very poor seakeeping abilities, and their armour was little better than the South Dakotas, which means that they might have fared poorly in North Atlantic combat. I know, I'm going straight into the what-ifs that are the nocturnal fantasies of wargamers, but my point is, let's not get into criticism if it can be avoided. Let's just compare, note advantages and disadvantages of design practice where relevant in the design history, and leave the rest to readers. Instead of talking about anachronisms, just say something like: "The Bismarcks use an upper belt of side armour (the citadel armour) to protect the innards of the ship. While deprecated by Anglo-American navies after World War I, the German designers felt that citadel protection would be vital against cruisers and destroyers in the close-quarters combat expected in the North Sea." That stays neutral, even if it's a bit of a cop-out. Thoughts? Sacxpert (talk) 02:36, 20 March 2009 (UTC)


 * OK, let's not have a criticism section then. But, you can't say what you just did since you are presuming to know what the German designers thought, and even worse, you are justifying it with respect to just one of the possible missions. There's plenty of evidence that experts (the Admiralty, the USN, DK Brown) regarded it as a pre-Jutland armor scheme, and that is a significant POV and so should be presented. As it happens, that suits the final configuration of the ship as built - a high speed Home Waters battlecruiser. Greglocock (talk) 03:22, 20 March 2009 (UTC)


 * Actually, I could say that, provided I found a source that said that this was why German designers preferred citadel armour. I'm not justifying anything; I'm only saying what I've read in Garzke, probably Breyer, etc. about German armouring schemes, secondary battery selection, and powerplant configurations. Those references include primary sources, including post-war letters from designers, which sounds like reasonable grounds. Also, I'm not saying we can't say that the RN & USN designers regarded it as bad practice, I'm only saying that discussing such critiques without providing countervailing arguments is imbalanced. For example, saying that "the mixed-calibre secondary battery was a waste of space and weight, and resulted in poor fire control, according to RN and USN engineering reports" would be an insufficient treatment of the subject, since it offers no argument -- from reputable sources -- as to why such a choice was made. The reader would be left to conclude that German naval engineers were somehow all fools, which is absurd. In the same vein, I think the article ought to dispense with the comparisons to the Bayern class, which I think implies that the Germans just copied a 20-year-old design, which, as G&D explicitly prove, is false. Sacxpert (talk) 10:31, 20 March 2009 (UTC)

Main Guns
Ok, there's much to work on in this article. The main guns are certainly less powerful than they could have been (the german 16" gun was still in development, yet it was planned to refit the Bismarck class with them eventually), yet judging just by bore is nonsense. In fact, the german 15" gun had higher vertical armor penetration capability than at least the british and possibly the american 16" guns due to higher muzzle velocity. Horizontal it was indeed less because of the lighter shells. However, while british and american main guns were able to deliver about 1.5 shots a minute, the german 15" gun delivered 2.5 (if I remember that right). As you didn't fight a naval battle with just one salvo back then, the weights of the broadsides should be compared related to time as well.

I will gather references as I have time before changing the article, but I thought I'd give others the opportunity to comment. LoneWolfJack 15:49, 31 July 2007 (UTC)


 * I'm ot sure about the performance of the British 16" shells, but the American "super-heavy" 16" APC round was probably the best capital-scale naval artillery shell ever developed. Its armor penetration capability was virtually identical to that of the Japanese 18.1" shell, and it vastly outperformed any 15" shell ever developed.  Nominal rate of fire for the German 15" gun was around 2.5 rounds per minute, versus 2 per minute for the American 16".  Broadside weight for the Bismarck-class: 14,112 lbs.  Broadside weight for North Carolina/South Dakota/Iowa-classes: 24,300.  That works out to a nominal per minute broadside weight of 35,280 lbs. for the Bismarck-class, versus 48,600 for the American fast battleships, which also had vastly superior fire control systems.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.139.94.211 (talk) 05:29, 25 April 2009 (UTC)

Armor
The Article totally leaves out decapping. In fact, the armor scheme of the Bismarck class is highly complex and due to lack of documents and as there are only a few naval experts working on them in their free time, progress in reconstructing the ideas behind the armor scheme is slow. What we know is that it was almost impossible to get a shell into her vital areas at short range due to the sloped armor belts behind the main armor. At close range, even 14" guns easily penetrate 80cm of armor, so it doesn't matter if you have a 33cm armor belt like Bismarck or a 35cm like King George V. However, if you have another sloped armor belt behind the main belt, the battered shell that defeated the main armor belt can be stopped with much less effort (thinner armor).

Vertical armor protection is even more complex than the horizontal armor scheme and investigation is still going on. What we know is that Bismarck's horizontal armor had emphasis on protecting the vitals of the ship, which by german way of thinking were the engine rooms the command center and the magazines. While the british an americans built ships to be sent out, fight a battle and eventually return to port for repairs, the germans built ships with the idea of toughness. They wanted ships that could take a lot of damage and still be able to fight as the german navy couldn't just call a ship back home due to lack of strategically placed ports.

In terms of vertical armor this means that the germans again used sloped armor, which makes perfectly sense as no shell comes in at a 90° angle. Also, the vitals of the Bismarck class were positioned in a very clever way. In order to score a vertical magazine hit, the enemy would have to penetrate the top of one of the main turrets and the barbettes, and we're talking about 45cm of stell here if I remember that right. For the engines, a shell coming in at say a 50 or 60 degree angle would not only have to defeat two to three armor belts but also part of the ships structure like hangar or funnel.

It should also be noted that while british and german armor were about equal in quality (the british having a little edge), the american "class a" armor platest used for the Iowa class lagged behind about 30% in strength.

I will gather references as I have time before changing the article, but I thought I'd give others the opportunity to comment. LoneWolfJack 15:49, 31 July 2007 (UTC)


 * Sounds a little like fanboyism to me, and a lot of it is pure make believe. Post-Jutland German naval design put great emphasis on internal subdivision and keeping vessels afloat.  As a result, their ships, including the Bismarck-class were very "tough" in the sense that they were very difficult to SINK.  On the other hand, German design unquestionably reflected expectations based on the relatively short cruising ranges of their capital ships, so the emphasis was on pure survivability, rather than the ability to engage in sustained combat.  This shows up in the poorly protected command and control links of the Bismarck, which helped ensure that she was quickly rendered combat ineffective and rapidly silenced in the final gun duel.  Allied (especially American) designs placed greater emphasis on sustained combat, and, not surprisingly, command and control links on Allied vessels were much better protected.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.139.94.211 (talk) 05:59, 25 April 2009 (UTC)

Based on WWI Design
This is an "old chestnut", most notably the assertion that they were based on the Baden and/or Bayern WWI BBs. What is the evidence for this, even accepting that the design was conservative from a fuel source POV? bigpad 14:04, 21 June 2007 (UTC)
 * What do you mean by "conservative from a fuel source POV"? I believe the statement refers in large part to their armor scheme, which essentially looks like that of ships designed before Jutland. TomTheHand 14:19, 21 June 2007 (UTC)


 * i believe i can source a source for the link to the Baden, even just in terms of layout. GraemeLeggett 16:18, 21 June 2007 (UTC)


 * Specifically (1) use of multiple thin armour decks (2) thick upper belt (3) placement of vital combat stations between armour decks (4) shell trap (I think). Bis Armour layout was virtually identical to that of pre Jutland WW1 BBs, if you look in Breyer. The outcome was that Bis had a very narrow, or non existent, IZ against many earlier or contemporary BBs . Now, some of that (1,2 and 3) may have been a result of her intended role as a commerce raider, rather than a line of battle design. If so, that was muddled thinking. It is not an old chestnut at all, it is a sensible observation, somewhat exagerated... but it contains a very strong element of truth. Greglocock 01:22, 22 June 2007 (UTC)


 * Hi, You often make reference to Breyer. Do you mean his "Battleships and Battlecruisers" tome, which is a first-class *technical reference book but not specifically about Bismarck and needs to be read with other comparative and less technical sources to give a more balanced overall picture. I seem to recall (from many years ago), though, that elements of Bismarck's layout did indeed draw on earlier designs, although I think it would be simplistic for anyone to suggest that she was merely an enlarged Baden (not that this has been said, exactly). bigpad 16:11, 22 June 2007 (UTC)


 * Yes that's the book. It's not often that less technical references are preferred. If you look at Moltke 1911 Bayern 1912 Ersatz Yorck 1916 Scharnhorst and Bismarck 1935, and the subsequent H class proposals, their armour schemes in cross section are very similar, dominated by the presence of the shell trap, which was introduced in 1880 by White, thick upper belt, and multiple thin armour decks. In comparison the Americans only used a shell trap in 1917 for Pennsylvania, and, interestingly, Mississipi in 1935. The Japanese were very fond of them but dropped them for Yamato, and went for the simple armoured box style. The British dropped them entirely after 1918. Now, I may be reading too much into the shell trap feature, but the Admiralty was exceedingly scathing about them. So EVERYBODY else dropped them and went to armoured box, do you not think that was for a good reason? Greglocock 02:56, 23 June 2007 (UTC)

I have to confess to a lack of knowledge of shells traps and must bow to your mechanical engineering background here. What I do know is that a relatively large percentage of Bis. displacement went on armour, with maybe only the Yamato class having an even higher %age? Bis. main belt proved more than capable of absorbing heavy enemy fire, although you and others have questioned the ship's ability to absorb plunging fire. That contingency didn't happen until the ship's final battle (if at all?) and it's ironic that a hit to an unarmoured feature of the ship, the rudder, rather than a shell penetrating its hull, sealed its fate. I accept that the forward hit from POW probably made the operation unsustainable but didn't, in itself, cause the ship to be sunk. My point in "less technical refs" is that it's always impt to consider the circumstances in which a ship might be used operationally before coming to conclusions on its overall rating. bigpad 15:02, 28 June 2007 (UTC).


 * Bis' armor scheme only made sense if ranges were shorter than Jutland, or if all long range encounters were against small calibre weapons. The first makes no sense, post Jutland, and both imply that Bis would always have the speed and manouevring room to force an action at her preferred range agaisnt BBs. Manifestly this did not happen. I think I have demonstrated pretty conclusively that the armour layout is essentially similar to that of a pre WW1 design, upscaled, whereas with the curious exception of a couple of USN boats, everybody else abandoned that layout as WW2 approached, and went to the single box design. In general main belt penetrations are exceedingly rare, there is a very strong argument that main belts were consistently too thick from 1880 right through to 1945. I think I discuss this above.


 * So having got the armour disposition out of the way I suggest we examine armament, fire control, and propulsion with the same vigour. To get the ball rolling, most WW1 BBs had twin turrets, whereas most Treaty BBs were designed with triple/quad turrets, as a weight saving. Bis stuck with twins. In gunnery control, radar was gaining ground rapidly for rangefinding, and to a lesser extent spotting. I don't know what the british and germans were using as fire control computers, I know what the americans and japanese were up to. Finally the other holdover from WW1 was the use of 3 shafts, which has always been associated in the RN with a weak stern. Greglocock 23:35, 28 June 2007 (UTC)


 * I would caution against reading too much into general traits. The Kriegsmarine was tailoring its warships to specific operational requirements, and their perceptions of priorities. If the Bismarck had used triple turrets in an A-B-Y configuration, it would have meant risking a greater percentage of the battery in the event of a lucky hit. A & B were disabled simultaneously, after all, so this was clearly a valid concern. Along with this, the Kriegsmarine was determined to preserve maximum fire for chasing fire. Likewise, the secondary battery was designed specifically to counter large (both in size and quantity) British destroyers. The three shaft setup was not ideal, to be sure, but it was a superbly sub-divided system. I would assume that it was dictated by (1) the intended turboelectric drive system, (2) the need to maintain hull-fineness ratios for desired speed coupled to the limiting factor of the Kiel Canal, and (3) a need to maintain minimums for the underwater protection system. As Garzke and Dulin said in Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II, "The propulsion plant of the Bismarck-class battleships was the most advanced geared-steam turbine drive used in a European capital ship to that date." Whatever its faults, the armour system did protect the ship from sinking; it took multiple torpedoes and scuttling charges to sink her. Its fire-control systems seemed fairly good; it was straddling Hood in just three salvoes, sank her in three minutes, and then inflicted sufficient damage to the Prince of Wales that she was forced to disengage. Granted, the AA fire control was far less effective, and her radars were primarily search sets, not fire-control units.


 * The last paragraph of the history section particularly bothers me, since it seems to imply that the Bismarck was somehow a backwards and outmoded design. It preserved certain features not used by some other navies, but this does not necessarily make it out-dated. All Axis battleships (and the Sovietskiy Soyuz-class), for example, used split-secondary batteries. It was a questionable design feature, but not evidence that the Germans were somehow uniquely backwards. Breyer and Garzke/Dulin seem to concur that the Bismarcks were a good match for their contemporaries, particularly in the European theatre.


 * Finally, in regard to the repeat-Bayern charge, I quote Garzke and Dulin: "This...resulted in some speculation that the Bismarck-class battleships were mere copies of these older ships. This is false; the new ships had to be faster and have more protection, range, and gunpower. The percentages allocated to armor protection, propulsion, and armament were not the same. The triple-shaft arrangement and the distribution of the main armament and its caliber were the same, but these were the only similarities." Sacxpert 08:31, 19 August 2007 (UTC)


 * /All/ designs are compromises. Post Jutland BBs designed by other nations bore little resemblance to their pre-Jutland designs, particularly in fire control, armor layout and armament. Bis shares many characteristics with pre WW1 designs, as identified above, even if the %age weight allocation was different. I don't think anyone used the phrase 'mere copy', obviously Bis was a reasonable design, but was not a very modern design, and did not make the best available use of displacement, even given the beam limitation. The reason I emphasise this is the ridiculous claims that are made about Bis, which are not borne out by detailed study. Your point about the 3 shaft layout is good, but, that was a decision that they made, again, another compromise, and as it turned out, rather an important one. Greglocock 23:37, 19 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Bismarck had a very high percentage of her weight tied up in armor precisely BECAUSE the armor design was so outdated. The more efficient, all-or-nothing designs that other nations adopted in their modern capital ship designs allowed them to have heavier armor over the areas that mattered, while still using less armor over all as a percentage of total weight.  It's worth noting in this context that HMS Hood, which also was not designed to modern, all-or-nothing standards, also had a relatively high percentage of its total weight tied up in armor compared to other RN capital ships, and its protection was, of course, notoriously inadequate.  I don't think anyone has suggested that Bismarck was purely a scaled up Bayern-class design, but, at the same time, you don't want to read too much into weight distribution percentages, as the differences between Bayern and Bismarck represent in large part, the effect of scaling up to achieve the desired speed performance.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.139.94.211 (talk) 06:24, 25 April 2009 (UTC)

Horizontal armor
Just as a reminder to myself the recently excised para "This basic layout of the horizontal protection was questionable in light of lessons learned in World War I, particularly at Jutland. This had emphasised that multiple thin layers of horizontal armour were less effective than a single thick layer. This vulnerability was was particularly important when the ship came under long-range plunging fire. " is easily referenced, when I have done my taxes I shall sit down with DK Brown and put them in. I am astonished that otherwise knowledgeable editors have not come across this facet of the design. Greglocock (talk) 00:11, 4 May 2009 (UTC)

Furthermore the Admiralty report is an analysis of the primary source, Bismarck's layout. Hence it is a secondary source WP:SECONDARY. In this instance a primary source would be if I post the plans and say, see for yourself. Greglocock (talk) 08:49, 4 June 2009 (UTC)

Here's some Preston quotes from Battleships 1856-1977

p101 Basically an enlarged version of the 1915 Baden, she displayed many old-fashioned features - particularly seperate high-angle and low-angle batteries and a lack of vertical sandwich protection against underwater damage. In fact her most important asset was her massive beam.

p103

The Bismarck was a rework of the Great War vintage Baden design, before the threat of heavy airborne attack had become a factor in BB design. To counter long range gunfire she had a low armoured deck with internal communications running above it and lighter (12.6 in) side armour (...compared with KGV...).

p105

Among the principle features which stamp the is design as elderly are the triple gun-battery, ..., and the relatively low level at which the the main armored deck was positioned. ...the USN and the RN had independently reached the conclusion that bombs were a bigger danger than long range gunfire and had sited the AD as high as possible. Nor was there any sandwich protection against torpedoes;instead the Bis relied on her massive 118ft beam to provide a deep space between the ship's side and the anti torpedo bulkhead. This gave great initial stability and resistance to underwater damage, but eventually resulted in an accelerated tendency to capsize,especially as the freeboard was quite low.

..sea speed of only 29 knots, only a fraction of a knot greater than (...SoDak or KGV...)

Greglocock (talk) 08:52, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

Vertical armor/TDS
Bill Jurens made some interesting observations on the engine room's armor here http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=216&st=0&sk=t&sd=a&start=15. I'll see if the actual scans of ship's drawings I've got confirm that detail. Greglocock (talk) 06:38, 3 June 2009 (UTC)

Is Scharnhorst a boat?
Sorry, I hadn't realised that this was such a bone of contention, my edits were purely in response to reading the reference which said BC, whereas the editor of the article had 'mistakenly' read it as BB, and reverted it without checking. If you want my personal opinion, BC was a pretty meaningless phrase by WW2, I am quite happy for Scharnhorst to be described as a BB, in general terms, BUT NOT WHEN THE REF FOR THAT SENTENCE SAYS THE OPPOSITE. Cos that is how references work. Greglocock (talk) 13:49, 3 June 2009 (UTC)


 * Ref you say? see Siegfried Breyer. I am fairly certain that in G+D's text the reference as BC is a simply mistake, (otherwise why would be S+G discussed in detail in their Axis BATTLESHIPS book?).
 * Besides, the Germans pretty clearly designated them as Schlachtschiff (though personally I agree with you that
 * a, BC by WW2 is a pretty meaningless term
 * b, I would too be more inclined to call them BCs, based on their similiarity in priorities - lots of armor, weak guns, high speed - to WW1 German BCs). But hell the Jerries called them BBs...! Kurfürst (talk) 13:55, 3 June 2009 (UTC)


 * Read for understanding. The reference for that sentence describes S as a BC. I am perfectly well aware that other refs call them BBs, otherwise there would be no sustainable controversy. Your other point is wrong, books about BBs are allowed to mention anything they want, if it makes sense. Is English your first language?Greglocock (talk) 23:47, 3 June 2009 (UTC)


 * Suddenly it is realized why the Scharnhorst class article is named "Scharnhorst class warship (1936)"...
 * By the way, G&D very purposefully call the ships battlecruisers throughout the entire book. Their reasoning, found on p. 130: "Even though the German Navy regarded the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as battleships, they were, in a sense, battlecruisers with heavy protection, high speed, and medium-caliber guns, a development of the Deutschland-class armored ships and a transitional type with a design constrained by technical limitations and political considerations." I don't have an opinion on either designation. — Ed   (Talk  •  Contribs)  23:53, 3 June 2009 (UTC)
 * Then the discussion is moot; the current Stalinist solution (no man, no problem, no designation, no problem) works for me. Kurfürst (talk) 10:23, 4 June 2009 (UTC)

Weird quote in Design section
The purported quote is reffed to two different books, and is not an accurate rendition of one of them. While we're at it unless someone can provide a quote from JB's book that justifies the silly claim made on his behalf, I am inclined to strike that sentence. Greglocock (talk) 10:38, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * I'm curious who added that quote. Loosmark (talk) 10:43, 18 June 2009 (UTC)

Couple of Peacock phrases
There's two sentences that really make virtues out of nothing - British BBs were designed in the expectation of access to ports, hence didn't need long endurance to the same extent as commerce raiders based in Kiel, and the number of shells fired /at/ the hulk prove nothing about the effectiveness of the armor scheme, the RN have only considered silencing a boat as the criterion of success. Greglocock (talk) 11:17, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * OR has no relevance to the article IMHO. Besides they run out of fuel while chasing Bismarck, so I guess British expectations about not needing long endurance were flawed. Kurfürst (talk) 11:29, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * You keep muddling what actually happened with what ships were designed to do. This article is a critique of design, not performance. the performance critique belongs in the ship article in my opinion. RN ships were designed to have a short range. Annoying but true. Greglocock (talk) 11:35, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * It seems to me that needing to pull over on the highway at every gas station just isn't as effective as a car that can drive from New York to Chicago with a fill up or two. But that's just my US$0.02. As to the second point, whether a ship is actually sunk by gunfire or if it's just damaged so severely that it's forced to scuttle doesn't matter; the same result occurs. On the other hand though, one shouldn't conflate the effectiveness of the design with the ship's specific fate; like I said somewhere else the other day, I doubt a KGV or SoDak could have stood up any better to the same level of pummeling that Bis endured at her last battle. Parsecboy (talk) 11:43, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * I agree that KGV or SoDak probably would have not stood up any better but the reality of the matter is that Bismarck performed really poorly in her last battle, she didn't manage to do any damage to the British ships whatsoever. Loosmark (talk) 11:49, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * That is largely irrelevant; you are doing exactly what I highlighted above: conflating the effectiveness of the design with its specific fate. The fire control directors were silenced early; how do you expect the ship to fire accurately without them? And that's not a fault of the design&mdash;you can't exactly slap 14" of side armor on the little directors on top of the ship. All BBs have this weakness. Parsecboy (talk) 11:52, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * Which fire control directors are you talking about? Surely not all them were destroyed at once. Nothing prevented the Bismarck from hitting the British ships damaging their fire directors. Loosmark (talk) 12:10, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * This is getting off topic, the last gun director was destroyed shortly after 9:00; Rodney opened fire at 8:47 and KGV followed less than a minute later. Bis was also listing badly and unable to steer; not exactly the best gunnery platform. Parsecboy (talk) 12:24, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * This is not correct. Her forward gun director was hit at 9:00, the aft gun director remained operation till 9:13 when it was hit by a 14'' shell. Btw if she was listing badly and unable to steer because of a single torpedo hit, well then there were obviously some flaws in her design. Loosmark (talk) 12:41, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * She was listing from the damage she sustained from PoW; the rapid maneuvering during the swordfish attack reopened the wounds and allowed more water into the ship. Parsecboy (talk) 12:44, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * So it seems was damaged rather badly by PoW. Loosmark (talk) 12:54, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * True, but range was a design compromise the RN deliberately made, and is one reason why the KGVs were more or less treaty compliant (a silly idea but there ya go) and Bis wasn't. I don't, particularly, object to the observation, I do object to the implication that this makes Bis some sort of wundership. The number of shells used in target practice is just silly. It is a meaningless number, hence peacock. How many 14 or 16 inch hits were used to silence her? DK Brown says 20 is a typical number, throughout the 20th century. Greglocock (talk) 11:58, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * Bis was 'treaty compliant', do your reading. The silly idea from the Brits was that they rushed the KGVs into the shipyard, the Germans and US waited a couple of months and could build - more or less - the ship they wanted, making good use of the escalation clause provided. Besides - IIRC the Treaty displacements were for displacement w/o fuel included, so the 'design compromise' about fuel sounds silly grounds. Everybody else managed to build longer ranged vessels, take a look at the Richeliues, fantastic ships IMHO (and cool looking, too). Kurfürst (talk) 12:06, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * I see no enthusiasm from the RN, Admiralty, or anyone much, to delay building KGV. In the context of the easy availability of ports for the RN, and the central location of RN anchorages wrt the NA, and the North Sea, designing KGV for a shorter range than Bis was sensible (Kiel to Scapa and back is the thick end of 1500 nm). As it turned out, neither classes range was really adequate for the eventual mission in the NA, by about the same margin. So it is peacockery, Bis had the extra range she had to have just to equal the operational range of KGV in the context of NA ports. As to the speed puffery, trial speed on smooth water is no guide to realistsic sustained speeds in the NA. Greglocock (talk) 12:42, 18 June 2009 (UTC)

<-- This is the problem I think we're having; there are those who think the ship was awesome, and those who think it was crap. We need to drop all that BS and just stick to the facts. The thing we need to remember is that we're an encyclopedia, not an editorial. For example: Bis had a turtle back armor design. Fact. The USN and RN thought that it was outmoded. Fact. The turtle back design was total crap. Editorializing. And that's the problem, because it sucks in edit wars. If we could leave it at the first two, we wouldn't be having the back and forth we've got going on right now. We can even say that certain authors think the design was crap. But we can't take one author's opinions as absolute fact, especially if there are others who disagree. Parsecboy (talk) 12:26, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * Who does think that this ship was crap? I most certainly don't and I don't think any other editor does. As for the turtle back design being a total crap, nobody said anything like that. What was included in the article was an opinion of an expert, who reached that conclusion after very professional and detailed anylsis, that the turtle back design compared unfavorably with a more traditional design. So I really don't understand what you mean by this "turle design was a total crap" thing. Loosmark (talk) 12:49, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * The thing is, there are useable refs that support both POVs. The difficulty is that the resulting article reads like a ping pong match, not an encyclopedia. You'll see in the archive for the Bis ship article where I suggested a brief, referenced, fairly neutral, section on the design, Predictably enough it was ignored and that section degenerated into the sort of ping pong article we see here. Greglocock (talk) 12:42, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * That's what I'm saying: we can't take one author's opinions as fact. They need to be properly attributed and treated as only their opinions. You, Saxcpert and I discussed this underlying issue a while ago, but nothing really came of it. Something I think would help this article a lot is if we reorganized it along the lines of this, where the plain facts are organized first. Then, a final paragraph in each section can list the pros and cons of each thing. There we can discuss the issues of range in the propulsion section, compare it to the proposed diesel engines, etc. Parsecboy (talk) 12:51, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * I haven't seen your sandbox idea, i will look at it now. Incidentally, my own, not entirely uninformed POV, is that Bis was a reasonable design, whose main virtues were largely due to her enormous size, rather than any particular wisdom in the design of the armor/TDS. But, given that design load, a competent designer could have done much better, even with the knowledge of the time. She was also a fairly poor choice as a commerce raider, but admittedly you can only play the cards you hold. We also struggle with the wargamer's attitude, that BBs were designed to fight each other, mano a mano, yet the reality is that they were designed as part of a system, ignoring the rest of that system is amateurish. And of course, amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics. Greglocock (talk) 13:07, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * If you want to add anything to the sandbox, go ahead. As you can see, it's far from complete. I was planning on leaving the pro/con arguments to you guys anyway. I generally agree with you on your assessment of the ship; people need to get over the misconceptions that any ship is particularly "awesome". People love the Iowas, but they had their faults as well. Parsecboy (talk) 13:13, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * This should be a quote in the 'Strawman arguement' article... I don't see a wargamer attitude here, unless you mean the zealotry to compare to 'US and UK' designs, and show how awfully poor the ship was, as is common on the wargamer discussion boards you appear from, instead of simply describing the facts and hopefully, provide an explanation (from respected authors of course) why large caliber secondary guns or incremental armoring for short range was choosen. You don't have to pass a judgement on it, just explain how stuff works. But I clearly see your fondness of bashing this ship, for whatever reason. Of course you and I can have different opinion about the ship, but neither should presented in wikipedia, but only what reliable sources say (if we wish this to make a good article, that is). You OTOH litter this article with your opinionated comments and place large boxes containing your opinion only again. I wish you would stop tearing the article apart this way. Kurfürst (talk) 20:43, 18 June 2009 (UTC)


 * The way i see it Greglocock was just trying to bring more objectivity to the article, not by passing judgements but by providing good sources. Loosmark (talk) 20:55, 18 June 2009 (UTC)

Armament
The Royal Navy 15 inch probably has better overall penetration when deck armour is taken into account and much superior destructiveness due to its larger bursting charge, and heavier shell. For those that want to reference the penetration tables, which based upon Nathan Okun's armour penetration studies, here it is again: And heg (talk) 03:00, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

Article fully protected
Since this article is the subject of an ongoing edit war involving multiple participants, I have fully protected this article. The issues need to be worked out here on the talk page. -MBK004 03:14, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

My gun is bigger than yours
First of all you need to find RS that compare the gun with another gun. Then you need to decide if it is a worthwhile comparison. Then you need to include that information in the article written in a neutral fashion. Personally I find any touting of superiority of Bis guns as being better than Hoods', which is at least relevant, rather daft. It would only be notable if the Germans had /failed/ to improve on them. I would have thought a more logical comparison would have been with the guns used in BBs built at around the same time, in the class article.Greglocock (talk) 04:27, 17 February 2010 (UTC)


 * Nathan Okun is a "widely acknowledged expert". In fact on penetration he is the premier authority. Nathan Okun's work was used to build the penetration tables], and it is presented on his resource page at  (see the very bottom of the page).  Richard Worth has published numerous works on Naval History . Lundgren has also written articles on naval history. I don't really mind removing the comparison comments, but if you want a reputable source with which to compare battleship gun penetration, Worth, Lundgren and Okun's penetration tables are the place to go. Each nation's gun's penetration is calculated against its own and other nation's armour, using the best data and armour penetration formulas available. And heg (talk) 05:00, 17 February 2010 (UTC)


 * The fact is, that type of information (i.e., armor penetration and bursting charges) should be placed in the associated gun articles (namely: 38 cm SK C/34 naval gun and BL 15 inch Mk I naval gun); that level of detail isn't warranted here. Parsecboy (talk) 12:21, 17 February 2010 (UTC)


 * I agree with Gregolock's latest edit, and with Persecboy's comment. Basically comparisons are only asking for trouble, and are usually roots of all POV pushing by fanboys and detractors. They best be avoided - if a reader wants to compare that, he can do it him/herself by comparing the data in the article. Far more interesting for the class article would be IMHO the history behind choosing the main armament for the B class. Its less known for example, that 38cm guns were only added later, initial design studies considered a 33cm gun on a smaller vessel. As usual the design continued to grow, ending where the practical limitations of drydocks and channels meant that 42k tons or 38cm were the max. permissable. Also of note would be the German practice of usign semi-fixed ammunition. Kurfürst (talk) 19:01, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

My battleship is bigger than allowed
So, if there is a clause allowing the Bismarck to be 42,000 instead of 35,000 tons, it should be possible to find it in the treaty mentioned, right? Only problem, it isn't. The "escalator clause" mentions main gun caliber, not tonnage. The Bismarck should have stayed under 35,000 tons. It was a violation of the international commitments undertaken by Germany.

It seems somebody is bent on waging an edit war on this point, based on a quotation from a book that apparently says the treaties said something they don't say.


 * Read the book. It states quite clearly on the first page The escalator clause of the 1836 London Naval Treaty permitted 406-mm guns and 45,000 ton displacement... If you continue to remove validly sourced information, you will be blocked for disruption. Parsecboy (talk) 10:11, 13 April 2010 (UTC)


 * The |text of the treaty doesn't mention a 45,000 ton limit. It does say if any of the parties to the 1922 treaty don't agree to 14 inch then the limit is 16 inch. Germany is not mentioned in the 1936 text at all, except in so far as being another "Power not a part to the present treaty" (Article 25). Under article 25 if any of these other parties build ships bigger than the treaty limits, then the Treaty signatories can start building ships that are not in compliance with the treaty limits - but they a) have to tell the other parties what they are doing, b) start negotiations with the treaty parties to minimize the departure from the limits. After three months from a) the other treaty parties can build outside the limits of the treaty.
 * Are there other books on the subject we could use to cross check? I've given Brown's book on British ships back to the library ubfortunately. GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:56, 13 April 2010 (UTC)


 * German Battleships 1939-1945 doesn't address the London Treaty, but it does discuss the Anglo-German Naval agreement on page 21, about which it says [In regards to the treaty], it was agreed, amongst other things, that Germany could build a surface fleet of up to 35 per cent of the size of Great Britain's. This meant a tonnage allowance on 184,000 tonnes available for battleship construction, equating to five ships of some 35,000 tonnes each. This was subsequently increased to 45,000 tonnes. Parsecboy (talk) 12:13, 13 April 2010 (UTC)


 * World War II in Europe has this to say: In 1938, a new protocol allowed the naval powers to build battleships up to a standard displacement of 45,000 tons. Although Germany probably had intended from the start not to respect the 35,000 ton limit, that decision legalized the Bismarck, which displaced more than 40,000 tons. (emphasis mine) Parsecboy (talk) 12:25, 13 April 2010 (UTC)


 * I found that reference to 45,000 tons as "a standard displacement limitation of 45.000 t was agreed upon and signed by the United States, Great Britain , and France as a protocol to the Second London Naval Treaty on 30. June, 1938" (which is 2 years since the start of building the Bismarck). GraemeLeggett (talk) 12:33, 13 April 2010 (UTC)
 * PS I don't know if its me, but your links to google books come up as unavailable for viewing or limit reached. GraemeLeggett (talk) 12:36, 13 April 2010 (UTC)
 * Hmm, shows up fine for me. There's a way to get around that, but I can't remember what it is right now. Parsecboy (talk) 12:40, 13 April 2010 (UTC)
 * There used to be a website icanhide.com that would let you get around the page limit, but it seems its no longer active... Parsecboy (talk) 12:57, 13 April 2010 (UTC)
 * icanhide and its brilliant companion site which had every episode of Futurama online are no longer around. I now use http://proxify.co.uk/ or http://www.zend2.com/  Neither are perfect, but one has to make do. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 16:11, 13 April 2010 (UTC)

Article rewrite
Hey all, I'm rewriting this article in a sandbox here, feel free to add content. Though please add material only with reliable sources - I'm working on a 62-article FT, and this will eventually need to go to FAC, so we might as well do it right the first time. Once I get the draft finished I'll transfer it to article space, providing there are no objections from anyone. Parsecboy (talk) 17:17, 26 September 2010 (UTC)


 * There have been no objections (or even comments) in the past two and a half weeks, so I've gone ahead and moved the new version of the article here. Parsecboy (talk) 15:33, 14 October 2010 (UTC)

Ship numbers?
One point that came up with a quick read of the article - when was the decision made to build two, and why? The early design section implies that two were intended right from the start, but it doesn't say why this was selected - was it simply that there were only two suitably large shipyards? Likewise, there's a brief mention of a request in 1937 to build a third ship, but no mention of why it wasn't taken up. Shimgray | talk | 17:43, 14 October 2010 (UTC)

May 1944 attacks on Tirpitz
While Breyer may say it was (Brewster) Buccaneer aircraft that were going to be used for "Brawn", there is obviously an element of doubt in other editors minds. Perhaps we could scout out some alternative sources and see what they have to say.GraemeLeggett (talk) 13:20, 11 December 2010 (UTC)
 * 1) The same carriers are using Barracudas a few weeks earlier and a number of weeks later.
 * 2) there was no rotation of squadrons in the period 827 and 829 and 831 on Furious and Victorious
 * 3) the Buccaneer was not a carrier aircraft.
 * 4) The Buccaneer (Bermuda) were not used in significant numbers by the RN. Best I can find so far is that five were evaluated by/for the FAA.


 * None of these four books are viewable, but three of them appear to agree on Barracudas (the fourth just says "bombers"). Based on the fact that the FAA only ever tested 5 Barracudas, it looks like Breyer is mistaken. That being said, I'd prefer to fix it once we can find a RS to replace him (i.e., a book with the page number) rather than fix it and appear to attribute the information to Breyer. Parsecboy (talk) 13:42, 11 December 2010 (UTC)
 * I suppose in the meantime we could just remove the type of aircraft and refer to them simply as bombers. Parsecboy (talk) 13:52, 11 December 2010 (UTC)
 * In the case of Brawn, I would go for something along the lines of "another carrier-launched attack was ... but cancelled due to ..."GraemeLeggett (talk) 16:49, 11 December 2010 (UTC)
 * I inserted a slightly modified version here - how does that look? When I eventually get around to doing the Tirpitz article I'll get ahold of sources that can verify the number and type of the aircraft (for instance, I should be able to get and  quite easily through ILL). Parsecboy (talk) 17:09, 11 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Looks good. GraemeLeggett (talk) 17:22, 11 December 2010 (UTC)